The Dialectic of Discovery

by Andrea C. Birch
I. Introduction
P
EIROE OALLS the form of reasoning blY which hypo-
theses are formulated and selected " abduction."
[Abducrtion] is the first srtep of scientific reasoning, as induction is
the concluding step. Nothing has so much contrihuted ,to present
chaotic or erroneous ideas of the logic of science as failure to dis-
tinguish the essentially different charaoters of different elements of
scientific reasoning; and one of the worst of these confusions, as weIl
as one of the commonest, consists in regarding ahduction and induc-
tion taken together (often mixed wirth deduction) as a simple argu-
ment (7.218).1
Oertainly ablduction is merely preparatory. It provides a
weak largument leading to conjectureand cannot perform the
verifying function of induction. Ab,duction s.uggests that sorne-
thing ma.y be) but it is. the only form of reasoning that sup-
p,lies new ideas: "All the ideas of science come to it by the
way of Abduction" (5.145). Peirce explains.:
Abduction is the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis. It
is the only logical operation which introduces any new idea; for
induction does nothing but determine value, and deducrtion merely
evolves the necessary consequences of a pure hypothesis. . . . if we
are ever to learn anything or to understand phenomena at all, it
roust be by abduction that this is to be brought about (5.171).
1. Most of Peirce's writingsare in the Oolleoted Papers 0/ Oharles Sanders
Peirce, volumes one through six edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul
Weiss (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931-1935), volumes seven
and eight edited by Arthur Burke (Gambridge: Harvard University Press,
1958). The convention in citing references. is to place the volume number
to the left of the decimal point and the section number to the right.
References to this work will be cited internally.
295
296 Andrea O. Birch
Fr Peirce, abduetion both deseribes the discovery p,roces.s in
science and has a logie. The process of formulating new ideas
is not merely amenahle to psychologieal or historical descrip-
tion, hut to logieal ,analysis. In fact, Peiree comp'ares abduc-
tion to the type of theoretieal argument Aristotle calls reduc-
tion. Peirce writes:
... abduction (which Ithe present writer believes to have been what
Aristotle's twenty-fifth chapter of the second Prior Analytics imper-
fectly 'described under the name apagoge, until Appellicon substituted
a single wrong word and this disturbed the sense of the whole),
furnishes the reasoner with the problematic theory which induction
verifies (2.776).
This p,aper will llot examine Peirce's clainl that abduction
is a logie of However, his reference to reduction in-
troduees the issue that concerns us, hare: In what way does
Aristot,elian reduction con'Stitute a logic of diseovery?
In heginning to ans,wer this question, we will uncover Aris-
totle's elue that links reduetion to the method of analysis and
synthesi8. Since reduction is expressed in syllogistic form, the
discussion must foeus hriefly on the meaning of the syllogism.
Sinee the syllogism, and most obviously the red'uctive syllogism,
has its roots in dialeetic, the investigation must also seek the
meaning of dialectie. In s.um, to explore the p,roces,g, of dis-
covery in an Aristotelian context this p,aper will discu'Ss three
essential terms: reduction, syllogism, and dialectic.
11. Reduction
Peirce tries to elevate abduction to the status of induction
and deduetion. He is aware that ,according to Aristortle all
models of argument can be reduced to the logical form oi the
18yllogism. Aristotle's interest in the syllogism had led him to
review the various modes of argument and to mention one im-
portant hut often neglected form of argument, namely, reduc-
Dialectic of Discov'ery 297
tion. As Peirce reeognizes, the neglect of reduetion result.s in
a gap in th,e understanding of scientific method in the A r i s ~
totelian sense. Reduction can he a way of arriving at explana-
tions needed to form the premises of demon'Strat,ive or scientific
s.yllogisms.
