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Smith A 1776 An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Liberty Classics, Indianapolis, IN Straszheim M 1986 Urban residential location. In: Mills E S (ed.) Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics: Urban Economics. North-Holland, Amsterdam, Vol. II, pp. 717–57 Thunen J H von 1842 Der isolierte Staat in Beziehung anf $ Landwirtschaft and Nationalokonomie, Le! opold, Rostock, W Germany [trans. Wartenberg C M 1966 Von Thunen’s Isolated W State. Pergamon, Oxford, UK] Tiebout C 1956 A pure theory of local expenditures. Journal of Political Economy 64: 416–24 van Ommeren J, Rietveld P, Nijkamp P 1996 Residence and workplace relocation: A bivariate duration model approach. Geographical Analysis 28: 315–29 q Weber A 1909 Uber den Standort der Industrien, Tubingen, $ Germany [trans. Friedrich C F 1929 Alfred Weber’s Theory of Location of Industries. University of Chicago Press, Chicago] White M J 1999 Urban areas with decentralized employment: theory and empirical work. In: Cheshire P, Mills E S (eds.) Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics: Applied Urban Economics, Vol. III, pp. 1375–1412
a broader range of perspectives encompassing structural and systemic as well as perceptual causes and allowing for conﬂict to be liberating rather than simply reactionary in certain circumstances. This range of approaches, their conceptual origins, and means of conﬂict resolution are examined in this article, after describing the spatial and temporal dimensions of locational conﬂict.
1. Spatial and Temporal Dimensions
The relatively site-speciﬁc character of locational conﬂict diﬀerentiates it from relatively a-spatial forms of political expression such as social movements, protest movements, and even geopolitical territorial or jurisdictional conﬂicts. Individual sites of locational conﬂict, however, may seek coalitions with conﬂict participants in other locations to form aggregate social or protest movements covering wide geographic regions. Local advocacy groups in the USA and elsewhere, opposed to the siting of environmentally hazardous waste treatment facilities, for example, have become adept at forming broad-based coalitions seeking to alter regulatory provisions governing waste production, treatment, and disposal at regional and national scales. Inherently geographic, locational conﬂict and NIMBYism are frequently manifested at the local scale of the immediate neighborhood or district in which deleterious eﬀects of a proposed facility or activity are concentrated and experienced. If one conceptualizes the negative eﬀects as an externality generated by the proposed facility (e.g., the smoke and particulates expelled through a factory’s smokestack and falling on the surrounding neighborhood), then those eﬀects can be mapped onto a spatial externality ﬁeld deﬁning the area of impact (Cox and Johnston 1982). Locational conﬂict is often relatively local in scale since such externality eﬀects usually attenuate sharply with distance. Conﬂict also becomes manifest at larger spatial scales, often depending on geographical circumstances of adjacency or propinquity. A proposal to site a noxious facility near a municipal or regional border, for example, may generate locational conﬂict between the abutting jurisdictions. Proposals to site solid waste disposal facilities that will accept waste from multiple jurisdictions often generate opposition to the importation of waste from distant locations, expanding the conﬂict over a sizable area. Locational conﬂict has similarly emerged at the national scale over proposals to export hazardous waste from western industrialized nations to lessdeveloped countries and over the migration of noxious eﬀects, such as air or water pollution, across international boundaries. Concerns over the worldwide eﬀects of climate change attributed to material practices in high-consumption nations can be understood as locational conﬂict at the global scale. 9019
C. Gorter and P. Nijkamp
Locational Conﬂict (NIMBY)
Locational conﬂict arises when individuals or groups believing themselves to be negatively aﬀected express opposition to a locational or siting decision made by others. As an expression of protest or opposition within the public sphere, locational conﬂict represents a political manifestation of a geographical conﬂict over locational decision-making. Conﬂict may be initiated by the siting or locational designation of a facility, activity or land use believed by an aﬀected party to be noxious, hazardous, undesirable, stigmatizing, or unwanted for any of myriad other reasons. Such targets of conﬂict have been dubbed locally unwanted land uses, or LULUs, by Popper (1985). NIMBY, an acronym for Not In My Backyard, is a colloquial expression of locational conﬂict, articulating the sentiment that certain activities, facilities or land uses should be located elsewhere (not in my backyard) because of real or perceived negative eﬀects of the sited activity on the surrounding area. NIMBYism, often referred to as the NIMBY syndrome, refers to the common or widespread opposition to change in one’s surroundings associated with the introduction of an activity or land use thought to bring negative consequences. The term NIMBY is often used, by extension, to refer both to individuals or groups that habitually or expectedly oppose change in the local environment and to the unwanted land use or facility to be sited. In common usage, NIMBYism pejoratively connotes a reactionary parochialism based on self-interested, and thus possibly biased, perceptions. Locational conﬂict, in contrast, embraces
