Defending Europe

The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy

Edited by Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler

remains a sine qua non of the wider relationship. the two enlargemenrs are intrinsically linked because the stabilization of the European security space is as much (if not more) about economic security. Hungary and Poland were invited to join the Alliance. an nflliction." 1 50 far. However. a certain degree of political incoherence between the allies as. Indeed. There is. This search is lent some urgency by the election of a new adrninistration seemingly less predisposed toward Europe and the allies. and yet for whom enlargement. in many ways. the Czech Republic. of both the EU and NATO. the EU endeavors to beco me more military.French t NATO's Madrid Summit in July 1997. Deterrence must be backed up by A . on the other. therefore. on the one hand. as military. NATO atternpts to become a more polirical organization while. not jusr for the Alliance but also for the EU.I CHAPTER 9 Dilemmas ofNATO Enlargement Julian Lindley. The Alliance also committed itself to "extend further invitations in coming years to narions willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership. This takes place against the backdrop of Kosovo that demonstrated that NATO must be able to act in pursuit of security as well as exist in rhe interests of security. Although they are linked they are not politically compatible. enlargement is. so good. and because of the political complications they entail and rhe pressures rhey create enlargement undoubtedly destabilizes transatlantic relations at a time when the emphasis is on the search for a new political bargain between traditional members.

and its allies over the future shape and role of the Alliance. the internal and external pressllres upon NATO I an organization are profound and becoming steadily more so as Europ and America drift into a dysfllnctional strategic relationship in whk 11 rhere is little or no consensus over the risks and threats that rnust h confronted or the solutions that must be found. therefore. In the fog of a peaceful but vaguely unstable European continent I what cannot be denied is that the political heart of the Alliance is changing radically and ir is difficult to assess what t~e out:ome will. the 2002 NATO Review Conference. NATO's assistant secretary general for Political Mfairs. crent a diffuse security role for the Alliance. the . which find themselves floating in the military rnid-Atlantic. (including civilian aid programs). profound malaise in the relationship manifests itself. in many ways. be. U. enlargement brings as many complications to the Alliance. the policy toward Russia and. establish a broad security guarantee in rhe European security space. there are already four levels of military capability in rhe Alliance-the United States. the process will become a litmus test ((li the state of transatlantic relations as the debate over extending the se 11 rity umbrella meets head on the need for greater military efficiency. a redefinition of burden sharing in a cornplcx security environment that requires holistic. not just enlargement. the United States will doubtless r~act to this perceived drift in its now time-honored way by atternpung to reassert U. if the partner countries are added to rhis politico-milirary soup rhen the problem becomes even more complex.jThere is also a degree of urgency because. which is precisely the outcome the process seeks to avoid. Implications of Enlargement for NATO: The Legitimacy/Effectiveness Dilemma NATO enlargement is paradoxical because while embracing states in a security regime is normally deemed to reinforce its strength this is by no means automatically the case. sanctions against Iraq are but rhree areas wher . In addition to the tensions over the strategic direction of rhe AlIiance.S. is likely to prove an exacting and delicate affair. it is a challenge to see how further enlargement can take place without some sort of settlernent between the United Stat . Missile defens I European defense. Indeed. As early as January 1996. particularly in a Congress that has driven much of the enlarge ment processo Consequently. hegemony is not what it used to be. the other continental Western Europeans and. Enlargement tests that balance becau it redefines the political mission. an enlarged NATO is a leap in the dark because no one really knows how successive enlargements will change the political balance and/or the military efficiency of the Alliance. reinforce the milítary role of the EU as juxtaposition to that of NATO and undermine the basic political consensus and military mission of the Alliance. At worst. duplicate OSCE. failcd promises not only complicate relations with candidate countrres but also create a c1imate of insecurity. NATO enlargement. complicates decision making. reduces the qualitative levei (lI military-operational effectiveness and costs a lot of money-money rh I no one seems willing to spend. as the EU is now finding to its ~ost. at a time of supreme American power.S. either in the wider context of European security or in the case of NATO. as security benefits.182 e Julian Lindley-French Dilemmas of NATO Enlargement e 183 credible conventional capability. Certainly. 01 course. At the military levei there will certainly be no NATO standard of military capability. such change seems poorly appreciated m the Ulllt·tI States. therefore. an enlarged NATO could help to reinforce interlocking institutions. finally. civil-military approach . Indeed. Gebhardt von Moltke. rhere are a host of more imrnediate problems. No! surprisingly. is that NATO will come to resemble a military "clearing house"a kind of interoperability nexus in which asymmetrical capabilities are cobbled together in some form of (hopefully) working politico-rnilitary mechanism. Indeed.-European disagreements over an extra-European role fOI' NATO. which is vanishing into the military-technical distance. borh political and functional.. wrote "Allies will want to know how possible new members intend to contribute to NATO's tasks . In the absence of a systemic threat American hegemony loses its ability to influence by cooptive means. "2 In this respect. Unfortunately. Moreover. NAT ) enlargement cannot be neatly packaged or quarantined from tho (' tensions. NATO-EU relations. underpin NATO-EU relations and. Consequently. Indeed. the new members. Consequently. At best. the United Kingdom and France. leadership when the rhetoric of partnership woukl probably be more politically effective. in cooperation with the OSCE. Moreover. is a risk-a cost-benefit exerci se in which the Alliance must confront exactly the same "deepening" and "widening" dilemma that rhe EU faces.covcr ali the issues that cause contention in the rransatlantic relationship. This dichotomy in both til policy positions and perceptions of Americans ando Euro~eans .. The most likely outcome. an enlarged NATO could push Russia toward an aggressive posture. which will assess til progress made on enlargement and decide who next will be offered full mernbership.

