Embodied ethnography. Doing culture

Over recent years there has been serious research and debate within the social sciences focused on the constitution of knowledge in various settings and contexts. This work has raised issues that seem to have become central to discussions about anthropological research and writing. In this paper I will be arguing that although anthropology has engaged with these issues it has not applied the insights of recent theory to this process. In addition, where these theoretical developments have been applied to anthropological investigation there has been no recognition of the issues raised by critical examinations of the research process. I will go on to argue that applying recent theoretical perspectives of our examination of the research process as well as to analysis of the results will create further potential for research, analysis and theory. Critical examinations of research, epistemology and the constitution of knowledge have highlighted that ‘facts’, and knowledge about them, are actively constituted rather than being pre-existing and discovered (for example, see Haraway 1991a). The analysis of ‘facts’ as constructed in turn problematises the idea of the objective detached observer recording pre-existing facts. It has also been suggested that far from being value-free and disinterested, objectivity itself is not only a value-laden cultural artefact but also a political artefact built on, and upholding, certain relations of power. Not only has the unquestioned legitimacy and authority of positivism been brought into question but it has also been pointed out that all people – observers and participants – occupy inherently subjective and limited positionings. Consequently, it is claimed that all positionings and perspectives are inherently partial and that claims to objectivity are merely a means to privilege and extend the authority and status of certain positioned and partial perspectives. These points significantly question any person’s ability to gain objective knowledge as all knowledge is inherently subjective and partial (Haraway 1991b). Implicit in this point is a critique of the privilege of objectivity and scientific professionalism and the suggestion that all perspectives, while unique, cannot be seen to be inherently inferior or superior. All of these points have raised serious issues for the process and possibilities of anthropological research. In relation to ethnographic fieldwork, it is now widely accepted that the anthropologist can no longer be seen as an observer recording social facts and processes but must be seen as an active, situated, participant in the construction of accounts and representations. It has been suggested that these accounts be acknowledged as partial fictions because they have been actively constructed through the use of techniques that include omissions and rhetoric. ‘Even the best ethnographic texts – serious, true fictions – are systems, or economies, of truth’ (Clifford and Marcus 1986: 7). There has also been a concern with the anthropologist’s ability to

Social Anthropology (2000), 8, 1, 51–60. © 2000 European Association of Social Anthropologists


for the proposition that autobiography be used as a tool. relationships and social order are constituted for people in the processes of ongoing social interaction. either after they have left it and are writing up or as individuals with internal cultural values of their own. the main analysed and considered attributes and activities of the anthropologist are intellectual in terms of thinking. these concerns have led to a heightened critical focus on the process of constructing representations in text (Clifford and Marcus 1986). see Okely and Callaway 1992). see Pool 1994. however. there have been attempts to turn the research gaze on to anthropologists themselves (for example. I will argue that one of the reasons for this is that the reflexive anthropologist has all too often been constructed as a sentient consciousness reflecting on fieldwork without any consideration of the implications of his or her physical presence in the field. Pool uses a concept of dialogue that implies the priority of verbal communication rather than embodiment implying the intersubjective significance of mutual physical presence. and indeed critical reflection on anthropologists’ writing. the focus on analysis. To do this. Firstly. Csordas 1990). So while I agree that the logic of the argument for greater reflexivity is sound in theory and intention. Secondly. and in 52 AARON TURNER . For the most part. disposition. While I agree that the anthropologist is an integral and influential part of the research process and the representations produced as part of it. In some cases attempts at reflexivity have kept consideration of anthropologists and their activities separate from discussions of the process operating in the field of their research. I will argue that the ways that people have attempted to engage with these points seem to be to restricted and limited. it is argued that the anthropologist has to be visibly reinserted into the research and the representations that come from it. This perspective on what we see in the field has been used to shift the anthropologist’s attention away from the study of an enduring society or culture in itself to the ways culture is lived. relying on some of the key distinctions that they intended to overcome. this seems to be seen as an issue of presenting the research process and the influences on it as clearly as possible. Much examination of anthropologists themselves. and practices of people in the field has been highlighted by much recent anthropology – particularly medical anthropology – on embodiment (Scheper-Hughes and Lock 1987. like the observer and the observed. it is proposed that the anthropologist must reflexively interrogate the processes by which they themselves contributed to the construction of the information and representations constructed through the research. Because of these issues. As well as a critical examination of writing as the part the anthropologist plays in the construction of representations. (For an account in which the presence of the anthropologist is taken as an essential starting point. Csordas (1990: 5) has suggested the value of seeing embodiment as ‘the existential ground of culture’ through which realities. focuses on anthropologists separated from the field of research. the practice of reflexivity has often done little to reinsert the anthropologist in representations of the field and the construction of knowledge about it. writing and the anthropologist’s history and values maintains a distinction between the anthropologist and the context of fieldwork leaving the anthropologist’s participation in the field unconsidered. writing or cultural values. This pattern in the engagement with reflexivity has two important points for the argument of this paper.privilege their own knowledge and perspectives above those of the people they have worked with. Consequently.) The significance of the actual physical presence. the intellectual work of thinking and writing (of anthropologists) and the work of daily life (of the subjects in the field).

