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. Documents Relating to the Sub-Commission on Munitions. C O N F E R E N C E OF THE A L L I E S A T P E T B O G E A I ) JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1917. March 1917.Printed for the use of the Cabinet.

and other officers. Finance. Mr. Italy. Colonel R E M O N D . France. and members of the French Munitions Mission in Russia. Commerce. His Excellency General BELAYEFF. President. Russia. Commandant CAVALLERO . His Excellency General BABIKOFF . and Agriculture. . His Imperial Highness G R A N D D U K E SERGE MICHAILOYITCH . and other officers representing various Departments of the Ministry of War and the Ministries of Marine. Great Britain. Major-General HEADLAM . General ROMEI-LONYHENA . His Excellency SENATOR GARINE.MEMBERS OF T H E MUNITIONS SUB-COMMISSION. and other officers. LAYTON . and Ways and Communications. General JANIN .

. j. PART I. 3.. Plenary Conference (with translation).Grand Duke Serge's Memorandum on present Russian Artillery Situation.—General Note. with Replies of British Delegates.—Report of Sub-Commission to. . IV.. .—Draft Scheme for the Militarisation of Labour at Archangel.—Detailed List of Russian Artillery Demands.—Notes and Tables on the Present and Prospective Munition Output of Russia. II.-Note on the Capacity of Russian Ports. t. A:Unex 1. V.—Report to Lord Milner on Russian Demands.281 REPORTS AND DOCUMENTS.—. III.

and will require some very important improvements in organisation. and at a special conference the port capacity was reduced to 4. as given by the Admiralty.431. great care had been spent in drawing up for the first time a carefully thought-out scheme of artillery equipment. A summary of these detailed demands. January-February 1917. PART I . No more guns than those previously ceded could possibly be sent into Russia until Archangel opens.400. the shipping tonnage arrangements for the year. in particular.Printed for the use of the Cabinet. and one battery of 9-2-inch howitzers per month for six months starting from June next.000 tons were allocated to artillery.. aeroplanes and explosives already on order. Of this amount 1. but it represents little more than one quarter of the demands. S. But these supplies would have left the artillery equipment very far from adequate. SECRET. The programme was therefore based on the figure of 4£ million. while the railways. This figure will severely tax the resources of the ports. could handle 8 million tons. The total is largely composed of 3-inch shell. Even this figure was considered by both the British and French officers to be excessive. desirable to allow a margin 25 per cent. however. rifles. The figures would not. but also in raw materials. two batteries of 8-inch. was presented before the sittings were concluded in a report to Lord Milner by the British representatives on the Sub-Commission (see Part III below). . March 1917. and commercial products.000 tons. A A. Official figures were put forward showing that the ports could deal with 12f million tons in 1917. above this figure in the supply arrangements for 1917. and as it seemed impossible to arrive at definite limits either for the ports or railways. All these various demands had been prepared in considerable detail before the arrival of the Mission. viz. [370-1] B . and it was therefore proposed that Great Britain should allocate to Russia four batteries of 6-inch.. Tonnage. Artillery. while the conclusions were embodied in consultation with the French and Italian delegates in a separate statement which was presented to the Minister of War (see Part II below).. In view of the possibilities of delays in delivery and losses. stand examination. Conference of the Allies in Petrograd. &c. it was said. It was not easy with the information at our disposal to determine what exactly were the limiting factors to the capacity for importation. and. The demands put forward amounted with existing orders to some 13 million tons of material. tons for the calendar year. and the offer will leave the whole British output of April and May for our own forces. it was clear that this quantity of goods could not possibly be imported into Russia in 1917. were taken as our basis. together with various comments and recommendations. This is far greater than the amount of these munitions hitherto imported. however.000 tons.G E N E R A L NOTE. but though very little of this could be ruled out as unnecessary. THE Munitions Sub-Commission was entirely occupied with an examination of the needs of Russia not only in artillery and other munitions. together with cessions of heavy artillery and ammunition already promised. it seemed. 3.200. This document was accepted by him as the report of the Munitions SubCommission subject to the reservation that small changes should if necessary be made in the allotment of available transport facilities. machinery..

Further. There is no prospect of Russia's shell capacity increasing sufficiently to leave a margin for making British type ammunition. The need is. The next demand in order of urgency is for railway material.000 tons of shell steel and 200. These two items—railway material and wire—together with 1. and we must therefore undertake to provide sufficient imports . As regards aeroplanes. Special importance was also attached to the demand for barbed wire. Russia was told that the utmost possible number of aeroplanes would be sent up to a total of 800 machines complete with machine guns and wireless apparatus. Russia is herself making barbed wire. leaving only 740.000 tons awaiting shipment at Vladivostock. the needs of Russia are at least as important as in the case of artillery.000 tons for other demands. &c. and the training of pilots for these machines will be under his control. Offers were also made with regard to propellant and explosives.to enable Russia to complete her full ammunition programme. though the require­ ments for the equipment of new divisions. are enumerated in a statement given below.000 tons to motor transport.000 tons to metals. but it is essential that arrangements should be made now to send forward an adequate supply as soon as Archangel opens. together with the answers given by the British delegates.500. There is unfortunately nothing that can be done to modify the situation materially this year. Of this it is proposed to allocate 280. for the production of Russian type ammunition is still inadequate for the guns in the field and is limited by the output of shell steel. The Grand Duke Alexander has also arranged to send regularly a certain number of men and officers both to France and . It was therefore decided to recommend that orders should be placed for sufficient wire to keep her factories employed. to sweep the front before the Russian offensive starts.000 tons on order for delivery this year. The Russians were also offered fifty Stokes and fifty 2-inch trench mortars with ammunition for experimental and demonstration purposes. so urgent that it was agreed to recommend that orders should be placed now for delivery at.200. Neither France nor ourselves were able to offer help in the matter of field guns. But there are already 700. but has a capacity for barbing still larger quantities.510.000. however. which is even greater than in our own case. full responsibility-for shipping and delivering these batteriescomplete with all equipment in Russia. The demands will also he exceedingly heavy if there is any appreciable movement of the line during the present summer. and with the cession proposed will be able to put into the field in the last half of 1917 nine 6-inch and three heavier howitzer batteries a month.000 tons of rails and 100. These w ill be sent to Major Valentine. It is thought that this ratio of three to one represents a suitable ratio of 6-inch to heavier artillery.000 tons which was agreed as the minimum coal requirement. T Other Requirements. It is true there are 60. emphasis was laid on the danger of Russia's growing dependence on America. but when this is moved it will not go very far to meet requirements. Russia is herself turning out five 6-inch howitzer batteries a month. could be transported this year. amount to 3. and 1. including 100. This latter figure will involve scaling .000 tons of rolling-stock. and on the southern front it is almost entirely lacking. the Grand Duke was informed that the British Government hoped to be able to send one or two squadrons of fighting aeroplanes with personnel and equipment. in addition to the heavy mortars already being supplied. The Minister of War was very anxious that Great Britain should take. Ammunition for these guns must be supplied from home. If this is done. or. Other Artillery Department demands. The figures are subject to small modifications as a result of the decisions of the Conference. Russia can afford to run the risk of using up all her reserves during the intervening months.The proposal was put forward on a monthly basis.000 tons for the Artillery Department. if placed. It is also important that the supplies should be as evenly spread as possible in order to prevent unduly large accumulations at Archangel. for increasing the establishment per division (54 instead of 36 per division are aimed at) and for making good wastage are greatly in excess of Russians own output. Most of the front is very inadequately barbed. as a regular supply of artillery will greatly facilitate the work of training.England to study British methods and machinery. and though no precise numbers were given. just as it would if placing them on the Western front. and it is extremely improbable that orders could be placed for additional quantities. In the former case. the end of 1917 of 200.

by agreeing in principle to this tonnage programme. as well as representatives of the Admiralty and of the Ministry of Commerce. The Minister of War should be pressed to confirm or modify this total and to make an allocation at the earliest possible moment. and this is largely being used for stores in connection with the naval base. had passed over the line. but it is not impossible that means may be found for increasing the capacity of the Siberian line.000 tons for marine demands. There is only warehouse capacity lor some 5.000 tons.000 tons. A comparison of this figure with the demands given in the detailed report below. The work of the next four weeks will show whether there is any prospect of getting through anv considerable volume of material by May. le.). which is one of immediate and pressing importance. not confirmed by the result of enquiries at Romanov itself on our return. The discharging berths are capable of dealing with 1. would permit of the despatch of most of the urgent material. wool. rubber. There are. the 19th February (N. and.000 tons before the line becomes impassable in May. In this connection the Minister of War has agreed to reserve the railway exclusively for certain artillery requirements. cotton.a n d with last year's experience it should be possible to make a further very appreciable increase in 1917. and it was pointed out that the railway had only just been taken over from the Construction Department by the regular Traffic Department.000 tons more' were expected.000 tons of the balance. but both warehouse accommodation and shore labour are inadequate. and orders have been issued to ship no other goods either from New York or from London. of course. extremely acute. and Great Britain. containing 120 tons of goods. It is. Bury is giving special attention. and. in view of the fact that every ton of material which is to reach the front by midsummer must pass into Russia by this route.000 tons afloat awaiting discharge. which should be on the front by the summer. and to cut off almost entirely the importation of. These anticipations were.. and all possible steps should be taken to" secure that the proposed total of 3. which controls the ports. The cargo afloat had risen to 44. & & [370-1] B 2 . leaving 140.000 round to Archangel by icebreaker. It was urged that this estimate was a conservative one. No. army equipment. The railway will also be of special importance next winter for the regular provisioning with ammunition of the British type artillery which will then be in the field. if realised. exceeded. reliable information was received from Romanov during our stay in Petrograd. &c. Italy.400. the line should enable us to pour into Russia a continuous stream of ammunition and other munitiona during the winter of 1917-18. and was leaving at the rate of 200 tons a day.) had reached 5. Russians needs are. of which it was hoped to send 12. Hence the unloading gangs were standing idle waiting for trucks. and possibly also in developing-the route through Dalny.180 tons. but on Monday. There remains the question of the Murman Railway. When the Mission reached Romanov only one munition train. and this total. Capacity of the Ports. But the work done at Archangel in 1916 was far better than was expected-the port being practically cleared by Christinas . useless to send goods which can neither be unloaded nor moved away by rail.s.down existing orders and allocating tonnage as between France. machinery for the sake of getting large additional quantities of artillery and coal into the country. while it has also been suggested that the Japanese could render some help in providing rolling-stock. The capacity of the Vladivostock route is limited by the railway.000 tons is supplied. and passing places increased this summer.500 tons a day. in short. though there were then 20. But the difficulties are all such as are capable of being overcome by energetic handling. a number of serious troubles which are preventing the clearing of the port. curves and gradients reduced. in fact. one train a day as against five a day required to complete the February programme. Our journeys over the railway were very satisfactory. when certain weak places have been strengthened. however. The tonnage forwarded by rail by the 7th February (o. shows that. while 24. These gentlemen were agreed that we could safely rely on the transport of 120. including representa­ tives of the Construction and Traffic Departments. and all commercial requirements. Lord Milner presided at a meeting at which were present various representatives of the Railway Department. if possible. This is a matter to which Mr. Roumania is to have 120.S. the Russian Government are prepared to face the acutest shortage in commercial materials. with the result that trucks which are needed to move material along the piers are being used as storing places in the rear of the port.

inch ammunition is now filled. and that as soon as he has had time to study outstanding orders he will issue an authoritative order of priority. This suggestion is intimately connected with the proposals for British repre­ sentation in Russia. on the one condition that a definite tonnage programme and priority arrangement is finally approved and strictly adhered to by the Russian Government. Half the total Russian output of 3. The duties of the Russian Commission would be limited to dealing with contracts and to acting as the channel through which the Russian Government make known its wishes as regards priority. the most important statement was made by the Minister of War that he has now insisted in the Council of Ministers that all orders to be placed overseas must be approved by him. Commodore Kemp. and Mr. which is not sufficiently controlled or of good enough quality. It may be remarked here that much good work of this kind has already been done by French experts in Russia. It is also clearly desirable that latest ideas from the Western Powers should be available in Russia. but even more important results of the work of French permanent Mission are indicated in the rapid increase in output in the Moscow area which has been organised by them. and it is extremely desirable that. who will be able to explain what has been done in England in the way of economising the use of metals. fo Russia one or more representatives. and at that port the chief difficulty is labour. no objection would be raised in Russia if this were done. the most important means of access to Russia. in a factory erected and run by these French officers. but we are unable to say whether his concurrence was obtained. but not to import material of secondary importance.000 tons this year. if there is evidence of this happening. On the day we left Petrograd the proposal was submitted by Admiral Korvin (the Russian admiral in charge of Archangel) to General Gourko. who would be responsible for handing it over to the authorities in a form in which it could quickly be made ready for service. on which Mr. as the Russian Commission would still be responsible for shipping raw materials and other goods. Hussion Output. On the whole. but definite recommendations were made with regard to the recall of skilled labour from the colours and to the appointment of an organiser for the Donetz coal area. The Minister of War heartily welcomed the suggestion that the British Minister of Munitions should have an officer in Petrograd who would combine with other diities that of a liaison officer between the Ministry of War and the Ministry . and the War Department welcomed an exchange of experts. To a large extent this is a matter of transport. and workshops. there is a prospect that the ports may be able to deal with more than 3. In particular we have undertaken to send out.400. was approved by the Minister of Marine and the Minister of War. in the hands of a Committee consisting of General Poole. Reference has already been made to the request of the Minister of War that the British Government should make itself responsible for the despatch to Russia of all British type war material-which should be sent complete with all necessary appurtenances to a British officer in Russia. Bury will report later. It is worth a great deal of sacrifice to get the vital necessities into Russia. The Artillery Department is also sending to England an officer to study our methods of amatol filling and the composition of signal lights. the Admiralty should make every effort to feed Russia to the full capacity of the ports. Shipping and British Representation in Russia.Archangel remains. The conclusions of the Commission pointed time and again to the vital necessity of securing an improvement in the output of Russia's mines. The matter has been left. whether in production or in shipping. if things go well. Lindley. however. This scheme. who will have to find the men and officers. The Mission therefore pressed upon the attention of the Government a scheme for the militarisation of shore labour handling general cargo. furnaces. It is important that British munitions officers in Russia should work in closest touch with this Mission. which was drawn up by Commodore Kemp and discussed by the officers of the Mission with British officials having a knowledge of conditions in the White Sea. and above all that there may be no divergence in the advice which is pressed upon the Minister of War. so far as British interests are concerned. The Minister of War was of opinion that if the British Government wished to take over all shipments. It was pointed out that this would involve a duplication of shipping authorities in England. In this connection.

but although all the work of the Mission emphasises the need of dealing with this problem and especially the allocation of transport as a whole. and Commission internationale de Ravitaillement. it appears that some steps may be required to centralise at home the work of the War Office. Ministry of Munitions. there is no one British Department to whom the information should be handed over. We have.of Munitions. however. The precise functions of this officer and his relations to General Poole and to the various Departments at home are matters which will require speedy consideration. brought back a very considerable number of documents dealing with various aspects of the munitions problem in Russia. I n this connection. His organisation should be such as to enable him to advise the British. in dealing with Russian affairs. Treasury. while he would also be an adviser to the Russian Minister of War. for example. Government on the munition situation in Russia. \ . Admiralty.

* although every effort will be made to exceed this figure. 3. T H E representatives of the Allies on the Armaments Commission have examined with the most sympathetic attention the demands put forward by the Russian Government. it is very improbable that it will be possible t a import into Russia during the current calendar year more than 3. ces conditions. L E S representants des Allies a la Commission des Arrnements ont examine avec le plus grand inter&t les demandes du Gouvernement russe. which they consider to be needed in their entirety. 2. must be reserved for Roumanian munitions.000 tons. Petrograd. mais encore de la penurie des navires signalee par les repre­ sentants de la Grande. non seulement de la capacite restreinte des ports. par oil doit se faire toute importation. March 1917.* quelque effort quon fasse pour depasser ce chiffre. toutefois. (Voir plus loin article 14.000 tonnes already existing. February 17. on croit devoir 4.C O M M I S S I O N T O P L E N A R Y CONFERENCE.Printed for the use of the Cabinet. — R E P O R T O F S U B . that the following allocations ainsi qu'il suit. necessary to take into account. may even suitably be made for losses and delays in delivery.400. 1.) Petrograd. I t is. necessary that all visions les plus optimistes et prendre les supply arrangements should be based on mesures necessaires pour fournir a la Russie the most favourable hypothesis. Conclusions of the Representatives of the Allies on the Armaments Commission.] (Translation. 1917. however. comme gested. Ils considerent ces demandes comme entierement justifiees. SECRET. not merely the restricted capacity of the few ports through which all imports must be brought. 120. it is sug­ proposer au Gouvernement russe. PART I I .400. Conference of the Allies in Petrograd. Moreover.000 tons out of the seraieut rfeervees a la Roumanie. In view of these conditions. but also the limited quantity of shipping tonnage which the representatives of Great Britain have indicated will be available. On doit meme envi­ sager le cas ou les dangers de la navigation no permettraient pas de 1'atteindre. It i^.) * Not including. it is quite possible that even this figure may not be reached. 2. On the whole. 1917.000 tonnes. II convient m6me de taken to send to Russia the maximum prevoir une maj oration pour parer aux possible total. - 11 a d'ailleurs ete entendu anterieure­ In accordance with an arrangement ment que. and steps le maximum possible.the additional imports which it is hoped will be supplied from Japan. Some excess allowance pertes et aux retards de livraison. for the consideration of the Russian la solution la plus avantageuse. On doit. however. Conclusions des Representants allies a la Commission des Armements. and the insufficiency of the means of rail transport from these distant bases to the interior of the country. 4/17 fevrier. peu nombreux. entre les diverses natures should be made among the various classes Non corapris le supplement qu'on peut esperer du Japon. 1. in view of the increased dangers of navigation.Bretagne. sur ce total. [With Translation. B . II appa­ rait alors tres peu probable que Ton puisse importer dans 1'annee plus de 3. de repartir Government. Dans. 120. et de 1'insuffisance des raoyens de transport de ces bases eloignees vers 1'interieur du pa)^s. total available . Mais Ton est oblige de tenir compte. [370-2] . se baser sur les pre­ 3. 4. January-February 1917.

or any additional output which Japan may be able to supply under the conditions indicated in article 14. a ce^der par livraisons echelonnees jusqu'a la fin de 1 9 1 7 .. the cession of which had been postponed . old type guns. &c.T.T. a partir de fevrier.. Other inetal Fil de fer (a transformer en Russie en fil barbell) ..000 Shell steel .... starting from February 15.) Artillerie lourde: 50 materiels de 155 longancien modele dont la cession avait ete ajournee.000 coups de mortiers de 11-inch This programme is largely based on the possibility of production of the various items.000 Wire (to be barbed in Russia). ni les navires..000 (N. 5... la requirements of the army and the navy marine. The figure for " Guns.00U rounds already promised) per month.000 4.) Munitions l 4 5 . mortars L..000 1:: 0.000 120. 1. remorqueurs. starting from February. 1.200.000 Coal Balance available for meeting the other J?ournitures diverses pour 1'armee. (a.. par mois. Ammunition. . par mois : a partir de fevrier. tugs..000 180. 700. to be delivered at regular intervals until the end of 1917-. .. et le commerce .. . (c. or ships.250. en sus de celles consenties ante­ rieurement: France. which can be taken to Russia inde­ pendently of the above tonnage. 1 2 0 . en elements complets (obus non charges).... comportaht une majora­ tons—a figure which allows a margin of t o d e 2 5 pour cent p a r rapport aux -25 per -cent. 110..000 1.000 and the needs of the Ministries of Gom­ merce and Agriculture 4..000 4. ..000 Munitions for Roumania Charbon ..500. Heavy Artillery :— 5 0 — 1 5 5 millim. Elle.) Trench Mortars : 3 6 0 — 5 8 millim.. 2. ne comprend pas les articles originaires de la Suede.250.B. .—Des listes plus detaill^es seront foumies. bateaux pour le service des ports qui peuvent se rendre en Russie par leurs propres moyens.. (c. (b. (b. gun ammunition (including the 15. 0 0 0 rounds of 120 millim.000 340. . de chemin de fer . for the Artillery Department ..000 deja promis).500.) Tons. . . 120.. starting from February. 15.000 rounds of 155 millim. over the amount which will in probably be available:— disponibilites probables : Tonnes.. .) Ammunition: 4 5 .B..) Gette .2 4 0 millim.. I t does not include munitions pro­ duced in Sweden.. 2.... with an initial equipment of 500 rounds per mortar. .. 340.de chargements. mortar No. with an initial equipment of 500 rounds of ammunition per mortar.000 Acier a obus ..—More detailed lists will be supplied..200. Sous la rubrique " Materiel et Muni­ tions d'Artillerie" sont comprises les cessions principales suivantes que les repre­ sentants allies proposent a. Materiel et munitions d'arfillerie .000 coups de 155 long. ni ceux que le Japon pourrait fournir en supple­ ment dans Jes conditions indiquees a 1'article 14.000 (N. & c ..000—11-inch howitzer empty shell and components per month. par mois..000­ Guns. 5. for the Artillery Department" includes the following principal allocations which the Allied representatives will recommend that their Governments should cede to Russia in addition to munitions already promised.000 700. avec dotation initiale de 500 coups par piece . a partir de fcvrier. France.000 tonnes.) Mortiers de tranchee : 360 canons de 58 No. ammunition. . un tonnage eventuel de of munitions of a total tonnage of 4.. Materiel et munitions pour la Eoumanie .000 110. 1.. 120 mortiers de 240 L. avec dotation initiale de 500 coups par piece.250..000 Railway material Autres m^taux . 3. 180.250. gun ammunition per month. repartition suppose qu'il sera possible de se procurer les fournitures envisagees. 3. leurs Gouverne­ ments.. 100.... . 0 0 0 coups de 120 long (y com­ pris 15. or barges for use in Russian ports.

le Gouvernement anglais remplacera les canons des modeles c e d e s par lui qui auraient ete mis hors de service.) Trench Mortars : 50—2-inch mortars at once. plus un total de 50obusiers de 4*5 inches destines a rem­ placer les pertes de materiel de ce calibre. 1. during the winter 1 9 1 7 ­ 18 the British Government will replace guns and howitzers of the types ceded by it which have been put out of action. 500 rounds per gun for 9*45-inch mortars. avant juillet. a part-ir de 1'ouverture du port d'Arkhangelsk . a u s s i t 6 t que possible. 0 0 0 .000 in July. 1. 7 5 coups par semaine et par piece pour les obusiers de 9*2 pouces.) Materiel d'Aviation : Le plus. 2 bat­ teries of 8-inch howitzers. 1 battery of 9"2-inch Howitzers per month for six months from the opening of Archangel. En outre. for a certain propor­ tion.000 fusees detonateursde 2 4 / 3 1 . jusqu^a concurrence de 8 0 0 au maximum pendant 1'annee 1 9 1 7 .) Heavy Artillery : 4 batteries of 6-inch howitzers. 1.000 en juillet. (a. 330 mortiers de 9"45 pouces. plus a total of 50—4*5 howitzers needed to replace losses.000. up to a maximum of 800 aeroplanes during 1917.) Artillerie lourde: 4 batteries d'obusiers de 6 pouces. 75 rounds per gun per 9*2-inch howitzer. notably those relating to aviation material. 1. 0 0 0 en avri]. 3. 2 batteries d'obusiers de 8 ponces.000 cartouches pour pistolet automatique ( 1 .000 fuses of 2 4 / 3 1 . 1. avec appareils de telegraphie sans fil. week for week for week for For trench mortars: 500 rounds per gun for 2-inch mortars. . From July onwards the British Govern­ ment will furnish a continuous supply for these mortars as may be required.) Ammunition: For heavy artillery at the as for guns already viz. as soon as they can be produced.000.000 rounds per gun for Stokes mortars. le Gouvernement a n g l a i s fournira u n ravi­ taillement journalier pour tous ces mortiers.' ammunition for "(1.000. Great Britain.) Aviation Material: As many aeroplanes as possible. (d. with machine guns and. Other demands are still under the consideration of the French Government. Pour les mortiers de tranchee : 500 coups par piece pour les mor­ tiers de 2 pouces.grand nombre possible d'avions. notani­ ment en ce qui concerne le materiel d'aTiation.000. 3 3 0 — 9 4 5 mortars. 75 coups par semaine et par piece pour les obusiers de 8 pouces. 1. pendant 1'hiver 1 9 1 7 .) 1. 0 0 0 . (Jrande*Bretagne. 500 coups par piece pour les mor­ tiers de 9*45 p o u c e s . des leur achevement.000. 1 batterie d'obusier de 9*2 pouces par mois pendant six mois. En outre. (d.1 9 1 8 . (a. 5 0 .1. In addition.) Materiel de trandiee : 50 mortiers de 2 pouces de suite. (c.000 en octobre. 0 0 0 rounds of automatic pistols April. pour une certaine proportion. :— 100 rounds per gun per 6-inch howitzer. with wireless apparatus.000 coups par piece pour les mor­ tiers Stokes.S t o k e s mortars at once. - (c. avec mitrailleuses.000 D'autres demancles sont encore soumises a 1'examen du Gouvernementfrancais. (b.) Munitions : Pour 1'artillerie lourde en meme temps que les niateriels promis : 100 coups par semaine et par piece pour les obusiers de 6 pouces.000. same rate promised. 75 rounds per gun per 8-inch howitzer. ^b.) percussion type before July 3 .000.000. a partir "de juillet 1917. et.000 in in October. 50 mortiers Stokes de suite .

6. delivery to start in March 1917. Grande-Bretange et Italie. as well as of cartridge cases and fuses.000 tons in all for the year 1917. de nouvelles commandes jnsqua concurrence de 100. on condition that the Russian Artillery Department will produce before June a design of shell for use in Russian type guns for which British quality shell steel would be suit­ able. Further. Italie.000 tons should be made between the three countries.000 tonnes de fxl de fer. including 3 7 0 . 8. 0 0 0 tons of rails for delivery in the last quarter of 1917. 40 canons anti-aeriens pour la marine. II sera probablement insuffisant pour la quantite des marchandises qui attendront 1'embarquement dans les ports e t entrepots . France. 7. The tonnage given under the head of "Railway Material" represents the amount to be delivered on existing orders. including orders already placed. sous r e s e r v e que la Direc­ tion d'Artillerie russe produira avant juin des traces d'obus pour canons russes per­ mettant d'utiliser les aciers anglais.000 tonnes pourraient etre reservees aux auto­ mobiles de toute nature. The English delegates will also re­ commend their Government to cede to Prussia out of its own resources 4. les delegues anglais proposeront a leur Gouvernement de placer.000 tons of shell steel a week during the six months open navigation at Archangel. up to a total of 100.000 tonnes entre les trois pays. 0 0 0 tons should be reserved for motor vehicles of all classes. la Russie 4. If these suggestions are accepted. of the urgent need of increasing the means of transport. France. 7. however. y compris les c o m m a n d e s deja faites. ils proposerdnt enfm de commander en Amerique '110. et" de limiter les expeditions d e cha. obus par semaine. si possible. Les delegues anglais proposeront Cgal­ ment a leur Gouvernement de prelever sur sespropres ressources et de c. and Italy.( . there would remain 140. onpense que 200.000 tonnes de rails. Ce total est inferieur au tonnage necessaire pour le transport des commandes deja en cours. adcli­ tional orders. a transformer en Ilussie en til barbele". Le Gouvernement russe voudra bien indiquer 1'utilisation q u i lui paraltra le plus desirable pour le tonnage restant disponible. should be strictly limited to the tonnage allocated to it. a division of these 200. I t is. Le tonnage indique sous la rubrique " Materiel de Uhemin de fer ' comprend les quantites qui doivent 6tre livrees d'apres les ordres deja donnes. en 1917.000 tons available for all other needs—this total is considerably less than the tonnage required to trans­ port the goods due on existing orders. a la part qui lui aurait ete attribute. II conviendrait alors d'etablir une repar­ tition de ces 200. and 2 0 0 . pendant six mois d'ouverture du port a" Arkhangelsk.000 tonnes de materiel roulant et 200. is still under consideration by the Italian Government. suggested that a figure of (say) 2 0 0 . est encore soumise a 1'examen du Gouvernement italien.eder a.que pays. Great Britain.000 tons of rolling-stock. soit au total 370.000 tonnes dis­ ponibles pour les autres besoins.000 tonnes d e s rails. and shipments from each country during 1917. and for transport to Russia at the beginning of 1918. if possible. 200—105 millim. Further.000 tonnes d'acier a. : (e. en raison de 1'urgence d'une augmentation des moyens de transport.) Other demands are also under considera­ tion by. ainsi que des douilles et fusees. however. the English delegates will recommend their Government to place.) D'autres demandes sont encore soumises a 1'examen du Gouvernement italien. 8.the Italian Government. En outre. II resterait ensuite 140. (La cession de 60 autres. 40 anti-aircraft guns for the navy. and will probably be less than the volume of material which will actually be waiting Etant donnes les besoins urgents du front russe. In view. Italy. 0 0 0 tons of rails. they will recommend that 110. (The cession of 60 more. in view of the urgent require­ ments on ihe Russian front.) Propellant: 30. guns. a livrer dans le dernier Lrimestre de 1917 et a transporter en Russie au debut de 1918. Poudres: e) 30. Toutefois. The most suitable distribution of the remaining tonnage is a matter for the consideration of the Russian Government. 200 pieces d e 105 a livrer a partir de mars 1917.000 tonnes au total pour 1'annee 1917.000 tons of wire shall be ordered in America to be transformed in Russia into barbed wire. 6.

II irest done pas opportun de lancer de nouvelles commandes a livrer dans Paimee courante. ! shipment a t the ports. It is further essential to take all possible precautions to guarantee the safety of the port of Romanoff and its environment. Russia. it is suggested that the customs should be levied. For this purpose an adequate supply of sledges. the shore labour handling du port charge" des manutentiens a. Enfin. II convient done de rassembler a 1'avance. trench mortars. si des mesures n'etaient pas prises pour differer 1'envoi dans ces ports des merchandises qui ne sont pas de premiere urgence. propellant. Finally. mais dans une ville de l'interieur. or in warehouses: when navigation opens. et dassurer dans ce cas le transport par traineau dans cette partie. not at Romanoff itself.. before the opening i^ouverture de la navigation. il y aurait interest a ce que les droits de douane soient percus non a Romanoff. on considere comme tout a For this purpose it is considered abso­ fait indispensable de militariser. jusqu'a la reouverture du port cVArkangelsk. les traineaux. avant la lutely essential that. terre et general cargo should be put under a flu chargement des trains. and avia. but at some town in the interior. 9.tion material. In order that the munitions ceded to Russia may be put at the disposal of the armies with the least possible delay. Toutefois. le personnel of navigation. Le tonnage maximum prevu ne 11. tant centre les accidents a terre que contre les entveprises des sous­ niarins ou autres navires ennemis. ^Arkhangelsk. both against accidents on land and against attacks from submarine and other enemy vessels. ammu­ nition.lors de la reouverture de la navigation. pour evitcr toute perte de temps. however. Les representants allies croient devoir appeler l'attention du Gouvernemeut russe sur le danger de rencombrement qui se produirait. pour les avoir sous la main en cas de besoin. en raison de l interet tout special qu'il y a a faciliter les transports dans Finterieur du pays et sur le front. des poudres et du materiel deviation. 11. 10. Pour que le materiel cede puisse etre mis dans le plus bref delai possible a la disposition des armees russes. 9. II est d'autre part indispensable de prendre toutes les precautions utiles pour garantir la securite du port de Romanoff et de ees abords. The maximum shipping tonnage pourra etre realise" que si les navires sont indicated can only be supplied if ships etenus le moins longtemps possible dans are retained fer the minimum possible [370-2] r . military regime. II est prudent de prevoir le cas ou le trafic serait interrompu sur une partie de la ligne par suite d'un accident quelconque. qui est actuellement la which is actually the chief gateway into principale porte d'entree sur la Russie. ou transport du materiel d'arti]lerie. so as to be ready in case of emergency. of the special import­ ance of facilitating transport both into Russia and on the Eastern front. should be immediately mobilised. clearly undesirable that any new orders should be placed for delivery during the current year. In view. the British delegates will recommend their Government to place orders for immediate delivery of cranes and other equipment needed in the port of Archangel. and also for harness. II y a lieu de remarquer que le 10. it is considered essential that until the opening of Archangel the Murman Railway shall be entirely reserved for the transport of guns and howitzers. dans les ports de depart. I t is to be observed that the pro­ programme propose ne pourra etre execute gramme proposed can only be carried out 'iue si des mesures energiques sont prises if energetic measures are taken without sans delai pour assurer dans les meilleures delay to assure that suitable conditions of conditions le fonciionnement du port work prevail at the port of Archangel. des mortiers de tranchee. on estime qu'il serait necessaire de reserver le chemin de fer Mourman. les delegues de la Grande-Bretagne propose­ ront a leur Gouvernement de placer des commandes pour la livraison immediate de [rrues et autres outillages pour le port d'Arkhangelsk et aussi de harnachement. it is. to prevent congestion and less of time at the port. animals and drivers. therefore. A ce propos. In view of the possibility that traffic may be interrupted by an accident on some part of the line it is desirable to make provision for sledge transport. animaux et conducteurs neces­ saires. The allied representatives desire to call the attention of the Russian Government to the danger of congestion which will be produced at the ports of embarcation unless measures are taken to prevent the despatch to the ports of goods of secondary importance. des munitions.

and that the necessary berths. 13. en 1917. Les represeutants allies tiennent a exprimer leur reconnaissance pour le trks obligeant empressement avec lequel le Gouvernement russe leur a fourni tous jes renseignements demandes. energique et actif.les ports. energetic and active officer. La penurie des metaux oblige aussi a en supprimer 1'emploi dans les industries qui n'ont aucun rapport avec la guerre. The scarcity of metals makes it necessary to suppress their use in indus­ tries that have no direct connection with the war. If the Japanese Government would undertake the organisation of transport by sea. C O 15. dans la fabrication du materiel de guerre et des munitions. Dapres les ren­ seignements recueillis. ­ length of time at the port. a Arkhangelsk. On obtiendrait une amelioration immediate de la situation en concentrant dans la main d'un seul chef.000 tonnes de ble\ II est done de la plus haute importance de preparer ^nergiquement et sans retard cette derniere operation. en 1917. 14. ammunition. in this con­ nection a new difficulty will arise. une nouvelle difficulte surgira. steel. An immediate improvement in the situation would also be obtained by the appointment of an. railway material. 13. en ce qui cmcerne les munitions. 12. I t appears that the munition pro­ ducing resources of Japan have not hitherto beeu utilised to the fudest possible extent. It is. of the first importance that prompt and energetic steps shall be taken for facilitating this operation. la re­ partition des charbons dans la region du Sud. it is thought that more coal could be pro­ duced from. it is essential that her own pro­ duction should be increased. In view of the impossibility of iui­ porting all the coal and steel which Russia requires. Ic is recommended that the Allied Govern­ ments represented at the Conference should put before the Japanese Govern­ ment the necessity of organising its resources iu order to provide Russia with propellant. ] 6. in 1917. cuivre. Si le Gouvernement japonais se chargeait de 1'organisation des transports par mer et de la fourniture de wagons et de locomo­ tives. therefore. . the mines if they could obtain further skilled labour. il en resulterait un supplement de materiel appreciable. 14. magasins. should be immediately taken in hand. II semble que les ressources du Japon. on est d'avis que les grandes mines pourraient produire plus de charbon si Ton mettait a leur disposition le personnel specialiste necessaire qu'il faudrait rappsler du front a cet effet. and of the allocation of w a g o n s for its transport. [f the Russian Government is of opinion that the development of its output could be increased by engineering or other expert assistance. et la distribution des wagons pour leur transport. ses Allies de 1'Ouest seraient heureux de lui donner satisfaction sur ce point. copper. and completed munitions. 12. the Western Allies would be glad to aid them in this respect. en commencant des maintenant la construction des quais. 16. and other war material. and could find means of supplying a certain number of waggons and loco­ motives. acier. 0 0 0 tons of wheat. par tous les moyens possibles. A cause de Timpossibilite d'importer tout le char bo n et lacier qui font defaut a la Russie. from the necessity of export­ ing at least 5 0 0 . Si le Gouvernement russe pensait que la mise a sa disposition d'ingenieurs ou autres experts put favoriser le develop­ petnent de sa production. il est indis­ pensable d'user de tous les procede\s propres a e"conomiser le metal. it might be possible to make a considerable addition to the quantity of munitions that could be imported into Russia as indicated above 15. warehouses. From information received. at Archangel. Ace point de vue. &c. The Allied delegates wish to express their appreciation of the readiness which has been shown by the Russian Government in supplying them with all necessary information. On the other hand. in 1917. il est essentiel que sa production propre soit augmentee. it is also essential to introduce all possible devices for economising metal in the manufacture of guns. n'aient pas ete utilisees aussi largement qu'il etit 6te possible. en raison de la necessite dexporter au moms 500. by all possible means. who would have supreme control of the distri­ bution of coal in the region of the South. De m6me. &c . On suggere que les Gouvemements allies representes a la Con­ ference fassent une demarche aupres du Gouvernement japonais pour lui demander d'organiser ses ressources en vue de fournir a la Russie poudres. materiel de chemiu de fer et munitions confec­ tionnees. which would have to be recalled from the Army for the purpose.

00 0 nition Other things.00 0 Rifles .000 152.000 170.000 120 i. Fusils-mitrailleurs Mitrailleuses Cartouches Autres objets.000 20.J plosives) j Grand t o t a l : 1.000 328.200 - 180. 29. optical munition. mais a 1'exclusion des automobiles 170..) 1 tors) Trench mortars and 29.200.000 120.000 360.000 JAITMI AIBIJ Propellant 30. Munitions pour canons et obusiers Canons et obusiera (tracteurs compris) pris) Mortiers et muuitions Aviation Poudrea.082. Amerique. Explosifs Fusils ..000 (Sont compris dans GrandeBretagne) " .000 30. but excluding auto­ mobiles i 394. 83.000 120. plus the munitions to be despatched from Italy and the explosives from Prance.000 tonnes.000 150.288 DETAIL du Tonnage alloue pour le Materiel et les Munitions d'Artillerie.000 20. ) British. &c.000 2.. France.00 0 . materiel optique...10.000 tons.000 7.000 12.000 20. for the ArtilleryDepartment.000 12.. soit 1$00.400 guns and BOWITzers Guns AND howitzers 10.000 (plus ex.000 tonnes. say.00 0 Ammunition for 170.400 7.000 152.000 328. France. i America. 1. ammunition Aviation 70. "l20 ^ 10..000 360.000 tons.000 UJUUU ? Explosive 30.000 mam J 20.200 (Included (including traci n British.000 t * 150.000 ? ? 30.000 120. 360.000 70.082.000 6.000 6.000 180. plus le materiel TENANT dTtalie et les explosifs venant de France.40 0 j 180.000 10..000 n 83..00 0 394. - ANALYSIS of the Tonnage allocated to Guns and Ammunition.000 6. y compris signaux lumineux.00 0 10.000 10.000 CLUDIDG signal lights.000 (plus explosifs) 360.00 0 152. 0 . in2. Automatic rifles .000 12. GrandeBretagne. Great Britain.00 0 Au total: 1...000 Machine-guns Small-arms ammu.

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