Bipartition of the Soul in the Early Academy Author(s): D. A. Rees Source: The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol.

77, Part 1 (1957), pp. 112-118 Published by: The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies Stable URL: . Accessed: 26/03/2011 09:13
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Apelt in his Platon-IndexIsays briefly that the soul is there treated as tripartite. that of the soldier or man in public life. he seems to suggest a little later that the soul of the gods is intellect through and through-a suggestion which seems to render inappropriate the introduction of the horses into the picture at all (just as it might be urged that in the phrase we have used above 'unity'. but neither passage proves his point. 'Seelenlehre'.5 Thirdly.. and supports this by referring to I. and least common for the first). The soul is likened to a team consisting of a charioteer and two horses which he is attempting to drive. the auxiliaries and the artisans. but the same is not true in other species. Ibid. however. the rational towards knowledge. and that of the merchant or other person engaged in a money-making enterprise. See pp. touch on the question in Volume II of his Platonz. Gernet in his translation (with commentary) of Book IX. Rep. and rigid exactitude of doctrine is not to be expected. parts of the soul. 44 1C ff. 433A. It will be well to begin by recapitulating briefly the main points in the moral psychology of the Republic. 3 4 5 6 7 .9 Fifthly. 9 Ibid. in fact. Here. he there states that the Laws treats the soul as tripartite. Io 58oD ff. Plato is indicating the unity and harmony that reign in the divine soul. Plato argues that the pleasures of the rational element are not simply superior to those of the other two but more real as well.g. however. the rational.I2 The charioteer is clearly reason. so that the charioteer has difficulty in driving. the spirited towards honour and public distinction. the rational controlling the appetitive through the agency of the spirited.6 Fourthly. the second actually suggesting that it requires some modification. Book X suggests at least that the rational element is the real self. etc. (b) at the same time each of the three elements represents a drive towards one of three goals.. while justice consists in the maintenance of the proper relation between the three elements. Neither England's commentary nor Ritter's affords much help. 863B. the distinction of three elements in the soul is made the basis for interpreting the four virtues. s. indeed.v. and the appetitive towards pleasure (interpreted as bodily pleasure). Cf. The best treatment known to me is the discussion of the second of these passages by L. 435 B ff. attempt a general study of this. esp.4 The soul is there divided into three parts or (better) elements. the rulers. that it alone is immortal. it will not. 435E-436A. as will be argued below. the soul being in the right state and the agent's actions right in consequence when the rational element controls the appetitive through the agency of the spirited.8 while the state as a whole will be just if the correct relation between the three classes is maintained and the reason of the rulers preserves its control with the help of the auxiliaries. The latter does. in the case of the gods the charioteer and the two horses are all of noble breed. the leading one is that of the moral psychology of the Laws. IV. The problem seems to have been on the whole neglected by scholars. 105-6 (n. the three classes will have as their specially characteristic virtues wisdom. and in that of mankind one horse is of noble breed and the other of ignoble. the spirited and the appetitive. and further these ways of life are specially characteristic of different races. 451. 70). Paris. wisdom being the virtue of the rational element and courage of the spirited (ideally under the control of the rational). and temperance in the willing acquiescence of the appetites in the rule of reason. One might add that the imperfect types of state and character depicted in Books VIII-IX can be interpreted in terms of the relations of the three 1Phdr.Io Finally. 246A-B. the three elements in the soul and the three types of character are correlated by Plato with the three classes in his ideal state. each of these three drives may predominate in any individual soul (though it is commonest for the last to do so. Secondly. indeed.BIPARTITION OF THE SOUL IN THE EARLY ACADEMY the AMONG topics this paper will discuss. and the three are therefore to be correlated with three ways of life. pleasures being graded as higher or lower according to the element in the soul which enjoys them. 1917. taken strictly. the tripartition of the soul is applied in Book IX to the discussion of pleasure. but will confine itself to the question whether that work presupposes any particular division of the soul into parts. 428C ff. 1 61 IB-612A. 644C and IX. or towards material gain as a means to the attainment of pleasure."I The theory that the soul is tripartite occurs also in the Phaedrus. and that the other two exist merely in virtue of our temporary attachment to a body.3 but it requires some expansion and supplementation. 440E-441A. and this division has two aspects: (a) an analysis is thus provided which can be used in the interpretation and appraisal of all action whatever. courage and temperance respectively. 8 Ibid. Ibid. the setting is a myth. In saying that in the case of the gods both horses are of noble breed. P. e. 443C ff. which is certainly not true without qualification. that of the thinker.7 On the larger canvas of state organisation.