As Peirce mentions, Aristotle discusses reduotion in Prior
Analytic 11, 25. Aristotle's example ia:
Knowledge can be taught, B-A
Virtue is knowledge, C-B
Virtue can be taught, C-A
The characteristic element of a reduction is that the mlnor
premise CB (i.e., the relation of the middle term B to the last
term C), although uncertain, is. equally as prohable as the oon-
clusion or more probahle than the conclusion CA. If the minor
premise is equally as prohable as or more probable than the
conclusion, we have a reduetion: "for we are nearer to knowl-
edge, since we have taken a new term [B, thereby ohtaining
the p,remise BA and the p,remise CB], heing so far without
knowledge that A belongs to C." 2
From Aristotle's deserip
1
tion of the syllogism which springs
out of reduction, it becomes increasingly clear that the delihera-
tion involved in r:eduction can be compared to the analytic
method in mathematics.
3
Basically, theanalytic method in
mathematics entails starting with the figura to be constructed
or theorem to be proved .and working back to something already
known. That would mean working hack to Ja known figure
which the mathematician can constructand from which he can
then draw the required figure; or working hack to a more easily
proved theorem from which he can deveJop' the p,roof he is seek-
ing. The mathematician works hack until he comes to a figure
2 Aristotle, Analytica Priora, 69a28-29, trans. A. J. Jenkinson, in The
Basio Works 0/ Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random
Rouse, 1941).
3 W. D. Ross, Aristotle (London: Methueu, 1949) p.41.
298 Andrea O. Birch
ora theorem whieh his existing knowledge enables hirn to con-
atruet or prove.
In Prior Analytics 11, 25 Aristotle does not compare reduc-
tion to the method of analysis. However, in the Nicoma,chean
Eth.ics he indieates that the steps of any deliheration are simi-
lar to those in mathematieal investigation. Aristotle first de-
serihels the method used in deliberation:
We deliberate not about ends but about means. For a doctor does
not deliberate whether he shall heal, nor an orator whether he shall
persuade, nor astatesman whether he shall produce law and order,
nor does :any one else deliberate about his end. They assume the end
and consider ho\V' and by what means it is to be attained; and if it
seems to be produced by several means they consider by which it is
most easily and best produced while if it is achieved by one only
they consider how it will be a.chieved by this and by what means this
will be achieved, till they come to the first cause, which in the order
of discovery is rthe last.
4
The desire for A begins. the deliberation proces.s; aehieving
A is the x of the problem. Persona must eon-sider by wh:at means
they ean aehieve or ac.eomplish A. Sometimes it will take
several steps to aecomplish the goal. They migh.t reeall that B
is the means to A; B becomes the unknown y. If they eannot
aeeomplish B, they may remembHr that C is the means to B;
C beeomes, the new unknown z, hut in this ease, it is something
they ean do at the moment. They must then translate their
choice of C into \aetions. The eompletion of their aetions is the
aetual achievement of A.
Aristotle then eompares. the method used in deliberation to
the method of analys.is us.ed in mathematics.:
For the person who deliberates seems to investigate and analyze in
the way described as rthough he were analysing a geometrical eon-
struction (not all investigation appears to be deliberation-for
4: Aristotle, Nioomaohean Ethios, 1112b12-20, trans. W. D. Ross, in
McKeon.
Dialectic 0/ Discovery 299
instance mathematical investigations-but all deliberation is investi-
gation), and whart is last in the order of analysis seems to be the
first in the order o'f becoming.
5
The method used in deliberation does seem to compare to the
mathematieal method of analysis. PoJya provides an algebraic
example from whieh wer will be ahle to draw out the compari-
son.
6
The object of the problem is to find x satisfying the equa-
tion: 8(4
X
+4-
X
) - 54(2
X
+ 2-
X
) + 101 = o. Someone might
recognize that, sinee 4
X
= (2
X
)2 and 4-
X
= (2
X
)-2, it would be
us.eful to introduce: y = 2
X
The equation with y ia simpler
than the original: 8(y2 + 1/y2) - 54(y + l/y) + 101 = o.
The task is not over, because it another substitution:
Z = Y + l/y. The equation becomes: 8z
2
- 54z + 85 = o.