t~"1I more resembles the political machinations of the EU. the Commlttee of Natlou . which further complicates the nature of 111 Alliance and bifurcares its mission. There are fifteen candidate countries seeking to "accede" to the EU. NATO is in need of reforrn. rhe architecture of ~uasi-enla~gement has beco~T1 " industry: the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAP. First. at best. ir increases the political pressure on the EU to enlarge itself Second. there is no polirical roadmap guiding the allies on the path to enlargement-no agreed timetable. In 2002 NATO is. as indicated earlier. rhe paraphernalia of enlargement have expanded over th 1'" decade in inverse proportion to the political will necessary to makt I happen. Indeed. as a result of these many conflicting forces and inconsistent positions.4 The Alliance is not much better. t:'\. no agreed order of prospective members. the reform of the armed forces til both new members and aspiram countries is proving extremely slow complex. among them Turkey NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council. Lithuaoia. other countries who are candidates for accession to the EU as well as other prospective partners in EU-Ied crisis management. li. Thus. They 1'1 'I disproportionate burden on a bureaucracy rhat is ill suited to t!le. ~hey th~msdv are faced with a choice: spend limited resources on bringing rheir armcd forces up to NATO srandard or embark on the thoroughgoing economl reform required to prepare for EU membership. in spire of recent reassuring comments from British Prime Minister Tony Blair. the PFr. by creating the expectation 111 enlargement. NATO is going about enlargement in an almost ad hoc manner. Fourth. The "word on the street" is that 2006 will be the earliest that the first wave of EU enlargement will take place. member and candidate alike.I Armaments Directors with Partners (CNAD with Partners). First. Slovenia and possibly . Moreov~r. consultation and cooperation with NATO and its non-EU members. Not surprisingly. rather than offer any meaningful solut~~11. . Implications for the EU: The Asymmetric Membership Dilemma The report of the French presidency of the EU to the Nice summit in December 2000 stated: "The Union will ensure the necessary dialogue. This will also lead progressively (irony of ironies) to a NATO. NATO is muddling through enlargement because the members lack sufficient political cohesion to will either its means or its ends. NATO was built around a core POIIlH " understanding and an asymmetric political and military ~artnel" 11I1 berween North America and Western Europe. Indeed. . Third. no plan of action. it reinforces asymmetric memberships that further complicate interinstitutional relations between the EU and NATO. rhe posttl 1\ of the European members will be furrher reinforced because they hav fifty years experience of playing the kind of g~mes that are p." such as Ukraine."3 In EU-speak that means the great and rhe good have absolutely no idea how rhe relationship with the candidate/accession countries is going to work in practice. find themselves in a kind of political no mans land. Second. likely ooly to offer fulI membership to Romania. The complexity of contemporary Alliance and European politics already constraining the Alliance." s~ch as ti" Individual Partnership Programs (IPPs). more divided and more political than at any time in its ~"d parcel of Brussels daily life across rown from NAfO. .being disturh II not only by Western Europe's legitimate political ambitions but also h the demands of a new group of members who are not so much parto I' . c1ients. The recent Intergovemmental Conference (IGC) on reform of EU institutions in preparation for EU enlargement underIined the sheer complexity of the process. with full respect for the decision-making autonomy of the EU and the single institutional framework of the Union. The complexity of their respective enlargements leaves NATO and rhe EU polirically paralyzed with rhe result that everybody. In practice it is very hard to separate the two enlargements in the minds of those who aspire to be members of the two organizations.h lishrnent of the very dividing lines in Europe that NATO seeks to pr ''11'111 Fifth. In such a situatron the new members are likcly to be disappointed because the NATO they join is unlikcly to be the NATO they want. Indeed. NATO enlargement creates problems for the EU. led by the United S.C).184 • Julian Lindley-French Dilemmas of NATO Enlargement e 185 United States will find leadership increasingly difficult to assert within an AlIiance more fractious. with neither the political nor the practical implications being properIy addressed.:al Enlargement rakes place at a time when tha~ ~alallce i. NATO creates winners and losers Wit~l rhose "excludrd. badly underfunded and that still needs urgently to attend to exisnng 111I functions. the mechanisms for "self-improvem~nt. enlargement transfers security risks from beyond NA1'()' horders to within them. needing constant reassurance to avoid the overt re sI .s. Certainly. Membershtp Action Plnn (MAPs) and the Planning and Review Process (PARP) tend to underlln rhe extent of problems. such as ESDI and the DCI. in spite of the many declarations to the contrary. finds its candidature for the EU perpetually 00 the back burner. and served only to demonstrate that progress is by no means certain. although a full member of the Alliance. '"U' .

