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by F. A. K. Yasamee

(Balkans: A Mirror of the New World Order, Istanbul: EREN, 1995; pp. 121-132)

More than seventy years ago the British scholar R. W. Seton-Watson published a
work entitled The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans(1). Since then, nationality
and its associated problems have remained at the heart of the politics, both
domestic and foreign, of the peoples and states of the Balkan peninsula.
Nationality has proved a persistent force, but not an immutable one. The
perceptions, aspirations and expectations which define such notions as "Greek",
"Bulgarian" or "Serb" have changed over time. They have been revised from
above, by a succession of political regimes: monarchical, parliamentary, military,
communist and post-communist. They have been more subtly affected by social
and cultural changes, including the advent of mass literacy and mass
communications. Above all, they have been altered by the great political
upheavals which the Balkan peninsula has undergone in the course of the
twentieth century: the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, the First and Second World
Wars, and the post-1989 collapse of communism.
A striking instance of the mutability of nationality is furnished by that group of
South Slavs who today call themselves Macedonians. Not only does their
nationality continue to be disputed by several of their neighbours, but they
themselves have accomplished the feat, unique in the modern Balkans, of
assuming one national identity, and then discarding it in favour of another. The
Macedonians are an extreme case, but it will be suggested here that the forces
which have governed the peculiar evolution of their sense of nationality are not,
at bottom, different from those which have shaped the nationalities of other
Balkan peoples. Before proceeding to a detailed examination of the Macedonian
case, therefore, it is appropriate to make certain general observations on the
subject of nationality in the modern Balkans.

The first general observation to be made is that the Balkan peninsula is peopled
by small nations. Serbs, Albanians, Greeks, Bulgarians, Macedonians, Romanians,
and Croats are numerically few in comparison to the Russians and Ukrainians
who inhabit the territories to their north, with the Germans and Italians who
dwell to their west, and with the Turks who live to their east.(2) The small size of
each of the Balkan peoples has rendered them both individually and collectively
vulnerable to domination by extra-Balkan powers. Reference may be made not
only to the four or five centuries of Ottoman rule, but also to the experience of
German and Italian occupation during the Second World War, and to what, for
certain Balkan peoples, was arguably a form of Russian domination between
1944 and 1989. Within the modern era, too, the Balkan peoples have also felt
themselves to be vulnerable to domination by each other. For many non-Serbs,
including many Macedonians, both the first and second Yugoslavias were thinly-
disguised vehicles for Serbian domination. It should, however, be added that the
problem is not exclusively Serb: at different times in the modern era, the Greeks
and the Bulgarians have also been seen as potential dominators of their Balkan
This chronic sense of vulnerability, both to immediate neighbours and to extra-
Balkan powers, has had important repercussions on the foreign policies of Balkan
states. On the one hand, Balkan states and peoples have, at various times,
sought to free themselves from domination by extra-Balkan great powers, and to
assert their independence or "non-alignment". On the other hand, at other times,
Balkan states and peoples have sought actively to involve extra-Balkan powers in
their affairs, seeing in them strong patrons who might protect and advance their
interests against those of their neighbours.

There is, however, more to the smallness of the nations of the Balkan peninsula
than the objective facts of population size, and the implications of those facts for
international power politics. Equally important are certain cultural and attitudinal
characteristics of the small nations of the Balkan peninsula. The first of these
characteristics, particularly marked in the case of the Macedonian Slavs, is a
sense of vulnerability to cultural assimilation. This sense of vulnerability is
grounded in historical experience: cultural and linguistic assimilation has played
a large part in the "nation-building process" in the nineteenth and twentieth
century Balkans. It is well established that the modern Greek nation was built up
in significant part through the assimilation, or "Hellenisation", of originally non-
Greek speaking elements, including Albanians, Vlachs, Slavs, and even Turkish-
speakers of the Orthodox Christian faith. From the early nineteenth century
onwards, the Greeks were pioneers in the use of schooling and educational
propaganda as a device for assimilating non-Greeks, including not a few
Macedonian Slavs.(3) In similar fashion, it has been suggested by competent
scholars that at the time of the founding of the Bulgarian state in 1878, less than
50% of the new state's population may have been Bulgarian. Within a few
decades this percentage rose to form an unchallengeable majority, partly, at
least, through the assimilation of non-Bulgarian elements in the population.(4)