The steps so far have involved analysis. Analysis ends with the
last ,equation and :a known on the part of the problem-solver:
how to solve quadratic equations. Synthesis i8 the second part
of the method and always, aecompanies analysis. Synthesis in-
volves carrying through the step8 of analysis in reverse order.
The pTohlem-solver first find8 Z (z= 5/2, 17/4), then y (y =
2, 1/
2
, 4, and ends by finding x, the original thing sought
(x = 1, -1,2, -2).
Based on Aristotle's eX
i
ample of deliheration and Polya's
ma,thematical ease it is possible to make six points concerning
the method of analysis.
Firs,t, in both ease8 analysis starts with an unknown x which
the deliberator or p,rohlem--solver assumes actually exists and
meets certain conditions.. The assumption of x is provisional;
it is made in order to begin the analysis.
7
The deliherator, for
example, ean imagine achieving A before he has actually done
so.
5 Ibid., 1112b2Q-24.
6 George Polya, How to Salve It (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1945) pp. 144-45.
7 lbid., p. 146.
300 Andrea O. Birch
Seeond, in deliheration and in mathematical problem-solving
the person works. hackwards until he arrives at something that
ean he done here and now or at something already known, or
until he discovers. that the p,roblem has no solution. Aristotle
adds, for example: "And if we eome to an inlpossibility, we
give up the seareh, e.g., if we need money and this eannot be
got: b,ut if a thing ap'pears possible we try to do it." 8
Third, meaningful analysis is really a dual method hecause
it must always be followed by synthesis.
Fourth, the last step of analysis is the first step of synthesis.
The last step in the deliberation is the first step that must ac-
tually be taken. The last step of the mathematical analysis
provides that whieh must be solved first in the synthesis.
Fifth, as hinted at in the fourth point, the order of synthesis
is opposite to the order of analysis. The order of calculation
(oraetion, or earrying Ollt a plan) is opposite to the order of
diseovery (or invention, or devising a plan).
Finally, analysis, is a powerful method of discovery. Pap-
P'US, the third century geometer who expounded on the method,
e o n s i d e ~ s analysis and synthesis, a powerful tool for diseovering
solutions to geometrieal p,rhlems.
9
Aristotle elearly eonsiders
analysis a way of diseovering the means tn achieve desired ends.
Polya believes that analysis is a way to discover solutions to
not only geometrieal problems but also algehraie problems and
even non.-mathematieal p:rohlems.
We ean now conelude that 'Sinee reduction ig a type of de-
liberation it too ean b1e eomp,ared to the method of analysis in
8 Nicomachean Ethics, 1112b24-66.
9 See Thomas Heath, A History 0/ Greek Mathematics., vol. 2 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1921); Jaako Hintikka and Unto Remes, The Methoa
0/ Analysis (Boston: D. Reidel, 1974); Norman Gulley, "Greek Geo-
metrical Analysis," Phronesis 3 (1958) 1-14; Noretta Koertge, "Anal-
ysis as a Method of Discovery During the Scientific Revolution," in Sci-
entific Discovery, Logio, ana Rationality, ed. Thomas NickIes (Boston:
D. Reidel, 1980).
Dialectic of Discovery 301
mathematics. Moreover, since the method of analysis, 18 a
method of di!scovery, the steps of a delibera1tion, or specifically
of a reduction, comprise a prrocess of diseovery.
One problem emerges in this scenario. Aristotle's diseussion
of reductlion in the Prior Analytics 11, 25 focuses on a reduc-
tive Isyllogism rwhich seems to express only the synthetic branch
of the dual methode If one desi:ves to he ahle to make th.e stalte-
ment "Virtue can be taught" (x), he may introduee the state-
ment "Virtue is knowledge" (y). That is uncertain, but is
more p.robable than x and easier to consider. Thinking hack,
he knows that "Knowledge can be taught" (z). Given this
known, he can express the syllogis.m: Knowledge can 1e taught
(z); Virtue is knowledge (y) ; therefore, Virtue ean be taught
(x). In isoJation from the diseovery process, the syllogism
embodies only the synthesis.
