Cracking the BDM A very recent lesson of history

Reaching the end of the current legislature, 2005-2009, it is appropriate to make a retrospective over the political developments in this period, considering some trends, scenarios, groupings and procedures from the perspective of an electoral cycle. This exercise is not gratuitous, and clearly pursues to make a diagnosis of political situations and stakeholders so as to be able to anticipate with better certainty what may follow in the perspective of the up-coming electoral competition for the parliamentary elections. We shall particularly focus in this article on the tepid grouping on the eve of that poll, which was attributed the role of a „united opposition”, of democratic alternative to the communist governance, the Bloc „Democratic Moldova” headed by then the general mayor of Chişinău Serafim Urechean. Let us remind that nearly to the electoral campaign in 2005 the Russian political technologists have put themselves out to put together all their political tools from Chişinău in this mega-project with powerful connections in Moscow. It is true that besides the Russians’ effort to put together this electoral structure of single use some other Western institutions also have put themselves out to bring together under the Urechean’s name a range of separated and bizarre groupuscules on the Moldovan political spectrum. However, by the mid of electoral campaign, being warned that they are making, willingly or unconsciously, the Russians’ game, these Western activists backed out and gave out any support favouring the group concerned. Thus, this mammoth-construction, eclectic and shaky from the very beginning, may be also called Russian matryoshka, in which belly a range of smaller matryoshkas were comprised, which immediately after the elections gushed out one after another from the shell where they sheltered. And since Serafim Urechean was given the role of electoral locomotive, all the dubious and exotic characters of local political fauna were lifted up in the wagons. Let us take them successively.
1. Dumitru Diacov with his party that’s called democratic, originating from the

Komsomol nomenclature and from circles that are closed to special services from Soviet time, then in 1994 he got on the top of the Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova (DAPM). A DAPM wing was broken by the then president of the republic Petru Lucinschi in 1998 and recycled into the Bloc for a Democratic and Prosperous Moldova with „Swallow” as electoral symbol. Precisely Lucinschi has installed Diacov in front of the new political formation. 2. Dumitru Braghiş with his social-democrats originating from the former Komsomol headed by him until 1991. In December 1999 he is installed by Petru Lucinschi in the position of prim-minister. In 2001 the „Braghiş” Government participates in parliamentary elections as „Braghiş” Alliance
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3.

4.

5.

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and gets into the parliament in this formula due to administrative resources used by him as the prime minister in office. Vladimir Filat, originating from obscure circles that were active on the territory of Romania, brought in 1998 in Chişinău and installed in the position of head of Privatisation Department, then, in 1999, state minister and head of the Chancellery of „Sturza” Government. Installed in the governments of the time under protection of Lucinschi and Diacov, he also belonged to the Bloc for a Democratic and Prosperous Moldova, with „Swallow” as symbol. Vitalia Pavlicenco, a person who succeeded to be member of the Communist Party during the soviet time, after which she was member of many phantomparties. The most long standing political project of which he was a part was the Party of Democratic Forces, headed by Valeriu Matei, who came to his political end on elections held in 2001. Vladimir Braga, former chairman of the county Council of Chişinău and of the district of Ialoveni, practically unknown to public opinion, but considered as being a heavy tool in the area where he used to hold positions in local public administration. A separate category were the padding people who were either cash-bringers for the elections of 2005, or votes-bringers as having the imagined VIP status attributed to them.

Although Moscow, eager to punish Vladimir Voronin for rejecting the Kozak Memorandum in November 2003 and to remove his party from governance, has massively supported the Bloc „Democratic Moldova” of Urechean, BDM gets just 28.33%, representing 34 mandates in the Parliament with seats. It thundered and Russians has gathered them, used to make jokes the journalists. And in those four years of nosy presence in the Parliament, the tumbledown electoral group called BDM has teased in rags. We will show bellow how precisely the dissolution of BDM occurred and what consequences these re-groupings may have in perspective of up-coming parliamentary elections. 1. DUMITRU DIACOV The first gang-breaker was Dumitru Diacov. It was the only possibility. This political adventurer, with a dubious past of Komsomol activist and that of being correspondent of TASS Soviet news agency in Bucharest, became famous for the capacity to betray his protectors and partners. To know the professional carrier before acceding in 1994 in the Parliament in Chişinău is determinant for correct understanding of the psychological and political profile of this character. To this end, we reproduce bellow a fragment taken from the free Wikipedia encyclopaedia that is accessible to anyone in Internet: „Until 1977 he worked as editor and chief-editor of programs on Television of Moldova. Then, he works in leadership bodies of the Soviet
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Organization of Communist Youth (Komsomol). In period 1977-1979 he is secretary of the Komsomol Committee of the State Committee for Radio and Television, and then he becomes the instructor for ideology in the Central Committee of the Komsomol Organization of Moldova. Between 1981–1984 Dumitru Diacov works as head of department in the Central Committee of the Komsomol Organization of Moldova. Since 1984 he was correspondent in Soviet Socialist Moldovan Republic of the Moscow daily „Komsomolskaya pravda” [Komsomol’ truth] (then official body of the communist youth of the USSR). He then comes in Moscow as counsellor of the Secretary of the USSR Komsomol Central Committee (Moscow) (1986--1988). Between 1988 and 1989 he was consultant in the Foreign Affairs Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and then between 1989 and 1993 he was the head of bureau of the TASS news agency in Romania, in Bucharest. In 1993 he comes back in the Republic of Moldova, working during a year as counsellor and head of Political Department of the Moldovan Embassy in Moscow.” The last detail of this fragment should be corrected. In 1993 Diacov does not come back in Moldova, but in Moscow. And in 1994, in the electoral campaign for the Parliament, he was placed on the list of Democratic Agrarian Party, that group being an anti-reformist one, an antinational and fully subordinated to imperial interests of Russia. Thus, Diacov is parachuted in the Parliament in Chişinău after prooving his loyalty towards Moscow by his whole carrier, including his activity in framework of the soviet Embassy in Bucharest between 1989 and 1993, where he works under cover of being head of the main soviet news agency in the capital of Romania. We mention, by the way, that Diacov was sent into the mission in Bucharest just several months before the events in December 1989, an episode that represents a dark page in his biography. From Bucharest he is moved again to Moscow at the position of diplomat in the Embassy of Moldova, where he works side-by-side with Valeriu Pasat, and from there directly on the top of political hierarchy of Chişinău. We remind that Democratic Agrarian Party, that „party of power”, created from top to the bottom, had as pillars those three exponents of soviet nomenclature, who held the key-positions at that time: Mircea Snegur, president of the Republic of Moldova, Petru Lucinschi, president of the Parliament, and Andrei Sangheli, primeminister. This troika of the top of nomenclature, being always in rivalry and provisionally put together under the umbrella of agrarians from DAPM, has broken on the presidential elections held in 1996, where all three were candidates against each other. On that poll Lucinschi won, and the biggest looser was Andrei Sangheli. Immediately after the conclusion of 1996 presidential elections those three started the preparations for the 1998 parliamentary elections. It is true, Mircea Snegur succeeded to detach in 1995 eleven MPs from DAPM faction with Nicolae Andronic as leader, then the deputy speaker of the parliament, incorporating his own political entity, baptised the Party of Renaissance and Conciliation. Shortly, Petru Lucinschi acted exactly like Mircea Snegur, tearing off from the same factions of agrarians, which initially counted 56 mandates, a number of