These assimilatory processes were facilitated by certain objective features of

Ottoman and early post-Ottoman Balkan society. The population, whether
Moslem or Orthodox Christian, was massively illiterate, living for the most part in
scattered rural communities, and speaking dialects rather than "languages".
Until the early nineteenth century, there were to most intents and purposes only
two written languages in the region: Turkish, the language of literate Moslems;
and Greek, the language of literate Orthodox Christians. Even in the
"prenational" era, education, and its concomitant, social advancement, implied a
degree of cultural and linguistic assimilation, at least for those whose mother-
tongue was neither Turkish nor Greek. Finally, though statistics of any kind are
lacking, there are grounds for suspecting a significant incidence of bi-or even tri-
lingualism in the late Ottoman Balkans, particularly in urban centres in
lingustically-mixed regions, of which Macedonia was a prime example.

It should be emphasized that the type of assimilation under discussion was

voluntary: nobody was beaten up. Rather, once a particular linguistic and
"ethnic" group achieved a position of social and political dominance, so members
of other groups proved willing to assimilate to its language and culture. Of
course, there have been certain clear barriers to assimilation. Religion remains
one of the most important, as evidenced by the Slav-speaking but Moslem
Pomaks and Torbesh, and by all three religious-national communities in Bosnia-
Hercegovina. Nor is it at all easy to assimilate a population once it has been
raised lo the level of independent national consciousness through literacy,
education, and the acquisition of its own social and cultural leaders; the
Macedonians in the first Yugoslavia are a case in point. But the continued
existence of non-coercive assimilatory pressures should not be overlooked. As
recently as the 1970s, for example, it was possible to hear intellectuals in Skopje
speculate that the long-term fate of the Macedonians of Yugoslavia would be
Serbianisation. It was not that such pessimists believed in "dark plots" hatched in
Belgrade, but that they feared that the pressure of the general Yugoslav popular
culture, which was largely Serbo-Croatian speaking, would ultimately erode the
cultural and linguistic particularity of the Macedonians.

One further aspect of the "small nation syndrome" may be termed "cultural
provincialism", by which is meant simply the observable fact that the various
national cultures of the modern Balkans, with their distinctive institutions, habits
and ways of life, are not regarded by their participants as being for export. This is
in marked contrast to the modern cultures of Western Europe, Russia and
America, and also in contrast to the dominant pre-national cultures of the
Balkans, the Ottoman Moslem and the Byzantine Orthodox, both of which were
regarded by their adherents as being, in principle, exportable to those who would
accept them. Throughout the modern era, the nations of the Balkans have been
major cultural importers, from Western and Central Europe, and also from Russia
in its Tsarist and Soviet forms. In culture, as in politics, the modern Balkan states'
insistence upon "national" independence and particularity has gone hand in hand
with a marked reliance upon external patrons and partners.

A second general observation concerns "national identity." In the modern

Balkans, as elsewhere, group identity has proved to be more complex than
appears from standard nationalist accounts of the subject. One plausible view of
the development of national identity in the Balkans since the early nineteenth
century would point to the progressive dissolution of larger religious identities
(Orthodox, Moslem) into smaller linguistic "national" units (Greek, Serb,
Bulgarian, Romanian and Macedonian in the case of the Orthodox; Bosnian,
Albanian, and Turkish in the case of the Moslems). An equally plausible view,
placing its emphasis upon the processes of assimilation alluded to above, would
point to the progressive absorption of smaller, local identities into the larger
linguistic nation. What is misleading about such views, however, is that they
imply that an older set of identities has been entirely displaced by identities
which are essentially new, or at least, "revived". For one thing, most, if not all, of
the modern national identities were at least prefigured in the "pre-national" era:
terms like "Albanian", "Serb" and "Bulgarian" were used, and in senses which
were not fundamentally different from those in which they are used today.
"Macedonian" is perhaps the most important exception. For another, "pre-
national" identities have persisted: the old Moslem and Orthodox religious
solidarities have not lost all appeal, and nor have some of the local,
"particularist" identities, one notable example being "Montenegrin." Finally, it is
worth noting that the modern, "national" era lias also brought with it new
identities which transcend the boundaries of the nation-state as conventionally
understood, among them being "Slav", "Yugoslav" and "European". In sum, in the
modern Balkans, as elsewhere, group identities are comprised of an amalgam of
allegiances, and the emergence of national identities in their modern form is best
understood not as a process of displacement, creation or rebirth, but as a
process of reconstruction and reinterpretation, in which old and new allegiances
combined and were partially redefined. This process was not of necessity
definitive: there remained the possibility of further change, particularly under the
pressure of compelling events.

