Terrorism: An Electronic Journal and Knowledge Base Volume I, Issue 1 Performative Violence?

The Multitude of Lone Wolf Terrorism
Author:
Jelle van Buuren
Universiteit of Leiden

August 2012

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Terrorism: An Electronic Journal and Knowledge Base

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Performative violence?
The Multitude of Lone Wolf Terrorism
Jelle van Buuren

Lone wolf terrorism - violent acts committed by single individuals with a significant impact on society - has moved up the public, political and scientific agendas. Without doubt, the double terrorist attacks by Anders Behring Breivik in Norway last July, which claimed 77 lives, have functioned as an important catalyst in this growing attention. But lone wolves asserted themselves prior to the Norway attacks. Think for instance of Baruch Goldstein, an American-born Israeli citizen who was responsible for the death of 29 Muslims praying in the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron; the Austrian Franz Fuchs, who used letter bombs to kill 4 and injure 15 people; US army major Nidal Malik Hasan, who is accused of a mass shooting at Fort Hood in which 13 people died and 30 were wounded; and the American mathematician Theodore  Kaczynsky,  also  known  as  the  “Una  Bomber”,  who  engaged  in  a  mail  bombing   spree that killed three and wounded 23. In addition, there have been several lone wolves who assassinated political leaders, such as Yigal Amir, the assassin of former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin; Volkert van der Graaf, who killed the Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn; and Mijailo Mijailovic, who is responsible for the death of the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs Anna Lindh (Bakker and De Graaf 2010). In The Netherlands we can also notice the murder of movie director and opinion maker Theo van Gogh by Mohammed Byouri, or the attack in April 2009 on the Royal Family by Karst Tates, who tried to ran with his car into a bus which carried the Dutch Queen and other members of the royal family, killing seven bystanders. In The Netherlands, the responsible authority for counter terrorism NCTb has warned for the threat that emanates from radicalised individuals (Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie 2011). These facts seem to give more than enough reason to scrutinize the phenomenon of lone wolf terrorism more closely. However, some prudence is called for. Whenever a new term hits the public, political and scientific discourse we have to be aware of the possible fashion fad of the new concept. In the Netherlands, for instance, we have witnessed political murders (Fortuyn, Theo van Gogh) perpetrated by individuals, that were never referred to as the acts of lone
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wolf terrorists. At  forehand,  the  lacking  label  of  ‘lone  wolf  terrorism’  didn’t  seem  to  have  had   any influence on the degree Dutch society was able to interpret these attacks, let alone deal with them. Further, it should be noted that the introduction of a new term does not necessarily mean that the phenomenon the term is referring to also is brand new. More important probably is that we should have some restraint in thinking that once we put the right label - or scientific definition or concept - in place we obtain by definition a better understanding of social reality. The opposite could also be true: by approaching a subject from a too clear-cut or abstract definition or conceptualisation important themes that could be of importance in understanding the issues at stake could get out of our sight. This  ‘ethnocentrism  of  the   scientist’  leads  to  substituting  the  practical  relation  to  the  world  for  the  observer’s  theoretical   relation to practice, or,  to  use  Bourdieu’s  formula,  ‘to  take  the  model  of  reality  for  the  reality   of  the  model’  (Bourdieu  1987:  62;;  Bourdieu  and  Wacquant  1992:  69).  An exploratory approach seems for now an appropriate route to follow, as we are far away from any theory that could explain, let alone predict lone wolf terrorism. In this article we will therefore look into a triad of issues that have been turned up in research into lone wolf terrorism: (1) How ‘lone’  are  lone  wolves;;  (2)  is lone wolf terrorism a new phenomenon and is it on the rise; (3) What motivates the lone wolf terrorist? We will end the article with an initial impetus to some theoretical or conceptual approaches that could be of use in further researching lone wolf terrorism.

1. How lone is the lone wolf?
What  exactly  do  we  mean  when  we  speak  of  lone  wolf  terrorism?  It’s  a  question  that  is  not   easy to answer to. Some of the confusion surrounding lone wolf terrorism can be seen back in the different definitions that circulate within literature. A commonly used definition of lone wolves is that it is ‘a  person  who  acts  on  his  or her own without orders from - or even connections to - an  organization’  (Stewart  and  Burton  2008). In the definition of COT (2007: 6) lone wolf terrorism is described as the intentional acts committed by persons (a) who operate individually; (b) who do not belong to an organized terrorist group or network; (c) who act without the direct influence of a leader or hierarchy; (d) whose tactics and methods are conceived and directed by the individual without any direct outside command or direction. According to Kaplan (1997), lone wolf terrorism may  be  defined  as  ‘an operation in which an individual, or a very small, highly cohesive group, engages in acts of anti-state violence

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independent of any movement, leader or network of support’. The latter definition paves way to a concept of lone wolf terrorism in which more than one person is engaged. This confusion in definitions has of course its effects on what is counted for as acts of lone wolves. For instance, the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing, which is usually presented as a prototype act of lone wolf terrorism, is not counted as such in a study of the COT (2007) because Timothy McVeigh executed the attack indeed by himself, but got some help in preparing the attack by his friend Terry Nichols. Other scholars however contest that there is anyhow something like lone wolf terrorism. Based on their research into 40 terrorist attacks by right extremists in the United Kingdom, all labelled by the authorities as lone wolf attacks, Jackson and Gable (2011) concluded that the phenomenon of lone wolf terrorism is mostly a myth. All perpetrators proved to have a long and clear involvement in organised right extremist networks. Their motivation and knowledge to carry out terrorist attacks were handed to them through virtual networks that nourished them both ideologically and practically. Most of the perpetrators used the internet to establish contacts with like-minded activists, to exchange ideas and to get hold on information how to get weapons or how to build bombs. The researchers cite a senior FBI officer who stated that the only genuine lone wolf the FBI ever had come across was Ted Kaczynski, the so-called Unabomber (Jackson and Gable 2011: 13). Of course, this confusion can be partly explained by  realizing  that  ‘terrorism’  is  a  social  construct  and  that  definitions  of  terrorism  typically   reflect the interests of those who do the defining (Spaaij 2012: 15). But it also shows the complexity of lone wolf terrorism and the danger that a too clear-cut definition of it comes at the price of a serious reduction of complexity. A typology formulated by Pantucci (2011: 7-8; 12-32) of lone wolves inspired by a Jidahist world view also shows that  the  ‘lone’  wolf  in  one way or the other is linked (virtually) to others. Pantucci distinguishes between ‘Loners’  (an  individual  who  plans  or  attempts  to  carry   out an act of terrorism using the cover of extreme Islamist ideology without having any actual connection or contact with extremists - beyond what they are able to access through passive consumption on the internet or from society at large);;  ‘Lone Wolves’ (individuals who, while appearing to carry out their actions alone and without any physical outside instigation, in fact demonstrate some level of contact with operational extremists);;  ‘Lone Wolf Pack’  (similar to the Lone Wolves, except rather than there being a single individual who becomes ideologically motivated); and ‘Lone Attackers’  (individuals who operate alone, but
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demonstrate clear command and control links with active extremists, rather than loose online connections or aspirational contacts). Under closer examination lone wolves therefore seem to be to a lesser degree individuals who operate completely on their own than we would expect on the face of it. It seems most of the lone wolves are somehow - passive or active - part of broader communities, or at least understand themselves as being part of a broader community. It therefore seems sensible not to overestimate  the  importance  of  the  ‘acting  alone’  of  a  lone  wolf  in  preparing  and   committing an attack, but instead look more closely into the changing dynamics and relations between individuals and communities. In the literature on terrorism a great deal of attention has always been devoted to the analysis of group dynamics, on how immediate social interactions shape and change ideology and sentiment. Current and ongoing debates within the literature powerfully impact the extent to which group dynamics of some form still play a role  in  the  processes  of  ‘lone-wolf’  radicalization.  Some observers note that the viral spread of extremism online, especially social media, can act as a surrogate offline social network. If this is the case, it is possible the group dynamics usually described to radicalisation within terrorist groups also occur within a ‘digital ecology in some adumbrate form’ (Bartlett and Miller 2012: 3). The paradox seems to be that Internet gives rise to the birth of a ‘community of loners’   (Pantucci 2011: 6). De availability of extremist readings and ‘how  to  do’  instructions  can  have   furthered  the  growth  of  the  ‘autodidactic  extremist’.  The  loner  leaning  towards  violence  can   now easily teach himself the extremist creed, and then define his global outlook along the same lines, using it as a justification when carrying out an act of violence. (Pantucci 2011: 11). As Matthew Feldman - who  doesn’t  refer  to  lone  wolf  terrorism  but  to  broadband   terrorism - states:  ‘a  few  mouse-clicks enable the assembly of everything from radical doctrines  to  bombs’ (2011). Virtual group dynamics therefore may influence, at least to some extent, individuals who operate autonomously. Conversely, lone wolf terrorists may also influence wider movements (Spaaij 2010: 866). The case of Breivik shows a combination of both tendencies. By citing a range of ideological readings from authors belonging to the international counter-jihad movement, Breivik shows that he understands himself as being part of this ‘community of belief’  or ‘ideology of extremism and validation’  (COT  2007:  7);;  At the same time Breivik hoped that his acts would inspire his allies to do the same. He sketched his - real or imagined - allies how to operate in order not to be discovered timely by law
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enforcement or intelligence: ‘[Their]  Achilles  heel  is  their  vulnerability  against  single/duo   martyr  cells’  (Berwick  2011:  934).

2. Is lone wolf terrorism on the rise?
In spite of the current attention for lone wolf terrorism it is not a new phenomenon. The concept  of  ‘Leaderless  Resistance’  for  instance  has  been  for  decades  the  favourite battle model for right wing and anti-government militias in the United States (Kaplan 1997). Historically  the  phenomenon  of  ‘radicalised  individuals’  even  can  be  traced  back  to  the  19th century  when  anarchists  enjoyed  some  reputation  for  their  individual  ‘Propaganda  of  the   Deed’  (Novak 1954: 176). This historical outlook is also of interest for the current discussions as these examples show that individuals who for tactical, ideological or personal reasons acted alone in perpetrating their attacks nevertheless were embedded in broader social and political environments. The question whether there is a significant rise during the last decades in attacks by lone wolf terrorist is not easy to answer in an unambiguous way. As far as international data are available about the threat and violence of lone wolves – data that are difficult to compare because of the differences in definition – the results are quit murky. According to the COTstudy (2007: 19) Europe witnessed a peak in lone wolf attacks in the eighties (13 incidents); in the nineties the amount of attacks equalled that of the seventies (7 incidents). In the first decade of the 21st century the figure advanced to 11 incidents. In the United States there was a peak in the nineties (13 incidents) and a decline in the number of lone wolf attacks to 8 in the last ten years. According to data collected by START (2010: 2-3) there is a watershed in the amount of lone wolf attacks before and after the 1995 Oklahoma Bombings. In the period 1970-2006 6,5% of the terrorist attacks in the U.S. could be ascribed to lone wolves. Since 1995 however 43 out of a total of 131 incidents seemed to be the work of individuals. In the light of these figures Spaaij (2010: 866) concluded that lone wolf terrorism counted roughly for one percent of all terrorist attacks, that the phenomenon especially can be found in the United States and show an upward trend, but that the same cannot be established for other countries. Research into the attacks of individuals against public persons in Germany (Hoffmann e.a. 2010), against politicians in Western-Europe (James e.a. 2007), against Members of Parliament in Canada (Adams e.a. 2009), against presidents in the US (Megargee

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1986) or against public persons in the US (Fein en Vossekuil 1999) shows similar results: attacks by individuals are not tied to a particular period but are of all time, but it is not crystalclear if we witness a significant upward trend. The same can be said for The Netherlands. Bovenkerk (2005) conducted research into the phenomenon of death treats by individuals against politicians and other public authorities as a result of the boom in death treats against politicians after the murder of Pim Fortuyn. An inventory by the department of Home Affairs showed that more than thousand death treats (bullet letters, threats by telephone and hate mails) against politicians were made during the period May 6th 2004 to May 28th 2004. The period after the turbulence in May 2004 also showed a tidal wave of death threats against politicians and administrators. A special police squad grounded in 2004 registered during the period 2005-2010 1234 death threats against national politicians and Members of Parliament with an average of 250 a year.1 A total of 106 politicians reported death threats. The average victim was threatened eight to ten times a year. The dark number of course is not known. Politicians and public authorities at the local level were also the victim of threats. The department of Home Affairs reported in 2009 that three out of ten local authorities were the victim of aggression by individuals (BZK 2010). The research of Bovenkerk however also showed that public authorities were the object of aggression for decades. Respondents came up with examples of death threats from twenty or thirty years ago. Threats and attacks by individuals against public authorities therefore are also in The Netherlands not a new phenomenon. The lack of reliable figures makes it difficult to give a sound judgement about the prevalence of lone wolf terrorism. The perceived rise in lone wolf terrorism therefore can also be the result of the so called registration effect (Bovenkerk 2005: 187; for a more general discussion of registration effects and its impact on crime figures see Wittebrood & Nieuwbeerta 2006). When law enforcement authorities devote more attention to a specific criminal phenomenon and start registering all incidents the usual result is an increase in figures that can easily give the impression that there is a huge problem compared to earlier days. Bovenkerk further argued that there is a difference in the way public authorities reacted on threats and political violence. According to Bovenkerk the authorities were traditionally inclined to dispose of the
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Figures from the period 2004-2008 are retrieved from NCTb 2010; figures from the period 2009-2010 are retrieved from press statements of the Public Prosecutor; see: http://www.om.nl/onderwerpen/bedreigingen/@155307/lichte-stijging/ 6

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involved individuals as harmless quarrel mongers and choose deliberately not to give any public  attention  to  the  threats  in  order  not  to  give  other  ‘lunatics’  the  inspiration  to  come  up   with the same ideas (Bovenkerk 2005: 51). Nowadays almost every incident hits the press; not only national incidents but also international incidents thanks to the internationalisation of communications. This could also influence and stimulate copycat behaviour (see for instance Berkowitz and Macauly 1971: 238; Kostinsky, Bixler, Kettl 2001: 999). In connection to this attention should be drawn to societal’s increasing sensitivity for everything that is connected with insecurity and risk. Modern societies are dominated by fear, risk and insecurity and ‘security’ has become a governmental technique to produce meaning and order in society. The loss of social connections, identities and public morality has put the issue of meaning and significance to the foreground and has subscribed a permanent feeling of existential insecurity in the capillaries of society (Bauman 2006; Beck 1992; Boutellier 2005; Furedi 1997 en 2006). Incidents not only emerge faster and more often into the public consciousness, the political and societal reactions they provoke are also harsher. When the Dutch revolutionary group RaRa planted and detonated a bomb that destroyed the house of state secretary Kosto responsible for asylum policies in 1991, there was a short discussion at the highest political-administrative levels whether politicians should be better protected. The conclusion however was that as a matter of principle, public authorities in The Netherland should not be encircled with body guards (Muller 1994: 378-380). Nowadays personal protection by body guards is the order of the day. Whether this just reflects the expanded threat these authorities are facing or that the changed societal context and sensitivity also comes into it, remains an open question.

3. What motivates the lone wolf?
A last question relates to the motivation of lone wolves. Partly this has to do with the terrorist character of lone wolf attacks and therefore also refers to definitional issues and in connection with that the quantative and qualitative reading of the phenomenon. Some definitions require a terrorist intention in order for attacks to be qualified as lone wolf attacks (COT 2007); other definitions  don’t  have  this  requirement  or  focus on the terrorist effect instead of the terrorist intention. Of course there are sound arguments to distinguish between the terrorist or nonterrorist dimension in the attacks by individuals. But for the broad, explorative approach we

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have chosen for this article it seems not sensible to put the terrorist dimension to the foreground of our analysis; it runs the risk of removing at forehand acts by individuals that apparently not qualify for the terrorist requirement whereas it could be the case that those acts provide important information for our understanding. Besides that there is an inherent problem in determining the motives of individuals: outsiders attribute intentions to the acts of individuals. The danger of subjective interpretations is constantly lying in wait (COT 2007: 8). This seems especially the case when it concerns acts of terrorism. Terrorists are ‘containers  into  which  one  can  project  one’s  unconscious hostility’,  according  to  DeMausse (cited in Victoroff 2005: 33). Victoroff warns against the tendency to explain the terrorist mind-set by projecting the state of mind supposedly  ‘required’ to act in this way. Our default reaction is that evil acts must be the product of fundamentally evil or insane individuals. A comparable critique was launched by Durodié - at the occasion of the 2005 attacks in London - who stated that all kind of self-appointed experts and commentators projected according to their pre-existing political persuasions their own pet theory onto the situation with a view to shaping ensuing policy (2007: 427). According to Durodié the uncomfortable truth could be that the London attacks were largely pointless and meaningless and in that way reflected the nihilist sentiments of other disgruntled individuals like the youngsters responsible for the Columbine high-school massacre (2007: 434) - an analysis which of course could also reflects particularly preoccupations held by Durodié. An additional problem - assuming that something can be said about the motivations of lone wolves - is that scientist some times have the tendency of slicing up social reality into nice fitting but abstract categories, classifications and concepts that hardly ever can be found in reality. Generally spoken, social reality - for as far as there is such thing as reality - and especially the individual agents living in it, hardly show any interest in or behave themselves according to the definitions, concepts and categories scientists stick onto it. When reading the motivations of lone wolves it can be of scientific relevance to classify them: is there a political motive, a personal motive or is the motive diffuse or incomprehensible? However as soon as a concrete case shows up these classification schemes are hardly tenable. Take for instance the case of Tristan van der Vlis who killed arbitrary bystanders in a shopping mall in a small village in The Netherlands before taking his own life. As far as we know, Van der Vlis  was  driven  by  a  diffuse  anger  against  ‘society’,  a  personal  rage  against  ‘God’  and  rage   against  ‘the  municipality’.  Most  scientists  will  not  qualify  Van  der  Vlis  as  a  lone  wolf  terrorist because he seemed not to have a political or terrorist intention or goal. The question however
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remains if Van der Vlis in his diffuse anger wanted or could make the same fine conceptual distinctions  between  ‘society’,  ‘politics’  or  ‘political  system’.  The same can be said of Nordine Amrani who killed six bystanders in Liege (Belgium) before killing himself. Amrani apparently hated  ‘the  world’,  hated  ‘the  system’  and  thought  ‘everybody  was  against  him’.   What if he had not chosen his victims randomly at the square in front of the local court house but had entered the court? Would his act then have been qualified as a terrorist or political act of a lone wolf? Looking at the fear and panic provoked by the attacks of Amrani one has to conclude that the result of his actions corresponds to what usually is considered to be acts of terrorism.  The  ‘diffuse’  or  ‘incomprehensible’  rage  attributed  to  lone  wolves  could  therefore   partly reflect the diffuse state of politics and the fragmented character of society in which guiding ideologies have lost much of their importance, politics and administration are nodalized and in which it is increasingly unclear who is responsible for what policies or policy outcomes. Instead of keep trying to classify the deeds and motivations of lone wolves according to previously defined categories, it could be more promising to take this vagueness as a starting point and accept that one of the characteristics of lone wolf terrorism is that ‘society  and  state  are  fused  together  into  a  single, all-rounding  threat’  (Wieviorka  2003:  16). Case studies that have been conducted show that there are indeed real problems in attributing motivations and intentions to lone wolves. Assigning motivations to individual acts of terror is inherently subjective and open to considerable interpretation. This fact becomes all the more problematic as individuals move away from explicitly claiming their attacks and prefer instead to let their actions speak for themselves. A particularly apt example comes out of Oklahoma City. Timothy McVeigh could have been (and was) described as a terrorist motivated by religion for his adherence to the Christian Identity movement. However, later it became clear that McVeigh viewed himself more as a political terrorist acting in response to the federal raids at Ruby Ridge and Waco and out of his virulent opposition to gun control measures. Less often cited is the contention that McVeigh acted on ethnic principles based on his alleged belief in the White supremacy movement (Quillen 2002: 287). Given these limitations on identifying motivations, the difference between religious and political motives is also hard to prove. According to Quillen, many of these questions about terrorist motivations are simply unanswerable. In fact, seeking definitive answers may obscure more than it reveals (Quillen 2002: 288). A last comment on this subject is that the emphasis on the diffuse or incomprehensible dimensions of modern terrorism runs the risk of ascribing in

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retrospective crystal-clear and unambiguous motivations  to  ‘old  school’  terrorists.  It  can  be   questioned if that view is correct.

4. Are lone wolves lunatics?
Two different reactions dominate the debate after lone wolf incidents have taken place. The first is to classify the attacks as the work of lunatics and to state that these acts should be judged accordingly. Any possible relationships with underlying societal phenomena are rejected. The second reaction postulates these acts have to be understood as social or political acts. Are lone wolves mostly mentally ill and should we understand and judge their actions accordingly?  The  question  whether  radicalised  individuals  are  ‘insane’  has  been  earlier  put   forward in  the  case  of  ‘old  school’  terrorists.  After  reviewing  the  literature  on  this subject, Victoroff (2005) concluded there is no robust scientific evidence to support the position that terrorists suffer from mental disorders. Research into (attempted) attacks or threats against public figures by individuals however tends towards the conclusion that most of them suffer from mental disorders. According to Fein en Vossekuil (1999) most perpetrators had a history of depressions and despair. Most of them once or more had tried to commit suicide and were known by mental health authorities. Research by Mullen (2007) shows that a majority (65%) of perpetrators were mentally ill. A recent review of literature by Meloy c.s. (2011) on attackers and individuals issuing death threats concluded that the vast majority of the subjects suffered from serious mental disorders. ‘Grandiosity’  seems to be an important element in the mental illnesses most subjects suffered from. Grandiosity is analysed as a form of pathological narcism  and  ‘entitlement’  that  also  can  be  found  regularly  with stalkers. This narcism asks for recognition and reward and, when recognition is not given, is the source for depression or suicide attempts. Research into attacks by individuals against European politicians (James c.s. 2007) showed that 13 out of 24 of the perpetrators suffered from mental disorders (schizophrenia, paranoia, borderline, depressions and obsessions). Ten of the perpetrators  were  classified  as  ‘loners’  that  were  socially  isolated  and  detached  from  society.   Thirteen attacks were motivated idiosyncratically or were the result of fixation on a public figure (2007: 339).

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However, inside academics the exact role of mental illness plays is being disputed. Fein en Vossekuil emphasize that mental disorder should not be seen as the primary origin of lone wolf attacks. Before an attack is being executed an attacker has to go through a rational process. A target has to been chosen and a planning and an escape plan have to be made. Evidence shows that attackers and near-attackers evinced a range of sophistication and attention in their planning. ‘All  could  think  clearly  enough  and  were  sufficiently  organized  to   mount an attack or make a near-lethal approach to a prominent person of public status (1999: 331). Mullen c.s. (2007: 3) however disagrees. Combining their own research results with other research findings they conclude that mental illness is common under individual attackers and that there can be established a clear link between mental disorders and attacks or threats against public figures. Specific research into the more narrow category of lone wolf terrorists shows that the rate of psychological disturbance appears to be higher amongst lone wolf terrorist compared to terrorists in general and that they suffered from a variable degree of social ineptitude: they were, to varying extents, loners with few friends and generally preferred to act alone (Spaaij 2010: 867). Further, some kind of breach in their personal biography can be noted; a sweeping and life changing experience that functioned as a trigger (Fein & Vossekuil 1999: 327; Springer 2009: 79-81). Researchers however emphasize that, even when psychological factors are present, lone wolf terrorism should be approached as combination of individual, social and external factors. According to Spaaij (2010: 867) it involves a social process that is inherently individual in nature and that depends on the specific situation and personal characteristics of the individual involved and his/her interaction with significant others. The mixture of causal factors is diverse and unique for each individual. Political and sub cultural conditions are mediated by social and psychological dynamics in which the individual is directly involved.

5. Social and political motives
According to most researchers, clear political motives are hardly of any importance for lone wolves. A modification of this assumption however seems to be needed at forehand. Attacks by lone wolves can partly be the result of conscious tactical choices made by terrorist organisations or networks to encourage their potential adherents to conduct their own

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operations (Pantucci 2011: 4)2. These terrorist entrepreneurs therefore have a clear political motive and their adherents are apparently seduced to follow the call for autonomous action. Whether this political legitimation of their acts is central for their motivation or merely presents to them the grammar to legitimize their actions remains to be seen. Besides that, researchers have acknowledged that some kind of a grief is always underlying the acts of lone wolves (Calhoun en Weston 2003). A  ‘grief’  is  defined  as  a  situation  that  gives  occasion  to   frustration, anger or dissatisfaction. Perceptions of injustice or dishonesty could be the result of this. Goldberg  (2003:  15)  postulates  that  ‘fanatic  violence’  is  an  attempt to seek social justice.  The  ‘fanatic  hatred’  claims  that  the  state  has  violated  the  social  contract  with  society   by  treating  them  unjust.  ‘In  short,  an  individual  who  is  treated  unjustly  can  legitimately   declare his contract with the social order null and void and demand that his natural rights be restored - taking whatever retaliatory actions necessary to protect his own well-being’.   According to Goldberg, justice has a deep emotional appeal that goes beyond any legal or political definition and is  related  to  one’s  frustrations  and  resentments.  Their  hate  is  therefore   mostly an attempt to be seen and heard (Goldberg 2003: 17). Fein en Vossekuil (1999) however state that attacks  and  threats  don’t  have  to  be  motivated  by   grieves. The motive can also be to achieve notoriety or fame. Many of the assassins and would-be assassins simply felt invisible. They didn't want to see themselves as nonentities. They experienced failure after failure after failure, and decided that rather than being a 'nobody,' they  wanted  to  be  a  'somebody’.  That’s  why  according  to  Fein  and  Vossekuil  some   attackers appeared to have clothed their motives with some political rhetoric. They chose political targets because political targets were a sure way to transform this situation: They would be known. If the objective is notoriety or fame, that's the most efficient instrumental mechanism by which to achieve that. Associating with a broader political movement or goal allows would-be assassins to see themselves as not such a bad person. In this way assassins are basically ‘murderers in search of a cause’ and construct a narrative to legitimize their acts. The  importance  of  ‘being  seen’  can  also  be  found  in  studies  into  suicide  terrorists.  The  ‘quest for significance’  is interpreted as an overarching motivational mechanism in which personal frustrations, ideological frameworks and social pressure play mostly a functional role (Kruglanski e.a. 2009). Spaaij (2012: 38-39) concludes that lone wolf terrorists combine the

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The Jihad-glossy Inspire published  for  instance  the  article  “How to make  a  bomb  in  the  Kitchen  of  your  Mom”,   which according to Western intelligence agencies had the purpose of encouraging potential lone wolves to take matters in their own hands. 12

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broad structures of a more prevalent extreme ideology with their own personal grievances. Lone wolves tend to create their own individualized ideologies from a broader political, religious or social aims and personal frustrations and aversion. So it seems that what characterizes the motivation of lone wolves is that they transcend existing categories and classifications and botch together a narrative that suits them.

6. Discussion
Lone wolf terrorism is a complex and contradictory phenomenon which should be treated prudently. We have to guard ourselves against easy assumptions or conclusions. As we have seen, lone wolf terrorism is not something that just occurred recently. Political violence and threats committed by individuals can be found through history. As reliable figures are lacking it is hardly possible to make any grounded statement about the suggested upward tendencies or future trends. It seems that individuals are more than it used to be responsible for carrying out attacks, but also here some prudence is required. The emergence of the virtual world has changed the relations and dynamics between individuals and communities. Further it seems that there are difficulties in reading the motivations of lone wolves which some times are seemingly diffuse or incomprehensible, some times can resolve into more or less known extremist ideologies and are mediated by psychological disorders to a varying degree. This issue is further complicated as it is inherently difficult to ascribe from the outside intentions to individual perpetrators, as it is to establish whether a motive is ideologically consistent or not. Lastly, the societal context has been changed. Politics have been polarised, the public discussion is sharp and - especially in The Netherlands - rude or hateful. Death treats can be found on a regularly base not only in the political spectre, but saturate all kinds of societal communications. For now, the best starting point for further research and theorizing seems to be the interplay between individual, social and external factors. In the words of Spaaij (2010: 867): it involves a social process that is inherently individual in nature and that depends on the specific situation and personal characteristics of the individual involved and his/her interaction with significant others. The mixture of causal factors is diverse and unique for each individual. Political and sub cultural conditions are mediated by social and psychological dynamics in which the individual is directly involved. Besides digging deeper in concrete cases of lone

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wolves it seems therefore of importance to also explore further the underlying political and cultural circumstances in which the acts of lone wolves are embedded. We understand lone wolf terrorism not as an isolated phenomenon but as the product of modern society. Just as nobody is born as a terrorist, nobody is born as a lone wolf terrorist. We would like here to further explore two issues that we hypothesize as being of importance for our reading of lone wolf terrorism and that are both situated at the cross point of political, social and individual dynamics: the relationship between individuals and communities and the motivational issue.

8. A continuum of lone wolf terrorism
We start with the changing relationship and dynamics between individuals and communities. The  current  state  of  research  emphasizes  that  the  degree  in  which  lone  wolves  act  ‘alone’   should be put into perspective. In most cases lone wolves are part of broader communities of belief or at least they understand themselves as being part of such communities. Although we can  postulate  that  to  a  certain  degree  we  witness  the  ‘individualisation  of  terrorism’  at  the   same time it is imperative to render account of the complex and paradoxical nature of what is defined  as  ‘individualisation’.  Individualisation  is  a  fact  of  modern  life  but  at  the  same  time   new communities and connections are being configured making those new communications both more large-scale as small-scale. Digitalisation and virtualisation give rise to new forms and connections and at the same time change existing relationships. A central issue in these new (re)configurations is the question of significance. Individuals have loosened their ties with institutions and close communities but are not totally atomitized. Duyvendak and Hurenkamp (2004: 15-16; Duyvendak 2004) have labelled these developments as the transformation into communities light, or neo-tribes (Maffesoli 1998): individuals indeed are looking for connections with broader communities and want to be part of something bigger, something that gives meaning to their lives and produce identity and self-understanding; at the same time however these connections must me be of a more informal or noncommittal character. Therefore the most crucial transformation can be situated in the make-up of these connections. Connections between individuals and between individuals and communities are looser; weak, temporarily and fragmented ties replace the strong and all-embracing ties that connected people in the era of close defined classes, ideologies and identities. It could even be the  case  that  exactly  these  modern  possibilities  to  connect  oneself  at  a  distance  in  a  ‘light’,   anonymous way with virtual communities are par excellence suited for those individuals who

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- for one reason or the other - are reluctant or unable to  participate  in  ‘real’  thick communities.  The  ‘lightness’  of  communities  and  the  way  individuals  are  connected  with   them does not mean they are of less importance for identity formation, signification and selfunderstanding. Quite the contrary. Instead of focusing on individualization it is better to understand these developments as deinstitutionalization or de-collectivization. This reflects a more general trend in modern societies and is also applicable to the political level. Stolle and Hooghe (2003) pointed at the emergence of informal political participation in which attendance in formal and hierarchically organised participation channels descends but this loss is compensated by an increasing informal participation. Beck (1993) has labelled this sub politics: politics is no longer the monopoly of institutionalised political actors. Sub politics interweaves daily and political worries and therefore withdraws itself from institutionalisation and hierarchy. The common denominator is that formal institutions loose strength while individual citizens design their political and societal involvement in different, less institutionalised manners. Sub politics is especially designed in the new social media. According to Bartlett, Birdwell and Litter (2011: 15; 30) ‘the  melange  of  virtual  and  real-world  political  activity’  is the dominant way millions of people - especially young people - relate to politics in the twenty-first century. This ‘nascent,  messy  and  more  ephemeral  form  of  politics’  is  becoming  the  norm  for  a  new,  digital   generation. Social media are the new face of politics and political expression. How and in which ways new political identities, political actions, political communications and political significance are produced by virtual networks asks for more research, just like the relationship between on-line and off-line identities and activities. The same can be postulated for our understanding of the more extremist digital frontlines that emerge. One of the few articles that devotes special attention to the meaning extremist virtual communities offer their members is by De Koster and Houtman (2008) who interviewed members of the right-wing extremist website Stormfront. They concluded that offline stigmatization, creating feelings of dissociation or detachment underlies virtual community formation by Dutch rightwing extremists. Stormfront is like a second home for them, a safe place in which they find refuge and can be who they want to be and freely express their thoughts and identities. It could be hypothesized that in general individuals who feel stigmatized, humiliated or denied in real life find refuge in virtual communities of like-minded. A better understanding of the dynamics between individuals and communities as mediated by virtuality, the meanings that
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are produced, identities and worldviews that are being articulated and the interplay between the off-line and on-line world could give us more knowledge of the processes that drive individuals to convert knowledge, political views and encouragements acquired in the virtual communities into actions in the real world. Too much  fixation  on  the  apparent  ‘loneliness’ character of acts by lone wolves runs the risk of loosing sight of what is also, or even more important: the changing relationship, and the changing dynamics between individuals on the one hand, and groups, networks or environments on the other hand. It seems therefore a mistake to create an opposite between an individual, and a group or network and treat them as completely different cases. We should think instead of it as a continuum, in which individuals are connected in different ways, with different magnitude and with different objectives with their environments, which we should understand  as  ‘communities  of  belief’  (COT  2007)  in   which  ‘ideologies  of  extremism  and  validation’  flourish.

9. Performative violence
The second issue that calls for more research is the (political) motivation of lone wolves. As Sprinzak (1991: 50) stated: ‘Terrorism does not exist in isolation and is a form of human behaviour that is integrally linked to the normal world. Terrorism is a direct behavioural extension of non-terroristic  opposition  politics.’  Sprinzak  analyzed the processes of delegitimation that convert individuals and organisations from  ‘dissatisfied  democrats’  into   uncompromising  terrorists.  It’s  a  challenge  to  utilize  these  insights  for  modern  political   phenomena and to investigate if and how these kinds of processes of delegitimation are still at work. Sprinzak wrote his article at a time that politics particularly was formed in solid organisations on the base of coherent, all-covering ideologies. Nowadays the great ideologies are almost gone, crumbled or fragmentized and partly replaced by new or modified ideologies like populism that are not easy positioned in established political schemes. Moreover, individuals influenced by the possibilities new social media offers are constructing their own copy-paste ideologies and signify their own, sometimes idiosyncratic meaning to the world. Such a copy-paste  ideology  is  not  ‘just’  a  random  ideology  of  a  lunatic.  It  is,  for  the  people   involved, a highly sophisticated worldview that gives meaning to the world, provides a sense of direction and enables a person to express their position in the world. The Internet plays an important role here since it makes it very easy for people to assemble and express their own

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worldview (De Koning 2011)3. The  ‘diffuse’  motivation  or  ‘individualized  ideologies’  that   are often attributed to lone wolves therefore can be read as the reflection of a diffused world of politics and policies in modern societies. Political centres seems to be displaced, disappeared or dissolved in hybrid national and international governance networks of an unprecedented complexity in which it is hardly knowable who is responsible for what. Discomfort, dissatisfaction, rage, alienation or repudiation will compared to earlier days conform itself less in collective political identities and institutions and more in personalized ideologies and political identities. It is not that much the question whether these forms of discomfort  are  ‘political’  but  the  question  whether  these  ‘hidden  transcripts’  (Scott  1998)  are recognized  as  ‘politics’  and  by  whom.   That way, the cultural embedment and the cultural scripts of modernity should also be taken into account. Some of the cultural scripts lone wolves apply (Breivik, Van der Vlis, Armani) are not dumfounded. Larkin (2009) pointed for instance at the cultural script - both in the matter of form as well as content - the Columbine High School shootings have produced for a number of succeeding rampage shootings. Rampage shootings were no longer the provenance of isolated, loner students who were psychologically deranged. Columbine raised rampage shootings in the public consciousness from mere revenge to a political act. The shooters Klebold and Harris were overtly political in their motivations to destroy their school. In their own words, they wanted to ‘kick-start a revolution’ among the dispossessed and despised students of the world. They understood that their pain and humiliation were shared by millions of others and conducted their assault in the name of a larger collectivity. Klebold and Harris identified the collectivity - outcast students - for which they were exacting revenge. That is what distinguishes Columbine from all previous rampage shootings (2009: 1320). One of the cultural scripts that are a consequence of the Columbine shootings is that the shooters engage in their rampages to ‘make a statement’. The body count exists primarily as a method of generating media attention. Killing for notoriety is the second outcome of the Columbine shootings. The extent of media attention seems to be closely related to body count. To such disgruntled students, payback consists of killing convenient targets, making a statement, and dying in a blaze of glory (2009: 1323).