activity and interaction in a social field. thereby effecting what happens and the significance it has for the constructions that emerge for participants. Consequently. Embodiment seems to shift the study of society and culture to an examination of processes at work in everyday experience and interaction. Arising from these perspectives is the idea that culture only exists and persists in the form in which it is lived and that this form is itself constituted in ongoing intersubjective interaction. sensing. To do this. culturally informed (Bourdieu 1977) and as a mnemonic of tradition (Connerton 1989). it would seem that we should include as an embodied subject the whole anthropologist in the form in which he or she was present in the research process. The distinction often made between anthropologists and the social field in which they are researching is an important issue that I will question later in the paper. However. My involvement has been very active and has consisted of a lot more participation than EMBODIED ETHNOGRAPHY 53 . practices and political configurations. If we intend to include a consideration of the part we have played in the research process and the representations constructed from it. culture can be understood to be embodied and sustained and developed in practice. but are covered by the blanket-term ‘informants’. this in turn involves developing relationships.the living of it. The anthr opologist in the r esear ch pr ocess In this section I aim to examine the implications of applying the theoretical insights of work on embodiment to the anthropologist’s role in the research process. A focus on embodiment within anthropology has generally involved a focus on the embodied experience and practice of others. This perspective links with ideas of bodily practice as mindful (Scheper Hughes and Lock 1987). the reflexive anthropologist has remained present as an analytical consciousness but not as an embodied. The aim of this paper is to highlight the opportunity that embodiment presents both to our examination of the part we play in our own research and to the object of that research more generally. A central point for this paper arising from this perspective is the shift from seeing culture as principally located in people’s minds in concepts and values to a perspective on culture as the embodied and enacted result of continually coming to terms with the world in which one lives. at least to some extent. implying a fixed role and fixed relationship that seems to appear from nowhere. The bulk of my fieldwork until now has consisted of becoming involved in the daily lives of young white guys in Southall and nearby areas of west London. It is also interesting to note that informants are often seen to belong to the anthropologist – ‘my informants’ – and not the social context in question. interaction and disposition. while the anthropologist is once again distanced from the account. Participant observation involves. My main point at this stage is that the anthropologist cannot be present in a social field without participating and becoming a significant author of events. the anthropologist’s presence. socially situated participant. My aim in this paper is to highlight some of the implications of the absence of the embodied reflexive anthropologist and to suggest some of the possibilities that arise from placing them at the centre of analysis. constituted. It is interesting to note in view of my present argument how these relationships are often not described as shifting social relationships that have constantly to be negotiated. acting. I will draw on my field work amongst younger people in an area of West London. I would like to illustrate this by reference in my own research.