By considering reduction a type of deliberation and com-
paring it to the method of mathemaltical analysis, we were able
to hint at a broader meaning for reduction. Now we must try
to approach reduction from a different angle in order to clarify
its links to analysis. Sinee reduction is a type of argument
which Aristotle says ean be expressed in syllogi8tic form, we
turn to an exploration of Ari8totle's. understanding oei the syl-
logism as a way to shed light on the meaning of reduction. We
will find that the syllogi8ill itself iso not as restricted to the
synthe,tic proces8 as it first ap!pears. ThiSi will have implica-
tions for reduction.
111. Syllogism
Aristotle's gener.al definition of the syllogism is weIl known:
" A syllogism is an argument in which, certain. things having
been assumed, something other than these folIows of necessity
from their being 80."10 ThH task estahlished by this definition
1.0 Aristotle, Topica, 100a25-26, trans. E,. S. Forster (Cambridge: Har-
yard University Press, 1960); Analytica Priora, 24b18. See Ernst Kapp,
302 Andrea C. Birch
of the syllogism may be int.erp,reted in two ways.. One either
begins with a given set of premise:s and searches for possible in-
ferences from them, or one heings with a given " conclusion "
or "thing sought" (sueh as x in the syllogism above) and
searches for the possible p,remises. Kapp ,argues that Aristotle
understands the task in the second way.l1 To p,araphrase Kap,p,
of course Aristotle's, syllogism involves possible combinations
of premises leading to a given conclusion, hut this does not
mean it deals with inferences from given prenlises to a previ-
ously unknown conclusion.
Before focusing on the reductive syllogism, it is useful to
point out that evena demonstrative syllogisllt p,roductive of
seientific knowledge does not move from known premises to a
conclusion previously "Lmknown. In Posterior An,al'ytiC'sJ 11, 13,
Aristotle gives an example of demons,tration propter quid
J
demonstration of the rHasoned fact, which alone can be con-
sidered demonstration proper hecause it gives the reason why
an attribute inheres in a 8ubject :'12
What is near does not twinkle.
Planets are near.
Planets do not twinkle.
This is a genuine seientific syllogism sinee the lniddle term ex-
presses the cause, the explanation 01 the faot. It is, because
planets are near that they do not twinkle. What is clear is
that the characteristic feature of the demonstrative syllogism
is that it hasa scientific explanation in the premiseB. It does
not contain so'mething new in the conclusion. The conclusion
is already known. The movement in a demostrative syllogism
is not, therefore, from known p,remises to a, conclusion pTevi-
Greek Foundations 0/ Traditional Logic, (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1942) p. 11.
1.1 Kapp, ~ e e k Foundations, p. 71.
12 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, trans. Hugh Tredennick (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1960).
Dialeclic of Discovery 303
ously unknown. The conclusion that the planets do not twinkle
is an observed fact previously known by experience. The ob-
served fact does follow from the two premises, "What is near
does not twinkle" and "Planets are naar," as a. conclusion.
However, it iB not a new fact inferred from the given premises.
What is "new" is not the fact contained in the conclusion,
but the explanation provided in the minor premise. The scien-
tific explanation, discovered by other mHans Buch as induction,
comprises the p,remise from which the obsHrved fact can be
derived asa conclusion. Aristotle's demonstrative syllogism
systematizes the facts of the explanatory premise and the con-
clusion.
In a similar way, Aristotle's reductive systematizes
the knowns of the major p1remise, the probable explanation of
the minor premise, and the opinion which is exprHssed in the
conclusion. Although the demonstrative syllogism iso de1fined by
the middle term expressing the cause and a syllogism
is characterized by the middle term exp,ressing merely a p,rob-
able cause, their syllogistic forms, are similar. In both cases the
desired end or conclusion already exists'. The concluSlion of the
demonstrative ,gyllogism does not contain anything new. The
conclusion of the reductive syllogism contains a given opinion,
but no new information. What is "new" in the demonstra-
tive syllogism is the scientific explanation provided by the
minor premise. What is "new" in the reductive syllogism is
the attempt to express a p,robable explanation in the minor
premise.
