No: 12-7747

_______________________
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
____________________
NEIL J . GILLESPIE, ET AL, - PETITIONERS
vs.
THIRTEENTH J UDICIAL CIRCUIT, FLORIDA, ET AL, - RESPONDENTS
________________________
PETITIONER’S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF
IN PETITION NO. 12-7747 FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
________________________
SEPARATE VOLUME APPENDIX
Appendix 1 Hon. Dennis J acobs, The Secret Life of J udges, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 2855 (2007).
Appendix 2 J anuary 7, 2013 letter, Bar Counsel Annemarie Craft, re. Robert W. Bauer complaint
Appendix 3 J anuary 10, 2013 letter, Neil Gillespie to Bar Counsel Annemarie Craft, re Mr. Bauer
Appendix 4 Email to J ames Watson, Chief Branch, re. Grievance Committee as Bar’s “grand jury”
Appendix 5 J anuary 21, 2013 letter, Robert W. Bauer to Bar Counsel Annemarie Craft
Appendix 6 December 31, 2012 letter, Neil Gillespie to Bar Counsel Leonard Clark, re. records
Appendix 7 J anuary 18, 2013, Bar complaint Catherine Barbara Chapman, violation Rule 4-8.3
Appendix 8 Communication with Gwynne Alice Young, Board of Governors; current President
Appendix 9 Florida Bar Discipline System Chart
Appendix 10 Florida Bar ethics complaints substantially related to Ryan Christopher Rodems
Appendix 11 21 Related legal actions to Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, 05-CA-7205
Appendix 12 April 25, 2012, letter of Chief J udge Anne Conway, U.S.D.C., Middle District, Fla.
Appendix 13 August 30, 2010 letter to J ames Leanheart, Court Operations Supervisor
Fordham Law Review
Volume 75
|
Issue 6 Article 4
2007
Te Secret Life of Judges
Dennis Jacobs
Tis Article is brought to you for free and open access by Te Fordham Law School Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Fordham Law Review by an authorized administrator of Te Fordham Law School Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dennis Jacobs, Te Secret Life of Judges, 75 FordhamL. Rev. 2855 (2007).
Available at: htp://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/fr/vol75/iss6/4
APPENDIX 1
THE JOHN F. SONNETT MEMORIAL LECTURE
THE SECRET LIFE OF JUDGES
Dennis Jacobs*
Dean Treanor, distinguished faculty, students, alumni, colleagues, and
fellow friends of Fordham Law School, I am honored more than I can say to
be invited to deliver this distinguished lecture in the post-centennial year of
this great law school-now, this venerable law school. I am going to
express my gratitude by saying some things that matter to me, that are not
often said, and that distill observations that have (increasingly) bemused me
over the fourteen years that I have been a judge.
The title of my lecture gives little clue, I suspect, as to what I am going to
say; but it is not a tease. I am going to talk about "The Secret Life of
Judges," by which I mean a habit of mind that, among so many admirable
features of the judicial mentality, amounts to a serious and secret bias.
There is a social reluctance to talk about this kind of thing. It sounds
sanctimonious. Then again, a neat thing about giving a lecture is that it
disarms inhibitions about lecturing people. I get to be sanctimonious
without worrying about it.
This lecture is about bias, the judge's inbred preference for outcomes
controlled by proceduralism, the adversary system, hearings and experts,
representation by lawyers, ramified complexity of doctrines and rules,
multiple prongs, and all things that need and use lawyers, enrich them, and
empower them vis-A-vis other sources of power and wisdom.
Let me make this bias concrete by example. If you arrived in an
appellate court as counsel for a medical-malpractice plaintiff, and the three
individuals on the bench were wearing white coats instead of black robes
and had stethoscopes around their necks, I think your heart would sink. I
could tell you that the three doctors deciding your case have taken an oath
to be impartial as between patients and the medical profession and that they
are conscientious, decent individuals who take seriously the obligation to be
neutral. You would not be reassured: You would understand that there is
(at least) an internalized bias that the doctors would not acknowledge
because they would not notice it. A similar dread would come over the
* Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. These remarks were
made on November 20, 2006, at the 2006 John F. Sonnett Memorial Lecture held at
Fordham University School of Law. This transcript of Chief Judge Jacobs's remarks has
been lightly edited.
2855
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
defendant's lawyer if the three judges each had a limb suspended in
traction.
In our courts, judges are lawyers. They are all lawyers. Most of us have
never been, nor want to be, anything else. We are proud of being lawyers.
For many of us (like myself), lawyering is our only talent (assuming we
have any talent at all), and it is the source of as much esteem as we enjoy.
Our calling says a lot about how our minds work, what we respect, and
whom we trust.
I am not-I repeat, I am not-speaking about a bias based upon politics
or agenda, economic class, ethnicity, or para-ethnicity. When I refer to the
secret life of judges, I am speaking of an inner turn of mind that favors,
empowers, and enables our profession and our brothers and sisters at the
bar. It is secret, because it is unobserved and therefore unrestrained-by
the judges themselves or by the legal community that so closely surrounds
and nurtures us. It is an ambient bias.
The result is the incremental preference for the lawyered solution, the
fee-paid intervention or pro bono project, the lawyer-driven procedure, the
appellate dispensation-and the confidence and faith that these things
produce the best results. It is an insidious bias, because it is hard to make
out, in the vast maze of judicial work and outcomes, the statutes, doctrines,
and precedents that are woven together like an elaborate oriental rug in
which the underlying image of the dragon emerges only after you stare for a
while. I discern in this jumble a bias in favor of the bar and lawyers: what
they do; how they do it; and how they prosper in goods and influence. This
is the "figure in the carpet."'
This bias has several effects and ramifications. Judges all too frequently
frame legal doctrines without considering the litigants' transaction costs.
Considering how many of us conscientiously think hard about the economic
consequences of the outcomes we adopt, it seems strange that our cases
reflect an almost complete disregard and ignorance of the costs,
uncertainties, and delays inflicted by the judicial process itself. I think that
is because judges as lawyers cannot see as a problem the activity and
busyness from which our brothers and sisters at the bar draw their
livelihood, their career advancement, their distinction, and (often) their
sense of purpose in life. All of this depends on the ceaseless turning of the
legal machine.
Judges tend to assume that the adversary process assures a fair fight and a
just outcome. And judges work hard to be fair as between the adversarial
positions presented. But almost always, the adversaries on all sides are
lawyers; so adversariness is no great engine for assuring fairness when it
comes to the allocation of decision-making power between lawyers
(adversaries all) and the institutions and populations outside our profession.
The result is not that lawyers and the legal profession always win in court
1. See Henry James, The Figure in the Carpet, reprinted in The Figure in the Carpet
and Other Stories (Frank Kermode ed., Penguin Books 1986).
2856
[Vol. 75
THE SECRET LIFE OF JUDGES
contests (even though they are on both sides); but, there is no doubt that
they get to punch above their weight.
As I hope I have made clear, I am talking about altruistic litigation as
well as hourly fee-paid work and work on contingency. For all the good
that public interest lawyers do (and it is a great deal), some of it results in
the short circuit of democratic decision making and coerced policy choices.
Thus, the threat of litigation often compels school boards to suppress all
orthodoxies except those endorsed by the cadres of constitutional lawyers
and constitutional law professors. A school-board member exercising
fiduciary duties will bow to anticipated demands rather than bear the cost of
exercising or testing the board's own rights, if only because the cost of
litigating a flag, a reference to God, a locker search, a dirty word, or
something like that, can easily cost the school board the annual services of a
music teacher or a teacher of remedial reading.
To my observation, judges are blind to this. I think that is because public
interest litigation greatly enhances lawyer influence and-not at all
incidentally-increases the influence and power of judges. Judges love
these kinds of cases. Public interest cases afford a judge sway over public
policy, enhance the judicial role, make the judge more conspicuous, and
keep the law clerks happy.
Whether fee-paid or pro bono publico, when lawyers present big issues to
the courts, the judges receive the big issues with grateful hands; the bar
patrols against inroads on jurisdiction and independence and praises the
expansion of legal authority; and together we smugly congratulate ourselves
on expanding what we are pleased to call the rule of law.
Among the results are the displacement of legislative and executive
power, the subordination of other disciplines and professions, and the
reduction of whole enterprises and industries to damages. Examples come
ready to hand, though, speaking as I do as a judge, I am constrained from
citing specifics of controversies that may come before me. In generalities,
let me observe,
* Judicial power over the legislature and the executive is dilated by
constitutional litigation, much of which is lawyer-driven. Often,
the plaintiff's standing is made to rest on largely notional,
abstract harms (like annoyance or anxiety), and sometimes the
existence of the plaintiff is a recruitment detail that is easily
arranged.
* Through such constitutional litigation, judges get to direct the
work of educators, police, child protection officers, and many
other professionals who have training to discharge critical
responsibilities that require their expertise and experience.
" Class actions and consent decrees allow judges to operate prisons
and schools, to force appropriations, and to channel funds.
* In mass tort, judges hold in their hands the fate of vast
enterprises and can cause their extinction, with capitalization
2857
2007]
FORDHAMLA WREVIEW
forfeit to distribution between lawyers and plaintiffs and workers
let go.
Judges who issue expansive rulings in these spheres enjoy wide esteem
and reputation. There are judges whose fine reputations rest in part on the
ability to handle and administer innumerable claims through litigation and
settlement, pretty much without regard to whether the claims themselves are
based on fraud, corrupt experts, perjury, and other things that would be
deplored and persecuted by the legal profession if done within other
commercial
fields.
2
The broadest judicial bias I see, and the one I will describe most vaguely,
is the bias in favor of legal complexity. The volumes of the third edition of
the Federal Reporter spread themselves like kudzu vine over the shelves of
law libraries. I will offer no example, because I would be honor-bound to
cite myself as a chief offender, but it is a problem when the complexity of
the law causes laymen to view the legal process as either political or as
essentially random. This phenomenon is made visible in the papers of pro
se litigants, who rarely bother to read the trial court decisions that reject
their claims, and proceed to appeal on the theory (perhaps not altogether
misguided) that the sheer, ramified, sprawling patterns of law will (in the
hands of the right judge) yield a substantial payment or a sweet revenge.
It is an observed fact that the complexity of doctrines and opinions (not
to mention the discovery of new doctrines) evokes praise and respect from
within the profession. But our highly ramified litigation system imposes
vast costs on other fields of endeavor, on our democratic freedoms, and on
the unrepresented and the non-litigious.
The law reviews seem to have exhausted all topics dealing with bias in
the law and the ethics and infractions of other professions. I asked one of
my law clerks to check to see how many articles have dealt with the bias of
judges toward the dominance and control of the legal profession, and my
clerk came up dry.
3
That does not surprise me, because if judges have this
unconscious bias, so (I think) do law professors, for the same reasons-and
students, for the same (and other) reasons. Scholarly papers undertake to
expose and demonstrate the institutional and cultural biases of the law in
every direction but this one. It is not for me to say whether I am making the
point of this lecture effectively; but at least I can say that the competition is
thin.
2. This point has been made in the asbestos context. See, e.g., Lester Brickman,
Ethical Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 33 Hofstra L. Rev. 833, 911 (2005) ("[T]he
pervasiveness of the absence of application of ethical rules to asbestos litigation and to a
large extent, to asbestos bankruptcy proceedings as well, can only stand as an indictment of
the courts, disciplinary authorities and indeed, the legal profession."); Lester Brickman, On
the Theory Class's Theories of Asbestos Litigation: The Disconnect Between Scholarship
and Reality, 31 Pepp. L. Rev. 33, 37 (2003).
3. Subsequent to this Lecture, Professor Benjamin Barton has posted a paper that
discusses this bias. See Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of
the Legal Profession? (Apr. 3, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cftnabstractid=976478
2858
[Vol. 75
THE SECRET LIFE OF JUDGES
Why do we not notice this bias that I am talking about? If you are with
me so far, and you now agree (or started out believing) that judges have a
bias in favor of legalism and the legal profession, you may wonder as I
have, why it is not noticed. Actually, it is a very familiar phenomenon that
we do not recognize our bias as such. One tends to assume that bias has a
nasty face, and that decent people shrink away instinctively. But some
forms of bias are culturally embedded and are exercised with popular or
elite approval.
Bias is not a moral evil. Everyone feels tugs of loyalty; everyone should.
The bias I am talking about is more finely characterized as a tropism, an
instinctive turning to follow a source of vital energy. That is what the
sunflower does. But it is one thing to turn to follow the sun, and it is
another to follow the American Bar Association (ABA), the law schools,
law clerks, and the sound of applause.
Judges are susceptible to the opinions of others in our profession. But
the bias in favor of more law, more procedure, and more process is in great
measure bred in the bone of a lawyer. A judge is trained in the law;
virtually all of us have high self-approval and a high regard for our
profession, its processes, its culture and values, and its judgments-the
profession which (after all) did loft judges to the bench, where we
presumably wanted to go.
The tropism in favor of what lawyers do, and our tendency to expand the
spheres of activity in which lawyers act and control, comes clothed in
virtue. It is seen by us mainly as respect for due process, as the open door
of the courthouse, as a flowering of the rule of law-and so excesses are
viewed with indulgence as a Tocquevillian quirk of the American character.
But it is unbecoming for judges to dismiss this phenomenon. It matters that
our conduct as judges is reinforced by the support and praise that we get
from colleagues, lawyers, bar associations, and law schools. I think fair-
minded people should recognize the dangers that arise when judges, as the
final arbiters for allocating vast power, money, and influence, are all
members of the same (self-regulating) profession-and often of the same
professional groups and social environments. It is a matter of like calling
unto like.
Judges adhere to tight ethical constraints that keep us honest in that way
and to that degree; but (ironically) some of those same constraints tend to
reinforce our professional bias by insulating us from the influences of
politics and (non-law) commerce. Unless we make an effort, we can
become disconnected from the values and perceptions of the larger public.
The more we obey the constraints that isolate us within a circle of legal
culture, the more we are left to be judged, evaluated, and flattered (or not)
by the nourishing, attentive, knowledgeable circle of lawyers, law students,
and professors-which (to make matters worse) includes often the most
charming and scintillating people in the community.
The mystique of the judicial process, and its power and pretension in this
country, is pretty much all based on the idea of neutrality. If that idea is
2007]
2859
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
deflated, by puncture or slow leak, it is bad for judges and for the larger
community. Our work is subject to hostile critiques; and, if we do not
acknowledge and restrain our bias, others will notice, and forces will
marshal to rein us in.
These critiques are often classified as attacks on judicial independence,
and resisted as interference, or dismissed as ignorant. Thus, a great theme
of the legal profession is emphatic support for judicial independence. That
is a good thing, and I enjoy my independence as much as the next judge;
but judges should consider and appreciate that one effect (maybe a motive)
of the bar's avid support of judicial independence is to make judges
"independent" of many influences (good and bad) that compete with the
dominant influence over judges that is exerted by fellow lawyers, bar
associations, and law professors. This support of judicial power by the bar
may be a pillar of law, but it can also operate as group loyalty, the
protection of turf, or a reciprocal commitment to the ascendency of judges
and lawyers.
This bias I am talking about keeps us from seeing obvious things. For
example, bar associations nowadays are chiefly trade groups. It is naive to
think that the legal profession is the only disinterested player in our
economic life. And bar groups are highly political. The ABA has formally
adopted and announced hundreds of positions on virtually every issue in
political dispute: You can look them up. It lobbies for those views in
legislatures; it promotes them in amicus briefs filed in the courts. Yet
hundreds of federal judges are members; thousands in the state and local
courts. The canons of judicial conduct
4
make space for that anomaly.
The canons broadly warn that "[a] judge should refrain from political
activity."
5
But the same canon (7) has a proviso: "this should not prevent a
judge from engaging in the activities described in Canon 4,"
'
6 which says
that "[a] judge may serve as a member, officer, or director of an
organization.., devoted to the improvement of the law."
' 7
And the
commentary positively "encourage[s]" a judge to "contribute to the
improvement of the law" by various means, expressly including "through a
bar association."
8
Hospitably, the commentary allows a judge to "receive
as a gift travel expense reimbursement including the cost of transportation,
lodging, and meals, for the judge and a relative incident to the judge's
attendance at a bar-related function."
9
The legal profession, like all other fields, should be able to tap the
experience and wisdom of its leading members, judges among them. And
4. Code of Conduct for United States Judges (2000), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/ch I.html.
5. Id. Canon 7.
6. Id. Canon 7C.
7. Id. Canon 4C.
8. Id. Canon 4 cmt.
9. Id. Canon 5C(4) cmt.
2860
[Vol. 75
THE SECRET LIFE OF JUDGES
there are times and places for that; at one time, the organized bar may have
been such a forum. But now?
Judges who are members of the ABA are technically in an auxiliary for
judges in which they presumably participate in the development of legal
ideas. But allowing judges to join a trade association so that they can
collaborate with the membership in developing the law seems to me to
make matters much worse rather than better. In any event, the expedient of
a judges' auxiliary would not be tolerated in any other ethical context. If
there were a judges' auxiliary to the American Bankers Association or the
Brotherhood of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, I am sure they would love
to have us, and would happily work with us on shaping legal improvements.
What if there were a judges' auxiliary to the Tobacco Institute or the
American Insurance Association that paid my way to their conventions
(with my relative), where I could work with them shoulder to shoulder on
beneficial improvements in the law? Why assume that the improvements
favored by the ABA are less self-serving than the improvements favored by
other professional and trade groups?
When the ABA considers improvements in the law, it usually comes
down on the side of punitive damages, attorney's fees, the expansion of
causes of action, and new areas of regulation that require maintenance by
lawyers (such as speech at election time). I do not claim to be any better
than the next one, but I would be uncomfortable being a guest of the ABA
on well-oiled occasions when such improvements are discussed. All of this
is made worse by the fact that the ABA often litigates as amicus curiae (and
I will pass over without comment the ABA's evaluation of judicial
nominees).
Of course, judges should be involved in the development of the law-
case by case, chiefly. No doubt, judges also read some books, go to debates
and forums, and attend seminars. But the idea that judges will develop the
law under the sponsorship and aegis of a powerful interest group should
provoke disquiet-and would, but for the fact that (with some notable
exceptions) judges do not see this as an issue.
I sometimes think that the problem at bottom is really a lack of respect by
lawyers for other people. Judges live chiefly in a circle of lawyers. Our
colleagues are lawyers; happily, our friends are lawyers (and I am hoping to
keep some after this lecture); the only outside income a federal judge can
earn (aside from royalties) is from teaching in law schools (with the idea, I
suppose, that they furnish a nonpartisan environment); and the only political
and trade organizations we can join are bar associations.
But outside that circle there are people who are just as fully absorbed by
other pursuits that deserve consideration and respect. Judges need a
heightened respect for how nonlawyers solve problems, reach
compromises, broker risks, and govern themselves and their institutions.
There are lawyers on the one hand; and just about everybody else is the
competition in the framing of values and standards of behavior.
2007]
2861
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
In that competition, judicial bias has eroded the independence and
influence of doctors, medical administrators, insurance underwriters,
engineers, manufacturers, the military, the police, wardens and corrections
officers, the clergy, employers, and teachers and principals.
I think that judges ought to appreciate that they operate under an
internalized conflict of interest when they deal with all of these categories
of people, and others, and that (as someone observed) divided loyalties are
rarely divided down the middle. There is a great danger that, by the
subordination of other professions, callings, and centers of power (and of
their judgment and discretion), we are losing indispensable influences.
Another consequence of biased vision is the assumption that if something
is of great importance, it can be safely left to lawyers. That is fine when it
comes to statutory interpretation and such, but lawyers lack humility in
approaching great matters. As judges, we tend to assume that adversarial
hearings and expert testimony will render the judge omni-competent and fit
to decide the great questions, and that a legal mind is the highest and most
useful development of mental capacity.
The mind-set is that if something is of great importance-such as speech,
thought, and expression; race, identity, and sexuality; life and death-it
cannot be safely and properly left chiefly to anyone else. How else does
one account for the fixation on issues such as capital punishment and the
right to die, given that capital punishment cases are few (at least in these
parts), and that death is coming for us as a certainty, regardless of whether
we classify it as an entitlement? As we exercise power over all the basic,
ultimate, and transcendent things, I think that judges should consider how
we inevitably diminish the influence of doctors and juries, clergy and social
workers, legislatures, and the ordinary citizen.
The legal mind is indispensable to lawyering, and for other purposes it is
perfectly okay in its way. But it has its limitations. For example, every
problem-solving profession-except ours--quickly adopts as preferred the
solution that is simplest, cheapest, and most efficacious, or (as they say)
elegant. Also, our legal mind is invasive: It has institutional advantages for
subordinating other modalities of thought, and it presses those advantages.
And it is triumphalist about its expansions of influence. The uninitiated,
who lack the legal mind, are harnessed to our purposes as jurors or are put
to the margins. What nonlegal professionals think can be dismissed as
arbitrary and capricious, or (if needed to assist the legal process) can be
classified as expert opinion, to be weighed by us and by our standards.
The legal mind can hold its own with the competition in terms of rigor; I
have one, and I make no apology for it. But at least I have come to admit
that, depending on the question, the legal mind may be insufficient or may
be inferior to the moral imagination; the scientific method; the practical arts
of healing, politics, and entrepreneurship; the promptings of loyalty, faith,
and patriotism; and the experience and expertise found elsewhere and
among others.
2862
[Vol. 75
THE SECRET LIFE OF JUDGES
If you are not with me this far, you will have little interest in this last
question: What can be done to correct this bias and to place the legal
profession again on a footing of parity and fair competition with other
professionals and activities that have a right to influence in our
communities and our culture? In a nutshell, judges should lead the bar in
exercising the self-restraint and self-discipline that is incumbent on a
profession that has a virtual monopoly on legislative power and a monopoly
by patent on the power of the judiciary, and that is largely self-regulating.
Other professions, by ethics or honor, exert the imagination and self-
possession to avoid exercising all the power they have. Let me give an
incendiary example.
When a military force occupies a conquered province, the military has
vast power and may be tempted to run things in a way that best serves the
dominance and comfort of the military profession. A military solution can
be found for every challenge; such solutions fit the salient talents and skill-
sets of military commanders. No doubt it is of the greatest convenience to
the military and a great comfort to them to impose early curfews; to censor
letters; to close the outspoken newspapers and the satirical magazines; to
take over the radio, the police, and the prisons; to shoot looters; to draft
strikers; to favor military justice; and to commandeer all the better hotels. I
think there is a natural temptation for the military officers in charge to do all
these things because these are measures that subordinate a lot of conduct
that undermines military administration, and because no doubt lifelong
professional military officers might believe that these measures are
effective and fair and constitute the best design for the organization of the
society under their thumbs. Others in the military might applaud the tidy
administration that results.
We (in the profession of law) recoil from such measures in part because
it is not our profession; it does not fit our salient talents and skill-sets; it
puts to the margin what we do and the sphere in which we operate; and so
we lack faith in it. It seems to us, viscerally illegitimate.
But an enlightened military recognizes that imposition of all these
measures on an ongoing or permanent basis improperly subordinates other
spheres of life. The military types (I am not one) seem to control
themselves through a concept of honor. Maybe judges should consider
their example. I concede that a country could do worse than suffer rule by
lawyers: I would prefer a tyranny of law to life under a military regime.
But outside our professional sphere, the dominance of the legal profession
and the judiciary is resented more than we appreciate.
As a matter of self-awareness and conscience, judges should accept that
the legal mind is not the best policy instrument, and that lawyer-driven
processes and lawyer-centered solutions can be unwise, insufficient, and
unjust, even if our friends and colleagues in the legal profession lead us that
way. For the judiciary, this would mean a reduced role, but not a
diminished one if the judiciary is elevated by considerations of honor, self-
restraint, and respect for other influences.
2007] 2863
Notes & Observations
THE FLORIDA BAR
651 EAST JEFFERSON STREET
JOHN F. HARKNESS, JR. TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-2300 850/561-5600
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR WWW.FLORIDABAR.ORG
January 7, 2013
Mr. Neil J. G-illespie
8092 S.W. 115th Loop
Ocala, FL 34481
Re: Robert W. Bauer; The Florida Bar File No. 2013-00,540 (8B)
Dear Mr. Gillespie:
Enclosed is a copy of our letter to Mr. Bauer which requires a response to your complaint.
Once you receive Mr. Bauer's response, you have 10 days to file a rebuttal if you so desire. If
you decide to file a rebuttal, you must send a copy to Mr. Bauer. Rebuttals should not exceed
25 pages and may refer to any additional documents or exhibits that are available on request. Please
address any and all correspondence to me. Please note that any correspondence must be sent
through the U.S. mail; we cannot accept faxed material.
Please be advised that as an arm of the Supreme Court of Florida, The Florida Bar can
investigate allegations of misconduct against attorneys, and where appropriate, request that the