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24 MPs with Dumitru Diacov as leader, he holding, likewise Andronic, the position of deputy speaker of the Parliament. The group set up by Lucinschi, who placed Diacov in the position of its chairman, was called the Bloc for a Democratic and Prosperous Moldova (BfDPM). We shall point, by the way, that both Andronic and Diacov were sanctioned one by one by DAPM for desertion and dismissed from the positions of deputy speakers of the Legislative. That grouping, having the President Petru Lucinschi as patron and protector, succeeds to reach a remarkable result in elections of 1998, obtaining 18.16 % and, 24 MP mandates accordingly, having the third result after the communists and Democratic Convention. However, immediately after his instalment in the chair of speaker of the Parliament, Dumitru Diacov betrays Lucinschi and is trying to make his own game. In collusion with Ion Sturza, Vladimir Filat and others, those from Diacov’s group succeed to become in a record-time the heroes of multiple scandals of corruption revealed by a parliamentary investigation committee, headed by the undersigned. Following this chain of scandals involving Dumitru Diacov and his protégés, and following an incompetent and antisocial governance, this entity is rejected by the electorate does not succeed to surmount the electoral threshold for the Parliament of 2001. Actually, the same fate was destined for the other two components of a shaky and corrupt parliamentary majority, i.e. the party headed by Mircea Snegur and that of Valeriu Matei, they both definitely disappearing after the electoral failure in 2001. Between 2001 and 2005, the legislative period of that Parliament, the Diacov’s party seemed to be definitely disappeared from political stage. But suddenly, on the eve of elections held in 2005 Diacov is brought out naphthalene, recycled and put on joint list of the BDM of Serafim Urechean. Right on the first seating of the new legislative body, Diacov betrays Serafim Urechean and the bloc with which he got into the Parliament obtains the recognition of his own parliamentary faction that includes ten fugitives from BDM, among whom his deputy, Vladimir Filat. Obviously, the betrayal of Serafim Urechean by Diacov was a conditional one. He took Voronin’s side, accepting to vote for the second presidential mandate in exchange of recognition of his own parliamentary faction, evaded from BDM. So, Dumitru Diacov, after this political offence, possesses a legally recognised parliamentary faction, even though it wasn’t an autonomous electoral subject during the elections, as well as a car on duty, an adviser and a secretary, but especially a pretension of being equal to the other parties that got into the Parliament by their own efforts as separate electoral subjects. Shortly after the betrayal against Urechean in favour of Voronin, Diacov betrays Voronin too, awkwardly regretting the vote in his support. That gesture of mea culpa showed, actually, that he would have been expecting much bigger favours on behalf of the head of the state, and also the fact that the character concerned has thus tried to get repositioned on political spectrum, competing with the Urechean’s exponents from Alliance “Our Moldova” [AOM] in anticommunist and anti-governmental rhetoric. Obviously, by posing himself as an opposition to the governance, Diacov hoped to attract the public sympathy and eventually some votes for his formation. By a boomerang effect, though, Dumitru Diacov finds himself being betrayed by his closest acolyte, Vladimir Filat, who slams the party’s door and scrapes up in 2007 his own political grouping. Diacov rushes to mark his former deputy as a betrayer
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and it’s hard not to believe him. Yet, it happened like in popular saying: cuckoo is singing his own name. Thus the betrayer Filat betrayed the betrayer Diacov. It is true that Diacov has tried to compensate somehow the departure of Filat by attracting in his team two sonorous names - Oazu Nantoi and Oleg Serebrian. Those two are basically the bearers of positive image, being known rather as political analysts than political stakeholders. Previously, both of them have tried to erect their own political parties, but without any success. The calculation error of these remarkable intellectuals, in our opinion, was the merging the political commentary with party building and with political management. This way or another, that unnatural political marriage, by which it was tried to gluttonise two respectable names, well known for their democratic visions and patriotic position, with a party without any identity, without values, circumstantial and with a past that is not at all an honourable one, categorically didn’t bring an addition to the image of that grouping. May be rather it thrown a shadow of doubt on good names of those two. In order to increase his chances to penetrate the Parliament, several months ago Dumitru Diacov initiates a public flirt with Dumitru Braghiş. Both of them declared that they started the negotiation process in view of merging the parties headed by them – Democratic Party and Social-Democrat Party accordingly. It was soundly claimed that the process of those two parties’ unification would be based on their adherence to the social-democrat doctrine, while it is known that ideological label was chosen by them circumstantially, which is by the way typical one for the ex-communist area, where the former nomenclature uses to make up with centre-left ideological unguents and to bear social-democrat masks. Actually, the only defining element in common for both of them is their long past of top exponents of the soviet regime in the leadership bodies of the communists youth’ organisation, called Leninist Komsomol. As it was expected, this entire bustle resulted in lamentable failure. Two Komsomol swards didn’t manage to get accommodated in a single socialdemocratic sheath. The disputes on the chairmanship on eventually unified party, as well as on its name and eventual order on electoral list proved to be insurmountable, those two blaming mutually each other for the failure of fusion. Not even the major risks of not overcoming the electoral threshold were able to temperate the ambitions of those two. There would be another common element among those two, which came recently to the fore once with the aggression of Russia against Georgia in August 2008 and annexation by Moscow of those two secessionist enclaves, Abkhazia and South Osetia. Diacov and Braghiş supported, each of them in his own manner, the aggression of the Russian Federation, blaming Georgia for aggression and application of military force against those two secessionist republics. If we add to this also the lack of support from those two politicians for the 2003 Rose Revolution in Tbilisi, as well as the evasion to show the support for the 2004 Orange Revolution in Kiev, plus the refusal to recognise the Great Starvation of Ukrainian people because of the totalitarian-communist regime in 1932-1933 as genocide against the Ukrainian people and to express solidarity with the Ukrainian authorities on the occasion of commemorating the 75 years from HOLODOMOR, the identity profile of these Siamese brothers of Moldovan politics becomes even more limpid. Both gravitate on
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the orbit of Russian interests and avoid taking stands that would provoke dissatisfactions in Moscow. Here the lack of reaction, refusal of taking trenchant attitudes are sometimes more eloquent than a public declaration. Should we also remind about the episode of taking by surprise of these two Komsomol activists by journalists in the Chişinău airport, visibly drank, in the height of 2005 electoral campaign, stealthily coming back from a confidential visit in Moscow, then the similarity between the two becomes even more striking, and their political affiliation even more flagrant. However, the merge didn’t occur, the personal interest proving to be more powerful than the risks to shelter on political nothingness after the electoral failure in 2009. The recent attempt of Diacov to get over the footlights by drawing out of naphthalene and presenting as DP candidate to the position of prime-minister Valeriu Bulgari (not Bulgaru, as it should be normal to correct and spell his name) in the perspective of the future post-electoral configuration, a rightly forgotten character, originating from the old communist nomenclature and know as being one of the keyfigures of the corrupt and anti-national governance, head in succession by the primeministers Andrei Sangheli, Ion Ciubuc and Ion Sturza, where he was deputy primeminister and minister of agriculture, casts Diacov into ridicule. Here the danger to irremediably compromise the shadow of honour that the Democratic Party could still have is obvious. One of the reasons for optimism in the perspective of the up-coming electoral poll for Diacov could be related to the marriages of his two daughters. One of them got married with the millionaire Gabriel Stati, son of the well known businessman, the magnate Anatol Stati, boss of the company ASCOM GROUP. The other one is married with a citizen of Lebanese origin named Mahmoud Hammoud, about whom it is being said that he is linked to the Islamic terrorist organizations. This exponent of an important Lebanese group got to the Republic of Moldova about ten years ago, after being forbidden to stay in Romania. Here he succeeds to penetrate rapidly into political circles, obtains the citizenship of the Republic of Moldova through a decree signed by the president Petru Lucinschi, becomes the Honorific Consul of Lebanon and runs on the list of the National Liberal Party headed by Mircea Rusu in the 2001 parliamentary elections, among others beside Vitalia Pavlicenco. This spectacular ascension is explained by those who know the case by the fact that the person concerned would be nephew of the former foreign affairs and defence minister of Lebanon who has the same name (see more on Google), but also due to the generous funds offered by him to Moldovan politicians, who accepted, contra-cost, to do him these favours. In October 2001 the president Vladimir Voronin withdraws the citizenship from Mahmoud Hammoud following some information provided by the Intelligence Service, which on its turn received it from the western partners. However, in June 2003 president Voronin returns the citizenship back to Hammoud Mahmoud. He settles in Germany, where he gets the status of diplomat together with Diacov’s daughter, she being a civil servant in the Moldovan Embassy in the same country. Recently Mahmoud Hammoud is said to be forbidden to enter in the Republic of Moldova because he would have been declared persona non grata on the territory of our country. Navigating on Internet in search for some additional information about him, once the Google search engine was accessed, the Interpol webpage appeared