Locational Conﬂict (NIMBY) Locational conﬂict is not a uniquely recent phenomenon nor one exclusively associated with highly industrialized societies. Analysis of newspaper accounts of locational conﬂicts in nineteenth-century Worcester, Massachusetts (Meyer and Brown 1989) found that the frequency of reported conﬂicts on a per capita basis was essentially the same in Worcester in the 1870s as occurred in the 1970s in Vancouver, British Columbia (Ley and Mercer 1980), London, Ontario (Janelle 1977), and Columbus, Ohio (Cox and McCarthy 1980). The location of rendering plants, slaughter houses, and saloons generated protest in the nineteenth century, while waste incinerators, homeless shelters, and low-cost housing frequently motivated opposition in the late twentieth century. A vexing new problem for local oﬃcials is the location of cellular telephone towers, which are sometimes disguised inside church steeples or building cupolas to avoid protests over visual blight. In general, however, while the targets of conﬂict have changed to reﬂect changes in technology, economic activity, and society at large, the intensity of conﬂict was no less virulent a hundred years ago than it is today. The perceptual basis of locational conﬂict exhibits both change and continuity over time. Newly industrializing cities of the nineteenth century provided a context in which proximity to the coal smoke and pollution emitted by mills and factories was perceived as beneﬁcial, no doubt due to an association with steady employment and economic prosperity (Meyer and Brown 1989). In contrast, public awareness of the health hazards of industrial activity is one of the most frequent sources of locational conﬂict today. A common focus of protest in 1870s Worcester were the millponds which, despite their obvious economic importance, were thought to generate ‘miasma,’ believed to be a disease-bearing atmospheric poison produced by decaying organic matter (Meyer and Brown 1989). The parallel to today’s conﬂicts over siting waste incinerators is striking. Both the millponds then and the incinerators now are considered necessary adjuncts to essential economic activity but both were and are also perceived to present risks to health and the environment. Both, consequently, are said to produce the NIMBY syndrome: yes, society needs the facility – but Not In My Backyard. autonomous locational decision-making by recognizing that individual utilities are not independent of the externality eﬀects produced by the locational decisions of others (Cox and McCarthy 1980). Conﬂict ensues when the utility of a locational choice is diminished by the negative externalities generated by the locational choices of others. This extension of traditional location theory shifted analysis away from individual locational choice towards a focus on the manipulation of the spatial distribution of externalities, that is, on attempts to exclude negative externalities and attract positive ones. While classical location theory addressed individual locational decision-making within a framework of economic rationality, locational conﬂict theory examines collective strategies for the protection and enhancement of neighborhood quality within a framework of collective political action. As a result, the focus of analysis moved from the economic to the political arena, from individual choice to collective action, and from locational decision-making to locational conﬂict as a politics of turf. The view of locational conﬂict as turf politics, however, retains an axiomatic assumption of traditional location theory. The central assumption in this behavioral approach is that conﬂict arises when a locational decision perceived as beneﬁcial by some is perceived negatively by others. While focus has shifted to collective action, the impetus for political engagement still resides in the individual’s perception of positive or negative consequences associated with a proposed locational decision. The active agent is the autonomous individual whose behavior is guided by a unique calculus of perception, whether locational conﬂict is situated within an individual choice framework of conﬂicting utilities or in the pluralist politics of neighborhood change. Situated at the level of conﬂicting perceptions, the behavioral