p.22 while the faculty of divination is assigned to the liver.. L. II82a23 ff.2o and this is certainly possible (it had. 2" 44D-45B.27 However. Burnet (The Ethics of Aristotle (900oo). PP. 65A. pleasure and pain and the various emotions. The nearest approach to a mention of the tripartition of the soul in the political sketch in the Timaeus is the demand at 18A that the nature of the guardians shall be both 'spirited' and 'philosophical'.26 and in this the main features of the political institutions of the Republic are recapitulated (the purely ethical and metaphysical discussions and the higher education being left aside). the pleasures of smell are. Perhaps the Phaedrus was written about the same time. 15 Ibid. I 7C. 69C-D. vol. 69D-7 IA.BIPARTITION OF THE SOUL IN THE EARLY ACADEMY 113 Of the composition of the human soul sufficient indication is incompatible with 'harmony'). D-E.23 There are two further points to be noted about the Timaeus. on the other hand. located in the brain. 42A-B. 395 (ed. 246B. Plato does not set out an ordered system but deals with problems as and when they occur in the course of the discussion. the only distinction made being that between those: whose business it is to rule and guard the state and. but he presents no good reasons for his view. 42A-B. the rational element is explicitly but the evidence is inconclusive. E. when immortal souls are implanted in bodies. This is that the Timaeus opens with a brief outline of a discussion on the ideal state which the participants are supposed to have held on the previous day. and of desire. 65A. the latter of which (as has been mentioned already) speaks of a mortal form of soul. 16 Ibid.) questions the relevance of these passages and of Plt. indeed. 584B. 25 65A. The former arises from a brief passage on which no great weight can be laid. 64A-65B provides a discussion of pleasure on physiological lines which contrasts sharply with that of RepublicIX. w6 erd v yewopycov (sc. the spirited in the heart and the appetitive in the abdomen. In the relevant portion of the Timaeus.'9 The Timaeus differs from the Republic in that the parts of the soul are now located in organs of the body. though it is difficult to build anything on this since the passage is so brief and since 65A does speak of the 'mortal part' of the soul as that experiencing the pleasures there discussed. iii (1953). and is much closer to the more extended treatment of the Philebus. But in the present instance there seems to be more to it than this. been suggested as a possibility by Wilamowitz). the farmers and artisans. A. to violent intrusions from the physical world. contrasting it with the divine. without feeling any need to repeat himself by going once again over the ground covered in earlierdialogues. 79-95)).3o A division of the soul into two elements is. 27 . is the companion of insolence and wantonness. 253E. 7oA. but controlled sufficiently by the word of command and by reason . E. but nowhere is it stated that the number of classes in the state is to be three.. Ti. where the division into three is not mentioned. though this too is a matter of controversy. Qu. as a matter of fact. 26 17C-19B. '9 Cf.29 Writing in dialogue form. Taylor seems to have thought that Plato believed them to be so located when he wrote the Republic. and it is difficult to say that in any of them. One horse is good.24 while not specifying that part any further. 1920). on the other hand. Plato goes on to speak of the accession of sensation. 247D. This is illustrated both by Republic X and by the Timaeus.6 its fellow. in view of the cursoriness of the outline and the fact that in the Republic itself Plato is able to proceed some considerable distance without dividing the guardians into rulers proper and auxiliaries.S. '7 Ibid.Is needing no whip. and when the soul is subject. 63 n. p. p. 29 There seems to me to be great force in Mr. a8 lta Iv Ovzoetf6. cf. 69C-D. the Timaeusapart (if it be counted as late). the Timaeusbeing careful to distinguish what is mortal in the soul from what is immortal. vol. 253D. 72D. 24 Cf. and amenable only to whip and spur. 30 Ti.4 the good is a lover of honour conjoined with modesty and temperance. a little hard to fit into the tripartition. the contrast intended being that with the theory (ascribed to Socrates) of the soul as an indivisible 13 Phdr. as a matter of fact.25 There is equally little to be inferred from the second point. 72D. 309C (discussed below) to the bipartition of the soul into a rational element and an irrational. deaf.21 In the Timaeus. not owing its existence to any corporeal attachments.. IX. 496. Platon. the other bad . y'vog) 6crat te iAAat Tr'evat. it is unambiguously presupposed. I8 Ti. however. 23 71A-72C. i. N. 21 20o 14 Ibid. nia 6N qStAodaooqov. through sensation. G. after various metaphysical preliminaries. one can build nothing directly on this (though we may be reminded of it by what we shall find later in the Laws). It is like the Philebus in not explicitly correlating pleasures with the three parts of the soul in the manner of the Republic. A Commentaryon Plato's Timaeus (1928). But the pleasures of smell are also mentioned in Rep.28 Plato nowhere explicitly abandons the tripartition of the soul.I3 can be obtained from what is said later in the myth. for the rational element tended naturally to stand apart from the other two as that which alone was immortal and divine. ascribed to Plato in Magna Moralia I. Owen's arguments for placing the date of the Timaeus not long after that of the Republic ('The Place of the Timaeus in Plato's Dialogues' (Cl.I8 Once again the second and third elements in the soul make their appearance when reason has received bodily attachments. but in the later dialogues it falls into the background.I7 It is plain that the three constituents of the myth are the parts of the soul figuring in the Republic.