Further. In my effort to participate I attempt to play football competently and not exceed my competence. Even if the conversation topic is changed I will occasionally be asked: ‘So. I have sometimes noticed the hesitancy of others to express an opinion. Even in speech. Most of the things we decide to do are leisure activities and many of these are games that are usually. This discussion is pursued until something is decided on. So I did more than just go along with competition. They are watching the way I act to see my preference and I am doing the same. as I have suggested. I have also noticed that the young man who I have been closest to and who brought me into the collective has at times used me to create a decision that has gone unchallenged by others. At first I was struck by an awareness of the significance of the appearance of competence and the ability to compete effectively. to my own surprise I actively engaged in it. Despite my attempts to let natural cultural processes take their course it is evident that I am actively participating in deciding what we will do. It seems clear to me that I am a significant participant in affecting the practices we engage in and how we come to do them. At the same time I endorsed and furthered the competition and confirmed the importance and natural taken-for-grantedness of competence at football (I will come to my negation of that later). When I am absent. For example. On meeting or arranging to meet most talk is asking what guys ‘feel like doing’ or what ‘we could do’. Each time I noticed him become more intent and less relaxed. I am also a significant participant in affecting the way practices are engaged in and carried out as well as the meanings that are constituted from them. if not always. even old ice cream sticks are turned into something to do and a means to compete.observation. Secondly. I have been wary of this process because I want to do what they want to do. Thirdly. during some periods I have had a car and am willing to contribute to the cost of activities (as a participant). They try ideas out on me and then decide on something that I agree on. when this young man improved at pool my playing intensified. I suspect that the process and dynamic of the way choices are made is different in some way. In fact. If I tried to just emulate what others were doing and go along with things I would be endorsing and promoting a certain way of doing things. quite naturally saying 54 AARON TURNER . I thought I should throw a game to help the research but when it came to the shot I did not. Whether this young man often makes the decisions in the group or not. structured around competition. I can not help but be actively involved in the decision-making process. I have never refused to compete in a game and this may have contributed to competition being the main form of play when we are together. Most of the time spent together has involved ‘doing things’. This may be because I was reluctant to state a preference or it may be because they are unsure of expressing themselves openly when I am there. but not show it to be as limited as it seems compared to their competence. I also participate in these. quickly racking up the balls for a chance to win again. By trying not to affect the process I endorse choices as they are run by me and in the end endorse the final choice. what do you want to do?’. I noticed the importance of winning when I played one young man at pool and won. and perhaps more importantly. I have no idea what happens when I am absent or even if the issue of what to do arises in the same way or is dealt with in the same way when I am not there. I am present. it is clear that I am affecting the dynamics of the process and the resources and balance of power by which these processes are engaged in. so I do not want to make the decisions and try to express enthusiasm for doing something while insisting that I do not mind what. Firstly. so our demeanour and actions are affecting the process and understandings of it.

During fieldwork I have con- EMBODIED ETHNOGRAPHY 55 . to which the anthropologist may or may not be able to gain ‘insidership’. Consequently. This representation. and this negotiation then becomes an important focus of the analysis of embodied interaction from a position of involvement and experience. misses an essential fact through which these activities were pursued. the anthropologist must be seen as an inside participant in the negotiation of culture. We have learned nothing of ‘them’. although parallelling many anthropological representations of ‘cultures’. The point I am trying to make does not in any way relate to debates about the ability of anthropologists to become cultural ‘insiders’. I am putting aside the consideration of insider and outsidership. there is a distance between the observed actions of embodied subjects and the representations of these. Debates about anthropologists as insiders or outsiders depend on the idea of a culture existing before the anthropologist arrives. To extract the anthropologist as separate from the cultural subjects involved would be to misrepresent the social configuration in which the practices and meanings that emerged was negotiated. and on what terms. But to extract the anthropologist as a participant in this process would be to present a unfounded fiction. I am not suggesting that the anthropologist is gaining the knowledge and understanding to become an ‘insider’ in an existing culture in which they were previously an ‘outsider’. As implied here. I was an active participant in the processes whereby these practices were engaged in and in the processes in which their significance was found. in order to consider from a different perspective the anthropologist’s position in a social context. an insider to the social processes by which practices are developed and gain meaning. I will give a few examples from my own research. this is not a representation that can be attributed to ‘their culture’ or to things ‘they do’. and the boundary and continuity it implies. the anthropologist’s participation becomes the object of study rather than a variable to be controlled for through analytic reflexivity. Traditionally. Consequently. The focus on processes that the anthropologist is directly involved in also allows her/him to interrogate processes from the position of experience of embodied negotiation in which reality and social order are discovered and constituted. The anthropologist is a significant participant. Accepting involvement as the basis of interpretation adds to the possibilities of analysing these processes. Considering the anthropologist as an embodied participant also allows the problematisation of the anthropologist’s own experience as a serious object of analysis. I will come back to these issues later. is an important consideration for observation and analysis. or giving a smile or laugh after a slip or outrageous miss of the ball actively confirm and claim the importance of competence. In view of my participation in these processes it would be a violent misrepresentation to state or even construct a representation along the lines of ‘young white males often play football. This raises issues about concepts of social and cultural identity in relation to both the concept of insiderness and other concepts of identity that rely on reference to ‘us–them’ distinctions.‘unlucky’ after a missed pool shot or missed goal. and much of their interaction is around competition’. Consequently. The part that the anthropologist can play in these negotiations. What I have learned about is ‘we’ as a negotiating social configuration. competition and success. the examination of embodied interaction as a constitutive process seems to rely heavily on interpretation of uses of other bodies and of the significance and outcomes of interactions. and persisting during and after their stay.

So embodied experience in the field can also inform us about our own embodiment and what we take for granted and do without reflection. Playing football or tenpin bowling. This seems to offer further possibilities for employing anthropology as cultural critique by making the familiar strange (Marcus and Fischer 1986). What this term refers to is the configuration of subjects who are present. Since the anthropologist will generally be examining processes among configurations 56 AARON TURNER . I caught the end of the reply that followed the short laugh: ‘He is a bit odd but you’ll get used to him’. Although I thought I played for fun. This led me to be more serious about the way I played while trying not to look as if this was the case. to build on this idea I will be using the concept of the ‘socially constituting configuration’. and are therefore actively involved in negotiating cultural practices and the meanings drawn from them. and kicking it carefully as if aware of a degree of attention and scrutiny. It shows a strong relation to sensory experience. when we went out to play the other young men I was with immediately displayed all their flash footwork and ball-handling skills. has opened up avenues for the analysis of the ‘kick around’ for experience. it shows me embodying it.stantly been surprised at the things my body does quite naturally that I never would have expected. In terms of competition when playing pool or running. The anthropologist’s experience provides some basis. This observation. I was struck by the intense feeling when all ten pins went down or when the ball hit the post or was saved. although I agreed with myself that it was a good idea not to play to win. When it came to football. This incident shows more than me learning their value of competence. At first. legitimating and promoting it in a bid to develop my ability to persevere in the field. This led me to observe my approach to playing pool in other contexts. The comment implied a link between performance on the pitch and the kind of consideration I would be given as a person generally. I still did so. These experiences suggest that the feat of achieving a set of prescribed outcomes through manipulation of bodily practice is more than just a meaning-making process or a means of establishing social position. I only did this when I was sure I could win if I wanted to. missing the ball a couple of times and smiling at my mistake. Even smaller boys who would kick the ball back into play if it went too far seemed both to relish the chance of kicking the ball. I began watching myself trying to look competent but not show the limits of my competence. which started with my own experience. Interrogation of the anthropologists’ experience may also allow for the development of understanding of the relationship between experience and social practices and processes. The socially constituting configuration So far I have suggested the importance of recognising the anthropologist as a participant in social processes and grounding research and analysis at this point. I played casually. for analysis of these relationships. Playing with other players who were not so good and also noticing the way small boys kicked the ball back to us I noticed how carefully boys seemed to be about kicking a ball right when trying to kick it back. although not a necessarily comparable one. social positioning and personhood. Football began to seem as much about appearance and showing oneself playing as it was about the actual game itself. One of the guys muttered something to another. on other occasion I played to win and the winning was the enjoyment.