approach to locational conﬂict rarely considers why changes occur in local areas such that conﬂict arises over their perceived positive or negative consequences. A structuralist approach views locational conﬂicts as symptomatic of fundamental contradictions situated within the basic structure of society. Locational conﬂicts, in this view, are merely surface manifestations of deep-seated conﬂicts inherent in the extant system of social organization (Cox and McCarthy 1980). Within a structural mode of explanation, negative externalities are not viewed simply as evidence of market imperfections subject to correction but rather are understood as necessary and inevitable consequences of class relations within the process of capital accumulation. Identifying the particular structural contradictions that become manifest as locational conﬂict, however, is itself a subject of conﬂict and disagreement. In one view, the inherent contradiction between labor and capital generates contradictory orientations to neighborhoods, such that labor’s attachment to place based on the neighborhood’s use value conﬂicts with capi-
2. Antecedents and Conceptual Approaches
Formal analysis of locational conﬂict by American geographers began in the early 1970s as an extension of classical economic location theory. Classical theories of industrial and residential location presented a model of locational choice by autonomous units (ﬁrms or households) seeking to maximize individual utility functions within budget constraints. Political geographers such as Kevin Cox and his students at Ohio State University challenged the assumption of 9020
Locational Conﬂict (NIMBY) tal’s investment interest based on the neighborhood’s exchange value. Locational conﬂict, in this framework, arises from the fundamental antagonism between labor and capital with respect to neighborhood change. In another view, locational conﬂict is situated within the incessant competition between factions of capital, and results when the expansionary interests of mobile capital conﬂict with the exclusionary interests of capital already ﬁxed in place (Plotkin 1987). For example, existing investors seeking to exclude potential new competitors may resist a shopping center developer’s search for new investment sites. Bridging these two approaches is a third view in which labor’s attachment to neighborhood erects a barrier to continued accumulation of capital. In response, capital encourages long-running societal processes—the homogenization of space, pervasive ideologies of materialism and consumerism, media manipulation and mass education, and increasing residential mobility, among other contributing factors—which succeed in transforming neighborhoods from communities into commodities and, consequently, transforming labor’s attachment to community into an orientation based on protecting neighborhood exchange value (Cox 1981). Now locational conﬂict occurs when the exchange value interests of capital and labor fail to coincide as, for example, when a land developer’s proposal for a shopping center generates traﬃc and pollution that threaten to reduce the resale value of surrounding homes. More recently, a post-structuralist approach has emerged that situates locational conﬂict within the antagonistic discursive or representational strategies of contending groups vying for control over the use of space, where such control is an expression of political power. Rejecting the view of space as simply a container for action, this approach, inﬂuenced by the work of Lefebvre (1991) and others, considers the social and political process through which the meaning and use of space are constructed in particular instances. Now locational conﬂict is not primarily about the spatial distribution of activities or land uses nor is it simply about contrasting preferences for various activities in particular locations. Rather, locational conﬂict is symbolic conﬂict over the social distribution of power to assign meaning and uses to space (Mitchell 1992). Locational conﬂict symbolizes contention over whose values have standing within the political process and whose values, therefore, become expressed in the landscape. Recursively, control over the use of space symbolically constitutes the controlling group as a legitimate actor within the broader political process. Establishment of a squatter settlement within an aﬄuent residential neighborhood despite the opposition of existing residents, for example, provides a site for housing impoverished families. Also, and perhaps more importantly, it discursively represents squatter families as legitimate occupants of space and, therefore, legitimate participants in the political process. The evolution of locational conﬂict theory from classical to behavioral, to structural, and post-structural formulations parallels theoretical developments in the ﬁeld of geography as a whole. Underlying each of these theoretical positions is a set of often incommensurate assumptions regarding the relative autonomy of individual actors, the primacy of market processes, the nature of the public interest, and the respective roles of structure and agency in creating geographic landscapes. In addition, the various theoretical understandings of locational conﬂict point to substantially diﬀerent routes for its amelioration or resolution. A behavioral model of conﬂict based on contrasting perceptions suggests that resolution is attainable through public information and education designed to bring perceptions into agreement. A model of conﬂict based on the unequal spatial distribution of negative externalities suggests the use of compensation to equalize outcomes. Understanding conﬂict as symptomatic of deep underlying structural relations requires the elimination of structural contradictions. A focus on locational conﬂict as the symbolic expression of rights to create the meaning of space requires the deconstruction of opposing claims and their reconstruction in more equitable forms. Far from being merely an academic exercise, one’s theoretical approach to locational conﬂict implicates signiﬁcantly diﬀerent avenues for its resolution, as discussed in the following section.
3. Resol ing Locational Conﬂict
The contentious character of locational conﬂict has generated considerable debate over the intervention strategies conducive to its resolution. Approaches to intervention diﬀer according to their proponents’ understanding of the sources and dynamics of conﬂict, as described above, and according to their focus on the varying perspectives of conﬂict participants. Methods of resolving conﬂict distinguish between communitycentered, user-centered, and state-centered approaches (Takahashi 1998 and DeVerteuil 2000).
3.1 Community-centered Approaches Community-centered approaches focus on community opposition to a proposed facility siting. Depending on the characteristics of the community and, in part, on the perspective of the analyst, local opposition can be interpreted as exclusionary parochialism or as constitutionally protected freedom of speech and dissent (Takahashi 1998). Those taking the latter perspective point to instances in which poor or politically marginalized communities succeed in preventing the siting of an environmentally hazardous or otherwise noxious facility and consider that conﬂict has been resolved through defeat of the siting proposal (Heiman 1990). 9021
Locational Conﬂict (NIMBY) More frequently, and especially when phrased in the NIMBY characterization, locational conﬂict is viewed as a shortsighted and parochial expression of selfinterest that prevents achievement of the greater public good. Their proponents present the facilities whose siting generates locational conﬂict as both necessary and beneﬁcial for society. A mobile society needs highways and airports. Consumers expect convenient access to shopping. Production of wastes is an inevitable by-product of a consumer society and requires safe and reliable disposal capacity. New prison construction keeps dangerous criminals oﬀ the streets and prevents prison overcrowding. From this vantage point, conﬂict over siting proposals poses a barrier to attainment of the public good and requires a strategy to overcome, elude, or defuse opposition in order to allow the siting to go forward. Some professional associations of land and real estate developers oﬀer guidelines and training to assist their members to negotiate the hazards of community opposition to proposed developments. Such strategies counsel facility proponents to anticipate opposition, solicit statements of support from potential allies, marshal expert testimony for public presentation, demonstrate the anticipated beneﬁts of the proposed scheme, utilize formal appeals procedures, and the like. Compensation of aﬀected parties is a central premise within the community-centered approach. If locational conﬂict arises from the unequal spatial distribution of negative externalities created by the sited facility, then conﬂict can be resolved through compensation of those bearing a disproportionate share of costs. The theory of compensation assumes that costs are susceptible to translation into a single monetary metric and that a fair system can be devised for identifying aﬀected parties and distributing payment. Such a system is diﬃcult to devise in practice, however. It is diﬃcult to distinguish between payment as compensation of costs and as inducement to accept costs, and communities often reject compensation as synonymous with a bribe. It is relatively easy to compensate for direct costs associated with a newly sited facility, such as additional emergency response equipment, but it is more diﬃcult to assess a value for indirect costs such as stigmatization or economic growth foregone when potential investors avoid proximity to a noxious facility. There is disagreement as to whether costs should be compensated at an equal level in an impoverished and an aﬄuent community. On purely economic grounds, the impoverished community can receive less compensation because poor people are satisﬁed at a relatively lower cost but this conclusion can easily be challenged on ethical grounds. Compensation as a means of resolving locational conﬂict is problematic for these and other reasons. Some practitioners adopting the community-centered approach choose siting strategies based on equity considerations. Such strategies typically distinguish 9022 between the goals of procedural equity in decisionmaking and distributional equity in outcomes. Approaches based on distributive justice assume the necessity of the facilities in question and seek to achieve a fair distribution, where the primary criterion of fairness is to avoid neighborhood concentrations of unwanted facilities. One such method is to devise a point system for desirable and undesirable facilities (parks and libraries in the former category, for example, and waste incinerators and sewage treatment plants in the latter) and to equalize points across neighborhoods or political jurisdictions. Localities might be encouraged to opt for an undesirable facility so as to qualify for a desirable one under this system or might be disqualiﬁed from obtaining a beneﬁcial facility due to insuﬃcient points for hosting undesirable ones. The obvious diﬃculty in assigning points to facility types, however, has prevented this system from being implemented in practice. New York city’s legislatively mandated fair share process for distributing unwanted city facilities across neighborhoods similarly has been abandoned in practice due to diﬃculties of implementation. Community-centered approaches based on procedural justice argue that public opposition is mobilized not only by unwanted siting outcomes but also by perceived unfairness in the decision-making process. At a minimum, the procedural solution takes the form of a mandated hearing within a public review or permitting process. The public hearing has been criticized as a means of facilitating public participation, however, on the grounds that it is rarely more than advisory and that important decisions, such as the need for the facility, have usually been taken prior to the hearing. More detailed procedural approaches stress the importance of community consultation early in the siting process, inclusion of all stakeholders in negotiations, and the opportunity for sites to withdraw from consideration at any time. The most fully developed approach within this framework allows localities to volunteer themselves as sites for controversial facilities, subject to speciﬁed siting criteria and in return for generous compensation. This approach elides diﬃcult ethical questions, however, if localities volunteer for controversial facilities not through choice but due to a lack of alternative means of economic survival.
3.2 User-centered Approaches The user-centered approach usually applies to conﬂict over social service facility location. This approach moves beyond the perspectives of siting proponents and opponents and considers the perspective of facility users who often experience extreme poverty and\or physical, social, or mental disability as a barrier to access to needed services (Takahashi 1998). Omission of the users’ perspective in community-centered
Locational Conﬂict (NIMBY) approaches both reﬂects and contributes to their stigmatization. While equity in community-centered approaches focuses on community participation in facility siting decisions, equity in the user-centered approach is concerned with facilitating access to needed facilities on the part of service-dependent clients. Residents and users of homeless shelters, drug or alcohol rehabilitation centers, domestic violence shelters, group homes, and similar facilities are often dependent on multiple services and beneﬁt from service clustering that other community residents view as an undue concentration of unwanted facilities. Social service providers choose from two divergent strategies in countering local opposition (Dear 1992). The collaborative approach seeks to establish a partnership between the service provider and the host community through public outreach and education aimed at improving awareness, tolerance, and acceptance. The autonomous approach considers access to needed services to be a civil right of facility users and relies on legislative and judicial protections to override community opposition. quences of hosting a controversial facility but rather in a regulatory approach that inexorably leads to facility siting as a policy solution that concentrates costs on host communities. To the extent that this is the case, the resolution of conﬂict requires a restructuring of policy assumptions and policy solutions through political debate, redirecting costs from host communities back on to capital, and avoiding the emergence of conﬂict at its source rather than seeking to ameliorate its occurrence after the fact.
