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Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de (1689-1757). for The Encyclopedia of Political Thought. Ed. Gibbons. Wiley-Blackwell (2014?

) Paul O. Carrese Political Science, U.S. Air Force Academy 2012-2013 Forbes Visiting Fellow, James Madison Program, Princeton University French jurist and philosopher, leading thinker of the moderate Enlightenment, foremost influence on the framers of the U.S. Constitution and more generally on the development of liberal constitutionalism and a globalized liberal politics. Montesquieus chief work, The Spirit of Laws (1748), was praised in the latter eighteenth century as the standard of political science. While eventually eclipsed by the French Revolution and radical Enlightenment thinkers, its influence in Britain and America was enduring. His philosophy shaped thinkers ranging from Rousseau, Burke, and Gibbon to Madison, Hegel, and Tocqueville (Carrithers et. al. 2000, Rahe 2009). He was the most cited European author in America during the framing of the Constitution and Bill of Rights, eclipsing Locke and rivaled only by his own disciple Blackstone (Lutz 1984). Eventually Montesquieus influence declined, given criticism of his complicated philosophical style, and the charge (including by Jefferson in his later years) that his republicanism was anti-democratic. Nonetheless, his political philosophy which also includes a philosophical novel, Persian Letters (1721) and a philosophical history, Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and Their Decline (1734) still is indispensable for understanding modern liberalism and globalization. His philosophy is the most complex and comprehensive in modern thought, addressing relations between crucial dimensions of human affairs including civil and criminal law affecting individuals, constitutional politics and parties, geography and climate, global commerce, religion and culture, and international relations. This comprehensiveness, coupled with his deep influence on Anglo-American constitutionalism and its rise to be the dominant power across the globe, suggests that the twenty-first century world was envisioned by Montesquieu more than any other philosopher. The central theme of Montesquieus political philosophy is moderation, a classical and medieval ideal that he imbued with a modern and humane spirit that would support liberty while tempering the rationalism in earlier modern philosophy. His moderation thus encompasses both philosophical and political balance (Aron 1967; Mansfield 1989; Goyard-Fabre 1993; Cohler 1998; Carrese 2003; Spector 2005; Rahe 2009; Craiutu 2012; Spector 2012). It best befits human nature to avoid extremes of theory that obscure the genuine complexities of human life and affairs, and also to avoid despotic political structures that lack the complexity and selfrestraint to secure individual liberty and tranquility against ruling powers. Montesquieus greatest achievement is a constitutionalism of liberty, developed in his earlier works and completed in The Spirit of Laws. Throughout his works he blended or balanced various schools of philosophy and approaches to religion and law, from classical and medieval to modern, and both biblical and non-biblical. He finds human nature oriented to both moderate sociability and to individual tranquility. His philosophy includes abstract conceptions of right and the state of nature but also comparative study of historical and legal phenomena, expressed in extended analysis or pithy remark. A review of his life and his three major works, with a focus on main themes of his comprehensive philosophy in The Spirit of Laws, suggests why Montesquieu deserves his important legacy and should continue to draw critics and admirers. 1

Developing a Philosophy of Moderation Montesquieus family heritage, and geographic situation near a port far from Paris, influenced his development of a philosophy that would avoid intellectual and political extremes (Shackleton 1961; Shklar 1987). Charles-Louis de Secondat, ultimately baron of La Brde and Montesquieu, was born into a French aristocratic family in southwest France, near Bordeaux. He received a classical, Christian, and modern education at a Catholic school near Paris, then studied law in Bordeaux and Paris. After returning to La Brde he inherited his uncles barony of Montesquieu and his position in the regional court (parlement) of Bordeaux. He married a devout Protestant, with whom he had three children, and who helped him to manage his estates. A few years after becoming a senior judge (prsident mortier) Montesquieu published Persian Letters (1721), which made him famous in France and Europe as a philosophe or enlightened intellectual. After a decade as a provincial judge, mostly in the criminal court, he sold the office in 1725 to turn fully to philosophy. He had been active in the Academy of Bordeaux, engaging in discourse about the new natural science as well as moral and social questions. After Persian Letters he returned to Paris as an intellectual celebrity, and he was admitted to the Acadmie franaise in 1728. He always balanced his judicial and philosophical endeavors with interest in his vineyards and commerce in wines, especially for export from the port of Bordeaux. Starting in 1728 he spent several years travelling to Austria, Germany, Hungary, Italy, including nearly two years in England. There he attended debates in Parliament, was elected to the Royal Academy in 1731, and deepened his admiration for but also concerns about English liberty. Upon his return to Bordeaux he undertook larger philosophical projects about human nature, moderation, and liberty, first his work on the Romans (1734), and eventually Spirit of Laws (1748). In Paris he now was hailed as a leading mind of enlightenment by such younger philosophes as dAlembert and Diderot, editors of the Encyclopdie. The Spirit of Laws was criticized by French theologians and some Church leaders; Montesquieu published Defense of the Spirit of Laws in 1750, but the Vatican placed it on the Index of Prohibited Books in 1751. He died in Paris in 1755, amid controversy between the Jesuits and his philosophical friends; he confessed and took communion, but did not relinquish control of his papers to the Church. It is only near the end of The Spirit of Laws that Montesquieu states its rationale: I say it, and it seems to me I have brought forth this work only to prove it: the spirit of moderation ought to be that of the legislator; the political good, like the moral good, is always found between two limits (Book 29, chapter1). He announced his principle only after extended examination of the complexity of human affairs in Europe and beyond, from classical to medieval to modern times, with an eye to the goodness and defects of human nature. Indeed, Montesquieus three major works capture the various strands of philosophy, religion, geography, politics, and commerce into which he was born or he explored, blending and retaining what he deemed just and moderate.