I am using the term to examine the use of focusing on configurations of people actually present in social interactions. significance and terms of social relationships and social networks. gave me a wink and muttered ‘You got to give them a chance’. To examine the occasions on which it becomes impossible to assume community and a sharing of some common reality is extremely important for understanding how notions of ‘us’. Often it was said that there was ‘nothing to do’ in the area and this was often linked to the kinds of people around the area. I decided to let him know that I really could not play darts and was doing my best. The concept also has the benefit of not assuming membership. that in doing so the ways that these other influences are brought to bear on negotiations must be examined rather than assumed. it is completely dependent on who is present or brought to significance by the people present. as if some breach had EMBODIED ETHNOGRAPHY 57 . The concept of the ‘socially constituting configuration’ is useful as it does not necessitate the assumption of the boundaries and extension of culture or community. the idea and concept of community becomes problematic. At any one time and place this collective constitutes the embodied subjects doing culture. On one occasion a man who was watching me play darts with the same incompetence as the young women I was playing with. he looked distinctly uncomfortable and I also felt uncomfortable. Culture as embodied practice. and demonstrates this fact. but it can be widened out to include the influence of people not present and – in view of network theory – objects. as are the nature. when I was using it. However.in which they themselves are present. his expression changed. how is it possible for people to assume that the basis for social life is shared and can be left unsaid? This is especially the case where there is an anthropologist present who does not belong to what may be an assumed community. In these cases both the nature of the area and its facilities. were constituted as significant participants influencing what we did and where we did it. in analysing the significance of the car as a participant I would suggest that we examine how its significance was constituted by the participants present. I have become increasingly attentive to the occasions on which I am kept within the range of acceptable by my age being overlooked. Halfway through telling him. How is it possible for people to assume community or society? In other words. It is important to note that I participated in this process by trying to go along with what the other wanted to do and being eager to contribute in some way. If we see the socially constituting configuration as the context of the constitution of culture and social relationships. Examining the processes within a socially constituting configuration that is constantly in flux and changing in constitution disallows the assumption of ‘community’ as a necessarily significant unit of social constitution. In my case I am not within the age range of people that these young people normally hang out with. influencing the practices that we engaged in. by being seen as a little odd but something ‘you will get used to’ when my incompetence at football causes observers to laugh. and ‘community’ and ‘society’ remain important constructs in the face of constant assault. this raises the question of how inclusion is constituted. disposition and interaction is constituted in the intersubjective interaction of socially constituting configurations. my car became a significant ‘actor’. this socially constituting configuration should be seen as a socially constituting ‘we’ or ‘us’ rather than socially constituting ‘them’. however. For example. together with other absent residents. When I had the car it was usually suggested that we go and do things that had to be driven to. It seems to me. It is also important to note that other factors and people were brought to bear in the making of these decisions.

as was the ability of us as two males to collude in this fiction. Most of the time I have been with these ‘mates’ they have been together. However. Joe. and Rich is understood to be Indian. as do Tom and Don. They see themselves as mates and have often described themselves as ‘us lot’ and talked about possibilities for action that constitute them as some kind of group or community. Don is agreed to be black. For example.occurred between us. These networks are often ‘cut’ (Strathern 1996) as these other friendships are not always extended to all the ‘mates’. implying that the white people in the pub were welcome and in some way belonged. You are in the centre of Southall’. His expression changed again. Joe smiled. To me. but as just a game of fun. Al expressed an unwillingness to accept community with this guy who used to be a friend. it’s just a game’. . they also have networks that extent to other mates. they will say: ‘You know what we should do? We should all . on this night in the area we were in. but has a cockney accent. while providing a basis for the three of us to be together that extended to a wider ‘community’ of whites. . Don and Tom and the others seem clear that when Al is invited out by his other mates. It is relevant to note here that they seem to agree that they all have different ethnicities. Here again the terms 58 AARON TURNER . saying that he was the only ‘blacky’ there. They all laughed and agreed. and he shrugged: ‘Never mind. His comments implied ideas about insiderness. His comments implied that the young man had no reason to be in the pub because of his skin colour. wondering at what he was doing. They see their community as the centre of their life in the area. In my research it has become clear that certain ‘communities’ are implicitly or explicitly constituted and brought to bear in certain instances but are absent or denied in others within the interactions of a socially constituting configuration. to go to a party in another area of London. This way of talking. Al invited me out with his mate. ‘This is it. Al was not keen to met him because he was ‘an idiot’. Joe remarked on his presence in the pub. these signal the moments at which society becomes possible to resume and the principles by which it is seen to operate come to be reinstated by slights of definition. they are not necessarily invited. Al also has other friends that the others know. When I have been there I have been understood to be Jewish. and if they are. they are not always accepted. I interpreted this occasion as an instance in which the assumption of male superiority in competence in certain activities that allows them to patronise women was displaced. It also seems to be assumed that it can be taken for granted that everyone will act together. while Joe tried to convince Al that Jake was ‘all right’ and a ‘good bloke’. However. at their houses and going out to other people’s house and blues parties. In these suggestions it seems clear who is being talked about. It is also assumed that they will stand up for each other’s interests and fight on each other’s behalf. using the term ‘nig nog’. Al is seen to be of Irish background. Tim is seen to be Australian (despite a cockney accent and an English upbringing in London). also discredited the community of mates that Al and I spent time with at other times. I have spent a lot of time among a group of ‘mates’. As Al said when we were all in his living room. It was Al who invited me to spend time with him and his mates in the pub. Gesturing with his head towards a passing Asian-looking young man.’. but with whom he often goes out with separately. Later that evening another guy was supposed to turn up. not as a site for the establishment of social position and assumptions about its basis. Tom is seen to be English with gypsy blood. outsiderness and community. His reaction was to redefine darts. he joked that he must be lost. in discussions about people or events at the pub at which the are regulars.