This leads to the third general observation, which concerns history, and how
history is perceived. The teaching of history has played a positive role in the
development of modern national consciousness in the Balkans. History, in those
countries, is a highly politicised subject of study. It is not simply that history i.s
used to foster a sense of past achievement, and to legitimise the present: it also
arouses expectations for the future, and not only territorial expectations. Balkan
history-writing, whether of the nationalist or Marxist schools (the two are not
mutually exclusive), treats modern Balkan history as rational: as the unfolding of
logical processes of clear tendency and direction. For the nationalist school, Ihe
focus is on the "re-birth", affirmation, consolidation and self-assertion of the
"nation". For the Marxist school, the focus is on the unfolding of the iron laws of
social development, and the successive transitions from feudalism to capitalism,
and from capitalism to socialism. "History has a trend."(5)

There is an alternative view of modern Balkan history: namely, that far from
having a clear trend, it has been catastrophic. In the present context, the use of
the term "catastrophic" implies no value judgements, bul simply suggests that
the course of nineteenth and twentieth century Balkan history has been marked
by a series of trend-breaking events, most, though not all, the product of
external forces, which have diverted history from its anticipated courses, nullified
expectations, and in the process, undermined and redefined identities, including
national identities. This point is crucial to an understanding of the evolution of
the national identity of the Slavs of Macedonia.

The national revival of the Slavs of Macedonia began in the late Ottoman Empire,
in the middle decades of the nineteenth century. This national revival was
roughly contemporaneous with those of the other Orthodox Christian peoples of
the Balkan peninsula, and was produced by more or less the same causes: a
growing sense that the Ottoman Empire was doomed, and that the emancipation
of its subject peoples was a realistic prospect; an increasing commercial
prosperity, which strengthened the urban, "middle-class", social leadership of the
Orthodox peoples; an expanding demand tor education, and in particular, for
popular education in the vernacular languages of the Orthodox; and an
increasing exposure to cultural and intellectual influences from Western and
Central Europe, and also from Russia.(6) The national content of the Macedonian
Slav revival was clearly and unequivocally Bulgarian. This should occasion no
surprise. The identification "Bulgarian" was already current among the
Macedonian Slavs; their dialects closely resembled those of their eastern Slav
neighbours, who then, as now, were also known as Bulgarians; and the emerging
modern Bulgarian literary language was readily comprehensible in Macedonia.
Indeed, nineteenth century Macedonia served as one of the principal centres of
the Bulgarian national revival: its Slav inhabitants, led by their new nationally-
minded intelligentsia, participated fully in the Bulgarian literary and linguistic
revivals, in the movement lor schooling in Bulgarian, and also in the first major
political expression of the Bulgarian national movement, namely, the successful
campaign tor a national Orthodox church, established in 1870 as the Bulgarian

The Bulgarian revival in Macedonia was not unopposed. For one thing, the
population of the region was ethnically and religiously mixed: Orthodox Slavs
were the largest ethnic group, but they did not constitute an absolute majority of
the population, which also included large numbers of Moslem Turks, Albanians,
Pomaks and Torbes, Orthodox Greeks, Vlachs and Serbs, and a significant Jewish
community. The Greeks and Serbs, too, had national ambitions in the region, and
believed that these could be furthered by a policy of cultural and linguistic
assimilation of the Macedonian Slavs, to be achieved through educational and
church propaganda. Nonetheless, by the 1870s the Bulgarians were clearly the
dominant national party in Macedonia; it was widely anticipated that the
Macedonian Slavs would continue to evolve as an integral part of the modern
Bulgarian nation, and that, in the event of the Ottoman Empire's demise,
Macedonia would be included in a Bulgarian successor-state. That these
anticipations proved false was due not to any intrinsic peculiarities of the
Macedonian Slavs, setting them apart from the Bulgarians, but to a series of
catastrophic events, which, over a period of seventy years, diverted the course
of Macedonian history away from its presumed trend.