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which officially announced that Mahmoud Abbas Hammoud is internationally pursued. We find out from Interpol that he is born on February 14, 1968 in Arzay, Lebanon, has the height of 1.75 meters, brown-green eyes, dark brown hair. At the category of accomplished crimes there are crimes against children, kidnapping. It is also specified the fact that his arrest is demanded by the authorities of Slovakia. Although back in 1998 Diacov got into conflict with Lucinschi, the person who would be able to facilitate their relationship and communication would be Anatol Stati, given the old and friendly links of this businessman with the ex-president of the country. It is said that during the presidency of Petru Lucinschi precisely Anatol Stati was the closest and most favoured businessman. It is good not to forget here that Lucinschi remains one of the active players (true, more from the shadow) in Moldova, he being powerfully connected with decision-making centres in Moscow, including through one of his closest disciples, combined with the interests of Russian special services, Valeriu Pasat. However, an eventual massive injection of capital could not essentially modify the electoral chances of Diacov, and this is also due to his managerial inability, and also because the local DP structures don’t have functional relation with the party’s leadership, this being a rather clientage one and lacking any binding doctrine or set of common values. In conclusion, it is the case to mention that Dumitru Diacov did never become MP by his own. In 1994 he was brought in the Parliament by the DAPM electoral embarkation, in 1998 he entered on the backside of Petru Lucinschi, and in 2005 he was transported by the BDM electoral carriage headed by Serafim Urechean. The only attempt to step over the electoral threshold happened in 2001, which resulted in lamentable failure. It is true, the Diacov’s Democratic Party obtains certain results in local elections, but these are explainable neither by the managerial qualities of Dumitru Diacov, nor by the contribution of the party as a whole. The reason of these relative successes is completely another one. The local DP’ kernels are originating from the former DAPM, and this party of local nomenclature was established based on officials from local public administration, chairmen of kolkhoz and specialists in former agricultural collective households, who became in a night „leaders” of farmers’ households, a kind of managers who exploit, usually abusively, the farmers’ land, precisely the naivety and poverty of whom is being used by the „new boyars”. Actually, the social basis of PD in the territory is of rather the same substance as that of AOM, with the only difference that the last one succeeded to summon around more clientage. This being the situation, the electoral perspectives of PD on the eve of elections in 2009 are completely gloomy. 2. DUMITRU BRAGHIŞ Dumitru Braghiş is one of the emblematic exponents of the soviet nomenclature. The long service in key-positions of Komsomol has left an inerasable mark on this person. During the last decade of USSR’ existence, the shamelessness and luxury of the „soviet aristocracy” became particularly cynical and detestable on the background of increasingly general material misery of the people. And among those
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„chosen ones” belonging to the „over-placed layer”, who was in comfort party during the time of plague, was also Dumitru Braghiş, the last first-secretary of the Central Committee of Komsomol of the Soviet Moldova, member of the USSR Komsomol’ Central Committee, becoming even the deputy in the USSR Congress of Deputies in Moscow also through the support of the Communist Party. We extracted from the same free encyclopaedia Wikipedia several lines from the soviet past of D. Braghiş that we are reproducing bellow, mentioning by the way that, unlike the case of Diacov, for instance, the past of Braghiş is presented with considerable omissions and in a much more summary form: „Professional activity started at the Tractor Plant in Chişinău as engineerconstructor (1980-1981). Since 1981 and until 1992 he detains various eligible positions within the Union of Communist-Leninist Youth (Komsomol) of the USSR. Between 1987 and 1988 he is instructor within the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldova. In 1989-1991 he is a deputy of USSR people. In 19921995 he has the position of deputy director general of the Company FRCE "Moldova Exim". In 1995-1997 he detains the position of director general of the Department for external economic relations of the Ministry of Economy.” It is worth noting that during the great transformations at the end of the last decade of USSR’ existence, with Perestroika meaning a new melting of the communist totalitarian regime, with taking out of the state of somnolence and raising on the history’s stage of the „captive peoples”, with the animation of the renaissance and national liberation movement, with the struggle for re-conquer the Latin Alphabet and State Language, the Tricolour and finally the Independence, Braghiş, likewise Diacov, Urechean or Filat, was among the „big absents”, when they were not directly present among those who oppressed the democratic fighters. Entire political biography of Braghiş is directly linked to that of his spiritual protector, Petru Lucinschi. Precisely to this ex-first-secretary of the Communist Party of Moldova and secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, who became in 1996 President of the Republic of Moldova, Braghiş owes the mandate of prime-minister, obtained at the end of 1999. Also to Lucinschi he owes the creation of the so-called electoral bloc „ Braghiş Alliance”, which entered into the Parliament following the elections in 2001 by massive utilisation of administrative resources. Today it is clear that if Braghiş would have held the position of prime-minister, he would succeed to scrape up a single use electoral embarkation and moreover to penetrate into the legislative of the country. It is worth mentioning that on that alliance’ list the front positions, not by surprise, were taken by the key-figures of the „Braghiş” Government: deputy prime-ministers Valeriu Cosarciuc and Lidia Guţu, the head of the Department of Privatisation and Administration of State Property, Alexandru Oleinic, as well as Ion Guţu, former member of the Government in several cabinets, Mihai Plămădeală, ex-minister of interior (the last two being known as close ones to Lucinschi). A joke launched on the occasion of 2001 elections has briefly and plastically characterised the electoral results of that time. In the Parliament got two parties and a Government: communists, Christian-democrats and the „Braghiş” Government.
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By around the mid of that legislation, Braghiş re-baptises his political creature in Social-Democrat Alliance, since at that time the title Social-Democrat Party belonged to a formation established back in 1990 and linked to the name of Oazu Nantoi. On the eve of elections in 2005, Braghiş enters with this political entity into the Bloc „Democratic Moldova”. Yet, in time he follows the Diacov’s example and, together with several other MPs. He separates from the bloc that brought him into the legislative. After some additional time, he succeeds to produce a merge with the Social-Democrat Party, which meanwhile got into the possession of the Muşuc family, and in the media circles the story being circulating that Oazu Nantoi gave up the party to Muşuc following some pecuniary agreements. Thus, Braghiş becomes chairman of the new unified grouping, and the young Eduard Muşuc gets the position of secretary general. Yet, in political circles there is a rumour that the merge between the Braghiş grouping and that of Muşuc didn’t actually happen, an unseen fault being preserved between them that produces considerable dysfunctions within the formation. Since Eduard Muşuc was elected meanwhile to the position of chairman of the Chişinău Municipal Council due to the vote of Communist counsellors, the fact that got the young Muşuc closer to the Government and the president Voronin, while Braghiş remains closely linked to Petru Lucinschi, it seems that the closer is the future electoral poll the bigger are the risks for this tandem to be cracked. The entrance of Muşuc in Voronin’s grace was not extended on Braghiş, the last one feeling as being marginalized and frustrated comparative to his young party-colleague. In order to complete the political profile of Braghiş it is necessary to remind ourselves an episode from the 2005 electoral campaign, when the governmental circles in Moscow openly and aggressively supported the Bloc „Democratic Moldova” against Vladimir Voronin, was made guilty for getting out of Kremlin subordination by rejecting the Kozak plan and the idea of legalising the Russian military presence in Moldova. Precisely on that period Braghiş was seen campaigning in the secessionist area from the left of Nistru, being accompanied by cars with head-lights belonging to the special services of Smirnov. Also on that hot period of 2005 parliamentary elections the Russian special services fabricated in Moscow an anti-Moldovan creature called „Motherland Moldova” and headed by their agent-provoker called Andrei Ţărnă. Also at that time, in the capital-city of Russian Federation a so-called congress of Moldovans was organized, to which the workers originating from Moldova were brought. In the presidium of that ridiculous gathering the following persons have been observed: Valeriu Pasat, former Moldovan corrupt public servant who serves a foreign state against his own country, Grigori Karamalak, called „Bulgarul”, head of interlope world, suspected for committing a number of grave crimes, including murders, tortures, thefts, being in international pursuit on the request of Moldovan authorities and protected for many years by FSB (Russian Federal Security Service), the abovementioned Andrei Ţărnă and Dumitru Braghiş. Obviously, the company in which Braghiş got to was not at all an accidental one, characterising him exactly as a person closely linked with the interests of Moscow in the Republic of Moldova. With feeble territorial structure, with a doubtful political past, with a shapeless and confusing public discourse, and also lacking a powerful team, if he will be compelled by circumstances to run by alone in the up-coming parliamentary elections,