By not situating research and analysis in the embodied participating anthropologist many opportunities for theory and analysis are being missed. relations bore no reference to any community and were wholly based on personal feelings and choice without relation to a wider population. the mood of reflexivity within anthropology has been engaged with mainly as intellectual subjects. ‘Introduction. Consequently. turned up with three mates of his own to whom we were introduced. 1977. Partial truths’. extending to different people and populations on varying terms and at different times. Clifford and G. At the party Jake. Berkeley: University of California Press.ac. EMBODIED ETHNOGRAPHY 59 . culture and identity are central for a more processual and critically informed theorisation of social processes. E. J. Drinks were passed round and shared. Considering the anthropologist as a participant forces us to reconstruct the terms on which we view other participants. These opportunities are based on accepting the anthropologist as a participant in various and varying constituting configurations. The problematisations this perspective raises about society. one of Jake’s friends was Asian-looking but this was not commented on at the time or after. This focus on social constituting configurations shifts our examination from local contexts and people as examples that can allow us to understand wider cultures or communities to an examination of the ways in which culture and social relationships are constituted. As we made our way back to Southall. As I have argued. It makes more sense to ask how it is that groups and communities are constituted as significant at different times and what the significance and participation of different people and practices in these processes implies. Outline of a theory of practice. We all smiled and laughed and sat on the two couches in the party. Interestingly enough. only admitting people that one liked or knew were ‘alright’. Al declared: ‘Jake’s mates were all right’.of ‘community’ have changed. This was a community: ‘your friends are my friends’. in (eds. Marcus. to ignore the participation of the anthropologist in the processes of the development of cultural practice among varying socially constituting configurations seems to miss the opportunity of developing a comprehensive analysis of these processes. We talked and interacted as a group. and Joe agreed. who was white. In relation to these kind of social processes it does not make sense to consider people as part of any community or group. 1–26. I have also argued that perspectives on embodiment suggest that by being present in the field the anthropologist becomes a significant participant in the intersubjective constitution of culture. The poetics and politics of ethnography. We have to move from seeing participants as unproblematic members of a society or culture to examining the methods by which society is constantly remade as a possibility against its own inconsistencies.) J. Clifford. P. It could even be argued that no specific community was brought to bear in this instance. This example shows how different ‘communities’ are constituted and denied. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Writing culture. Aaron Turner Centre for the Study of Health Sickness and Disablement Department of Human Sciences Brunel University Uxbridge UD8 3PH United Kingdom Email: Aaron.uk References Bourdieu.Turner@brunel. 1986.

1986. N. Pool. and Lock. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 2: 517–35. and Marcus. and Fischer M. London: Free Association Books.). Haraway.). M. (eds. ‘The mindful body. Okely. E. M. London: Routledge. Marcus. R. Csordas. Anthropology as cultural critique. D. 60 AARON TURNER . Writing culture. 1986. Conversations in a Cameroon village. in Simians. cyborgs and women. J. Ethnos 18: 5–47. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. London: Free Association Books. A prolegomenon to future work in medical anthropology’. J. 1992. J.Clifford. 1991a. The science question in feminism and the privilege of the partial perspective’. ‘Embodiment as a paradigm for anthropology’. How societies remember. The reinvention of nature. G. E. 1989. T. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1987. cyborgs and women. H. J. Anthropology and autobiography. 183–201. the reinvention of nature. 1996. Oxford: Berg. Berkeley: University of California Press. M. 1994. 1990. J. Dialogue and the interpretation of illness. An experimental moment in the human sciences. Connerton. Simians. 1991b. Strathern. The poetics and politics of ethnography. ‘Cutting the network’. G. ‘Situated knowledges. (eds. P. and Callaway. Medical Anthropology Quarterly 1: 16–41. Scheper-Hughes..

Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful