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(21) People v. Lidres (108 Phil.

995) FACTS: Dionisio Lidres and Josita Diotay filed their applications as substitute teacher for Magdalena Echavez. The Supervising teacher requested Diotay to sign an agreement, wherein both Diotay and defendant agreed to take over Echavez position on a 50-50 basis, e.i that is the period from January to March 1954, would be equally divided between them. Diotay then took over and began teaching. However, on February 12, 1954, Lidres went to the school with a letter of resignation and asked Diotay to sign it, the latter refused. Lidres told Diotay that whether she like it or not, he would take over her class on February 22, 1954. True to his word Lidres went to the said class and insisted to take over. He held class with the half of the class and erased Diotays name from the attendance chart and place his own. Diotay informed the principal and the following day they were summoned by the supervising teacher, ordered Diotay to continue her teaching and advised Lidres not to go back to the school. Without heeding the said instruction Lidres without any authority whatsoever, again took over Diotays class against the latters will. Lidres was charged and prosecuted with the crime of Usurpation of official functions as defined and penalized in R.A. No. 10. ISSUE: WON R.A. No. 10 is only applicable to members of subversive organizations engaged in subversive activities. HOLDING: Court ruled that in examination of the discussion of House Bill No. 126, which became R.A No. 10, discloses indisputably that said Act was really intended as an emergency measure, to cope with the abnormal situation created by the subversive activities of seditious organizations at the time of its passage in September 1946. Hence, the elimination of the element of pretense of official position required under Article 177 of the RPC. And since it is neither alleged in the information nor proved during the trial that defendant is a member of a seditious organization engaged in subversive activities, he could not be liable or found guilty under said provision of R.A. No. 10. Granting, arguendo, that R.A. No. 10 is an amendment to Art. 177, and not merely an implementation thereof, the subsequent enactment of R.A. 379, effective June 14,1949, would constitute an amendment thereof restoring the element of pretense of official position in the offense of usurpation of official functions. Under R.A. 379, the law in force at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, pretense of official position is an essential element of the crime of usurpation of official functions. But the information specifically charges that defendant committed the offense without pretense of official position. Under the circumstances, the facts alleged in the information fail to constitute an offense.

(22)People v. Reyes [48 O.G. 1837] FACTS: The accused was the star witness in a prosecution for robbery against Jemenia. Before the trial, the accused executed an affidavit in which he manifested that he was not interested in the prosecution of the case and that he wanted to give the accused a chance to earn his living wisely in the honest way. The fiscal refused to ask for the dismissal of the case. When the case was called for trial, the accused, who was asked to identify Jemenia, testified that he could not remember anymore the face of Jemenia. After further questions failed to elicit other data, the case against Jemenia was dismissed by the court, resulting in his acquittal. ISSUE: Is it necessary that the false testimony directly influence the decision of acquittal to be liable under Article 181 of the RPC? HOLDING: The contention of the defense that the acquittal of Jemenia was due to failure of the fiscal to call other witnesses who could have properly identified Jemenia, is irrelevant. It is not necessary that the testimony given by the witness should directly influence the decision of acquittal, it being sufficient that it was given with the intent to favor the accused. (23) People v. Capistrano [40 Phil. 902] FACTS: Accused-appellant Barbara Capistrano stated under oath two contradictory statement: one before the Assistant prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation before filing the information against her father Alejo Capistrano for Rape, statement whereby she was accusing the latter of the said crime; and another before the Court of first instance at the hearing of the same cause for rape, saying that the one call Juan Sol, and that for her fear to the latter who had threatened her, she made the former statement before the fiscal imputing the commission of the crime to his father. In view thereof, the fiscal filed a case against her for the crime of perjury. ISSUE: WON the two contradictory sworn statement are enough to convict the accused of perjury. HOLDING: The Court ruled that in order to hold the accused guilty of the crime of perjury, it was necessary to prove that she did not believe said testimony as true or, what amounts to the same thing, that which she testified to before the CFI was not true. A conviction for perjury cannot be sustained merely upon the contradictory sworn statement of the accused, but the prosecution must prove which of the two statements is false and must show that statement to be false by other evidence that the contradictory statement. One who is thus accused for having given under oath a statement contradictory to the one given in a former examination, has the

right to prove that the statement formerly given by him was induced by threats and duress. (24) People v. Bautista [40 O.G. 2491] FACTS: This case is by virtue of an appeal interposed by the Solicitor-General to the resolution of the Court of First Instance of Cavite dismissing said case for the following reasons: first, that the accused Sotero Peji Bautista was not given a preliminary investigation before trial; and second, that said accused had been twice put in jeopardy. The accused Bautista was charged by one Ong Loo in the justice of the peace court of Kawit, Cavite, with having violated the provisions of article 183 of the Revised Penal Code on May 30, 1935 by knowingly subscribing under oath a false affidavit. After the preliminary investigation required by law, the justice of the peace remanded the case to the Court of First Instance because it did not fall under his jurisdiction and he reached the conclusion that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the crime was committed by the accused. However, the provincial fiscal, filed another charging him with false testimony in a criminal case under article 180 of the said Code, which is a felony entirely different from that which had been the subject of the preliminary investigation by the justice of the peace. After trial has commenced with the fiscal presenting his first witness, the accused objected that he had not been given a preliminary investigation and that the crime with which he was then charged was entirely different from that which had been imputed to him in the justice of the peace court. The judge then presiding ordered the transfer of the case to the justice of the peace court of the capital of the province to the end that the necessary preliminary investigation be there made. This done, the justice of the peace returned the case to the Court of First Instance. ISSUE: WON the accused had been twice put in jeopardy. HOLDING: The Court ruled that it is not true that said accused had been twice put in jeopardy or in danger of being tried for the same crime of false testimony in a criminal case. All that took place was a preliminary investigation in the first case, namely, that endorsed to the justice of the peace of the capital of the province so that said investigation might be conducted. And this proceeding had to be taken because the accused asked for it, invoking his right to a preliminary investigation before the submission of the charge against him. He had then undoubtedly a right to said investigation because when the fiscal first charged him with false testimony in a criminal case, case No. 6999, said fiscal disregarded the aforementioned procedure and formality, it not being possible to declare that the same were observed just because he had them in case No. 1047 of the justice of the peace court of Kawit for the reason that in the latter case a crime distinct from that imputed to him afterwards was involved. The Revised Penal Code divides false testimony into three forms: first, false testimony in a criminal case (arts. 180 and

181) ; second, false testimony in a civil case (art. 182); and third, false testimony in other cases. The requisites for each of these three forms are different, and the penalties for each one of them and for each of their variations are also different. From the foregoing it is obvious that it is not the same thing to charge one with false testimony in a criminal case and to charge him with false testimony in a civil case, and with the same crime in other cases. Therefore, if there had been nothing more than a preliminary investigation, clearly it could not be said that the accused had ever been in jeopardy. This is because a preliminary investigation is not a trial or any part thereof and does not have for its object that of determining definitely the guilt of the accused by proofs, counterproofs, and the other formalities prescribed by law. (25) People v Cabero (61 Phil. 121) FACTS: Accused Hilaria Cabero presented a written complaint, statement and affidavit to the court of the justice of peace, duly subscribed and sworn to by her before the justice of the peace, when in fact she well knew that the said complaint, statement and affidavit were false and untrue. She was charged with the crime of perjury. However, the lower court dismissed the information as it does not fall under Art. 183 of the RPC or Art. 180 of the said Code. Hence, the Solicitor- General brought this appeal. ISSUE: Can a false affidavit in a complaint give rise to perjury? HOLDING: The indictment in the complaint closely follows Art. 183 and alleges every fact required by that article. An affidavit was made upon material matters before the competent person authorized to administer an oath required by law. It is further clearly alleged that the accused well knew that the affidavit in question made by her was false and untrue upon the material matters recited. It would seem that the court had the opinion that an affidavit to a criminal complaint has an entirely different status from an ordinary affidavit for other purposes. In the case of People v. Rivera (1933, 59 Phil. 236), the court held that a false affidavit was not a violation of Art. 363 of the RPC but did not hold that it would not violate Art. 183 of the RPC. The indictment in the present case is more complete that in the Rivera case in that it has an express allegation of guilty knowledge. The holding of the trial court that the complaint did not properly change as offense was therefore erroneous.