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Dumitru Braghiş risks to surmount not the electoral threshold and, therefore, to be absent in the next legislature. 3. VLADIMIR FILAT Makes his first appearance in public life in 1998, when is installed in the position of head of the Department for Privatisation and Administration of State Property, through the support provided by Petru Lucinschi, then President of the republic, and Dumitru Diacov, then speaker of the Parliament and head of a pro-presidential political group called the Bloc for a Democratic and Prosperous Moldova. In just several weeks from the enthronement on this position, Filat becomes the cause of the first scandal of corruption of that governance which shaken the public opinion. Apropos, while the Filat detained key-positions in the Government (1998-1999), the undersigned made a number of parliamentary investigations, followed by official reports of a parliamentary investigation Committee headed by me, by declarations and interpellations made in the plenary of the Legislative, by articles in the press. However, the activity of the Prosecution service and Judiciary was at the service of the corrupted governmental officials. These cases of corruption, of embezzlement of public properties and finances committed by Filat were widely reflected in the book „Vladimir Filat, a gangster of transition who robbed the country”, which can be found on the webpage www.ppcd.md . However, let us see now what elements of his past until being placed in high governmental ranks could be of interest for a deeper understanding of this character’s profile. That is how he is presented, for instance, by the free encyclopaedia Wikipedia: „Vlad Filat was born on May 6, in 1969 in village of Lăpuşna (district of Hânceşti). After the graduation in 1986 of the general school in Lăpuşna, he satisfied the compulsory military service in the Soviet Army (1987--1989). He studied then in the Cooperative College of Moldova (1989--1990) and in the University Alexandru Ioan Cuza in Iaşi, Law Department (1990--1994). Between 1994-1998 Vlad Filat initiates and manages a number of business affairs in Romania, being the director general of "RoMold Trading Ltd" in Iaşi (1994-1997) and chairman of the administrative board of the Company "Dosoftei" in Iaşi (1997-1998). He returns to the Republic of Moldova in 1998.” So, the first scandal that made known him to the public opinion was that related to the unlawful privatization and sale, at diminutive prices, of six aircrafts TU 154B to a Russian company. Then the scandal with cigarettes smuggling followed. The Filat’s company „Romold Trading” Ltd obtains a contract of exclusiveness with the Chişinău Tobacco Factory to export in Romania the cigarettes produced by this state enterprise. Although the contract stipulated the payment in advance for the goods, Filat always pays with major delays the commercialized cigarettes. However, it is not suffice for him to have this fraudulent scheme of getting over-profits from intermediary
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activities in distributing the products belonging to a state enterprise, which could have sell its production with the same success without the participation of the parasitecompany of Filat. He decides to multiply his fabulous revenues by smuggling. Thus, on September 12, 1998, the police bodies of the Iaşi county have organised a flagrant and captured four vehicles with smuggled 1 852 400 packages of cigarettes “MT” amounting to ROM 7.5 billions. The goods belonged to the company of Filat, who, in complicity with a number of Romanian citizens created a criminal network for introducing and commercializing in Romania smuggled cigarettes produced in Chişinău and taken out for free on the back door of the enterprise, which was post-factum paid for the taken commodities. A monstrous scandal has followed in Romanian and Moldovan media. Being under investigation, Filat didn’t step on the territory of Romania for several years, being afraid to be arrested and given to judiciary. However, since he was a weigh tool for the Chişinău governance, controlling via Diacov the General Prosecution Service, and the Moldovan authorities were reluctant to cooperate with Romanian ones, Filat succeeded to avoid both the investigation and the punishment. By the end, the relations settled with influential circles in Romania during his stay in Iaşi since 1990 made it possible to hush up the case. Also, while Filat was at the helm of privatization, we shall point out to the case related to the Cement Factory in Rezina. The competition on privatization for this giant-enterprise was attended by the autochthonous company ENERCOM Ltd and the French one FINARGE 26, a company associate with the concern LAFARGE. The bids of these two companies were the following: 1) ENERCOM – USD 15 millions, 2) FINARGE 26 – USD 10 millions. According to the legal provision, the recognised winner should be the one who offered USD 15 millions. However, Filat, through a fraudulent scheme, sells this enterprise for just USD 200 000 dollars. Thus, the price was diminished by 45 times, if to take into account the amount of 15 millions and the rate of exchange a 1 MDL which was then 6 USD. Therefore, Filat obtains the possibility to share with the investor the difference of USD 14 millions 800 000. How much he got from that mafiotic business, only he knows. Another case of illegal privatisation that brought enormous damages to the state and, accordingly, as it seems, new fabulous incomes to Filat, is that of denationalisation of those six wine factories on the territory of Russian Federation belonging to Moldova. Details to be found on the webpage of the Court of Accounts, where this case is exposed in the Decision no. 118 dated on 27th of December 2002. It is worthwhile mentioning also the case brought to the fore by the main institution competent for verifying the way of utilisation and administration of public finances and described in the Decision no. 83 of the Court of Accounts dated on 4th of October 2001 concerning the results of the control of some aspects of economicfinancial activity of the Commercial Bank “Moldinconbank”. That economic crime, which, as it’s seen, was committed by the same Filat, has brought about damages to the state amounting to around MDL 5 millions 326 thousands, plus MDL 2 millions 243 400 revenues in form of dividends. That is what was possible to check, but in fact the damage in this case was much bigger.
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The case that is most known to the public opinion is related to the privatization of that enormous building on the Ştefan cel Mare boulevard, the matter consisting in fraudulent sale of shares possessed by the state in the enterprises JSC “IPTEH” and JSC “IMTEHCOM”, by which the public interest was damaged as well as the state Budget, and Filat obtaining a property amounting to tens millions. These are just several strikes made by Filat while being in the Government. But let’s get back to the youth of our hero. According to the affirmations of some eye witnesses, which correspond to a number of recent disclosures made by the leader of a nongovernmental organization during a press conference, in summer of 1989, when accomplishing his military service in border-guards troops in a unite placed near to the city situated in Crimea, Sevastopol, the young Filat was sent to a KGB school, located in Moscow’s proximity, which used to train secret agents and selected the personnel for the high educational institutions of the main Soviet secret service. It seems that precisely his stay in that special KGB school during just several months marks for good his habits, contacts and relations of subordination. The stay in the soviet army between 5th of May 1987 and 15th of August 1989 represents for sure a fundamental stage that determined the afterwards trajectory of Filat’s life. Without that short, obscure and defining page of his biography, the rapid ascension in business of the young Filat even from the times of studentship may seem rather strange. The commerce with cigarettes is just an area of business that bring to him enormous incomes. Shortly after the graduation, Filat buys a typography – the biggest one not just in Iaşi, but also in entire area of Moldova and over the Prut. He is being observed in the business with real estates, in the import-export activities etc. Even from that time Filat was suspected of being just an exponent of some secret structures that were active on the territory of Romania, he having the role of a young prosperous businessman. Though, in reality, everything led to the conclusion that he was just the authorised person through whom some huge funds were moved and legalised in the interest of a network with special missions on the territory of Romania. It worthy mentioning that Filat was following his studies side-by-side with Alexandru Tănase, who afterwards became the defence layer of Valeriu Pasat and first deputy chairman of LDPM, formation that is headed by Filat. The particular trust that Al. Tănase enjoys, who was attributed the task of being defence layer of the most scandalous, important and dangerous exponent of Russian special services, who acts against the Republic of Moldova, could be also explained by relations established during the studentship in Romania with the people from the respective shadowy structures. We shall remind here that both Filat and Alexandru Tănase, who have run in 2007 for the positions of municipal counsellors, have indicated in their CVs submitted to the Chişinău municipal electoral Council being „Moldovans” by nationality, the studies in Romania having no power of illuminating the two ones upon their own ethnic identity that cannot be confound by a person with a minimum training in citizenship. We shall pint out, by the way, that e.g. the ex-prime-minister Ion Sturza or the young expert in international relations Andrei Popov have also exposed, with various occasions, their Moldovan ethnic origin, they being as alien from the Romanian identity as those two former students in law from Iaşi, Filat and Tănase, or as
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Urechean, Diacov and Braghiş, for instance. We shall show bellow why precisely we invoked here the names of those two leaders of the Association for Foreign Policy, Ion Sturza, chairman, and Andrei Popov, executive director. It is true that until now Ion Sturza did neither publicly show the relation with Filat and nor his support to the last one. Yet, if our observations will be confirmed and at a certain moment the relation Filat-Sturza will become an obvious one, it is not surprising at all the fact that persons who know not just by hearsay what is conspiracy work and preservation of a secret succeeded to camouflage for quite along time their cooperation. It seems that precisely during his stay in Romania Filat got to know Dumitru Diacov, present on Romanian territory since 1989, where he was in the mission several month before the December events in the same year, where, as it’s known, the soviet special service were involved. Thus, Diacov and Filat were on the same time in Romania during three years, between 1990 and 1993, one being in Bucharest on the position of head of bureau of the main soviet news agency TASS, who worked in the soviet embassy, while Filat was in Iaşi, being officially a student in the Law Department. Apropos, the two ones never talked in public either about the moment when they have acquainted or about the person who introduced them to each other. It is certain, however, that while after the parliamentary elections in 1994 Diacov is surprisingly installed on DAPM electoral list, on top of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, becomes head of the parliamentary delegation to the Council of Europe, then also deputy speaker of the Legislative, Filat appears also surprisingly in four years distance, exactly like Diacov without a day of political activity in the Republic of Moldova until the moment of his placement on the electoral list and promotion to key-positions in the state. We shall mention, by the way, that in 1994 next to Diacov at least two persons made their appearance and positioned on first rank positions in the pro-Russian governance of the Democratic-Agrarian Party, they also being on the diplomatic positions of the Soviet Embassy in Romania, including the moment of December 1989. It is about Mihai Popov, installed on April 5, 1994 in the position of foreign affairs minister and holding that position until July 28, 1997. After closing his ministerial mandate, Mihai Popov is sent as ambassador to Paris. Another known character, who like Diacov and Popov was in the USSR Embassy in Bucharest during the 1989 December events, is Tudor Botnaru, the one who becomes in 1990 head of KGB of the Moldovan SSR. Bellow we reproduce the information picked up from Wikipedia about this notorious exponent of KGB, mentioning also the fact that T. Botnaru held the position of first deputy minister of foreign affairs exactly in April 1994, when Popov took over the ministerial portfolio, and Diacov became responsible for external policy in the Parliament. „In 1963 hired by the KGB of the Moldovan SSR, included in the structures of counter-intelligence services, and in 1966 – in the services of external information. As external information officer, he was under diplomatic cover of the USSR, working in USRR embassies in Romania and France. Within the KGB of Moldovan SSR, he
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has held first the position of senior operative inspector in Section I and then that of Head of Bureau. Tudor Botnaru has worked in the Committee of State Security of Moldova, then he was in the Union’s Committee, and that he was a security officer in the USSR Embassy in Bucharest. In July 1990, on the initiative of the Republic’s leadership, Tudor Botnaru was brought from Bucharest and appointed to the position of chairman of the State Committee for Security (head of KGB) of Moldovan SSR, being advanced to the rank of major-general. He was the first external information officer in Moldovan SSR who became chairman of KGB. In April 1990 the leadership of the Ministry of National Security (MNS) of the Republic of Moldova (Tudor Botnaru, Demian Munteanu), under pretext of facing the threat that the KGB premises in Moldovan SSR could be attacked by “extremists” from the People’s Front of Moldova, decided to transport the KGB Archive of MSSR from Chişinău to Tiraspol, where it is to be found even now... Between 1991 and 1994, general Botnaru has held the position of head of the Training Centre of the Ministry of National Security of the Republic of Moldova. Since April 1994 he worked as first deputy minister of foreign affairs. From December 1994 to 1997 he had the position of extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador of the Republic of Moldova in the Kingdom of Belgium and, and by plurality, also in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Great Duchy of Luxemburg and the Kingdom of Netherlands, as well as the head of Moldovan diplomatic mission to the Council of Europe (since 3rd of May 1995). He was called back from the position on 17th of March 1997, afterwards being appointed to the position of minister of national security. From 24th of January 1997 to 11th May 1999 Tudor Botnaru ahs held the position of the minister of national security, being member of the Supreme Security Council. On 14th of March 1997 president Petru Lucinschi conferred him the military rank of divisional general. On 11th of May 1999 he was revoked from the position of ministry on request „because of reaching the pension age” and retired. A candidate in the parliamentary elections on February 25, 2001 for the MP position on the list of social-political movement "For Order and Justice".” We brought back in discussion the presence of those three Moldovans - Dumitru Diacov, Mihai Popov and Tudor Botnaru, persons of maximum trust from KGB in Bucharest during the last period of Ceauşescu regime, including the moment of events from December 1989, in which they had a direct participation, in this chapter where we deal with Vladimir Filat – in order to emphasize the political filiation of that character, also, like the other three, teleported into the epicentre of political life in Chişinău and made in a night great official in Government. Apropos, if it is to talk about his spiritual parents, a case of a father and son, natural for this time, rightly correspondents here,
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they belonging to the same set. For this time, it is about Mihai Popov and his son, Andrei Popov, known to public opinion as a delicate political analyst, also a former public servant in the Ministry of foreign affairs, dismissed from position following a scandal related to a case with traffic of children. It is known that currently Andrei Popov is executive director of the Association for External Policy, the chairman of which is the ex-prime-minister Ion Sturza. Curios is the fact that Andrei Popov, who in his public commentaries is introducing himself as an independent and unbiased analyst, was observed vigorously chanting, as a genuine protester, the slogans launched by those from the stage of the meeting organized by the Liberal Democrat Party headed by Vladimir Filat on 21st of December 2008. What could be deducted from here? First hypotheses is that Filat and Popov-junior represent a new generation, faithful successor and continuer of the cause of their parents’ generation, sometime just spiritual ones, other time also natural. A second hypotheses is the one according to which the Filat’s party would be backed, among others, also by ex-prime-minister Ion Sturza, during whose mandate our hero has held the position of the state minister, head of Governmental Chancellery. (We shall note that the appearance of Sturza in 1998 on top of Diacov’s group, under the patronage of Lucinschi, was as unexpected as that of Filat, Sturza being at that time an absolute anonym, without any political activity before the elections.) And if Andrei Popov is currently the employee of Sturza, he, obviously, can’t have other political sympathies but those of his boss, who pays him the wage. It is known that Ion Sturza is the deputy chairman of Rompetrol, the right hand of Romanian magnate Dinu Patriciu, he also being until recently director of Rompetrol Moldova. He also holds the position of honorific consul of Kazakhstan in Moldova. It is also known that it is precisely due to him that the realization of the big transaction was possible when the state oil company KazMunaiGaz from Kazakhstan has purchased 75% of shares possessed by Patriciu in Rompetrol at the price of 2.5 billion euro. Sturza was succeeded in position of director general of Rompetrol Moldova by Alexandru Coman, who is the brother of Anatol Coman, former great master of Masonic lodge in Moldova. Some sources state, apropos, that Filat and Sturza would be also affiliated to masonry. That is what Romanian press used to write about this transaction: „Romanian businessman Dinu Patriciu has sold 75% of his shares in Rompetrol Group to a state company in Kazakhstan for USD 2.1696 billions, becoming thus the richest man in Romania the assets of whom are confirmed on the market through a transaction. Patriciu has held 80% of Rompetrol Group, and his partner, American Phil Stephenson, had 20%. Rompetrol Group, registered in Netherlands, was assessed in this transaction at USD 3.616 billions. Patriciu still have now 20% of the group, Stephenson - 5%, and the company KazMunayGaz has 75%. ”

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Thus, Ion Sturza, who made Dinu Patriciu the richest Romanian, has benefited from a commission that is said reaches several hundred millions euros, which increased his several millions property, initially originating from his business with juice, and then from the banking and other activities. Concerning that transaction, the Bucharest newspaper Capital Market also wrote the following: „Additionally, it is at all possible that the money gained by Dinu Patriciu following the transaction will be invested precisely in the Republic of Moldova. According to Ion Sturza, the former major owner of Rompetrol declared that he is going to establish an investment fund Romania-Moldova with financial sources of around one billion euros.” Also at that time Dinu Patriciu declares for press that he is going to invest in Moldova an important part of the sum gained from the transaction with Kazakhs. If the relation Patriciu-Sturza-Filat is true, then it would be easy to understand where the astronomic funds invested in political projects with Filat on the spear’s cap are proceeding from. Such investment would shake the entire political system of Moldova, this being at risk to be dissolved or even flooded by such massive financial injection from abroad. To make clearer the profile and origin of Ion Sturza, who loudly praises himself to Romanian press because of the strike made through that transaction due to particularly close relations he has in Moscow, it is the case to look back at his youth. That is what we got from the same encyclopaedia Wikipedia: „After graduation, he holds various positions in the area of external economic and cultural relations. Between 1983 and 1985 he honours his military internship as senior military instructor. Then he works as referent in the Association of Friendship with Foreign Countries (1985--1987). In 1987 he contributes to the establishment of the Foreign Trade Association "Moldex" (OCEM), in framework of the Government of Moldovan SSR, being appointed to the position of deputy director general. Within OCEM the first investment projects were prepared aiming at technical re-equipment of enterprises of the industry of national economy, projects that stipulated the attraction of foreign capital. As deputy director general, he coordinated the implementation of projects on financing, supply and installation of some developed equipment at the canning factories in Orhei, Camenca and at the enterprises in Cupcini, Ungheni, Soroca, Floreşti etc. In 1991 he founds and holds the position of director and president of the administrative board JSC "Incon", a company that becomes one of the main financial-industrial groups in Basarabia. He founds and then chairs the bank "MoldIncomBank" in Chişinău. In 1996 Ion Sturza holds, in parallel with his activity in "Incon", the position of president of the supervisory council of "FinComBank”.