attorney be disciplined. The Florida Bar cannot render legal advice nor can The Florida Bar
represent individuals or intervene on their behalf in any civil or criminal matter. Further, please
notify this office, in writing, of any pending civil, criminal, or administrative litigation which
pertains to this grievance. Please note that this is a continuing obligation should new litigation
develop during the pendency of this matter.
Please review the enclosed Notice on mailing instructions for information on submitting your
rebuttal.
Sincerely,
Annemarie Craft, Bar Counsel
Attorney Consumer Assistance Program
ACAP Hotline 866-352-0707
Enclosures (Notice of Grievance Procedures, Copy of Letter to Mr. Bauer; Notice - Mailing
Instructions)
cc: Mr. Robert W. Bauer
APPENDIX 2
NOTICE OF GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES
1. The enclosed letter is an informal inquiry. Your response is required under the
provisions of The Rules Regulating The Florida Bar 4 8.4(g), Rules of Professional Conduct.
Failure to provide a written response to this complaint is in itself a violation of Rule 4 8.4(g). If
you do not respond, the matter will be forwarded to the grievance committee for disposition in
accordance with Rule 3-7.3 of the Rules of Discipline.
2. Many complaints considered first by staff counsel are not forwarded to a grievance
committee, as they do not involve violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct justifying
disciplinary action.
3. "Pursuant to Rule 3-7.I(a), Rules of Discipline, any response by you in these proceedings
shall become part of the public record of this matter and thereby become accessible to the public
upon the closure of the case by Bar counselor upon a finding of no probable cause, probable
cause, minor misconduct, or recommendation of diversion. Disclosure during the pendency of
an investigation may be made only as to status if a specific inquiry concerning this case is made
and if this matter is generally known to be in the public domain."
4. The grievance committee is the Bar's "grand jury." Its function and procedllre are set
forth in Rule 3-7.4. Proceedings before the grievance committee, for the most part, are non­
adversarial in nature. However, you should carefully review Chapter 3 of the Rules Regulating
The Florida Bar.
5. If the grievance committee finds probable cause, formal adversarial proceedings, which
ordinarily lead to disposition by the Supreme Court of Florida, will be commenced under
3-7.6, unless a plea is submitted under Rule 3-7.
THE FLORIDA BAR
651 EAST JEFFERSON STREET
JOHN F. HARKNESS, JR. TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-2300 850/561-5600
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR WWW.FLORIDABAR.ORG
January 7, 2013
Mr. Robert W. Bauer
2815 NW 13th St Ste 200E
Gainesville, FL 32609-2861
Re: Complaint by Neil J. Gillespie against Robert W. Bauer
The Florida Bar File No. 2013-00,540 (8B)
Dear Mr. Bauer:
Enclosed is a copy of an inquiry/complaint and any supporting docunlents submitted by the
above referenced complainant(s). Your response to this complaint is required under the
provisions of Rule 4-8.4(g), Rules of Professional Conduct of the Rules Regulating The Florida
Bar, and is due in our office by January 22, 2013. Responses should not exceed 25 pages and
may refer to any additional documents or exhibits that are available on request. Failure to
provide a written response to this complaint is in itself a violation of Rule 4-8.4(g). Please note
that any correspondence must be sent through the u.s. mail; we cannot accept faxed material.
You are further required to furnish the complainant with a complete copy of your written
response, including any documents submitted therewith.
Please note that pursuant to Rule 3-7.1 (b), Rules of Discipline, any reports, correspondence,
papers, recordings and/or transcripts of hearings received from either you or the complainant(s)
shall become a part of the public record in this matter and thus accessible to the public upon a
disposition of this file. It should be noted that The Florida Bar is required to acknowledge the
status of proceedings during the pendency of an investigation, if a specific inquiry is made and
the matter is deemed to be in the public domain. Pursuant to Rule 3-7.1(f), Rules of Discipline,
you are further required to complete and return the enclosed Certificate of Disclosure form.
Further, please notify this office, in writing, of any pending civil, criminal, or administrative
litigation which pertains to this grievance. Please note that this is a continuing obligation should
new litigation develop during the pendency of this matter.
Mr. Robert W. Bauer
January 7, 2013
Page Two
Finally, the filing of this complaint does not preclude communication between the attorney and
the complainant(s). Please review the enclosed Notice for information on submitting your
response.
Sincerely,
Annemarie Craft, Bar Counsel
Attorney Consumer Assistance Program
ACAP Hotline 866-352-0707
Enclosures (Certificate of Disclosure, Notice of Grievance Procedures, Copy of Complaint,
Notice - Mailing Instructions)
cc: Mr. Neil J. Gillespie
VIA U.P.S. Tracking No. lZ'64589FP296184312
January 10, 2013
Annemarie Craft, Bar Counsel
Attorney Consumer Assistance Program
The Florida Bar - ACAP
651 East Jefferson Street
Tallahassee, FL 32399-2300
RE: Robert W. Bauer, The Florida Bar File No. 2013-00,540 (8B)
Dear Ms. Craft:
I received but am confused as to your letter dated January 7, 2013 relative to the above captioned
complaint. Bar Counsel Mr. Wilhelm dismissed/returned my complaint against Mr. Bauer dated
October 31,2012, designated RFA No. 13-7675, by letter to me dated November 9,2012. The
complaint was then submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States for pendent jurisdiction
December 10, 2012 in Petition No. 12-7747 for writ of certiorari. Kindly explain what is going
on, since your letter makes no reference to this chain of events, or Petition No. 12-7747.
My priority now is Petition No. 12-7747 which is taking all my time. I likely am not able to file a
rebuttal in this matter until either the conclusion of Petition No. 12-7747, or a break in the
workload. While ACAP central may be adequate to intake this complaint, bias at the local level
is another matter, and recognized by the Special Commission on Lawyer Regulation chaired by
Henry Cox ("Cox Report). The Cox Report recommended ACAP style screening of all written
inquiries and complaints so that all questions concerning the conduct of members of the bar are
addressed in a similar fashion. The Commission also recommended a central intake system
utilizing ACAP resources in Tallahassee.
The reason for central ACAP intake is clear: The Commission knew that some complaints, like
my earlier complaint against Mr. Bauer, TFB No. 2011-00,073 (8B), would not be "addressed in
a similar fashion" locally where the attorney was favored. The Letter Report issued March 18,
2011 by Mr. Watson in 2011-00,073 (8B) did not copy with Rule 3-7.4(k) because it did not
explain why nlY complaint did not warrant further proceedings.
Pursuant to Rule 3-3.4(b), I believe a special grievance committee is needed, located outside the
Eight Judicial Circuit which includes Alachua County where Mr. Bauer practices, and outside
the jurisdiction of Mr. Watson, and Carl Schwait, the designated reviewer, to avoid bias. Sending
this matter to another state in the U.S. Eleventh Circuit may even be required to avoid bias now.
cc: Robert W. Bauer
APPENDIX 3
Case 5:10-cv-00503-WTH-TBS Document 58-1 Filed 11/14/11 Page 24 of 50 PageID 1547
APPENDIX 4
Case 5:10-cv-00503-WTH-TBS Document 58-1 Filed 11/14/11 Page 25 of 50 PageID 1548
Case 5:10-cv-00503-WTH-TBS Document 58-1 Filed 11/14/11 Page 26 of 50 PageID 1549
Case 5:10-cv-00503-WTH-TBS Document 58-1 Filed 11/14/11 Page 27 of 50 PageID 1550
Case 5:10-cv-00503-WTH-TBS Document 58-1 Filed 11/14/11 Page 28 of 50 PageID 1551
Case 5:10-cv-00503-WTH-TBS Document 58-1 Filed 11/14/11 Page 29 of 50 PageID 1552
The Law Offices of
Robert W . Bauer, P.A.
2815 NW 13th Street, Suite 200E, Gainesville, FL 32609
www.bauerlegal.com
Robert W Bauer, Esq. Phone: (352)375.5960
Maria Perez Youngblood, Esq.
Timothy C. Youngblood, Esq. Fax: (352)337.2518
January 21, 2013
Annemarie Craft
Florida Bar Association
615 East Jefferson Street
Tallahassee, FL 32399-2300
Re: Complaint by Neil J. Gillespie
Florida Bar File No. 2013-00,540 (8B)
Dear Ms. Craft:
This letter is to memorialize our telephone conversation of January 15, 2013. In that
conversation, I requested a copy of Mr. Wilhelm's October 9, 2012 letter to Mr. Gillespie.
Additionally, I requested an additional 20 days to respond to the Complaint.
Thank you for your assistance regarding this matter.
clNeal Gillespie
8092 SW 115th Loop
Ocala, FL 34481
APPENDIX 5
December 31, 2012
VIA U.P.S. Tracking No. 1Z64589FP292488484
Leonard E. Clark, Bar Counsel
The Florida Bar, Tampa Branch Office
4200 George J . Bean Parkway, Suite 2580
Tampa, FL 33607
Dear Mr. Clark:
This is a records request made under chapter 119 Florida Statutes, Rule 2.420, Florida Rules of
J udicial Administration, and any other applicable law, for records in the following Florida Bar
complaints:
1. Ryan Christopher Rodems, TFB File No. 2013-10,271 (13E). Kindly provide records
subsequent to your letter dated October 26, 2012 (copy enclosed), including email.
2. Eugene P Castagliuolo, The Florida Bar File No. 2013-10,162 (6D). Kindly provide
records subsequent to your letter dated October 26, 2012 (copy enclosed), including email.
Thank you in advance for your prompt consideration.
Sincerely
Neil J . Gillespie
8092 SW 115th Loop
Ocala, Florida 34481
Telephone: (352) 854-7807
Email: neilgillespie@mfi.net
Enclosures
APPENDIX 6
THE FLORIDA BAR
TAMPA BRANCH OFFICE
JOHN F. HARKNESS, JR. 4200 GEORGE J. BEAN PARKWAY, SUITE 2580 (813) 875-9821
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR www.FLABAR.ORG
TAMPA, FLORIDA 33607-1496
October 26,2012
Mr. Neil J. Gillespie
8092 S.W. 115Th Loop
Ocala, FL 34481
Re: Complaint of Neil J. Gillespie against Ryan Christopher Rodems
The Florida Bar File No. 2013-10,271 (6D)
Dear Mr. Gillespie:
Pursuant to your public records request dated September 15,2012, and October 25,2012, please
find attached a letter from Mr. Rodems to the Florida Bar dated September 24, 2012. In
reviewing the file, it appears that all other correspondence from Mr. Rodems has been provided
to you. Specifically, Mr. Rodems' response to the fifteen (15) day letter dated September 17,
2012. If you require additional information, please contact me at the above referenced number.
Sincerely yours,
Leonard Evans Clark
Bar Counsel
THE FLORIDA BAR
TAMPA BRANCH OFFICE
JOHN F. HARKNESS, JR. 4200 GEORGE J. BEAN PARKWAY, SlIlTE 2580 (813) 875-9821
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR www.FLABAR.ORG
TAMPA, FLORIDA 33607-1496
October 26,2012
Mr. Neil J. Gillespie
8092 S.W. 115Th Loop
Ocala, FL 34481
Re: Con1plaint by Neil J. Gillespie against Eugene P Castagliuolo
The Florida Bar File No. 2013-10,162 (6D)
Dear Mr. Gillespie:
Pursuant to your public records request dated September 15, 2012, I have enclosed additional
correspondence received from Mr. Castagliuolo. Please find attached to this letter an email from
Mr. Castagliuolo to the Florida Bar dated October 22,2012.
In reviewing the tile, it appears that all other correspondence from Mr. Castagliuolo has been
provided to you. Specifically, Mr. Castagliuolo' s response to the fifteen (15) day letter dated
August 30, 2012, and his follow up response to the fifteen (15) day letter dated September 19,
2012. If you require additional information, please contact me at the above referenced number.
Sincerely yours,
Leonard Evans Clark
Bar Counsel
THE FLORIDA BAR
INQUIRy/COMPLAINT FORM
PART ONE (See Palfe 1, PART ONE - Required Information.):
Your Name: Neil J. Gillespie
Organization: _n/_a _
Address: 8092 SW 115th Loop
City: Ocala State: FL
Zip Code: 34481 Phone: 352-854-7807
Email: neilgillespie@mfi.net
ACAP Reference No._n_o_ne _
Attorney's Name: Catherine Barbara Chapman
Address: 1983 Centre Pointe Boulevard, Suite 200
City: Tallahassee State: ~
Zip Code: 32308 Telephone: (850) 224-7091
PART TWO (See Palfe 1, PART TWO - Facts/AIle2ations.): The specific thin2 or thin2s I am complainin2 about are:
See accompanying letter and exhibits.
PART THREE (See Page 1, PART THREE - Witnesses.): The witnesses in support of my allegations are: [see attached
sheet].
PART FOUR (See Page 1, PART FOUR-Signature.): Under penalties ofperjury, I declare that theforegoingfacts are
true, correct and complete.
APPENDIX 7
VIA U.P.S. Tracking No. 1Z64589FP290450115 J anuary 18, 2013
Attorney Consumer Assistance Program (ACAP)
The Florida Bar
651 East J efferson Street
Tallahassee, FL 32399·2300
Complaint against attorney Catherine Barbara Chapman, Florida Bar ID: 0148814
1983 Centre Pointe Boulevard, Suite 200, Tallahassee, FL 32308, (850) 224-7091
This complaint is for Ms. Chapman’s violation(s) of Rule 4-8.3, Reporting Professional
Misconduct, in connection with her representation of my former lawyer Robert W. Bauer in
Gillespie v. The Thirteenth J udicial Circuit, Florida, et al., 5:10-cv-503-(DAB)-TBS-WTH, my
federal ADA and civil rights lawsuit in U.S. District Court, Middle District of Florida.
Mr. Bauer was referred to me by the Florida Bar Lawyer Referral Service for a case in
Hillsborough County, Florida, Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, 05-CA-7205. During
and after that representation Mr. Bauer violated numerous Rules of Professional Conduct, see
Robert W. Bauer, The Florida Bar File No. 2013-00,540 (8B), which complaint does not seek
return of $19,212 in fees paid to him
1
, but his disbarment for a pattern of incompetence and lack
of diligence by Mr. Bauer in my case, and toward his other elderly and disabled clients who
contacted me to complain about him. Mr. Bauer is also involved in racketeering to undermine
civil litigation and Bar complaints as discussed below.
At the center of this matter, now before the Supreme Court of the United States, Petition No. 12-
7747 for writ of certiorari, is Ryan Christopher Rodems, who conspired with my last attorney,
Eugene P. Castagliuolo, in a pattern of racketeering activity to undermine Bar complaints,
Florida case 05-CA-7205, federal litigation in 5:10-cv-503, and obstruct justice, see
Eugene P Castagliuolo, File No. 2013-10,162 (6D), sent to Tampa October 25, 2012
Ryan Christopher Rodems, File No. 2013-10,271 (13E), sent to Tampa October 26, 2012
Mr. Castagliuolo even provided copies of his filings and responses to the Florida Bar in the
above captioned complaint to Mr. Bauer and Mr. Rodems, as indicated by the abbreviation “cc:”
preceding their names, suggesting this racketeering activity is currently ongoing.
Complaint Against Catherine Barbara Chapman, Fla. Bar ID No. 0148814
Ms. Chapman is part of this pattern of racketeering activity to undermine my federal litigation in
5:10-cv-503, and obstruct justice, for failing to report in violation of Rule 4-8.3(a), misconduct
of Mr. Rodems, who on J une 21, 2011 unlawfully obtained a Settlement Agreement and General
Mutual Release for the State of Florida, Mr. Bauer, and The Law Offices of Robert W. Bauer, to
assign my civil rights and disability claims to Rodems and his partners. Mr. Rodems then entered