. in fact. 35 Ibid. flaatAtK?) 'rtaT?77). F. But.I. that of putting into effect the pronouncements of reason. as spirit or anger would fall without difficulty into the ranks of the appetites and desires. 22B-C. 2rA-D. v a-roi3 OvLKv Et'VC Theodoret.33 We are inevitably reminded of the Timaeus. 432a24-6.b7V E& TE Td HAc-wv 7S 7 POUTKOvGas. IHArwvoKaiT AdyovV8 aIxV 7Y.. there is nothing to necessitate one.35 For man the good life must unite both. if there were to be two elements postulated.L8rp. who was shown by Diels to be dependent on Aetius: HvOayo'pa3S yyapKav HA'rwv Tatr v [sc. 8 KaG . poa IV-p4. StXl O7 ETE•ov. There is in fact evidence of a tendency in Plato in this direction. it is conceded. cf. will be. One may compare the way in which the TatioTO'qJ rftKyv. Aff. Doxographi Graeci [Berlin. particularly as the picture of the ideal life for the individual is constructed on the same lines as that in the Republic. so reason rules the appetites by means of the spirited element. It can be plausibly argued. . but it is clear that divine existence is thought to be pure intellect. it will be argued later that it provided the psychological basis of Aristotle's Protrepticus. Qu. it nowhere classifies pleasures in accordance with a tripartition or any other similar analysis of the soul. petd 6d t6d OeSov Tod 'poyevg cv airt 34 Phlb. as in the Philebus. Hackforth. pp. OYLK aKpt PLtLEP. satisfy a god. R. If one examines it not as the pursuit of honour and distinction in particular but as an element involved in action in general. 6oE. 'Psychology and Social Structure in the Republic of Plato' (Cl. 6oD-E. IV. Rep. 37 Phlb. 38 Cf. it may be thought of as strength of will or of character (normally co-operating with reason). so that. 7' T' O•vLtKb same idea is expressed by Theodoret.37in man. ad3Ot dvOpcnm'vot 309C. 32 unity: pLET i-a'r'a 84 (sc. while on the other hand it seems difficult to dissociate the notion entirely from that of anger.. conceived purely as an emotion. 6IB.Ka 6LLEPp7 7"Y t~ TO TPOUEXES V•V-7C-o T TO T 8E AOYOV. but it is not one which a man can desire. . rpqLEpp tLv -8 [av' To adAoyov ' T. though it discusses pleasure at length.38 This by itself is not much to build on. Qu. which is based on a consideration of the two claimants put forward for the title of the good for man. and the gods are such-and. 1879]. The Politicus. on the other hand. may. 265-72). the list of goods at the end of the dialogue contains nothing which could be the special goal of a spirited element. '7v i/vx'v] tpE'Ca'Et a FLEv avT7S Etvat Aoyut'v rO ' E"iAoyov. 4. 58IC-583A. and theirs. namely that. PP. In the Republic its function seems to be primarily executive. X. and it is impossible to be dogmatic. ypr aoyov TO ry EtaSpoortveL4 Aoyco'v. Cornford. while Ovos. 435E-436A. . where even in the ideal state the philosophers undertake to rule merely because they are conscious of a moral constraint to do so. 246-65). 22D. Diels. iii. devoid of pleasure. 36 Ibid. whether anything more is involved is difficult to say. V. knowledge accompanied by the appropriate pleasure. There is little of relevance in the Philebus. In particular.(sc. 2iD-22C.32 that the spirited element was always in an ambiguous position. H. Arist. but sions '7 Adyov EAoyov T-o `'Xov one may compare the manner in which the doxographical tradition represents Plato. as in the Phaedrusand Timaeus.31 Further.36 There will inevitably be some hazard in the attempt to infer a moral psychology from these data. 23A. such as is conceived in the Republic. REES are used in the dialogues in the sense required. but perhaps one may tentatively draw some indications from its ethical argument. vi (1912). Plac.I I4 D. Kac expresLTpE EKarTOV EXOV KGat yAOyOV 3pC0 K7E'ICEV and nowhere (?OKacrrTo) 3' De An. a distinction between a rational and an irrational and appetitive soul seems to be involved-a purely intellectual being would not. rrdAtv] TO. 19 (cf.. E. knowledge and pleasure.The A-yov -4nv E ' 7T . IX. 7rv1-/7LtKv". pp. though there is nothing to preclude any third element. this function of the spirited element would disappear. a rational and an irrational. however. ica" . 22A ff. on this view. and it is alluded to in the De Anima.389-90). Graec. states that he will maintain the right relation-the metathat part of the soul which has existed eternally phor actually used is taken from weaving-between and that which is 'of animate kind'. That evidence is negative for the most part. Cur. it was natural that the two selected should be the first and the third. a further characteristic of the Philebus to be mentioned. but merits investigation nevertheless. or as self-respect (perhaps not widely different). 'The Modification of Plan in Plato's Republic' (Cl. as the rulers control the artisans through the instrumentality of the auxiliaries. after Pythagoras and Socrates) v 3LEldAo ~.A TE ATt. A.N. while in such states as actually exist it is the part of a wise man to avoid the political arena as far as possible: his aim. vii (1913). II77b26-I•178a2. distinguishes different types of pleasure and (like the Republic)differentiates true pleasures from false. It may well be argued that all that this proves is that Plato did not here need any such analysis. M. or even that the main justification for its inclusion lay in the political structure of the ideal state. if once it were conceded that reason could be effective of itself in ruling the appetites.34 while the choice of pleasure without knowledge is even less acceptable. Aftius reports 77V ?~UbX as follows: FHvOaydpac Y P EXELY . 33 HPJ7 TOv IV KaT L avyyevig' daeyeveg 6v T• Ti• T(s4 ' I?vXyi ard~ovy p'pog 6Oep cavvptorapovaiy&weeic. though perhaps an examination of the Laws will give some little help.Such a bipartition aKGt was certainly familiar in the discussions of the Academy. experience pleasure. instead of three. There is. with IV. The life of knowledge alone.7. discussing the way in which the ideal legislator will rule his subjects. as some years ago by Cornford and Hackforth...

'47 As in the Republic.I15 Here our primary evidence is provided by IX. BIPARTITION OF THE SOUL IN THE EARLY ACADEMY .40 on the other hand in the Republic. 636D-E. however hesitantly. shortly after the passage on Ov~du quoted above. 44oE-44 IA. 84oB-C. presupposed throughout. III. while the educational ideal laid down at the beginning of Book II is similarly that the child shall feel pleasure and pain at the right things. alike in all cases. and 63oA-D.E. and all obedience of individuals to it. zpitov zoiy0d aTet Ov9ZOet6. 863E-864A. nothing is said of that here.).. ?bvXii r TdaetCrtxOOa d J-Aaa rp6 x AoYta~tLKdo'v. 3vcrEpt Kal Ep4TEc . where Plato. 40 Cf. discussing the nature of criminal responsibility. 47 A. the tripartite nature of the soul.)-where that conviction prevails in the soul and governs a man's conduct.E. 1223a26-1224a7 (cf. even though it might be objected that Plato is more concerned with detailed legislation here than he was in the Republic-after all. as three in number. is of no great importance for us. e8v8'KUOT )fj 49 Pol. envy or cupidity. while in the Republic these are set out as bound up with. p.1. I225b25 and juxtaposition of pleasure. pain and desire at 631E. E. 44 classification of appetite. Cf. as by Kant and T. and this is remarkable in so long a work paying so much attention to moral psychology. when advancing the ideal of harmony in the state. also ibid.20-25 Walzer. pain and self-control recur at III. all that is done from such a principle. Ovtudj and E. What we find in the Laws-at least in the early books-is that the virtues to receive the greatest attention as virtues are courage and temperance. enumerates three sources of wrong action. special attention to courage and temperance. All these passages can be interpreted on the assumption that the tripartite soul is. which sets out the psychological preliminaries. 7•m ibid. he also manages to say not a little about theology. discussing criminal responsibility. devotes 7 TO /W ala'to 7Tpd6 to roApcov VTro0 /zaLLvet. from the impulse Jva-rp•r•E. I. &iv /Z?' KaK /g 'poo~i 6taqOapfj. H. 7roA') 46 -rd I57oVdiKat' !/dg (sc. though detriment thus caused is popularly taken to be involuntary wrong (dKoCLtov cLtKGav ELVLa). the same themes of pleasure. where Plato stresses the regulation of desire for pleasure in the sexual sphere. 1334a22-36. KpELTOWV a6roi0) is discussed at 626E in terms which presuppose a division of the soul (Plato had not abandoned that). edTtKOVpOV Similar views have been av Td x< adopted in recent centuries. 5a.33. III. fear. the reader is left in no doubt that spirit is a part of the soul on its own account. P. 647C-648E. but this same set is found also in Aristotle's Protrepticus. Green AoyutrtIKC taeat. in Book I. II. 39 is classed by Aristotle as a ard'Oo De An.15-2o Ross = Fr. a rational and an irrational. tpUd 626E. desire for money.48 three elements but into two. where Plato.. but what he says about it is studiously vague. as when the four virtues are introduced at 63oA-B. The phrase 'to be master of oneself' (r~ Vt-v avTdov contrast. But nevertheless Plato studiously avoids mentioning it. and dependent on. wisdom.44 In both cases the virtue consists in self-command. esp. JAToY11VKoSE ola 7TAd tLE*POS Plato is careful to distinguish spirit from pleasure (or.46 VIII. though it is stated that in the conflict of reason with the appetites the spirited element normally sides with reason. pain and right thinking at 696C. VII. 5.N. The other relevant passages occur largely. 1323b33-36. it is not denied that this may fail to occur. as does also what Plato says a little later. also the E. also Rousseau). temperance that appropriate in the face of pleasure. 45 653A-C.4' These conceptions set the key for the whole of the rest of Book I. tai5ra ydp 4' 627D ff. we have what may be termed an 'internal' definition only Finally we may note that a little later. But there is more to it than this: the Laws operates on the basis of the familiar set of four virtues. rather. 'spirit' (Ovpod). must be pronounced right (&'Katov) and for the highest good of human life. 635E. though here applied to the individual soul and not to the state. dpOT Adyot' Katl Ogro7. 