The first of these catastrophic events was the Russo-Ottoman war of 1877. This
led to the establishment, in 1878, of a de facto independent Bulgarian state in
Moesia and parts of Thrace; Macedonia, however, remained under direct
Ottoman rule. This political separation weakened the Bulgarian cause in
Macedonia in a number of ways. In the first place, the Bulgarians lost the
confidence of the Ottoman authorities, who took steps to constrain Bulgarian
national activity in Macedonia. In the second, the Serbs and the Greeks seized
the opportunity to intensify their own assimilatory national propagandas in the
region. Finally, a significant proportion of the Slav intelligentsia of Macedonia, the
leaders of the Bulgarian revival, emigrated to the new Bulgarian state in search
of jobs and careers. However, the fact that the political separation of Macedonia
from Bulgaria in 1878 has proved permanent should not lead us to exaggerate its
significance at the time; lo contemporaries, the setback to the Bulgarian cause
seemed temporary. By the 1890s Ottoman hostility was abating, and the
authorities were tolerating a renewal of Bulgarian ecclesiastical and educational
activities in Macedonia; Greek and Serb propaganda made but little headway
among the Slavs; and a new generation of Bulgarian intelligentsia was emerging
in Macedonia.(8)

It was, however, members of this new generation who were responsible lor
provoking the second catastrophe to face the Slavs of Macedonia. They did so by
launching an attempt to overthrow Ottoman rule in Macedonia by force, the
vehicle for this attempt being a body conventionally known as the Internal
Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO). Formally, IMRO did not seek
Macedonia's annexation to Bulgaria, but only Macedonia's autonomy - a point
which has encouraged misleading suggestions that IMRO viewed the Slavs of
Macedonia as an independent "Macedonian" nation, ethnically separate from the
Bulgarians. In reality, IMRO never questioned the Bulgarian national identity of
the Macedonian Slavs; its apparent preference for autonomy over annexation
was essentially a matter of political tactics, and at most, implied a recognition
that the presence ol numerous non-Bulgarians in Macedonia might render
outright annexation to Bulgaria impractical. From the late 1890s onwards, IMRO
embarked upon a campaign of revolutionary agitation and terrorism in
Macedonia, culminating, in 1903, in an unsuccessful attempt at a mass uprising.
The consequences lor the Slav population of Macedonia were grave. Faced with
repression on the part of the Ottoman authorities, and also with armed attacks,
tolerated by the Ottoman authorities, by local Greeks and Serbs, many fled to
Bulgaria, or renounced their Bulgarian identity and declared themselves to be
Greeks or Serbs. Others look advantage of new opportunities for emigration to
the United Stales of America. For the first time, or so it appeared, the Bulgarian
national movement in Macedonia might he in danger of losing its principal asset:
namely, the Bulgarians' status as (the largest ethnic group in Macedonia. As to
IMRO, in the face of failure it rapidly lost its organisational coherence, and broke
up into mutually hostile factions. The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 afforded
some respite, offering the Slavs of Macedonia some opportunities for legal
political activity and representation in the Ottoman parliament; but they were by
now too weakened to derive much advantage from these concessions.(9)

