Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC FACTS: Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban

, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Paul’s College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a “Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months. ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte. HELD: Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons: 1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte; 2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue. 3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium. 4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brother’s house, an act, which supports the domiciliary

having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte. the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24. . May 7. celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones. and May 25.intention clearly manifested. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte. WHEREFORE. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban. 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. May 11.

always mean domicile. To prove his residence at Makati. and the suspicious circumstances under which the lease agreement was effected all belie petitioner’s claim of residency for the period required by the Constitution. the fact that petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled with the short length of time he claims to be a resident of the condominium unit in Makati (and the fact. as used in election laws. in the Second District of Makati. of his stated domicile in Tarlac) “indicate that the sole purpose of (petitioner) in transferring his physical residence― 27 is not to acquire’s new residence or domicile “but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City. by its terms.― 28 The absence of clear and positive proof showing a successful abandonment of domicile under the conditions stated above. petitioner presented an alleged lease agreement of a condominium in the area. and respondent Aquino himself testified that his intention was really for only one (l) year because he has other “residences― in Manila or Quezon City. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. . Issue: WON leasing a condominium unit is enough to prove residence. for election purposes. While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or to be voted upon. the lack of identification – sentimental. it is only for a period of two (2) years. Comelec contend that in order that he could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City.Facts: Petitioner Agapito Aquino was disqualified from being proclaimed as the winner of the Makati City Congressional elections because his opponents were questioning his residency requirements. Ruling: Residence. actual or otherwise – with the area. While a lease contract maybe indicative of respondent’s intention to reside in Makati City it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one’s original domicile especially since. Aquino “must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice―.

Frivaldo described himself as a “natural-born” citizen of the Philippines. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on 22 January 1988. In the certificate of candidacy filed on 19 November 1987. and some of them subject to greater risk than he. Frivaldo is disqualified from serving as governor of Sorsogon. 473 and PD No. However. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. was “merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator’s agents abroad. California. U.S. On 27 October 1988. filed with the Comelec a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo’s election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen. Frivaldo should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. by naturalization.FRIVALDO vs. The evidence shows. Once any of the required qualifications is lost. as provincial governor of Sorsogon? HELD: The Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over the question as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election. It therefore represents the decision of the COMELEC itself that the Supreme Court may review. in accordance with Section 253 of the Omhibus Election Code. who categorically claims that Frivaldo is a foreigner. having been naturalized in the United States on 20 January 1983. The Solicitor’s stance is assumed to have bben taken by him after consultation with COMELEC and with its approval. His naturalization. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on 18 January 1988. his title may be seasonably challenged. or by repatriation. he said. 725. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress. omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the certification from the United States District Court. being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been filed within 10 days from his proclamation. the decision on Frivaldo’s citizenship has already been made by the COMELEC through its counsel. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco. returns and qualifications of the members of the Congress and elective provincial and city officials. the league of Municipalities. Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. the Solicitor General. He failed to take such categorical acts. and assumed office in due time. Northern District of California. COMELEC FACTS: Juan G. who was also suing in his personal capacity.” He also argued that the challenge to his title should be dismissed. Sorsogon Chapter represented by its President. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility.A. There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo. who did not find it necessary — nor do they claim to have been coerced — to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos. Rhe anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country cannot be permitted. ISSUE: Whether Juan G. Still. Under CA No. . 63 as amended by CA No. as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. however. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer’s entire tenure. if he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship. Salvador Estuye.

Sec. ISSUE: Does Moreno’s probation grant him the right to run in public office? HELD: Yes. the imposition of the sentence of imprisonment. when Moreno was finally discharged upon the court's finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation. the Comelec en banc assails Sec." Thus. 40(a) of the Local Government Code which provides that those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment. within two (2) years after serving sentence. Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of action because he was already granted probation. Moreno argues that the disqualification under the Local Government Code applies only to those who have served their sentence and not to probationers because the latter do not serve the adjudged sentence. even assuming that he is disqualified. Probation Law should be construed as an exception to the Local Government Code. It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 168550. No. 2006 FACTS: Norma L. The Probation Law should allegedly be read as an exception to the Local Government Code because it is a special law which applies only to probationers. Since Moreno was released from probation on December 20. his subsequent election as Punong Barangay allegedly constitutes an implied pardon of his previous misconduct. On his petition. the provision does not specifically disqualify probationers from running for a local elective office. following the case of Baclayon v. a penalty which also covers probationable offenses. his case was deemed terminated and all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction were restored to him. It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute. The grant of probation to Moreno merely suspended the execution of his sentence but did not affect his disqualification from running for an elective local office. including the right to run for public office. general in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special statute. Moreno also argued that under Sec. was thereby suspended. disqualification shall commence on this date and end two (2) years thence. COMELEC G. . While the Local Government Code is a later law which sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of local elective officials. Further. In spite of this. However. August 10. The Comelec en banc granted her petition and disqualified Moreno. as well as the accessory penalties. Mutia. 40(a) of the Local Government Code covers offenses punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment. the Probation Law is a special legislation which applies only to probationers. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running for Punong Barangay on the ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention. 16 of the Probation Law of 1976 (Probation Law).MORENO vs. are disqualified from running for any elective local position. will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such earlier statute. Allegedly.R. 16 of the Probation Law provides that "[t]he final discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for which probation was granted. 2000. the final discharge of the probation shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed.

object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. modesty. or good morals. declared petitioner disqualified from running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti.” Citing above as ground. or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men. both the “fence” and the actual perpetrator/s of the robbery or theft invaded one’s peaceful dominion for gain – thus deliberately reneging the process “private duties” they owe their “fellowmen” in a manner “contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty. Petitioner claimed that Section 40 (a) of the Local Government Code does not apply to his case inasmuch as the probation granted him by the MTC which suspended the execution of the judgment of conviction and all other legal consequences flowing therefrom. he admits all the elements of the crime of fencing. “when the conviction is for an offense involving moral turpitude. And although the participation of each felon in the unlawful taking differs in point in time and in degree. Laguna. Actual knowledge by the “fence” of the fact that property received as stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one’s rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft which. Moral turpitude is deducible from this.Dela Torre vs COMELEC [258 SCRA 485] Facts: Section 40 (a) of Republic Act 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) provides that a prior conviction of a crime becomes a ground for disqualification from running for any elective local position – i. However. vileness.e. the COMELEC in a resolution. 2 of PD 1612. honesty. item. contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice. From the definition of fencing in Sec.” . an offense whose nature involves moral turpitude. by their very nature. or to society in general. rendered inapplicable Section 40 (a) as well. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness. Held: Yes. COMELEC held that petitioner was found guilty by the MTC for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. are crimes of moral turpitude. honesty and good morals. justice. Issue: WON the petitioner applicant is disqualified for the coming elections due to a crime involving moral turpitude. an element of the crime of fencing may be gleaned that “the accused knows or should have known that the said article.

• There must be some other act independent of and prior to the filing of his candidacy. • Omnibus Election Code has a policy of banning Philippine citizens with dual loyalties and allegiance. Miguel’s act of filing a certifícate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines did not itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the US. a rival candidate. • The law requires that the candidate who is a green cardholder must have waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country. ISSUE: WON Miguel is a resident of Bolinao. . (COMELEC dismissed the contest. Caasi. No evidence that Miguel waived his status as green card holder before he ran for mayor. objected to Miguel’s qualifications on the ground that the latter was a green card holder. 1988. and not US. • Local Gov’t Code requires residence of one (1) year in the municipality (to get acquainted with the place’s condition). HELD: Miguel lost his Philippine residence.CAASI V CA (1990) FACTS: •Miguel won as Mayor of Bolinao. holding that the possession of a green card does not establish Miguel’s abandonment of his Philippine residence) •When Miguel returned to the Philippines in November 1987.he stayed in Bolinao for only three (3) months before the elections on January 18. hence a permanent resident of America and not of Bolinao.

. (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad.” It is clear from this provision that fugitives from justice refer only to persons who has been convicted by final judgment. Issue: Whether private respondent. It includes those who after being charged flee to avoid prosecution. The Court opted to remand the case to COMELEC to resolve and proceed with the case. it is claimed.Marquez vs. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any local elective position. Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon. a petition for cancellation of respondent’s certificate of candidacy on the ground of the candidate’s disqualification under section 40 of the Local Government Code [Section 40. The following persons shall be disqualified from running for any elective local position: (e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Medyo bothered ako doon. Before the May 1992 elections.. V. a. 73. Saguisag who. Fugitive from justice refers to a person who has been convicted by final judgment. who at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy is said to be facing a criminal chargebefore a foreign court and evading a warrant of arrest comes within the term “fugitive from justice. However. It provided: Art. . has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his alleged “flight” from that country. The Oversight Committee evidently entertained serious apprehensions on the possible constitutional infirmity of Section 40(e) of RA 7160 if the disqualification therein meant were to be so taken as to embrace those who merely were facing criminal charges. The COMELEC is directed to proceed and settle the case in conformity of the given clarification with the term “fugitive from justice”. a criminal charge against him for ten counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles. the scope of fugitive. during the bicameral conference committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives.” The Oversight Committee finally came out with Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991. Disqualification. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest. COMELEC Facts: It is averred that at the time respondent Rodriguez filed his certificate of candidacy. A. Petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings against private respondent before the COMELEC but the latter dismissed the petition. but COMELEC dismissed the petition. Fugitive from justice refers to a person who has been convicted by final judgment. COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not private respondent is a fugitive from justice when it outrightly denied the petition for quo warranto.] was filed by petitioner. A similar concern was expressed by Senator R. USA. Disqualifications – The following persons shall be disqualified from running for any elective local position: “xxxx(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad.” Held: The Supreme Court ruled that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 provides: Article 73. made this reservation: “de ipa-refine lang natin 'yung language especially 'yung.

Jr. herein private respondent.. .” Private respondent revealed that a charge for fraudulent insurance claims. Private respondent filed a petition for disqualification before the COMELEC based principally on the allegation that Rodriguez is a “fugitive from justice. flee to avoid prosecution. Rodriguez. however. His rival candidate for the said position was Bienvenido O. Rodriguez is therefore a “fugitive from justice” which is a ground for his disqualification/ ineligibility under Section 40 (e) of the Local Government Code according to Marquez. The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one’s flight from a particular jurisdiction. being charged. submitted a certification from the Commission of Immigration showing that Rodriguez left the US on June 25. 1996 Facts: The petitioner Eduardo T. 1985.roughly five (5) months prior to the institution of the criminal complaint filed against him before the Los Angeles Court.” Held: No. Issue: Whether or not Rodriguez is a “fugitive from justice. COMELEC 259 SCRA 296. grand theft and attempted grand theft of personal property is pending against the petitioner before the Los Angeles Municipal Court. Rodriguez was a candidate for Governor in the Province of Quezon in the May 8. Marquez. The Supreme Court reiterated that a “fugitive from justice” includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who. And obviously. there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment or of a promulgated judgement of conviction. 1995 elections.RODRIGUEZ vs.

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