11I Ibo ff. 43 Cf. which were expounded in the Republic as resting on the character of the soul as triwhich analyses the soul not into partite. courage. pleasure and are ignorance. and moral education in the steps taken to inculcate it. But where there is a conviction that a course is bestwherever a society or private individuals may take that best to lie (v. The threefold 403aI6-I7 1i47a14-I6. Taylor's translation.42 On the other hand. 628D-E 48 Fr. (cf. and elsewhere in Aristotle also. esp. 44oE.49 To presuppose four 'cardinal' virtues does not necessarily involve presupposing three parts of the soul. IV. ambition (q!Ao7rtgla) and fear of detection. 863B-C.39 towards pleasure). i . at 647C-D. 631C-D. spirit and thought occurs at even if unfortunate consequences should arise. E.45 To touch on a few isolated passages later in the work. whether damage is the consequence or not. 29. and those of pleasure. More significant is IX. VII.N. and cf. even if the soul be divided into parts and if further this division be taken to be the basis of the dis42 Cf. though not entirely. The classification of the sources of wrong action is reminiscent of the tripartition of the soul in RepublicIV. pleasure or pain. E. gives definitions of justice and injustice which it is instructive to compare with those in Republic IV: 'Wrong (dQ&Kia) is the name I give to the domination of the soul by passion.43 and between these an elaborate parallelism is maintained. temperance and justice. 870. the sources of wrong-doing are listed ofjustice. The crucial words on the subject of Ov~Lds as follows: v iv 7J arj~ iv V K9I71La 9'ac~TE• 9 ET0E T ITCLOS ELTE TL WV O GV1LLS. . at IX. tx' Ovyoet6C) Evyx-7 V AiAV7ag KEK)7JtEvoVaVjtoobov? roT v"g' j•uiAAovatix' Tt Rep. courage being the virtue appropriate in the face of pain. 689A-E. where.

they are contrasted with men and with other 'earthy' creatures whose movements are characterised by disorder.56 It is difficult to be sure of the psychological theory of movement and action which underlies this classification. as he was in Republic IX. The old third class. and the absence of the rigid scheme of the Republic means that the treatment is freer and more empirical. the star-souls will be purely rational. and if so it will be helpful to compare the passage of the Timaeus in which it is said that a rational element exists not only in the human soul but in those of the lower animals also. and his treatment is no longer forced in the same way. their movement being for that reason perfectly orderly. We find in the Laws a greater complexity of social structure. A. which differs from that of the Republicin certain respects in which the latter is closely connected with the tripartition of the soul. the opposite of pleasure. while the new religion of the Laws is certainly brought forward with the utmost seriousness. The Laws does. The tripartition of the human soul is naowhere mentioned. Plato does not grade pleasures in accordance with any division of the soul into parts. 870. temperance and courage will be shown in the control of pleasure and pain by reason. suggests a certain hesitation in Plato's mind. as in the Philebus. 983D-E. The Epinomis (whoever its author may be) provides very little. but is only putting forward his new political scheme as something second-best. and even tempting.55 Moving according to reason. IV. as is confirmed by IX. 98IC-985B. and this does not mean that he was still committed to the Republicas a whole. 55 Ibid.54 the perfectly circular movements of the stars are evidence not of the lack of an indwelling soul but of its perfection. It remains to ask what further evidence there is to support the thesis I have been suggesting. 4ID-42D. 58 Contrast the Phaedo: but the theory of aether is later than that dialogue. ambition and fear of detection. but how far this is to be connected with the tentative shift in the direction of a bipartite soul it is difficult to say. like all other motion.58 All this is possible. 69oA ff. 53 III. A further point which is perhaps of some significance in so long a work is that. IX. 54 Epin. o 56 This seems to be the implication ofrd I'v o~y 'v dxraVla 52 VIII. elements of both monarchy and democracy (if these are the proper terms) being found. to vindicate the primacy of the pleasures of the intellect.6'~rep 'd7ToA) rd rept dpq oCg . 846D. 693D-E. 9oE-92C. to see here not a tripartition but a bipartition into a rational element and an irrational. If the alternative bipartition be employed.5z the citizens of the Laws correspond to the two upper classes of the Republic. examination of the most directly relevant passage of the Lawss5 shows no more than that Plato still regarded his early communism as ideal. the contrast envisaged between the activity of divine beings. due to a soul attached somehow to the body and governing it. but it is certainly possible that it is envisaged. 982A-E. even on its political and institutional side. when the sources of wrong-doing are given as desire for money.53 The primary distinction is that of rulers and ruled. 863E-864A (also quoted above): reason is simply contrasted with the emotions. suggest a bipartition of the soul more naturally than a tripartition.116 D. as previously.57 In that case. IX. 863B-C. will be one between different types of being all of which possess reason. since fear of detection amounts to a desire for freedom from pain. will be the specific virtue of the rational element and justice will be shown in the maintenance of a total balance. If so. taken T7roLteaOat bpd6vtov with the emphatic injunction that man must study astronomy if he would be perfect. and it has been seen that there were tendencies in other dialogues pointing in that direction. contrasted with the rational part of the soul there will be an irrational. 57 Ti. though more seriously distorted than in that of man. quoted above. but Plato does not make any such point explicitly. though so much is said about pleasure. 739. However. It is difficult to be sure how far it is relevant here to refer to the ideal state of the Laws. but while in the first type reason is hindered by no disturbing elements. T6 -) v T EtLTE KCat Opav~ rdpov EXoviaa rov Elvat. but what it says may be worth noting.. The motion of the stars is. in fact. that of men and that of the lower animals. To this it may be objected that Plato has not really abandoned his earlier ideal state. though man is indeed able to contemplate the heavenly bodies and the order in which they move. Again. and among them the established order is slightly less authoritarian. though the former predominates. REES tinction between the virtues. characterised by the capacity for feeling pleasure and pain. if indeed a very precise one underlies it at all. while the souls of the lower animals will be completely 5' V. The nature of the star-souls-their connection with bodies composed of aether-will mean also that corporeal attachment as such will not bring upon the soul the disturbance of appetite: that happens only in the case of 'earthy' creatures. it is possible. but then. that of the artisans. he is no longer concerned. in the second appetite and spirit provide a certain degree of disturbance and in the third a greater. 712B ff. if we look at the Epinomis without reference to the Timaeus. esp. but. 50 Lg. 982A-B. it holds.50 we have a list that could indeed be brought within the old threefold framework. is now placed outside the ranks of the citizens altogether. L 7fd TEKy •LOv Xpt KovotJUevovr 'pov Xp vo/gietv. in the course which deliberation pronounces to be the best and with a perfectly orderly motion. while wisdom. v o' pov. as in the case of the Laws.

For Bernays' view of the dialogues in general. ii (1869). the virtue of the part which is highest and is alone immortal. ft. repeated later in the NicomacheanEthics. 62 bvypi) p.63 The argument for the absolute superiority of the rational element is clinched by the assertion. Bernays held that it referred consistently to Aristotle's lost dialogues -in other words. I. III. 432a24-26. D. II. 64 Loc. They may not be in the 63 I.67 E. so the rational element within the soul is superior to the irrational and rules over that.Kai o'3 zdvov xtveT A'yovot GtoptiovTOEg. who approached the problem afresh in his attempt to trace the course of Aristotle's development. and has been the subject of much controversy in the course of the last century. Io02a26-28 he took to refer to the Eudemus. of the contemplation of the divine.65 and also De Anima III. 67 J. bpdviyog gives several . ed. to his published works as distinct from his lectures. n. since there is now no reason why their number should be limited to four. Les Listes anciennes des Ouvrages bVXig').N. II.2). avTol"g after the Eudemus. 'OIber die exoterischen Reden des Aristop.. F. Aristotle (E. Aristotle seems to deny intelligence to animals while allowing them both imagination and appetition. ii (1949). will contain both a rational element and an irrational. La Rivilation d'Hermis Trismigiste. pp. Politics.T. but it will be capable of virtue and. X. 6. who was followed by Susemihl. I I69a3. P. Td d A'dyov 6i The Protrepticus seems to have been written shortly Eov. rAoyov. I-V (i. 11.. nor was he compelled to hold with Bernays that differences in doctrine were always due to the dramatic setting (though that may sometimes be the case). 