Persian Letters: Despotism and Liberty in Familiar and Foreign Lands Montesquieus first published work examines despotism in various forms, East and West, Muslim and Christian, sexual and political. The device chosen is letters (161 in all) mostly written or received by two Persians who explore science and learning in Europe, particularly Paris. The main character is Usbek, master of a large harem, who writes and receives letters about Western learning, culture, politics, and religion but also about his wives and eunuchs in the Persian seraglio (the compound of the harem). Usbek journeys to seek knowledge and wisdom (letter 1), but he also notes that he fled the shahs court because a habit of speaking the truth had aroused enemies (letter 8). Montesquieu portrays Usbek and his companion Rica as products of their culture and religion but also as embodying the inquisitiveness in human nature as philosophic souls reflecting on everything from love and the sexes, science, morals, and politics, to metaphysics, the tensions between reason and revelation, and philosophic inquiry itself, including its degraded forms of pedantry and abstraction. Shortly before his death Montesquieu added Reflections on The Persian Letters to a new edition, along with new letters. He explains that he used a poetic form because it permitted philosophical complexity: the author has given himself the advantage of being able to join philosophy, politics, and morals to a tale, and to bind the whole with a secret and, in some fashion, unknown chain. It includes biting satire of Europe regarding absolutist monarchy, Catholicism, the fusion of church and state, sexual license, moral hypocrisy, and the various modes of despotism permeating pre-Revolution France. It also takes seriously the exploration of another world (as he puts it in Reflections) and it echoes Montesquieus lifelong fascination with geography, culture, and travel reports by Europeans visiting Asia, Africa, and America. One of Montesquieus departures from Hobbes and Locke is his attention to relations between principles of right and government on the one hand and, on the other, to history and mores or social culture, including family life and relations between the sexes. Persian Letters pursues analytical inquiry about laws, natural right, and religion, but also incorporates the status of women and how this reflects or reinforces despotism in politics, religion, and philosophy (Schaub 1995; see, e.g., letters 9, 20 to 22, 26, 27, 34, and 38 to set the theme). This is more than a Frenchified Lockean individualism, and while its eroticism and scandal fueled its success, they serve a serious inquiry. Letters opens with the anxiety and exhilaration of leaving home; it closes with the final letter to Usbek, from his wife Roxana, informing him of her revolution against his despotism. Montesquieu suggests that philosophic, personal, and political extremes beget further extremes in families, cultures, politics, and religion, and the consequences are tragic. Usbeks views are not simply Montesquieus, for a tone of parody surrounds this arbitrary master who enjoys philosophical exchanges. He is tyrannical toward wives and slaves, consuming luxury and leisure at Isfahan and Paris, but sees fit to pronounce on the tyranny of the Papacy or Louis XIV (letters 29, 37), on the immoderation or extravagance of mankind (40), on the corruption of family morals in France (letters 48, 56), on political liberty and mild government (letters 51, 80, 92, 102-104 ), on rules of justice and law (83, 94, 95), and on proper regulation of marriage and population (letters 113 to 122). To note the parody or paradox is not to dismiss the insights in his letters, many of which Montesquieu developed in later works. One instance is the tale of the Troglodytes (letters 11 to 14), about a people so self-interested and heartless that they nearly exterminate themselves, leaving a sole family who lived by virtue and 3

fellow-feeling as the basis on which to rebuild society. Portraying the virtue of humanity as the core of justice seems a rejoinder to Hobbess conception of a state of nature marked by radical self-interest, a critique reinforced in The Spirit of Laws. On the other hand, the new utopia of virtue does not last, as the Troglodytes eventually seek a king and laws. Persian Letters established Montesquieu as at once an Enlightenment thinker critical of Christian conventions, monarchy, and Scholastic learning and a counter-Enlightenment thinker somewhat wary of immoderate claims for modern reason, or at least the claims of some to refound all thinking on new systems and then revolutionize human affairs accordingly. He is a worthy successor to the humanism and wit of Montaignes Essays while not so skeptical about the possibility of a properly systematic understanding of human nature and politics.

Romans: Balancing Liberty and Power at Home and Abroad Today the least studied of Montesquieus major works is his one-volume philosophical history, Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and their Decline (1734). Like Persian Letters, it was published anonymously in Holland. Its account of classical republican virtue aroused Rousseaus admiration, and the now more-celebrated historian of Rome Edward Gibbon acknowledged inspiration from Montesquieu (Montesquieu 1999, Lowenthal Introduction). Scholars long characterized Considerations as a preparatory study for Spirit of Laws. We now know it was the opening for a three-part study, to be followed by his Reflections on Universal Monarchy in Europe and an essay on liberty in England, which he already had observed (Rahe 2009). His Universal Monarchy, which criticized the imperial ambitions of the Bourbons (especially Louis XIV), was finished by 1734 but after the monarchys severe reaction to Voltaires Letters Concerning the English Nation (or Lettres Philosophiques) Montesquieu withheld it. He also reserved his study of the English constitution, for eventual use in Spirit of Laws and it became the most famous chapter (Book 11 chapter 6). The aborted volume would have portrayed an ancient, self-destructive project for empire; criticized its modern counterpart; and, praised the modern commercial republic as a novel way to balance political power abroad with liberty at home. While Montesquieu sought to correct Europeans fascinated with a new Rome, his interest in the Romans also permeates his writings. His admiration for republicanism in Considerations is somewhat shaped by Machiavellis rehabilitation, in his Discourses on Livy (1532), of the ferocious Roman republic as a model for modern states. Still, Montesquieu is more disturbed by Roman immoderation than impressed by imperial power. His constant praise for liberty of the early Romans and of their opponents is paired with warnings about hubris and inhumanity. Indeed, his topic is not the republic or empire but the Roman people, especially their tragic character, as if he is offering one of Plutarchs biographical studies writ large. There is no preface to Considerations that states its rationale, but its title describes a philosophical work that searches for causes of the political and moral trajectory of a famous people. Montesquieu argues that the grandeur of the Romans lies mostly in their republic, its moral and martial virtues as well as balanced constitutional government, and secondarily in their conquests and raw power. Their decline consists first in internal decay and later in imperial overextension, as they displace the simple mores of citizens sacrifice for the commonweal, 4