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Copy-paste ideologies can also be discovered in the intermingling of ideologies from the extreme left and the extreme  right  in  what  is  called  the  ‘Third  Position’:  a  collective  interest  in  opposing  the  police  and  state   regardless of differences in other social philosophy or ideals (Borum and Tilby 2005: 209). 17

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It is interesting to compare the cultural scripts lone wolves make use of with more general cultural scripts that can be found in late modernity and that are of importance for identity formation and the production of significance. Modern times seem to put a premium on selfexhibition. The importance of individual responsibility, authenticity, wealth, celebrity status and self-expression  the  ‘casting  society’  emphasizes  paves  way  to  understanding  oneself  and   presenting oneself to the out world as  a  brand  (‘the  brand  Me’).  The essence of this personal branding is to recommend your self  constantly  or  to  ‘expose’  the  Self  one  way  or  the  other  to   the outer world. This exposition of the Self asks for a reaction, for confirmation by others. Nothing is worse than placing a message on Facebook and not getting any reaction to it. That comes close to a denial of existence... Performativity therefore seems to be the essence. According  to  Mayer  (2001:  366),  following  Mark  Juergensmeyer’s  analysis (2000: 122-126), the acts of lone wolves are not executed to achieve some political strategic goal but to make a symbolic statement.  Juergensmeyer  labels  this  as  ‘performance  violence’,  ‘drama’s  designed   to  have  an  impact  on  the  several  audiences  that  they  affect.’  This  performative violence can apply to terrorist as well as to self-destructive actions; in the case of lone wolf terrorism a combination of both often exists. Bovenkerk (2005) also has pointed at a shift from instrumental towards expressive violence. Most political actions in the sixties, seventies and eighties were clearly political and societal inspired and can be seen as instrumental to a goal. Nowadays  the  political  dimensions  have  moved  to  the  background  and  working  off  one’s   emotions has gained more importance. Staging a spectacular action allows an individual to attract the attention of the world and may to some extent be intended to reach that goal. Think for instance of the videotapes made by the Columbine killers in 1999. They had been eager to document everything and hoped that movies would be made of their stories: ‘Directors will be fighting over this story,’ one of them said (Mayer 2001: 365). Performative violence therefore foremost refers to itself. It is the construction of identity or position through active expression. Performative violence is not directed so much against the world, but clamours for attention from audiences, demands audiences to look intently to the actor/perpetrator and by doing so recognizing and acknowledging the actor/perpetrator in its very existence and uniqueness. An understanding of lone wolf terrorism requires attention for both change as continuity, for the changing dynamics and relations between individuals and communities and the politicalcultural scripts in which identities are being expressed and individuals give meaning to themselves and the world they inhibit. Some lone wolves will be driven by more or less established and coherent political ideologies or political-religious ideologies (Jihadism, right18

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wing extremism), whether or not actively encouraged by terrorist entrepreneurs or the virtual communities of belief they have converted themselves to, and to some extent originating from feelings of discontent, alienation, anger and detachment. Other loners will be motivated by more idiosyncratic factors, more driven by personal feelings of denial, humiliation and alienation and translated in a variety of motives. All will be drawing on political-cultural scripts to find the grammar to express themselves both in form as well as content. It should not come as a surprise that in a heavily personalized and de-institutionalized society such manifestation of rage and hate will express themselves in the form of personalised performative violence that transcends established categories and classifications. Whether we read  these  manifestations  as  ‘political’  or  put  them  aside  as  the incomprehensible acts of lunatics tells as much of our ability to recognize the hidden transcripts of politics in a liquid post-political age as it tells of lone wolves.

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References
Adams, S. J., T.E. Hazelwood, N.L. Pitre, T.E. Bedard, S.D. Landry (2009) 'Harassment of Members of Parliament and the Legislative Assemblies in Canada by individuals believed to be mentally disordered', Journal of Forensic Psychiatry & Psychology, Vol. 20, No. 6, pp. 801-814 Bakker, E. & B. de Graaf (2010) Lone Wolves. How to Prevent This Seemingly New Phenomenon? Discussion Paper for Expert Meeting on Lone Wolves, ICCT, The Hague, 5 November 2010 Bartlett, J., J. Birdwell and M. Littler (2011) The New Face of Digital Populism. London: Demos Bartlett, J. & C. Miller (2012) ‘The Edge of Violence: Towards Telling the Difference Between Violent and Non-Violent Radicalization’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 1-21 Bauman, Z. (2006) Liquid Fear. Cambridge: Polity Press Beck, U. (1992) Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage Beck, U. (1993) Die Erfindung des Politischen. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. Berwick, A. (2011) 2083 – A European Declaration of Independence. De Laude Novae Militiae Pauperes commilitones Christi Templique Solomonici. London (pseudonym of Anders Behring Breivik) Berkowitz,  L.  and  J.  Macauly  (1971)  ‘The  Contagion  of  Criminal  Violence’,  Sociometry, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 238-260 Borum,  R.  &  C.  Tilby  (2005)  ‘Anarchist  Direct  Actions:  A  Challenge  for  Law  Enforcement’,   Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 28, pp. 201-223 Boutellier, J.C.J. (2005) De Veiligheidsutopie. Hedendaags onbehagen en verlangen rond misdaad en straf. Den Haag: Boom Juridische Uitgevers Bourdieu, P. (1987) Choses dites. Paris: Minuit Bourdieu, P. and L.J.D.  Wacquant  (1992)  ‘The  Purpose  of  Reflexive  Sociology’,  in:  P.   Bourdieu and L.J.D. Wacquant (eds) An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. Chigaco: University of Chigaco Press, pp. 61-215 Bovenkerk, F. (2005) Bedreigingen in Nederland. Verkenning in opdracht van Politie en Wetenschap. Utrecht: Willem Pompe Instituut Universiteit Utrecht BZK (2010) Bedreigd bestuur 2010. Agressie en geweld tegen politieke ambtsdragers bij gemeenten, provincies en waterschappen. Den Haag: Ministerie van BZK

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Calhoun, F. and S. Weston (2003) Contemporary threat management: A practical guide for identifying, assessing, and managing individuals of violent intent. San Diego: CA. Specialized Training Services COT (2007) Lone Wolf terrorism. Final draft 6/7/2007. Case study for Work Package 3 ‘Citizens  and  governance  in  a  knowledge-based  society’ Durodié,  B.  (2007)  ‘Fear  and  Terror  in  a  Post-Political  Age’,  Government and Opposition, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 427-450 Duyvendak, J.W. (2004) Een eensgezinde, vooruitstrevende natie. Over de mythe van dé individualisering en de toekomst van de sociologie. Amsterdam: Vossius Pers Duyvendak, J.W. & M. Hurenkamp (2004) Kiezen voor de kudde. Lichte gemeenschappen en de nieuwe meerderheid. Amsterdam: Van Gennep Fein, R.A. and B. Vossekuil (1999)  ‘Assassination  in  the  United  States:  An  Operational  Study   of Recent Assassins, Attackers, and near-Lethal  Approachers’,  Journal of Forensic Sciences, Vol. 44, No. 2, pp. 321-333 Feldman,  M.  (2011)  ‘Research  Report’,  e-Extreme, Vol. 12, No. 1 Furedi, F. (1997) Culture of Fear: risk-taking and the morality of low expectations. London: Cassell Furedi, F. (2006) Culture of Fear revisited. London: Continuum Press Goldberg,  C.  (2003)  ‘Fanatic  Hatred  and  Violence  in  Contemporary  America’,  Journal of Applied Psychoanalytical Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 9-19 Hoffmann, J., J. R. Meloy, A. Guldimann and A.  Ermer  (2011)  ‘Attacks  on  German  Public   Figures, 1968–2004: Warning Behaviors, Potentially Lethal and Non-lethal Acts, Psychiatric Status,  and  Motivations’, Behaviour Sciences and the Law, Vol. 29, pp. 155-179 Jackson, P. and G. Gable (2011) Lone wolves: myth or reality? London: Search Light James, D.V., P.E. Mullen, J.R. Meloy, M.T. Pathé, F.R. Farnham, L. Preston, and B.L. Darnley  (2007)  ‘The  role  of  mental disorder in attacks on European politicians 1990–2004’,   Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, Vol. 116, pp. 334-344 Juergensmeyer, M. (2000) Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence. Berkeley: University of California Press Kaplan, J. (1997) 'Leaderless resistance', Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 80-95 Koning,  M.  de  (2011)  ‘Radicalization  Series  V:  Freedom  Fighters,  Conflict  and  Culture  Talk’, Closer. Anthropology of Muslims in Europe, 27 July 2011

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Koster, W. de & D.  Houtman  (2008)  ‘Stormfront  is  like  a  second  home  to  me’,  Information, Communication & Society, Vol. 11, No. 8, pp. 1155-1176 Kostinsky,  S,  E.O.  Bixler  &  P.A.  Kettl  (2001)  ‘Threats  of  School  Violence  in  Pennsylvania   After Media Coverage of the Columbine  High  School  Massacre’,  Archives of Pediatrics & Adolescent Medicine, Vol. 155, pp. 994-1001 Kruglanski,  A.W.,  X.  Chen,  M.  Dechesne,  S.  Fishman  and  E.  Orehek  (2009)  ‘Fully   Committed:  Suicide  Bombers’  Motivation  and  the  Quest  for  Personal  Significance’,  Political Psychology, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 331-357 Larkin,  R.W.  (2009)  ‘The  Columbine  Legacy.  Rampage  Shootings  as  Political  Acts’,   American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 52, No. 9, pp. 1309-1326 Maffesoli, M. (1988) Le temps des tribus. Le  déclin  de  l’individualisme dans les sociétés de masse. Paris: Meridiens Klincksieck Mayer, J. (2001) 'Cults, Violence and Religious Terrorism: An International Perspective', Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 24, No. 5, pp. 361-376 Megargee,  E.I.  (1986)  ‘A  Psychometric  Study  of  Incarcerated  Presidential  Threateners’,   Criminal Justice and Behaviour, Vol. 13, No.3, pp. 243-260 Meloy,  J.  R.  e.a.  (2011)  ‘Factors  Associated  with  Escalation  and  Problematic  Approaches   Toward  Public  Figures’,  Journal of Forensic Science, Vol. 56, No. S1, pp. 128-135 Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011) Nationale contraterrorismestrategie 2011-2015. Den Haag: Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie Mullen, P. et al. (2007) The Role of Psychotic Illnesses in Attacks on Public Figures (not officially published) Muller, E.R. (2004) Terrorisme en Politieke verantwoordelijkheid. Gijzelingen, aanslagen en ontvoeringen in Nederland. Arnhem: Gouda Quint. NCTB (2010) Individuele bedreigers van publieke personen in Nederland. Fenomeenanalyse en een beleidsverkenning. Den Haag: NCTB Novak,  D.  (1954)  ‘Anarchism  and  Individual  Terrorism’,  The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, Vol. XX, No. 2, pp. 176-184 Pantucci, R. (2011) A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist Terrorists. London: ICSR Quillen, Chris (2002) 'A Historical Analysis of Mass Casualty Bombers', Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 25, No. 5, pp. 279-292 Scott, J. C. (1998) Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press

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Spaaij,  R.  (2010)  ‘The  Enigma  of  Lone  Wolf  Terrorism:  An  Assessment’,  Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33, No. 9, pp. 854-870 Spaaij, R. (2012) Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism: Global Patterns, Motivations and Prevention. Dordrecht: Springer Springer, N.R. (2009) Patterns of Radicalization: Identifying the Markers and Warning Signs of Domestic Lone Wolf Terrorists in our Midst. Montery: Naval Postgraduate School Montery Sprinzak, E. (1991) ‘The  Process  of  Delegitimation:  Towards  a  Linkage  Theory  of  Political   Terrorism’,  Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol 3, No. 1, pp. 50-68 START (2010) Background Report: On the Fifteenth Anniversary of the Oklahoma City Bombing. Maryland: START Stewart,  S.  and  F.  Burton  (2008)  ‘The  Lone  Wolf  Disconnect’, Stratfor January 30 th, retrieved from: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/lone_wolf_disconnect Stolle, D. en M. Hooghe (2003) ‘Changes in the Participation Pattern of Western Populations’, In: M. Micheletti, A. Follesdal en D. Stolle (Eds) The politics behind products. Victoroff,  J.  (2005)  ‘The  Mind  of  the  Terrorist.  A  Review  and  Critique  of  Psychological   Approaches’,  Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 49, No. 1, pp 3-42 Wieviorka, M. (2003) The Making of Terrorism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press Wittebrood,  K.  en  P.  Nieuwbeerta  (2006)  ‘Een  kwart  eeuw  stijging  in  geregistreerde Criminaliteit.  Vooral  meer  registratie,  nauwelijks  meer  criminaliteit’,  Tijdschrift voor Criminologie, Jrg. 48, Nr. 3, pp. 227-242

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