1254a24-b24. In its favour two facts can be adduced: first that. pp. 57-8. ch. which was written in or shortly after 66 Tp0d7ov yap tiva d7Tetpa balverat (sc. apart from a few passages. It is clear that not much can be built on the above. pp. Festugibre. p.977B-978B. but held that. 55-69). 477-94.68 This interpretation of such K terms as E'WEopTLKOL was. in his later years. p dev Kat KWAvELt. temperance and justice.6' The relevant portion argues that the soul and its goods are to be preferred to the body and its goods. Jaeger (Aristotle. Diels oyot doubted if any single consistent meaning was to be given to these phrases running through all the passages where they occurred. AOyLOTLKd6V d'Aristote (1951). Bywater.v. however.66 The interpretation of the former is L bound up with that of the phrase ol iS'orEpLKO Oyot. ydEj6v olat 7 pdaTetv. I68. 56 -5Dialogue of Aristotle' (J. But the bipartition of the soul is found here in uneasy collocation with the theory of the four virtues. if such were to be given. 7). Aristotle. I-III. on the other hand. esp. De An. Bernays. 6-8 Ross (fr. J./ IV A~yort dpKOvdvrOC ta. P. 1863). But Bonitz's Index s. Aristotle's subsequent evolution shows a gradual change: in the Eudemian Ethics. bpovtyq)ra-ov YAoyovadOril elvat. I. 127-8. 69 H. Pp. that this is the real self. 11-12 414bi6-19. and that there is perhaps in the Epinomisa tendency in this direction. 70 Jaeger. while in the NicomacheanEthics. though specially detailed attention is bestowed on courage and temperance.64 The Protrepticusfollows the Academic tradition of distinguishing four cardinal virtues of wisdom. Moraux. and a distinction is further made within the soul of a rational element and an irrational. VIII). with no suggestion that they are purely derivative (while justice and the intellectual virtues now receive separate treatment). many other virtues are discussed also. b4-8.T.69 But Bernays' interpretation found a supporter in Jaeger. which were intended only for his pupils. criticised by Diels.). and found no difficulty in the idea that Aristotle should. I. pp. 11. Diels. iwv ackuatrog flAxtov (dpXtKndTepov ydp). VII. vol. pp. 6o DeAn. vigg ' o d TOV6 KEteL6E see pp.. d r-4 Tivxi-j) o O 421a22-3 speaks of man as oov T. p. A. esp. passages where that word is used of animals.e. above all. 35. E.N. teles' (Sitzungsberichte der preussischen Akademie der WissenProtr. however. 6 T% A6dyoveXoV Kat KatO -d given. 'dpta Ti d 354 (cf. which seems to belong to the late fifties. especially i o2a26-28. The treatment of the moral virtues has no longer an a priori basis but an empirical. 13.6o secondly. occurs several times in the treatises of Aristotle.59 Against this interpretation one can allege (for what they are worth) the passages of the Timaeus referred to above. 429a4-8. with others which are similar. 'On a Lost R.. the known prevalence (of which we shall have shortly to speak) of such a bipartition in the circles in which the Epinomis was composed. 324-5. Die Dialoge des Aristoteles (Berlin. 492).979C-D. 63-9. Ph. 45. 6E Atdo Y EX Kai LivotavLO ydp TOLO gZo KaK v 68 Ibid. 246 ff. courage. Cf. II168b2898Ia5. 91.62 The simile is found also in the Politics. 6 Walzer) (from Iambl. though they are still dealt with first. which. It remains to examine the passage on the bipartition of the soul in NicomacheanEthics. Susemihl and Protrepticus. The human soul. and as the soul is superior to the body and rules over that. it would have to be 'discourses external to Aristotle's school'.A. 980a27Ross. IX.7o Diels may perhaps have been right to the extent that one should not expect the phrases under discussion to bear the same meaning in every passage where they occur. have sometimes referred to earlier works of his own in which views were put forward with which he was no longer completely in accord. 59 Epin. E. its movements will in the ordinary course of things be disorderly. What is much more important is that a of bipartition of the soul is explicitly put forward in the Protrepticus Aristotle. with the references there O Kai OV~ULKOV E7TLVUrTtK6dV. Hicks (1894). see. esp.BIPARTITION OF THE SOUL IN THE EARLY ACADEMY 117 irrational (or should we say 'non-rational'?) and their movements will exhibit disorder throughout. they scarcely receive special prominence. 65) claims to be the first to attribute this chapter of lamblichus to the schaften (1883). 65 Aye'yat &7ept adZriT v oT19 E4CoeptpKOL (sc. cit. Ka XPraoTov 7vY 46ov. Met. I I77b31-11 78a3. the primacy belonging to wisdom (aoola).