The United States had a point. has compromised itself to an extent by joining NATO's pfP.S. thus implying an involuntary extension of U. that was the implicit "deal" between the United States and its allies." Indeed. Neutrality is no longer really an option for any EU member state. there was a rrade-off between economic security and military security by which candidates sought a U. Switzerland.? Certainly. whereby the U. if NATO ernbarks upon a second wave of enlargement before the EU has even reached the starting post. create not only pan-European mutua11y assured vulnerabilities but a1so the need for mutually reassuring commitments.I. the benefit to be derived from neutraliry in a postmodern world. EU-caucusing is not Eurocaucusing and so long as there is an imbalance between the two enlargements Western Europeans will tend to see their interests as being distinct from their Central and Eastern European neighbors. this would be an extension of Pillar Two of the Treaty on EU (i. partners.. there will only be true symbiosis between the two enlargements if both sides to the transatlantic security bargain recognize that membership of either will afford the same security guarantee. such as Sweden and . commitments in Europe. NATO allies and. It is also a debate fraught with difficulty because there are undoubredly some in the United States (and United Kingdorn) who believe that a wider Europe will mean less Europe and those in Europe who believe that a wider Alliance will rnean less America. form of contribution. but not for the foreseeable future (and is hardly likely to enjoy U. the United States has beco me increasingly concerned that EU membership means a "backdoor" secur ity guarantee from NATO for EU members. the intergovernmental CFSP). This would aiso help case the problem of EU-caucusing within the Alliance that NATO enlargement tends to reinforce because it further dilutes a single European position. support). Moreover. indeed.=--==--------'-~----- -- - . in turn.S. there is a fine balance between the forces pushing the EU to enlarge (including NATO enlargement) and the many pressures from within it to delay..186 • Julian Lindley-French Dilemmas of NATO Enlargement • 187 Previously. military commitment to Europe is offset by the EU's economic investment in Europe. such cornmitments are already implicit in the EU's HG. which will. NATO enlargement will undoubtedly reinforce this tendency. Implications for the "Neutrals": The Are We.. including whether or not NATO membership is an option in the medi um to long termo Moreover. One solution could be for the EU member states to opt for a kind of "virtual enlargement" in which non-El.e.lreland. security guarantee alongside an EU economic "guarantee. This is a reflection of geo-political change that is a1so encouraging a reevaluation in other "hard-line" neutrals. They will have what is termed a "decision-shaping" capability. Having joined the EU they are now engaged in often-tortured debates about what is the purpose and. Aren't We Dilemma The debate over NATO and EU enlargement is also having a significant impact upon how the so-called "neutrals" see themselves. Ireland and Sweden) making some. Thus. Indeed. a!though the EU's autonomous capacity is still more autonomous than capable. are invited to formalize the decision-shaping formula through a kind of EU "Partnership for Peace. This interinstitutional imbroglio is further complicated by the pressure emanating from those in Washington who see EU enlargement as a commitment to what they regard as asymmetric burdcn-sharing. in many ways EU-caucusing is as inevitable as it is desirable because of the need for a functioning mechanisrn that can adequately reflect the changing political balance of power in the Alliance. it is simply a reflection of political reality. Ir is ironic that it is the foggy peace of post-Cold War Europe that is forcing an abandonment of ---~~=~"""".S. but that goal proved to be polirically and practically impossible. There is already pressure from some EU acccssion states to "join'' PiIlar Two before rhey are fully admitted to the rest of rhe Treaty on European Union. the debate in the early 19905 centered upon rhe need for parallel enlargements.S." ln effect. Indeed. rhe fact that ir exists exerts increased pressure upon rhem to come off the neutral fence. Included in the planning framework for the EU's ERRF is a Committee of Contributors made up of non-EU European states. Finland. by contrast to those of other members. However. Ir is hard to imagine a scenario in which a NATO member is confronted with a major challenge to its security without the nonNATO "EU Four" (Austria. The debate that took pl~ce in Finland in the run up to their accession to rhe EU was often heavily laced with references to the security that the country would gain from EU membership.. Ultimately. indeed. Through ESDP a European guarantee may one day prove feasible. although what that means exactly has yet to be defined. irrespective of the final shape of NATO enlargement. they were not voting for a EU security guarantee. the problem of block-building within the Alliancc will become more acute as Western European interests become increasingly distinct. To counter this. Given the relative paucity of EU rnilitary capabilities and that Finland's main securiry concern has been and rernains Russia. at least in the strict sense of the termo Even that doyen of neutrality.

