Port Security Aff


1AC – Inherency
First, Ports are underfunded now—hurts competitiveness and national security MAR, 3-7-12
*Maritime Activity Reports, Press Release, “Ports Urge Congress to Support Port Security Grants.” Online, http://www.marinelink.com/news/congress-security-support342938.aspx] MB At two separate Congressional hearings, representatives of the American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA) emphasized the need for federal support for seaport security and maintenance and improvements to federal navigation channels. Port industry leaders illustrated the challenges underfunding security and dredging pose for national security and U.S. international competitiveness.¶ ¶ As the House Appropriations Committee begins work on the Fiscal Year 2013 budget, AAPA executives reminded Congressional leaders of the critical role ports play for the nation – serving as a front line of defense on international borders and facilitating overseas trade, 99 percent of which moves by water. ¶ ¶ Captain John Holmes, Deputy Executive Director of Operations at the Port of Los Angeles, testified before the Homeland Security Subcommittee regarding Port Security Grants within the Federal Emergency Management Agency. ¶ “The fiscal year 2012 funding level represents a 59 percent cut from the prior year and 75 percent less than the authorized level,” Holmes stated. “This will harm our ability to expand protection of our maritime assets, carry out Port-Wide Risk Management Plans, and fund federal mandates, such as installation of TWIC readers.”¶ ¶ Kurt Nagle, President and CEO, submitted testimony to the Energy and Water Subcommittee on the budget for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Civil Works program. The testimony focused on the need for full use of the Harbor Maintenance Tax annual revenue for maintenance dredging and the need to adequately fund needed channel deepening projects. ¶ ¶ “The federal government has a unique Constitutional responsibility to maintain and improve the infrastructure which enables the flow of commerce, and much of that infrastructure in and around seaports have been neglected for too long, particularly the capacity of the federal channels, which affects the ports’ ability to move cargo efficiently into and out of the U.S,” Nagle wrote. “This hurts U.S. business, hurts U.S. workers, and hurts our national economy.”

And, reforms to the Port Security Grant Program are needed, Changing grant structure is key to effective port security investment and preparedness against terrorist attacks—reforms are key GAO, 2011
*Government accountability office report to congress, “PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM¶ Risk Model, Grant Management, and Effectiveness ¶ Measures Could Be Strengthened.” November 2011, Online, http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587142.pdf] MB FEMA has faced several challenges in distributing PSGP grant funds, and FEMA has ¶ implemented specific steps to overcome these challenges. Only about one-quarter of ¶ awarded grant funding has been drawn down by grantees, and an additional onequarter remains unavailable (see table below). Funding is unavailable—meaning that ¶ grantees cannot begin using the funds to work on projects—for two main reasons: ¶ federal requirements have not been met (such as environmental reviews), or the port ¶ area has not yet identified projects to fund with the grant monies. Several challenges ¶ contributed to funds being unavailable. For example, DHS was slow to review costshare waiver requests— requests from grantees to forego the cost-share requirement. ¶ Without a more expedited

waiver review process, grant applicants that cannot afford ¶ the cost-share may not apply for important security projects. Other challenges ¶ included managing multiple open grant rounds, complying with program ¶ requirements, and using an antiquated grants management system. FEMA has taken ¶ steps to address these challenges. For example FEMA and DHS have, among other ¶ things, increased staffing levels, introduced project submission time frames, ¶ implemented new procedures for environmental reviews, and implemented phase ¶ one of a new grants management system. However, it is too soon to determine how ¶ successful these efforts will be in improving the distribution of grant funds. ¶ FEMA is developing performance measures to assess its administration of the PSGP ¶ but it has not implemented measures to assess PSGP grant effectiveness. Although ¶ FEMA has taken initial steps to develop measures to assess the effectiveness of its ¶ grant programs, it does not have a plan and related milestones for implementing ¶ measures specifically for the PSGP. Without such a plan, it may be difficult for FEMA ¶ to effectively manage the process of implementing measures to assess whether the ¶ PSGP is achieving its stated purpose of strengthening critical maritime infrastructure ¶ against risks associated with potential terrorist attacks.

1AC – Plan
Thus the plan: The United States Federal Government should implement Government Accountability Office reforms for risk assessment management to the Port Security Grant Program to award $400 Million in unused grant funds for port security infrastructure investment

We found that PSGP allocations were highly correlated to risk for the grant years we examined and DHS has taken steps to strengthen the PSGP risk allocation model by improving the quality and precision of the data inputs. FEMA has not evaluated the effectiveness of the program because it does not have measures to track progress towards achieving program goals.1AC – Solvency Reforms are key to ensure all FEMA PSGP grant money is effectively allocated— key to port security GAO. “PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM¶ Risk Model. While FEMA may not consider draw down levels to be an accurate measure of progress made in improving port security.¶ • . Additionally.pdf] MB Port areas have unique characteristics—they are centers of commerce. The Port Security Grant Program (PSGP)—administered by FEMA and supported with subject matter expertise from the Coast Guard—is one tool DHS uses to protect critical maritime infrastructure from these risks. hubs of transportation. about a quarter of the awarded funding remains unavailable due to delays in using grant funds. These characteristics result in specific vulnerabilities that must be addressed to avoid the human or economic losses that would result from a terrorist attack. draw down levels for the PSGP are low—with about one-quarter of fiscal year 2006 through 2010 grant monies drawn down as of September 2011. To strengthen DHS’s methodology for measuring vulnerability in ports. about $400 million in awarded grant funding remains unavailable to grantees for port security projects. Grant Management. Without a plan. FEMA awarded nearly $1. Risk management has been endorsed by the federal government to help direct finite resources to areas of greatest risk and grant programs have provided substantial resources toward this effort. However. this measure has become the de facto yardstick for assessing progress in securing our ports because no other measures exist. However. While the allocation process has been risk. For example.gov/assets/590/587142. and incorporate these changes into future iterations of the PSGP risk model.7 billion in port security grants for fiscal years 2006 through 2010. and Effectiveness ¶ Measures Could Be Strengthened. challenges with the cost-match and associated waiver process. Initial steps have been taken to develop performance measures for the PSGP. http://www. and often close to major population centers. We are making four recommendations to help strengthen the implementation and oversight of the PSGP.¶ FEMA has taken steps to improve the availability of funds and has developed internal performance measures to begin evaluating its administration of the grant program. and challenges that grantees have had complying with postaward requirements. there is little assurance that these measures will be implemented in a timely way to assess the program’s effectiveness in ensuring that critical port infrastructure is protected. but the time frame for implementing them is unclear. and to improve the precision of grant allocations to high-risk port areas. To establish a more accurate measurement of grant effectiveness. FEMA should expedite its efforts to implement performance measures for the PSGP. 2011 [Government accountability office report to congress. additional efforts—such as accounting for how new security measures affect port vulnerability and using the most precise data available in the risk model—could further strengthen the model and build upon the progress made. we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the FEMA Administrator to:¶ • Develop a vulnerability index that accounts for how security improvements affect port vulnerability.based.” November 2011.gao. however. FEMA has faced significant challenges administering the grant program. As a result. Online.

further improvements ¶ are needed to ensure that the vulnerability score for a specific port is ¶ responsive to changes in security that may occur in that port—such as ¶ the implementation of new security measures. and apply this ¶ vulnerability measure in future iterations of the grant allocation model.¶ 26¶ Instead. http://www. “PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM¶ Risk Model. the PSGP risk model held vulnerability ¶ constant.gov/assets/590/587142. which reduced the value of the model in estimating risk. DHS modified the vulnerability index in the fiscal year 2011 PSGP ¶ model such that vulnerability is no longer held constant.¶ 25¶ Regarding both ¶ models—which are similar in structure to the PSGP risk model—we ¶ recommended that DHS formulate a method to measure vulnerability in a ¶ manner that captures variations across jurisdictions. To ¶ respond to these recommendations and other external feedback ¶ regarding the grant programs. We have ¶ reported on the value of measuring vulnerability in risk analysis models in ¶ two prior reports. which recognize the number . 2011 [Government accountability office report to congress.¶ To strengthen the administration. And. This ¶ limitation is due to the fact that the data elements within the vulnerability ¶ index are counts of activities. Reform of the risk assessment model for providing grants solves port security—ensures the best data is used to direct grants properly GAO. the ¶ new vulnerability index recognizes that different ports can have different ¶ vulnerability levels. we reported that DHS chose to hold ¶ vulnerability constant and consider all states and urban areas equally ¶ vulnerable in the HSGP risk analysis model. Prior to fiscal year 2011. Online. and to streamline processes. we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the FEMA Administrator to develop—in collaboration with the Coast Guard—time frames and related milestones for implementing performance measures to monitor the effectiveness of the PSGP. we reported that DHS also ¶ chose to consider all transit agencies equally vulnerable in its Transit ¶ Security Grant Program (TSGP) risk analysis model. In June 2008. Grant Management.pdf] MB In fiscal year 2011.Coordinate with the Coast Guard to determine the most precise data available to populate the data elements within the vulnerability index and to utilize these data as an interim measure. The fiscal year 2011 ¶ PSGP risk model is provided in full in appendix II.gao. we recommend that the FEMA Administrator—in conjunction with the Office of the Secretary of Homeland Security—evaluate the waiver review process to identify sources of delay and take measures to expedite the process. Although FEMA has taken the first step towards improving how port ¶ vulnerability is measured in the PSGP risk model. In the fiscal year 2011 PSGP model. port vulnerability ¶ is assessed using four data components thought to influence a port’s ¶ vulnerability to attack. oversight.¶ 24¶ In June 2009. until a revised vulnerability index is developed.” November 2011. as shown below in table 4. and Effectiveness ¶ Measures Could Be Strengthened.¶ To ensure that waiver requests—including those submitted under previous cost-share years in which money remains unassigned and those that may be submitted in future grant rounds if a cost-share requirement is applied—are evaluated promptly. rather than accounting for differences across ports. and internal controls of the PSGP. even if ¶ those security measures were funded using PSGP grant dollars. but ¶ additional changes could improve how vulnerability is measured in the ¶ model. The fiscal year 2011 ¶ vulnerability index does not provide a mechanism to account for how new ¶ security measures—such as the installation of cameras or the provision of ¶ additional training to security officials —affect a port’s vulnerability. DHS modified how port vulnerability—the relative ¶ exposure to an attack— is calculated in the PSGP risk model. and to produce a more complete risk ¶ picture.

Incorporating completed security projects ¶ into the vulnerability component of the risk model could help increase its ¶ robustness and more accurately direct allocations to the highest risk port ¶ areas. The MSRAM data—¶ which are updated annually— provide information to the model on the ¶ percentage of national high-risk assets that reside within each port.¶ However. the new camera ¶ system would not reduce the port’s vulnerability score as calculated by ¶ the risk model. FEMA officials reported that capturing data ¶ on all security improvements would be challenging due to the need to ¶ collect and validate data for all ports included in the PSGP risk model. for example. one would expect to reduce the ¶ ferry system’s vulnerability to attack. Thus. Instead. a port ¶ could only reduce its vulnerability score by reducing the number of ¶ passengers utilizing the ferry system. if a port installed security cameras throughout a ferry system to ¶ monitor vessel or ferry passenger activity.¶ The National Infrastructure Protection Plan states that when measuring ¶ vulnerability. FEMA officials acknowledged the importance of incorporating ¶ completed security projects as part of the vulnerability component of the ¶ risk model and stated that FEMA will continue to refine its vulnerability ¶ assessments. including ¶ those funded through the PSGP. the risk model would likely continue to recognize the ¶ same ports as the highest risk. As such. regardless of the security improvements ¶ made in those ports. .of activities ¶ that may occur—such as how many ferry passengers board a ferry—but ¶ do not account for the protective actions taken to secure them. The model’s robustness is thereby ¶ limited because activity counts do not reflect improvements made to port ¶ security. MSRAM is not designed. Without accounting for the reductions in vulnerability ¶ achieved through new security measures implemented in a port. However. In addition. to ¶ evaluate security projects that may affect multiple assets in a port. with this type of measure. ¶ It is important to note that some security improvements may be captured ¶ by the inclusion of the Coast Guard’s Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM) results in the PSGP risk model. MSRAM does not account for all types of security ¶ improvements because it is an asset-based model that assesses ¶ improvements to individual port assets such as a ferry terminal or a ¶ chemical plant. the robustness of the risk model may be ¶ limited and not accurately reflect the relative risk of port areas throughout ¶ the nation. the security benefits of the¶ PSGP are also not recognized. by not accounting for security ¶ improvements resulting from PSGP grants.¶ However. because the “ferry ¶ passenger” data element within the model’s vulnerability index is simply a ¶ count of passengers utilizing the ferry system and is not a reflection of the ¶ security measures in place to protect the ferry system. in this example. For ¶ example. one should describe all protective measures in place and ¶ how they reduce vulnerability.