1323a2I-7. n. De An. but we may take it that it was not himself alone that he had in mind.. d••W'EpLKOT does indeed state that i i 02a26-28 refers to the Protrepticus. fr. Met. J. but nevertheless puzzling. and this creates a presumption in its favour elsewhere also. VII. M. Protr. C) gHAw~rivo) T?7 dAoyila.74 that the allusion is to the Eudemus. 6' vewT)Tpmv "'IcdgflAtXo t5v " xA4Y? T oi 68 AOYLK47. Olympiodori Norvin (1913).78 Heinze reconstructed psychological and eschatological theories from Plutarch.118 D. in his L'tvolution de la Psychologie. pp. In this they are compared with lamblichus and Plutarch. A. cOg Itv 7TaAatLSvevOKpdaTy? ot 6?1xpt zTxv Kat: KaG HAorgapo 7'T8re0atTOrTo. was though it is certainly possible that that dialogue dealt with these topics. I2a37..II. 76 E. 404b27. 38 ad fin. presumably for personal reasons.Anonymus ap. Xenokrates (1892).79 More to the ed. 9. 11. In Platonis Phaedonem Commentaria. 13-20. and •g• contrasted with various other philosophers. pp. and that both were immortal. i 182a23 ff.7.acceduntFragmenta. De Facie in Orbe Lunae. do'g dI'vov o voY. Oxford. among them a Hepi 7TaO6&v. I. 'Posidonius and Solar Eschatology' (Class. a27. In part Aristotle would be criticising his own earlier self.75while the Eudemian Ethics and Politics do so under the term o o'dot. can leave no real doubt that it is to the Protrepticusthat Aristotle is alluding: the other interpretation may have been helped by the fact that there is no good reason for supposing. T 1o95b32-Io96a4 (cf. taken in conjunction with what Jaeger has said about the term ~WeL'OpLKO o'yot. The Plutarch is Plutarch of Athens. I33. Xenokrates. Hamilton. But comparison of I I02a26-28 with the passage from the Protrepticusreferred to above. p. 1. Xenocrates. Of De An. fr. Quart. note ad loc.. REES proper sense technical terms: they may only seem to be such when they have first been isolated and tabulated by scholars. Heinze and Burnet. I 13f.81 D. VII. to be contrasted with the rational. 74 Die Dialoge des Aristoteles. 13-35). 8o o0 1dv dn7Td 9i j 4vXijX pt Tij Ew/ 'xOU T4r AoyuKij coni. Heinze.J Ross. we learn from Diogenes Laertius' catalogue of his works that he wrote on topics of moral psychology. 63-4. 72 Met. and attributed them to him. s8 See above. fragment and gives no supporting reasons. Ka•Y 7ToOcb$1ueOa 7mdaag KaOev6ovxt ZT ' 7rapovaag Td 6ovk.E. pp. Jesus College. W. the language would also be compatible with their having held that there were more irrational elements in the soul than one. Plutarch's .-p. Cf. maintained that I Io2a26-28 referred to Xenocrates. and pp. REES. i. a Neoplatonic philosopher of the first half of the fifth century. Similar confirmation comes from Magna MloraliaI. CtbHpd6KAoK Kati lImpt IdOv ot 68 664av. p. and the doxographical tradition (as has been seen) makes it clear that the two lower divisions of the soul were regarded frequently as subdivisions of the irrational. 77 P. A. That the Protrepticus in Aristotle's mind is made still more certain by the fact that an earlier passage in Nicomachean Ethics I alludes to the Protrepticusunder the term r' ydyKUKAta. 0qOdpovat ydp xiv Hopqv'ptog" gIXpt p d 7roAAot xtCv Hept7TaZrnLKCV 0' O 68' bt8* vX Zij ' " Tgvv v SOelpovatydp txg eptKda ed 6Ah7v. but of what he said nothing is known directly. Xenocrates and Speusippus regarded the soul as immortal tdXpt i-s oylas-. I Io2a26-28.but he mentions no particular d'Aristote. pp. W.8o But unfortunately this does not settle the issue definitely in favour of attributing a bipartition of the soul to Xenocrates and Speusippus. 1218b32-34. 24-30). Phil. xxviii (I934). I 14ia6. Now it is perfectly possible that Xenocrates did hold the view in question. but there is little or no evidence on which to work. 191 I1). co" vt ri7Tov NovZinvto~o. as did Bernays. like E. Bernays) (divxov g$ewm d7raOavaxi~ovatv. 141-3. Heinze and Burnet were influenced by Diels. E. I. But cf. Burnet. I028b24. and an examination of the other cases confirms that the use of /''XPt is inclusive. xxvii (1932). II. is a passage in a Neoplatonic commentary on the Phaedo found in conjunction with part of that of Olympiodorus. and even if he did it is unlikely that the reference here is to him. 191.N.76 Nuyens.N. According to this. 4o8b32-409bI8.6~ 'LptIXL PZST •or Oew.L. 63-9. 432a24-26 all that needs to be said or that can be said definitely is that. Speusippus. Jones. 123-47. 39. but these attempts fall to the ground. Lang (De Speusippi Academici Scrijptis. and also (probably) by the fact that there are several passages where. I. 11. I24.e. But it is at least certain that in several passages Bernays' interpretation can be seen to be correct ifJaeger's arguments are kept in mind. Aristotle criticises views of Xenocrates without mentioning his name72 (the only work where he does so being the early Topics73). 75 E.77 As for Xenocrates. VI. M and N (frequently).. 'The Myth in De Facie (94oF-945D)' (Class. IV. 78 D. two books. The Ethics of Aristotle (I900). it confirms that the bipartition of the soul was familiar in the early Academy. pp. p. 55. ed. R. 73 Top. 152a7. Kat• KaOev6etvi6taTov " Lvv ovX aipezxv 6'. I The list includes a Hept'bvXiyg in I-I4. 7i R. that the meaning is that Xenocrates and Speusippus held that there were in the soul both a rational element and an irrational. 75 Heinze. P. III. and several works on ethics. however. 79 Heinze.while there seems to be no other thinker to whom he consistently alludes in this veiled and anonymous manner. Pol.

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