1
Mr. Bauer charged me $31,863 in legal fees. Much of the money was wasted or not productive, including costs to
re-litigate matters previously decided res judicata, and $5,600 in travel time. Also, Bauer never filed the amended
complaint he promised. $19,212 was paid to Bauer from my Social Security disability benefits or borrowed.
$12,650 remains unpaid and subject to an improper attorney charging lien.
The Florida Bar ACAP J anuary 18, 2013
Complaint - Catherine Barbara Chapman Page - 2
the agreement in case no. 5:10-cv-503 with a Notice Of Assignment And Motion For Dismissal
Of Action With Prejudice (Doc. 32) to dismiss my case with prejudice. This representation of the
State of Florida in a federal court action by Mr. Rodems was major misconduct because only the
Attorney General may represent the State of Florida in a federal court action.
Ms. Chapman violated RULE 4-8.3 - REPORTING PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT
Rule 4-8.3(a) Reporting Misconduct of Other Lawyers. A lawyer who knows that another
lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a
substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in
other respects shall inform the appropriate professional authority.
Rule 4-8.3(b) Reporting Misconduct of J udges. A lawyer who knows that a judge has
committed a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct that raises a substantial
question as to the judge's fitness for office shall inform the appropriate authority.
Rule 4-8.3 Comment
Self-regulation of the legal profession requires that members of the profession initiate
disciplinary investigation when they know of a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Lawyers have a similar obligation with respect to judicial misconduct. An apparently isolated
violation may indicate a pattern of misconduct that only a disciplinary investigation can uncover.
Reporting a violation is especially important where the victim is unlikely to discover the offense.
Mr. Rodems Not Authorized To Represent State of Florida in Federal Litigation
Mr. Rodems is a lawyer in private practice who engaged in a type of “unauthorized” practice of
law when he represented the State of Florida J une 21, 2011 in my federal lawsuit. Previously I
complained in general terms that Mr. Rodems’ representation of the State of Florida was
improper. Recently I determined Mr. Rodems violated certain provisions of the Constitution and
laws of Florida. Only the Attorney General of Florida may represent the State of Florida in a
federal court action, Fla Const Art IV § 4, and FS § 16.01. Mr. Rodems’ conduct is prejudicial to
justice in violation of Bar Rule 4-8.4(c) and (d). Mr. Rodems also intentionally mislead several
federal judicial officers in the performance of their duty in violation of Bar Rule 4-8.4(c) and (d).
Rule 4-8.4(c), conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation.
Rule 4-8.4(d), conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.
Unfortunately Ms. Chapman failed to report Mr. Rodems’ misconduct as requited by Rule 4-
8.3(a) Reporting Misconduct of Other Lawyers. Ms. Chapman also failed to report the
misconduct of federal judicial officers under Rule 4-8.3(b) Reporting Misconduct of J udges,
which judge and magistrates had a duty to disclose on the record Rodems’ misconduct. Also, I
asked Ms. Chapman about her duty under Rule 4-8.4 and she stated in an email to me August 13,
2012 at 7:03 AM “I do not believe [Mr. Rodems] has committed any misconduct.” (Exhibit 3).
The Florida Bar ACAP J anuary 18, 2013
Complaint - Catherine Barbara Chapman Page - 3
Ms. Chapman’s Misconduct Related To Doc. 32 Filed J une 21, 2011 in 5:10-cv-503
Ms. Chapman was served by electric transmission on J une 21, 2011 in Case 5:10-cv-00503-
WTH-DAB, Document 32, Filed 06/21/11 by Mr. Rodems, Notice Of Assignment And Motion
For Dismissal Of Action With Prejudice, (Exhibit 1), according to the Certificate of Service:
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been served this
21st day of J une, 2011 by electronic transmission to Catherine Barbara Chapman, Esquire,
catherine@guildaylaw.com, counsel for Defendants The Law Office of Robert W. Bauer, P.A.,
and Robert W. Bauer. No other defendant has been served.
/s/ Ryan Christopher Rodems
RYAN CHRISTOPHER RODEMS, ESQUIRE
Mr. Rodems Notice Of Assignment And Motion For Dismissal Of Action With Prejudice stated:
On J une 21, 2011, Plaintiff Neil J . Gillespie assigned all claims in this action to Ryan
Christopher Rodems, Chris A. Barker, and William J . Cook. See Exhibit "1".
Assignees hereby move the Court for an Order dismissing this action with prejudice,
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2).
Ms. Chapman knew Exhibit “1” was a Settlement Agreement and General Mutual Release, and
assignment of my claims in federal litigation involving the State of Florida, Mr. Bauer, and The
Law Offices of Robert W. Bauer, to Mr. Rodems and his law partners.
Ms. Chapman knew the Settlement Agreement and General Mutual Release, and assignment of
my claims involved Mr. Bauer, his law firm, and the following State of Florida Defendants:
Thirteenth J udicial Circuit, Florida
Claudia Rickert Isom, Hillsborough Florida J udge (Fla. Bar ID 200042)
J ames M. Barton, II, Hillsborough Florida J udge (Fla. Bar ID 189239)
Martha J . Cook, Hillsborough Florida J udge (Fla. Bar ID 242640)
David A. Rowland, Court Counsel, Thirteenth J udicial Circuit (Fla. Bar ID 861987)
Gonzalo B. Casares, ADA Coordinator, Thirteenth J udicial Circuit, Florida
Ms. Chapman knew only the Florida Attorney General can represent the State of Florida in
federal litigation, and that Mr. Rodems was not the Florida Attorney General.
Ms. Chapman knew Mr. Rodems had no authority to represent the State of Florida and negotiate
a settlement agreement and assignment of my federal claims to himself and his law partners
while I was detained and in custody of one of the Thirteenth J udicial Circuit Florida in
depravation of the very rights I sought to enforce in federal court, and enter the settlement
agreement in federal litigation on behalf of Florida to dismiss 5:10-cv-503 with prejudice.
The Florida Bar ACAP J anuary 18, 2013
Complaint - Catherine Barbara Chapman Page - 4
Ms. Chapman knew State ex rel. Shevin v. Weinstein holds that a circuit court judge does not
have authority to appoint counsel to represent the State of Florida:
Only the Attorney General of Florida may represent the State of Florida in a federal court
action. A circuit court judge was without the authority to appoint an acting state attorney
to represent the state in an action pending before a federal court. State ex rel. Shevin v.
Weinstein, 353 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dis1. 1978).
Ms. Chapman knew Section 16.01 Florida Statutes states:
16.01 Residence, office, and duties of Attorney General. The Attorney General:
(4) Shall appear in and attend to, in behalf of the state, all suits or prosecutions, civil or
criminal or in equity, in which the state may be a party, or in anywise interested, in the
Supreme Court and district courts of appeal of this state.
Ms. Chapman knew The Florida Constitution: Article IV, SECTION 4. Cabinet, states:
(b) The attorney general shall be the chief state legal officer. There is created in the office
of the attorney general the position of statewide prosecutor. The statewide prosecutor
shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the state attorneys to prosecute violations of
criminal laws occurring or having occurred, in two or more judicial circuits as part of a
related transaction, or when any such offense is affecting or has affected two or more
judicial circuits as provided by general law. The statewide prosecutor shall be appointed
by the attorney general from not less than three persons nominated by the judicial
nominating commission for the supreme court, or as otherwise provided by general law.
Ms. Chapman knew Mr. Rodems mislead in violation of Rule 11, F.R.C.P., the following three
federal judicial officers in the performance of their duty in case 5:10-cv-503-(DAB)-TBS-WTH.
United States District J udge Wm. Terrell Hodges, Senior Status, Article III federal judge,
Presided in case 5:10-cv-503 September 28, 2010 - present. (Fla. Bar ID 36398)
United States Magistrate J udge David A. Baker (Fla. Bar ID 477893)
Presided in case 5:10-cv-503 Sepember-28-2010 to J uly-29-2011
United States Magistrate Thomas B. Smith (Fla. Bar ID 256269)
Presided in case 5:10-cv-503 J uly-29-2011 to February-27-2012
Ms. Chapman knew the above federal judicial officers had a duty to stop Mr. Rodems’ fraud on
the court, a fraud introduced in Case 5:10-cv-00503-WTH-DAB, when Rodems filed J une 21,
2011 Doc. 32, Notice Of Assignment And Motion For Dismissal Of Action With Prejudice,
(Exhibit 1), but that the above federal judicial officers failed to do so, other than U.S. District
J udge Wm. Terrell Hodges did not grant Mr. Rodems’ motion.
The Florida Bar ACAP J anuary 18, 2013
Complaint - Catherine Barbara Chapman Page - 5
Ms. Chapman knew she had a duty under Rule 4-8.3(a) to report Mr. Rodems’ misconduct
described above, but she did not report Rodems’ misconduct, and choose instead to engage in
racketeering activity and obstruct justice to benefit her client, Robert W. Bauer and his law firm.
Ms. Chapman knew she had a duty under Rule 4-8.3(b) to report misconduct of the above federal
judicial officers, but she did not report the misconduct, and choose instead to engage in
racketeering activity and obstruct justice to benefit her client, Robert W. Bauer and his law firm.
Ms. Chapman’s Misconduct Related To Doc. 40 Filed J uly 14, 2011 in 5:10-cv-00503
Ms. Chapman was served by electric transmission on J uly 14, 2011 in Case 5:10-cv-00503-
WTH-DAB Document 40 Filed 07/14/11 by Mr. Rodems, Response to “Plaintiff Neil J .
Gillespie’s Motion To Strike Or Set Aside Mr. Rodems’ Notice of Assignment Of Claims And
Motion For Dismissal Of Action With Prejudice” [DKT 33]. The Certificate of Service states:
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on J uly 14, 2011, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was
filed using the Court’s CM/ECF filing system, which will send an electronic notice of
filing to: Catherine Barbara Chapman, Esquire, catherine@guildaylaw.com, counsel for
Defendants The Law Office of Robert W. Bauer, P.A., and Robert W. Bauer and anyone
else registered to receive such filings. No other defendant has been served.
/s/ Ryan Christopher Rodems
RYAN CHRISTOPHER RODEMS, ESQUIRE
Mr. Rodems Response at Doc. 40 stated in part: (Pages 1 and 2 appear at Exhibit 2)
Gillespie has no standing to make such a motion, and this Court does not have subject
matter jurisdiction to hear a dispute about a contract – the settlement agreement Gillespie
asks this Court to set aside -- that is not the subject of this action.
Mr. Rodems violated his duty under Rule 11 on J uly 14, 2011 when he submitted (Doc. 40).
Unfortunately it is Mr. Rodems who lacked standing because he is not the Attorney General of
Florida and therefore he cannot represent the State of Florida in federal litigation. Moreover,
U.S. Magistrate J udge Thomas Smith indicated in his Order (Doc. 51) that the proper method of
challenging evidence is by filing a notice of objection. Morgan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 700
F.Supp. 1574, 1576 (N.D. Ga. 1988). Therefore I filed a Notice of Objection (Doc. 63).
The Hon. Wm. Terrell Hodges entered Order of Dismissal (Doc. 64) and did not grant Rodems
Notice Of Assignment of Claims And Motion For Dismissal With Prejudice (Doc. 32).
Ms. Chapman knew only the Florida Attorney General can represent the State of Florida in
federal litigation, and that Mr. Rodems was not the Florida Attorney General, as set forth in
more detail in the above section “Ms. Chapman’s Misconduct Related To Doc. 32 Filed J une 21,
2011 in 5:10-cv-00503”
The Florida Bar ACAP J anuary 18, 2013
Complaint - Catherine Barbara Chapman Page - 6
Ms. Chapman knew she had a duty under Rule 4-8.3(a) to report Mr. Rodems’ misconduct and
Rule 11 violation(s), but she did not report Rodems misconduct, and choose instead to engage in
racketeering activity and obstruct justice to benefit her client, Robert W. Bauer and his law firm.
Ms. Chapman knew she had a duty under Rule 4-8.3(b) to report misconduct of the above federal
judicial officers, but she did not report the misconduct, and choose instead to engage in
racketeering activity and obstruct justice to benefit her client, Robert W. Bauer and his law firm.
Ms. Chapman’s Open Defiance of Rule 4-8.3(a) Reporting Misconduct of Other Lawyers
In an email to Ms. Chapman August 13, 2012 at 6:19 AM I asked her about Rule 4-8.3 Reporting
Professional Misconduct. (Exhibit 3).
Thank you Ms. Chapman. Are there currently any outstanding documents? Also when
can I expect a reply to my November 17, 2011 question to you:
“On another matter, I don’t see how Mr. Rodems can lawfully or ethically represent your
client, and my former counsel, Robert W. Bauer, and the Law Office of Robert W. Bauer,
in this matter, through the so-called Settlement Agreement and General Mutual Release
of J une 21, 2011. What is your view?”
Members of the bar have a duty to report professional misconduct. Have you made a
complaint against Mr. Rodems for his misconduct in this case?
Florida Bar Rule 4-8.3 Reporting Professional Misconduct
(a) Reporting Misconduct of Other Lawyers. A lawyer who knows that another
lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises
a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a
lawyer in other respects shall inform the appropriate professional authority.
You know of the misconduct of Mr. Rodems representing his firm and law partner
against me, a former client, contrary to ethics rules and McPartland v. ISI Inv. Services,
Inc., 890 F.Supp. 1029, M.D.Fla., 1995. That is only one example of Mr. Rodems'
misconduct.
Neil Gillespie
Ms. Chapman responded by email August 13, 2012 at 6:58 AM: (Exhibit 3)
The document served last week.
I do not believe Mr. Rosemary has committed any misconduct.
I replied by email August 13, 2012 at 7:03 AM: (Exhibit 3)
The Florida Bar ACAP J anuary 18, 2013
Complaint - Catherine Barbara Chapman Page - 7
Which document served last week? There were several.
Who is Mr. Rosemary?
Ms. Chapman responded by email August 13, 2012 at 7:19 AM: (Exhibit 3)
The last document.
My apologies. I meant Mr. Rodems.
As set forth above, Ms. Chapman knew only the Florida Attorney General can represent the
State of Florida in federal litigation, and that Mr. Rodems was not the Florida Attorney General.
Ms. Chapman knew she had a duty under Rule 4-8.3(a) to report Mr. Rodems’ misconduct, but
she did not report Rodems’ misconduct, and choose instead to engage in racketeering activity
and obstruct justice to benefit her client, Robert W. Bauer and his law firm.
Ms. Chapman knew she had a duty under Rule 4-8.3(b) to report misconduct of the above federal
judicial officers, but she did not report the misconduct, and choose instead to engage in
racketeering activity and obstruct justice to benefit her client, Robert W. Bauer and his law firm.
The foregoing examples are not Ms. Chapman only violations of her duty under Rule 4-8.3(a) to
report Mr. Rodems’ misconduct. Mr. Rodems has committed multiple violations of the Rules of
Professional Conduct while representing his law firm and partner in civil litigation against me, a
former client on the same or “substantially related” matter, contrary to Bar Rules 4-1.7, 4-1.9, 4-
1.10 and the holding of McPartland v. ISI Inv. Services, Inc., 890 F.Supp. 1029, M.D.Fla., 1995.
The Florida Bar Discipline Program Is Intended To Protect the Public
A pamphlet Hiring the Right Person to Help Me With My Legal Problems, published by The
Florida Bar Public Information and Bar Services Department as a service for consumers states:
"The Florida Bar disciplinary program has become the gold-standard for protecting the public."
Background of the Complaint Against Ms. Chapman
Ms. Chapman represented and defended Mr. Bauer in the following lawsuits:
Gillespie v. Thirteenth J udicial Circuit, FL, et al., 5:10-cv-503; C.A.11, 12-11213-C
Estate/Gillespie v. Thirteenth J udicial Circuit, FL, 5:11-cv-539; C.A.11, 12-11028-B
I am a law-abiding consumer of legal and court services affecting interstate commerce. The
Florida Bar Lawyer Referral Service referred to me Robert W. Bauer, a lawyer who was not
The Florida Bar ACAP J anuary 18, 2013
Complaint - Catherine Barbara Chapman Page - 8
competent and not diligent in his representation of me. I complained to the Florida Bar in 2010
about Mr. Bauer, see File No. 2011-00,073 (8B). The Bar issued a Letter Report Pursuant to
Rule 3-7.4(k) of No Probable Cause Finding that failed to comply with Rule 3-7.4(k) because it
did not explain why the complaint did not warrant further proceedings. Also, the Letter Report
failed to include any documentation explaining why the complaint did not warrant further
proceedings. The Bar opened a second complaint J anuary 7, 2013, File No. 2013-00,540 (8B).
Fraud and misconduct of Tampa attorney Ryan Christopher Rodems, and his partners Chris A.
Barker and William J . Cook, of the law firm Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, form the basis of this
matter, and has led to 21 related legal actions (Exhibit 4) and 14 Bar complaints. (Exhibit 5).
Prior to filing any lawsuits I complained to the Florida Bar beginning in 2003. (Exhibit 5). The
early complaints were considered by the Tampa Branch Office prior to central ACAP intake.
Susan Bloemendaal was then, and is today, Chief Branch Discipline Counsel for the Tampa
Branch Office of The Florida Bar. Over the period 2004-2010 Ms. Bloemendaal improperly
obstructed my complaints, and aided and abetted Mr. Rodems and his partners in taking 90% of
a contingent fee case instead of 45% allowed under Florida Bar Rule 4-1.5(f)(4)(B)(i), for an
unjust enrichment of $21,431. Ms. Bloemendaal’s own statements in the matter show she acted
as a partner in fraud with Mr. Rodems and his law firm, not an independent discipline counsel.
Mr. Rodems, his partners, and Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA represented me as substitute counsel
in the AMSCOT case, 99-2795-CIV-T-26C, Clement, Blomefield, Gillespie v. AMSCOT, U.S.
District Court, M.D.Fla., Tampa. The case settled on appeal before a decision was entered, U.S.
Eleventh Circuit, No. 01-14761-AA, Clement, Blomefield, Gillespie v. AMSCOT Corp.
Mr. Rodems and his partners concocted a closing statement fraud (Rule 4-1.5(f)(5)), to take
$50,000 as a “claim” for “court-awarded fees and costs” and thereby steal $7,143 from my
settlement. This was decided by Hillsborough J udge Richard Nielsen by his order J anuary 13,
2006 and established res judicata a case of fraud and breach of contract. This ruling was the basis
of Robert W. Bauer litigating the case. This was also the basis of Seldon Childers’ litigation
report of September 16, 2009, who determined $7,143 was stolen, not $6,224 first alleged.
Duty and Authority to Discipline Attorneys: The Rules Regulating The Florida Bar
Rule 1–3.1. Composition
The membership of The Florida Bar shall be composed of all persons who are admitted
by the Supreme Court of Florida to the practice of law in this state and who maintain
their membership pursuant to these rules.
Right to practice law is not a constitutionally protected privilege or immunity. State ex rel.
Florida Bar v. Sperry, 140 So.2d 587, 133 U.S.P.Q. 157 (1962), certiorari granted 83 S.Ct.
148, 371 U.S. 875, 9 L.Ed.2d 113, 135 U.S.P.Q. 503, vacated 83 S.Ct. 1322, 373 U.S. 379, 10
L.Ed.2d 428, 137 U.S.P.Q. 578, on remand 159 So.2d 229.
The Florida Bar ACAP J anuary 18, 2013
Complaint - Catherine Barbara Chapman Page - 9
Rule 1–8.1. Responsibility of board of governors
Among its other duties, the board of governors is charged with the responsibility of
enforcing the Rules of Discipline and the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Rule 1–10.1. Compliance
All members of The Florida Bar shall comply with the terms and the intent of
the Rules of Professional Conduct as established and amended by this court.
Attorney is an officer of the court and an essential component of the administration of
justice, and, as such, his conduct is subject to judicial supervision and scrutiny. State ex rel.
Florida Bar v. Evans, 94 So.2d 730 (1957).
Florida Supreme Court has power to authorize investigations of professional conduct for
purpose of determining whether formal charges shall be made against an attorney. Swanson v.
The Florida Bar, 1967, 381 F.2d 730, certiorari denied 88 S.Ct. 468, 389 U.S. 972, 19 L.Ed.2d 463.
Rule 3–1.1. Privilege to practice
A license to practice law confers no vested right to the holder thereof but is a conditional
privilege that is revocable for cause.
A lawyer should view his work not as mere ‘‘money getting’’ but as service of highest order;
not as a mere occupation but as a ministry. State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Dawson, 111 So.2d
427 (1959).
Rule 3–3.1. Supreme Court of Florida; disciplinary agencies
The exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Florida over the discipline of persons
admitted to the practice of law shall be administered in the following manner subject to
the supervision and review of the court. The following entities are hereby designated as
agencies of the Supreme Court of Florida for this purpose and with the following
responsibilities, jurisdiction, and powers. The board of governors, grievance committees,
and referees shall have such jurisdiction and powers as are necessary to conduct the
proper and speedy disposition of any investigation or cause, including the power to
compel the attendance of witnesses, to take or cause to be taken the deposition of
witnesses, and to order the production of books, records, or other documentary evidence.
Each member of such agencies has power to administer oaths and affirmations to
witnesses in any matter within the jurisdiction of the agency.
Where state bar and its staff counsel are designated as agencies of Supreme Court for purpose of
administering its jurisdiction to regulate admission of persons to practice of law and discipline of
persons admitted, state bar is an arm and part of judiciary, one of three co-equal branches of state
government; thus, state bar and its agents acting within the scope of their office are protected
from liability for publication of defamatory matter by absolute privilege. Mueller v. The Florida
Bar, App. 4 Dist., 390 So.2d 449 (1980).
The Supreme Court alone has power to discipline attorneys by grant of exclusive jurisdiction.
The Florida Bar ACAP January 18,2013
Complaint - Catherine Barbara Chapman Page - 10
Pantori v. Stephenson, App. 5 Dist., 384 So.2d 1357 (1980).
Power to render ultimate judgment in attorney's disciplinary proceeding rests in the Supreme
Court. The Florida Bar v. Abramson, 199 So.2d 457 (1967).
Rule 3-4.1. Notice and Knowledge of Rules; Jurisdiction Over Attorneys of Other States and
Foreign Countries
Every member of The Florida Bar and every attorney of another state or foreign country
who provides or offers to provide any legal services in this state is within the jurisdiction
and subject to the disciplinary authority of this court and its agencies under this rule and
is charged with notice and held to know the provisions of this rule and the standards of
ethical and professional conduct prescribed by this court. Jurisdiction over an attorney of
another state who is not a member of The Florida Bar shall be limited to conduct as an
attorney in relation to the business for which the attorney was permitted to practice in this
state and the privilege in the future to practice law in the state of Florida.
Rule 3-4.2. Rules of Professional Conduct
Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the rules governing The
Florida Bar is a cause for discipline.
Attorney may not hide behind client's instructions in order to perpetrate fraud against third
party. The Florida Bar v. Feige, 596 So.2d 433 (1992).
Attorney found to have violated disciplinary rules by assisting client in conduct known to be
fraudulent, failing to reveal fraud to affected person, accepting employment where his
professional judgment will be affected by his own personal interest, and accepting employment
when he is witness in pending litigation, will be suspended from practice of law for two years.
The Florida Bar v. Feige, 596 'So.2d 433 (1992).
Conclusion: Reiteration of Rule 4-8.3 Comment
Self-regulation of the legal profession requires that members of the profession initiate
disciplinary investigation when they know of a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Lawyers have a similar obligation with respect to judicial misconduct. An apparently isolated
violation may indicate a pattern of misconduct that only a disciplinary investigation can uncover.
Reporting a violation is especially important where the victim is unlikely to discover the offense.
Under penalties of perjury, I declare that the foregoing facts are true, correct and complete.
Sincerely,
Neil J. Gillespie
8092 SW 115th Loop
Ocala, Florida 34481
Enclosures: Signed Co
Case 5:10-cv-00503-WTH-DAB Document 32 Filed 06/21/11 Page 1 of 4 PageID 600
1
Case 5:10-cv-00503-WTH-DAB Document 32 Filed 06/21/11 Page 2 of 4 PageID 601
Case 5:10-cv-00503-WTH-DAB Document 32 Filed 06/21/11 Page 3 of 4 PageID 602
Case 5:10-cv-00503-WTH-DAB Document 32 Filed 06/21/11 Page 4 of 4 PageID 603
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
OCALA DIVISION

NEIL J. GILLESPIE,

Plaintiff,
Case No.:5:10-cv-00503-WTH-DAB

vs.

THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,
FLORIDA, et al.

Defendants.
____________________________________/

RESPONSE TO “PLAINTIFF NEIL J. GILLESPIE’S MOTION TO STRIKE OR SET
ASIDE MR. RODEMS’ NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT OF CLAIMS AND MOTION
FOR DISMISSAL OF ACTION WITH PREJUDICE” [DKT 33]

On June 21, 2011, Plaintiff Neil J. Gillespie assigned all claims in this action to Ryan
Christopher Rodems, Chris A. Barker, and William J. Cook. Dkt 32, Exhibit 1. Thereafter, the
Assignees moved the Court for an Order dismissing this action with prejudice, pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 41(a)(2). Dkt 32.
Gillespie now moves this Court to set aside the settlement agreement reached wherein he
assigned the claims in this action to Assignees. Gillespie has no standing to make such a motion,
and this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear a dispute about a contract -- the
settlement agreement Gillespie asks this Court to set aside -- that is not the subject of this action.
1


1
Notwithstanding the lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Gillespie’s recitation of the
events surrounding the settlement are belied by the record. The settlement agreement was signed
by Gillespie while sitting next to his attorney. In fact, in deciding whether to sign it, Gillespie
stated to his attorney, “I’ll defer to your judgment on this.” Gillespie’s attorney stated, “I’ve
already given you judgment in private, and I’ll give it to you on the record. I think this is -- this is
an agreement you want to enter into, and I think it is in your best interest.” (Exhibit 1). Gillespie
now claims that he signed under duress, lacked informed consent, and asserts other reasons it
should be “set aside,” none of which are supported by the record of the settlement conference.
Case 5:10-cv-00503-WTH-DAB Document 40 Filed 07/14/11 Page 1 of 2 PageID 1350
2
2

The Court should deny Gillespie’s motion and grant the Assignees motion to dismiss the action,
Dkt 32.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14
th
day of July, 2011.

/s/ Ryan Christopher Rodems
RYAN CHRISTOPHER RODEMS, ESQUIRE
Florida Bar No. 947652
Attorney for Assignees
BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A.
501 East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 790
Tampa, Florida 33602
Telephone: (813) 489-1001
Fax: (813) 489-1008
E-mail: rodems@barkerrodemsandcook.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on July 14, 2011, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was
filed using the Court’s CM/ECF filing system, which will send an electronic notice of filing to:
Catherine Barbara Chapman, Esquire, catherine@guildaylaw.com, counsel for Defendants The
Law Office of Robert W. Bauer, P.A., and Robert W. Bauer and anyone else registered to receive
such filings. No other defendant has been served.
/s/ Ryan Christopher Rodems
RYAN CHRISTOPHER RODEMS, ESQUIRE

Case 5:10-cv-00503-WTH-DAB Document 40 Filed 07/14/11 Page 2 of 2 PageID 1351

Neil Gillespie
From: "Catherine Chapman" <catherine@guildaylaw.com>
To: "Neil Gillespie" <neilgillespie@mfi.net>
Sent: Monday, August 13, 2012 7:19 AM
Subject: RE: please see attached, thank you
Page 1of 2
1/17/2013
The last document.

My apologies. I meant Mr. Rodems.

From: Neil Gillespie [mailto:neilgillespie@mfi.net]
Sent: Monday, August 13, 2012 8:04 AM
To: Catherine Chapman
Subject: Re: please see attached, thank you

Which document served last week? There were several.
Who is Mr. Rosemary?
----- Original Message -----
From: Catherine Chapman
To: Neil Gillespie
Sent: Monday, August 13, 2012 7:58 AM
Subject: Re: please see attached, thank you

The document served last week.

I do not believe Mr. Rosemary has committed any misconduct.

Sent from my iPhone

On Aug 13, 2012, at 7:19 AM, "Neil Gillespie" <neilgillespie@mfi.net>wrote:
Thank you Ms. Chapman. Are there currently any outstanding documents? Also
when can I expect a reply to my November 17, 2011 question to you:
"On another matter, I don’t see how Mr. Rodems can lawfully or ethically
represent your client, and my former counsel, Robert W. Bauer, and the Law
Office of Robert W. Bauer, in this matter, through the so-called Settlement
Agreement and General Mutual Release of J une 21, 2011. What is your view?"
Members of the bar have a duty to report professional misconduct. Have you made
a complaint against Mr. Rodems for his misconduct in this case?
Florida Bar Rule 4-8.3 Reporting Professional Misconduct
(a) Reporting Misconduct of Other Lawyers. A lawyer who knows
that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other
3
respects shall inform the appropriate professional authority.
You know of the misconduct of Mr. Rodems representing his firm and law partner against
me, a former client, contrary to ethics rules and McPartland v. ISI Inv. Services, Inc., 890
F.Supp. 1029, M.D.Fla., 1995. That is only one example of Mr. Rodems' misconduct.
Neil Gillespie
----- Original Message -----
From: Catherine Chapman
To: Neil Gillespie
Sent: Sunday, August 12, 2012 11:26 PM
Subject: RE: please see attached, thank you