It appears that Aristotle's, definition of the syllogism within
his develop,ed formal logic is. an artificial argument from
premises to the conclusion. The conclusion does. follow from
the premises.. Horwever, Aristotle continues to recognize that a
syllogistic argument musta.ctually fir8t involve a. search for
premises that lead to the given conclusion before the syllogism
304 Andrea C. Birch
itself is expressed. As we have seen, the conclusion of a syl-
logism is not a new fact derived from the prenlises. According
to Aristotle'B understanding of the syllogiBm, then, the order of
the premises and the conclusion in the syllogism itself is op-
posite to the order of thinking leading to the syllogism. If the
syllogiBm itself is p,receded by a movement from conclusion to
pi:r.emises that lead to the conclusion, it follows that when the
conclusion appears in the syllogism it will not be something
new.
The examples of the demonstrative and reductive syllogisms
show that Aristotle himl8elf interprets the definition of the
syllogism as a search for premises, not as a movement from
premises to new, and previou'Sly unknown, inferencers in the
conclusion. The reason for this is easy to explain if we ex-
plore the roots of the syllogism in dialectic.
IV. Dialectic
Aristotle was. influenced by the actual syllogistic practices
he reviews in the Topics.'13 The Top!ics deals with syllogisms as
they emerge in dialectic practice.
Aquinas explains the meaning of dialectic hy situating it
within the context of his discussion of reason and logic in
his Oom,menlary on the Posterior Ana.lytics.
14
Aceording to
Aquinas, logic is the art of p,roviding directive guidance for the
acts of reason. It is a rational science not only because it is in
accordance with reason, for any art can be described as rational
in that sense. Rather, logic is called a rational science p,rin-
cipally heeause it is concerned with the activity of reason as its
p,roper suhject matter. Since the subject matter of logic is the
activity of reaSOfi, Aqllinas writes that one should "view the
1.3 Kapp, Greek Foundations, pp. 73, 13. See Paul Durbin, Logic and
Scientijic Inquiry (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing, 1968) p. 32.
14 Thomas Aquinas, Oommentary on the "Posterior Analytics" 0/ Aris-
totle, trans. F. R. Larcher (Albany: Magi, 1970) pp" 1-2.
Dia.lectic of Discovery 305
parts oi logic according to the diversity among the acts oi
reason." 1.5
The primary act of reason is concerned with that which is
proper to reason; it is the discourse from one thing to another
in s.uch a way that through the known one comes to a knowl-
edge of the unknown. Within this act of reason, Aquinas makes
a threefold division. We will deal with the first tw'O divisions.
One process of reason induces necessity in such a way that
it is impossible to fall short of the truth, and so can result in
the certainty 01 science. The part of logic concerned with the
first proeess of rHason is c.alled Pa,rs Iu,dicaliva hecause it re-
sults in judgments possessing the certitude of science. The
PoS'terior Analytics oi Aristotle, concerned as it is with the
demonstrative syllogism ordered to material resolution, exem-
plifies that first part of logic.
In the second process of reason something true is concluded,
hut without the accompanying necessity. Pars I nventiva is the
p,art oi logic that deals, with the second process of reason. In-
v'entio or discovery does: not necessarily res.ult in certitude.
Aquinas differentiates three levels of certitude hased on the
nearnes.s to scientific certitude. The first level concerng. us here.
Although science is. not ob,tained in this first level, belief or
opinion may be achieved hased on the: prob'ahility of the initial
propositions. In such eases reason leans. completely to oue side
oi a contradiction. The Topics or dialectics deals. with the first
level of inV'entio hecause the dialectical syllogism, which is the
subject of th,e Topics} proceeds from premises which are prob-
able.
Within the first level oi Pars Inventiva} therefore, argumen-
tation is diale:ctical because, although it comes closest to sci-
entific certitude, it res.ults in opinion hased on the prohability
of the p,remises. The key points for this diseussion are that
15 Ibid., p. 1.
306 Andrea C. Birch
dialectic, which deals with dialectieal argumentation, must be
considered a branch of logic and that dialectic ean be sub..
sumed under that part of logic which deals rwith inventio or
diseovery.
In the T o p i c s ~ Aristotle explains that the study of dialectic
is useful for mental training, fr conversations., and for ap-
plication to the sciences. Through the Topics at least four
features of dialectical reasoning emerge.
First, a dialectical argument requires a questioner and a
respondent. The questioner knows from the heginning what he
wants to convin0e the respondent of or get the respondent to
agree to. It is. us.ually referred to as. the conelusion. However,
from the perspective of the questioner, what is to be accepted
by the respondent is present from the beginn.ing.
16
If we look
at the respondent we ean see that he must know the conclusion
from the beginning becau'be, by the type of ans.wers he gives,
hel tries. to avoid it.
Second, the questioner, knowing the conclu.sion he wants the
respondent to ,agree to, must find appropriate questions to ask
the respondent. The questioner's. task in a dialectical disputa-
tion is to discover arguments that sup'port the point of view ex-
pres:sed in thel conclusion. More speci:fically, his problem is to
:find p,remises the r:esponde,nt will aceept and from which the
respondent must acknowledge the conclusion that folIows..
Third, as Ari'stotle states. in the first chapter of the T o p i . c s ~
the premises of a dialectical argument are generally accepted
opinions that "command themselves to all or the majority or
to the wise." The assumptions of a dialectieal argument ,are,
therefore, opinions to whieh the questioner must get the re-
'spondent to agree.
Fourth, both Kap!p and Randall deseribe the thinking that
16 Kapp, Greek Foundations, p. 14. :See John Herman RandalI, Aristotle
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1960) p. 39.
Dialeclic of Discovery 307
leads the questioner to finding the dialeetical syllogism as
"thinking hackward."17 If a dialectieal s.yllogism is
fined as an argument in which the conclusion is derived from
premises exp,ressing opinions admitted by the respondent, then
itappears. that the order of reasoning leading to the s.yllogism
is opposite to the order of the p,remises and conclusion of the
syllogism. The questioner reasons from the conclusion (which,
as we have noted, is there from the beginning) to the p,remises,
although the order of the syllogis.m is from premises. to con-
clusion.
Kap,p argues that the demonstrative syllogigm is easily con-
nected with Aristotle'g understanding oi the syllogism that
takes into 'account the features. of dialectieal practices, p'articu-
larly, the givennes8 of the conclusion and the need to search for
premises. It seems ev;en more oovious that the reductive 8yl-
logism should be linked to dialectic. Reduction is characterized
not only by the pre-existence of the desi:ved end or conclusion
and the seareh for premises, hut also by the fact that its prem-
ises, although uncertain, are agreed upon beeause they are more
probable than the conclusion. This as:peet of the premis.es. of a
reductive syllogism .al1ows for a natural to the
agreed upon opinions. that form the p,remises. of a dialectical
argument. To repeat the point, if dialeetie ean he connected to
demonstration, it seems even more elear that the aetual pTactice
oi dialectic influeneed Aristotle's formulation of reduetion.
v. Cons.equences for a Logie oi Discovery
Wehave seen that Aristotle,through his discussion of
liberation, provides the initial evidence for comparing reduc-
17 Kapp, Greek Foundations, pp. 14-15; and RandalI, Aristotle, p. 39.
However, Kapp says that it is not ,as simple as a comedian indicated in
answer to a question about how he managed to have such funny ideas:
"Oh, that is quite easy, first I sit down and laugh and then-I think
backwards."
308 Andrea O. Birc'h
tion to mathematical analysis. Now after the hrief discussion
of the syllogism and dialectic we are able to determine more
specifically how r:eduction answer:s. to analysis and w:here it fits
into the whole process of analysis and synthesis.
The p-roces8 of arriving at the premises through working
backwards. from the thing sought can be described as reduction
proper. It is what Aristotle discusses as the process used in
deliheration and what he compares to the method of mathemati-
cal analysis.. Moreover, it leads. to finding the reductive syl-
logism. The process of moving from a comhination of premis.es
to the thing soughtas the conclusioll is the synthesis. that ex-
presses the reductive syllogism. The direction that leads to
finding the reductive syllogism is opposite to the order of the
premis.es and the conclusion (which expresses the thing sought)
in the reductive syllogism itself. The discussion of dialectic
help:s us to see that while the reductive syllogism certainly fol-
lows the order of synthesis it is also linked to analysis. A true
understanding of the reductive syllogism takes account of the
fact that syllogistic argunlent (in this case the reductive 8yl-
logism) must firs.t involve an actual reduction or search for
premises using the method of analysis.
The search for the source of reduction and the reductive
syllogism in the definition of the syllogism artd in dialectic has
actually illuminated the meaning of analysis and synthesis in
two ways. This. becomes important for the history and philos-
op,hy of scienee hecause during the scientific revolution. New-
ton's dual method of analysis. and synthesis went heyond mathe-
matics to become a powerful tool for discovery and proof in the
p,hysical sciences.
First, just a,s the reductive syllogism recognizes the link be-
tween arriving at the syllogism and the reverse order of the
syllogism itself, the ,dual method of analysis,and synthesis
acknowledges the inexorable connection between the order of
analysis and the order of synthesis. The reductive syllogism
Dia.lectic 0/ Discovery 309
cannot he understood in isolation from its dialectic roots which
express the p'r'ocess of discovering premises. In the same way,
the deduction of synthesis. cannot be understood in isolation
from the analytic or reductive pTocess of working hackwards to
discQiver p'remises.
Now it should be clear why mathematicians. and 8cientists
from Pappus to Newton have insis.ted that analysis be follow'ed
by synthesis. It s.hould also he ap'parent why explaining the
scientific pTocedure as following hypothetico-deductive method-
ology is limited. The hypothetico--deductive method focuses, in
Newtonian terms, on synthesis hut ignores analysis:. It begins
with :an hypothesis which acts as the starting point of deduc-
tion. This would he comp'arable to looking only at the deduc-
tion of synthesis. The hypot,hetico-deductive method ignores
any theory concerning how the scientist arrives at the hypo-
thesis in the first pIace. In other words, it ignores the dialectic
of analysis and reduction and thus neglects apart of the dis-
covery process of science. A consequence of the analysis/syn-
thesis model of discovery is that it offers the logic of analysis
(with its rich sources in mathematical analysis, reduction, and
dialectie) as a road to hypothesis formation. In so doing, it
provides the philosopher of science with a way to move beyond
the simplistic laheling of hypothesis. formation as a mysteriouS',
irrational pTOCes.s that is not amenahle to philosophie investi-
gation.
Secondly, if the link between reductionand the reductive
syllogism and the link between analysis, and synthesis cannot
be severed, the discovery process must he expanded to include
not only reduction and analysis, but the reductive syllogism
and synthesis. In other words, the process, of discovery must
include both reduction and its. accompanying reductive syllo-
gism or analysis and its accompianying :synthesis. The diseus-
sion ofdialectic should have made itap,parent why the method
of analysis and synthesis is considered a discovery p'rocess. In
310 Andrea G. Birch
brief, sinee dialeetic is a logic of diseovery,. and sinee the re-
duetive syl10gism doe8 not forget its roots in dialec.tic, arriv-
ing at p'remises through reduction and expressing them in a re-
ductive syllogism ean both be eonsidered p,arts of a dialectic
proeess of discovery. Sinee an,alysis eompares to reduetion,
analysis appeaT8 ,as an original dialeetieal p'roeess. And since
synthesis, whieh ean he stated as a reduetive syllogism, eannot
be understood in isolation from analysis, the dual method of
analysis and synthesis emerges as a dialeetieal procedure and
a pirocess of discovery.
In eaeh ease we ean see that the analysis';synthesis model of
diseovery (or the reduetion/reduetive syllogism model of dis-
covery, whieh is the same thing) elarifies issues. in the logic of
diseovery dehates. The analysis'; synthesis model ean hegin to
solve the probilem of what " diseQivery " refers to. In diseussing
the word " discovery," friends of diseovery often wrestle with
two questions. First they ask " what is being The
analysis/synthesis model of discovery provides the grounds for
saying that the analytic arm in eonjunction with stages of syn-
thesis involves the discoiVery of hypotheses or "ball park solu-
tions" while the synthetic arm in its iinal form ean lead to the
diseovery of larws or theories. In other words, the analysis/
synthesis model ean easily expand the meaning of discovery to
inelude the p
,
roeeS8 leading to either the tentative hypothesis, or
the verified theory as the aehievement.
The seeond question often asked is " what is the relationship
between discovery and justification One major a.dvantage
of the analysis/synthesis model of diseovery is that it allows the
philosopher to diseuss and "justifieation" without
getting emhroiled in the elassieal, but misleading, diseovery/
justiiication distinetion. Speeifieally, one ean diseus'S. the sup-
port for a claim in terms of synthesis rather than in terms of
justifieation aa such. Synthesis eonstituting a dialectieal p,roof
results in plausible solutions that ,are worthy of further pursuit.
Dialectic 0/ Discovery 311
This type of synthesis corresponds to preliminary justifica-
tion.
18
Synthesis constituting :strict scientific or demonstrative
proof leads to universal laws. or theories. This type of syn-
thesis c:an be compared to final justification.
19
The point is that
the analysis/s:ynthesis model can draw a natural connection he-
tween discovery and proof or justi:fication. Analysis and dia-
lectical synthesis are ,a closely intertwined discovery process
and clearly illustrate the link hetween discovery and proof (as
preliminary or dialectical). In addition, analysis and dialecti-
cal synthesis. can prepare the way for demonstrative synthesis.
This s.how's ,a strong relationship hetween discovery ( as analysis
and dialectical synthesis) and justi:fication in the more tradi-
tional sense of demonstration.
Further work must be done on various. issues surrounding
the logic of discovery. In those endeavors, the vocabulary as-
sociated with allalysis and s:ynthesis. should not be ignored.
Taking into account the distinctions and relationships between
analysis: and synthesis and their historical links. to reduction,
syllogism, and dialectic can lead to a more p,recise way of deal-
ing with the is:sues. The analysis/synthesis model of discovery
can complement some of the work already heing done. Fr ex-
ample, the classical method of analysis and synthesis, which
can trace its. roots. through Newton and Pappus to Aristotle,
c:an lend support to contemporary attempts that separate dis-
covery into a generation phase, a piursuit phase (including pre-
liminary evaluation), and an acceptance phase (including final
justi:fication) .20
To conclude, recall our original question : In what way does,
Aristotelian reduction constitute a logic of We now
1.8 Thomas NickIes, "Introductory Essay: Scientific Discovery and the
Future of Philosophy of Science," in Soientijio Disoovery, Logio, ana. Ra-
tionality, p. 20.
1.9 Ibid,.
20 Ibid., pp. 10, 20.
312 Andrea C. Birch
have at least n.ve ways. to answer that question.. First, it would
ap'pear correct to say that reduction as. a process of delibera-
tion that works. hackwards toward p,remises leading to a tenta-
tive solution constitutes a logic of disco:very. Second, since re-
duction is a proces:s that must be expressed in the reductive
syllogism to complete the search for the thing sought, reduction
and its reductive syllogism together make up a logic of dis-
covery. Third, reduction aB analysis is a logic of discovery.
Fourth, reduction and the reductive syllogism. as a method of
analysis and synthesis comprise a logic of discovery. Fifth,
the reason that reduction or analysis constitute a logic of dis-
eovery is because, ultimately, they are dialectical procedures.
The ground for all of these statements is that the syllogism
,and, in particular, the reductive syllogism, has its roots in
dialectic, a branch of logic that deals with discovery. Rather
than using the phrase "logic of discovery" or even "method
oi discovery," it would perhaps he most accu.rate to speak of
the "dialeetic of discovery."
St. Mary's Oollege,
Winona, Minnesota.