honesty, pagan piety, courage, frugality, liberty for the brutal luxuriousness of imperial rulers and subjects. The causes of greatness and decline are therefore partly moral and partly military or physical, but the rot is intimated from the beginning in Roman militarism. The republic never adequately moderates it; eventually it devours republican liberty, then itself. The Bourbons might have been alarmed that Montesquieu finds greatness in those who resist Rome, especially Hannibal for defending republican liberty in Carthage (chapter 4), and two Asians, Mithridates and Attila (chapters 7, 19). The greatest condemnation is of imperial rule, anticipating the focus of his masterwork: This frightful tyranny of the emperors derived from the general spirit of the Romans, which was extremely ferocious (chapter 15). Because they were accustomed to making sport of human nature in the person of their children and their slaves including the gladiatorial contests and other cruelties of the Coliseum they could scarcely know the virtue we call humanity. The improvement in modern Europe must be attributed to gentler manners, and to a more repressive religion, namely, Christianity, which at least formally condemns cruelty. The moral of the story is, for Montesquieu the opposite of Machiavellis view (which he had carefully studied), or Gibbons. Machiavelli and Gibbon admire power politics in the service of building a great edifice of military, economic, and civilizational might. Machiavelli in particular celebrates the ruthless cunning of Roman rulers, republicans and especially certain emperors, who combine force and fraud in just the right ratio to expand and then preserve their dominion and reputation (Carrese 2006, Rahe 2009). For Montesquieu, Rome clearly declines from republican virtue (itself of mixed quality) into the inhumanity of empire, especially with such emperors as Caligula or Nero: This is the place to set before ourselves the spectacle of things human . . . . how did this project for invading all nations end a project so well planned, carried out and completed except by satiating the happiness of five or six monsters? By the first century BCE, with Pompeys victories in Asia, the Romans mistook empire and physical greatness for true power and had forsaken liberty. Pompey, soon to be overtaken in civil war by Julius Caesar, completed the splendid work of Romes greatness but in fact showed Roman magnificence rather than true power, and thus public liberty was only the more endangered (chapter 7). Montesquieu distinguishes some healthier legacies of the republic, especially its constitutional balance in a mixed regime. This anticipates separation of powers and the pluralism of parties and interests in modern liberty, as in England (chapters 8, 9). Basically, however, Rome lost its liberty through two causes, expanding the empire (territory and martial power) and also the city (privileges of citizenship) (chapter 9). In the sequel he diagnoses The Corruption of the Romans in both morals and piety, citing Cicero and St. Augustine (chapter 10). He argues that human affairs are governed by general causes, moral and physical, with the moral dimension first (chapter 18). He praises the Romans for producing Trajan and Marcus Aurelius, and the humanism of Stoic philosophy, but such statesmen and philosophers are peaks of a doomed national character (chapters 15-16). These were crucial ideas for the philosophy articulated in Spirit of Laws, and a bracing consideration about liberty and power in itself.

Spirit of Laws: Designed for Moderation (Opening Sections, Six-Part Structure) On the Spirit of Laws (1748) develops the complexity evident in Montesquieus life and earlier works, seeking a balanced portrait of the myriad phenomena of human life and the varied 5

perspectives from which we judge politics and morals. Like his two earlier works it initially was published anonymously, this time in Geneva. As a modern he was skeptical about elements of classical and medieval Christian philosophy, but his masterwork borrows from these pre-modern views to moderate extreme and rationalist moments of modernity and Enlightenment. The work also foretold the rise of a globalized, commercial era dominated by liberal democracies; indeed, it provides the first architectonic philosophy of globalization. The moderate minds of the Enlightenment saw Spirit of Laws as comprehensive, insightful, and humane, a guide for the theory and practice of liberal politics. The radical Enlightenment philosophers saw it as disorganized, and too conventional or aristocratic, even as they praised particular insights. The complexity of The Spirit of Laws seeks to modify modern liberal philosophy by capturing the multifarious reality of humanity and politics, but not by rejecting universal principles of right for a sociology of diverse particulars. This philosophical moderation obviously informs his constitutionalism of separated, balanced powers, but he also argues that moderation characterizes natural right and prudent lawmaking. Moderation informs the design he invokes in the Preface to Spirit of Laws, although he warns it is not easy to discern and asks that one approve or condemn the whole book, and not some few phrases. Few if any works of liberal philosophy include maps one of Europe, one of the world to illustrate the range of cultures and histories reviewed for understanding human affairs. Few if any are so long, nor so complex in structure; the title to the work and its six-part structure together provide the best map for the readers journey. (Rahe 2009; Samuel 2009) Early on Montesquieu summarizes the work by explaining its title in terms of the various relations that comprise the spirit of laws (Book 1, chapter 3). Laws must relate to the nature (i.e., structure) and principle (animating passion or attitude) of a government; to the physical aspect of a country, including climate, terrain, and the natural economy; to the liberty, religion, inclinations, wealth, population, commerce, and mores and manners of the people; and, laws also are related to one another, their history, their purpose, and to the order of things they regulate. The philosopher must examine all these relations: all together they form what is called THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (1.3, original emphasis). The six-fold grouping of the thirty one books organizes Montesquieus examination of all these various relations. Part 1, Books 1 to 8, discusses laws in general and then human laws related to the nature or ruling structure and principle or motive forces of governments. The latter books of Part 1 (Books 2 to 8) especially examine whether traditional governments and political concepts adequately secure the moderation and tranquility essential to a humane politics, by analyzing education, penal law, luxury and the status of women, then the decline or corruption of governments. Part 2, Books 9 to 13, completes this transition beyond both classical philosophy and early modern liberalism by proposing a new liberal constitutionalism, encompassing foreign affairs, federalism, distribution of powers for liberty, and civil and criminal laws affecting individual liberty. Part 3, in Books 14 to 19, examines obstacles to political moderation from climate and terrain across the globe. Montesquieu seeks to explain the predominance of despotism or slavery, and the scarcity of liberty or tranquility, throughout the world and history. The final Book in this Part analyzes, nonetheless, how reformers can gradually change mores and cultures to alleviate despotism and promote liberty. Part 4, Books 20 to 23, argues that commerce and proper economic policy are the first supplements to the requirement of the right constitutional structure, and this view sowed the seeds of modern political economy and liberal 6

globalization. Part 5, Books 24 to 26, discusses laws on religion and tolerance and then defines distinct categories of law separating political from religious law especially so as to secure both individual liberty and social order. Part 6, Books 27 to 31, examines the history of ancient Roman and medieval Gothic laws and propounds a new historical theory of liberty and law, punctuated by general remarks on law (Book 29). Montesquieu eventually explains, near the end of the work, the principle by which the abstract, Enlightenment pronouncements that open Spirit of Laws on the invariable laws that govern all beings in the world (1.1) -- fit with his general emphasis on particularities of politics and law. He states that the spirit of moderation ought to guide philosophers and statesmen, since the political good, like the moral good, is always found between two extremes (29.1). The practical goal of his new science of politics is liberty (and a constitutionalism that supports it), but a modern conception of political moderation is the prerequisite for a humane and sustainable liberty that avoids extreme liberty (11.4, 11.6, 19.27). Philosophical moderation also is necessary for genuine philosophy as distinct from a system that is utopian or singleminded, thus failing to capture human reality (29.19, 30.10, 30.23)