would enable it to focus more effectively on dealing with the many zones of insecurity and instability to its south and east. At the same time. that is rhe "charrn" of Russia. the Act stated: "NA'J'( and Russia do not consider each orher as adversaries. after ali. ' but for the whole of Europe. soughl 111 frame a new relationship between the two former adversaries 111111 committed the new partners· to joint efforts to construct peace 1\11I1 stability in rhe Euro-Atlantic area. Russia continues to suffer from a form ." This is a tragedy. much depends on how Russia deals with it. "To !lu!'1 out rhe prospect of NATO expanding to indude rhe ECE [Easi 111 and Central European countries] would require sirnultaneous artempt to address Russiás real and alleged concerns about the futur 01 European securiry. Ali Weslt 111 governments would like partnership with Moscow but not atothe 1'. Therefore. the object of the exercise. both political and financia\. NATO was the enemy and now ir wants to n:'0~e rts e. given the somewhat anachronistic (hard-line realist) bent to current Russian thinking. at -Ieast if it involves any of the Balde states. Would NATO go to war for Poland? Most certainly. not surprisingly. At a superficial leve~ irnport 1111 steps have been taken to reassure the Russians tha~ NATO ~s no 10uI\! I an anti-Russian coalition. for each wave of enlargement that takes place. the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) Treaty or even European defense in return for grudging support for limited NATO enlargement. One are a of linkage that NATO must be careful to avoid is one in which enlargement is linked to domestic behavior. That is. Latvia and Lithuania will only join a meaningful NATO when they are no longer in need of it. That said. NATO cannot pretend that R~ssJa doe~ n~t 'I( I Unfortunately. Implications for Russia: lhe Partnerl Adversary Oilemma Russia is an enigma for the Alliance. but early signs suggest a "lucrative" pragmatism if the NMD debate is anything to go by. The West must not turn a blind eye to the manner by which Russia deals with its internal security concerns. it is aiso difficult to escape the conclusion that countries such as Estonia."" This Russian view of NATO enlargement not only sums up ti Russian attitude-it encapsulates the West's dilcmma. which is implicit in NATO enlargement. Moreover. As indicated earlier. Ir is powerful and rt IS emotrv " NATO has made great efforts to convince the Russians that enlnl~ ment is not aimed at ir and although ir has been repeatedly stressed t li I Moscow has no veto it is clear that much still depends on the Rus. Otherwise the stated assumptions of ali West 111 security policies-that Russia is in some meaningtul sense a partncr \1111 the substantial decisions affecting its security should therefore not It made without full cOllsideratioll of Russian interests.IIM111 border ever doser to Mother Russia." I of giving the Russians an enduring veto over the flltur~ expansron 01 111 Alliance. Ir would appear. Consequently. it is certainly difficult to see how progressive NATO enlargement can take place if Russian opposition is implacable. Indeed. there is a very distinct Russian point of view. if NATO enlargement simply makes Russia ever more hostile how can it be said to serve European security. To that end. it seems reasonable to assume that "linkage" could well raise irs ugly head again as the Russians demand further alterations to NMD.111 188 e )ulian Lindley-French Dilemmas of NATO Enlargement e 189 I1 traditional neutraliry. Russian opposition will certainly have implications for the Alliance. It is as yet unclear how President Putin will react to further NATO enlargements. They share rhe ali I of overcoming the vestiges of earlier confrontation and competitioll 011I1 of strengthening mutual trust and cooperation. Unfortunately."6 However. Equally. therefore. not Just for RII. illegitimate. Would the West go to war for the Baltics ifRussia reinvaded? No. I visible sign of Russian "defeat. a country whose painful history leads it perennially to confuse legitimate security concerns with those that are. while the implications for Russia of NATO enlargement are not in themselves great. it is impossible to overstate the psychological I . frankly. including der 1\ I cOllsultations with Moscow-could be considered in Russia as meanh less. rather than the ideologically charged atmosph of the Cold War. rnuch 01 Russia's relationship with the West hinges on NATO enlargement aml. There is also something ironic and illogical about Russian negativity. yes.I "Versailles Syndrome. He will certainly exact a price. because Russia still sees the end of 111 Cold War in terms of a defeat and any developments that come thereafter as the imposing of terms by an arrogant victor. However. that the best that can be hoped for from Russia is a reluctant and grudging acceptance. Thus. Chechnya must not become an accepted norm. only the 11\ . the further east that NATO expands the more dilute Article V wiU become. it is a sad but inescapable conclusion that Russiás hostility to NATO enlargement continues to divide Europe and it is Russia who sets this particular agenda by choosing to see NATO enlargement in those terms. A stabilized border to the West. 111 attitude. The 1997 NATO-RuSSla Foundmg Act 011I1 rhe creation of the NATO-Russian Joint Permanent Council." with NATO enlargement ~eing. the very name "NATO" is replete with neganve implli tions for a Russian people who labored under forty years of st~te pr(lp I ganda.

really want because it implies an autornatic security guar~ntee. 111111 meantime there wiU of course be much debate. Unfortunately. overt political will to reinforce its credibility. widening does affect deepening and it makes Illlle sense to pretend otherwise. what constitutes an attack in the modern age? Cyberwarfare? Implications for the Candidate Countries: lhe Article V Dilemma "The door to NATO membership remains open to other European countries that are ready and willing to undertake the commitments and obligations stemming from NATO members~i~ and contribute to se '~ rity in the Euro-Atlalltic area. it is noto Compared. be sensitive to Russia without ever allowing ir any right of veto. nuclear arsenal to the territorial defense of Western Europe. in what arder and how fast?"Q'I h problem is centered upon Article V of the Treary o: Washinl1l111 NATO's founding act. lndeed. Europe has one almighty security hangover and it is questionable whether Western Europeans and Americans are prepared to spend large . Implications for Public Opinion: The Who Pays What Dilemma The past decade has witnessed a new phenomenon in the shaping of sec. However. even thirry plus. ln any case. n tion in Europe involving other European institutions. This is the central paradox of NATO enlargement because ir adds responsibilities without adding capabilities. 1111/1 Unfortunately. to be effective unanimity is not an option.ere li. Unfortunately. the celebrations were just a little too long and too loud at rhe end of the Cold War. or in the longer run.1 Consequently." Radu Bogdan captur ' 111 problem succinctly by posing a couple of question~: "NAT li. Clearly. at least since the mid-1960s when the Soviets gained effective nuclear parity with the United States. Unfortunately: as th ti. There is no conceivable scenario in which NATO would use nuclear weapons in defense of Central and Eastern European members. it is Article V that candidate COIIIIII I Implications for NAlO's Nuclear Policy.S. twcnl eight. a bluff. wher u~ to be democratic. rheir very membership changes NATO making 11 11 attractive as a military security "product. ". say. a NATO of twenty-three. The Credible Deterrent Dilemma During the Cold War the assumption (and it was thankfully only an untested assumption) was that Article V linked the U.t It. and convinced their respective publics that the days of extensive security commitments were over. The adnllsSlOn of new de~ocra\l( members into NATO is itself part of a wider pracess of greater tnteg •. NATO must. AlI Western governments are increasingly sensitive to public concerns about the cost of security. By ali means trade the tradable. bui not the inalienable. ir was always thus. neither is effectiveness.u~ity and defense policy: the direct and potent influence of public opllllOn.. NATO must avoid becoming simply a more muscular OS(.ajority of thern it is. They want to join the Alliance because of wha. Therefore. Indeed. therefore. cornrnitted itself to reviewing the enlargement process in 2002. its very uncertainty and arnbigurry lends rt some deterrent value. with Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty of the WEU. be ir in human or financial terms. Actually.8 The NAT( enlargement debate all too often has an unfortu~ate rendency to III discussed within the AlIiance as though the candidate cnurttrres ar I theoretical device. . There is always much talk about rhe interests anil burdens of existing members and often lirtle about rhe legitimate aspira tions and security needs of candidate countries. onl ar the expense of democratic representatioll. What the candidate countries have to consider is whether a contemporary conventional "bluff" is worth having.:ould ~robably nllll unanimity of purpose in an ever more complex securrty envlronment.Dilemmas of NATO Enlargement 190 e Julian Lindley-French e 191 impact of NATO enlargement on the Russian mind and it is b~hol~en upon the West to use every means at its disposal to put these historical concerns to rest. the NATO nuclear security guarantee is. any deterrent needs credible military capability and. contrary to Jo~chka FIscl~{·. As a resulr. It is the sense of security and stability that Alliance membership affords candidate countries that seems to matter. NATO must gct used to a wodtl that is even more suboptimal rhan the one it currently occupies. th. Could the A1I111I1 remain functional ir it were much further enlarged? How many I" members should be invited to join. NATO enlargement further decouples the United States fram its allies (it would be ironic if Lithuania achieved by default what Russia had been working so hard for over the past fifty years). ~or the m. lndeed. Consequently. by and large. However.. \ f knows only too well. rather than the reality. now famous view. it is merely an agreement to consult in the event of an attack on a NATO member. Enlargement definitively breaks that link and denuclearizes the Alliance. no quick solutions to this problem because. NATO enlargement is a dilemma for the candidat~ 0\111 tries.

