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be the development of a morality of loyalty which in turn is related to the development of a relevant situated social identity. This is obviously a very diﬃcult to area in which to get hard evidence. The existing evidence therefore comes from atypical group members, is largely anecdotal, and has mostly been gathered by journalists rather than social scientists. It could be argued, however, that scholars could make more use of these as primary sources. Probably the only thing we can claim to have any ﬁrm evidence on is that children and young people who join nationalist\separatist guerrilla movements are not psychopaths and come from no particular social strata of society. Other hypotheses including ideas of ‘terrorist personality types’ or psychodynamic explanations will always be very hard to substantiate. opposing groups in order to foster positive intergroup attitudes—the contact hypothesis. This has been a well-researched area for many years and now boasts an extensive literature. What this literature indicates is that for contact to be even minimally eﬀective it has to take place under highly prescribed conditions. However, what advocates of the contact hypothesis appear to be reluctant to accept is that while there is evidence that bringing groups together promotes interpersonal contact satisfactorily, it does not necessarily promote intergroup contact. There is also good evidence that intergroup conﬂict can be reduced by manipulating the process of social categorization in order to alter group boundaries. This is a strategy that both social scientists and policy makers should consider more often. The evidence also suggests it is not possible to bring social categorization to an end entirely. Rather it is better to concentrate on altering the content of stereotypes or manipulating who gets put in which social category by altering intergroup boundaries. See also: Coping across the Lifespan; Disasters, Coping with; Stress and Coping Theories; Violence and Eﬀects on Children
6. Children and Peace
One of the problems, it has been suggested, in bringing peace to societies that have experienced political violence is that the next generation will have either begun to believe that there is no future, or that they will be able to think of the future only in negative terms. Given that we know little about the way in which children develop concepts of peace and war it could be argued that it is premature to try to educate children to be peace makers (see Peace Promotion, Psychology of). Despite this lack of basic knowledge this process has already begun in some societies and some people apparently believe it is eﬀective. However, there is virtually no empirical evidence to substantiate their claim. A major problem would appear to be that too much of what passes for peace education focuses on interpersonal conﬂict as opposed to intergroup conﬂict. In future, curriculum designers need to produce a more eﬀective peace education program and also to overcome the problem that peace education per se is not always politically acceptable. It could also be argued that school-based peace education is always bound to be ineﬀective because it targets the wrong people in the wrong setting. For example, there is speculation, if not evidence, that children’s ideas about peace and war may be more inﬂuenced by what they learn from their parents than from their schools. There is deﬁnitely evidence, which is now often forgotten, that learning about such things as peace and war involves emotions primarily and that providing facts may not alter these emotions. This is obviously an area which is in need of much more research which develops what is known and makes it amenable for use in applied settings. The alternative to peace education which is most often advocated is bringing children together from
Cairns E 1996 Children and Political Violence. Blackwell, Oxford, UK Dawes A, Donald D 1994 Childhood and Ad ersity: Psychological Perspecti es from South African Research. David Philip, Cape Town Freud A, Burlingham D T 1943 War and Children. Medical War Books, New York Garbarino J, Kostelny K, Dubrow N 1991 No Place to be a Child. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco Leavitt L, Fox N 1993 The Psychological Eﬀects of War and Violence on Children. Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ Machel G 1996 Impact of Armed Conﬂict on Children. United Nations Children’s Fund and United Nations Department of Public Information, New York Raviv A, Oppenheimer L, Bar-Tal D 1999 How Children Understand War and Peace. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco
War, Sociology of
The sociology of war is a central topic in both political and historical sociology, since war is one of the most important policies states can pursue, and the outcomes of wars have often shaped both the formation and the dissolution of states. The literature on war is thus concerned with both its causes and its consequences. Studies of the causes of war can be divided into three broad categories. The ﬁrst type takes the system as a whole as the unit of analysis and focuses on how 16363