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... Sturza holds the major share stock of "Incon" JSC, which has the total monopoly in the industry of natural juices and vegetable and fruit canning in Moldova. Due to the governmental guaranties, Incon gets a credit of USD 22 millions from the International Financial Corporation, in order to re-equip the privatized juice and canning factories. ... In April 2005 Ion Sturza, director general of the company Rompetrol Moldova, was appointed to the position of deputy president for development of the Rompetrol Group for Russia and Commonwealth of Independent States.” The first after-graduation years show Sturza as a person in whom KGB has confidence. His external activities, „cultural and economic” ones, were led precisely by the soviet security service. That is why during his military service the euphemistic formula of „senior instructor” is used. For those who don’t know, we mention that the so-called Society for friendship with foreign countries („Obshchestvo drujby s zarubejnymi stranami”) was in soviet period a structure of KGB, the last person who headed this organisation being Ludmila Scalnâi, a person known for being attached even since soviet period until now to Petru Lucinschi. KGB also had under control the so-called Foreign Trade Association "Moldex" (OCEM), in framework of the Government of Moldovan SSR, where Sturza appears as deputy director general. Thus it is simpler to unravel the enigma why in 1998 President Petru Lucinschi places on the top position on behalf of the Bloc for a Democratic and Prosperous Moldova those three individuals, who seem to have close relations, established even from their youth, with KGB, and namely Dumitru Diacov, Ion Sturza and Vladimir Flat. Although, basically, Sturza avoids lately to appear in public and didn’t show anywhere with Filat, nevertheless one year ago a news has reached the media that shows that relations between these two are very close. On 18 th of January 2008 the newspaper „Jurnal de Chişinău” makes public the information by which it announces the readers that those two “friendly families”, precisely Sturza and Filat, have left together to vacation in a remote locality in Austria. Some sources state that those two one would also have real estate properties in that country. Thus, we see that shortly after the LDP was launched, Filat and Sturza leave to Austria to plan the development of the corresponding political project. Let’s recall that the founding congress of LDPM was held on December 8, 2007, i.e. just several weeks before these two left to Austria. As a curiosity, we shall also point to the strange coincidence between the logo of Rompetrol Moldova and that of LDPM. Thus, the symbol of the oil company led by Sturza coincides with that of Filat’s party: in both cases there is a green tree with a rich crown on the wind. Now it is clearer where the Filat’s party is feeding with „vital energy” and „green colour”. Here it is useful to access the web pages www.rompetrol.md and www.pldm.md . We shall quote bellow several fragments from Romanian press, which through the light on the nature of the relations between these persons with enigmatic figures such as Anatol Coman. He seems to have direct attribution to various transactions that,
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among others, are related to the illegal trade with weapons, but also to powerful links with Russian special services, which also control de facto the masonry in this area. The article „The „JUDAH“network: the Ivan’s spies”, published in „Evenimentul zilei” of Monday, 23rd of July 2008 and undersigned by Mihai Munteanu, says: „The curtains of transactions with weapons disclose the scope of Russian operations in Romania. A report of the Division of Military Security from Bucharest (DMS – military counter-intelligence) reveals how the Moscow secret services informationally penetrate the national defence industry. The bid: control over importexport operations, with a huge financial potential, as well as “precious” informations concerning the defence strategy of the Romanian government.” Further, we quote further the article: „Bucharest. Division of Military Security. October 2003. Meeting Aurel Cazacu, the colonel (e) Cetinoiu mentions to him two contact persons for Armitech: Moldovans Anatol Coman and Vasile Gondiu. DMS officers add: „In the circles of merchants with special products it is known that Anatol Coman was senior officer in KGB, is mason Great Master of the Lodge of Chişinău and that side-by-side with Gondiu Vasile act together with Alexandr Kondyakov (former KGB general), through Novokom (officially recognised as a lobby company of Vladimir Putin)... Alexandr Vladimirovich Kondyakov (58 years old) is the director general of the Russian consultancy company Novokom. Political consultancy, international relations, informational and analytical activities. During the cold war, Kondyakov commended with the KGB spying residence in London. Currently, he is the second man in Russian masonry: Great Secretary of the Russian Great Lodge.” The Bucharest newspaper „Ziua” no. 4280 issued on Thursday, 10th of July 2008, tackles the same issue of making use of Masonic channels by Russian services in Romania and Moldova: „In 1997, same the Italian Great Ordinary Lodge founds in Chişinău "The Great Lodge of Moldova", with the support of then president Piotr Kirilovich Lucinschi. The lodge was registered with number 113 in the registry of Italian lodge, and the initiation ceremony, which lasted about 11 hours, was held on 7 th of June in "Codru" hotel in Chişinău. According to sources in Chişinău, first "initiates" were 32 persons, the 33 rd participant being the Great Master of the Great Italian Ordinary Lodge, professor Giuliano Di Bernardo, who, by the way, held a press conference on that topic for the newspapers and televisions in ex-soviet area. Subsequently, he departed to Kiev and Cernăuţi to "bear the light" further. The first "Great Master" of MLM was appointed Anatol Andreevich Coman, a former employee of the Ministry of interior, suspected of being affiliated with KGB. The headquarters were in the building of Euro Credit Bank. Currently, in the Republic of Moldova there are 16 lodges, headed by the "Great Master" Iurie Sedletski, rector of the University of European Studies of Moldova.”
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The newspaper „Flux” published on its turn on 4th of July 2008 an article entitled „Masonry representatives in Moldovan politics”, which shows that this secret organisation would include as “brothers” the „illuminated” Vladimir Filat, Dumitru Diacov, Dumitru Braghiş, Serafim Urechean and several others. That is how it could be explainable also the fact that namely these politicians have represented the keyfigures of the dead bloc Democratic Moldova, above all them hovering the protecting figure of the one who brought the masonry in Moldova, Petru Lucinschi. Another obscure side, which explains the strength of relation between Ion Sturza, Vladimir Filat, and also with Anatol and Alexandru Coman, the last two brothers being always present in Moldovan-Romanian business combinations, would be their affiliation to masonry, an occult organisation with dubious goals, which seems to be powerfully penetrated by its Russian branch, fully controlled on its turn by the special services of Russia. Apropos, same newspaper „Flux” published back on 13th of June 1997 a number of materials about the foundation of the Masonic lodge in Chişinău: „On Saturday, 7th of June, Giuliano di Bernardo, Great Master of the Great Ordinary Lodge of Italy, has declared in framework of a dialogue with media representatives in „Codru” hotel that the lists of first candidates in Moldovan masonry he has received from the President. That meeting was attended by journalists from Radio Moldova International, „Mesager”, reporters of the agencies „Moldpres” and „Flux”. AP FLUX publishes on 7th of June a news that starts as follows: „President Petru Lucinschi „authorized” the inauguration of Masonic lodge in Chişinău and submitted the list of persons to be initiated” – declared the Great Master... The daily „Flux” writes on 9th of June: „Great Master of the great lodge says that the list of first 30 candidates was prepared by the president Lucinschi.”. In interview offered to the reporter of „Infotag”, Giuliano di Bernardo contests the affirmation of some media outlets that Petru Lucinschi prepared and submitted to the Italian lodge the list of first 30 candidates to the Moldovan masonry. The interview is taken over by „Nezavisimaia Moldova”, June the 10th.” Therefore, after blessing the creation of this Masonic structure and submitted the list of first 30 candidates to masonry, Lucinschi, seeing that the Italian disclosed to the press his involvement, demands to the one to belie the stated earlier on. The same issue of „Flux” also shows that „33 Chişinău inhabitants belong to this secret organization”, pointing also that „on Saturday of June the 7th in Chişinău was created the Masonry of the Republic of Moldova. It was founded at the proposal by the World Masonry based in London, with the support of Regular Masonic Lodge of Italy. On the same occasion, Chişinău was visited by a delegation including over 40 members of the Italian Lodge...
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At the inauguration ceremony of Moldovan Masonic Lodge 33 citizens of the republic were initiated. The seating of the lodge lasted for about 10 hours. Those 33 persons undergone though rituals of „spiritual renaissance”, after which they were given some royal tools and a tie with lodge’s emblem.” „Flux” also shows that among initiates it is to be found Anatol Coman, director of the joint venture „Naroma” and his brother businessman Alexandru Coman. It is true that the whole list of those 33 „brothers” from Chişinău, „illuminated” by Italians, was never made public. However, the information emerged subsequent completes this list. Yet, we may admit that some of them were selected for „initiation” following the moment when the Chişinău lodge was found. However, regardless the moment of recruiting in that occult organisation, it is absolutely obvious that over all „brothers” the shadow of the same Lucinschi is hovering. This being the situation, the affiliation of some Moldovan politicians to a quasisecret organization such as masonry has to be viewed also in the context of constitutional provisions that stipulate in Article 41 (5) that „Secret associations are forbidden”. It is worthwhile mentioning also the fact that the political project as such loudly launched a year ago, with Vladimir Filat on the lance’s cap, shows undoubtedly he is backed by a huge financial force. The subordination itself of an important part of the media under this political project shows the capacity of the shadowy financial individuals to waste fat sponsorships, so that to satisfy even the appetite of most insatiable exponents of media circles and head of some media outlets. Among these is the TV channel PRO TV, radio station „Vocea Basarabiei”, newspapers „Timpul” and „Jurnal de Chişinău”. These media outlets became tools docile to the mafiotic interests of the grouping concerned, headed from the shadow by some figures like Valeriu Pasat or Petru Lucinschi. In this sense, it is symptomatic the fact e.g. that the meeting held on 21st of December 2008, organized by the political entity headed by Filat, both Constantin Tănase, director of „Timpul” newspaper, as well as Val Butnaru from the „Jurnal de Chişinău” showed on the tribune and, scarifying their own image of independent journalists, which was promoted for years until that moment, declared themselves as being supporters of this political party. Among the protesters in duty of Filat, those two co-founders of the radio station „Vocea Basarabiei” were also present in a front place - Veaceslav Ţâbuleac, director, and Valeriu Saharneanu, the last being also president of the Union of Journalists. Beyond the obvious venality and avarice of these journalists, who manifest their political sympathies depending on the sums they receive, it might be supposed that in their case there is also quite a bit of dose of superficiality, of incapacity to consider deeply the political phenomena with all the implications and shady sides. Their jingoistic, sugary and rhetoric spirit, in the style of Caragiale’s characters or, more actual, in style of some like Adrian Păunescu or Vadim Tudor, make them easy achievable targets for shadowy manipulators, who have professionally studied the social-psychological typology and portray of such persons so as to offer them with incentives capable to provoke the expected reactions.
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We shall also remind here the fact that in political history of the Republic of Moldova since the proclamation of Independence and until now many projects have existed where the occult financial interests were intersecting with the structures of secret services, with mafiotic networks, with economic criminality, being based on utilisation in political purposes the dirty money and corruption as defining elements. But never before the moment - when the Liberal-Democrat Party headed by Filat was launched - these phenomena reached that high degree. Corrupting the political leaders and local elected one, corrupting the journalists and, generally, prostituting a part of intellectuals that are present in our public life reaches unprecedented scope. The dirty money, generously wasted, creates to this cheater an image of respected individual with claims of being a state man. In perspective of elections, the media aggression and invasion with dirty money over the public space risk to deeply vitiate the electoral process. In conclusion, it becomes obvious that Vladimir Filat is backed by interests of several types of secret organisations, which seem in his case as being in concrescence: special services, masonry, mafiotic networks. Intertwinement of these occult networks in a joint political project, which pursues to take over the power in the Republic of Moldova, represents a real danger for the democratic system and the rule of law institutions of the country. This danger is even bigger since our society is a democracy in transition without powerful democratic institutions and traditions, and the economic and social vulnerabilities could become chronic in case if some oligarchic groups of criminal kind would get installed at the helm of the country. Another major risk is that of attaching our country to the geopolitical interests of the Russian Federation. This threat is being clearly outlined from the whole political ascendance of the individuals who belong to the political grouping concerned. However, with an open media campaign and an electoral competition where all political stakeholders could confront unembarrassed, following some public debates and even scandalous disclosures such noxious and antinational projects could be disarticulated and, finally, annihilated. Turning back to the relation, which seems to develop, Filat-Sturza and to the possible its implications, we shall say the following. It seems that in ten years after the resignation of the „Sturza” Government, the ex-prim-minister is willing to requite. Feeding financially the grouping of his friend and former colleague from the Government, Vladimir Filat, after that he has accumulated sufficient capitals to feel complete as a businessman, Ion Sturza could now strive for loudly returning in Moldovan politics. This spectacular return could be initially produced either by his inclusion on the LDPM electoral list, or, in case of electoral success of that party, in a key-position within the Government, which can’t be inferior to that held 10 years ago. If the situation is precisely this, then it seems that the tandem Sturza-Filat didn’t put itself up with the resignation of the Government 10 years ago, as well as with electoral failure suffered during the parliamentary elections back in 2001, when both of them run in elections on the list of Diacov’s party, of which leaders they’ve been. It could be
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supposed that the idea of abandoning Diacov, whom they believed as being, and this was not ungrounded, consumed and overcome by the time, got rooted in their minds even from those times. And the electoral failure faced in 2001 is entirely put by these two on the shoulders of same Diacov, hoping that without him they could achieve a bigger success. The major illusion of such persons, who are striving to make a place for themselves in politics, is that money could constitute the main vehicle that would bring about the success. They’re trying to mechanically apply the procedures of economic management, or to say it otherwise, the way of administrating a private company, in the political area. Certainly, the modern political management has borrowed many elements from the business management. However, the determinative here is not the similitude, but the differences, especially when they seem to be secondary. And one of the fundamental difference, which concerns the administration of a political party compared with the business administration resides in the way how people are motivated. While in business the main instrument that motivate an employee is a financial one, in politics this is mostly a moral one, i.e. it is about the one’s adhesion to a set of values and principles, a doctrinal concept or to some abstract ideas, which form the one’s spiritual universe. In other words, the politics has as fuel for party’s militants the enthusiasm, major aspirations for implementing a strategic project, which aims at common goodness and general interests of the society. Yet, precisely these kind of differences between the business administration and administration of a political party are dropped out by men like Sturza and Filat, who, being used to practice the cool calculation, being pre-eminently egoistic and therefore incapable of altruist gestures, can’t live and therefore understand the states like enthusiasm, generosity, dedication, spirit of sacrifice. That is where the illusion comes from that the relation between the employer and employee, true in business, might be also integrally extended over the relations between the relations between leaders of a political party and its members. And it can’t be otherwise, since the cynicism, arrogance and self-content, as defining features of such characters, keeps them in a kind of opacity that doesn’t allow them to understand the spiritual universe of those who have as intimate and profound motivation of their presence in politics the integrity, loyalty and enthusiasm as states that mobilise collective energies and bring major changes into society. The vision full of disdain on the simple man, who shall bring the success in politics, regarded as an entity who would only strive for fortune and thus could be motivated exclusively with the money will turn to be one of basic causes for the failure of this political project. The market law, applied on relations between the leadership group and those that are considered vendible by definition, that might be procured, haggled, hired to work in this group’s favour, can bring certain results only when it is about corrupting a part of „elites”. So, it is about the situation when individuals like Filat waste money to buy journalists, local elected persons or, in general, exponents of other parties, or in other words various sorts of „VIPs” good of being used as „influential agents” to manipulate a part of the public in favour of the political projects concerned. However, by the end the dysfunction that these oligarchs drop out, relation that these money-sacks can neither control nor to model in their
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favour, is the direct communication between the exponents of their political group and elector. If the relation, truly, a perverse one, between political bosses and their employees from such structures of clientage has as linkage, as factor of formal attachment the money, having some contractual relationship, then on the next level the relation between the „electoral agent” and the elector cannot anymore financially welded. It needs confidence, but precisely this is what these kinds of projects totally lack. The confidence in leaders and in mission that they have to fulfil, that is absent in case of LDPM, will reveal by the end that lacking element that will determine the failure of this undertaking. And the media that is servile to that group, focused on the „image making” for the „leader”, even if creates a favourable background to him, do not bring votes. So that since the effect of manipulation is nevertheless a limited one, with all the gold of the world, a gangster can’t be made into a Prince Charming or a state man, who is concerned about the need of the many ones.

4. VITALIA PAVLICENCO Vitalia Pavlicenco represents the emblematic case of a political leader’s antipode. She can have neither charisma nor the management skills, not abilities of positive communication, indispensable to a person who wishes to build a political party. She is a person who reminds through her discourse of the sound produced by metal sliding on glass. She was twice MP: in the legislature of 1998-2001, getting into the Parliament on the list of the Party of Democratic Forces, headed by Valeriu Matei, whom she served for some years as a media attorney and main image-maker, toughly fighting with his enemies on the pages of „Mesagerul” newspaper. Meanwhile the party, the newspaper, as well as that political leader disappeared; it is said – not without direct contribution of V. Pavlicenco. She also run in 1994 on the list of that body created by Gheorghe Ghimpu, Democrat Party, which, yet, didn’t succeed to surmount the electoral threshold. She also was member if the Liberal party headed by Mircea Rusu, on the lists of which she run in the parliamentary elections held in 2001. She gets into the Parliament of 2005-2009 on BDM list. She detaches herself shortly from the group headed by Urechean, together with Anatol Ţăranu, blaming the former mayor of Chişinău for links with Moscow and for the fact he would have sold places on electoral list. As MP she is hyperactive, intervening with speeches in almost all plenary sittings and having statesmen for each end of the sitting. She practices a public discourse that is allegedly pro-Romanian, radical up to provocative, posing herself both as attorney of Romanism and of Romania to equal extent. Recently she created, together with the MP Anatol Ţăranu, with she separated from meanwhile, a phantom-party, pompously called National Liberal Party, thus taking over with no shame, fully and with ostentation, the title, logo and yellow colour of then ruling party in Romania, headed by the prime-minister Călin PopescuTăriceanu. The purpose pursued by Pavlicenco was to pose herself Pavlicenco as exponent – and homologous! – of the Romanian ruling party in the Republic of
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Moldova, probably in parallel willing to get a political and financial support from Bucharest. The fact that the Romanian ruling party didn’t sketched any gesture of outstripping from this scandalous and ridiculous mini-party show either the lack of interest from Romanian NLP towards the realities in Moldova, or lack of any analysis on political life in Chişinău. Similarly to other MPs detached from BDM, Vitalia Pavlicenco categorically used to introduce herself from the parliamentary microphones by adding, after uttering her own name, also the title of her pigmy political party, National-Liberal Party. Once the 2009 elections are approaching, Pavlicenco, understanding that she doesn’t have any chance to bring her microscopic groupuscules in the future Parliament, got associated with another phantom-party, also bombastically called „The Movement European Alliance”, headed by another outsider of Moldovan politics, another figurant of public life, similarly acid and lacking any characteristics of a political leader, Anatol Petrenco. Once the news about the unification of those two Lilliputian parties got into the ears of political commentators, they invented a joke that plastically characterises the created situation through an arithmetical exercise: 1*1=1. Thus, if no one else shall be found who would need the acidity, the corrosive, querulous and strident conduct of this madam in perspective of up-coming electoral battle, so as eventually using her as a media killer against the opponents, then Vitalia Pavlicenco risks disappearing in definitive way from the political life.