such is the parlous state of their finances that they have no alternative but to follow the lead of their Western Eurapean counterparts in opting for cheaper. Indeed. the n w members have to fund. the sharing of both risks and burdens. NATO enlargement will certainly have to be dane on the cheap. but more relevant peacekeeping. 11 I is dane at all. Therefore. Certainly. Thus. Indeed. "ti sophisticated arguments about investing in the future of Europe rhllt rarely get heard above the clamor for new hospitais and schools. a broken promise an act of betrayal? These are very real issues for countries whose own histories have been consistently brutalized by a tragir cornbination of Great Power aggression and/or indifference. more or less. Ir is being seduced into a military-technical "paradise" that is largely irrelevant for today's security needs. will only be made worse by NATO enlargement. say. Consequently. They are wrong. Frankly. Consequently. First. The United States. the fundamental premise upon which the Alliance is founded. In such an environment security policy could be increasingly renationalized and in a region of weak and failing states this would be dangerous not just for the candidates thernselves. There are too many other competing interests in sear h "I state funding for significant amounts to be invested on enlarging tllI Alliance." primarily because public opinion in the West is oth rw engaged. When does a delayed prornise become a broken one? When i. For a whole range of domestic reasons (such as the power of defenseindustriallobby groups) the United States is preparing for a war that is not going to happen.192 _ )ulian Lindley-French Dilemmas of NATO Enlargement _ 193 amounts of money on extending either military or economic securit til Central and Eastern European countries. In effect. much of the d 111111 on this issue has been a quintessential exercise in transatlantic "hru I passing. sadly. there is a military-technical dichotomy in the Alliance today. drive toward the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) forces Europeans to make a choice between war fighting and peacekeeping-a choice most do not want to make. They will never dose the military-technical gap with the United States. NATO enlargr within the framework of the existing bureaucracy. This gulf is primarily the resulc of contending military-technical choices that the United States and its allies are making. is being undermined. For the new members and candidate countries this problem is magnified. European states will increasingly opt to spend their limited funds on peacekeeping capabilities at the expense of war fighting. Functionallmplications of NATO Enlargement: The Who Does What Dilemma There is a dangerous gulf opening between the United States and its allies about the purpose of the Alliance. they do not need to because they face threats/risks different from those facing the United States. public opinion will have to be managed by gOVl'll1 ments more effectively than has hitherto been the case and that 011111 have significant implications for NATO enlargement. be it that of NATO or the EU seern little like an Eastern Promise-always just over the horizon. . less capable. it is difficult to envisage how in five years time Force XXI could possibly "interoperate" with. This is a problem that is exacerbated for many of the Europ '11\ allies by the strict budget constraints required by membership ar 1111 Eurozone. the U. rOI many rhe promise of enlargement. seem able only to escala te fram the bottom end of the Petersberg Tasks (humanitarian and rescue missions) to some point up that limited scale (peacekeeping and some forms of peacemaking). There is another constituency that Americans and Western Europr 11 ali too readily forget: public opinion in the candidate countries. peacekeeping is not merely a subset of war fighting. a Hungarian infantry battalion unless technology is diverted from its current course as a force separator and turned into a force bridge. today's politics are those of the immediate . but for alI the NATO alJies. Failure to exporl security to the East wilJ only result in the East exporting problems to rhc West. illegal migration and the destabilizing effects of poverty are ever more apparent on the streets of Western Europe. in order to demonstrate that they are able to perform at least some relevant missions. Indeed. At the same time. Many Americans reading this will no doubt jump at this statement and assert (once again) that the problems result from low European defense spending and a lack of willingness to follow the American lead. on the other hand. The Europeans. what pass s 111I debate is hardly matched by enthusiasm. 01' I further cut in income taxo This leaves two options. this is the reality thar the West must confronto Crime. the requisite reforms thernselves.S. the problem is primarily American in its making and. Indeed. Ir also forces the allies into a corner. Therefore. Indeed. The impll cations of dashed hopes and broken promises are replete with risks I() stability. Unfortunately. for all its military might. Second. the unwillingness of Americans to cornrnit their forces to the kind of "muddy boots" peacekeeping that represents 90 percent of the security "market" effectively negates American leadership within the Alliance. It is a very complex set of skills at which several Eurapean states excel and at which the United States is poor. seems able only to escalate fram the top end of the Petersberg Tasks/small-scale contingency threshold.