Law, Governments, and their Spirit and Corruption (Part 1, Books 1 to 8) Montesquieu opens Part 1 with a Book on laws in general that blends classical, medieval, and modern philosophy about cosmic order, natural law, and human laws. His most abstract idea, that law governs all of reality, cites the moralist and biographer Plutarch for the maxim that law is the king of all, mortal and immortal, taken from advice to a prince (1.1). Thus he argues that, because man has freedom to ignore divine and natural laws, there are three laws that remind him of the creator, his own true nature, and his duties to fellows. God gives him the laws of religion, philosophers give him the laws of morality, and legislators recall his duties through political and civil laws (1.1) Montesquieu nonetheless is modern, for there is only a weak metaphysics in his divine law yielding minimal natural laws (1.1, 2). He uses but moderates earlier state of nature theories about mans pre-political nature; the liberalism of Hobbes and Locke, with its excessive focus on individual autonomy and rights, is too simple and thus inaccurate (compare Pangle 1973 with Spector 2005). Peace is the first natural law and he criticizes Hobbes for projecting so complex an idea as domination on early man. The second law is nourishment, while the third is mans natural sociability, to include sexual charm. Knowledge is another bond among us, making the desire to live in society the fourth natural law. Having addressed cosmic and natural laws he notes three kinds of human laws, needed because man in society develops a pride that violates the peaceful, sociable laws of his nature (1.3). The first is the right of nations, preventing or moderating war. Second is political right, governing rulers as well as ruled within a state. Third is civil right, governing individual relations in a political order. Regarding the latter two, he states that laws ought to be so appropriate to the people for whom they are made that it is unlikely the laws of one nation can suit another (1.3). Montesquieu develops these themes in the remainder of Part One, and throughout the work. His initial focus is the nature (or structure) and motivating principle of governments. He defines three kinds: republic, in which many rule; monarchy, in which one rules under law; and 7

despotism, in which one rules arbitrarily (2.1). Republics come in two kinds in aristocracy a few rule, in democracy the people rule. He couples this four-fold scheme with analysis of the principle or motivating passion for each government: democracy is animated by political virtue or love of its egalitarian laws; aristocracy by moderation, in which the few provide as much equality under law as possible; monarchy by honor, as the sense of privilege and self-interest among nobles; and finally, despotism by fear, for the princes arbitrary will is ruthlessly enforced. There are many insights about governments in Book 2, and many were drawn upon by framers of constitutions in the waves of democratization beginning with the American revolution in 1776. Both The Federalist and its Anti-Federalist opponents, debating the 1787 Constitution, embrace a blend of elements from Montesquieus democratic republic (civic virtue, representation versus direct democracy) and from his aristocratic republic (powerful senate, expertise in judicial and executive offices). In the remainder of Part One Montesquieu gradually transcends this typology with a further distinction between moderate and immoderate governments (see 3.10, 5.14, 8.8). He turns from institutions to address the education characteristic of each government (Book 4) since laws reflect and are reinforced by mores. Since the principle is more important than the institutions, he analyzes laws that sustain political virtue, moderation, and honor (Book 5). He turns to penal laws reflective of each principle and government, noting which laws and judicial forms are friendliest to individual security (Book 6). The final dimension of the political psychology inherent in governments, shaping human souls, is the laws on luxury and the status of women (Book 7). Montesquieu gradually reveals that the best protection for his broad idea of natural right (see 1.2, 3.10, 6.13, 24.6, 26.3) is complexity among powers: In order to form a moderate government, one must combine powers, regulate them, temper them, make them act; one must give one power a ballast . . . to put it in a position to resist another (5.14). Moreover, despotism can arise anywhere. He reinforces this in the book on corruption of various governments. Democracy corrupts itself through a spirit of extreme equality when the people want to do everything themselves, tossing aside senate, executive, judges (8.2). Monarchy corrupts when it removes the prerogatives of the nobility, towns, and other intermediate orders or bodies (8.67). While republics seem to secure liberty only moderate governments do whether monarchies or republics since republican virtue (whether Spartas or Platos) requires a renunciation of oneself, which is always a very painful thing (4.5-8). Jesuits and Christian monks also enforce severe moral order on others and themselves (4.6, 5.2). That is, there can be a despotism of virtue. This analysis points to his moderate alternative: a constitutional, commercial monarchy or republic with a moderate liberal spirit. Liberal Constitutionalism (Part 2, Books 9 to 13) Montesquieus liberal constitutionalism is a comprehensive philosophy of affairs, following the three laws defined in Book 1 international law, constitutional law, and the civil and criminal laws affecting individuals. Montesquieu prescribes a blend of realism and liberal ideals to guide international affairs balancing realist concerns about power and interest with liberal and Christian principles about natural right and peace. The right of nations is by nature founded on the principle that the various nations should do to one another in times of peace the most good possible, and in times 8

of war the least ill possible, without harming their true interests (1.3). This international right points to federalism, which solves the problem that republics are too small to defend: a federated republic has all the internal advantages of republican government [liberty and virtue] and the external force of monarchy (9.1). Regarding offense, the right of nations requires that war follow the law of natural enlightenment, which wants us to do to others what we would want to have done to us (10.3). Modern Europes principles surpass the Romans, partly due to Christianity: international right now seeks preservation and justice rather than subjugation, and for this progress homage is owed to our modern times, to contemporary reasoning, to the religion of the present day, to our philosophy, and to our mores (10.3; see 24.3). In political right or constitutional law, Montesquieus novel philosophy of a tri-partite separation of powers including the first argument in political philosophy for independent courts argues that liberty is found only in moderate governments (11.4). Moderation occurs only when power is not abused; but it has eternally been observed that any man who has power is led to abuse it; thus even virtue has need of limits. These premises point to a distribution of powers: So that one cannot abuse power, power must check power by the disposition of things (11.4). However, there is alone one nation in the world whose constitution has political liberty for its direct purpose (11.5). In his study of Englands constitution he observes that every state has three powers, legislative, executive, and judicial. He defines liberty: Political liberty in a citizen is that tranquility of spirit which comes from the opinion each one has of his security. Liberty thus requires a government such that one citizen cannot fear another citizen (11.6). Only moderate governments achieve this, for there is no liberty unless the powers are independent of each other. All would be lost if the same man or the same body of principal men . . . exercised these three powers, or even any two. Constitution makers, including the American framers, learned much from Montesquieus analysis. Its negative dimension prevents excessive power; today this is termed checks and balances. Its positive side is a division of labor: legislatures are best at deliberating, a single executive best at decisive action, etc.; today this is separation of powers. However sophisticated, this scheme was not developed by philosophers but arose among ancient Germans: This fine system was found in the forests (11.6). This last thought justifies examination of other constitutions. Englands extreme political liberty doesnt disparage those who have only a moderate one, for he thinks the excess even of reason is not always desirable and men almost always accommodate themselves better to middles than to extremities (11.6) (Krause 2000). Europes monarchies each have their distribution of powers which more or less approach political liberty (11.7). The best actual government is the moderate monarchy or Gothic government arising from early Germanic liberty, eventually achieving balance between commoners, kings, nobility, and clergy. It is the best kind of government men have been able to imagine (11.8). The final books in Part Two turn to civil right, directly affecting individuals. Book 12 examines individual liberty, which means security or the opinion one has of ones security. This is never more attacked than by public and private prosecutions. Thus, individual liberty primarily depends on the goodness of the criminal laws (12.2). Indeed, the knowledge already acquired in some countries, and yet to be acquired in others, respecting the surest rules one can observe in criminal judgments, concerns mankind more than anything else in the world (12.2). This suggests needed revisions to the criminal law (12.4). The leading liberal reformer 9

of penal law in eighteenth century Europe, Cesare Beccaria, cited Montesquieus inspiration. A humane code delineates four kinds of crimes against religion, mores, tranquility, and the security of citizens. Only the fourth is properly part of criminal law at all. Treason, and freedom of speech, writing, and thought, require greater toleration and caution (12.7-13). The presentation of moderate constitutionalism concludes by arguing there is nothing that wisdom and prudence should regulate more than taxation and public revenues (13.1). Montesquieu is no longer celebrated as a founder of modern economics, but leading liberal economists such as Adam Smith and John Maynard Keynes acknowledged his influence. Moderate governments that favor the liberty of property owners and merchants produce the greatest prosperity. They could tax more in war or national emergency, but should keep levels moderate (e.g., 13.14-15).

Nature, Culture, Despotism and Remedies in Law and Mores (Part 3, Books 14 to 19) With Part 3 of Spirit of Laws Montesquieu breaks the implicit ascent in Parts 1 and 2 of the work, which move toward a new constitution of liberty that can escape the despotism evident in human affairs, philosophy, and religion. Books 14 to 19 address the natural, historical, and cultural obstacles to his humane constitutionalism. Book 14 generally examines laws in relation to climates across the globe; next, three books address forms of slavery in various climates, from chattel slavery (15) to domestic slavery of women in polygamy (16) to political slavery under despotism (17); and, one more book about nature and laws assesses terrain (18). A final book (19) in this Part begins to rise above nature to suggest how political culture can support liberty and moderation. Both critics and advocates have portrayed Montesquieu as a determinist for arguing that differences in temperature, climate, terrain, and geography influence mores, manners, culture, and laws. No determinist with a narrow focus on causation involving guns, germs, steel, and geography -- could dispense so much advice on counteracting physical and cultural tendencies toward despotism. Montesquieu declares that bad legislators favor the vices fostered by a climate, while good ones oppose them (14.5). Thus, he repeatedly condemns chattel slavery as violating natural right (15.2, 7, 12), and encourages its opponents by declaring: Knowledge makes men gentle, and reason inclines toward humanity: only prejudices cause these to be renounced (15.3). Montesquieus larger concern was why moderate government and liberty seem to occur only in Europe, while despotism dominates Africa, Asia, and the Americas (see 8.8, 11.5, 15.9, 16.9, 17.5-6, 18.3). He raised this question at the dawn of modern European colonialism, and his queries deepened liberal philosophy while pressuring Europeans to respect natural justice. He excoriates the Spanish for their brutality and crimes in the Americas (15.3-4), and insists that a universal natural right is the benchmark among peoples (15.1, 2, 7, 17; 16.2, 12; 17.5). More rugged and inhospitable terrains are friendlier to liberty than more luxurious climates, which partly explains why liberty arose first in Europe (18.1-5). Still, humans can improve their natural economy by developing technologies to change the terrain, such as dams, canals, or other arts (18.7-15). Book 19 turns to how laws relate to the general spirit, mores, and manners of a nation. A general spirit is produced by climate, religion, laws, the maxims of the government, examples of past things, mores, and manners (19.4). A spirit conducive to humane mores and laws 10

deserves benign neglect, while despotic nations should be reformed (19.10, 12, 13). This cautious ascent toward reform returns Montesquieu to the English (19.27). His sequel to the analysis in Book 11 examines how laws can contribute to forming the mores, manner, and character of a nation. (These two studies of England, 11.6 and 19.27, were separately published in English translations in the eighteenth century, including a 1750 Edinburgh pamphlet with both chapters facilitated, apparently, by Hume; see Spurlin 1940, Kingston 2008, Rahe 2009.) Montesquieus theme in this second analysis of England is the dynamic equilibrium of its politics, which promotes private enterprise and commercial opportunity. He commends the freedom for all the passions there hatred, envy, jealousy, greed, and pride since it yields a beneficial conflict between the parties supporting the legislative and executive. Passion, faction, and other vices paradoxically maintain liberty for all: they would even have the good effect of straining all the springs of the government, and rendering all the citizens attentive (19.27). Nonetheless, Montesquieu paints a mixed portrait; the extreme liberty analyzed earlier (11.6) produces extremes of populism and individualism. Populism permits excessive acts of executive power in the peoples name, so that one would often see the form of an absolute government over the foundation of a free government. Their repressive laws against Catholics do all the evil that can be done in cold blood. The English have wit (esprit) but not taste, and lack politeness since each is always busy with ones own interests. The frenzy of liberty even produces polarization of thinking, and intellectual partisanship obscures reality: in extremely free states they betray the truth because of their very liberty, since every one becomes as much the slave of the prejudices of his faction as he would be of a despot (19.27). Part 3 thus argues that, despite natural or cultural obstacles, laws can reform a people -hopefully for moderate ends. The second half of The Spirit of Laws, Parts 4 to 6, continues to emphasize the achievements possible for prudent legislators and reformers. Commerce, Globalization, and Dynamic Societies (Part 4, Books 20 to 23) Part Four examines the important relations between politics and economics through two books on international commerce (20 and 21), one on money and economic policy (22), and a final book on demographics and population policies (23). He offers his own Invocation to the Muses, a poem that hopes to move from the realm of pain, fatigue, and worry traversed in Part 3 to achieving wisdom and truth through pleasure (20, Invocation). This launches an epic narrative on commerce, in which Montesquieu compares a poem on Portuguese explorers and navigators with the charms of the Odyssey and the magnificence of the Aeneid (21.21). These modern heroes open up vistas for productivity, commerce, comfort, and exchanges of views; the new worlds they discover are not only the Far East and West Indies, but achievements of technology and navigation, and benefits of commerce and a gentler civilization. The analyses of commerce, economic policy, and population in Part 4 thus develop the first argument in liberal philosophy for what we now call globalization. The obvious attraction of this new moral and political project is the prosperity already achieved through scientific invention and commerce, and the greater potential ahead: Europe has reached such a high degree of power that nothing in history is comparable to it (21.21). Nonetheless, he was among the first to argue that enlightened self-interest also could safely guide relations among nations, yielding a high-minded hedonism that was humane and successful.

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While commerce corrupts pure mores, as classical and medieval political philosophy and also Biblical religion worried, it softens harsh mores in private and public life. Commerce has spread knowledge of the mores of all nations everywhere: they have been compared to each other, and good things have resulted from this. It thus cures destructive prejudices: it is an almost general rule that everywhere there are gentle mores, there is commerce and that everywhere there is commerce, there are gentle mores (20.1). Indeed, the natural effect of increased international commerce is to lead to peace. Further, the spirit of commerce produces moderation about justice as opposed to either banditry or moral virtues that neglect self interest (20.2). He praises the moderation of the English for best knowing how to take advantage of each of these three great things at the same time: religion, commerce, and liberty (20.7). After criticizing the Romans for a focus on military land power that did not sufficiently value commerce or sea power (21.13-17), Montesquieu analyzes how commerce dawned in Europe through, and despite, barbarism and thus ushered in the modern age (21.20). He boldly criticizes Aristotle, the Scholastics, the Gospels, anti-Semitism, and Machiavellism in noting that rulers and ruled in a commercial regime ultimately become more concerned with interest, profit, and success than with pride, mastery, bigotry, or greatness. Princes had to govern themselves more wisely, since great strokes of authority were so clumsy that experience itself has made known that only goodness of government brings prosperity. Modern Europe has begun to be cured of Machiavellism and has learned that there must be more moderation in councils (21.20). Discussions of usury and of legal reform suggest that Laws extreme in the good give rise to extreme evil (22.21).It is moderation which governs men, and not excesses, whether the extremes are wickedness or severe moralism (22.22). The Book on population closes Part 4 by reiterating the need for moderate laws and policies, grounded in a humane conception of natural right. Montesquieu encourages the prudent legislator to discern a middle state between the worldliness of the ancient Romans and the otherworldliness of Christianity. Both extremes overlook the pleasures of innocence, such as sexuality, marriage, and children (23.1, 7, 20, 21). These are, not coincidentally, the same natural sentiments by which Montesquieu already redefined natural right, thereby moderating the narrow conceptions of Hobbes and Locke (see 1.2, 3.10, 6.13, 24.6, 26.3).

Moderate Religion and the Ordering of Laws (Part 5, Books 24 to 26) Montesquieu develops his liberal principles about religion and politics mainly in the two Books on religion (24 and 25), which include analyses of biblical religion, classical philosophy, and their mixture in medieval Scholasticism (24, chs. 1, 6, 7). Issues of theological and human authority require a sequel about ordering divine and human laws (book 26). His distinction within modern liberalism is to eschew characterizing religion as solely a problem, one to be managed or privatized by the liberal state (compare Kingston 2000 with Pangle 2010). Throughout earlier Parts Montesquieu regularly invokes Christianity as a source of moderation and liberalism (10.3 on international law; 2.4, 3.10, 6.13, 12.29, and 19.18 on moderating despotism; 15.7 on undermining slavery). His analysis of cosmic and natural law invokes a creator, and cites the most important natural law (albeit manifested last) as our inclination to seek the creator (1.1-2). He balances affirmation with admonitions about extremes adopted by religious leaders or zealots, Christianity included (5.2, 14; 12.4, 5, 8; 14.7; 15.4; 21.20; 23.21). In Part Five he endorses the political moderation of Lockean toleration, and spiritual moderation 12

against religious zealotry, but finds immoderate the claims of modern reason and science to guide humanity absent any transcendent inclination. Book 24 opens by addressing the rival tendencies to evangelize either the next life or this one, to elevate either heaven or earth over the other. Montesquieus alternative is to unite them both (24.1). Book 25 also opens by contrasting extremes, the pious man who always speaks of religion (what he loves) versus the atheist who also incessantly talks of religion (what he fears) (25.1). It is in this spirit that, in book 24, Montesquieu strongly defends Christianity against the philosopher Pierre Bayle (24.2, 6). Some religions, most especially Christianity, incline politics toward moderation; thus moderns and Europeans owe to Christianity both a certain political right in government and a certain right of nations in war, for which human nature can never be sufficiently grateful (24.3). He echoes orthodox Christianity in criticizing Bayle for misunderstanding the spirit of Christianity, since (pace Bayle) it does distinguish between precepts or commands and counsels of perfection. This moderation in expectations, this distinction between basic commands and exhortations, is given by the legislator of the gospel and accords with the spirit of his laws (24.6). Christianitys moderation also allows, Montesquieu seems to think, careful praise of Stoicism for its worldly benevolence: if I could for a moment cease to think that I am a Christian he would count the destruction of Zenos sect among the misfortunes of human kind (24.10). Such warnings about otherworldliness, about obsessive hope or fear for the next life (24.11, 12), nonetheless are not echoes of Machiavelli, since Montesquieu is moderating religious sentiment, not mocking it. Indeed, religion is the greatest spring there is among men (24.13, 14). Still, it is less the truth or falsity of a dogma that makes it useful or pernicious to men in the civil state than the use or abuse made of it (24.19, title; see also 24.4). Book 25 then discusses religious toleration and advocates penal reform. Montesquieu moderates Lockes liberalism by insisting that toleration concerns a balance between individual conscience and communal mores, since that is best for both individual and political liberty. His complexity and moderation appreciate the private and public importance of faith while deterring extremism. The penal laws should decriminalize religion (25.12; see 12.4). Governments with established religions should not force conversions; the better way to attack a religion is to tempt its believers with the advantages and pleasures of turning away (25.12). Montesquieu reinforces these principles by discussing jurisdictional conflicts between kinds of laws, including religious and political laws. He delineates nine sorts of law, from natural right and then divine right down to civil and domestic right (26.1). The stakes are high, and knowing well these orders of law is the sublimity of human reason. The central, refereeing principle is natural right as rights of natural defense and natural modesty for individuals, which trumps orthodoxy (26.7-14). He harshly criticizes the human tribunals of the Inquisition for judging by the maxims of the tribunals which regard the next life (26.1112). Like Bacon, Hobbes, and Locke, he recommends a basic precept of modern liberalism: THE WELL-BEING OF THE PEOPLE IS THE SUPREME LAW (26.23). Yet unlike his liberal predecessors he defines tranquility to include the metaphysical, endorsing wide authority for religion in regulating marriage. He describes marriage as the act of most interest to society but it always has been the object of a particular benediction that depended upon certain higher favors (26.13). This careful perception of the multifarious dimensions of human affairs, including higher ones, is the voice of moderate Enlightenment. 13

A New Theory of Law: History, Moderation, Reform (Part 6, Books 27 to 31) It is fitting that the final Part of the Spirit of Laws develops a new historical jurisprudence in two Books (27-28), then offers one last theoretical Book (29), and finally develops an historical theory of the laws (30-31). With this dialectical structure Montesquieu reiterates that the practical and historical dimensions of philosophy must balance theory. This longest, and usually neglected, Part of the Spirit of Laws provides histories of Roman (27) and then French laws (28, 30, 31), interrupted by a Book of general remarks on how to compose laws (29). Scholars often treat Part 6 as an appendix, with the exception of Book 29. This partly is due to a subtitle in the early editions which suggested this, but the reader who seeks to understand the work and also the subsequent history of Anglo-American constitutionalism and all liberal democracies neglects Part 6 in error. Montesquieu states in the Preface and Book 1 that the entire work explains the spirit of laws, and the jurisprudence developed in Part 6 argues that liberty and security gradually developed in the traditional law of Europe. This blend of liberal principles and tradition legal prudence prepared for Blackstones similar blending of common law and liberalism, of historical inquiry and theoretical clarity, in his Commentaries. Spirit of Laws and Commentaries are, arguably, the two most fundamental philosophical sources for American constitutionalism (Lutz 1984, Carrese 2003). Montesquieus analysis of the origins and evolutions of French civil law (book 28) argues that prudent reformers and judges should build upon the spirit of medieval Gothic law rather than Roman Civil Law (book 27), because of the severity of Roman law and also its influence on Ecclesiastical Law. The apex of book 28 recounts efforts of the thirteenth century King, Saint Louis, to restore reasonableness and moderation to law. Louis IX does so, however, by drawing upon native Germanic moderation and gradually developing in his courts a due process more natural, more reasonable, more in conformity to morality, to religion, to public tranquility, to the security of the person and of goods. The moral of the story: Reason has a natural empire . . . one resists it . . . yet a little time, and one is forced to come back to it (28.38). Montesquieu then uses the opening lines of the sequel, Book 29, to declare his philosophy of moderation as his purpose in writing the work (29.1). The topic is the way to compose the laws and it seems to be the last theoretical book. Between the more historical books in Part 6 he pauses for general advice to all legislators or founders. He closes this book by criticizing his philosophic predecessors, to include Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, More, and Harrington, for the passions and prejudices behind their philosophic legislating (29.19). This bold moment brings the work full circle, for it complements his prefatory announcements that I did not draw my principles from my prejudices but from the nature of things, and, that he believes his work has not totally lacked genius (Preface). That said, the final two Books of the work are not narrowly historical, since they offer important teachings about political philosophy and constitutionalism; indeed, Montesquieu states there would have been an imperfection in my work if he had omitted analysis of the feudal laws (30.1). An important reflection on philosophy is voiced through a debate about the origins of the French constitution. His own view of the feudal French constitution develops by examining two rival historians, each propounding a system that abstracts from reality and facts. Neither the portrait of an almost exclusively noble origin, nor that of an almost exclusively 14

monarchical one, captures the truth (30.10). The larger point is that these two along with other modern authors with particular systems brush away the contexts evident through careful observation (30.14; see 30.23). As with his closing remark about the narrowly partisan thinking of English historians, it seems likely that Montesquieu has other kinds of thinkers in mind (see 19.27). This view also explains why these closing historical books offer, according to their titles, a theory of the laws (30, 31); a reader always has to be on guard with a philosopher who acknowledges the greatness of, and his debt to, other philosophers but states I do not believe I have totally lacked genius (Preface). Theory is a term rarely used in the work, and used in a book title for the first time here. The new theory seems to be Montesquieus blending of universal meaning and right with historical particularity. The jurist and moderate Enlightenment philosopher examines samples of medieval constitutions to discern a not-too-theoretical theory of their development, for the benefit of moderate reformers and legislators.

Montesquieus World: His Legacy in Thought and Practice Unlike the rationalism of some Enlightenment predecessors, Montesquieu accounted for the complexities in human thoughts and deeds. Unlike the fatigue and skepticism of his latemodern and post-modern successors, he resisted moral and political relativism. This moderate approach to political philosophy explains why Montesquieu was the foremost influence upon the framers of the 1787 Constitution, but also rivaled Locke in informing the complex ideas of liberty and constitution announced in the Declaration of Independence (Spurlin 1940). Both documents blend the components comprehended in Spirit of Laws from liberalism and modern republicanism to elements of classical philosophy, Christianity, and the traditional common law to develop an American constitution of liberty. Such balance continues to pervade American constitutionalism two centuries hence, shaping the complexity of American life and thought as well as that of other liberal democracies. Distinct schools of scholarship or political factions may emphasize some single element of modern liberal democracy and our globalized world, whether pluralism, or an abstract theory of justice, or rights of individuals, or public purposes, or community, or religion. Familiarity with Montesquieus comprehensive, architectonic philosophy illuminates the interrelations and larger whole in late-modern life, and helps to compare it, as he does, to alternative philosophies or beliefs. As noted, a range of important philosophers and thinkers cited Montesquieus influence even as some sharply departed from his philosophy. The more faithful include Blackstone, Burke, Smith, Madison, Hamilton, and Tocqueville. Montesquieus only rival as a philosophical and jurisprudential authority for the American framers was his disciple Blackstone, whose Commentaries also delineated the complex constitutional forms necessary for liberty and stability (Carrithers et. al. 2000, Rahe 2009). Tocqueville named Montesquieu as one of the philosophers most important for writing Democracy in America, a work that explains and guides the modern liberal democracy arising from the American and French revolutions but a work that also moderated elements of Montesquieus philosophy (Carrese 2003). One scholar rightly deemed Montesquieu the father of constitutions, preparing for the waves of liberal democracies that struggled to be born in subsequent centuries (Shklar 1987). Scholars who see the importance of the various strands that comprise the broader political culture or spirit animating politics in addition to institutions, policies, and economics owe a debt to this capacious philosophy. Montesquieu surely would be pleased to know that his philosophy, once 15

implemented, supported the global success of Anglo-American constitutionalism and the dominance of the liberal globalization led by America. That said, as we approach the third century of its influence, it comports with Montesquieus spirit to ask how that philosophy itself needs to be moderated given some of the excesses of the liberal, globalized era it fostered. One benefit of his complex philosophy is that, because its search for truth is not transfixed by abstract doctrines, it can recognize need for adjustment in light of larger truths and subsequent considerations.

[Cross references] Blackstone, Sir William; Constitutionalism; Federalism; Federalist Papers; French Enlightenment; Liberalism; Liberty; Moderation; Natural Law; Natural Rights; Republicanism; Separation of Powers; Smith, Adam; Tocqueville, Alexis de; Toleration

[References and Suggested Readings] Aron, R. (1967) Les tapes de la pense sociologique. Paris: Gallimard. Main Currents in Sociological Thought, Volume 1: Montesquieu, Comte, Marx, de Tocqueville. Translated R. Howard and H. Weaver, Introduction by D. Mahoney and B. Anderson, Foreword by P. Manent. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction (1998). Carrese, P. (2003) The Cloaking of Power: Montesquieu, Blackstone, and the Rise of Judicial Activism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. _____. (2006) The Machiavellian Spirit of Montesquieus Liberal Republic. In Rahe (Ed.) Machiavelli's Liberal Republican Legacy. New York: Cambridge University Press. Carrithers, D., Mosher, M. and Rahe, P. (Eds.) (2000) Montesquieus Human Science: Essays on the Spirit of the Laws. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Cohler, A. (1998) Montesquieus Comparative Politics and the Spirit of American Constitutionalism. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. Craiutu, A. (2012). A Virtue for Courageous Minds: Moderation in French Political Thought, 1748-1830. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Goyard-Fabre, S. (1993) Montesquieu: la nature, les lois, la liberte. Paris: Presses universitaires de France. Kingston, R. (2000) Montesquieu on Religion and the Question of Toleration. In Carrithers et. al. (Eds.) Montesquieus Human Science. Kingston, R. (Ed.) (2008) Montesquieu and His Legacy. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Krause, S. (2000) The Spirit of Separate Powers in Montesquieu, Review of Politics, 62: pp. 231-265. 16

Lowenthal, D. (1959) Book I of Montesquieus The Spirit of the Laws, American Political Science Review, 53: pp. 485-98. _____. (1964) Montesquieu and the Classics. In J. Cropsey (Ed.), Ancients and Moderns. New York: Basic Books. Lutz, D. (1984) The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought, American Political Science Review, 78: pp.189-97. Manent, P. (1987) Histoire intellectuelle du libralism: Dix leons. Paris: Calman-Lvy. An Intellectual History of Liberalism. Translated R. Belinski, Foreword by J. Siegel. Princeton: Princeton University Press (1995). Mansfield, H (1989) Moderating the Executive. In Taming the Prince: The Ambivalence of Modern Executive Power. New York: Free Press. Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de. (194951) uvres compltes de Montesquieu, 2 volumes. Edited by Roger Caillois. Paris: Bibliothque de la Pliade. _____. (2011) Persian Letters. Translated by S. Warner and S. Douard, Introduction by S. Warner. South Bend, IN: St. Augustine Press. _____. (1999 [1965]) Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and their Decline. Tranlsated D. Lowenthal. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett. _____. (1989) The Spirit of the Laws. Translated A. Cohler, B. Miller, H. Stone. New York: Cambridge University Press. Muller, J. (1988) The American Framers Debt to Montesquieu. In Muller (Ed.), The Revival of Constitutionalism. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press. Oake, R. (1955) Montesquieus Analysis of Roman History, Journal of the History of Ideas, 16: pp. 44-59. Pangle, T. (1973) Montesquieus Philosophy of Liberalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. _____. (2010) The Theological Basis of Liberal Modernity in Montesquieus Spirit of the Laws. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Rahe, P. (2009) Montesquieu and the Logic of Liberty. New Haven: Yale University Press. Samuel, A. (2009) The Design of Montesquieus The Spirit of the Laws: The Triumph of Freedom over Determinism, American Political Science Review, 103: pp. 305-321. Schaub, D. (1995) Erotic Liberalism: Women and Revolution in Montesquieus Persian Letters. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Shklar, J. (1987). Montesquieu. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Shackleton, R. (1961) Montesquieu: A Critical Biography. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Spector, C. (2005) Quelle justice? quelle rationalit? La mesure du droit dans LEsprit des lois. In Volpilhac-Auger (Ed.) Montesquieu en 2005. Oxford: Voltaire Foundation. _____. (2012) Was Montesquieu Liberal? The Spirit of the Laws in the History of Liberalism. In Geenens and Rosenblatt (Eds.) French Liberalism from Montesquieu to the Present Day. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Spurlin, P. (1940) Montesquieu in America, 1760-1801. Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press. Waddicor, M. (1970) Montesquieu and the Philosophy of Natural Law. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

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