only two to five percent of ¶ containers shipped around the world are physically inspected at their ¶ port of arrival. terrorists have shown themselves to be frighteningly inventive. 2008 *Peter.html] MB MILLIONS of cargo containers are unloaded from ships each year at American seaports.com/2012/06/27/opinion/thedangerous-delay-on-port-security. MARKEY and BENNIE G. all maritime cargo bound for the United States must be scanned before it is loaded on ships.rand. Most commentators generally agree that terrorist ¶ contingencies involving this class of vessel are more likely to involve ¶ exploitation of the cargo supply chain than attacks directed against ¶ carriers themselves. “The maritime dimension of international security: terrorism. but also relatively easy. whether it ever plans to comply with the law. Reflecting this. piracy. the statistical probability of successfully ¶ smuggling a weapon or bomb is much greater than the probability of ¶ intercepting one.”¶ But for the past five years. the expansive global container-shipping complex offers ¶ terrorists a logistical channel that favors the covert movement of weapons and personnel.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG697.¶ 25¶ Simply put.¶ 24¶ By contrast. providing countless opportunities for terrorists to smuggle and unleash a nuclear bomb or weapon of mass destruction on our shores.” Online. Terrorist attacks on ports are coming and we are lagging behind in security now Nadler et all. and it is not clear to us.¶ 28¶ Compounding the situation is the highly rudimentary ¶ nature of the locks that are used to seal containers. to comply with the law. they also have a ¶ high waterline.¶ Over the years. Unlike other cargo vessels that typically handle payloads for a ¶ single customer loaded at port. RAND corporation. http://www. They have hidden explosives in printer cartridges transported by air and embedded explosives in the shoes and underwear of airline passengers. there would be ¶ no way of ensuring that the targeted crate would be loaded and placed ¶ in a position that could allow a bomb to be detonated with maximum ¶ effect. which means that a considerable quantity of explosives ¶ would be needed to cause a critical breach. and challenges for the United States. Even if sufficient quanti ties could be smuggled aboard hidden in a container. “Cargo. the Terrorists’ Trojan Horse.¶ 26¶ Just as importantly. As the Harvard political scientist Graham T.¶ 27¶ Each point of ¶ transfer along this spectrum of movement is a potential source of vulnerability for the overall integrity of the cargo and provides extremists with numerous opportunities to “stuff” or otherwise tamper with ¶ boxed crates. Online. as the authors of the law. And. The cargo containers arriving on ships from foreign ports offer terrorists a Trojan horse for a devastating attack on the United States.pdf] MB Finally. a nuclear attack is “far more likely to arrive in a cargo container than on the tip of a missile. NADLER. This is largely because the ¶ international trading system is deliberately designed to be as open and ¶ accessible as possible (to keep costs low and turnover high). container ships deal with commodities from hundreds of companies and individuals that. logistically and diplomatically. 6-26-12 [JERROLD L. NYT contributors. the Department of Homeland Security has done little to counter this threat and instead has wasted precious time arguing that it would be too expensive and too difficult. Allison has put it. in most cases are received and transported from inland warehouses. EDWARD J. Merchant craft are not only large. Congress passed a law five years ago mandating that by July 2012. This is unacceptable. To counter this threat. http://www. But the Obama administration will miss this deadline. the nature of container shipping industry makes terrorism likely Chalk.nytimes. the bulk of which ¶ consist of little more than plastic ties or bolts that can be . which necessarily means minimizing the disruptive impact of any security measures thereby instituted. leveraging container carriers for logistical purposes ¶ is not only viable. the highly complex nature of the containerized supply chain creates a plethora of openings for terrorist infiltration.1AC – Terrorism First. THOMPSON.

“Maritime Security:¶ Potential Terrorist Attacks¶ and Protection Priorities. Coast Guard.S. Many littoral states fail to routinely vet ¶ dock workers. both because it is virtually impossible to inspect containers once they are on the high seas ¶ and due to the fact that only a tiny fraction of boxed freight is actually ¶ checked on arrival at its destination.¶ Government Accountability Office (GAO) analyst testified before Congress in 2006. Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service. They come in standard sizes from 20 to 53 feet long. who is a former Commandant of the U. The absence of uniform and concerted dockside safeguards ¶ works to the direct advantage of the terrorist. although the most common are 40 feet or longer—about the size of a truck semi-trailer. making it impossible for government authorities to ensure that only legitimate cargo has been packed.fas. office buildings. especially in and around ports. outlines a scenario that most concerns him: Let me share with you the terrorist . propane tankers) or community (e. refineries. sports¶ complexes.¶ 30¶ do not require that truck drivers present valid identification before entering an offloading facility.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787.. shipping containers are relatively large.S. http://www. “Maritime Security:¶ Potential Terrorist Attacks¶ and Protection Priorities.¶ 23¶ In addition to vessels and infrastructure..¶ 24¶ Because the characteristics of infrastructure targets or human targets may be unique¶ to any specific category of target (e.” Prepared for members of congress. and other critical infrastructure.¶ dams and locks.g. 2007 [Paul and John. port among the hazard scenarios it developed¶ in 2004 as the basis for U.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787. And.¶ Ports contain a number of specific facilities that could be targeted by terrorists. homeland security national preparedness standards. There are numerous possibilities. port is one of the threats most specifically and frequently mentioned by legislators in the context of maritime security.” Prepared for members of congress.¶ 29 Underscoring all of these considerations is the ineffectiveness of ¶ point of origin inspections. cruise ships. http://www. Resources. passenger ferries.S. understanding how target characteristics relate to terrorist capabilities¶ and objectives may offer valuable insights into the credibility of particular attack¶ scenarios. And. the containers on any given ship are packed at the factories or warehouses of many different companies that can be dispersed far and wide from the loading port.S.¶ Charleston).S. The potential smuggling and detonation of a nuclear or dirty bomb device in a shipping container at a U. specifically port infrastructure attacks are likely Parfomak and Frittelli.pdf] Method of Delivery. during which the integrity of the shipments rests entirely on the trustworthiness or due diligence of the truck drivers. The¶ Homeland Security Council included terrorist attacks on ships carrying flammable¶ and toxic chemical cargoes in a U. online. 3-14-2007.¶ 31¶ and frequently over look the need to ensure that all cargo is accompanied by an accurate ¶ manifest.quickly cut ¶ and then reattached using a combination of superglue and heat.fas. power plants. 3-14-2007. online. terminals. Third. terrorists may seek to attack maritime¶ communities using ships as delivery vehicles for WMDs or by exploiting chemicals¶ or explosives in cargo ships or onshore storage tanks in populated port areas. the containers are typically trucked to the port of loading. the risk of terrorists smuggling in nuclear weapons through shipping containers extremely high—many steps in container loading process that could allow terrorist infiltration Parfomak and Frittelli. factories. Second.¶ including military vessels and bases.89 Shipping containers may be particularly vulnerable to terrorist infiltration compared to other types of cargo for three reasons.pdf] Another key aspect of maritime terrorism scenarios is identifying potential¶ targets. A maritime security expert at the Council on Foreign Relations. 2007 [Paul and John. As a U. First.g. Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service. Resources.

http://www. A local truck driver. Terrorists can build the a Hiroshima style nuke – materials are available and technical skills aren’t needed Mendalia. others fear that¶ terrorists could do so. U. for example. the operatives load a dirty bomb wrapped in lead shielding. “Maritime Security:¶ Potential Terrorist Attacks¶ and Protection Priorities. especially HEU. The Hiroshima bomb was a “gun assembly” weapon. Detonating the explosive shot one mass of HEU into the other. or HEU) next to the explosive. online. The container doors are shut and a mechanical seal is put into the door pad-eyes. A container of athletic foot wear for a name brand company is loaded at a manufacturing plant in Surabaya.S. Indonesia. Defense.pdf] Terrorist attacks on U. and Trade Division.”¶ 8¶ Many believe¶ it would be hard for a terrorist group to obtain enough HEU for a weapon.77 A2003 simulation of a series of such attacks concluded that they “could cripple global trade and have a devastating impact on the nation’s economy. And. “Terrorist Nuclear Attacks on Seaports: ¶ Threat and Response.) This is the simplest type of nuclear weapon. The container and seal numbers are recorded at the factory. scientists had such¶ high confidence in the design that they did not test the Hiroshima bomb.”¶ 7¶ A National Research Council study stated: “The basic technical information needed to¶ construct a workable nuclear device is readily available in the open literature. and they then refasten the door. a mass of uranium highly enriched in the¶ isotope 235 (highly enriched uranium. These designer sneakers are destined for retail stores in malls across America. The National Research Council study rated the threat level from¶ SNM from Russia as “High — large inventories of SNM are stored at many sites that¶ apparently lack inventory controls and indigenous threats have increased.fas. On the way to the port.scenario that most keeps me awake at night..S. Some of the sneakers are removed and in their place. nuclear non-proliferation experts expressed their beliefs (on average) that there was a 25% chance of a dirty bomb attack in the United States by 2010 . http://www.. and a second HEU¶ mass at the other end. ports with radiological dispersion devices (“dirty” bombs)is also considered among the gravest maritime terrorism scenarios. In a 2005 survey. he turns into an alleyway and backs up the truck at a nondescript warehouse where a small team of operatives pry loose one of the door hinges to open the container so that they can gain access to the shipment. Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service.¶ rapidly assembling a mass large enough to support a fission chain reaction. sympathetic to al Qaeda picks up the container.pdf] MB Build a Bomb. (Plutonium¶ cannot be used. Its nuclear¶ explosive was a gun barrel about 6 inches in diameter by 6 feet long.” Prepared for members of congress. i. Five former Los Alamos nuclear weapons experts held that¶ such a weapon “could be constructed by a group not previously engaged in designing or¶ building nuclear weapons.e. providing a number of requirements were adequately met.org/irp/crs/RS21293. 2005 [Jonathan..org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787. It was capped at¶ each end.”¶ 9 And independently dirty bomb attacks on Ports are extremely likely—they are coming now by 2015 Parfomak and Frittelli. Specialist in National Defense¶ Foreign Affairs. fissile plutonium¶ or HEU). 3-14-2007. with standard explosive at one end.”78 Many terrorism analysts view such a dirty bomb attack as relatively likely. Experts agree11¶ that terrorist groups could not make special nuclear material (SNM. Many believe that a terrorist group with access to HEU and key skills could¶ build a crude nuclear weapon. Resources.fas. Online.” CRS report for congress.. The¶ primary impediment that prevents countries or technically competent terrorist groups from¶ developing nuclear weapons is the availability of SNM. 2007 [Paul and John.

82 And. dirty bomb attacks are just as bad as nuclear attacks BERES IN ‘94 (Prof.81 Port operators have testified before Congress that they believe “it is just a question of time” before terrorists with dirty bombs successfully attack a U. Additionally. U. port. and possibly the survival of civilization itself. the health of economic [*67] development. that would-be users of radiological weapons would favor plutonium over radioactive fission products. n25 Perhaps the most significant dangers that evolve from modern day terrorism are those relating to the safety. LN//] Radiological weapons are not as widely understood as nuclear explosives. p.and a 40% chance of such an attack by 2015. therefore. and rights of ordinary people. Radiological weapons are devices designed to disperse radioactive materials that have been produced a substantial time before their dispersal. nuclear terrorism risks extinction ALEXANDER (Dir. It is more likely. but they may be equally ominous in their effects.. the expansion of democracy. Such weapons. The targets against which terrorists might choose to use radiological weapons include concentrations of people inside buildings.79 Studies suggest that the materials required to make a dirty bomb may be widely available and poorly controlled internationally. “Terrorism in the 21st Century”.5 ounces of plutonium could prove lethal to everyone within a large office building or factory) or devices designed to disperse other radioactive materials. welfare. the stability of the state system.S. the dispersal of spent nuclear reactor fuel and the fission products separated from reactor fuels would create grave hazards in a populated area. urban areas with a high population density as a whole. concentrations of people on urban streets or at sporting events. and global security concerns. This is because it would be easier for terrorists to achieve nuclear capability with radiological weapons. and British intelligence agencies have reportedly concluded that Al Qaeda has succeeded in making such a bomb.S. Spring. The threat of nuclear terrorism involving radiological weapons is potentially more serious than the threat involving nuclear explosives. therefore. The form such weapons might take include plutonium dispersal devices (only 3. Political Science. Placed in the hands of 8955*27 terrorists. such weapons could pose a lethal hazard for human beings anywhere in the world.80 According to some press reports. Even a world already dominated by every variety of numbing could not fail to recoil from such a prospect. “On International Law and Nuclear Terrorism. Depaul Business Law Journal. present-day terrorists have introduced into contemporary life a new scale of terror violence in terms of both threats and responses that has made clear that we have entered into an Age of Terrorism with all of its serious implications to national.” 24Georgia Jounral of International and Comparative Law 1. could also be the subject of a more plausible hoax than nuclear explosives. but the handling of such materials would be very dangerous to terrorists themselves. Purdue University) ‘94 *Louis Rene. ln] More specifically. regional. and agricultural areas. Inter-University Center for Terrorism) 2000 *Yonah. In principle. And. a terror attack causes retaliation and freak-out that ensues will guarantee extinction – draws in Russia and China and causes massive nuclear war Ayson 10 .

But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation. when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality. how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks. the U. Issue 7. if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal. the so-called n+1 problem. could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. In that situation. perhaps Iran if its program continues. there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. identifiable and collectable. “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects. Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington. Indeed. on a higher stage of alert. For example. in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States. In this context. and possibly Pakistan. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack. the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. Volume 33. and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces. however remote. and especially an act of nuclear terrorism. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. its radioactivity makes it detectable. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments. including its nuclear arsenal. if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise. it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U. today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France. and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place.”41 Alternatively. most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from. July. and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture. in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack. not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. For example.40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld] /Wyo-MB A terrorist nuclear attack. and probably Israel and India as well. could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course. or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war. As part of its initial response to the . The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States. Some possibilities.[Robert. For example. the temptations to preempt such actions might grow. do suggest themselves. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion. as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. the materials used and. In such a tense environment.S.S.

If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect. for some reason. what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use. there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades. what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If. According to ¶ the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets. 2011 [Government accountability office report to congress. They are also potential conduits for weapons prepared ¶ elsewhere and concealed in cargo designed to move quickly to many ¶ locations beyond the ports themselves.S. is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them. and an attack on this system could have a ¶ widespread impact on global shipping. and the global ¶ economy. and Effectiveness ¶ Measures Could Be Strengthened. or decided to threaten the use of. the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China. the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. it may be informative to reverse the tables. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya. and ¶ cargo ships present potentially . increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. albeit a slim one. Finally. and perhaps even offensive to contemplate. Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming. But there is just a chance. the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. In response. and ¶ vessels are part of an economic engine handling more than $700 billion in ¶ merchandise annually. the nation’s ports have ¶ been viewed as potential targets of attack for many reasons. “PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM¶ Risk Model.pdf] MB Since the terrorist attacks of September 11. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo. which seems quite plausible. They might surmise. that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response. which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind.” November 2011. 2001. Additionally. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russia’s use of nuclear weapons. ports often are not only gateways for the ¶ movement of goods. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. international trade. (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group. including outside Russia’s traditional sphere of influence? And if not. both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. For example. nuclear weapons. where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint. Online. or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway. presenting additional opportunities for terrorists intending to harm ¶ U. interests. but also industrial hubs and close to population ¶ centers. waterways. Grant Management.gov/assets/590/587142. tankers.act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Further. perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear. If some readers find this simply too fanciful. http://www. Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters.gao. how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase “how dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to mind. Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort. ports. and indeed the leading state in the international system. would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack. to do so. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. for example. but an entirely different thing for a state actor. cruise ships. and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. Russia. effective PGSP funding is necessary to solve a terrorist attack emanating from US ports GAO.

. and ¶ improve recovery and resiliency through the development of security ¶ plans. the federal government has provided almost ¶ $2. The Coast Guard provides subject matter ¶ expertise to FEMA on the maritime industry to inform grant award ¶ decisions. To strengthen the security of the nation’s ports against risks associated ¶ with potential terrorist attacks. and to further capabilities to prevent. to train and exercise. Balancing security concerns with the need to facilitate the free ¶ flow of people and commerce remains an ongoing challenge for the public ¶ and private sectors alike. Since the program’s ¶ inception in fiscal year 2002. or disruption of ¶ commerce. and private entities to ¶ increase portwide risk management. and the provision of security ¶ training to employees.5 billion in PSGP funding to state. local. detect. enhance domain awareness. The PSGP is to provide funding to the nation’s highest risk port ¶ areas to support increased portwide risk management. environmental damage. to enhance ¶ domain awareness. the purchase of security equipment. to expand port recovery and ¶ resiliency capabilities. and recover from attacks involving improvised explosive ¶ devices and other nonconventional weapons. DHS administers the Port Security Grant ¶ Program (PSGP) through its component agency. the Federal Emergency ¶ Management Agency (FEMA). respond to.desirable terrorist targets given the ¶ potential for loss of life.

Inherency .

and that " if the port fails. Since the Sept. a Republican. terrorist attacks. cut. joined her. and should be of major concern for the American people. That. their funding is either unspent." . "Why would we go backwards?" she asked. Standing in the port in front of a foreign cargo ship. in protecting America's ports . Broward Sheriff Al Lamberti.5 million for Port Everglades." Democratic Congresswoman Debbie Wasserman Schultz blasted Republicans' proposed 2011 budget Monday. should be our focus. office says. unspent. "This means the Obama Administration has failed to allocate $1. along with the fact that Congressional Democrats failed to pass a budget last year. 11.4 billion dollars remains ready for us. Wasserman Schultz. but pay for new projects and technology. 3/8/11. with heavy trucks roaring by. she said "a tight web of security" at the nation's ports is essential to the safety of the community. Accessed online via Proquest] "1.” Web. saying the port is Broward County's economic engine. D.Inherency – Inefficient Funding Now Funding is being allocated inefficiently—while ports are vital to national security. the country fails. said a two-thirds slicing of the national Port Security Grant Program would translate to a loss of $1." a statement from his Washington. 2001. Those grants are not used for day-to-day security.C. D-Weston. Port Everglades security has been beefed up substantially.. South Florida Sentinel. or forgotten Wallman 11 *Brittany. and also to the economy. “Wasserman Schultz Blasts Port Security Budget Cuts.4 billion into port security. saying one of the many cuts would crimp security at Port Everglades and in ports across the country.

" said Kurt Nagle. enhancements to perimeter security. public port authorities have made terrorism detection and prevention one of their top priorities. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). could impact the current security capabilities of many U.S. America's seaports and the federal government have joined forces to make major gains in fortifying and hardening port facilities against intruder attack." Security Improvements Significant. American Association of Port Authorities' president and CEO. access control and credentialing systems. America's ports and their terminal operators have invested billions of dollars into security personnel and training. and safe. ports as well as hamper their ability to carry out their five-year port protection plans. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). To implement the security measures in this legislation. the lumping of port grant funds with other State and Local Program grants-such those for first responders. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Domestic Nuclear Protection Office. "Regrettably. which includes the Port Security Grant Program. 11. seaports have been a vital part of this nation's transportation infrastructure." He added. Ports” Accessed online via lexis+ In the decade since Sept. "With the death of Bin Laden. vessel tracking and underwater threat detection systems.S.S. Coast Guard. Furthermore. urban areas and transit systems-will likely result in even less funding for port security. But Costs High The comprehensive Maritime Transportation Security Act Port Act of 2006 changed the way ports handle cargo and passenger movements. Since then. and limit infrastructure construction costs to 10 percent of the grant total. such as ports. Security Still a Top Priority of U. interoperable communications technology. With the combined efforts of port authorities and initiatives of federal agencies within the FBI and Department of Homeland Security (DHS). ports are significantly safer now than prior to 9/11. “10 Years After 9/11. including the U. critical infrastructure facilities. AAPA has urged DHS to streamline their processes and get funding out more quickly.S. Although insufficient security grant funding is a chief concern among ports. management and policing personnel expenses (representing the highest ongoing cost for security at most ports). the more than 50 percent funding level cut recommended for FEMA's State and Local Program grants. In addition to making continued enhancements. "For centuries.Inherency – Security Ineffective Now Inefficient and slow grants and cost-share programs make current security ineffective PR Newswire 2011 *American Association of Port Authorities." pay 100 percent of their security program operations. and waterside security such as patrol boats. 2001. secure seaport facilities are critical to protecting our borders and moving goods. Transportation Security Administration (TSA). are being asked to be extra vigilant to protect against retaliatory terrorist attacks. there is also a significant concern about the time delay between when DHS announces grant awards and when it completes all reviews and gives grantees authority to begin their security improvements. ports. Consequently. in addition to the huge funding cuts proposed for fiscal 2012 and beyond. the Port Security Grant Program helps pay for maintaining and replacing our current security assets at ports. . the grants oftentimes require ports to pay a 25 percent "cost-share. While federal Port Security Grant Program funds have helped pay for the sweeping security overhaul at U.

Advantages .

Online. ¶ They contain not only terminals where goods bound for import or export ¶ are unloaded or loaded onto vessels. factories. Grant Management.Terrorism – Inherency – Risk High Terror risk high—ports are high value targets GAO. and Effectiveness ¶ Measures Could Be Strengthened. 2011 *Government accountability office report to congress. and interwoven with complex transportation networks ¶ designed to move cargo and commerce as quickly as possible (see fig 1). ¶ While no two ports in the United States are exactly alike.gao. and purchased cameras to ¶ reduce the potential for unauthorized entry and help prevent ¶ vulnerabilities from being exploited. port ¶ stakeholders are taking mitigation steps. http://www. easily accessible by water and land. “PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM¶ Risk Model. but also other facilities critical to the ¶ nation’s economy.pdf] MB The United States has approximately 360 commercial sea and river ports. hired security guards. For example. close to crowded ¶ metropolitan areas.” November 2011. . port stakeholders ¶ have installed fences. To ¶ reduce the opportunity for terrorists to exploit port vulnerabilities. such as refineries. and power plants. many share ¶ certain characteristics that make them vulnerable to terrorist attacks: they ¶ are sprawling.gov/assets/590/587142.

but have provided ominous glimpses of what they may be capable of—as in the failed airline attack involving the Nigerian. as patrons watched the World Cup soccer tournament. Bin Laden spent the last decade on the run following the al Qaeda-mounted terrorist attacks in the U.S. al Qaeda and its affiliates have found refuge in lawless pockets of the continent. his second in command. officials worry about the future of cooperation there if he steps down. or AQAP. after the fall of the Taliban.-born radical cleric who gained a following via his Internet sermons and who has become a key recruiter.S." said Leah Farrall. And there are numerous Islamic terror outfits not allied . al Qaeda had adapted itself to survive and operate without him.S. Radicalized converts don't seek permission from headquarters before acting. other high-profile jihadis—from Abu Musab al Zarqawi in Iraq to Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen— threatened to eclipse bin Laden as the global jihadist movement's most powerful spokesman.S. and other Western countries.S. bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. 5-3-2011 *Margaret and Keith. Mr. veterans of al Qaeda's Afghanistan operation helped establish franchises in places like Indonesia. Africa. or AQIM. http://online.com/article/SB10001424052748703703304576299041912668436. an Australian counterterrorism expert. has increasingly worried U. Some In Africa. a former director of the Central Intelligence Agency. part recruiting tool. Awlaki. "We've struck a substantial blow at part of the [radical Islamic] movement. allies such as Egypt and Yemen and giving terrorists potentially more operational breathing space. ensuring the threat his terror network poses will live well beyond his demise. the underwear bomber who attempted to blow up a U. He inspired Maj. bin Laden's former secretary in Afghanistan who escaped to Iran. led by Nasir al Wahishi. Kampala. He escaped from prison in 2006 and spearheaded the merger of the Saudi and Yemeni branches of al Qaeda in 2009. far from over. often working with minimal funding or sourcing funds from sympathizers independently from the main al Qaeda leadership. a U. offering advice and instruction for would-be bombers.S. in recent years. security analysts say. especially since it came in close-quarters combat with U. who went on a shooting spree at Fort Hood in Texas in 2009. but this is far.html] /WyoMB Long before Osama bin Laden's death. 11 attacks. The groups include Algeria-based al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Bin Laden's command largely moved out of Afghanistan in 2001. 11. Nidal Hasan. Southeast Asia and Europe. However. 2001. The most active offshoot group is al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. "His martyrdom has the potential to reinvigorate al Qaeda's brand among those already radicalized to the cause.-bound passenger plane on Christmas Day that year. own if the opportunity presented itself. While current President Ali Abdullah Saleh has been a less-than-perfect ally in the fight against AQAP.S. The new al Qaeda leaders in Yemen have surpassed their godfather by adapting their message for Western audiences. and subsequently extradited to Yemen in 2003. As the old guard was decimated. counterterrorism officials as one of al Qaeda's most dangerous leaders. from Somalia in the east to Mali in the west. could change that. Instead.S.-led invasion. on Sept. troops. Awlaki has been singled out by U.wsj." said James Woolsey. AQAP's ability to attempt fresh attacks against the U. it forced an evolution: The original group splintered. More than any other group. terror experts think AQAP may inherit al Qaeda central's mantle as the focal point of resistance to the U. Since the Sept.S. But their absence only served to diffuse operations over a wider collection of groups and individuals that carried on al Qaeda's mission around the Middle East. some U. which has been linked to several killings and kidnappings of Westerners in recent years. Abdulmutallab. In some ways this increased their effectiveness. Wahishi was buttressed in that regard by Anwar al-Awlaki. burnished by videotapes he released featuring him wearing his faded camouflage jacket and brandishing an AK-47 assault rifle. and many core players were caught or killed after the U. The cells appear to have little connection. were isolated.Terrorism – Inherency – Terrorism on the Rise Global terrorism on the rise Coker and Johnson. these disparate groups became increasingly autonomous. His death. Mr. encouraged their radicalized followers to strike on their Strong al Qaeda offshoots exist not just in hot spots such as Yemen. but increasingly in more far-flung locations. The subliminal message from AQAP is that new recruits don't need to seek military training in Pakistan or Yemen to score a hit against the "far enemy. Somalia and Indonesia. As time passed. such as Sweden and Norway. AQAP serves as connective tissue between al Qaeda branches in other regions. The expansion of al Qaeda affiliates comes against a backdrop of political upheaval in the Middle East that is disrupting counterterrorism cooperation by onetime key U. In Southeast Asia. The leaders of these groups consider bin Laden a religious and philosophical guide. was arrested.S. But his fugitive status didn't render the network impotent.S. bin Laden's operational role at the head of al Qaeda had faded while his role as charismatic figurehead increased. officials because of the instability in Yemen. who gained a wide following on the Internet thanks to his flawless English and heated sermons. in addition to attempting high-profile attacks. Middle East Correspondent for the Wall Street Journal. AQAP is adept at using technology: It publishes an online magazine called "Inspire"—part fanzine. and prepared Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. AQAP's profile has risen in lockstep with that of Mr." the phrase al Qaeda uses for the U. Threat From Splinter Group Persists. popping up in new places with new leaders who.S. but have worked independently from his command for years. and the three suicide bombings in July 2010 at restaurants in the Ugandan capital. “As Al Qaeda Adapts Its Tactics. Mr.

behind the May 2010 plot to explode a car bomb in New York's Times Square. last week highlighted the group's "continued menace." . the State Department's coordinator for counterterrorism. Other groups include Pakistan-based Lashkare-Taiba.with al Qaeda that could gain in prominence following bin Laden's death. including the Pakistani Taliban. which carried out the deadly 2008 assault in Mumbai. India. Daniel Benjamin.

Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service.. caution is warranted in light of al Qaeda’s adaptability.pdf] MB ¶ Terrorists might try to smuggle a bomb into a U. Online. Resources. http://www. however. . that can be used on and moved between a tractor-trailer. Nearly 9 million containers a year enter the United States by ship. tenacity. techniques.”¶ 4¶ CBP¶ Commissioner Robert Bonner believes an attack using a nuclear bomb in a container¶ would halt container shipments. “Maritime Security:¶ Potential Terrorist Attacks¶ and Protection Priorities. and reportedly inspects about 6 percent of them. Much global cargo moves by container. and audacity.. Successful development and application of maritime tactics.. port in many ways.” Prepared for members of congress. it remains an open question how likely maritime attacks against the United States may be. maritime targets would likely satisfy certain objectives of known international perpetrators such as Al Qaeda. and procedures has already occurred within the terrorist community. Despite potential setbacks—maritime terrorism is likely Parfomak and Frittelli.. although a successful attack on U. Defense. http://www.¶ 2¶ Customs and Border Protection (CBP) screens data for all¶ containers. but containers¶ may offer an attractive route. “Terrorist Nuclear Attacks on Seaports: ¶ Threat and Response. ingenuity.fas. however. A container is a metal box.S.Terrorism – Link – Risk High Ports are a key vulnerability that terrorists will exploit—containers are an easy vessel to smuggle in a weapon Mendalia. they remain a significant possibility and warrant continued policy attention. typically 8 ft wide by 8½ ft high¶ by 20 ft or 40 ft long. that while maritime terrorist attacks against the United States may be more difficult to execute and.124¶ It appears. online. Many believe that ports and containers are vulnerable.¶ or a ship. tactical uncertainties and security deterrents may lead terrorist planners to turn their attention elsewhere. therefore. “The intelligence that we have certainly points to the ports as a key vulnerability¶ of the United States and of a key interest to certain terrorist groups. a rail car. In terms of the scenario framework in this report. 2005 [Jonathan. 3-14-2007. Specialist in National Defense¶ Foreign Affairs.S.. The same naval analyst cited above calls for continued vigilance:¶ Rather than develop a false sense of security based on the belief that inherent difficulties will limit maritime terrorism . find ways to minimize economic problems.S. consequently. have occurred and there is evidence they have been planned for the future.” CRS report for congress.fas. and Trade Division.org/irp/crs/RS21293. leading to “devastating” consequences for the global¶ economy..org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787. It bears repeating.. that maritime terror attacks against the U. 2007 [Paul and John. less likely to occur than other types of attacks. despite the operational challenges.”¶ 5¶ People can. An FBI official¶ stated. .pdf] Given these challenges.¶ 3¶ Containers could easily hold¶ a nuclear weapon.

10 Consistent with this reasoning. economic losses. http://www.11 A weapon of mass destruction (WMD) attack on a heavily populated U. commercial vessel inventory.pdf] Acts of maritime terrorism may have many objectives.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787. Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service. online. passenger vessels such as cruise ships and ferries. which together account for less than 4% of U. port could inflict the greatest number of human casualties. federal agencies reportedly concluded in 2004 that the Washington state ferry system had been under surveillance as a possible terrorism target. SC. Resources. alone or in combination. or other negative impacts.S.12 .S.Terrorism – Impact . may be more attractive terrorist targets than cargo and other vessels. environmental damage. The Defense Department’s Joint Task Force–Civil Support developed such a scenario in a 2005 exercise involving the smuggling and detonation of a 10kiloton nuclear device in the port of Charleston. of minor or major consequence. 3-14-2007. They may seek to cause human casualties.9 If human casualties are the principal objective. “Maritime Security:¶ Potential Terrorist Attacks¶ and Protection Priorities.Death Port terror attack would cause massive loss of lives Parfomak and Frittelli. 2007 [Paul and John.fas.” Prepared for members of congress.

Many ports are in major cities. Defense. Terrorists might obtain a bomb in several ways. 2005 [Jonathan.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787. radiological. Defense.org/irp/crs/RS21293. mitigating economic effects¶ of an attack. and Trade Division.” CRS report for congress. and indirect costs of $300 billion to $1. and¶ kill many people.pdf] If economic loss is the primary objective.pdf] MB A terrorist nuclear attack on a U.Terrorism – Impact – Economy Terror attack on ports will hurt the global economy—funding for security is key Mendalia. etc. Online. Specialist in National Defense¶ Foreign Affairs.S. Issues¶ for Congress include safeguarding foreign nuclear material. Resources. intelligence. “Terrorist Nuclear Attacks on Seaports: ¶ Threat and Response. spread fallout over many square miles. Ability to detect a bomb appears limited.¶ biological.” CRS report for congress. http://www.” Prepared for members of congress. a 10. with potentially few human casualties but significant impacts to critical infrastructure or commerce. start fires. seaports could be targets for terrorist attack.000 to 1 million people and would¶ result in direct property damage of $50 to $500 billion. The Limburg bombing may have been an attack of this type. disrupt commerce.¶ 1 A port terrorist attack could shut down the global oil trade causing economic damage Parfomak and Frittelli. Online. “Terrorist Nuclear Attacks on Seaports: ¶ Threat and Response. http://www. “Maritime Security:¶ Potential Terrorist Attacks¶ and Protection Priorities. The United States is using¶ technology.to 20-kiloton¶ weapon detonated in a major seaport would kill 50. an attack using a¶ nuclear weapon merits consideration because it would have much higher consequence. international cooperation. 2005 [Jonathan.fas. to try to thwart an attack.fas. Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service. terrorists may seek to carry out different types of attacks. This report¶ will be updated as needed. By one estimate. While it would probably be more difficult¶ for terrorists to obtain or fabricate a nuclear weapon than other WMD. threatening to disrupt the global oil trade and causing considerable consternation among tanker operators. A terrorist Hiroshima-sized nuclear¶ bomb (15 kilotons. seaport could cause local devastation and affect¶ the global economy.fas. Specialist in National Defense¶ Foreign Affairs. especially in a port that handled¶ petroleum and chemicals.2 trillion. 3-14-2007. losses due to trade disruption of¶ $100 billion to $200 billion.¶ U.. the equivalent of 15.pdf] MB Terrorists have tried to obtain weapons of mass destruction (WMD) — chemical.org/irp/crs/RS21293. and nuclear weapons. http://www. 2007 [Paul and John. online. though each poses¶ difficulties. it caused insurance rates among Yemeni shippers to rise 300% and reduced Yemeni port shipping volumes by 50% in the .000 tons of TNT) detonated in a port would¶ destroy buildings out to a mile or two.S. and Trade Division. A terrorist attack on ports would kill millions and tank the global economy from trade disruption Mendalia. and allocating funds between ports and other potential targets.13 Although the bombing killed only one member of the Limburg’s crew.

when he ¶ ¶ reflected on a guerrilla conflict in Afghanistan that had “bled Russia ¶ ¶ for ten years until it went bankrupt. resulted in a 93-percent drop in container terminal throughput ¶ ¶ that cost the Yemeni economy an estimated $3. it is certainly possible that temporary. in a 2005 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) exercise.” Ayman al-Zawahiri.pdf] MB ¶ ¶ While long-term or widespread disruption to the global economy is unlikely. it directly contributed to a short-term collapse of international shipping business in ¶ ¶ the Gulf.15 Other types of maritime attacks could disrupt more directly the shipping operations of key commercial ports.” Indeed.” Online. terrorists hypothetically destroyed the International Bridge in Sault Ste. and challenges for the United States. Marie.rand. to the ¶ ¶ extent that it does have at least a residual disruptive economic potential. piracy.16 Maritime terrorism damages the US and global economy from trade and oil disruptions Chalk. MI.¶ ¶ 14¶ ¶ It is also worth bearing in mind that maritime terrorism.¶ ¶ 16¶ ¶ his was made explicitly apparent in a video¶ statement released by the al Qaeda emir in December 2004.8 million a month in ¶ ¶ port revenues. For example. RAND corporation. resonates with the underlying operational and ideological rationale ¶ ¶ of al Qaeda and the wider global jihadist “nebula. have both squarely put the ¶ ¶ thrust of their continuing campaign against Washington in the context of economic war. spilling 90. at least rhetorically. attacking ¶ ¶ key pillars of the Western commercial. blocking the shipping channel below with debris. “The maritime dimension of international security: terrorism. ¶ ¶ and due to the tripling of war risks premiums levied on ships calling at ¶ ¶ Aden. led to a 48 cent per barrel hike in the price of Brent crude oil. http://www. Portraying the attacks ¶ ¶ on the World Trade Center and Pentagon as a single defining point in ¶ ¶ exposing the fallacy of American (financial) power. trading. and energy system is ¶ ¶ a theme that. by exploding a fuel tanker truck on the bridge.month after the attack.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG697. and that is viewed as integral to the Islamist ¶ ¶ war on the United States and its major allies. has become increasingly prominent ¶ ¶ in the years since 9/11.14 The bombing also caused significant environmental damage.¶ ¶ 15¶ ¶ Bin Laden and ¶ ¶ his chief “lieutenant. 2008 *Peter.000 barrels of oil into the Gulf of Aden. localized fiscal ¶ ¶ damage could result from an act of terrorism.”¶ ¶ 17 . Although the incident only¶ resulted in three deaths (including the two bombers). The suicide strike on the ¶ ¶ M/V Limburg in 2002 is a case in point.” affirming that al Qaeda is “continuing in the same policy to make the US bleed profusely to the point ¶ ¶ of bankruptcy.

If a “weak” dirty bomb attack is more likely than a “strong” one. online.. the effects on the general public of any dirty bomb attack. Resources. 2007 [Paul and John. even a weak one. port. Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service. analysts and policy makers draw qualified conclusions about such an attack. As one analyst has stated.. the benefits of deploying one may far outweigh the costs and difficulties entailed in its construction. “Maritime Security:¶ Potential Terrorist Attacks¶ and Protection Priorities.Terrorism – Impact – Dirty Bomb Terrorists will use dirty bombs—benefits outweigh the risks Parfomak and Frittelli.fas. not withstanding the challenges to dirty bombers. 3-14-2007. “the chances of a dirty bomb being deployed by al Qaeda cannot be discounted. Given the exponential psychological and economic effects of such a weapon.S. http://www.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787.” Prepared for members of congress. it is unclear whether such an attack would meet terrorist objectives.pdf] Faced with contradictory perspectives on the likelihood of a dirty bomb attack scenario at a U. On the other hand. may be great enough to motivate potential attackers.”88 . but a weak attack will have limited effects.

pre-placed explosives. While these suspicions could not be proved. Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service. missile or airplane attack). The Coast Guard’s FY2006 budget specifically requested funding for “additional boat crews and screening personnel at key LNG hubs.pdf] Potential terrorist attacks on LNG tankers in U. waters have been a key concern of policy makers in ports with LNG facilities because such attacks could cause catastrophic fires in port and nearby populated areas.101 Former Bush Administration counter-terrorism advisor Richard Clarke has asserted that terrorists have both the desire and capability to attack LNG shipping with the intention of harming the general population. However. The attack on the Limburg. or external terrorist actions (such as a Limburg-type. and they can never be entirely eliminated. hijacking.”97 To date.”99 A 2004 report by Sandia National Laboratories concluded that potential terrorist attacks on LNG tankers. DHS stated that “the risks associated with LNG shipments are real. no LNG tanker or land-based LNG facility in the world has been attacked by terrorists.”100 The Sandia report identified LNG tankers as vulnerable to ramming.Terrorism – Impact – LNG Tanker Attack Terror attacks on LNG tankers likely— Parfomak and Frittelli. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) specifically included LNG tankers among a list of potential terrorist targets in a security alert late in 2003. is often cited as an indication of LNG tanker vulnerability.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787.102 . “Maritime Security:¶ Potential Terrorist Attacks¶ and Protection Priorities. similar natural gas and oil assets have been favored terror targets internationally. 3-14-2007.” Prepared for members of congress. insider takeover. although an oil tanker.S. online. http://www. 2007 [Paul and John. could be considered “credible and possible.fas. Resources.98 The DHS also reported that “in early 2001 there was some suspicion of possible associations between stowaways on Algerian flagged LNG tankers arriving in Boston and persons connected with the so-called ‘Millennium Plot’” to bomb targets in the United States.

Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another. from which no one will emerge victorious. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet.eg/2004/705/op5.org.Terrorism – Impact – Nuke War Nuclear Terrorism risks Global Nuclear War Sid-Ahmed 2004 (Mohamed. it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Al-Ahram staff) “Extinction!” Al-Ahram Weekly issue no. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war. . tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate.ahram.htm What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails. police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights. 705 WBW http://weekly. this war will be without winners and losers. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. we will all be losers. Societies would close in on themselves.

the Israeli Samson option would also include attacks on Russia and even “anti-Semitic” European cities In that case. if not all. Because of the Russian “dead hand” system.” Science Direct). as it will be the signal for permission for anyone to use them.WYO/JF In a remarkable website on nuclear war. would then retaliate against Russia. they’ve figured out that the best way to escalate these tensions into nuclear war is to set off a nuclear exchange. “everyone else feels free to do so. in a matter of a few minutes. Any accident. it would retaliate with the suicidal “Samson option” against all major Muslim cities in the Middle East. No doubt. which could be exploited as a window of opportunity to “win” the war. Once one does. it is only a matter of time before the escalation of violent conflict leads to the actual use of nuclear weapons. Afterwards. then the likelihood of a rapid escalation of nuclear attacks is quite high while the likelihood of a limited nuclear war is actually less probable since each country would act under the “use them or lose them” strategy and psychology. would rain upon most of the major cities in the Northern Hemisphere. November.Terrorism – Impact – Retaliation Terrorism causes retaliation that guarantees extinction Morgan 9 Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. bringing death or else radiation disease that would be genetically transmitted to future generations in a nuclear winter that could last as long as a 100 years. Moore compares swift nuclear escalation to a room full of people embarrassed to cough. many of them much more powerful than those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. “where regional nuclear commanders would be given full powers should Moscow be destroyed. keep. Yongin Campus – South Korea (Dennis. if there is such a remnant. massive radioactive clouds would drift throughout the Earth in the nuclear fallout. stated for years that if Israel were to suffer a nuclear attack. to a life of unimaginable misery and suffering in a nuclear winter. whether from terrorists or a nation state. of course. mistaken communication. some of those groups will look for any means to fight their oppressors” In other words. hair-trigger basis the nuclear web rests on. however. And what many people fail to realize is what a precarious. “World on fire: two scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possible extinction of the human race. of nuclear warheads. In other words. all that militant terrorists would have to do is get their hands on one small nuclear bomb and explode it on either Moscow or Israel. for years to come. and inevitably use nuclear weapons.S. as long as war and aggression are backed up by the implicit threat of nuclear arms.” it is likely that any attack would be blamed on the United States” Israeli leaders and Zionist supporters have. . accessed 9-16-2011. will be used. Carol Moore asks the question “Is Nuclear War Inevitable??” In Section . China would probably be involved as well. unleash the use of nuclear weapons. it will spread quickly. these nations will attempt to obtain. and the U. once Pandora's Box is opened. and once a weapon is used. restraint by one power would be interpreted as a weakness by the other. leading to horrific scenarios of global death and the destruction of much of human civilization while condemning a mutant human remnant. it is very likely that many. As Moore points out. if not tens of thousands. The bottom line is that as long as large nation states use internal and external war to keep their disparate factions glued together and to satisfy elites’ needs for power and plunder. Futures. and once even just one is used. Furthermore. as thousands. likewise. And as long as large nations oppress groups who seek self-determination. taking a savage toll upon the environment and fragile ecosphere as well. Moore points out what most terrorists obviously already know about the nuclear tensions between powerful countries. false signal or “lone wolf’ act of sabotage or treason could. Russia would retaliate.

” Online. but DoD [Department of Defense] could also lose ¶ precious cargo and time and be forced to rely heavily on its [already] ¶ overburdened airlift capabilities. ¶ Commercial carriers transport more than 95 percent of the country’s ¶ non–Northern American trade by weight and 75 percent by value.rand. piracy. national security.pdf] MB As one of the globe’s principal maritime trading states. gross domestic product.¶ Besides economic considerations. if these ¶ terminals were decisively attacked. The Departments of Defense and Transportation have jointly designated 17 ¶ American ports—13 of which also act as commercial trading hubs—as ¶ strategic because they are necessary to expedite major military deployments. the marine transportation ¶ system plays an important role in U.”¶ 2 .S.¶ 1¶ In the view of the Government Accountability Office. “The maritime dimension of international security: terrorism. and challenges for the United States. more than double the figure recorded in ¶ 1970. accounting for nearly 20 percent (measured in metric tons) of all international sea-borne freight in any given year. ¶ Commodities shipped by sea currently constitute a full quarter of ¶ U. “not only could … civilian casualties be sustained.Terrorism – Impact – Hegemony Terror attacks on ports damage DOD effectiveness and military deployments Chalk. 2008 *Peter.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG697. the United States has a ¶ direct. RAND corporation. http://www. vested interest in securing the world’s oceanic environment.S.

¶ 8¶ Quite apart from the widespread physical suffering and psychological trauma that this would necessarily engender.pdf] MB Finally. such a reaction could easily precipitate a chain of ¶ events that.¶ 12 . Los Angeles. Honolulu. the industry ¶ will be in big trouble. Critics. attacks against a rapidly growing cruise industry—in ¶ 2004. not least because ¶ they could expose the country to a new form of highly damaging terrorism. this could result in considerable losses. it could also have ¶ genuinely disruptive political and fiscal effects. travel needs or. ¶ and (assuming a post-Katrina recovery) New Orleans—as well as some ¶ 330. albeit with the ¶ benefit of hindsight. could erode popular perceptions ¶ of governing credibility and legitimacy (as it did in Spain following the ¶ catastrophic commuter train bombings of 2004). In an age ¶ where counterterrorism has emerged as one of the state’s most pressing responsibilities. New York.Terrorism – Impact – Cruise Ship Attacks Attacks on cruise lines would devastate US economy Chalk. People just won’t sail anymore—either with the ¶ company owning the vessel or with one of its *few+ competitors.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG697. http://www.”¶ 11¶ In ¶ the United States.¶ 9¶ The economic fallout could be every bit as serious. leisure pursuits. Seattle. Tampa. and challenges for the United States. 2008 [Peter.” Online.rand. 78 percent of all passengers vacationing on luxury liners were ¶ from North America¶ 7—need to be taken seriously.2 billion in direct monetary benefit but ¶ also the revenue base of major tourist ports—notably Miami. RAND corporation. especially given ¶ the highly concentrated character of the cruise business and the fact that ¶ this mode of transportation is not integral to an individual’s day-to-day life.000 fulland part-time jobs. “The maritime dimension of international security: terrorism. A decisive attack against a fully laden passenger ship could ¶ be expected to result in a casualty count of several hundred or more. Canaveral.¶ 10¶ As one maritime security ¶ analyst in London put it: “If a major cruise liner was hit. Galveston. jeopardizing ¶ not only approximately $16. would undoubtedly demand to know why the ¶ sector was left exposed and why the intelligence services in the relevant ¶ flag nation failed to foresee that an attack was imminent. if not carefully managed. piracy. indeed.

piracy. shores is the use ¶ of a boxed crate to hide a radiological dispersal device that is then detonated on land.¶ 6 .” Online.Terrorism – Impact – Ayson Helper Terrorism would cause mass panic Chalk. RAND corporation.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG697. and challenges for the United States. http://www. it would ¶ cause at least localized contamination of the immediate surrounding area (often referred to as “ground shine”) and could reasonably be expected to elicit mass public panic of radiological fallout if deaths ¶ actually occurred. 2008 *Peter. One scenario that has been repeatedly played out because of ¶ the volume of (unchecked) containers shipped to U.S.¶ 5¶ Although the effects of such an attack would depend ¶ on the size and sophistication of the dirty bomb employed. “The maritime dimension of international security: terrorism.S.rand.pdf] MB Terrorist contingencies involving containerized freight have also ¶ been consistently highlighted as particularly relevant to U. national ¶ security.

.. and it is surely lower than the probability of virtually any other type of terrorist attack. online.pdf] ¶ Other experts concede that evaluating the likelihood of nuclear terrorism is inherently uncertain.” Prepared for members of congress. “Maritime Security:¶ Potential Terrorist Attacks¶ and Protection Priorities.Terrorism – AT: Low Nuke Terror Risk Even if nuke terror is low risk.¶ The probability of a terrorist attack with an actual nuclear weapon cannot be reliably estimated. http://www. 3-14-2007. Resources.. costs are so high we can’t ignore them Parfomak and Frittelli. 2007 [Paul and John. Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service. but that such potential attacks warrant attention even if they are unlikely. based on expected damages — the probability multiplied by the consequences — this threat must be considered one of the greatest dangers America faces.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787.76 . But the devastation from such an attack would be so overwhelming that.fas.

Solvency .

and consequence (the relative expected impact of ¶ an attack). vulnerabilities. or III are eligible to apply for funding as part of the “All Other Port Areas” Group. the Congress. we. Figure 2 below shows the location of port areas for groups I and II—the ¶ two highest risk groups that receive the bulk of grant funding. II. Ports not identified in Group I. or Group III. The PSGP risk methodology is similar to the ¶ methodology used to determine funding eligibility for other DHS state and ¶ local grant programs. the President.Solvency – Risk Management Key Effective risk management key to effective PSGP funding GAO. each port is ranked against one another and ¶ assigned a relative risk score.pdf] MB In recent years. DHS considers some ports as a single cluster—known as a port ¶ area—due to geographic proximity. Data for each of these variables are collected from offices and ¶ components throughout DHS. and a common waterway. At the recommendation of the Coast ¶ Guard.gao.gov/assets/590/587142. as well as from other data sources. . ¶ Based on risk. using the model. 2011 *Government accountability office report to congress.” November 2011. Risk management is a continuous process that includes the ¶ assessment of threats. Grant Management. shared risk. “PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM¶ Risk Model. http://www. Group II. and Effectiv eness ¶ Measures Could Be Strengthened. Online. each port area is placed into one of three funding groups—¶ Group I. One way in which DHS has applied risk management principles to ¶ the PSGP is through the use of a risk model to assess the relative risk ¶ posed to ports throughout the nation and to help determine PSGP ¶ eligibility and funding levels. The model consists of three variables: threat (the ¶ relative likelihood of an attack occurring). vulnerability (the relative ¶ exposure to an attack). the Secretary of ¶ Homeland Security. and ¶ then. and consequences to determine ¶ what actions should be taken to reduce one or more of these elements of ¶ risk. and others have endorsed risk management as a ¶ way to direct finite resources to areas that are most at risk of terrorist ¶ attack.

DHS utilized funding “floors” in the fiscal year 2011 ¶ risk model.Solvency – Reform Key To PSGP Allocation Inefficient funding decisions lead to poor grant allocation—reform is key GAO. to $3. Instead. Similarly. and Effectiveness ¶ Measures Could Be Strengthened. with allocations ranging from about $12 million for the ¶ Delaware Bay port area to about $30 million for the New York-New ¶ Jersey port area.gov/assets/590/587142. See table 3 below. we found that ¶ allocations to port areas were highly positively correlated to port risk. “PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM¶ Risk Model. ¶ according to the model’s determination of risk. DHS made two implementation decisions when finalizing grant ¶ allocations for fiscal year 2011. “PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM¶ Risk Model. DHS set the funding floor for Group II port areas at 50 percent—¶ meaning that the port area’s allocation could not decrease by more than ¶ 50 percent from its fiscal year 2010 allocation regardless of changes in ¶ risk. http://www. Grant Management. Reforms key to streamlined review process—solves grant allocation and use GAO. Second. Overall. port areas in Group III or the All Other ¶ Port Areas Group do not receive a designated allocation. A ¶ senior FEMA official reported that floors were used in the fiscal year 2011 ¶ PSGP risk model to mitigate wide fluctuations in funding so that port ¶ areas could better plan for long-term security improvements.” November 2011. Grant Management. 2011 *Government accountability office report to congress. for fiscal year ¶ 2011. despite changes in risk identified by the model.5 million.8 million for each group in fiscal year 2011. DHS chose to ¶ limit fluctuations in grant funding from year to year to any given port ¶ area. with allocations ranging from $1 million. 2011 *Government accountability office report to congress. which represented about 54 percent of the total risk for port areas.pdf] MB .¶ 18¶ In addition to the risk scores of the port ¶ areas. Online. these 11 port areas collectively received fiscal year 2011 ¶ allocations that were about $11.¶ In the fiscal year 2011 model. the average allocation to a Group I port area was ¶ about $20 million. the allocations to 3 Group I port areas would have fallen by ¶ more than 25 percent and the allocations to 8 Group II port areas would ¶ have fallen by more than 50 percent. which limited how much a port area allocation could decrease ¶ from year to year. port ¶ areas in Group III and the All Other Port Areas Group compete within their group for a portion of the group’s total funding—which was about ¶ $11. The average allocation to a Group II port area was ¶ about $1. To ¶ achieve this stability. http://www. DHS opted to direct the majority of ¶ available funding to the highest risk port areas. due to the use of funding ¶ floors. DHS set the funding floor for Group I port ¶ areas at 25 percent—meaning that the port area’s funding level could not ¶ decrease by more than 25 percent from its fiscal year 2010 allocation ¶ regardless of how much its risk profile changed. DHS directed 60 percent of ¶ available grant funding to the 7 Group I port areas in fiscal year 2011.¶ In addition to directing the majority of available grant money to the highest ¶ risk port areas. and were ¶ made largely in accordance with risk.6 million—or about 26 percent—higher ¶ than their risk profiles would have indicated. it then provided each port area within Groups I and II with a ¶ designated allocation based on the results of the risk model. This official ¶ also noted that floors have been used in the PSGP risk model since fiscal ¶ year 2008 and were also used in the fiscal year 2011 Homeland Security ¶ Grant Program (HSGP) risk model. as ¶ calculated by the risk model.” November 2011. DHS allocations of PSGP funds were ¶ based on DHS’s risk model and implementation decisions. According to FEMA data. ¶ in fiscal year 2011. as shown in table 2 below.gao. and Effectiveness ¶ Measures Could Be Strengthened.gov/assets/590/587142. For example.5 million for the Chicago/Lake Michigan port ¶ area. received by 21 ¶ Group II port areas. For example. However. First. In contrast to Groups I and II.gao.pdf] MB For fiscal years 2010 and 2011. After DHS determined the percentage of total funding it would direct to ¶ each group. if the floors had not been used in fiscal ¶ year 2011. DHS also opted to provide stability in the funding levels of ¶ Group I and II port areas through another implementation decision. Online.

one fiduciary agent told us that its field review team—including the COTP—would be unlikely to recommend a project for funding if that project relies on a cost-share waiver. Further. the actual approval time once the request was finalized was less than 7 months. and fiscal year 2011 grant cycles. FEMA stated that a decision on a waiver request could be expected approximately 30 days after all documentation was provided to FEMA in accordance with the process outlined in the July 2009 information bulletin. In this document. approval by the Secretary of Homeland Security. it took 74 days from the date requests were considered complete to achieve approval by GPD’s leadership. on average.42 However. about $110 million in PSGP funds awarded to Group I port areas from fiscal year 2007 through 2009—years in which the cost-share was required—remains unused. This process ensures that PSGP projects meet program goals and objectives. According to DHS. 5 of the 11 fiduciary agents we interviewed told us¶ that they had concerns with the cost-waiver request process—including with the length of time required for a decision. . due diligence requires both component and department level clearances.consuming and confusing.¶ Although FEMA has taken steps to improve the cost-waiver process. It took an additional 52 days. on average. certain grant applicants that cannot fund the cost-match requirement may not receive grant funds to implement their projects. According to FEMA officials. and fiscal year 2009 grant cycles—which were cost-share years—if money in their port area remains unused from those years. the Secretary can grant a waiver of the cost-share requirement if she determines that a proposed project is meritorious but cannot be undertaken without additional federal support. following a Fiduciary Agent Workshop. and distributed in a form and time frame that permits people to perform their duties efficiently.Fiduciary agents reported that the lengthy cost-share waiver process— used by applicants seeking an exemption from the required cost-share— further exacerbated the impact of the cost-share requirement under the PSGP. in order to responsibly award funding. Without a more efficient review process. Of the 126 days. For example. For example. However. Another fiduciary agent told us that there is little interest in the¶ fiscal year 2009 funds due in part to the lengthy waiver review process. Evaluating the waiver review process could help to ensure that the process is completed in a timely manner. of which 8 projects include a cost-share waiver request. according to FEMA records. but further action may be required to streamline the process.¶ FEMA released written responses to questions posed at the workshop. an unknown portion of this 7-month approval process was spent ensuring that the fiduciary agent had submitted all of the required documentation and thus. including secretarial clearance.¶ Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that “pertinent information should be identified. As a result. fiduciary agents remain wary of the cost-waiver request process. FEMA officials reported that they believe that this effort has helped improve some aspects of the process. only 1 of the 31 waiver requests submitted since the July 2009 information bulletin was issued has been denied—and it was denied at the GPD level.41 According to statute. As port areas solicit projects for these unused funds. The waiver approval process requires 22 steps—which include approval by leadership within FEMA’s GPD.43 Since the issuance of this information bulletin. to complete the remaining 11 steps of the waiver process—including approval at the Administrator of FEMA level and the Secretary of Homeland Security level. for cost-share waivers reviewed since December 2009 DHS took—on average—126 days to approve a request once all of the required information had been received. or may not even apply for funds.44 In November 2009. Additionally. However. fiscal year 2008. For example. fiscal year 2010. In July 2009. of required review. As shown earlier in table 8. Grant applicants unable to meet the cost-share requirement are eligible to apply for a waiver. Approval time lines ranged between 55 days and 268 days for these waiver requests. captured. on average. and finally. one fiduciary agent—who oversaw a cost-waiver application that took about 7 months to be approved—told us that the cost-waiver request process was time. 22 were approved. it continues to be lengthy and additional efforts may help expedite these reviews.”45 FEMA officials told us that FEMA has taken internal actions to improve the review process such as meeting with other key offices involved in the waiver process in the spring of 2011 to discuss and standardize information requirements for the waiver package.¶ The costshare requirement was waived for all applicants under the ARRA. FEMA issued an information bulletin to clarify the process that grantees should follow when submitting cost-share waiver requests. the port area submitted 10 projects to FEMA for approval in October 2011. FEMA records show that no approval recommendations from GPD leadership were overturned as a result of the additional 52 days. grant applicants may continue to submit cost-share waiver requests for new projects to be funded under the fiscal year 2007 supplemental. However. approval by FEMA’s Administrator. some applicants may submit cost-share waiver requests as well. one fiduciary agent from a Group 1 port area reported that her port area recently completed the field-review process to identify projects to fund using their unused fiscal year 2009 grant monies. FEMA has received a total of 31 costshare waiver requests—of which.

To address ¶ these objectives. ¶ DHS concurred with GAO’s ¶ recommendations.pdf] MB Why GAO Did This Study¶ From fiscal years 2006 through 2010. (2) encountered ¶ challenges in administering the grant ¶ program and what actions. ¶ the Department of Homeland Security ¶ (DHS) has awarded nearly $1. GAO was ¶ asked to evaluate the extent to which ¶ DHS has (1) allocated PSGP funds in ¶ accordance with risk. GAO reviewed the ¶ PSGP risk model.” November 2011. ¶ among other things. such as ¶ PSGP guidance. and Effectiveness ¶ Measures Could Be Strengthened. if any. Additionally. ¶ and program documents. ¶ The Federal Emergency Management ¶ Agency (FEMA)––a DHS component ¶ agency––is the agency responsible for ¶ distributing grant funds. http://www.Solvency – Reforms to PSGP Key Reform of risk assessment for allocating grants is needed to effectively manage PSGP grants GAO. funding allocation ¶ methodology. Grant Management. funding ¶ distribution. GAO ¶ interviewed DHS and port officials ¶ about grant processes. . 2011 *Government accountability office report to congress. and program challenges. Online.7 billion ¶ dollars to port areas through its Port ¶ Security Grant Program (PSGP) to ¶ protect critical maritime infrastructure ¶ and the public from terrorist attacks.gov/assets/590/587142.gao. grant distribution data. and (3) evaluated the ¶ effectiveness of the PSGP. GAO also recommends that ¶ DHS evaluate the cost-share waiver ¶ review process and take steps to ¶ expedite the process where ¶ appropriate and develop a plan with ¶ milestones for implementing ¶ performance measures for the PSGP. “PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM¶ Risk Model.¶ What GAO Recommends¶ GAO recommends that DHS ¶ strengthen its methodology for¶ measuring vulnerability in ports by ¶ accounting for how past security ¶ investments reduce vulnerability and ¶ by using the most precise data ¶ available. DHS ¶ has taken to overcome these ¶ challenges.

and Trade Division.fas. and oversight. For example. Nonetheless. The American¶ ¶ Association of Port Authorities. http://www.”¶ ¶ 20¶ ¶ Improving the¶ ¶ ability to detect terrorist nuclear weapons in the maritime transportation system may make¶ ¶ a terrorist attack on a port less likely to succeed. Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service. or greater. if these activities are intended to derive from a uniform federal maritime security strategy the question arises to what degree these activities are complementary or inconsistent.S. A key question is whether policymakers are too focused on a narrow spectrum of the threat. however.¶ If port officials.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787. 2007 [Paul and John. in maritime or surface transportation¶ ¶ [compared to commercial aviation]. Specialist in National Defense¶ Foreign Affairs. sharply increasing security against specific types of maritime attacks in specific locations may have limited benefits for overall port security if other significant vulnerabilities are not addressed as a result. or because they lack sufficient intelligence about terrorist threats. A former Federal Maritime Commissioner has stated that “it *is+ fair to say there has been little to no emphasis on non-containerized cargo in . “Maritime Security:¶ Potential Terrorist Attacks¶ and Protection Priorities.org/irp/crs/RS21293. and thus less probable. “Terrorist Nuclear Attacks on Seaports: ¶ Threat and Response. welcomed federal grants for port¶ ¶ security upgrades to comply with the MTSA.fas. either because their security assessments are inconsistent. for example. ports. rail yards. Plans reforms to PSGP risk assessment is key to solve terrorism—addresses a wide variety of security threats Parfomak and Frittelli.” Terrorists “may be deterred by a significant chance of failure.pdf] MB ¶ What Priority Should Port Security Have? The 9/11 Commission wrote. that these three dimensions of the nation’s maritime security strategy emphasize terrorism scenarios in different ways. such as¶ ¶ to reduce overcrowding of cargo-handling facilities and to hire more workers. grants. grant administration. At issue¶ ¶ for Congress is how to allocate security funds among ports and other potential targets.¶ ¶ 22¶ ¶ A similar¶ ¶ case could be made for gas pipelines. there is a logical basis underlying the scenario priorities established for exercises. Federal legislators appear to focus oversight on a different subset of scenarios. It appears.¶ ¶ “Opportunities to do harm are as great. Initiatives to secure shipping containers have just¶ ¶ begun.Solvency – Terrorism – Reforms Key Port security is essential to solve terrorism – Grants are key to solve Mendalia. As this report states. Resources. 3-14-2007. port security resources may be deployed inefficiently. or bridges. online. Defense. and legislators disagree on what types of attack scenarios are of greatest priority.” Prepared for members of congress. but called for “substantially greater¶ ¶ resources. notably WMD’s aboard container vessels and attacks on LNG tankers.pdf] Development and assessment of maritime terrorism scenarios is a key element of federal port security exercises. a trade association. electric power plants. and legislative oversight. with no obvious focus on any particular scenario. grant administrators. http://www. The DHS port security grant program currently emphasizes a subset of these scenarios—IED attacks on ferries and cruise ships in major ports. Online. Port security exercises (conducted under a number of independent programs) address the broadest range of terrorism scenarios. 2005 [Jonathan.” CRS report for congress.”¶ ¶ 21¶ ¶ Others agree that more resources are needed to secure U.

’”125 While concern. . for container security may not be misplaced.the political arena.” while in contrast. in this case. “‘virtually everyone’ in the industry thinks noncontainerized cargo is in ‘many respects a more vulnerable path. there are other forms of cargo that terrorists could exploit just as effectively.

Grant Management. As we reported in our June 2009 report on the Transit Security Grant Program. which increased project costs and limited what grantees could accomplish with grant funds. “PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM¶ Risk Model. Using numerous data systems and spreadsheets resulted in inefficiencies and. According to FEMA. had no established program for doing so. The group requested the establishment of a more structured postaward time line. http://www. although FEMA has systems to track the financial information related to its grants programs. such as EHP reviews.47 During a July 2009 FEMA-sponsored stakeholder conference. so that grantees would be better able to plan their projects. After FEMA approves the use of grant funds for a specific project. If the project does not require a detailed EHP analysis. GPD had not historically conducted EHP reviews on preparedness projects and thus.48 For example.pdf] MB In addition to funding that is unavailable because it is unused. in some cases. However. are met. FEMA cannot make grant funds available to grantees to begin work on approved projects until all postaward requirements. A senior FEMA official reported that delays in EHP reviews were due to the fact that prior to 2008.Solvency – Reforms Key to Solve Risk Assessment Inefficiencies in the review process caused by an antiquated risk-data system means that grants aren’t effectively allocated—review process is key to solve GAO. As such.¶ According to FEMA officials. some funding is also unavailable because it is onhold due to delays in achieving compliance with postaward requirements and challenges with FEMA’s grant management system. One cause of delay was inefficiency in the reviews conducted pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act. Online.gov/assets/590/587142. This official further reported that creating an “EHP Team” within GPD with the assistance of subject matter specialists via technical support contract and standardizing the format for project submittals has helped expedite EHP reviews. FEMA did not have a mechanism for systematically collecting data on the status of individual grant projects through the review process. including deadlines for EHP reviews.” November 2011. projects that require a more detailed analysis are reviewed either by the GPD-EHP team or passed to a FEMA regional environmental officer depending on the scope of the review. lost data. and Effectiveness ¶ Measures Could Be Strengthened. stakeholders reported that additional delays in making funds available resulted from compliance with postaward requirements.¶ Fiduciary agents we interviewed in 5 of 11 port areas reported that slow EHP reviews caused delays. these systems did not allow FEMA to track the status of grant reviews. which requires a review of the impacts of proposed actions as well as reasonable alternatives to those actions. GPD officials reported that each PSGP program analyst maintained separate spreadsheets that tracked the grants for which they were responsible. the data management system used to manage the Transit Security Grant Program is also used to manage the PSGP and no changes have been made to the system since our 2009 report.gao. including budgetary and environmental reviews. 2011 *Government accountability office report to congress. the delays caused by inefficient review processes have been amplified by FEMA’s reliance on an antiquated data management system. . it can be reviewed and approved by a GPD analyst.49 The overall result was a data system that did not provide information in a timely manner and that could not be used effectively to manage the grant lifecycle.46 Grantees submit Environmental and Historical Preservation (EHP) information to the Grant Program Directorate––Environmental and Historical Preservation (GPD-EHP) office for review. participating port areas stated that the EHP submission and review process associated with the PSGP was causing delays. as program analysts had to search across systems for information or were reliant on systems––such as the Homeland Security Information Network––that lost application information.

the development of a project management plan—which defines how the project is executed. an important challenge DHS should undertake is the measurement of its impact. http://www. baseline data existed for 2 of the 11 measures. who began in March 2011. among other factors.52 Best practices for project management also call for milestone dates. Additionally. monitored and controlled. In July 2011. This task force conceptualized 11 potential measures of effectiveness for the PSGP. Online.” November 2011. the same official told us that the division had developed a number of prospective performance measures for the PSGP.50 The Inspector General also reported that DHS has raised the overall bar of preparedness through the port security grants but it is not clear that DHS knows how much actual risk reduction has been achieved.gao. baseline data needed to implement the measures did not exist for all 11 draft measures.Solvency – AT: FEMA reforms solve now Current forms haven’t solved—more comprehensive reform is key to program effectiveness GAO. but that FEMA was still reviewing the draft measures. and 6 measures would require further refinement or coordination with federal partners. According to best practices for project management. additional data collection would be needed to populate 3 measures. this may have contributed to delays in developing performance measures because the staff at NPAD.¶ In December 2010. Four years later. 2011 *Government accountability office report to congress. to ensure the implementation of such measures. FEMA transferred responsibility for developing performance measures from GPD to FEMA’s National Preparedness Directorate. FEMA formed a task force to develop draft performance measures for the PSGP. in carrying out a project successfully. As a result. In October 2011. the official told us that it has not been determined whether the performance measures will be included in the fiscal year 2012 guidance. . however.gov/assets/590/587142. FEMA did not have a plan in place. However. According to FEMA documentation. the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General reported that as the PSGP continues to evolve. specifically the National Preparedness Assessment Division (NPAD). As a result. in January 2010. with milestones. Grant Management. needed time to familiarize themselves with the grant program and draft measures.51 FEMA officials report that this change was made to consolidate the development of effectiveness measures within the directorate containing assessment experts. “PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM¶ Risk Model. In 2006.pdf] MB FEMA has not evaluated the effectiveness of this program in strengthening critical maritime infrastructure against risks associated with potential terrorist attacks because it has not implemented measures to track progress toward achieving program goals. including the new Director. and closed—is a key element of project management. a senior NPAD official told us that the division was briefed on the¶ draft measures developed by the GPD task force. FEMA’s progress toward implementing measures to assess whether the program is achieving its stated purpose remains unclear. but they were considering developing different measures as well. and Effectiveness ¶ Measures Could Be Strengthened.

AT .2AC .

however. Congress may assess how¶ the various elements of U. its key to solve Parfomak and Frittelli. Differing priorities set by port¶ officials. there has been considerable public debate about the¶ likelihood of scenarios frequently given high priority by federal policy makers. and the implications of differing¶ protection priorities among them. and attacks on passenger ferries. 2007 [Paul and John. In addition. Congress may assess how the various elements of U. http://www. maritime security activities and increase the efficient deployment of maritime security resources.¶ Maritime terrorist threats to the United States are varied. 3-14-2007.S.¶ In addition to these issues.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787. Balancing the nation's homeland security resources across the maritime and non-maritime sectors is a policy challenge because specific sectors may fall under different homeland security authorities and regulations. such¶ as nuclear or “dirty” bombs smuggled in shipping containers.AT: States CP Congress key to effective port security measures—ensures uniformity Parfomak and Frittelli. online. Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service. and the implications of differing terrorism scenario priorities among them. and can take myriad forms. but that different dimensions of the nation’s maritime security activities prioritize these activities in different ways. Improved gathering and sharing of maritime terrorism intelligence may enhance consistency across various U. Resources.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787. 3-14-2007. “Maritime Security:¶ Potential Terrorist Attacks¶ and Protection Priorities. Resources.fas. Uncertainty about terrorist capabilities and activities complicates this problem by making it difficult to .” Prepared for members of congress. “Maritime Security:¶ Potential Terrorist Attacks¶ and Protection Priorities. As oversight of the federal role in maritime security continues. grant officials. maritime security fit together in the nation's overall strategy to protect the public from terrorist attacks.pdf] Public information suggests that the threat of maritime terrorism is significant. http://www. Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service. How they¶ ultimately relate to one another under a national maritime security strategy remains¶ to be seen.” Prepared for members of congress. Terrorists may seek to exploit such chemicals in any of these sectors. and in chemical facilities on land. As oversight of the federal role in maritime security¶ continues. In practice. Congress may raise questions concerning the relationship among these activities. bulk quantities of hazardous chemicals are found in marine vessels. online. Only congress has effective oversight to coordinate counter-terrorism. and legislators lead to differing allocations of port security¶ resources and levels of protection against specific types of attacks.S. in rail and highway tankers. maritime security fit together in the nation's overall¶ strategy to protect the public from terrorist attacks. 2007 [Paul and John.pdf] Clear perspectives on the nature and likelihood of specific types of maritime¶ terrorist attacks are essential for prioritizing the nation’s maritime anti-terrorism¶ activities. Improved gathering and sharing of maritime¶ terrorism intelligence may enhance consistency of policy and increase efficient¶ deployment of maritime security resources. liquefied natural gas¶ (LNG) tanker attacks.S. and so are the nation’s¶ efforts to combat them. Congress may raise questions concerning the relationship among the¶ nation’s various maritime security activities. For example.

compare terrorist attack scenarios across sectors. . Reviewing how these security priorities and activities fit together to achieve common goals could be an oversight challenge for Congress. Without such a comprehensive perspective on terrorist threats. security analysts may have difficulty identifying which assets to protect and how well to protect them with the limited security resources available.

Ports Neg .

¶ 19 Too many scenarios to effectively secure ports—can’t solve terrorism Parfomak and Frittelli.org/irp/crs/RS21293.” November 2011. Detecting an HEU bomb is difficult because HEU¶ emits very little radiation. For example. 2007 [Paul and John. http://www.fas. “Terrorist Nuclear Attacks on Seaports: ¶ Threat and Response.S. and Trade Division. DHS issued a report on the topic.gao. online. Securing every U. Securing the largest ports might lead terrorists to use¶ smaller ones. http://www.” Prepared for members of congress. hired security guards.S. terrorists might detonate a weapon before it is inspected. and interwoven with complex transportation networks ¶ designed to move cargo and commerce as quickly as possible (see fig 1).S. ¶ While no two ports in the United States are exactly alike. easily accessible by water and land. ¶ They contain not only terminals where goods bound for import or export ¶ are unloaded or loaded onto vessels. It¶ concluded “*i+mprovements are needed in the inspection process to ensure that weapons¶ of mass destruction . such as refineries.¶ In 2002 and 2003. Can’t solve terrorism—will just circumvent security Mendalia. “Maritime Security:¶ Potential Terrorist Attacks¶ and Protection Priorities.” CRS report for congress. Table 1 provides a set of illustrative characteristics which could serve as the basis for the development . Online. close to crowded ¶ metropolitan areas. through oceangoing cargo¶ containers” and recommended improving detection equipment and search methods. http://www.AT – Terrorism Advantage No terror risk now—mitigation strategies GAO. many share ¶ certain characteristics that make them vulnerable to terrorist attacks: they ¶ are sprawling. If the United States deploys sensors at¶ some ports. Grant Management. factories.-bound ships. and purchased cameras to ¶ reduce the potential for unauthorized entry and help prevent ¶ vulnerabilities from being exploited.¶ CBP did not detect these shipments. Online. R&D is underway to address this key issue.pdf] The dimensions of maritime terrorism defined above may be used to characterize both historical terrorist attacks and potential future attacks against the United States. If foreign ports screened containers before being loaded onto U. To ¶ reduce the opportunity for terrorists to exploit port vulnerabilities..org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787.fas. ABC News shipped shielded 15pound cylinders of depleted¶ uranium (DU.pdf] MB Terrorists can counter new technologies. Defense. do not gain access to the U. In September 2004.¶ CBP claimed the opposite.S.¶ terrorists could infiltrate the ports.-bound container might lead terrorists to smuggle a¶ weapon in a small boat or airplane. port ¶ stakeholders are taking mitigation steps.. 3-14-2007. ports in containers. “PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM¶ Risk Model. or ship it to another¶ port. natural uranium minus most uranium-235) into U. 2005 [Jonathan. 2011 [Government accountability office report to congress. port stakeholders ¶ have installed fences. and power plants.gov/assets/590/587142. ABC claimed that DU is a good surrogate for HEU.pdf] MB The United States has approximately 360 commercial sea and river ports. Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service. Specialist in National Defense¶ Foreign Affairs. Resources. and Effectiveness ¶ Measures Could Be Strengthened. but also other facilities critical to the ¶ nation’s economy.

org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787.fas.pdf] Although much attention is paid to the threat of nuclear terrorism. Doing so exhaustively. Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service.73 It also may be technically difficult to successfully detonate such a nuclear device. and far more than could be meaningfully addressed with limited counter-terrorism resources. 3-14-2007. “Maritime Security:¶ Potential Terrorist Attacks¶ and Protection Priorities.pdf] Clear perspectives on the likelihood of specific types of maritime terrorist attacks are essential for prioritizing the nation’s maritime anti-terrorism activities. Resources. logically consistent.fas.71 Expert estimates of the probability of terrorists obtaining a nuclear device have ranged from 50% to less than 1%. As one security analyst has articulated the problem. indeed... as appears to be the case for DHS port security grants. and this test took place under highly controlled conditions. As a 2006 RAND study of maritime security concluded “many perceptions of maritime terrorism risks do not align with the reality of threats and vulnerabilities.¶ An accurate assessment of the current nature and scope of the global maritime terrorist threat should be driven by an assessment of what is probable.72 Among other challenges to obtaining such a device. the responsible agencies must be confident that these scenarios are credible and do. online. objectives.75 . Resources. North Korea experienced technical failures in conducting its 2006 nuclear weapons test. liquefied natural gas (LNG) tanker attacks. online. In practice. Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff has stated. and operationally credible attack scenarios based on different combinations of perpetrators.” Prepared for members of congress. and attacks on passenger ferries. Low risk of nuke terror Parfomak and Frittelli. 2007 [Paul and John. including nuclear or “dirty” bombs smuggled in shipping containers. locations. rather than merely possible. there has been considerable public debate about the likelihood of scenarios frequently identified as having high priority by federal policy makers. However. experts believe it unlikely that countries with nuclear weapons or materials would knowingly supply them to a terrorist group. sober analysis of this issue has been clouded amid the anxiety created by the current global security climate. pose the greatest threat to the United States. 2007 [Paul and John. with much discussion turning on the notion that terrorists could potentially strike any target with virtually any means available. targets. Especially when security policies seek to concentrate resources against a relatively limited number of terrorism scenarios.29 Port terrorism threat is overblown Parfomak and Frittelli. http://www.. 3-14-2007. there are divergent opinions about the likelihood of a terrorist group such as al Qaeda constructing or otherwise obtaining a workable nuclear weapon. however. Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service. “Maritime Security:¶ Potential Terrorist Attacks¶ and Protection Priorities.”67 The following section discusses perceptions and uncertainties pertaining to three prominent maritime attack scenarios. Consistent with these perspectives.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787. however. “I don't think that in the near term there's a significant likelihood of a traditional nuclear device being detonated” in the United States.” Prepared for members of congress. http://www. and tactics.74 Attempting to detonate a nuclear device in a maritime terror attack could pose even greater operational challenges.of potential attack scenarios. leads to far more potential attack scenarios than likely ones. What is apparent from Table 1 is the possibility of generating numerous unique.

“Maritime Security:¶ Potential Terrorist Attacks¶ and Protection Priorities. By tonnage. http://www. in fact. Scientists have long questioned whether terrorists could actually build a dirty bomb with catastrophic potential since handling the necessary radioactive materials could cause severe burns and would likely expose the builders to lethal doses of radiation. notwithstanding the supposed ease of perpetrating such attacks. a federal official familiar with New York harbor.84 Weaker dirty bombs made from less radioactive (and more common) materials would be easier to build and deploy. Resources. “If I wanted to bring an atomic bomb into the port.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787. Resources. online.pdf] ¶ Other analysts assert that. I’d do it through that scrap operation.S.85 In support of this argument.pdf] Although many experts consider attacks with dirty bombs among the most likely maritime terrorism scenarios. online. Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service. Resources.fas. containers carry only 11% of U. port. “Maritime Security:¶ Potential Terrorist Attacks¶ and Protection Priorities. Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service. overseas waterborne trade92 and container ships account for about one in every three U.S.91 Non-containerized cargo is more plentiful. 3-14-2007.86 They also note that the 2005 U.” Prepared for members of congress.87 Port containers are not a terror risk—don’t fit with their goals Parfomak and Frittelli.fas. trucks. some analysts argue that terrorists will forego dirty bombs. 2007 [Paul and John. dirty bomb attacks.83 Building and transporting such a bomb safely and to avoid detection would likely require so much shielding that it would be “nearly impossible” to move.pdf] . These analysts question whether the container shipping system offers the routing or scheduling precision required by terrorists to position the bomb in the right place at the right time. and other vehicles).”95 No risk of LNG tanker attacks— Parfomak and Frittelli.” Prepared for members of congress. “Maritime Security:¶ Potential Terrorist Attacks¶ and Protection Priorities. Coast Guard and customs officials.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787.fas.94 Relatively low-value cargo might be targeted if terrorists perceive it receives less attention from U. Other observers assert that some types of noncontainerized cargo could also be used for smuggling a bomb. 3-14-2007. Consequently. 3-14-2007. contained no evidence of. indictment of alleged “dirty bomber” Jose Padilla. but would have a much smaller physical impact and would likely cause few human casualties.” Prepared for members of congress. restricting themselves to the use of more conventional explosives. For instance.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787. if terrorists were to attempt a nuclear or dirty bomb attack in a U. http://www. they would be unlikely to do so using a shipping container because it would put the device beyond a terrorist group’s control.S.S.S. analysts point to the fact that there have been no U.No risk of a terror attack using a dirty bomb—multiple reasons Parfomak and Frittelli. 2007 [Paul and John. online.S. a dirty bomb plot. pointing to a scrap metal terminal in Jersey City. other experts dispute this conclusion. http://www. Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service. stated the following to a reporter.93 Other types of cargo also face less security screening. 2007 [Paul and John. port calls.90 The manager of port security at the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey states that their biggest concern is roll-on/rolloff cargo (ships that carry automobiles. or references to.

org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787. credible threats against” the proposed LNG facility or tankers serving the facility.Although they acknowledge the security information put forth by federal agencies.110 Terrorist attacks on ports unlikely—well protected. waters would be unlikely because its potential impacts would not be great enough compared to other potential targets. the FERC stated that¶ for a new LNG terminal proposal . and other U. “Maritime Security:¶ Potential Terrorist Attacks¶ and Protection Priorities. maritime security measures. evaluation of a proposed LNG terminal in Long Island Sound. the head of one university research consortium remarked. 107295). wind. ports and waterways are increasingly well-protected against terrorists due to the ongoing security activities of the U. ! Surveillance at sea offers less cover and concealment than¶ surveillance on land. Notwithstanding specific acts of terrorism in the past. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). they note that fewer than 1% of all global terrorist attacks since 1997 have involved maritime targets. protections added using DHS port security grants. 3-14-2007.”104 Industry representatives argue that deliberately causing an LNG catastrophe to injure people might be possible in theory. territory since the anti-Castro attacks in 1976 despite their demonstrated ability to do so overseas. http://www. ! Tides.S.119 Furthermore.. historical experience provides little guidance in estimating the probability of a terrorist attack on an LNG vessel or onshore storage facility. Many of these pose a similar or greater hazard to that of LNG.S.S. online..120 Analysts also argue that U.S. at the national level.S. 2007 [Paul and John.fas.108 In a September.L. currents.. provisions of the Maritime Transportation Security Act (P. have expressed similar views.103 In 2003.105¶ The FERC also remarked. that the threat environment is dynamic and that some threats may be unknown. especially in U. many experts believe that concern about threats to LNG tankers is overstated. waters..107 LNG terminal operators which have conducted proprietary assessments of potential terrorist attacks against LNG tankers.. and proximity to¶ land must all . U. the perceived threat of a terrorist attack may be considered as highly probable to the local population.109 The evaluation also notes. naval analyst has identified a number of specific challenges for terrorists in the maritime environment:¶ ! Maritime targets are relatively more scarce than land targets.” Prepared for members of congress. the USCG states that “there are currently no specific. has stated his belief that a terrorist attack on an LNG tanker in U. however. 2006. however.”106 Former Director of Central Intelligence. not high priority.. sea state.121 Classification issues may also influence differing perceptions of maritime terrorism risk since piracy unrelated to terrorism is common in Southeast Asia and may be conflated with terrorism in maritime security statistics. such as the Cole bombing. One U.S. we don’t see LNG as likely or credible terrorist targets. However. visibility. especially compared to land attacks which may alternatively satisfy terrorist¶ objectives. and difficult to conceal Parfomak and Frittelli. international terrorists have attacked no maritime targets in U. Resources. Coast Guard. Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service. hard to train for.. that “unlike accidental causes. “from all the information we have .122¶ A key consideration in assessing the general likelihood of a maritime attack against the United States is the inherent operational difficulty in mounting such attacks. Likewise. but would be extremely difficult to accomplish. James Woolsey.S. for example. In a December 2004 report.pdf] Other analysts believe future maritime attacks against the United States are relatively unlikely. potential terrorist targets are plentiful.S. the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and other experts believe that LNG facilities are relatively secure compared to other hazardous chemical infrastructures which receives less public attention.

! Testing weapons and practicing attack techniques. the low¶ probability of damage and casualties secondary to the intended target.be factored into a maritime terror operation. and ship handling. and the problems associated with filming attacks at sea for terrorist publicity may also reduce the desirability of maritime targets.123 . hallmarks of Al Qaeda’s typically meticulous preparation. ! The generally singular nature of maritime targets. coastal piloting. ! Maritime terror operations may require skills that are not quickly or easily acquired such as special training in¶ navigation. are harder and¶ more difficult to conceal at sea than on land.

” November 2011.AT – Solvency – FEMA Solves Port security ok now—FEMA mandates solve GAO.pdf] MB To promote a regional approach to risk management in the highest risk ¶ port areas. and Effectiveness ¶ Measures Could Be Strengthened. http://www. .gov/assets/590/587142.gao. Online. 2011 *Government accountability office report to congress. Grant Management. The primary goal of a PRMP is to provide a port area with a ¶ mechanism for considering its entire port system strategically as a whole. “PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM¶ Risk Model. ¶ and to identify and execute a series of actions designed to effectively ¶ mitigate risks to the system’s maritime critical infrastructure. FEMA required—beginning with the fiscal year 2007 ¶ supplemental guidance—that all Group I and II port areas—the highest ¶ risk port areas—develop and implement a Portwide Risk Mitigation Plan ¶ (PRMP).

“Maritime Security:¶ Potential Terrorist Attacks¶ and Protection Priorities. “the ambiguous nature of most intelligence on terrorist threats means that . http://www. there appears to be disagreement among security analysts about the credibility and likelihood of specific attack scenarios frequently cited in maritime security policy discussions.S. online. As the President’s National Strategy for Homeland Security stated in 2002. 2007 [Paul and John. Perhaps predictably.fas. Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service..AT – Solvency – Risk Assessment Fails Risk assessment models fail—aff can’t solve Parfomak and Frittelli. . Resources.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787. decisions must often be made in conditions of great uncertainty.pdf] One significant disadvantage of emphasizing priority scenarios is dependence upon intelligence and risk assessment in an environment where neither may be robust..” Prepared for members of congress. 3-14-2007. Specific examples are discussed in the following section. serious threats to U.”66 To the extent that priority attack scenarios identified by DHS or port security officials are not the right ones. maritime security may remain.

Working .

Specifically. 2006 [Jon D. “THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE: U. careful inspection of all cargo will wreak economic havoc. Howard J. Available Online] MB The Department of Homeland Security has a simple goal in terms of cargo security. Haveman. Shatz.”52 Unfortunately again. there is no truly secure substitute for 100% checking of all cargo for WMD.” In “Protecting the Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost. We might never know whether these programs are successful. This leaves security planners in the difficult position of designing programs that will have high likelihoods of detection success.51 Unfortunately.S. .” Edited by Jon Haveman and Howard Shatz.AT – Solvency – Port Security Fails No way to ensure port security against terrorism Haveman et all. it aims to correctly identify high-risk cargo and inspect 100 percent of it. there is no way to guarantee that the department will identify all high-risk cargo: “Simply put. and Ernesto Vilchis. particularly in light of the adaptive and shifting nature of terrorist strategies. PORT SECURITY PROGRAMS. Absence of detection and absence of a terrorist incident might simply mean that terrorists used other methods and pathways for their goals or that they succeeded in infiltrating a weapon but that it failed to work.

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