4. Future Directions: Ethical and Social Justice Issues
Recent locational conﬂict scholarship has increasingly intersected with the literature of environmental racism and environmental justice. This coalescence emerges from a common conceptual focus on equity and on the distinction between distributive and procedural equity, in particular. Inﬂuenced in part by development of the state-centered approach, locational conﬂict scholarship is increasingly shifting attention from siting outcomes to examine political and structural inﬂuences on the siting process. This shift closely parallels a redirection within environmental justice scholarship from a focus on distributional equity, concerned with the concentration of environmental burdens in disempowered communities, to a focus on procedural equity, concerned with democratic participation in the gamut of prior decisions aﬀecting the production of burdens and beneﬁts to be distributed (Lake 1996). Recent environmental justice literature explicitly seeks to relinquish its narrow focus on inequity in facility siting, emphasizing instead the pervasive inequity in the broad socio-spatial processes creating geographic landscapes (Pulido 2000). The challenge for these increasingly combined spheres of scholarship is to expand understanding of these processes and to inform the design of institutional structures that expand community participation in their operation. See also: Behavioral Geography; Citizen Participation; Environmental Justice; Global Environmental Change: Human Dimensions; Location Theory
3.3 State-centered Approaches The state-centered approach to locational conﬂict reformulates the traditional question of locational conﬂict—‘Why is the community opposed to this facility?’—and asks instead: ‘Why is the state seeking to site this facility in this community?’ (Lake and Disch 1992). This rephrased question problematizes the assumption, shared by community- and usercentered approaches, that facilities are needed by society. In the state-centered approach, controversial facilities are understood as needed by capital seeking to externalize costs as a competitive strategy and as an expedient solution for the state seeking to facilitate capital accumulation while maintaining legitimation of the capital-labor relationship (Lake 1993). Facility siting in this context constitutes a particular problem-solving strategy that is instrumental for the state. By providing a locational solution to a problem of industrial production (waste production or homelessness, for example), facility siting allows production and capital accumulation to continue relatively unimpeded while concentrating costs on host communities. The decision to concentrate costs on communities rather than on capital reﬂects a political calculation that it is preferable for the state to confront localized political conﬂict than to risk a challenge to the capitalstate relation. The siting strategy deﬂects political conﬂict away from a potentially daunting challenge to the capital-state relation and into a relatively benign debate over the merits of alternative facility locations (Lake and Disch 1992). According to the state-centered approach, the root of locational conﬂict is situated not in the conse-
Cox K 1981 Capitalism and conﬂict around the communal living space. In: Dear M, Scott A (eds.) Urbanization and Urban Planning in Capitalist Society, Methuen, New York Cox K, Johnston R 1982 Conﬂict, politics and the urban scene: a conceptual framework. In: Cox K, Johnston R (eds.) Conﬂict, Politics and the Urban Scene. St. Martin’s Press, New York
Locational Conﬂict (NIMBY)
Cox K, McCarthy J 1980 Neighborhood activism in the American city: behavioral relationships and evaluation. Urban Geography 1: 22–38 Dear M 1992 Understanding and overcoming the NIMBY syndrome. Journal of the American Planning Association 58: 288–300 DeVerteuil G 2000 Reconsidering the legacy of urban public facility location theory in human geography. Progress in Human Geography 24: 47–96 Heiman M 1990 From ‘Not in My Backyard’ to ‘Not in Anybody’s Backyard!’ Grassroots challenge to hazardous waste facility siting. Journal of the American Planning Association 56: 359–62 Janelle D 1977 Structural dimensions in the geography of locational conﬂict. Canadian Geographer 21: 311–28 Lake R 1993 Rethinking NIMBY. Journal of the American Planning Association 59: 87–93 Lake R 1996 Volunteers, NIMBYs and environmental justice: dilemmas of democratic practice. Antipode 28: 160–74 Lake R, Disch L 1992 Structural constraints and pluralist contradictions in hazardous waste regulation. En ironment and Planning, A 24: 663–81 Lefebvre H 1991 The Production of Space. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, UK Ley D, Mercer J 1980 Locational conﬂict and the politics of consumption. Economic Geography 56: 89–109 Meyer W, Brown M 1989 Locational conﬂict in a nineteenthcentury city. Political Geography Quarterly 8: 107–22 Mitchell D 1992 Iconography and locational conﬂict from the underside: Free speech, People’s Park, and the politics of homelessness in Berkeley, California. Political Geography 11: 152–69 Plotkin S 1987 Property, policy and politics: towards a theory of urban land-use conﬂict. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 11: 382–403 Popper F 1985 The environmentalist and the LULU. Environment 27 7–11, 37–40 Pulido L 2000 Rethinking environmental racism: White privilege and urban development in Southern California. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 90: 12–40 Takahashi L 1998 Homelessness, AIDS, and Stigmatization: The NIMBY Syndrome in the United States at the End of the Twentieth Century. Oxford University Press, London
R. W. Lake Copyright # 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Locke, John (1632–1704)
1. Life and Writings
Hegel perhaps excepted, John Locke is the most eminent philosopher of the Western world to have addressed himself to political and social issues. Indeed his standing as the great thinker amongst English speakers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries gave to his writings on such issues, the theories of politics, toleration, economics and education, a standing which they would not have commanded even when taken together. And yet the famous Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1975) scarcely provided a 9024
general intellectual framework for his theories on individual topics. The action of his mind was like that of the beam of a searchlight shining through the darkness on individual objects but with no linkage made between them or any reﬂection back from object to source. John Locke the man can be taken as the archetype of the English country gentleman turned intellectual. He was the ﬁrst born of the two sons of a lawyer who fought for the Parliament against King Charles I when John was a teenager. The family had a small landed estate in the county of Somerset and Locke was born on August 29 1632 in the village of Wrington, though the family seat was at Belluton some ten miles away. He inherited the family properties and his father’s modest position within the community of gentry of the county. He was an absentee landlord, except for brief intervals, for most of his life. This was because his father designed him for a scholarly career, not all that unusual for the gentry but exceptional for an heir (Laslett 1948). Locke’s father set his sights high for his son, whose outstanding intelligence must have been evident from the beginning. In 1647 he sent him to Westminster School, the best in the country, and thereafter, in 1652, to the college of Christ Church in Oxford, where he went on to take oﬃce as a teacher between 1658 and 1684. Locke never married, and insisted that he would have liked to have lived his whole life there as a bachelor don. However, it proved otherwise, and within a decade he found himself for much of his time in London at the center of national politics, in the entourage of one of the great political magnates of the time, Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury, who was then in high oﬃce but subsequently became leader of the movement of opposition to the succession to the throne of the Catholic James, brother of the childless Charles II, the Exclusion campaign, as it is called. The explanation for this transmogriﬁcation, which left his position at Christ Church unaﬀected, was that Locke had taken up medicine so that he could continue his academic career without becoming a priest. In 1666, on a visit to Oxford, the invalided Shaftesbury met Locke who performed upon his body one of the medical miracles of that age which saved his life. It was as a medical adviser of Shaftesbury, not as an academic, that Locke took up and pursued his career as a writer on the theory of knowledge, and on what we now recognize as social scientiﬁc subjects. Two Treatises of Go ernment, also published in 1690, was composed while Locke acted as what a close friend called ‘assistant pen’ to Shaftesbury in the early 1680s during the Exclusion campaign. The Catholic James nevertheless became James II in 1685. A now outmoded interpretation of Two Treatises perceives it as the subsequent rationalization of the socalled Glorious Revolution of 1688\9; it is now accepted that the author’s intention was to justify a revolution yet to be brought about by Shaftesbury and
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences
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