what are the implications for the United States? To mau Europeans such is American power today that the United States /111 longer really constructs foreign policy in the classical sense. carries with it the potential to tear NATO apart. Ir was always thus. lndeed. ln the run-llp to the presidential elections the U. the United States is not going to leave Europe. Vil'gil1 on February 13. French." In th I sentences the president summed up America's dilemma: how to lead I process in an environment where leadership is not possible. The burden-sharing debar not a one-way street and the United States had better start getting I peacekeeping act together. debate OVl'1 NATO enlargement protracted issue of NATO enlargement. For many Europeans NATO enlargement is indicative of the lack of clear thinking in a United States that encourages Europe to pay more and do more without wishing to concede any real concomitant increase in its polirical influence. what is to be done? Throughout this piece the complexities and paradoxes of NATO enlargement have dominated. enlargement has become a metaphor for burden sharing in the American political mind mainly because of the refusal of Congress to fund the processo This sense of injustice is fuelled by the prevailíng sense in Congress that the United States was doing Europe a favor through its presence during the Cold War. i II I' Leone) European public opinion will simply not countenance Amerir \11 whining about burden sharing. we can deter the designs of aggressioll.. 2001 President Bush focused on both the enduring nul! changing qualities of the Alliance: "The security and welfare of member of this [transatlantic] community depend upon the security AI"J welfare of all. ln spit 01 its awesome power the United States no longer leads NATO.S. Implications for the United States: The Leadership/Partnership Dilemma Finally. and NKf changing and growing to meet them. Nowhere is this more apparent than over . it simpl exports domestic policy. effort pales) and their willingness to put troops in harms way during dangerous Peace Support Operations (PSOs) in a way that the United States seems unwilling to countenance. in an ar010 phere where it is British. None of us alone can assure the continuance of freedom This is still true today. Of course. ir is one of the forei '11 I" policy issues that could well get mired in what is likely to prove an acerbic battle. lndeed. thernselves. in such an environn 1'111 European public opinion might decide that rhe EU is a better 01'11011 for its security and defense than NATO. it was a bipartisan position held by both Democrats and Republicans.J'' And yet it is not that simph In a speech at NATO's Atlantic Fleet headquarters in Norfolk. underpinning these tensions are two sharply contrasting views of burden sharing. the agenda inside the Alliance in a way that would today be unrhinkablc. Eastern Promise? The Implications of NATO Enlargement So. That is no longer the case. Moreover. Hirherto. but it is likely to do irreparable damage if rhe United States does not back away from it.194 e lullan Lindley-French Dilemmas of NATO Enlargement e 195 This military-technical schism. therefore. Ir is Congress. Americans were used to drivilllJ. NATO Review Conference in 2002. The sooner the debate moves beyond the implied threat of disengagement that informs a lot of American rhetoric the sooner the political problems that afflict the alliance can be tackled. Kosovo. Europeans are also suspicious that for some in the United States (both Republicans and Democrats) NATO enlargement is simply a way for America to further disengage from European security. The Clinton administration took the view that. But the purpose of NATO rema lu permanent . Indeed. the adrninistration fails to push the Europeans with sufficient vigor toward an acceptance of both a D. with such a delicate poli" cal balance existing berween the Bush adrninistrarion and Congres 111 the run-up to the 2002 mid-term elections. united. NATO . have redi covered their political aurhority. Our challenges have changed. not least because of the vocal constituencies in the United States that trace their roots back to the candidate countries..S. lndeed. more than any other developmcnt. the process of enlargement was a done deal and it was now simply a question of who and when. Italian and German troops doin 111 dirty work and who are taking the casualties (East Timor.S. Moreover. timetable and meeting much of the cost. although this is likely to prove only 11 temporary respire and wi\l undoubtedly increase in the run-up to th. together. that is again likely to take the political lead if as seems possible. Europeans will increasingly demand a redeflnition of burden sharing to take into account their extensive aid programs (alongside which the U. Two things are clear. II a time of unrivalled power ir confronts allies who. First. not if. Second. This is not only plain wrong. having reached a binding agreement with the Europeans at the Madrid summit in 1997. None of us alone can achieve economic prosperity or mlll tary security. the United States is in Europe in pursuit of its own interests. Moreover. Indeed. and spare the continent from rhe effects of ethnic hatreds.

NATO and EU enlargements effectively compete for scare resources.196 e julian Lindley-French Dilemmas of NATO Enlargement e 197 enlargement was a metaphor for the wider transatlan~i~ [elatíons~íp and. NATO and EU enlargements must be coordinated where possible by including the force improvements necessary for NATO membership as part of the overall economic package required to prepare European countries for accession to the EU. has been trapped in a vicious circle of political postunng and maneuvering that is undermining the Alliance. Canada and the fifteen EU mernber states and partner countnes to support each other in times of crisis. NATO must aiso be poli tically relevant and this means that the allies need to ~oc~s'. but unavoidable. e The reworking of Article V: in light of the Euro-At!antic secur!ty guarantee. Ironically. Lithuania and yet. as such. The guarantee would commit rhe .U. this would involve . Policy cohesion with the EU to ensure that the negative. [oint membership criteria: in addition. Ir . say. this remains implicit in the core mission of the Alliance. the vrording of Article V should be rew?rked to remforce its poli ti cal credibility." but other confidence and security-building measures. membership performance cri teria should be created that link improvements in economic capability required by the EU with the achievement of NATO standards. cohesion. What NATO needs today ar the 5Cs: credibility. At present. Denuclearizing the NATO-Russian relationship: NATO's claim rhat ir no longer considers Russia as an adversary is undermined by the presence of nuclear doctrine at me heart of the Alliance. lt is inconceivable that the United States would go to nuclear war over. This is a sham because a modero NATO remains a cornerstone of security relations. that IS. not just in the Eura-Atlantic area. convergence. However." This would enable NATO to reach a true interoperability nexus and assist new members by permitting them to aim at interoperabiliry targets that include peacekeeping as a goal in itself Full spectrum war fighting is not a serious