5. VLADIMIR BRAGA We included also this character in our research not because he would have any comparable relevance with that of above-considered figures, but only for showing in his case it is about a situation that is practically characteristic to all five legislatures that used to have also “padding” deputies, with no influence on political life or on legislative process and practically unknown to the public opinion. Usually, they got on elective places in the lists submitted by the electoral stakeholders to the CEC, since it is believed to have a certain influence in the regions or in professional circles from they originate from. As a rule, such individuals as them succeed to have just a single MP mandate, after which they definitively disappear from public life. Due to a strangely arranged circumstances Vladimir Braga was, just several months before the closure of this legislature, appointed as chairman of the Ecologist Party „Green Alliance”. If it is not about a manoeuvre of some of the sharks of Moldovan politics, who is trying make use of such a pawn in certain electoral combination, then we face one of the oddest political creature here. Precisely like Vitalia Pavlicenco, Vladimir Braga used to register for declarations at the end of almost all plenary sittings hoping to get out of anonymousness and to make him as visible as possible.
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This being the situation, if Braga doesn’t find an electoral locomotive to which to grant the brand of his own political pygmy in exchange to his inclusion on lists with electoral chances, he will definitely disappear with the rest of his „ padding” brethren from the legislative.

Epilogue with Serafim Urechean I have considered as futile the inclusion of Serafim Urechean in a separate chapter of the same research due to a simple reason that earlier on we had more opportunities to tackle in a detailed way him and his acolytes from his formation that is called today Our Moldova Alliance. The cycle of articles published during 2008 in „Flux” in the column „Who is who in Moldovan politics or why the nomenclature can’t be in opposition?”, taken again in the book „Dinosaurs of soviet regime, devils of Moldovan corruption”, as well as the series of pamphlets issued under the title „Self-whipping of soviet dinosaurs or repentance of transition’s devils”, written by the undersigned, characterizes quite ample the identity profile of this politician and his fellows. Those willing to get familiarised with this texts could do so by accessing the webpage www.ppcd.md . I shall just point, apropos, that this political grouping is eminently a one of clientage, corrupted and formed of exponents of former soviet and party nomenclature and also of venal officials from former after-independence governments, and Urechean personally remains to be closely linked with the political circles from Moscow and Tiraspol. As we pointed out above, the relative success achieved by the former Bloc „Democratic Moldova” in parliamentary elections held in 2005 was due, basically, to the following three factors: 1. Political, financial and media support provided by Moscow; 2. Holding by Urechean the position of Chişinău’s general mayor, key-position in state hierarchy of the country; 3. Exploitation of electorate’s sympathies for the idea of unification of the democratic forces as alternative to the communist governance. The closer this Parliament’s mandate is nearing its end, the clearer it is that meanwhile Urechean has lost practically all advantages he had four years ago. It is obvious that in perspective of elections in 2009, Moscow will support pre-eminently other favourites, launched relatively recently with new political projects and, as it’s hoped, more attractive for electorate. These are first of all the Liberal-Democratic Party, headed Filat, and the Centrist Union of Moldova, headed by Vasile Tarlev. These political creatures were conceived symmetrically, the Filat’s group saving the role of vote-collector from those with pro-European and philo-Romanian visions, and the Tarlev’s one – from those nostalgic ones, voters with anti25

European and pro-Russian visions. Both these entities shall be propelled in the Parliament and join in a post-electoral coalition, possibly, beside other pro-Russian parties. One may see e.g. how those two twin groups are intensively promoted by the newspaper of Tiraspol’s secessionists which is published in Chişinău „Kommersant Plus” and the site also controlled by Russian services www.ava.md. We shall point out, by the way, to the comic coincidence of two initiatives launched practically concomitantly by Filat and Tarlev. Both of them favoured the revision of the Constitution in order to change the way of electing the country’s president so as to come back to the election of the head of state through direct vote. One shouldn’t forget that this constitutional change was operated by the Parliament in 2000, exactly when the then head of state Petru Lucinschi was preparing to win for the second time the presidential elections and to considerably widen, similarly to the Asian pattern, his competences. The appearance of this initiative on the agenda of both of these „fresh” party leaders, who otherwise simulate rather successfully being on diametrically opposed positions, disclose the simple fact that the theses concerned was served to them also by Lucinschi, who actually remains to be their shadowy boss. Even the idea of changing the electoral system, when half of MPs shall be elected on party lists, and another half – in uninominal constituency, which is being circulated in duet by Filat and Tarlev, is not just a coincidence. This idea is also brought out from an older political arsenal of the idem Lucinschi, and the one, who reminds with which ideas were defiling his political marionettes about seven-eight years, knows well that this is rightly so. The one who has doubts, may make an effort and consult the media from that time, in particular „Săptămâna” and the dead „De facto”. And in order to check the platform coincidences concerning the direct election of the president of the republic, as well as the change of electoral system into a mixed one, it is sufficient to access the already mentioned webpage of these two Siamese brothers, i.e. www.pldm.nd and www.tarlev.md . Of course, even if Filat and Tarlev appear as main favourites of Moscow in perspective of the future electoral campaign, who will benefit from the biggest support, all signs are leading to the univocal conclusion according to which Serafim Urechean, Dumitru Braghiş and Dumitru Diacov remain the politicians obedient to the Russian interests. Evidently, in case these entities chaired by them penetrate the Parliament, they shall then be brought, together with the other two, into a post-electoral parliamentary majority, the task of which shall be reduced to the election a president who would be sufficiently docile to the imperial interests of Kremlin. And the immediate interest of Moscow in the region is to legalise its military presence by transforming the contingent on the left bank of Nistru into military basis. Thus the Russian strategists hope to create an additional obstacle on the path of NATO’s enlargement and also to be able to influence directly not just the situation in Moldova but also that in Ukraine and in the whole Balkan region. In these conditions, the governance as such of a party that is entitled as communist awakens reaction of rejection both in western circles and among many citizens of the country who disown the communism and identify the old former regime
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of occupation with the present ruling party. Thus, the fertile soil being created by it self, the anticommunism for show and simulation of the stand of opposition stand, of democratic alternative to the current governance became the hobby horse of all exnomenclaturists and political adventurers. Nevertheless, in our opinion the political entity headed by Urechean, which is in continuous and rapid erosion and disaggregation, with a narrow-minded and out run leader, surrounded by profit-makers incapable to manage efficiently a viable political process, with a gravely compromised image, risks to face a catastrophic fall of its rating. The great bid which is made in AOM case is whether in those remaining several months until elections will be sufficient to push under the 6% threshold the wrecking embarkation of Urechean. In a way or another, if the grouping of Urechean won’t be a part of the future governance, and this seems to us as being unavoidable, then this artificial political construction will incurably disaggregate and will have to have the same destiny as other groups of clientage, created from „up to down”, based on utilisation of administrative factor and purchasing votes on money by offering some sponsorships to mayors, priests, school directors and other exponents of various territorial institutions, which weigh such politicians are trying to make use of . Thus, we may see with a free eye that after the BDM is cracked and it’s over, the electoral campaign may be followed by disaggregation and termination of the former components of this bloc of 2005 elections, which we dealt with in this research. 5th of January 2008 Iurie Roşca

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