Neither the first nor the second of these catastrophes had significantly affected
the Macedonian Slavs' sense of their national identity, which remained
predominantly Bulgarian. Not so the third catastrophe: the Balkan Wars of 1912-
1913. These put an end to Ottoman rule, but left the bulk of Macedonia, and its
Slav population, partitioned between Serbia and Greece. Only a small portion of
the territory and population went to Bulgaria. This territorial verdict was
confirmed at the end of the First World War, exposing the national identity of a
majority of the Macedonian Slavs to sustained assaults. Within Greece, and also
within the new kingdom of Yugoslavia, which Serbia had joined in 1918, the
ejection of the Bulgarian church, the closure of Bulgarian schools, and the
banning of publication in Bulgarian, together with the expulsion or flight to
Bulgaria of a large proportion of the Macedonian Slav intelligentsia, served as the
prelude to campaigns of forcible cultural and linguistic assimilation. Within
Greece, the Macedonian Slavs were designated "Slavophone Greeks", while
within Yugoslavia, they were officially treated as "South Serbs". In both countries,
schools and the media were used to disseminate the national ideologies and
identities, and also the languages, of the new ruling nations, the Greeks and the
Serbs. These cultural measures were reinforced by steps to alter the composition
of the population: Serb colonists were implanted in Yugoslav Macedonia, while in
Greek Macedonia, the mass settlement of Greek refugees from Anatolia
definitively reduced the Slav population to minority status. In both countries,
these policies of de-bulgarisation and assimilation were pursued, with fluctuating
degrees of vigour, right through to 1941, when the Second World War engulfed
the Balkan peninsula. The degree of these policies' success, however, remains
open to question. The available evidence suggests that Bulgarian national
sentiment among the Macedonian Slavs of Yugoslavia and Greece remained
strong throughout the inter-war period, though they lacked the means to offer
more than passive resistance to official policies.(10)

It was the fourth catastrophe, the Second World War, which was to have decisive
consequences for the Macedonian Slavs' sense of national identity. The German
invasions of Yugoslavia and Greece in 1941, and the Soviet invasion of Bulgaria
in 1944, destroyed the established political regimes in each of these countries,
paving the way for successful communist seizures of power in Yugoslavia and
Bulgaria (and also in Albania), and for a protracted civil war in Greece, which
ended, however, in the defeat of the communist-led side. Prior to the Second
World War, the various Balkan communist parties had enjoyed limited popular
support and influence, and their views on the Macedonian issue had been of little
practical importance. During the 1920s, the Comintern had advocated a "united
and independent Macedonia." This line was enthusiastically supported by the
Bulgarian communist party, which continued to stress the Bulgarian national
identity of the Macedonian Slavs, but it was regarded with embarrasment by the
Yugoslav and Greek communist parties, who were fearful of offending nationalist
sentiment within their own countries. Between 1933 and 1935, however, the
Comintern shifted its line, and gave its support to an original thesis, developed
by the Yugoslav party, which held that the Macedonian Slavs were neither Serbs
nor Bulgarians, but constituted a separate Macedonian nation. Whatever the
reasons for the Comintern's change ofattitude,which appear to have derived
from its concurrent pursuit of a "united front" of progressive forces against
fascism, the new thesis on Macedonian nationality was scarcely welcomed to the
Bulgarian party, and nor docs it appear to have aroused much of an echo within
Macedonia, even among communists.(11)

Nonetheless, having emerged, during the course of the Second World War, as the
most powerful communist party in the Balkans, the Yugoslav party was able to
impose its notion of a separate Macedonian nation on the Bulgarian and Greek
communist parties, evidently with Moscow's blessing, and to draw up ambitious
plans for the unification of the whole of Macedonia, including those parts held by
Greece and Bulgaria, within an expanded Yugoslavia or a Yugoslav-led Balkan
federation. The Tito-Stalin split in 1948, and the defeat of the communists in the
Greek civil war a year later, prevented the realisation of these territorial
ambitions, and also led the Bulgarian communist party to distance itself from its
earlier endorsement of the Yugoslav notion of a separate Macedonian notion.12
Within Tito's Yugoslavia, however, the notion of a separate Macedonian nation
and national identity continued to be emphasized. The Macedonians were given
their own republic within a federal Yugoslavia, and great efforts were made to
promote an independent Macedonian culture. Crucial to these efforts was the
creation of a new Macedonian literary language, taught in all schools and
propagated through the mass media/The new national language could scarcely
fail to bear a close resemblance to Bulgarian, but its separateness was
emphasized by a new orthography, by the cultivation of local dialect forms, and
by the importation of Serbian vocabulary. The language was followed by a
national literature, an officially-approved national history, and eventually - in a
communist state - a national Macedonian Orthodox church. By implication, at
least, such a programme amounted to a new form of de-Bulgarisation. As
officially promoted, the new Macedonian nationalism contained clear anti-
Bulgarian elements: historic links with Bulgaria were denied or played down,
while those with the other nations of Yugoslavia, including the Serbs, were played

There can be no doubt that the Yugoslav communists' promotion of a separate

Macedonian national identity has been a considerable success. The recent
disintegration of the communist regime, and the Macedonian republic's
secession from Yugoslavia, have been accompanied by no domestic questioning
of the Macedonian national identity, and by no significant resurgence of
Bulgarian national sentiment among Macedonians. The success of this
communist exercise in 'nation-building' is difficult to explain with precision, given
the inaccessibility of much of the historical evidence. However, the following
general points may be made. First, the promotion of a separate national identity
began in the 1940s, a full generation after the likeliest source of opposition to it,
the Bulgarian-minded intelligentsia, had been in good part driven out of
Macedonia; not surprisingly, active rejection of the new identity appears to have
been rare. Second, the decision to create a Macedonian literary language for
everyday use was genuinely popular, as was the initial talk of establishing a
united Macedonia. Third, the period of communist rule after the Second World
War brought about major social changes, including mass literacy and
unprecedented urbanisation, which greatly facilitated the dissemination of the
new Macedonian identity. So did an unprecedented expansion of the mass
media. Fourthly, an examination of the age-structure of the population of
Yugoslav Macedonia shows that a large majority were born after 1944, and have,
in consequence, been exposed exclusively to the Macedonian national idea.(14)

It remains to consider the fifth and most recent catastrophe to face the Slavs of
Macedonia: namely, the collapse of communism, and of the second, communist
Yugoslavia. This has led, for the first time in modern history, to the creation of an
independent Macedonian state: the republic of Macedonia officially seceded from
Yugoslavia in December 1991. As noted earlier, secession from Yugoslavia has
led to no questioning of the Macedonian national identity, which continues to be
expressed and defended, within the new Macedonian state, in the same
historical, linguistic, and cultural terms as were formerly employed in communist
Yugoslavia. If anything, this sense of national identity has been reinforced by the
recent behaviour of some of Macedonia's neighbours. Greece has refused to
recognise the new state, insisting that the name 'Macedonia' is the sole property
of the Hellenic nation, and that its appropriation by 'Skopje' threatens Greece's
own territorial integrity. Post-communist Bulgaria, for its part, has recognised the
Macedonian state, but pointedly added that it does not recognise the
Macedonian nationality. Within the Serb-dominated remnant of Yugoslavia, too,
ultra-nationalists have revived the pre-Second World War claim that Macedonia is
in reality 'South Serbia'.(15)

Yet if, in the short run, Macedonian nationality has been strengthened, it would
be dangerous to make predictions as to the longer term. For one thing, the
political situation in the Balkan peninsula remains highly volatile, and the
survival of the independent Macedonian state is not finally assured. As the
foregoing account has suggested, political upheavals have played a decisive part
in shaping the Macedonian Slavs' sense of nationality: fresh upheavals may
engender Further reshaping. For another, the Macedonian nation remains small
and relatively new; and as such, potentially vulnerable to cultural assimilation. In
this respect, there is an intriguing question-mark over the Macedonians' future
relationship with the Bulgarians. On the one hand, there is room for conflicts
which would strengthen the Macedonians' sense of separateness. For some, if
not all, Bulgarians, the Macedonians remain 'unredeemed' Bulgarian brothers,
whose Macedonian 'nationality' is a fraud perpetrated by the Yugoslav
communists. To further complicate matters, there have recently been signs that
the idea of Macedonian nationality may have taken root in Bulgaria itself, among
some inhabitants of that portion of Macedonia which has been Bulgarian since
the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, and also among some descendants of the
Macedonian emigre community in Bulgaria. Yet on the other hand, the possibility
of rapprochement should not be overlooked. Freed from the ideological control
exercised by the Yugoslav communists, the Macedonians may, over time, come
to take a more positive view of their historic links with the Bulgarians, and may
also, over time, prove, susceptible to the influence of the more deeply-rooted
and developed Bulgarian national culture. Anything resembling a comprehensive
re-Bulgarisation of the Macedonians seems out of the question: the two peoples
have lived apart for too long. But it is not inconceivable that there might develop
a revived sense of kinship and solidarity, which might in turn have important
consequences for international ralations in Balkan peninsula. All this, however, is


1. R. W. Scton-Walsbn; The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans (London, 1917).

2. Balkan nationality statistics are notoriously unreliable, but the following figures
may be taken as approximations: (here are 20 million Romanians, 10 million
Greeks, 8 million Serbs, 7 million Bulgarians, 4.5 million Albanians, 1 million
Macedonians and 0.5 million Montenegrins. For more detailed information on
ethnic minorities in particular, see Hugh Poullon, The Balkans: Minorities and
States in Conflict (London, 1991).

3. Roger Just, Triumph of the Ethnos', in Elizabeth Tonkin, Maryon McDonald and
Malcolm Chapman (eds.). History and Ethnicity (London and New York, 1989); P.
Mackridge, The Greek Intelligentsia, 1780-1830', in R. Clogg (ed.), Balkan Society
in ihr Afc of Grrek Independence (Totowa, N. J., 1981).

4. Stefan Troebst, 'Nationale Minderheiten'. in Klaus - Detlev Grothusen (cd.).

Sudosteurope-Handbuch. Band VI: Bulgarien (Gottingen. 1990).

5. William Empson, 'Just a Smack at Auden'. Collected Poems, (London, 1955).

6. Barbara and Charles Jelavich, The Establishment of the Balkan National States.
1804-1920 (Seattle, 1977).

7. Nikolai Genehev, The Bulgarian National Revival Period (Sofia, 1977), passim.;
Marin V. Pundeff, 'Bulgarian Nationalism', in Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer
(eds.), Nationalism in Eastern Europe (Seattle, 1969).

8. Fikret Adanir, Die Makedonischc Frage, Ihre Enstehung und Entwicklung bis
1908 (Wiesbaden, 1979).

9. Ibid.; cf., Fikret Adanir, 'The Macedonians in ihe Ottoman Empire, 1878-1912',
in Andreas Kappeler, Fikret Adanir and Alan O'Day (cds.), Comparative Studies on
Governments and Nondominant Ethnic Croups in Europe, 1850-1940, Vol VI.
(Dartmouth, n.d.).

10. Nationality problems in Yugoslavia and Greece after the First World War are
surveyed in lvo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia, Origins, History,
Politics, (Ithaca and London, 1984), and in George Th. Mavrogordatos, Stillborn
Republic: social coalitions and party strategies in Greece, 1922-1936 (Berkeley,
1983). Cf., Dimitar G. Gotsev, Miadezhkite natsionalnoosvoboditelni organizatsii
na Makedonskite Balgari 1919-1941 (Sofia, 1988); Ivan Katardziev, Vreme na
Zreenje. Makedonskoto nacionalno prasanje megu dvete svetski vojni (1919-
l930), 2 vols. (Skopje, 1977); J. Swirc. Bulgarian Conspiracy. (London, 1939).

11. Stephen E. Palmer, Jr., and Robert R. King, Yugoslav Communism and the
Macedonian Question (Hamden, Conn., 1971). pp. 19-57; Evangelos Kofos,
Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia (Ttessaloniki, 1964), pp. 57-94; Kosta
Tsarnushanov, Makedonizmat i saprotivata na Makedoniya sreshtu nego (Sofia,
1992), pp. 169-175.

12. Evangelos Kofos, op.cit., pp. 113-195; Palmer and King, op.cit., pp. 61-130;
cf., Magarditsch A. Halschikian. Tradition und Neuorientierung in der bulgarischen
Aussenpolitik. 1944-1948. Die "nationale Aussenpolitik" der Bulgarischen
Arbeiterpartei (Kommunisten) (Munchen, 1988).

13. Palmer and King, op.cit., pp. 153-174; Stefan Troebst, Die hulgarisch-
jugoslawische Kontroverse um Macedonian 1967-1982 (Miinchen, 1983), passim.

14. Stefan Troebst, 'Makedonische Antworten auf die "Makedonische Frage",

1944-1992: Nationalismus, Republiksgrundung, 'nation-building', Sudosteuropa
(Vol. 41, 1992).

15. James Pettifer, 'The new Macedonian question'. International Affairs (Vol. 68.
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