Mr. Gillespie-
In light of my schedule, I am not able to forward to Mr. Rodems all documents
you may file. Please make alternative arrangements.
Thank you,
Catherine B. Chapman
Attorney
Guilday, Tucker, Schwartz & Simpson, P.A.
1983 Centre Pointe Blvd, S-200
Tallahassee, FL 32308
Direct Line: 850.701.4341
Phone: 850.224.7091 | Facsimile: 850.222.2593
catherine@guildaylaw.com
NOTI CE: The contents of this e-mail are legally privileged and confidential, and intended only for
the use of the individual(s) and/or entity(ies) named above. I f the reader of this e-mail is not the
intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, disclosure, copying or
distribution of the contents of this e-mail message is strictly prohibited. Review by any individual
other than the intended recipient shall not constitute waiver of the attorney-client privilege, the
attorney work-product doctrine, any evidentiary privilege, or any proprietary rights in the
information. I f you have received this e-mail in error, please immediately notify the sender by
telephone (850/224-7091). Thank you.
3 Think about the environment before printing out this message
From: Neil Gillespie [mailto:neilgillespie@mfi.net]
Sent: Monday, August 06, 2012 6:08 PM
To: Catherine Chapman
Subject: please see attached, thank you
Page 2of 2
1/17/2013
21 Related legal actions to Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, 05-CA-007205
RCR - denotes cases where Ryan Christopher Rodems represented his firm and partner against former client Gillespie
1.RCR Hillsborough Co. 05-CA-7205, Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., Aug-11-2005 to
J un-21-2011, (Mr. Bauer appeared for Gillespie April 2, 2007 through October 1, 2009).
2.RCR Hillsborough Co. 05-CA-7205, Vexatious libel counterclaim, BRC v. Gillespie, J an-19-2006
to Sep-28-2010, (Mr. Bauer appeared for Gillespie April 2, 2007 - October 1, 2009)
3.RCR 2dDCA, 2D06-3803: Gillespie v. BRC, discovery related appeal (Gillespie pro se) (closed)
4.RCR 2dDCA, 2D07-4530: BRC v. Gillespie, voluntary dismissal (Mr. Bauer for Gillespie) (closed)
5.RCR 2dDCA, 2D08-2224: Gillespie v. BRC, § 57.105 sanctions (Mr. Bauer for Gillespie) (closed)
6. RCR 2dDCA, 2D10-5197: Gillespie v. BRC, appeal final summary judgment (Gillespie pro se) (closed)
7. RCR 2dDCA, 2D10-5529: Gillespie v. BRC, prohibition, remove J udge Cook (Gillespie pro se) (closed)
8. RCR 2dDCA, 2D11-2127: Gillespie v. BRC, prohibition/venue, J udge Arnold (Gillespie pro se) (closed)
9. RCR Fla.Sup.Ct. SC11-858: Gillespie v. BRC, habeas corpus, prohibition (Gillespie pro se) (closed)
10.RCR Fla.Sup.Ct. SC11-1622: Gillespie v. BRC, mandamus, other relief (Gillespie pro se) (closed)
11.RCR Federal Ct. 5:10-cv-503: Gillespie v. Thirteenth J udicial Circuit, Fla., Civil Rights/ADA (closed, appeal)
12. Federal Ct. 5:11-cv-539: Estate/Gillespie v. Thirteenth J ud. Cir., FL., Hobbs Act, Title 15, §1983, ADA, etc.
13. C.A.11, 12-11028-B: Estate/Gillespie v. Thirteenth J ud. Cir., FL., Hobbs Act, Title 15, §1983, ADA, etc.
14.RCR C.A.11, 12-11213-C: Gillespie v. Thirteenth J udicial Circuit, Fla., Civil Rights, ADA, (closed, appeal)
15.RCR SCOTUS Rule 22 Application, J ustice Thomas May 31, 2011, not docketed. (Gillespie pro se)
Emergency Petition for Stay or Injunction, re: Supreme Court of Florida SC11-858
16.RCR SCOTUS Rule 22 Application, J ustice Thomas J une 11, 2011, not docketed. (Gillespie pro se)
Extraordinary Writ of Prohibition, re: Supreme Court of Florida SC11-858
17.RCR SCOTUS Petition for Writ of Certiorari August 20, 2012 review Fla.Sup.Ct. case no. SC11-1622,
Returned August 23, 2012 because the petition was determined out-of-time.
18.RCRSCOTUS Rule 13.5 Application to J ustice Thomas, docketed August 13, 2012, No. 12A215
19.RCR SCOTUS Petition for Writ of Certiorari No. 12-7747, December 10, 2012, C.A.11 12-11028, 12-11213
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. Original Case 99-2795-CIV-T-26C, Clement, Blomefield, Gillespie v. AMSCOT, December 9, 1999
21. Original Appeal 01-14761-AA, Clement, Blomefield, Gillespie v. AMSCOT Corp., August 20, 2001
4
Florida Bar ethics complaints substantially related to Ryan Christopher Rodems*
*Partners engaged in the practice of law are each responsible for the fraud or negligence of another
partner when the later acts within the scope of the ordinary business of an attorney. Smyrna
Developers, Inc. v. Bornstein, 177 So.2d 16 (2dDCA, 1965).
1. William J . Cook RFA No. 03-18867 J une 12, 2003 (ACAP Central)
2. William J . Cook TFB No. 2004-11,734(13C) J une 7, 2004 (Tampa Branch)
3. William J . Cook TFB No. 2006-11,194 (13D) March 6, 2006 (Tampa Branch)
4. William J . Cook TFB No. 2007-10,004 (13D) J une 27, 2006 (Tampa Branch)
5. Ryan Christopher Rodems TFB No. 2007-11,162(13D) February 20, 2007 (Tampa Branch)
6. Chris A. Barker TFB No. 2007-11,792(13A) J une 18, 2007 (Tampa Branch)
7. Ryan Christopher Rodems File not opened/no number J une 20, 2007 (Tampa Branch)
8. Troy Matthew Lovell File not opened/no number J une 20, 2007 (Tampa Branch)
9. Robert W. Bauer TFB No. 2011-00,073 (8B) J uly 15, 2010 (ACAP Central)
10. Seldon J . Childers RFA No. 11-4718 August 25, 2010 (ACAP Central)
11. Eugene P. Castagliuolo TFB No. 2013-10,162 (6D) August 17, 2012 (ACAP Central)
12. Ryan Christopher Rodems TFB No. 2013-10,271 (13E) Sep-13, 2012 (ACAP Central)
13. Robert W. Bauer RFA No. 13-7675 October 31, 2012 (ACAP Central); denied Nov-09-12;
submitted in SCOTUS Petition no. 12-7747. Reconsidered J an-07-13, No. 2013-00,540 (8B).
14. Ryan Christopher Rodems, complaint submitted J anuary 4, 2013. Current status unknown.
McPartland v. ISI Inv. Services, Inc., 890 F.Supp. 1029, M.D.Fla., 1995 has been a mandatory
authority on disqualification in Tampa since entered J une 30, 1995 by J udge Kovachevich:
[1] Under Florida law, attorneys must avoid appearance of professional impropriety, and any doubt
is to be resolved in favor of disqualification. [2] To prevail on motion to disqualify counsel, movant
must show existence of prior attorney-client relationship and that the matters in pending suit are
substantially related to the previous matter or cause of action. [3] In determining whether attorney-
client relationship existed, for purposes of disqualification of counsel from later representing
opposing party, a long-term or complicated relationship is not required, and court must focus on
subjective expectation of client that he is seeking legal advice. [5] For matters in prior representation
to be “substantially related” to present representation for purposes of motion to disqualify counsel,
matters need only be akin to present action in way reasonable persons would understand as
important to the issues involved. [7] Substantial relationship between instant case in which law firm
represented defendant and issues in which firm had previously represented plaintiffs created
irrebuttable presumption under Florida law that confidential information was disclosed to firm,
requiring disqualification. [8] Disqualification of even one attorney from law firm on basis of prior
representation of opposing party necessitates disqualification of firm as a whole, under Florida law.
5
Neil J. Gillespie
8092 SW IIS
th
Loop
Ocala, Florida 34481
VIA CERTIFIED MAIL, RETURN RECEIPT
Article no.: 7006 3450 0001 22340041
October 24, 2007
Ms. Gwynne Alice Young, Board Member
Thirteenth Circuit Board of Directors, The Florida Bar
Carlton Fields, P.A.
P.O. Box 3239, 4221 W. Boy Scout Boulevard
Tampa, FL 33607
Dear Ms. Young:
Enclosed you will find a copy of my October 22,2007, letter to Mr. Francisco R.
Angones, President of The Florida Bar, requesting intervention on my behalf in the libel
counterclaim of Neil J. Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. and William J. Cook,
Case No. 05-CA-7205, Circuit Civil, Hillsborough County Florida. The supporting
exhibits to my letter to Mr. Angones are enclosed too.
I am a private citizen and bar complainant, and I have contacted you because my
bar inquiries concern lawyer misconduct in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, and you are a
member of The Florida Bar's Board of Directors for the Thirteenth Circuit.
Recently I provided you with copies of the following:
1. October 12,2007, letter Kenneth Lawrence Marvin, Director of Lawyer
Regulation, on the subject of his apparent failure to process bar complaints
pursuant to Rule 3-7.4(b). (with enclosures)
2. October 13, 2007 letter to Francisco R. Angones, President, The Florida Bar, on
the subject of Mr. Marvin's apparent failure to process bar complaints pursuant to
Rule 3-7.4(b). (letter only)
3. October 15,2007, letter to Mr. John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, The
Florida Bar, on the subject of Mr. Marvin's apparent failure to process bar
complaints pursuant to Rule 3-7.4(b). (letter only)
4. October 16,2007, letter to Mr. Donald M. Spangler, Director, Attorney Consumer
Assistance Program (ACAP), on the subject of whether ACAP promotes felony
extortion. (letter only).
APPENDIX 8
Sincerely,
Ms. Gwynne Alice Young Page - 2
Thirteenth Circuit Board of Directors, The Florida Bar October 24,2007
5. October 22,2007, letter to Governor Charlie Crist, Office of the Governor, on the
subject of Mr. Marvin's apparent failure to process bar complaints pursuant to
Rule 3-7.4(b), and the overall inadequacy of The Florida Bar. (letter only).
6. October 24,2007, letter to Mr. Donald M. Spangler, Director, Attorney Consumer
Assistance Program (ACAP), in response to his letter of October 19,2007. (w/enclosure)
A review of the enclosed documents, and the above six letters, should indicate to
you serious problems with how the Bar considered the following matters I submitted for
review: Sworn complaints that were investigated, complaints that the Bar failed to
process, and other matters, including the query whether ACAP promotes felony extortion.
Ms. Young, I would like your explanation for the overall inadequacy of The
Florida Bar's response to the attorney misconduct and related matters I submitted. I also
ask that you support my request for the Bar to intervene in the libel counterclaim, or in
the alternative, to submit an amicus curiae brief on my behalf.
Thank you.
. ~ '
e { ~ P i e ~ ~
Enclosures:
Exhibit A: Complaint For Fraud And Breach Of Contract
Exhibit B: Order On Defendants' Motion To Dismiss And Strike
Exhibit C: Answer, Affirmative Defenses And Counterclaim
Exhibit D: Plaintiffs Motion For Punitive Damages Pursuant To Section 768.72 Florida Statutes
Exhibit E: List Of Exhibits (1 through 50) to the above motion for punitive damages
Exhibit F: Transcript of telephone conversation, October 11,2006
Exhibit G: Florida Supreme Court case Tobkin v. Jarboe, 710 So.2d 975 (1998)
Exhibit H: Letter from attorney David S. Snyder to Mr. Rodems, September 7, 2006
Exhibit I: Letter from Mr. Rodems to Mr. Snyder, September 14, 2006
Exhibit J: Letter from Mr. Rodems to Mr. Snyder, October 5, 2006
Exhibit K: Letter from Mr. Rodems to Neil Gillespie, February 7, 2007
Exhibit L: Letter from the Florida Department of Financial Services, July 20,2007
HALT's amicus curiae brief in the Illinois case of Cripe v. Leiter
HALT's amicus curiae brief in the matter of Mark M. Hager
Letter to Mr. Donald M. Spangler, Director, ACAP, October 16,2007
Neil J. Gillespie
8092 SW IIS
th
Loop
Ocala, Florida 34481
VIA CERTIFIED MAIL, RETURN RECEIPT
Article no.: 7005 116000033335 1321
November 5, 2007
Ms. Gwynne Alice Young, Board of Governors
Thirteenth Circuit Board of Governors, The Florida Bar
Carlton Fields, P.A.
P.O. Box 3239
4221 W. Boy Scout Boulevard
Tampa, Florida 33607
Dear Ms. Young:
In previous correspondence to you, I inadvertently addressed you as a member of
the "Board of Directors" of The Florida Bar. I stand corrected. You are a member of the
"Board of Governors" of The Florida Bar for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit. I apologize
for any inconvenience or confusion this may have caused you.
Notwithstanding, as requested in my letter of October 24,2007, to you, I would
like your explanation of The Florida Bar's failure to process three attorney misconduct
complaints that I submitted in June, 2007, to Mr. Kenneth Lawrence Marvin. The
complaints involve lawyer misconduct in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit. Likewise, I
want a response from you as to whether the Bar's Attorney Consumer Assistance
Program (ACAP), promotes felony extortion by requiring the aggrieved client to attempt
to resolve their matter by writing to the subject attorney before filing a complaint.
Also, I ask that you support my request for the Bar to intervene in the retaliatory
libel counterclaim brought by my former lawyers about a previous bar complaint, or in
the alternative, to submit an amicus curiae brief on my behalf.
Thank you.
';&f,.1
IIJ. Gi
- y ; ~ ~
esple 7
07:02 NEIL GILLESPIE
PAGEl
Fax
From: Neil J. Gillespie
8092 SW 11 Sth Loop
Ocala, FL 34481
(352) 854-7801
email: neilgillespic@mfi.net
To: Gwynne Alice Young, Board of Governors, TFB
Fax: (813) 229-4133
Date: August 21, 2008
Pages: one (1), this page only
Re: no response, return materials
Earlier today 1spoke with you. This is a follow-up to my letters ofOctober 24, 2007 and
November 5, 2007 to you as a member ofthe Board ofGovemors. The Florida Bar failed to
consider a sworn bar complaint and other unprofessional conduct by the lawyers at Barker,
Rodems & Cook, PAw You also failed to respond to allegations by Barker, Rodems & Cook
that The F1t)rida Bar promotes felony exu)rtion through its ACAP program, which requires the
aggrieved client t() attempt to resolve their matter by writing to the attorney before
filing a complaint The Florida Rar also failed to act when Barker, Rodems & Cook
C()mmenced a retaliatory libel counterclaim against me over a bar complaint
In corre.'l'Onding with I have come to expect less than an ordinary human being. You
have chosen not to respond and that is typical ()fyour protession. Nonetheless, I request the
return ofthe material I provided you, in particular the exhibits to Plaintiffs Motion for
Punitive Damages Pursuant to Section 768.72 florida Statutes. It is a 169 page btJLUlded and
tabbed volume. Twill pay the return shipping charges. Thank you.
Neil J. Gillespie
Nc.n"H: ·Ibis fax and u..., acwmponying inbmalion is privilcgr;.d and IXV'lfidcntillilBld i.. inlmdcd (mly rc.. wa: by the above addressee.
Me not the intended yuu CIte hereby nOOtied dur any usc. di!olaninstK1I1 or copying of Ibis fiIx and d1C acampanying cornmunic3ions
iii strictJy prohibiLcd. lfYOIJ have recotvcd till, 0()f11JI11D1icali<1Il pJeage immediately DOUtY the sender bytelephooe. collect ifnoxssuy.
and rdum the ,Jrigirud [0 me at the abow via IJ.S. mail. 'I'hank you Cor your cooperation.
08/21/2008 THU 20: 46 [TX/RX NO 9193] 14l 001
ATlANTA
MIAMI
ORLANDO
ST. PETERSBURG
TAlLAHASSEE
TAMPA
WEST PAlM BEACH CARLTON FIELDS
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 4221 w. Boy Scoul Boulevard
Suite 1000
Tampa, Florida 33607-5780
P.O. Box 3239
Tampa, Florida 33601-3239
Gwynne A. Young
813.229.4333 direct 813.223.7000
gyoung@carltanfield,.com
813.229.4133 lax
www.carltanlield,.cam
August 26, 2008
Neil J. Gillespie
8092 SW 115
th
Loop
Ocala, FL 34481
Dear Mr. Gillespie:
Pursuant to your request, please find all documents in my file which you previously
provided. I had forwarded your correspondence to Bar Counsel for response.
S i n c e ~ .•
/V/f/r--e ~ .
Gwynne A. Young
GAY/chc
Encs.
13850964.1
eil J. Girtesp1e
Nell J. Gillespie
8092 SW 115
th
Loop
Ocala, Florida 34481
Telephone: (352) 854-7807
VIA FIRST CLASS MAIL
September 15, 2008
Ms. Gwynne Alice Young, Board of Governors
Thirteenth Circuit Board of Governors, The Florida Bar
Carlton Fields, P.A.
P.O. Box 3239
4221 W. Boy Scout Boulevard
Tampa, Florida 33607
Dear Ms. Young:
Enclosed you will find a money order in the amount of $6.45 to reimburse you for
postage paid in returning documents to me.
.
._/__ _
. ---:-.-..,------------_. -------------------------­
15-800
POST'''' T MONEY ORDER

__ '. _ fi'asT4LSERVICEe
enclosure ........ _-:--.. ....... ........ ..... .....,... '" .",.,.,.,
SERIAL YEAR. MONTH. DAY POSTOFFtCE U.S. DOLLARS AND CENTS
12191807520
2008-09-08 344741
AMOUNT:
ADDRESS FROM
ADDRESS'
C.O.D. NO. OR
USED FOR
016H16502306
..
ClI
III
$06.45Q
l!J
~
08/27/2008
Mailed From 33607
US POSTAGE
P.O. Box 3239
Tampa, Florida 33601·3239 CARLTON FIELDS
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Neil J. Gillespie
8092 SW 115th Loop
Ocala, FL 34481
\
I
ETHICS DEPARTMENT
• ElicsCCulsel
• 5Ass5tarCEthicsCounsel
•WrIIen EticslnlAtMlrtisingOpinions
.0raI EIt*:s Opnon
•Ethics EclJcBIion
•AlMewdAsbrrtIi AdwIltisilg
.SlptbSIlrIqConmlllBeooMlel1isi1g
I
I
TAMPA
•BranttllRCcUlseI
I I
I
ORLANDO
•Brard1 UPL. Cw1sel
I
IIIAIiI
I
TAMPA
Florida Lawyer Disciplinary System
FLORIDA SUPREME COURT
I
I
BOARD OF GOVERNORS
I
I
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
I
OFFICE OF STAFF COUNSEL
I
I
I
UPL DEPARTMENT
• lRCanel
• Ass5tarC UPLCwlsel
•CoordnaIioo and hlI'IlIIilgd aI

I
I
I
FT. LAUDERDALE
.Bnrd't UP\..Cw1sel
I
REFEREES
79 GRIEVANCE COMMITTEES
0VER700VCl.lM'EERS
(018 tilldYotun are norHaW'jlllS)
FIELD INVESTIGATIVE STAFF
·0lieI1nYesIigaIor

I
CENTER FOR PROFESSIONALISM
·Dillltlr
•&.wortlor PmssilnaIsmCon1'TjIeell'ld
CcmnIssicrloo Prdes&i:ll ,*" i
•Bnrd't UPL. Cw1seI
I I I
I
• PItm:Ces aspiationaI pis
I
MIAMI
TALLAHASSEE
ORLANDO
., Brandl SIaIICw1seI
·1 Brandl SIaIICotIlSel ·1 Brandl SIaIICotIlSel ·1 Brandl SIal! CotIlSel
·4AssisIanI SI8lI Cw1seI •4AssisIanI Staff Ccu1seI •5AssisWd SlaIICounsel •5Assistant SlaII Counsel
·,Aldta ·,Auchlr ·,AuciD
·'Audla
I
LAWYER REGULATION DEPARTMENT

•Diector·Assisllrt CanseI

.COOrtInaIiOn &......,dBnrd'tOlfrles
I
FT. LAUDERDALE
·1 Bnrd't SIaII CoUlSeI
·5Assistant SIaII CoUlSeI
·1 Auchlr
APPENDIX 9
Florida Bar ethics complaints substantially related to Ryan Christopher Rodems*
*Partners engaged in the practice of law are each responsible for the fraud or negligence of another
partner when the later acts within the scope of the ordinary business of an attorney. Smyrna
Developers, Inc. v. Bornstein, 177 So.2d 16 (2dDCA, 1965).
1. William J . Cook RFA No. 03-18867 J une 12, 2003 (ACAP Central)
2. William J . Cook TFB No. 2004-11,734(13C) J une 7, 2004 (Tampa Branch)
3. William J . Cook TFB No. 2006-11,194 (13D) March 6, 2006 (Tampa Branch)
4. William J . Cook TFB No. 2007-10,004 (13D) J une 27, 2006 (Tampa Branch)
5. Ryan Christopher Rodems TFB No. 2007-11,162(13D) February 20, 2007 (Tampa Branch)
6. Chris A. Barker TFB No. 2007-11,792(13A) J une 18, 2007 (Tampa Branch)
7. Ryan Christopher Rodems File not opened/no number J une 20, 2007 (Tampa Branch)
8. Troy Matthew Lovell File not opened/no number J une 20, 2007 (Tampa Branch)
9. Robert W. Bauer TFB No. 2011-00,073 (8B) J uly 15, 2010 (ACAP Central)
10. Seldon J . Childers RFA No. 11-4718 August 25, 2010 (ACAP Central)
11. Eugene P. Castagliuolo TFB No. 2013-10,162 (6D) August 17, 2012 (ACAP Central)
12. Ryan Christopher Rodems TFB No. 2013-10,271 (13E) Sep-13, 2012 (ACAP Central)
13. Robert W. Bauer RFA No. 13-7675 October 31, 2012 (ACAP Central); denied Nov-09-12;
submitted in SCOTUS Petition no. 12-7747. Reconsidered J an-07-13, No. 2013-00,540 (8B).
14. Ryan Christopher Rodems, complaint submitted J anuary 4, 2013. Current status unknown.
15. Catherine Barbara Chapman, complaint submitted J anuary 18, 2013. Current status unknown.
McPartland v. ISI Inv. Services, Inc., 890 F.Supp. 1029, M.D.Fla., 1995 has been a mandatory
authority on disqualification in Tampa since entered J une 30, 1995 by J udge Kovachevich:
[1] Under Florida law, attorneys must avoid appearance of professional impropriety, and any doubt
is to be resolved in favor of disqualification. [2] To prevail on motion to disqualify counsel, movant
must show existence of prior attorney-client relationship and that the matters in pending suit are
substantially related to the previous matter or cause of action. [3] In determining whether attorney-
client relationship existed, for purposes of disqualification of counsel from later representing
opposing party, a long-term or complicated relationship is not required, and court must focus on
subjective expectation of client that he is seeking legal advice. [5] For matters in prior representation
to be “substantially related” to present representation for purposes of motion to disqualify counsel,
matters need only be akin to present action in way reasonable persons would understand as
important to the issues involved. [7] Substantial relationship between instant case in which law firm
represented defendant and issues in which firm had previously represented plaintiffs created
irrebuttable presumption under Florida law that confidential information was disclosed to firm,
requiring disqualification. [8] Disqualification of even one attorney from law firm on basis of prior
representation of opposing party necessitates disqualification of firm as a whole, under Florida law.
APPENDIX 10
21 Related legal actions to Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, 05-CA-007205
RCR - denotes cases where Ryan Christopher Rodems represented his firm and partner against former client Gillespie
1.RCR Hillsborough Co. 05-CA-7205, Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., Aug-11-2005 to
J un-21-2011, (Mr. Bauer appeared for Gillespie April 2, 2007 through October 1, 2009).
2.RCR Hillsborough Co. 05-CA-7205, Vexatious libel counterclaim, BRC v. Gillespie, J an-19-2006
to Sep-28-2010, (Mr. Bauer appeared for Gillespie April 2, 2007 - October 1, 2009)
3.RCR 2dDCA, 2D06-3803: Gillespie v. BRC, discovery related appeal (Gillespie pro se) (closed)
4.RCR 2dDCA, 2D07-4530: BRC v. Gillespie, voluntary dismissal (Mr. Bauer for Gillespie) (closed)
5.RCR 2dDCA, 2D08-2224: Gillespie v. BRC, § 57.105 sanctions (Mr. Bauer for Gillespie) (closed)
6. RCR 2dDCA, 2D10-5197: Gillespie v. BRC, appeal final summary judgment (Gillespie pro se) (closed)
7. RCR 2dDCA, 2D10-5529: Gillespie v. BRC, prohibition, remove J udge Cook (Gillespie pro se) (closed)
8. RCR 2dDCA, 2D11-2127: Gillespie v. BRC, prohibition/venue, J udge Arnold (Gillespie pro se) (closed)
9. RCR Fla.Sup.Ct. SC11-858: Gillespie v. BRC, habeas corpus, prohibition (Gillespie pro se) (closed)
10.RCR Fla.Sup.Ct. SC11-1622: Gillespie v. BRC, mandamus, other relief (Gillespie pro se) (closed)
11.RCR Federal Ct. 5:10-cv-503: Gillespie v. Thirteenth J udicial Circuit, Fla., Civil Rights/ADA (closed, appeal)
12. Federal Ct. 5:11-cv-539: Estate/Gillespie v. Thirteenth J ud. Cir., FL., Hobbs Act, Title 15, §1983, ADA, etc.
13. C.A.11, 12-11028-B: Estate/Gillespie v. Thirteenth J ud. Cir., FL., Hobbs Act, Title 15, §1983, ADA, etc.
14.RCR C.A.11, 12-11213-C: Gillespie v. Thirteenth J udicial Circuit, Fla., Civil Rights, ADA, (closed, appeal)
15.RCR SCOTUS Rule 22 Application, J ustice Thomas May 31, 2011, not docketed. (Gillespie pro se)
Emergency Petition for Stay or Injunction, re: Supreme Court of Florida SC11-858
16.RCR SCOTUS Rule 22 Application, J ustice Thomas J une 11, 2011, not docketed. (Gillespie pro se)
Extraordinary Writ of Prohibition, re: Supreme Court of Florida SC11-858
17.RCR SCOTUS Petition for Writ of Certiorari August 20, 2012 review Fla.Sup.Ct. case no. SC11-1622,
Returned August 23, 2012 because the petition was determined out-of-time.
18.RCRSCOTUS Rule 13.5 Application to J ustice Thomas, docketed August 13, 2012, No. 12A215
19.RCR SCOTUS Petition for Writ of Certiorari No. 12-7747, December 10, 2012, C.A.11 12-11028, 12-11213
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. Original Case 99-2795-CIV-T-26C, Clement, Blomefield, Gillespie v. AMSCOT, December 9, 1999
21. Original Appeal 01-14761-AA, Clement, Blomefield, Gillespie v. AMSCOT Corp., August 20, 2001
APPENDIX 11
United States District Court
Middle District of Florida
George C. Young Courthouse and Federal Building
401 West Central Boulevard, Suite 6750
Orlando, FL 32801-0675
Anne C. Conway
Chief Judge 407-835-4270
April 25, 2012
Mr. Neil J. Gillespie
8092 SW 115
th
Loop
Ocala, FL 34481
Re: Gillespie v. The Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Florida, et al.
Case No. 5:10-cv-503-0c-10TBS
Dear Mr. Gillespie,
I am in receipt of your correspondence dated March 22,2012. Since this case is not assigned to
me there is nothing I can do to assist you.
Sil1cerely,
./ .. { l ~ / 1
nne C. Conway U
APPENDIX 12
Case 5:10-cv-00503-WTH-TBS Document 70 Filed 07/30/12 Page 71 of 88 PageID 1933
APPENDIX 13

Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful