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Summer2012

Genocide & Communal Violence

Genocide & Communal Violence: Exploring the Connection between Victim, Bystander and Perpetrator
PATRICK JAMES CHRISTIAN, PHD STUDENT Nova Southeastern University, Graduate School of Humanities & Social Science Department of Conflict Analysis & Resolution Instructor-Researcher National Intelligence University, Department of African Studies Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, Washington DC

Abstract: This paper constitutes an exploration into the connection between the victims, perpetrators and bystanders of genocide and extreme communal violence. The thesis is that this type of violence is driven by fundamentally different forces than regular warfare. This fundamental difference obviates the effectiveness of existing military and diplomatic approaches because of the nature of the psychological forces behind genocide and extreme communal violence. This exploration begins the process of deconstructing the individual and group psychological processes that generate these extreme forms of organized violence. By unpacking the psychological sociological processes that lead up to and sustain genocide and extreme communal violence, we can inform military and diplomatic training and planning at the programmatic stages of organization. Even beyond preparing interventionist forces for work in these extra-violent conflicts, the explanations of the psychological processes allow planners and trainers to understand how the violence of genocide affects peacekeepers and diplomats, an essential step in developing countermeasures in training, planning and execution. The desired results of treating genocidal and extreme communal violence separately from other forms of organized utilitarian violence are to isolate the debilitating psychological effects preparatory to intervention and treatment by interventionists. Keywords: genocide, communal violence, peacekeeping, warfare, cultural psychology, sociology, Bosnia, Serbia, Croatia, Rwanda, Darfur, cultural identity, prosopagnosia, identits-agnosia.

Chared remains of extreme communal violence in Ambarou, Northern Darfur, August 2004

Introduction
though war may be enacted on behalf of religion, genocide is a religious act Howard Adelman

The first time I walked onto a killing field in Africa was at the destroyed village of Ambarou, a days drive from the border town of Tine, Chad. An indescribable chill pervaded my chest and I felt as if I had become unconnected to everything and everyone around me. When I looked at my African colleagues, their faces were blank; eyes staring at the carnage surrounding us. At one
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point, I came across a small figure charred in ashes with his or her hands still manacled to a wooden post. The dull stainless steel of the old fashioned handcuffs still glittered in the bright sun and whispered to us of unspeakable things that our fellow humans had only recently been doing in the secrecy of the desert. I could not begin to imagine the sheer suffering which accompanied the death of that child and how I would have borne it at such a young age. We were well beyond the possibilities for restorative justice, for either the victims or the perpetrators. It seemed as if we were just witnesses in a play where our humanity, love, and compassion were as out of place as our ignorance. Again and again, I found myself wanting to forget the presence of these victims, and ignore the implications of the suffering they endured before they died. I remember feeling that I didnt have the strength of my own sense of human connection with the living to allow my connection with the dead. But at the same time, I remember feeling a welling of loss at my denial and a sense of disappointment of me by those I was there to witness on behalf of. We were bystanders, witnessing victims and perpetrators engage in ritualistic communal violence without the faintest understanding of what was happening and why (Christian, 2005). Peacekeepers as Bystanders: Fearing the Abyss
When you look into an abyss, the abyss also looks into you - Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche

The purpose of this paper is twofold; first, I suggest that there is a special relationship between the victims of genocide, the bystanders who watch them die and sift through the remains of their humanity, and the perpetrators who carried out those gruesome deeds. Secondly, I propose that our understanding of this relationship can assist us with each phase of the international practice of humanitarian and peacekeeping intervention. My starting premise is simple that the relationship between victim, bystander, and perpetrator is based on shame, humiliation and a failure of heroic archetypes1. None of the three can claim public status to heroism; not the victim in a context of heroic suffering, for they have gained nothing with the loss of their ability to create and sustain existential identity and its metaphysical conjugate, generational memory. Not the bystander as he/she bore witness not merely to anothers extinction, but to their own indifference or impotency to meet the demands of their own cultures archetypal heroism. Not the perpetrator, unable as they are to justify the necessity of their genocidal deeds outside of their own inner circle of cultural brethren. The swing position in this triad is the bystander, imbued as they are with the possibility of acting or not acting; intervening or continuing to bear silent witness. The victims certainly believed they had no choice, else they would have run when the early opportunities afforded themselves. In every case of genocide, some in fact did run, but the majority of victims in genocidal conflict remain to die. The perpetrators also believed that they had no choice. All perpetrators of genocide and ethnic

Heroes and heroic deeds are social constructs created in myth for each community as a determination of absolute good against absolute evil. The closer to the archetype of heroism that a member of a community attains, the further he/she clothes themselves in the robes of the prototype of hero. The archetypes and prototypes that create and define our heroes and heroism are deeper expressions of elements of social morals, evolved to sustain existence, create purpose, and transmit existential identity across generational memory. 1|P
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cleansing possess a belief that the stakes involved in their war of liberation is not mere land or riches, but the survival of their existential identity. There is always a physical and a metaphysical dimension to the cultural homicidal rage of genocide and extreme communal violence. Imbedded within the intersection of this relationship between the three parties to genocide lies an explanation not only for why it occurs, but why it is so often allowed to run its course once started. A comment from Lawrence Eagleburger, James Bakers deputy at the American Department of State, provides an unwitting insight into the thought process of the would-be international peacekeeper: It is difficult to explain, but this war is not rational. There is no rationality at all about ethnic conflict. It is gut, it is hatred; its not for any common set of values or purposes; it just goes on. And that kind of warfare is most difficult to bring to a halt. (Power, 2002, p. 282) Not only was Eagleburger knowledgeable about the republics of the former Yugoslavia, he was fluent in Serbo-Croatian languages. The mental images he possessed of the conflict defied his ability to analyze and understand the conflict parties motives or intents. The irrational state of mind that he ascribes to the conflict makes it seem as if he believes that the disputants are approaching insanity, a condition from which diplomacy or threat of force would be useless. These mental images of irrationality and even insanity as descriptors of the communal conflict in Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia were consistent across the political spectrum in both Republican and Democratic presidential administrations. President Clintons Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, provided an even starker personal assessment of the ongoing conflict when he stated that the hatred between all three groupsis almost unbelievable. Its almost terrifying, and its centuries old. That really is a problem from hell (Power, 2002, p. 306). Such sentiment has not been used to describe warfare by American political leaders since the American Civil War of 1860-1864; a conflict that killed more Americans than all US wars combined before or since. American political leaders and those who elected them demonstrated great sympathy and outrage over the atrocities brought home in words, pictures, video and audio by the journalists who at times forfeited their lives for those stories. But they were unable to bring themselves to commit to involvement in a conflict whose unknown origins created terror and disbelief in the possibility of resolution by international peacekeepers. Besides the Americans perspective, the European Community, once so determined to establish the rule of law and order on at least the civilized parts of the continent, similarly shrank from taking action against the communal violence in the Balkans even as it threatened their own security. I believe that the American and European hesitation to intervene as they stood watching the communal violence and genocide was based on deeply rooted fear of engaging disputants that are activated by social forces distantly familiar in the historical memory of both continents. Perhaps such hesitation arises as echoes of Nietzsches warnings about looking into the abyss; especially when no one seems capable of articulating the nature of the irrational forces dragging victims and perpetrators into a terrifying void. The victims of genocide and communal
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violence cross all racial, ethnic, religious and political ideology boundaries including Turkish Armenians, Iraqi Kurds, Nazi occupied European Jews-Roma-ethnic minorities, Argentinean and Chilean leftist dissidents, Chinas Tibetans, Rwandan Tutsis, and Sudanese Fur-ZaghawaMasalit. The diversity of those being exterminated in communal violence obviates the usual suspects of internal state violence. The political explanations of relative deprivation, racism, ethnocentrism, or a general lack of compassion fail to explain the reasons behind the conflict. This absence of causality combined with the sheer force of the violence helps us understand the widespread unwillingness to intervene and confront communal violence and genocide by organized societies that possess the capacity to do so. Very rarely (if ever) has an advanced society directly intervened with force to rescue a besieged minority from extermination by their own countrymen when the reasons for that extermination are so opaque. A number of complimentary factors might possibly affect this intransigence to act in the face of communal violence and genocide. Many of the stable nations in Europe and the Americas once fought bitterly violent civil conflicts and the scars of those old wars are still sensitive. The United States Army for instance, still studies the American Civil War with an intensity that belies the value of the lessons learned from that 160 year old conflict. Another factor is the intransigence of the disputant parties to compromise as a pathway towards saving the lives of the beleaguered populations being slaughtered. In the Balkans conflict, diplomats trying to convince the Bosnian Muslim and Croatian communities to move into safer areas were directly resisted by both leaders and the populations they represented. In Darfur, SLA and JEM militias attacked African Union peacekeepers who tried to move vulnerable populations out of the way of oncoming Janjaweed and into refugee camps across the border in Chad. The militias sought to maintain the status quo even with the expectation of physical annihilation of the remaining population (Prunier, 2005). Psychological Faces in conflict
Genocide aims to deface the face Howard Adelman

There may be good reasons for the trepidation of international societies to intervene in violent forms of communal conflict. Certainly, without understanding the complex processes that drive this type of conflict, any interventionist runs the risk of failure, disillusionment and the possibility of choosing sides in intimate savagery. As a departure from traditional explorations of the causes of genocide and the failures to respond, this paper suggests that there are little understood forces that drive genocidal violence and inhibit successful intervention on the part of bystanders and the societies that sponsor them. These forces are deeply psychological and profoundly emotional. Unchecked, they create tsunamis of uncontrolled rage, unspeakable fear, and un-restorable justice. Emanating primarily from the individual and group subconscious, we are all part of its possible expression and therefore a part of its ultimate solution. Understanding how the participants to genocide are all connected victim, perpetrator, bystander may allow us to examine a part of collective subconscious that we have thus far been unwilling to explore; the place where the collective self attempts to murder a part of itself that it no longer
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recognizes. This explains why there is always an intimate relationship between the victim and perpetrator of genocide and communal violence; each constitutes elements of a shared face that they have all come to know and accept, if not love. The concept of meta-contrast (Tajfel, 1982) works to merge multiple cultural faces into a single public face by comparing the multiples-turned-whole (lets call this the provincial inner) to the vast collective of markedly different cultures and identities that surround them (this we call the regional outer). Meta-contrast provides the needed distinction to the individual cultural faces of identity because of the starkness of the differences between regional outer and provincial inner (Brewer, 2001). Meta-contrast provides internal acceptance within the provincial inner of the constituent identity faces because again, the outer regional identity groups are so different, so foreign that the multiple parts of the inner now seem less foreign, even familiar. The familiarity of the inner faces provides relief from the threat of the outer, markedly different cultures and identities. Thus, meta-contrast serves a purpose to cohere the inner provincial collection of small group identities through the power of comparison with the vastly different, while at the same time providing the force of necessary distinction. When the many individual group reflections of the whole face (inner provincial) are optimally distinctive and sufficiently affirmed, harmony reigns even as individual group faces jockey for positions of power and socio-economic placement. Even the unfair use of the state and its elements of coercion and wealth creation by one cultural face over another would only spark political protests and riots; actions that are utilitarian in nature and suggestive of the ongoing influence of political discourse. Most importantly, this utilitarian violence does not descend into the overkill of genocide or the homicidal rage of true communal violence. The mutilations to the body, face, and genitals; organized rape and sodomy; the slaughter of children; or the concentration and starvation of neighboring groups do not constitute warfare. Just as the killer who stabs his victim one hundred and fifty times when just five or once would suffice is not just a murder. Individually and collectively, they are extreme acts that go well beyond the utilitarian focus of material gain or coercion of other members of a community. It is often the case that genocide and war operate simultaneously, with the former operating under the cover of the latter (Kuper, 1985). In Rwanda, the visible causes of rage by the majority Hutus against the minority Tutsis stemmed from a combination of Tutsi & Belgian repression against the Hutus combined with political chicanery of Rwandas Hutu controlled government that absconded with the countrys wealth and blamed their historical enemy, the Tutsis. The recovery of land, riches, and political power from ones socio-economic and political enemies is the stuff that most wars are made of; but not genocide. Success in wars of socioeconomic and political reorganization do not require the splitting open of the heads of ones political enemies or the severing of limbs, excavation of wombs by means of machetes and the like. The extremity of these acts is what suggests the presence of deeper, unaccounted for, forces in play that drive the violence we see in genocide and communal violence. The extremity of the violence seems to drown out interventionist possibilities of dialogue, political settlement, or the
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diplomacy that both soldier and statesman intuitively search for even during the rage of battle. It is as if the attainment of objective war gains of punishing the other, taking the others wealth and removing the other from power are of secondary importance in a genocidal war of extreme communal violence. In war, the enemy-others punishment and lowered position defines the needs of the self. In genocide, the self is rescued from oblivion only with the death of the other; the other must die so the self can live. That is why the conduct of war can be calculated by gains and losses of men and material against expected gains from enemy conquest, but not genocide or extreme communal violence. Genocide is calculated by a very different standard; one that most diplomats and military peacekeepers are wholly unprepared to understand. The forces that drive the overkill or homicidal rage of genocide and extreme communal violence and its effect on the peacekeeper-bystander are the subject of the remainder of this exploration. Every community comprises a collection of groups harboring different identities based on any number of elements or traits, to include visible/audible characteristics such as race, ethnicity, geographical orientation, language, speech patterns, religion, and outward cultural expression of clothing, architecture, music, family structuring, and the like. The non-visible/audible characteristics of the differing identities might include the narrative of historical origination or self identification with philosophical ideas, education, or patterns of thought. Every set of identity groups can be in the provincial inner or the regional outer depending on the issue. For instance2, in terms of romantic love, it is me against every other competitor; in terms of existential survival, it is me and my brother and father against everyone else; in terms of physical ordering of my home and its surrounding access, it is me, my family, and my neighbors against the rest of the village and villages; in terms of the order and safety of the society that harbors my social identity and aspirations for achievement, it is me, my family, my neighbors and my village against the competing villages. This is meta-contrast. Ones viewpoint of what is inner provincial and outer regional changes depending on the issue involved. The necessary point to make here is that every community is a collection of identity faces and each individual group identity face down to the family unit is constitutes a collection of identity elements of varying saliency depending on the issue being thought about. In the pathology of identity, saliency can be thought of as criticality. The more critical the element, the more it must be asserted in order to see the correct face of ones own identity. While all of my elements of identity make up my face, they are ordered in hierarchy based on situational need. For instance, I am a man, an Arab, a servant of Allah and his messenger Muhammad, a father, a businessman, a descendent of the Bedouin, a traveler, a son, an uncle, a philosopher, and so on. The element of my identity that is salient at any one time is dependent on the discourse occurring at that time (Izutsu, 2002). Discourses about faith and heritage may move my Arab and Muslim identities higher and place them in competing positions (Bamyeh, 1999). Discourses about the transmission of existential memory across generational

This is merely an example to illustrate the concept; every sociocentric and egocentric community member that is asked this question would arrive at similar, but different responses. 5|P
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lines might increase the saliency of my position as son, father and uncle, and place into competitions the remainder of my identity elements depending on how I need/want to be remembered by future generations (Attias-Donfur & Wolff, 2003). Healthy people and group faces manage the saliency changes within their identity on a daily basis without problems. Psychological damage or disease however, can affect their ability to manage these elements of identity and maintain the required saliency of their outward face. Identity failure can result in rapid and overwhelming feelings of alienation producing catastrophic loss of self esteem and assaults to the ego (Baumeister & Vohs, 2004). The resulting cascade of negative emotion, alienation, shame, and rage can lead to a loss of control and the commission of violent acts against those in the offenders care, those whom the offender loves or associates with. This is a matter for justice and law enforcement to enforce standards of behavior and self control in egocentric communities and a matter for community leaders in those that are sociocentric. But this exploration is not about the individual per se. It is about the sociocentric group, from family to clan to village to tribe or large group identity. The village and community consist of collectives of these individuals who share a common mask. This mask is an identity that faces the group in the larger community so that the community itself is a collection of faces that in turn creates a composite face of that community. These faces are inherited, ascribed, grown and socially constructed, element by element, with saliency changing with internal maturity and external stimulation. In egocentric societies, there are few limits to the boundaries of identity growth and construction on foundations that are inherited and ascribed. You could say that the development of human identity (individual and group) is humanitys greatest achievement of art at its best and is its greatest horror at its worst. Where the collapse, distortion or disorganization of the individual identity leads to psychological pain and the potential for criminal violence; the collapse, distortion or disorganization of the group identity leads to psychological pain and the potential for extreme communal violence and genocide. This is where we are going in this section of the exploration into the psyche of the group before, during, and after it suffers a collapse, distortion or disorganization event that leads it to organize around solutions of violence as mitigation of the existential destruction of the group. Every group identity face exists in view of and in shared spaces with other group identity faces as a required condition of psychological health. The only way that each group can perceive the outlines of their own inner group identity is by their ability to compare and contrast who they are against who they are not. We are who we are because we are not the other with whom we can compare ourselves to. The use by groups to define themselves against the boundaries of those around them is a necessary pre-condition for sustaining human group psychological health. It is how human beings perceive the world around them, by the use of necessary comparison and contrasts. The proximity requirement of group to group serves a number of other important psychological housekeeping functions, such as trait association and

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dissociation where desired traits of others are viewed and adopted, and unwanted traits are psychologically cast off onto others to carry for us (Stein, 1982). In healthy communities, each group identity face exists in optimal distinction from each other (Brewer, 2001) and in a balance of assimilation to the whole (Horowitz, 1985). All other faces are sources of positive comparison and contrast. The never ending competition between group faces for placement and power is balanced by egalitarian rules that prevent debilitating assaults to the collective ego (Baumeister & Vohs, 2004) and social imbalances of deprivation, both relative and aspirational (Gurr, 1970). The work of the identity faces also ensures appropriate levels of psychological mitigation against death anxiety (Becker, 1973) through the successful transmission of generational memory (Attias-Donfur & Wolff, 2003). Finally, those faces support the transmission of chosen traumas and glories (Volkan, 2001) as part of identity definition, construction, and assuagement of grief and mourning (Bremner & Marmar, 1998). This essential psychological sociological work of the faces of group identity and the face of the larger social identity is rich in creative action whose mark adorns the great cities and accomplishments of every civilization. But its failure also marks the landscape with the gas chambers of Auschwitz, the killing fields of Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Darfur amongst so many others. Just as the individual can be diagnosed with the underlying conditions that may pre-dispose him or her to sociopathic, psychopathic, homicidal rage by competent profilers of psychological behavior3, so can the individual and group identity face. While the criminal profiler cannot predict for certain that the individual diagnosed with a border line personality disorder will resort to violence, the presence of other indicators such as depersonalization of the emotions of others, desensitization to violence in the home, combined with past behaviors such as bedwetting, animal mistreatment, and trauma can be strong indicators of personality devolvement and the resort to violence. Similarly, the psycho-cultural profiling of these identity faces of groups in pre-conflict situations cannot predict when or even whether violence will erupt. But the danger signs can be of tremendous usefulness to those who are mediating and negotiating resolutions to as yet non-violent conflict. Also, even once the violence has begun, the ability to profile the identity faces in conflict most certainly provides interventionists with more strategies for interrupting the source of the social fuel that is sustaining the ongoing violence. In the cases of genocide and extreme communal violence of the type that occurred in Darfur, Bosnia, Rwanda, Cambodia, and pre-partition India for instance, certain pathologies instruct us on the underlying psycho-social dynamics that supported and drove the outbreak of violence. These psycho-social dynamics normally involve underlying weaknesses in the construction and expression of one or more group identity faces that are exacerbated by trauma, violence and loss.

This paper was developed as part of a presentation on the psycho-linguistics of victims and perpetrators of Genocide and extreme communal violence to the American Federal Bureau of Investigations Genocide & War Crimes Investigative Division in Washington DC. The FBIs psychological profilers make up the Behavioral Analysis Unit for Violent Crimes. 7|P
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Like the personality of the individual, the identity face of the group can sustain and recover from greater levels of trauma when it is healthier and stronger to begin with. Unfortunately, with both the individual personality and group identity face, appearances can be deceiving. Subtle but important weaknesses below the surface may not be visible until pressure in the form of trauma breaks the personality or identity face along the lines of the previous weakness. One such break can result from a type of group identity face disorder that bears similarities to an individual psychological condition known as prosopagnosia.

Prosopagnosia and Identits-Agnosia


Face-blindness and Identities Unknown

Prosopagnosia is derived from the Greek words prosopon, meaning face, and agnosia, meaning unknown. The lay term is called face-blindness, or the inability to remember faces. More exactly, prosopagnosia is a condition that denies the afflicted person the ability to match stored memory images of known faces (even of loved ones) with the visual images that the individual is receiving. In short, everyone the afflicted person sees is a stranger, including the stranger in the mirror themselves. Imagine your surprise upon waking up in your own bed in the morning and turning over to see a complete unshaven stranger staring at you, attempting to kiss you and touch you in intimate ways. Of course we can all imagine that the person might be someone from our fantasy dreams and thus the shock would only be pleasant, but in reality, the shock of prosopagnosia is normally one of terror and revulsion. While I dont mean to extend the neurological aspects of the condition of prosopagnosia from the individual to the group as a diagnosable condition, I use it as a mental reference to illustrate how a group identity face can turn on other group faces that inhabit its communal spaces for no apparent reason. This is a psychological sociological condition I think of as identits-agnosia, which combines the old Latin word for identity with the Greek word for the unknown. In the condition of identitsagnosia, a community suddenly finds itself confronted in close proximity with other group identity faces that it no longer recognizes and/or threatens the essential elements of its own inner core identity. This threat consists of identity diffusion, disestablishment, disintegration or disorganization. The group identity face interacts with, is defined, influenced, and surrounded by, other group identity faces in varying degrees of intimacy. With some others, there may be ties of blood and marriage. With yet others, there may be stark, but healthy differences in race, ethnicity or religion. Where the differences are not easily apparent, but represent or oppose high degrees of saliency for the group face, there is a potential for trouble. In Bosnia and Croatia, the differences in religion fell into this category of complex interchangeability. The two republics shared four religious traditions stemming from the Judeo-Christian-Islamic source of Abraham, Isaac, and Ishmael. Three of these were in direct competition for membership through patrilineal

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inheritance4, with the fourth, Judaism, using matrilineal lines of inheritance and a generally exclusionary system of social interaction. The religious differences of the first three were both over and under stated leading to complete confusion over the relative placement and importance of being Eastern Orthodox (Serbian identity), Roman Catholic (Croatian identity), or Sunni Muslim (Bosnian Muslim). A series of imaginary borders divided the great split in the European Christian Catholic community between Eastern Orthodox and Western Roman. A different, but overlapping imaginary border divided the furthest advance of Ottoman Muslim emigration & conversion into Christiandom which was further overlaid by politically imagined boundaries between Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia. Elements of Serbian Eastern Orthodoxy were shared across the borders of all three republics as was Croatian Roman Catholicism and Bosnian Islamic tradition. These three republics housed at least six separate core identities linked together in opposing formations by blood, marriage, religion, ethnicity, geography, history and language. The issue was not that the identities were different. The issue was that they were cross-wired. A Bosnian-Muslim man married to a Croatian-Catholic woman for instance, might live in a community whose surrounding villages were composed of Bosnian-Serbian-Eastern Orthodox Catholics, some of whom may have married Croatian-Roman Catholics which could be seen as a greater crime than if they had married outside the Christian faith5. Finally, in the large cities such as Sarajevo, urbanization had authorized the creation of even greater hybridization between the many possible identity combinations that still remained attached to their home identity structures. So each group identity face interacted daily with other group faces that shared some elements of intimate identity, but not others. Each was recognizable and each was familiar on one level and a stranger on yet another level. As long as the saliency of the elements of the faces of the identity masks were stable, the psychologically familiar and the stranger coexisted peacefully. In Darfur, the differences in race and ethnicity were just as complex. The one land contained the Dars (homelands) of a number of group identity faces, but we will focus on the faces of four: African-Muslim-sedentary-Fur, African-Muslim-Bedouin-Zaghawa, Arab-Muslim-BedouinRiziegat6, and Arab-Muslim-sedentary-riverine7 (Christian, 2012). From the exercise using the Bosnia-Serbia-Croatia example, you can probably already see the same complex inter-assortment of group identity faces sharing overlaps in a number of salient identity features. The Fur peoples were the original inhabitants of the land, and it is named for them, Dar-Fur or homeland of the Fur. They are African like the Zaghawa, farmers like the riverine Arabs, and Muslim like

Both Christian and Islamic social structures use patrilineage to determine the gaining religion and identity of the baby. This method serves the political-colonization drives of the originating societies that used patrilineage as psycho-geographical conquest through rape and forced immigration. Judaism historically used matrilineage to pass both religious and cultural identity belonging to the baby. 5 Because of the struggle over Catholic identity between Eastern Orthodoxy versus loyalty to the Roman Papacy. 6 Rizeigat tribe belongs to the larger Baggara (cattle herders) federation. Northern Rizeigat are dominant in the raising and herding of camels, while the southern Rizeigat are more so in cattle, as provided by the geographic and climatologic possibilities inherent in Darfur. 7 Sedentary riverine Arabs emigrated from Khartoum in the 18th and 19th Century and are primarily farmers. 9|P
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everyone else. The Zaghawa are African like the Fur, Bedouin like the Arab Rizeigat, and Muslim like everyone else. The Rizeigat are Arabs like the riverine Arabs from Khartoum, Bedouins like the African Zaghawa, and Muslim like all their rest. Bedouins however are an archetype of Arab identity (Bamyeh, 1999). Bedouin translates to Arab nomadic herder and the mental image of this archetype is recreated in artificial prototypes in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and the rest of the Arabian Peninsula monarchies even to this day (Izutsu, 2002). These artificial prototypes are subsidized communities that maintain the Arab identity archetype even as most successful Arabs have long abandoned the desert, camels, and the austerity of Bedouin life for more comfortable urban or suburban living. Where the ethnicity of being Arab is one contentious issue, the other is that of race; Arabs are white and Africans are black. Only the issue is that all the actual physical faces of the group identity faces in Darfur are the same color dark brown/black. A Rizeigat Arab will call a Fur or Zaghawa African the name Abid (Abd) which means slave to denote their adherence to the identity tag of African. But first they have to ask what their tribal name is to determine what group identity face they wear because they cant recognize members of one group face from another without a score card; the family and tribal system of names. The cross-wiring of identity faces in Darfur allowed for an Arab-Muslim-Rizeigat to marry a Zaghawa because they shared a salient identity component of Bedouin. A Muslim-Fur might marry a Muslim-Riverine-Arab in the interests of shared agricultural cooperation, emphasizing the shared salient identity of farming. Just as in BosniaSerbia-Croatia, the group identity faces of Darfur interacted daily with other group faces that shared some elements of intimate identity, but not others. Each was recognizable and each was familiar on one level and a stranger on yet another level. Now, lets discuss how they go from familiar-but-different face in shared spaces to face-of-stranger in intimate spaces and what happens when they do. There is a special connection between love and the face of identity. You may love a city, but you dont love cement, asphalt or steel. You love the mental representation of what that city means to you, punctuated by adjectives such as exciting, belonging, stimulating, engaging, sophisticated, sexual, intellectual, intimate, and so on. You may love a person, but you dont love red blood cells, fingernails, skin tissue, or flesh. You love the psychological and emotional representation of that person as an intimate partner, a stimulating companion, a sexually desirable and capable partner, and a nurturing caregiver. These representations that we love are identities that we perceive people and objects to possess and depending on where and how they fit into our core personal identity, we either love them or hate them. The reason that this is important is the difference between war and genocide. Both involve killing, but the victims of war are not the same as the victims of genocide (Adelman, 1997, p. 7). In war, political decisions drive violence aimed at physical objects be they military troop formations, weapon systems or economic industrial bases. Warfare negates the other as a thing, an obstacle in the path whom the violator need not confront or face, in contrast to violence which aims to deface the face, which figures on disfiguring the body. The latter is genocide; the former is not no matter how many are killed (Adelman, 1997, p. 8). Genocide and extreme communal violence
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of the type we are discussing here operate along entirely different lines of human behavior in the same way that the motivation of a white collar criminal who unintentionally causes the death of a victim is different from a schizophrenic serial murderer reenacting traumatizing active algolagnia in an attempt to feel human interaction. Both people kill to obtain some benefit that they believe they need, but the latters motivations cannot be curbed with simple discipline of a rule based society. Warfare attempts to defend social constructs of state borders, agreements on the use and division of common pool resources amongst competing states and regions. Genocide and extreme communal violence attempts to defend psychological constructs of identity boundaries and the use and division of common elements of multiple use identity factors such as religion, language, history, geography, and the like. Warfare attempts to preserve objects. The objects safeguarded by war include infrastructure, social continuity and patterns of multi-state interaction along the lines of international agreements. Genocide and extreme communal violence attempts to preserve love. The love they work at preserving is their self-love of their group identity face against its destabilization by the other faces that are no longer recognized or whose benign co-existence is no longer tolerable in the face of their own self loathing. Where warfare unites its community in communal ethos and pride, genocide and communal violence are reactions to self hate, disgust, and loathing. The deeper these emotions run, the greater the effort at erasing the would-be enemy who is violating their sense of self worth, esteem and love. This is a key differentiator between warfare and genocide and communal violence. The rage that flows throughout the fields of killing is related to the consideration that the genocidal killer defines his or herself by and through the death of the otherdisfigurement and dismemberment are central to genocidal murder and peripheral in mass warfare where it is restricted to the actions of psychopaths (Adelman, 1997, p. 7). Genocide and extreme communal violence work to reify the self and eliminate the psychological other. Its violence is aimed at the identity face of the stranger-other which threatens the devolving provincial inner: Genocide is not a test of the real, but aims to injure and annihilate persons as well as destroy their continuity, not only in this life, as is the aim of war, but in the exile in any possible hereafter. That is why, unlike war, genocide is a religious act however obscene that may sound. (Adelman, 1997, p. 8) Similar to the neuropsychological condition of prosopagnosia, identits-agnosia creates an inability on the part of the genocidal group to recognize one or more variations of its own face. This face of the stranger other in such intimate proximity to its own core face create fears of assimilation and existential annihilation. As an extreme form of cultural identity disorder, members of the affected community experience intense fears and emotions from interactions within their normative sociological structures. Community individuals who express a selected salient feature of the groups identity are seen and those that do not appear as newly recognized strangers in an unacceptably intimate spatial ordering. The suddenness of the realization of their physical proximity to the stranger-other destabilizes their own relationship within the larger
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sociological structure. The sudden proximity to images and ideas that are foreign can activate feelings of revulsion and revile. The presence of these images and ideas with their unwanted feelings are defended against by individual and group dissociation, a type of psychological escape mechanism that allows us to refrain from internalizing and dealing with unwanted images, ideas, emotions or feelings. The dissociation keeps the affected individual or group from having to come to terms with this sudden stranger-other which is occupying space within the sanctuary of their emotional sociological structure. Of course that stranger-other has always been there, but not as a stranger. Before, the salient elements of identity expression included sufficient commonly held images, smells, ideas and feelings to accept their presence as an accepted version of the face of the self. Now, those common elements are no longer recognized and are disintegrating the central image of the self with ugly intrusions of the stranger-other. The suddenness of the change of the other from part of the self to one of stranger-other creates susceptibility within the group to fantasy and paranoia that can play out in an ever deepening spiral of group psychological crises. As the affected group face turns on once compatible others, they respond in kind in a type of identity war that neither understands, but neither can stop. One exchange that I witnessed involved African Muslims who became incensed when their neighboring (and inter-related) African-Arab Muslims began referring to them as Abd, or slaves. The offended group turned on their verbal attackers, withdrawing their acceptance of their neighbors ethnic identity as Arab, the central salient point of their conflicted identity at that moment. The resulting violence between the tribes became all out of proportion to the logic of the verbal interplay. The alienation of the African-Arab-Muslims from the Arab community they were so desperate to be part of heightened the saliency of their Arab identity to the point that they no longer recognized their neighbor faces, even when those faces were related by blood or marriage. This condition of group psychological distress occurs over time and can be expressed and/or exacerbated by traumatic events. Some of the symptoms of trauma that can initiate or exacerbate this condition include:
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Emotional volatility in discussions of group identity, chosen traumas and chosen glories Intense, unstable inter-group relationships characterized by fantasized claims of injustice, intrusion, and interference with the survival of the unstable group Fear of disintegrating identity within the group and loss of acceptance without Inappropriate anger, rage and shame by the group as expressed in group gatherings or through socially chosen leaders Impulsive, seemingly self-damaging behavior to the group socially, economically, politically, or environmentally Individual and/or group self-destruction of physical expressions of cultural identity

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Verbal expressions of unwillingness to accept social life in the current construction totalizing in the nature of the life/death struggle Symptoms of dissociative behavior such as depersonalization and amnesia, accompanied by paranoia during stress Fantasy creation of and rewriting the past to account for gaps in the historical narrative created by repeated dissociation

Trauma of violence or loss can serve as stressors that can cause the perpetrator group of genocide or communal violence to experience a sense of failing identity boundaries with the other group identity faces. This sense of failing identity would normally create panic and intense psychic discomfort in varying degrees for the group members in psychological trouble. As the panic and intensity of the fear and pain increased, defensive measures would be employed by the group subconscious such as refocusing salience of identity on elements exclusive to the membership. The groups focus away from salient elements of identity that are shared by other group identity faces would work to shore up the flagging boundaries of the troubled group. As the boundaries of the groups identity stabilized, the tension would ease, parents might allow continuance of their childrens friendship with those of the other group identity faces and the community would slowly return to normal. This is the time that enlightened intervention could prevent violence by helping stabilize identities in a form of identity management pioneered by Vamik Volkan, of the University of Virginias Center for the Mind & Body8. If the failing boundaries did not stabilize however, increasing defensive measures by the group would work to reduce the groups psychological stability and susceptibility to the use of extreme violence as a final defense against psychological death and cultural dismemberment. Often, the trigger comes in the form of leaders such as Slobodan Miloevic, Radovan Karadi, Franjo Tuman, Theoneste Bagosora, or Omar Bashir who effectively exhort their group members to defend themselves by destroying the faces of the others who represent the competing elements of a failing identity face. As the identity boundaries fail, a process of alienation occurs, where the troubled identity group feels isolated and cornered by the remaining groups. An entire war of alienation, abuse, and threat of existential annihilation begins to unroll, but only in the minds of the affected identity group. The alienation of the troubled group sparks feelings of humiliation and unworthiness in comparison to those other faces that seem to be happy and untroubled. Even this ongoing differentiation between interior pain and exterior examples of joy only increase the aloneness of the troubled group because alienation cant be shared. Alienation generates shame, an emotion that inhibits the sharing of other primal emotions such as love, positive anger, loneliness, fear, pain and hopelessness. Over time, the alienation and shame (that is not even visible to the other group identity faces) generate rage and hatred against the emerging mental objects of their pain and suffering. Even as the troubled group cuts

Dr Volkan and a team from his center deployed to Eastern Europe to help several of the former Soviet client states manage the identity expectations in the wake of the fall of the USSR. 13|P
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off all elements of their identity face that other groups share, further isolating themselves from the community, the narrow the focus of their available sense of self; in effect becoming smaller and smaller as their identity grows narrow. Often, the group identity faces who share the communal space with their troubled neighbor have no idea of the coming storm. Part of this is because of who they are engaged with in the troubled group. Those members of the troubled group who are deeply involved with the other surrounding groups are what is known as identity bricoleur or cultural entrepreneurs. Their ability to transcend their own group over to others in business, marriage, and intellectual engagement leave them the least affected of their home group members who are suffering from devolving identits-agnosia. Thus, not only are they unable to warn their family and friends in other groups, they are usually utterly surprised themselves, unable to perceive the depth of their home identity faces suffering. The Betrayal of the Bystander
Victims must be suffering because they have done something, because they somehow are inferior or dangerous or evil, or because a higher cause is being served. The belief that the world is a just place leads us to accept the suffering of others more easily, even of people we ourselves have harmed. (Waller, 2002, p. 254)

This is where the bystander-interventionist hesitates. They see a storm of shame and rage breaking over the members of the community in violent conflict and have no idea what is happening. The political wrangling between interest groups whether they are Hutu versus Tutsi, Serbian versus Croat versus Bosnian, or African versus Arab is familiar and understandable, but the rage is not. The struggle over land, political power, or economic control of common pool resources, all reflect normal war aims of disputant parties. But the mass rapes, extensive torturing, maiming and defacing, disemboweling and burning of children, women and defenseless men is counterintuitive to productive violence meant to achieve rational utilitarian ends. The volume and intensity of the rage and un-choreographed, but widely synchronized overkill frightens, terrifies them into inaction. The bystander-interventionist hesitates not because they are afraid militarily, but they are afraid psychically as the unfolding violence calls up remnants of each persons own experience with failing identity, alienation, shame, rage and feelings of impotency in the face of the other. Those new to the scene of the violence look to explanations from those involved to understand the madness of the violence. What they hear are political positions overlaid haphazardly onto the explosion of violence, and usually the political positions or explanations do not match the scope or intensity of the violence. Unfortunately, neither the genocidal/communal violent group or the others can offer any explanation other than the feeble attempt at hasty constructs overlaid to explain what is going on. The bystanderinterventionist simply cannot understand and therefore cannot intervene effectively. The initial victim groups may then become enraged and attack the interventionists for their perfidy in promising to help and then standing by and watching as their families are slaughtered in a primal homicidal rage. As the violence continues, all of the group identity faces begin to withdraw into their most individuated elements of group identity (whether that is religion, race, ethnicity, etc)
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and elevate the saliency of the most basic characteristics that cannot be contested. This retreat into the heart of identity definition cuts away much of the faces of commonality that allowed the various identity-group faces to share communal spaces in non violent harmony. From the perspective of the potential international interventionists, a refusal by the victims to comply with the demands of the perpetrators to leave their homeland or risk widespread death is not a sufficient cause for abandonment. But the intransigence about compromising to achieve physical safety adds to the interventionists confusion over motive, intent, and role that the parties to the conflict are playing and have played thus far. At the heart of the consistent refusal by the international community (or any community) to intervene with physical force in the middle of an ongoing genocide or communal violence is an inability to understand what is happening right in front of their eyes. The international peacekeeping forces and donor societies can see the entirety of the visible action unfolding in front of their eyes. They can hear the words and statement of the parties on all sides and tabulate the awful consequences of entire populations as they metaphorically lay down and die by the hand of their fellow countrymen. But they simply cannot understand why it is happening. They cannot calculate the balance of rights for the nations and ethnicities involved. And without being able to understand these key issues, they cannot bring themselves to commit physical force that may worsen an already dire human tragedy. In war, there are good guys and bad guys; guilty and innocent; perpetrators and victims. As would-be peacekeeping powers stand at the precipice of intervention, they simply cannot distinguish between these polar opposites of invader and defender and they hesitate. This hesitation quickly becomes contagious as additional donor societies sense that the situation is not sufficiently clear to risk the lives of their own men and women in a genocidal conflict. Conclusion
If God made a world with a billion different human plans, He must have expected struggle. But He couldnt have intended a world where one vision prevails, because that would mean only a single vision of Him (Turow, 2005, p. 419).

This paper begins and ends with the proposition that genocide and extreme communal violence differ fundamentally from normal conflict or war. The attempts at determining if a conflict is genocide as a precondition to intervention is equally fraught with problems as Raphael Lemkins definition of genocide is a social construct based on legal principals. But the power and rage behind genocide can only be explained in terms of group psychological mechanism that are bounded by culture and protected as existential identity. This is why genocide is so hard to identify using the lens of law and politics. In its expression as violence, genocide and extreme communal violence are expressions of a deeply complex social condition that occurs under circumstances far more rare than the mere organized violence of warfare. The tools that the military and diplomatic interventionist uses to effectively mediate normal warfare are ineffective as they are applied to situations where genocide and extreme communal conflict are part of the underlying causes of the war. This being said, there are available strategies for dealing with genocide and extreme communal conflict that can utilize many of the systems and tools of
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peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention. But the peacekeepers and diplomats must come to terms with the fundamental differences that motivate and drive the rage that leaves them breathless. Lemkins Law on genocide may be legalistic, but his driving intent of saving cultural identities from extinction aligns with the primal drive of all communities in existential conflict; the avoidance of psychological death of the group identity face and the transmission of that identity across generational memory. Once we learn how to help psychologically failing societies climb down from the metaphorical ledge of self destruction, we will learn how to help them resolve the disorganization, destabilization and disintegration of their social faces. __________________________________________

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