option for candidate countries. It is frankly ridiculous and undermines the wider credibility of the Alliance as a security and defense mechanism. [oint membership funding: funding for NATO candidate and EU accession states should be linked to their performance under the joint membership criteria. but help Russia accept progressive enlargement of NATO. no decoupling and no duplicarion). . implications of asymmetric enlargements are kept to a minimum. NATO-EU membership coordination: European security is as much a function of economic security as military security. tt IS only an agreement only to consult in the event of a challenge to the security of a partner. A credible security policy that does away with a vestigial Cold War doctrine that is progressively undermining the deterrent value of the Alliance. several measures should be adopted: e • • • e A Euro-Atlantic security guarantee: NATO should commit itself to a new Euro-Atlantic Security Guarantee to recognize and resolve the military dimension of asymmetric memberships and back-door security gllarantees. To assist in this process. but beyond. A candid statement on both rhe likely timetable for enlargement and the reality of the security "product" that new members can expect from the Allíance. New Euro-Atlantic nuclear command: a new autonomous nuclear command should be created by the United States. Breaking the nuclear link would not only serve to reinforce me NATO-Russian Founding Act with little or no cost to the "realiry" of Alliance capabiliry. commitment and candor. in spite of ali the doctrinal adjustments of the past decade.was Madeleine Albright who gave the Alliance the 3Ds (no dlscnmmatlOl1. Planned convergence of the enlargement policies of the two organizations so that candidate/accession co~ntries trying to fulfi!1 what are essentially competing membership requuements from NA10 and rhe EU do not lose valuable and limited resources. the United Kingdom and France that preserves a Western nuclear identity and the role of nuclear weapons as a deterrent of last the conditional nature of the security guarantee. This should be recognized in a protocol to the Treaty of Washington. These are not just polirical niceties but observable fact. Breaking the nuclear link: NATO enlargement breaks the link between the territorial defense of a member and the American nuclear arsenal.S. Political commitment from existing NATO mernbers to ease the legitimate security concerns of Partner and Candídate countries through the use not only of the enlargement "tool. e Flexible ínteroperability: NATO needs to recognize and formalize the four basic levels of military capability within the Alliance e • (ir is not going to change) by creating a new doctrine entitled "Flexible Interoperability. This would assist in the "sequencing" of economic and military development.

These include r c 1\" tion that: (1) burden sharing cannot be defined only by expendlt 11I1 on high spectrum war-fighting capability. must also be factored lnto the equation (this will require a mind-set change in WashinglOlI I (2) recognition by the Europeans that the United Stares has lI! right to expect from its allies construcrive support in extr I European security management without carte blanche agreernr-nt to underpin this commitment the Europeans should create a regi I 'I of forces (like the mechanism rhat governs forces answerable to \11 ARRC and ERRC) that are constantly in a high statc of readine and able to support V. "Rernarks by the Presidem to the Troops and Personnel. 2000. 1999). 2." in V. Speech by U. Russia and Europe-The Emerging Security Agenda (Stockholm: SIPRI. of course. p. Baranovsky. is in rh insurancebusiness.S. The NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of Informatíon and Press. p. For the time beiru . rherefore. Prime Minister Tony Blair to the Polish Stock Exchange. ed. This is effectively what happened to Norway. "NATO's Open p. "Arrangernenrs Concerning Non-EU European NATO Members and Orher Countries which are Candidates for Accession to the EU. 9. "NATO Moves Towards Enlargement. hoping that disaster does nor srrike each and every mernber at one and the same time. at www. at www. Gebhardt Von Moltke." such as aid. like ali insurance cornpanies. 3. This reinforces the need for a balanced approach to enlargement rhat marches expansion of members with improvements in Norway then withdrew following a referendum that rejected EU membership. 1999). NATO." February 13. the West needs a new force and operarionnl planning nexus that can work up possible coalition formats (boih through virtual and real-time exercising) for operarions worldwide." NATO Review (January 19%). Spain and Portugal in rhe year prior to their accession. 25.K." in Tbe Reader's Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington(Brussels: NATO Office ofInformation and Press. true European securiry (and that is the end state of NAT will only be achieved through a security settlernent to whi h ali agree and from which ali benefit. 6. 82. enlargernent) 4. p. 22. 1997). the need for NATO to rernain a European military securiry agency is compelling. "Rornanian Reflections. forces in extra-European. 7.number-l0. including Russia. which militates against the "big-bang" approach to enlargement favored by some in the Vnited States. offering different policies to different members. 5. out-of-area opc ations. 2000. . Anel.198 e Iulian Lindley-French Dilemmas of NATO Enlargement e 199 e New Euro-Atlantic security contract: The United States and its nll have certain rights and obligations implicit in the conrernpor 11 relationship that need to be made explicit. "Russian Security and East-Central Europe. Yuny Davydov." December 4. p. 382-383. 83. NATO. and (3) in what is an extraordinarilyIluid security environ ment in which any number of coalitions could confront :lIly number of challenges. October 6. They were treated as full members for ali aspects of foreign policy coordination under the EPC formula. Ultimately. peacekeeping efforts 111111 "security investrnents." in NATO Review (Spring/Summer 2000). pp. p..whitehouse. 8. Notes 1. "The Founding Act on Mutual Relations. Co-operation and Security between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Russian Fed~ration" (Brussels: NATO Office of Press and Information. Radu Bogdan." from "The Presidency Repore on the European Security and Defense Policy. however. 10. 2001. 1997). 2.