War, Sociology of characteristics of the interstate system aﬀect the frequency of war. Debates focus on characteristics of the interstate system that are thought to increase or decrease war, such as global economic cycles, balances of power, and the increasing role of transnational organizations such as the United Nations. States are the unit of analysis in the second type, which explores the relationships among political, economic, and cultural features of particular states and their propensity to initiate wars. Social scientists disagree about the eﬀects of political systems (democracy vs. autocracy) and economic systems (capitalist, socialist, or other) within states on war. The third type analyses war as an outcome of choices made by individual and small-group decision making. There is also no consensus on which model of individual decision making is most appropriate for the study of war. Is the decision to go to war based on a rational calculation of economic costs and beneﬁts, or is it an irrational outcome of distortion in decision making in small groups and bureaucracies? Theories of the consequences of war tend to focus either on its role in state formation, or on its causal impact on internal revolts and revolutions. Historical sociologists have shown that the frequency, duration, and timing of medieval and early modern warfare were the most important determinants of the size and structure of states (Tilly 1975, 1990, Ertman 1997). However, just as war can make states, it can break them too. For example, Skocpol (1979) argues that costly warfare often leads to ﬁscal crises and state breakdown, facilitating revolutions. the strong using force against the weak. When one state begins to gain a preponderance of power in the system, a coalition of weaker states will form to maintain their security by blocking the further expansion of the powerful state. The coalitions that formed against Louis XIV, Napoleon and Hitler seem to ﬁt this pattern. Hegemonic stability theory (Gilpin 1981) suggests exactly the opposite, that unequal power in the system produces peace and that parity results in war. When one state has hegemony in the world system, it has both the incentive and the means to maintain order in the system. It is not necessary for the most powerful state to ﬁght wars, since their objectives can be achieved in less costly ways, and it is not rational for other states to challenge a hegemon with overwhelming power. For example, the periods of British and US hegemony were relatively peaceful and World Wars I and II occurred during intervening periods in which power was more equally distributed. A related attempt to explain great-power war is power transition theory (Organski 1968). Power transition theory suggests that diﬀerential rates of economic growth create situations in which rising states rapidly catch up with the hegemonic state in the system, and that this change in relative power leads to war. Debates about power transitions and hegemonic stability are of much more than theoretical interest in the contemporary world. Although the demise of the USSR has left the USA as an unchallenged military hegemon, its economic superiority is being challenged by the European Union and emerging Asian states (Japan in the short run, perhaps China in the long run). If power transition and hegemonic stability theories are correct, this shift of economic power could lead to great power wars in the near future. Another ongoing debate about systemic causes of war concerns the eﬀects of long cycles of economic expansion and contraction. Some scholars argue that economic contraction will increase war, since the increased scarcity of resources will lead to more conﬂict. Others have suggested the opposite: major wars will be more frequent during periods of economic expansion because only then will states have the resources necessary to ﬁght. Goldstein’s (1988) research suggests that economic expansion tends to increase the severity of great-power wars but that economic cycles have no eﬀect on the frequency of war. One signiﬁcant change in the last half of the twentieth century which will require substantial revisions in realist systemic theories of war is the development and increasing power of transnational organizations (such as the United Nations), since their assumption that the interstate system is anarchical may no longer be valid. If the military power of the United Nations continues to grow, it could become more and more eﬀective at preventing wars and suppressing them quickly when they do start. Of course, it remains to be seen whether powerful existing
1. Causes of War: The Interstate System
Most studies of war that take the interstate system as the unit of analysis begin with assumptions from the ‘realist’ paradigm. States are seen as unitary actors, and their actions are explained in terms of structural characteristics of the system. The most important feature of the interstate system is that it is anarchic. Unlike politics within states, relations between states take place in a Hobbesian ‘state of nature.’ Since an anarchic system is one in which all states constantly face actual or potential threats, their main goal is security. Security can only be achieved in such a system by maintaining power. In realist theories, the distribution of power in the interstate system is the main determinant of the frequency of war. Although all realist theories agree on the importance of power distribution in determining war, they disagree about which types of power distributions make war more likely. Balance-of-power theories (Morgenthau 1967) suggest that an equal distribution of power in the system facilitates peace and that unequal power distributions lead to war. They argue that parity deters all states from aggression and that an unequal power distribution will generally result in 16364
War, Sociology of states will choose to cede more power to such institutions. Theoretical debates about the systemic causes of war have not been resolved, in part because the results of empirical research have been inconclusive. Each theory can point to speciﬁc cases that seem to ﬁt its predictions, but each must also admit to many cases that it cannot explain. Part of the problem is that systemic theories have not incorporated causal factors at lower levels of analysis, such as internal economic and political characteristics of states. Since the eﬀects of system-level factors on war are not direct but are always mediated by the internal political economy of states and the decisions made by individual leaders, complete theories of the causes of war must include these factors as well. right, we may see economically based warfare on an unprecedented scale. The form of government in a country may also determine how often it initiates wars. Kant (1949) argued that democratic states (with constitutions and separation of powers) will initiate wars less often than autocratic states. This conclusion follows from a simple analysis of who pays the costs of war and who gets the beneﬁts. Since citizens are required to pay for war with high taxes and their lives, they will rarely support war initiation. Rulers of states, on the other hand, have much to gain from war and can pass on most of the costs to their subjects. Therefore, when decisions about war are made only by rulers (in autocracies), war will be frequent, and when citizens have more control of the decision (in democracies), peace will generally be the result. Empirical research indicates that democratic states are less likely than nondemocratic states to initiate wars, but the relationship is not strong (Kiser et al. 1995). Perhaps one reason for the weakness of the relationship is that the assumption that citizens will oppose war initiation is not always correct. Many historical examples indicate that in at least some conditions citizens will support war even though it is not in their economic interests to do so, due to nationalism, religion, ethnicity, or other cultural factors. Perhaps the most interesting current debate about democracy and war surrounds the proposition that democratic states never ﬁght each other. There is clearly a strong empirical generalization to be explained, since all agree that democratic states rarely ﬁght each other—depending on exactly how ‘democracy’ and ‘war’ are deﬁned, some argue they never do (Weart 1998). However, scholars disagree about the causal mechanism responsible for this association. Some stress the role of political culture, arguing that the norms of toleration and mutual accommodation that prevent conﬂicts within democracies from escalating to violence have the same eﬀect in limiting violent conﬂicts between democracies. These states consider each other part of the same ‘ingroup’ sharing the same values, and are thus very unlikely to ﬁght. In contrast, others suggest that ‘democratic peace’ could be the result of rational self-interest. Democratic politicians may simply fear the negative impact that losing a war might have on their prospects for re-election. Further research, probably at the level of detailed case studies that can reveal precise causal mechanisms, will be necessary to resolve this debate.
2. Causes of War: Capitalism and Democracy
One of the longest and most heated debates about the causes of war concerns the eﬀects of capitalism. Beginning with Adam Smith (1976), liberal economists have argued that capitalism promotes peace. Marxists (Lenin 1939), on the other hand, suggest that capitalism leads to frequent imperialist wars. The Smithian liberal argument suggests that since capitalism has both increased the beneﬁts of peace (by increasing productivity and trade) and the costs of war (by producing new and better instruments of destruction), it is no longer rational for states to wage war. The long period of relative peace that followed the triumph of capitalism in the nineteenth century and the two world wars that came after the rise of protectionist barriers to free trade are often cited in support of liberal economic theories (but the same facts can be explained by hegemonic stability theory as a consequence of the rise and decline of British hegemony). In contrast, Marxists (Lenin 1939) argue that economic problems inherent in advanced capitalist economies create incentives for war. First, the high productivity of industrial capitalism coupled with a limited home market due to the poverty of the working class result in a chronic problem of ‘underconsumption.’ Capitalists will thus seek imperial expansion to control new markets for their goods. Second, capitalists will ﬁght imperialist wars to gain access to more raw materials and to ﬁnd more proﬁtable outlets for their capital. These pressures will lead ﬁrst to wars between powerful capitalist states and weaker peripheral states, and next to wars between great powers over which of them will get to exploit the periphery. With the increasing globalization of economics, and the transitions of more states to capitalist economies, the debates about the eﬀects of capitalism, trade, and imperialism on war become increasingly signiﬁcant. If Adam Smith is right, our future is likely to be more peaceful than our past; but if Marxist theorists are
3. Causes of War: Decision Making
Few theories of war focus on the individual level of analysis; their assumptions about individual decision making are usually implicit or undeveloped. Notable exceptions include rational choice theories (Bueno de Mesquita 1981, Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992) 16365
War, Sociology of and arguments about organizational and small group decision making (Allison 1971). Bueno de Mesquita begins by assuming that the decision to initiate war is made by a single dominant ruler who is a rational expected-utility maximizer. Rulers calculate the costs and beneﬁts of initiating war, and the probability of victory, so wars will be initiated only when rulers expect a net gain from them. These assumptions generate several counterintuitive propositions. For example, common sense might suggest that states would ﬁght their enemies and not their allies, but Bueno de Mesquita (1981) argues that war will be more common between allies than between enemies. Wars between allies are caused by actual or anticipated policy changes that threaten the existing relationship. The interventions of the USA in Latin America and of the USSR in Eastern Europe since World War II illustrate the process. Other counterintuitive propositions suggest that under some conditions a state may rationally choose to attack the stronger of two allied states instead of the weaker, and under some conditions it is rational for a state with no allies to initiate war against a stronger state with allies. Other analyses of the decision to initiate war focus on how the social features of the decision-making process lead to deviations from rational choice. Allison (1971) argues that standard operating procedures and repertoires within states tend to limit the ﬂexibility of decisions and make it diﬃcult to respond adequately to novel situations. Others focus on the small groups within states (such as executives and their cabinet advisers) that actually make decisions about war. The cohesiveness of these small groups often leads to a striving for unanimity that prevents a full debate about options and produces a premature consensus. In spite of these promising studies, work on the deviations from rational choice is just beginning, and we are still far short of the general microlevel theoretical model of the decision to initiate war. cally argues that states not facing the threat of war would be satisﬁed with existing administrative arrangements, whereas those competing militarily would be forced to adopt the more eﬃcient bureaucratic form. In contrast to this, Levi (1988) views war as a consistent impediment to bureaucratization. She argues that war raises the discount rates of rulers, causing them to pursue policies that provide immediate gains even if they are costly in the long term. Thus, rulers facing war would be unlikely to pay the high start-up costs of bureaucratization, but would instead do things like selling oﬃces which would make bureaucracy much more diﬃcult to implement. Ertman (1997) suggests a related argument in which the timing of war is important. When states experienced early sustained warfare (prior to about 1450) they developed patrimonial administrations (due to lack of trained personnel and the dominance of ‘cultural models’ derived from feudal and Catholic institutions). These institutions were very diﬃcult to bureaucratize due to the power of entrenched oﬃcials to block reform. Ertman argues that states that were able to avoid frequent war until later were able to develop more bureaucratic administrations. Finally, wars that result in severe losses may facilitate bureaucratic reforms. One of the main barriers to bureaucratization is the entrenched oﬃcials in the state administration who have both the incentives and the power to block reform (Ertman 1997). These oﬃcials will not be dislodged by most wars, but their power will be broken by a severe loss at war, especially one that results in foreign occupation.
5. Consequences of War: Re olt and Re olution
Since the classic work of Simmel (1955, pp. 98–9) and Coser (1956, pp. 19, 95), the conventional wisdom has been that wars decrease the probability of revolts by increasing the internal cohesion of societies (the ‘ingroup–outgroup’ or ‘conﬂict–cohesion’ hypothesis). However, the results of empirical tests of the relationship between revolt and war have been mixed, at best. In contrast to the ‘conﬂict–cohesion’ hypothesis, historical sociologists focusing on the early modern period (Tilly 1975, p. 74) argue that ﬁghting wars increased the likelihood of revolts. Tilly argues that since subjects had few institutionalized mechanisms available to stop rulers from initiating wars contrary to their interests, the only option they had to try to limit war was revolt. In addition, Tilly (1975, p. 74) notes that since participating in wars weakens rulers, it increases the likelihood of a revolt. Theda Skocpol (1979) has made the most compelling argument that war is a primary cause of major ‘social revolutions.’ Her argument about the origins of the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions stresses the importance of factors that weaken the state,
4. Consequences of War: State Formation and Bureaucratization
How and to what extent does war aﬀect the formation and the structure of states? Tilly (1975, 1990) argues that ‘war made states’ in the early modern era. Warfare (along with the repayment of debts from past wars) cost far more than any other state policies in early modern Europe. Moreover, the timing and the nature of war shaped the structures of these developing states. One of the most interesting ongoing debates concerns whether war facilitates or hinders bureaucratization. Weber (1978) argued that states involved in military competition with other states (e.g., Western Europe) would be more likely to bureaucratize than those that were more isolated (e.g., China, Japan). Although he does not use this terminology, he basi16366
Warfare in History making it more vulnerable to overthrow. The main factor that tends to weaken states is war, especially in the context of strong peasant communities and an alienated dominant class. This work has been the primary inspiration for the development of a ‘statecentered’ approach to historical sociology.
Tilly C (ed.) 1975 The Formation of National States in Western Europe. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ Tilly C 1990 Coercion, Capital, and European States, 990–1990. Blackwell, Oxford Weart S 1998 Ne er at War: Why Democracies Will Not Fight One Another. Yale Universtiy Press, New Haven, CT Weber M  1978 Economy and Society. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA
This short summary has only been able to scratch the surface of the voluminous literature on war. Future research should attempt to link the several topics discussed here, by bringing together the micro and macro causes of war, and by tying the causes more closely to the consequences of war. The increasing development of technologies of mass destruction and the rise of transnational political units will also challenge existing theoretical frameworks. Like most of sociology, the sociology of war is still in its infancy. See also: Conﬂict and War, Archaeology of; Conﬂict: Anthropological Aspects; Conﬂict Sociology; Geopolitics; Military Geography; Military History; National Security Studies and War Potential of Nations; Peace; Peacemaking in History; War: Anthropological Aspects; War: Causes and Patterns Copyright # 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Warfare in History
This article divides the history of warfare into ﬁve periods: the classical era (including the wars of Greece and Rome); the Middle Ages (roughly from AD 500 to the Turkish conquest of Byzantium in 1453); the age of gunpowder (from 1453 to the American and French Revolutions beginning in 1776); the ‘long nineteenth century’ (from 1776 to 1918); and ﬁnally the contemporary period (covering World War II and the Cold War). Each of these periods will be deﬁned by changes in three dimensions. First and most obviously, each period is associated with a general group of military technologies. Second, each period also involves a shift in the nature of military organization. Finally, this periodization demonstrates changes in the reasons why people have gone to war.
Allison G 1971 Essence of Decision. Little Brown, Boston Bueno de Mesquita B 1981 The War Trap. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT Bueno de Mesquita B, Lalman D 1992 War and Reason. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT Coser L 1956 The Functions of Social Conﬂict. Free Press, Glencoe Ertman T 1997 Birth of the Le iathan. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK Gilpin R 1981 War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK Goldstein J 1988 Long Cycles. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT Kant I  1949 Eternal peace. In: Friedrich C (ed.) The Philosophy of Kant. Modern Library, New York, pp. 430–76 Kiser E, Drass K, Brustein W 1995 Ruler autonomy and war in early modern Western Europe. International Studies Quarterly 39: 109–38 Lenin V I  1939 Imperialism. International Publishers, New York Levi M 1988 Of Rule and Re enue. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA Morgenthau H 1967 Politics Among Nations. Alfred A. Knopf, New York Organski J 1968 World Politics. Alfred A. Knopf, New York Simmel G  1955 Conﬂict and the Web of Group Aﬃliations. Free Press, New York Skocpol T 1979 States and Social Re olutions. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK Smith A  1976 The Wealth of Nations. University of Chicago Press, Chicago
1. The Classical Period
1.1 Technology The Classical period deserves consideration on its own merits and in the context of an historical debate over the inﬂuence of Greco-Roman warfare on later European patterns. In the ﬁeld of technology, some historians argue that the Greeks and Romans began a pattern of using superior technology to compensate for having to ﬁght wars against numerically superior enemies. The Persian Wars of the ﬁfth century BC demonstrated the need for Greek city-states to combat the much larger armies of Persian kings Darius and Xerxes. Needing to slow the Persians, Spartan general Leonidas threw his much smaller force into a mountain pass near Thermopylae in 480 BC knowing that it would be destroyed to a man. Aware that his army would not return, Leonidas took with him only those men who had children to succeed them, an important consideration because the army and the citizenry were closely linked. To avoid future Thermoplyaes, the Greeks developed both oﬀensive and defensive technologies. Eventually, the typical Greek soldier wore nearly seventy pounds of armor and carried spears and swords that 16367
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences
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