HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

FM 3-01.87

PATRIOT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES

Distribution Restriction: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program or by other means. This determination was made on 15 February 1992. Other requests for this document will be referred to Commandant, USAADASCH, ATTN: ATSA-DT-WF, Fort Bliss, TX 79916-3802. Destruction Notice: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.

FM 3-01.87
Field Manual Number 3-01.87 Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC, 26 September 2000

Patriot Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
Contents
Page

PREFACE ............................................................................................ Chapter 1

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INTRODUCTION TO PATRIOT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES 1-1 Doctrinal Framework.......................................................................................... 1-1 Staff and Battle Crews ....................................................................................... Software ............................................................................................................. 1-2 1-2 2-1 2-1 2-2

Chapter 2

INITIALIZATION ................................................................................................ Battalion Initialization ......................................................................................... Battalion Initialization Structure .........................................................................

Distribution Restriction: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program or by other means. This determination was made on 15 February 1992. Other requests for this document will be referred to Commandant, USAADASCH, ATTN: ATSA-DT-WF, Fort Bliss, TX 79916-3802. Destruction Notice: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.

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Geographic Data Parameters ............................................................................ Automatic Battalion Initialization ........................................................................ Battalion FIDOC and Operational Parameters .................................................. ABT/TBM Defended Assets ............................................................................... Weapon Control Status...................................................................................... Tab 76—Counter-ARM Threat Parameters ....................................................... Deployment/Command Planning ....................................................................... Battalion Communications Control Data Entry .................................................. Communications Net Loading............................................................................ Volumes Allocation ............................................................................................ ICC/CRG Deployment........................................................................................ Fire Unit Tactical Initialization ............................................................................ Fire Unit Standard Emplacement....................................................................... Battery Tactical Initialization .............................................................................. Tactical Initialization........................................................................................... Data Initialization Sequence .............................................................................. Roll-Crossroll Alignment .................................................................................... Radar Alignment Procedures............................................................................. Manual Alignment Procedures........................................................................... Location Data Confidence Level........................................................................ Tab 14—Target Display Control ........................................................................ Data Buffer Transfer .......................................................................................... Radar Mapping .................................................................................................. Alternate Search Sector Control ........................................................................ Missile Depletion Rules...................................................................................... GLIF Threshold ..................................................................................................

2-3 2-5 2-9 2-16 2-19 2-25 2-30 2-31 2-37 2-49 2-51 2-60 2-61 2-66 2-67 2-68 2-70 2-72 2-74 2-76 2-76 2-79 2-81 2-84 2-88 2-91 3-1 3-1 3-10 3-12 3-19 3-21 3-22 3-23

Chapter 3

PATRIOT AIR BATTLE OPERATIONS ..........................................................
Patriot Crew Responsibilities ............................................................................. ICC Air Battle Operations................................................................................... Track Management ............................................................................................ Target Identification ........................................................................................... Target Engagement ........................................................................................... Threat Assessment ............................................................................................ Methods of Control.............................................................................................

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Status Monitor.................................................................................................... Fire Unit Surveillance......................................................................................... ABT Search Sectors .......................................................................................... TBM Search Sectors.......................................................................................... A-Scope Operations........................................................................................... Target Classification .......................................................................................... Identification....................................................................................................... Interaction of Fire Unit and ICC Identification Process...................................... Engagement Eligibility........................................................................................ Threat Assessment Process .............................................................................. Tactical Ballistic Missile Considerations ............................................................ ATM Capability................................................................................................... Remote Launch.................................................................................................. Launcher Dead Zones ....................................................................................... Patriot Missiles................................................................................................... FIDOC and Operational Parameters ................................................................. Missile Selection ................................................................................................ ATM Mission ...................................................................................................... ECCM Operations.............................................................................................. Ground Level Interference Filter ........................................................................ Track While Scan............................................................................................... Counter-Antiradiation Missile Operations .......................................................... Chapter 4 COMMAND AND CONTROL ................................................................................... Patriot Command and Control Structure............................................................ Patriot Command and Control Processing ........................................................ Master ICC Operations ...................................................................................... Master ICC Communications ............................................................................. MICC Display ..................................................................................................... Fire Unit to Fire Unit Operations ........................................................................ Data Links .......................................................................................................... TROPO Linkage Using HSDIO Card ................................................................. Data Languages................................................................................................. Appendix A PATRIOT DATA SHEETS................................................................................. Manual Orientation and Alignment Data Sheets ...............................................

3-25 3-26 3-26 3-27 3-29 3-31 3-34 3-41 3-43 3-46 3-48 3-49 3-58 3-67 3-73 3-76 3-83 3-85 3-86 3-100 3-102 3-104 4-1 4-1 4-2 4-3 4-5 4-7 4-10 4-14 4-15 4-15 A-1 A-1

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Technical Manuals ............................................................................................. Appendix B RADAR MAPPING ............................................................................................ Data Acquisition ................................................................................................. Preliminary Mapping Procedures....................................................................... Mapping Display and Control Selections ........................................................... Mapping Process ............................................................................................... Clutter Mapping.................................................................................................. Mapping Interference ......................................................................................... Appendix C AUTOMATIC EMPLACEMENT ........................................................................ Automatic Emplacement Overview.................................................................... Determining Satellite Coverage ......................................................................... Precision Lightweight GPS Receiver ................................................................. North Finding System ........................................................................................ Automatic Emplacement Status Monitor............................................................ Appendix D RSOP REQUIREMENTS................................................................................... Fire Control Configuration.................................................................................. Launcher Emplacement ..................................................................................... 5-Point Initial Search Lower Bound Data........................................................... Fiber-Optic Cable Deployment (DLU Launcher)................................................ Remote Launcher Employment ......................................................................... Appendix E ALTERNATE ALIGNMENT PROCEDURES .................................................... Mixed Mode Emplacement ................................................................................ Manual Alignment Without PADS ...................................................................... Appendix F WORLDWIDE UTM CONVERSION PROCEDURES AND TABLES............... Maps, World Models, and Datum ...................................................................... Universal Transverse Mercator Overview.......................................................... Appendix G FIX-OR-FIGHT CRITERIA................................................................................. Fix-or-Fight Guidance ........................................................................................ Categories of Responses................................................................................... Fault Alert Filter Use .......................................................................................... Executing the Diagnostics ................................................................................. Appendix H Appendix I BATI AND TACI FLOWCHARTS...................................................................... TASK ORGANIZATION WITH HAWK.............................................................. Engagement Operations ....................................................................................

A-1 B-1 B-1 B-2 B-4 B-8 B-15 B-17 C-1 C-1 C-3 C-3 C-10 C-12 D-1 D-1 D-2 D-4 D-5 D-7 E-1 E-1 E-3 F-1 F-1 F-3 G-1 G-1 G-3 G-7 G-8 H-1 I-1 I-1

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Alignment Methods ............................................................................................

I-3 I-6 I-7 I-8 I-11 I-12 I-16

Automatic Fire Distribution ............................................................................
Local Engagement Control Parameters............................................................. Friendly Protection ............................................................................................. Hawk Weapons Control ..................................................................................... Defense Design ................................................................................................. HIMAD Task Force Training ..............................................................................

Glossary ................................................................................................................................ Glossary-1 Bibliography .................................................................................................................. Bibliography-1 Index ........................................................................................................................................... Index-1

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Preface
This field manual (FM) is an in-depth guide to Patriot tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). It is intended for use by Patriot and Hawk commanders at all levels and their staff, tactical directors (TDs), tactical director assistants (TDAs), tactical control officers (TCOs), tactical control assistants (TCAs), leaders, and trainers. The manual includes chapters on initialization procedures, air battle operations, strategies, the interfacing of Hawk and Patriot fire units (FUs), and command and control (C2), communications. This FM also includes embedded training software programs for operators at the battalion and firing battery. The appendices contain Patriot blank forms, Radar Mapping, Determining Satellite Coverage, Reconnaissance, Selection and Occupation of Position (RSOP), Alternate Alignment Procedures, Worldwide Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) Conversion Procedures and Tables, Fix or Fight Criteria, and Battalion Tactical Initialization Flowcharts. Also included are Patriot Advanced Capabilities-3 (PAC-3), and Configuration-1 and -2 software and hardware update capabilities. This publication implements the following international standardization agreements (STANAGs) (NATO): STANAG TITLE EDITION

3700 3805 3880 4162

NATO Tactical Air Doctrine—ATP-33 (B) Doctrine for Airspace Control in Times of Crisis and War—ATP-40 (B) Counter Air Operations—ATP-42 (B) Technical Characteristics of the NATO Identification System

5 5 3 1

The proponent for this manual is HQ, TRADOC. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 directly to Commandant, USAADASCH, ATTN: ATSA-DT-WF, Fort Bliss, Texas 79916-3802. Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

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Chapter 1

Introduction to Patriot Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
This chapter is a guide to Patriot operations. Its focus is on how to use the immense combat potential of the Patriot system and how to synchronize Patriot operations with other air defense (AD) operations. The intent is to provide battle crews and staff planners with a clear understanding of system processing and software parameters to allow them to fight with their weapon system intelligently.

DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK
1-1. FM 3-01.87 is a companion to FM 44-85. These manuals should be read together. FM 44-85 describes the doctrinal framework with in which tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) described in FM 3-01.87 must function. This manual discusses these subjects at length as they have a direct impact on Patriot TTP. The classified material corresponding to the text in this manual is in the Special Text (ST) (S/NF)ST 44-85-1A(U), which contains the classified values referenced by the code numbers in bold and underlined (example: P4-123). SCOPE 1-2. This manual applies to Patriot units assigned to both corps and echelons above corps (EAC) organizations. FM 44-85 discusses differences in missions and applications. AUDIENCE 1-3. In writing this manual, it was assumed that readers will be at least acquainted with Patriot tactical and system operations. While hands-on experience with the weapon system is not a prerequisite, it is helpful for a better understanding of the system. Information from other sources was incorporated in an attempt to make it easier to understand system operations. DISCREPANCIES 1-4. This manual does not replace any technical manuals (TMs). If any discrepancies are found that exist between this field manual (FM) and any TM, assume the TM is correct on technical issues, as it is more likely to be up-to-date. Any discrepancies that are found in any classified information code numbers must be referred to the USAADASCH War Fighter Division,

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Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD). This FM is first and foremost about tactics. It describes technical issues only as a means to understanding tactical applications of the Patriot system.

STAFF AND BATTLE CREWS
1-2. Battalion S3s and their assistants may use the tactical information and recommendations as a baseline for designing defenses, configuring software data bases, and defining Patriot's interface into AD command, control, and communications (C3) architectures. Use this manual as a reference for crew training purposes. TDs and TCOs will find detailed information, not otherwise easily available, on software, data processing, equipment, and procedures. PATRIOT 1-3. This manual was written for Patriot officers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and enlisted soldiers. It is specifically directed toward the battalion S3, the battalion electronics missile maintenance officer (EMMO), battalion TDs, TDAs, and battery TCOs, and TCAs. HAWK 1-4. Appendix I contains Patriot system processing for Hawk communications and task force (TF) operations. It speaks directly to Hawk battle crews and to Patriot operators. Hawk officers and trainers should read this appendix closely. They include techniques and procedures for Hawk Phase III units controlled by the Patriot information and coordination central (ICC). COMMUNICATIONS AND LIAISON 1-5. Patriot communications officers and Patriot liaison officers assigned to duties in the joint service arena will find the discussions and descriptions of data links, interfaces, and communications useful. Air defense artillery (ADA) brigade S3s and communications officers will find applications for C2, task organization, and communications requirements.

SOFTWARE
1-6. This manual is mostly about software and its applications. When necessary, for understanding, the manual discusses hardware. Patriot crews and planners should keep in mind that many, if not most, TTPs employed by Patriot units are either embedded in the system software or impact in some manner on the software. Much of the air defense operations planning performed by the battalion S3 finds its expression in the tab entries made by battle crews before the battle begins, and in manipulation of the software during the battle.

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POST DEPLOYMENT BUILD-4 1-7. This manual describes the final fielded versions of PDB-4, software Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3), Configurations 1 and 2. Also included are the PDB-4.1, and 4.2 software upgrades for anti-radation missile (ARM) ARM and cruise missile (CM) defense. POST DEPLOYMENT BUILD-5 1-11. The Army is now testing the new Patriot PDB-5 software build (PAC-3, Configuration 3). When the Configuration 3 software and hardware are accepted, USAADASCH will update this manual with the doctrine and tactics from ST 44-85-3 Doctrine and Tactics Impact Package (DTIP) (Update-2). It will address the hardware and software changes, doctrinal and tactical changes, and will incorporate future DTIP publications into this FM as a change.

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Chapter 2

Initialization
This chapter addresses the ICC and engagement control station (ECS) initialization process. It stresses the importance, interaction, appropriate values, and operator functions that must be conducted during initialization. The Patriot system is a software-controlled automated weapon system that requires specific parameters to ensure effective operations. The battery and battalion with minimal human intervention automatically implement firing doctrine (FIDOC) to include warning procedures, alert statuses, rules of engagement (ROE), and supplemental fire control measures. The system's ICC and ECS must be properly initialized to ensure that system operations are maximized. Initialization consists of the procedures necessary to configure Patriot software for battle operations. The initialization sequence for an ICC is contained in TM 9-1430-602-10-1 and for an ECS in TM 9-1430-600-10-1. Initialization ensures operational readiness of the battalion and fire units (FUs). It also results in a full current data base and establishes digital data links with both intrabattalion and extrabattalion elements. The classified material corresponding to the initialization process in this chapter is in (S/NF)ST 44-85-1A(U), which contains the classified values referenced by a code number in bold and underlined (example: P4-123).

BATTALION INITIALIZATION
2-1. This section on battalion tactical initialization (BATI) provides information about the role initialization plays in battalion mission accomplishment and how initialization fits into the overall operation of the ICC as a command and control (C2) system. The kind of information required for BATI is especially important for the battalion S3, because it attempts to relate tactical situations to data contained in the ICC tactical data base. This section includes— • • • • • The sources of data parameters comprising BATI. Information or data required for BATI. Where initialization data comes from. Who should provide data required for BATI. How initialization data values are selected.

FUNCTION OF BATTALION INITIALIZATION 2-2. BATI provides the ICC weapons control computer (WCC) with data parameters necessary for C2 of battalion engagement operations. The ICC tactical data base contains data parameters that control tactical system

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operations. BATI is a setup process that must be performed prior to tactical operations. Engagement operations functions of the ICC use BATI data parameter values. The ICC system functions vital to mission accomplishment are— • • • • Command and coordination. Track management. Communications. Display and system control.

PURPOSE OF BATTALION INITIALIZATION 2-3. BATI works hand in hand with Patriot battery tactical initialization (TACI). This cooperation is especially important because both the ICC and ECS must maintain a common data base for proper command and control from the battalion level. BATI defines FIDOC, identification, assets and defended areas, volumes, and Patriot battery search sectors. In addition, other operational data parameters in the tactical data base must be set at the ICC and then transmitted to the Patriot batteries. BATI is required to set up the system before battalion tactical operations can be performed. BATI is also important because the tactical data base parameter values must be set properly for optimum battalion command, control, and communications (C3). Categories of initialization data and how they relate to system C3 functions are discussed next.

BATTALION INITIALIZATION STRUCTURE
2-4. BATI establishes the ICC tactical data base and allows certain data parameters to be input into the system before tactical operations are initiated. BATI data parameters have been categorized in Figure 2-1 to help understand how ICC processing uses initialization data. Figure 2-1 also shows tabular displays used to input and display the software data parameters in each category. Some data categories are used internally by the WCC and are not related to battalion C3. Other categories provide data for ICC displays. The TD and the TD's assistant control the BATI process. Other tactical operations (TAC OPS) tabular displays that are related to initialization tabs and which impact on BATI are included.

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B A T I INIT IA L IZ A TIO N STRUCTURE

CATEGORY

T A B U L A R D ISP L A YS T A B 58 T A B 72 TAB 1 T A B 76 T A B 10 T A B 67 T A B 68 T A B 79 T A B 69 TAB 2 T A B 73 T A B 59 T A B 62 T A B 78

TAC

OPS

G E O G R A P H IC D A T A P A R A M E TE R S F P F ID O C A N D ID P A R A M E TE R S C O M M U N IC A TIO N S CONTROL AND TRACK R E P O R TIN G P A R A M E TE R S IF F P A R A M E TE R S

T A B 12

TAB 6

T A B 74 T A B 55

F P S U R V E ILL A N C E P A R A M E TE R S A S S ET S/D E FE N D E D AREAS W EAPONS CONTRO L A N D ID VO L U M E S DEPLOYMENT P L A N N IN G D A T A IN ITIA L IZ A T IO N PRO CESS CO NTROL T A B 61

T A B 70

TAB 5

T A B 71

TAB 5

T A B 59

T A B 62

T A B 13 T A B 90 T A B 99

T A B 50 T A B 51

D IS PL A Y C O N T R O L A N D R E P O R TE D IN F O R M A TIO N

T A B 16 T A B 43

TAB 0 T A B 12

T A B 14

Figure 2-1. BATI Structure, Categories, and Tabs

GEOGRAPHIC DATA PARAMETERS
2-5. Parameters in the geographic data category are accessed using Tabs 58 (Figure 2-5) on page 2-8, 59 (Figures 2-30 and 2-33) on pages 2-49 and 2-52 respectively, and 62 (Figure 2-36) page 2-55. This data is required to— • • • • • • Convert track coordinates that are reported to the ICC. Report tracks on data links. Establish the battery positions for the ICC. Report the ICC site on data links. Include communications relay groups (CRGs) in the battalion data communications network. Display communications unit positions at the operator console.

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FIRING DOCTRINE AND IDENTIFICATION PARAMETERS 2-6. FIDOC and identification parameters are inputted in Tabs 1 (Figure 2-7), 10 (Figure 2-9), 76 (Figure 2-18), 78 (Figure 2-19), and 79 (Figure 2-21). Parameters in the FP FIDOC and identification categories are especially important to the process and conduct of battalion engagement operations. COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL AND TRACK REPORTING PARAMETERS 2-7. Communications control and track reporting parameters are located on four different tabular displays. Communications control and track reporting parameters are defined during initialization and command planning. This process for setup and control of the distributed data network for the ICC and control parameters are set in Tab 67 (Figure 2-24). FU communications control and track reporting parameters are set in Tab 68 (Figure 2-25). Extrabattalion unit (higher echelon units [HEUs], subordinate and lateral battalions, and auxiliary units), communications control, and track reporting parameters are set in Tab 69 (Figures 2-26 and 2-27). Tab 2 (Figure 2-39) allows and prohibits the ICC to make changes in the communications control and track reporting parameters for the defined units. IDENTIFICATION, FRIEND OR FOE PARAMETERS 2-8. Three tabular displays are used for the identification, friend or foe (IFF) and selective identification feature (SIF) parameter's initialization data category. Tab 6 is used to control the IFF and SIF settings, while Tabs 73 and 74 provide SIF codes. These codes are normally obtained from the airspace control order (ACO) provided by the airspace control authority. PATRIOT FIRE PLATOON SURVEILLANCE PARAMETERS 2-9. The ICC manages Patriot battery alternate search sectors using Tab 55. Tab 55 accommodates both Patriot battery ABT and tactical ballistic missile (TBM) surveillance parameters, as shown in Figure 2-35. The Patriot TBM threats include short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. These are surface launched missiles with ballistic trajectories. The Patriot ABT threat includes threat fixed-wing (FW) and rotary-wing (RW) aircraft, cruise missile (CM), and tactical air-to-surface missiles (TASMs) mission. ASSETS AND DEFENDED AREAS 2-10. There are two tabular displays, the tactical control Tab 5 and initialization Tab 70 (Figure 2-11), that deal with assets and defended areas. Tab 70 is the initialization data tab. Tab 5 is a TAC OPS tab that reflects entries made in the initialization data tabs. DEFINITION AND ASSIGNMENT OF WEAPONS CONTROL AND ID VOLUMES 2-11. There are three tabular displays that deal with weapons control and ID volumes and points. Tabs 61 (Figure 2-34) and 71 (Figure 2-14) are initialization and TAC OPS data tabs. Tab 5, a TAC OPS tab, reflects entries

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made in the initialization data tabs. Weapons control and ID volumes are handled on these tabs in a similar manner that Tabs 70 and 5 handle assets. DEPLOYMENT PLANNING DATA 2-12. BATI supports deployment planning using tabular displays in conjunction with symbols on the tactical display. FP locations and orientations planning are supported via Tab 59 (Figures 2-30 and 2-33) while Tab 62 (Figure 2-36) displays ICC, CRG, and FP planned communication links and antenna azimuths. INITIALIZATION PROCESS CONTROL 2-13. Certain BATI tabs are used to control initialization and data transfer processes in addition to data entry. The tabs placed in the initialization process control category are Tabs 13 (Figure 2-2), 50 (Figure 2-3), 51 (Figure 2-22), 90 (Figure 2-4), and 98 (Figure 2-38). DISPLAY CONTROL AND REPORTED INFORMATION 2-14. Tabs 0, 12, and 14 (Figure 2-10) are used for display control and other reported information. Tab 0 is an index. Tab 12 is FP locations/boundaries. Tab 14 is for target display.

AUTOMATIC BATTALION INITIALIZATION
2-15. The following sections describe the TTP to be used for the automatic initialization process. Recovery sequence is described in Appendix H. TAB 13—ICC MODE AND DATA BASE SELECTION 2-16. Tab 13, ICC MODE AND DATA BASE SELECTION, is the first tab displayed by the tactical software. Figure 2-2 contains the Tab 13 format.
ICC MODE AND DATABASE SELECTION ( )=SELECT ICC MODE: 0 = RECOVERY 1 = INITIALIZATION ( )=READ DATABASE ( ) = PRIMARY TACTICAL DATABASE ( ) UPDATE DATABASE; 1=YES *13*

Figure 2-2. Screen Display of Tab 13 2-17. Tab 13 is used during initialization to select the ICC mode and read/write-up to 10 data bases. The initialization mode is used to enter data into the ICC tactical data base or to review the previously entered initialization data. Enter 1 for initialization and ensure that the READ DATABASE field is blank normally.

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TAB 50—INITIALIZATION CONTROL 2-18. Tab 50 is displayed after Tab 13. Tab 50 provides control of the initialization processes by the selections shown in Figure 2-3.
INITIALIZATION CONTROL ( ) = SELECT INITIALIZATION MODE 0 = MANUAL DATA INPUT CONTROL 1 = AUTOMATIC DATA INPUT CONTROL 2 = RETRIEVE/COMPARE FPS DATA 3 = DEPLOYMENT/COMMAND PLANNING 4 = DATA INPUT COMPLETE *50* CLEAR DATABASE BY CATEGORY ( )( )( )( )( ) 1=ASSETS+VOLUMES 2=IFF CODES 3=COMMUNICATIONS 4=ALTERNATE SECTORS 5=FP/CRG DEPLOYMENT DATA

Figure 2-3. Screen Display of Tab 50 2-19. The effects of the automatic SELECT INITIALIZATION MODE selection are discussed. See TM 9-1430-602-10-1 for a detailed description of other initialization control procedures. 2-20. A MANUAL DATA INPUT CONTROL selection (0) allows input and review of initialization data through BATI tabs selected by the operator. Initialization data may be either created (if the data base does not yet exist), changed, or reviewed (if the data base has been read from ODS1 or it already exists). The desired initialization tab is selected by hooking the tab number from Tab 0, TABULAR DISPLAY INDEX, or by selecting the tab by number by the keyboard SEL TAB key. After BATI, Tabs 1, 2, 6, 10, 13, 14, 40, 58, 70, 71, 73, 74, 78, and 79 are input and Tab 0 is entered. Tab 50 is redisplayed. This allows an entry of 3 (DEPLOYMENT/COMMAND PLANNING) as the INITIALIZATION MODE for completion of BATI tabs under control of Tab 51. See Appendix H. 2-21. With an entry of 1 in the INITIALIZATION MODE data entry field, AUTOMATIC DATA INPUT CONTROL is selected. After Tab 50 is entered with this selection, the BATI tabs will be automatically displayed in sequence for data entry or review. The sequence of BATI tabs is 90, 58, SYSTEM+WEAPON CONTROL, 1, 6, 10, 14, 40, 43, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, and 79. After Tab 79, the last tab in the automatic sequence, is entered, Tab 50 is redisplayed for completion of the DEPLOYMENT/COMMAND PLANNING tabs. TAB 90—DATA COLLECTION CONTROL-INTERNAL 2-22. Tabular Display 90 is a two-page tab used to control simultaneous data collection to both internal and external data collection devices during BATI and TAC OPS. Tab 90 is shown in Figure 2-4.

DATA COLLECTION CONTROL - INTERNAL

PAGE 1 OF 2

*90*

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(1)=DATA COLLECTION DEVICE: 1= EDR, *TAPE*, 2=ODS2 (N)=RE-START WHEN DEVICE FULL: Y=YES, N=NO (N)=REPLACE MEDIA: Y=YES, N=NO YES=REMOVE AND LABEL DATA COLL MEDIUM AFTER ENTR TAB COLLECTION DEVICE WILL BE FULL IN:

*DISK*

nn : nn HOURS:MINUTES PAGE 2 OF 2 1=ON *90*

DATA COLLECTION CONTROL - INTERNAL (1)=EXTERNAL DATA COLLECTION 0= OFF, ENGINEERING TEST PARAMETERS: (0) (1) = DRIVE SELECTION: 0, 1 = NTL (cccccc) = MRT IDENTIFIER

Figure 2-4. Screen Display of Tab 90 2-23. Page 1 is used to allow data collection at the embedded data recorder (EDR) or ODS2, internal to the ICC. Page 2 is used to allow data collection at the battalion tactical operations center’s (BTOC’s) tactical command system (TCS), the remote maintenance monitor (RMM), or at tape drive devices that are external to the ICC shelter. The collected data can be used to assess system performance and to identify system problems. 2-24. The DATA COLLECTION DEVICE data field allows the operator to select the EDR, ODS2, or tactical storage device (TSD) for internal data collection. The EDR allows up to 8 hours of continuous data collection on 8millimeter data collection tape. If ODS2 is selected, the operator must have the data collection optical disk (OD) inserted into ODS2. The OD has the capability to record a total of 90 minutes of data collection (45 minutes each side of disk). Normally, the EDR is selected due to its greater capacity. During tactical operations, the recording media should be changed when full rather than recording over older data. Tab 90 is used in conjunction with the RECORD MODE S/I. GEOGRAPHIC CONTROL PARAMETERS 2-25. Tab 58 inputs battalion geographic control parameters. The ICC must maintain a centralized air picture to manage and correlate reported tracks. To do this, a coordinate conversion process must be performed. The battalion system coordination center (BNSCC) entry in Tab 58 is important because it provides a reference point for the ICC to convert tracks reported by other coordinate systems to the ICC coordinate system. Tab 58 format is shown in Figure 2-5.

(

BN GEOGRAPHIC CONTROL PARAMETERS ) UTM=BNSCC LOCATION

*58* ( n )=UTM WORLD MODEL

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(ddd:mm:ss,a)=DLRP LONGITUDE (dd:mm:ss,a)=DLRP LATITUDE (n)=NORTH REFERENCE: ( n n 0=TRUE, 1=GRID

0 1 2 3 4 5

=INTERNATIONAL =CLARKE 1880 =CLARKE 1866 =WGS-84 =EVEREST =BESSEL

)=UTM ZONE FOR GRID NORTH REFERENCE

Figure 2-5. Screen Display of Tab 58 2-26. Because the BNSCC is the center of the ICC display, it should be central to the area of operations (AO), or wherever battalion elements are deployed. The BNSCC should be chosen from the S3 operations map with overlays depicting the battalion AO. A map coordinate, chosen in the center of the area of operations, ensures that the ICC tactical display will provide adequate coverage of the AO. 2-27. The data link reference point (DLRP), north reference, universal transverse mercator (UTM) zone for grid north reference, and UTM world model entries (WGS-84 is to be used) in Tab 58 are required to support track reporting to non-Patriot elements. The DLRP allows all air defense artillery (ADA) and joint track reports to be referenced to a common point. The DLRP is customarily designated by the joint forces air component commander (JFACC) or the airspace control authority (ACA) through operational data (OPDAT). One DLRP is usually used for an entire theater of operations. The DLRP is required for Hawk fire units (FUs) and some higher echelon units (HEUs), when these elements are part of the TF. The BNSCC and the DLRP must be within 17 degrees (latitude and longitude) of each other. The DLRP must be the same for all elements exchanging data within the data link network, to include joint and combined forces. 2-28. North reference, UTM zone for grid north reference, and UTM world model entries are used when tracks are reported from an external battalion source that uses a grid north reference system. Patriot ICC software processing converts grid north-referenced coordinates to a true north reference. Accordingly, the default and recommended setting for the north reference on Tab 58 is 0=TRUE. The UTM zone for grid north reference entry is required only if grid north was selected for the north reference (the grid north reference system is sensitive to latitude). The ICC and Patriot batteries must use World Geodetic System-84 (WGS-84) to ensure proper track reporting and correlation. The proper model is found in the legend of military maps and may vary, depending on the location and the theater of operations. SYSTEM+WEAPON CONTROL TAB 2-29. The SYSTEM+WEAPON CONTROL tab (Figure 2-6) appears next. The FU method of control for ABT engagements is normally centralized and decentralized for TBM engagements. WPN CONTROL STATE and AREAS ENABLE are based on a standing tactical order (STO) or ACO. During ICC initialization only a 3 will be displayed in the automatic data reentry system (ADRS) data field. During tactical operations this tab is available for information and directing changes to the FUs.

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( ( ( ( FP FP FP FP FP FP

) ) ) )

ADRS: 1=ALL, 2=SUBS, 3=ICC, 4-SLCT SYSTEM=WEAPON S/I METHODS OF CONTROL: C=CENTRALIZED, D=DECENTRALIZED WPN CONTROL STATE: H=HOLD, T=TIGHT, F=FREE AREAS ENABLE: Y=YES, N=NO MOC: WCS: AE: MOC: WCS: AE: MOC: WCS: LCL ICC: aaaa-aaaa-aaaaa 1: aaaa-aaaa-aaaaa FP 7: aaaa-aaaa aaacc BNA: 2: FP 8: BNB: 3: FP 9: BNC: 4: FP10: BND: 5: FP11: BNE: 6: FP12: BNF: -

Figure 2-6. Screen Display of SYSTEM + WEAPON CONTROL Tab

BATTALION FIDOC AND OPERATIONAL PARAMETERS
2-30. FIDOC and operational parameter changes are input into three pages of Tab 1. This tab allows the operator to authorize the FIDOC and operational parameters during initialization. During TAC OPS all three pages are used. But during initialization only pages 2 and 3 are used (See Figure 2-7.).
( )ADRS: 1=ALL, 2=SUBS, 3=ICC, 4-SLCT FIDOC+OPNL PRMTRS PAGE 2 *1* FP 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 BN A B C D E F ( )ID MODE; A=AUTO, M=MAN ( )ID WGHT SET; 1, 2 OR 3 AUTHNS: ( )ECM Y=YES ( )POP-UP N=NO ( )MIN SAFE VEL ( )SLOW TGT ENGA ( )SIF FRIEND ( )ADRS: 1=ALL SUBORD FP , 2=SLCT ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ) ) ) ) ) ) = = = = = = ) )D FIDOC+OPNL PRMTRS PAGE 3 FP 1 2 3 4 5 TBMA ENGAGEMENT MODE; A=AUTO , M=MANUAL TBMB ENGAGEMENT MODE; A=AUTO , M=MANUAL TBMA MOF CONTROL; R=RIPPLE, S=SLS TBMB MOF CONTROL; R=RIPPLE, S=SLS URBAN LOW ALT TRAJ CTRL; 1=ON, 0=OFF TBMA DIVE CALCULATION; 1=ON, 0=OFF = TBMA DIVE ALTITUDE; TO = TBMA DIVE ANGLE; TO DEG *1* 6

Figure 2-7. Tab 1, Pages 2 and 3 2-31. Page 2 of Tab 1 is used to enter the ID mode and ID weight set. Authorizations for track ID criteria are entered in Tab 79 (Figure 2-21) for each subordinate Patriot FP and battalion. Page 3 allows the operator to set parameters for TBM engagement operations. 2-32. Tab 1, page 2, also controls authorizations transmitted by way of data link to subordinate Patriot batteries. In the automatic ID mode, the electronic countermeasures (ECM) authorization allows Patriot batteries

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subordinate to the ICC to automatically identify ECM emitters as hostile. Authorizing ECM at the ICC allows the electronic countermeasure criteria to be used for ID scoring. Authorization to use ECM as a hostile ID criterion is normally not granted to Patriot batteries because of the presence of friendly jammers (and the subsequent risk of identifying a friendly track as a hostile target). In the manual ID mode, ID processing is conducted using ECM criteria. However, the result of this processing is an ID recommendation for the evaluated target. ID MODE 2-33. The ID mode, either automatic or manual, can be set independently for the ICC and the battery. In the manual ID mode, the TD or TDA enters the ID for each track, except for TRUE FRIEND which requires receipt of a valid Mode 4 IFF response. In the automatic ID mode, (auto IFF/SIF state Tab 6), the FP assigns a track ID based on evaluation of the track using active and passive ID criteria. The ICC, in the automatic ID mode, assigns track identification based on FP track reports. The ICC and individual firing platoons ID modes are set in Tab 1. The S3 or the commander implements the selected ID mode. Their decision is based on guidance from tactical directives, tactical standing operating procedures (TSOPs), and operation orders (OPORDs), as well as the known data link architecture and the control chain in which the battalion must operate. When Patriot has ID authority, the system should be in automatic ID mode. Otherwise it should be in manual. ID WEIGHT SET 2-34. The ID weight set is a parameter used by the weapons control computer (WCC) for ID processing. There are three ID weight sets numbered 1 through 3. As a track history is maintained by the system, an ID score is computed continuously. The ID score depends on whether the track was reported within (and correlated to) certain types of ID volumes. Whether the track exceeded maximum safe velocity and whether any IFF responses were received, an ID score is computed. Each ID weight is assigned specific values for different ID volume correlation, maximum track speeds (passive ID criteria), and IFF response (active ID criteria). Criteria having values in the ID weight set are— • Friendly origin volume correlation. • Hostile origin volume correlation. • Negative or positive IFF and SIF classification. • Minimum safe velocity. • Restricted and prohibited volume correlation. • Safe passage corridor (SPC) volume correlation. 2-35. ID weight set 3 is for wartime operations. ID weight set 2 is used during periods of transition from peace to war, while weight set 1 is used during peacetime operations. Before using weight sets 1 or 2, however, units should be thoroughly familiar with (S)FM 44-100A(U). It is important to note that for automatic ID processing to work correctly, the ICC and ECS must use the

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same Patriot ID weight set. Accordingly, the TD or TDA at the ICC must be aware of ID mode changes made at the FU. Hawk units subordinate to the ICC must use a Hawk ID weight set having the same weights as the current Patriot ID weight set. 2-36. Criteria for a pop-up target are normally not allowed. Minimum safe velocity is allowed only when a slow and low joint criteria is in effect. Slow target engagements are authorized only when the threat of enemy helicopters is high and clutter returns are not significant. SIF friend is authorized when SIF alone is joint criteria for a friendly ID. 2-37. Page 3 controls TBM firing doctrine. Normally TBM A and TBM B engagement mode are selected as automatic. Also, the normal method of fire for both TBM A and B is ripple. Ripple fire used for TBMs is slightly different than that used for ABTs. The time delay between firings for TBM ripple is P4-1 seconds while the time delay for ABTs is P4-2 seconds. For the classified values, see (S/NF)ST 44-85-1A(U). Urban low-altitude trajectory control is normally off except when low-altitude TBM intercepts could cause damage in built-up areas. Consultation with civil authorities may be necessary to get a proper assessment of whether the risk of damage caused by low-altitude intercepts outweighs the risk of not engaging. When TBMs are a threat to Patriot defended assets, the TBM A dive calculation should be on and the dive altitudes and angles should be used. Default values for dive angles and altitudes for Tab 67 and are found in (S/NF)ST 44-85-1A(U). TAB 6—IFF/SIF CONTROL 2-38. IFF and SIF are controlled by way of Tab 6 and are part of the initialization sequence and available in TAC OPS for on-line changes. Tab 6 provides the capability to select the types of codes used for correlation of Mode 1 and 3A responses for the SIF. There are two available code sources, KAA-63 tables in Tab 73, and compass rose tables in Tab 74. Tables 1 and 2 are compass rose and Tables 3 and 4 are KAA-63. The contents of this IFF and SIF code tables will be discussed after Tab 6. KAA-63 code tables are most commonly used for SIF; Tab 74 (compass rose tables) is seldom used. The Tab 6 format is shown in Figure 2-8.
IFF/SIF CONTROL ( )=SIF TABLE ( )=MODE 4 CODE ( )=MODE 4 THRESHOLD ( )=MODE 4 LOW RANDOMNESS ( )=ENABLE MODE 4 ( )=ENABLE SIF ( )=MODE 1 CORRELATION ( )=MODE 3 CORRELATION YEAR( ) DAY( ) TIME( CMND VALUES: 1,2=CR;3,4=KAA-63 A, B H=HIGH L=LOW 1=YES, 0=NO 1=ON, 0=OFF 1=ON, 0=OFF 1=USE, 0=DON’T USE 1=USE, 0=DON’T USE )Z SOURCE= *6* CODE ENTRY FORMS: KAA63 *73* CROSE *74*

Figure 2-8. Screen Display of Tab 6 2-39. IFF Mode 4 control entries are also available in Tab 6. The Mode 4 code entry designates the code to be used in decoding Mode 4 responses. Code A or Code B can be selected. Normally, joint procedures will specify the use of Code A. The Mode 4 threshold entry can be set high or low. A high threshold setting means that the system requires more specific criteria to be met than

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the low threshold. Certain criteria have to be met before the system recognizes a Mode 4 response as valid. A low threshold setting has less stringent requirements for Mode 4. Normally, the high threshold is selected to gain a higher confidence that a positive Mode 4 response is valid since that normally leads to true friend identification. The Mode 4 low randomness entry is used for system control of Mode 4 interrogations. A Mode 4 low randomness entry of YES allows the system to continue using Mode 4 if the interrogator cannot maintain randomness of transmitted codes. Low randomness is normally on. 2-40. ENABLE SIF entry of ON will make the FP ENABLE SIF switches active at on-line Patriot batteries. With ENABLE SIF ON, fire units may interrogate tracks with Modes 1, 2, or 3A. Mode 2 code returns are not correlated against any other codes and are not used for track ID assignment in the auto ID mode. Mode 2 code returns are displayed on the ECS track AMP data tab and uptold to the ICC for display on the track AMP data tab. The enable Mode 4 entry has a similar effect at the Patriot batteries. An enable Mode 4 entry of ON will start on-line Patriot battery FP ENABLE MODE 4 switches. Normally, both Mode 4 and SIF are on. 2-41. Mode 1 and Mode 3 correlation control entries allow the system to use SIF correlation. It is not mandatory to authorize the use of Mode 1 or Mode 3 correlation. The Air Tasking Order (ATO) will define which modes will be used. However, both may be enabled at the same time. If both are enabled, the aircraft must respond correctly in both modes for positive correlation. The default value for Mode 1 correlation and the Mode 3 correlation is 1=Use. However, normally only one mode will be used for correlation based on the ATO. 2-42. Precise time of day is automatically provided in Tab 6 to Patriot FPs with the AEE PLGR and up-linked to the ICC, upon transition to TAC OPS when a valid communications link is established. Tab 6 data field related to the time of day (TOD) and identified as SOURCE = aaa, [(aaa = OPR (operator) or global positioning system (GPS)]. Operator entry of TOD is indicated by OPR and GPS indications (provided the precession lightweight GPS receiver (PLGR) indicates TOD). An operator cannot override PLGR provided TOD. 2-43. The precise time of day determination is an inherent function of the GPS PLGR that will be used by the ECS and ICC. Precise time of day is required to support told-in target correlation. Timely target cueing and target hand-off also require PTOD. Both the ECS and ICC will now use PLGR standard time to ensure that external synchronous communication links can be correctly established, that ACOs are established at their proper time, and the external source data correlation is correct. The PLGR standard time shall be used to synchronize time of day (TOD) for Patriot. By using the PLGR standard time, operator input will no longer be required for time synchronization. This will allow Patriot to be in time synchronization with all other PLGR time users. Current TOD control processing will be retained to support units without PLGR capabilities. Operator entries will be disabled for units that have PLGR and are receiving quality PLGR TOD data. Units with PLGR data shall be able to provide TOD to HEUs and adjacent units if they do not have PLGR based TOD.

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2-44. The ICC can establish its own TOD, but, the TOD may be overridden when an FU with a PLGR TOD comes in line. If the local ICC is the BN TOD master, then the Tab 6 TOD entry is required to establish the TOD for the battalion network. If the local ICC is not the TOD master, then Tab 6 TOD entries cannot be made on-line. When TOD entries are made in Tab 6 during BATI, date and time are also used to display the last ICC data base update in Tab 99 (Figure 2-58). FPs with precision lightweight GPS (PLGR) receiver-11 will have automatic emplacement enhancement capability and precise time of day (PTOD). Tab 6 also allows the TOD to be entered or reset for the use of the SIF codes, which are time-dependent. The time, day, and year information are required for use at the ICC if the ICC does not have any Patriot batteries on-line and if a battalion TOD master has not been established in Tab 2. 2-45. When the ICC transitions to TAC OPS, the first Patriot on line will send PTOD to OPS and establish active communications links with subordinate Patriot FPs equipped with the ICC and be designated the TOD master. As all other Patriot FPs come on-line, the lowest numbered FP will then be designated the TOD master. TAB 10—LOCAL ENGAGEMENT CONTROL PARAMETERS 2-46. Local engagement control parameters are input by way of Tab 10. These parameters are used to help the TD establish asset defense for his AO. There are three data entries pertaining to engagement control: Patriot engagement range bias, Hawk engagement range bias, and operator override time. Range bias affects ABT engagements Tab 10 (Figure 2-9) format is shown below.
( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) LOCAL ENGAGEMENT CONTROL PARAMETERS = FP1 ENGAGEMENT RANGE BIAS TO FP2 FP3 FP4 FP5 FP6 HAWK FP ENGAGEMENT RANGE BIAS -15 TO +15 SECONDS OPERATOR OVERRIDE TIME 00 TO 30 SECONDS *10*

Figure 2-9. Screen Display of Tab 10 Patriot Engagement Range Bias 2-47. Patriot engagement range bias via Tab 10 changes the engagement range limits expected by the system software. A positive range bias extends the maximum anticipated engagement range and decreases the probability of kill (Pk) while a negative range bias decreases the maximum anticipated engagement range and increases the Pk. Range biasing has an impact on intercept performance and affects the time to first launch (TTFL) calculation. 2-48. Patriot engagement range bias can be used when the battery missile supply versus the expected threat level permits. To maximize Pk, negative range bias may be used when a large raid size is anticipated against a battery with a low missile inventory. Conversely, positive range bias, in effect lowering the Pk, can be used when a battery with a full supply of missiles can

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risk engagement against a low-level threat. It is important to note that a positive range bias has an impact on the multiple simultaneous engagement capability of the system. Its use is not recommended. When Patriot engagements are to be directed at long ranges with intercepts beyond P4-3 kilometers, against small numbers of targets it is more effective to instruct TDAs and TCAs to engage at those ranges, regardless of time-to-launch release (TLR), instead of biasing the Patriot engagement range. See (S)FM 44-100A(U). Tactical Note: It is better to engage ARM carriers, ARMs, and jamming aircraft as soon as they come within range. Hawk FU Engagement Range Bias 2-49. Hawk FU engagement ranges may be biased using Tab 10. The Hawk FU engagement range bias is aggregate in nature; that is, one setting at the ICC affects all subordinate Hawk FUs in the TF, regardless of location on the battlefield. The Hawk engagement range bias has a range of + 15 kilometers _ and may be used similarly as the Patriot battery engagement range bias. A positive bias provides a means of decreasing time to first launch (TTFL) for Hawk, which has the effect of increasing the range at which Hawk fire units receive engagement commands from the ICC. A positive Hawk engagement range bias facilitates engagement assignment at a range to achieve intercept equal to the range bias setting plus the high-lethality range. The engagement range bias facilitates the selection of Hawk FUs for engagement by the ICC, but the bias has no effect upon the ability of the Hawk FU to make successful engagements at longer ranges. Targets out of range for the Hawk system will not produce the "in range" indication required to conduct the engagement (the Hawk fire unit must wait until the target meets system engagement capabilities regardless of the range of the target at the time the engagement command was received). A negative engagement range bias should not be used for Hawk fire units because this would increase the TTFL and have the effect of reducing the range at which Hawk could engage. A positive range bias should only be used if it is clearly apparent that Hawk FUs are not being selected as the primary candidate for engagement. 2-50. Operator override time applies to Patriot batteries using the automatic engagement mode only. This setting is the time given the TD or TDA to review the track data on the to-be-engaged queue (TBEQ) before automatic engagement. It begins after the target time to launch release (TLR) has gone to zero seconds. The recommended value for this Tab 10 setting is five seconds. The operator override time does not apply to TBM engagements in the automatic engagement mode. TAB 14—TARGET DISPLAY CONTROL 2-51. Tab 14, TARGET DISPLAY CONTROL (Figure 2-10), is automatically displayed during the initialization sequence, and can also be called up by the operator during TAC OPS. On page 1, the operator selects either English or metric units of measure for the altitude, speed, and range fields in Tab 14, Tab 78, (Track Amplifying Data), and also for target display data (Tab 79). Normally, English should be selected. 2-52. On page 2, the operator enters upper and lower limits for all four altitude bands, speed category limits for the target velocity vector display,

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and either tactical information link TADIL-B or NATO track numbers. Use the default values for the altitude bands. The medium speed category should be above MSV and below pop-up thresholds, if used. Otherwise, use default values. Normally, TADIL-J track numbers should be used, depending on the multi-TADIL environment.
TARGET DISPLAY CONTROL ( )= ALTITUDE UNITS: FOR TARGETS/MASK/VOLUMES 1=ENGLISH, 2=METRIC ( )= SPEED/RANGE UNITS: FOR TARGETS/CURSOR 1=ENGLISH, 2=METRIC LO ( ( ( ( ( TARGET DISPLAY CONTROL PAGE 2 HI = BOUNDARIES OF ALTITUDE BANDS, TO )( ) = BAND A )( ) = BAND B )( ) = BAND C )( ) = SELECT ALT LIMITS )( ) = MEDIUM SPEED CATEGORY LIMITS, TO ( ) = TRACK NUMBERS: 1=NATO, 2=TADIL-A/B, 3=TADIL-J *14* PAGE 1 *14*

Figure 2-10. Screen Display of Tab 14 TAB 40 2-53. Tab 40 controls special intelligence data. See (S/NF)ST 44-85-1A(U). TAB 43 2-54. Tab 43 controls specified intelligence data. For more information see (S/NF)ST 44-85-1A(U). TAB 70—TBM AND ABT DEFENDED ASSETS, (ICC) 2-55. Assets and defended areas are derived from the commander's intent and operations order of higher echelon elements. Doctrinal considerations for deployment planning for assets and defended areas can be found in FM 44-85 (for this discussion, the term "defended area" is considered to have the same meaning as "asset," therefore, the term asset will be used for both). 2-56. The ICC considers assets when performing threat assessment and FP candidate selection. This information will be discussed in three separate areas: asset definition, asset assignment, and asset control. INITIALIZATION PARAMETERS 2-57. Tab 70 (Figure 2-11) is used to enter initialization parameters that define the ABT or TBM asset. Tab 70 is available during initialization and during TAC OPS and CMND PLAN mode. Entering a zero in the ID data field may erase entries in Tab 70. Asset ID, location, radius or polygon, TBM, and asset threat category (ATC) are entered via Tab 70. Separate ABT and TBM assets capability provides improved defense design in the following areas: • More accurate definitions of defended areas.

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• •

More flexibility to tailor the defense for current mission requirements. Reduction in the probability of expending missiles against non-threatening TBM targets.
1 OF 54 ACTV 3 *70* MAX

TBM DEFENDED ASSETS *ABT ASSETS PGS 1-18* PG TB( ) =IDENTITY CENTER PT ( ) =STATUS;A/I ( ( ) =ATC; 1 TO 8 ( ( . )KM=RADIUS ( ( ( )=COORDINATE FORMAT ( 0=UTM, 2=LAT/LON ( 1=MGRS, 3=GEOREF ( ENTER TAB SETS FORMAT ( IN UTM ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

FP A/I COV 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 3 ( ) 4 ( ) 5 ( ) 6 ( )

SELECT ( )=PG ( )=ID

ABT DEFENDED ASSETS *ABT ASSETS PGS AT( ) =IDENTITY ( ) =STATUS;A/I ( ) =ATC; 1 TO 8 ( . )KM=RADIUS ( )=COORDINATE FORMAT 0=UTM, 2=LAT/LON 1=MGRS, 3=GEOREF ENTER TAB SETS FORMAT CENTER PT IN UTM

19-54* PG

1

OF

54 3

*70* MAX

FP A/I COV 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 3 ( ) 4 ( ) 5 ( ) 6 ( )

ACTV

SELECT ( )=PG ( )=ID

Figure 2-11. Screen Display of Tab 70

ABT/TBM DEFENDED ASSETS
2-58. Tab 70 accommodates a total of 54 assets (18 TBM only and 36 ABT/TBM). Assets are now labeled with two alpha characters and two numbers. ABT/TBM assets have the letters AT preceding the number that can range from 19 to 54. TBM-only assets have the letters TB preceding the number that can range from 01 to 18. Tab 70 accommodates a total of 54 assets. ABT assets (often referred to as ABT/TBM assets) are assessed for both ABT and TBM threats. Two types of ABT assets are definable, a point asset (without a radius) or a radial asset (with a radius). TBM assets are only assessed for TBM threats. Three types of TBM assets are definablea point asset, a radial asset, or a polygon asset. The polygon asset can be a minimum of three coordinate points or a maximum of eight coordinate points. 2-59. The active/inactive (A/I) column is used to set the activity status of each asset (A=active, I=inactive). Assets can be initially defined in the data base with an inactive activity status, and then made active later. The ATC is an important setting used to prioritize engagements based on the position and heading of enemy aircraft in relation to the asset. The threat with the highest ATC is placed on the TBEQ first. ATC can be set from 1 (highest priority) to 8 (lowest priority). Depending on the theater, assets may be rank ordered, grouped, or no priority specified. The battalion S3 must work with brigade to define asset threat categories (ATCs) for each asset to ensure that the commander in chief’s (CINC’s) intent is met. Normally, the ICC and FUs will

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be designated ATC 1 also to ensure self-defense. THAAD batteries in an air and missile defense task force (AMDTF) would receive equal priority. Tab 70 provides the operator the choice of four different coordinate systems for defining assets and defended areas. The operator should enter the coordinates in the same format used in the ATO, TAC OPDAT, or OPORD to reduce the possibility of translation errors. 2-60. Assets entered as a circle are displayed as squares. The diameter of the circle is the same as the width of the square. The center points are identical. Figure 2-12 shows how circles define an asset and are displayed on the system display.

ASSET AS DEFINED

ASSET AS DISPLAYED

X

UTM CENTER (Asset Location)

RADIUS (Asset Size)

Asset Numbers AT 19 TO 54 (ABT) TB 01 TO 18 (TBM)

Note: Assets with an inactive status (A/I = I) are displayed with low brightness.

Figure 2-12. Asset Display TAB 71—ALL VOLUMES AND POINTS DATA 2-61. Weapons control and ID volume initialization data is derived from airspace control orders and published tactical operations data (TAC OPDAT) information. ACO information involving airspace control volumes must be manually translated to Tab 71 data parameters at the Patriot battalion. Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) Publication 3-52 and FM 10-103 are references for specific airspace control measures use. Some ACM types (and corresponding references) which may be initialized are listed in Figure 2-13.

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STANDARD USE ARMY AVIATION FLIGHT ROUTE MINIMUM RISK ROUTE/LOW LEVEL TRANSIT ROUTE BASE DEFENSE ZONE IFF ON/OFF PASSIVE ID LINES MISSILE ENGAGEMENT ZONE RESTRICTED OPERATION ZONE COORDINATING ALTITUDE Figure 2-13. Airspace Control Measures GENERALIZED VOLUMES 2-62. Tab 71, weapons control and ID volume definition will be discussed. BATI Tab 71 is used to enter initialization parameters that define the weapons control and ID volumes. 2-63. There are several types of generalized volumes definable by Tab 71 entries. The polygon and cylinder volumes may be defined as a pure weapons control volume (having only a weapons control attribute). A pure ID volume (having only an ID attribute); or a composite volume (having both a weapons control and an ID attribute) may be used to define a weapons control and ID volumes. The polygon and cylinder volumes may be additionally defined as (or given attributes for) a friendly origin, a hostile origin, a prohibited volume (PV), or a restricted volume (RV). Friendly origins have a friendly ID attribute, while hostile origins, RVs, and PVs all have a hostile ID attribute. Corridor volumes must have a safe passage corridor (SPC) attribute, a friendly ID attribute. SPCs are defined by a centerline, and width, and have additional correlation criteria. The IFF passive ID (PID), IFFON, PIDON are special volumes, defined as a line. They are used as an ID processing boundary for automatic IFF interrogations in AUTO ID, MSV, SPC, PV, RV, and pop-up target classifications and are only performed between the Patriot battery and the IFFPID, and IFF on (IFFON) lines. Track speed and heading information are used to correlate targets to specific volumes, except for IFFPID and general points. 2-64. Tab 71 entries to define different weapons control and ID volumes will now be discussed. Figure 2-14 shows the format of the tab.
( )=ID ( )=STAT;A/I/T =CURRENT STAT *VOLUMES* PG 1/150 *71* DAY HRS MON YEAR ( . )KM=SPC WDTH ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )=ON ( )=SPC DIRECTN; ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )=OFF F=FWD, R=REV, B=BTH ( ) ( . )KM=VOL RADIUS ( )=COORD FORMAT ( ) ( . )TO(mm.m)aa=ALT 0=UTM 2=LAT/LON ( ) ( )TO(nnn)DEF=HDG 1=MGRS 3=GEOREF ( ) ( )TO(mmm)M/S=SPD ENTAB SETS FORMAT ( ) ( )DEG=SPC TOLERANCE ( ) ATTRIBUTES;Y/N ( )=ORIG USED UNITS: /150 ( ) ( )=SPC ( )=RVA ( )=PVA USED UNITS /800 SELECT: PG( ), ID( )

Figure 2-14. Screen Display of Tab 71 2-65. The activation time of each volume goes into the tab. If no time is entered, active volumes will be used for correlation.

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2-66. Minimum risk routes, low-level transit routes, transit corridors, air routes, standard use Army aviation flight routes, and other similar airspace control measures are friendly ID volumes. Friendly origin volumes such as joint or multinational air bases are friendly ID volumes also. 2-67. Airspace outside of airspace control measures and within a missile engagement zone (MEZ) is usually entered as a hostile ID volume. Restricted operations zones may be hostile volumes. Enemy airbases also may be hostile ID volumes. 2-68. The IFF on-line is a line volume. The passive ID on-line is a line volume. Usually, the two are combined into a composite IFF and passive ID on line. For units supporting corps or close to the enemy, their lines normally coincide with the fire support coordination line (FSCL). For rear area units, an artificial line is used to ensure that the ID function supports the engagement function. In this case the line is usually 100 km from the closest battery.

WEAPON CONTROL STATUS
2-69. The weapons control residual status is the weapon control status (WEAPONS HOLD, WEAPONS TIGHT, or WEAPONS FREE) used instead of or outside established weapons control volumes. Volumes can have both ID attributes and a weapon control attribute. Volumes that have either, but not both, attributes are called pure volumes (ID or weapon control). These volumes that have both attributes are called dual purpose or composite volumes. 2-70. For pure volumes, either ID or weapon control, the weapon control status reverts to the designated weapons control residual status when the AREAS ENABLE S/I is off. The only exception to this is the IFFPID, which is a line without a weapons control or ID attribute used to classify targets. When the AREAS ENABLE S/I is enabled, the pure weapon control volumes' weapons control status, as defined in Tab 71, is enabled once the volume is activated. For example, the weapon control status and the activated volume would be WEAPONS FREE with AREAS ENABLE S/I enabled. It would be the residual weapons control with the AREAS ENABLE S/I off. Dual purpose or composite volumes are unaffected by the AREAS ENABLE S/I. 2-71. The weapons control residual status is dependent upon the tactical situation. The Patriot weapons control residual status is affected sometimes by the weapons control state directed by headquarters. 2-72. Base defense zones, weapons free zones, restricted operations zones, MEZ and other similar ACM normally have a weapon control status. This is entered as the last part of the volume ID. SAFE PASSAGE CORRIDORS 2-73. The SPC DIRECTION data entry field is a required entry if the SPC attribute is indicated and CORR WIDTH data has been provided. Corridor direction is used for track correlation with the SPC based on the direction the track is flying in the corridor. There are three directions, with the direction

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referenced to the first point used to define the SPC centerline. The three directions are— • "F"—FORWARD: one way from first entered point to the last. • "R"—REVERSE: one way from last entered point to the first. • "B"—BOTH: two-way corridor. 2-74. SPC DIRECTION is another correlation criterion along with track altitude, heading, speed, and corridor tolerance criteria. Most aerial routes are both but this will be determined in the ACO. 2-75. The SPC WIDTH data entry defines the width of all corridor segments defined in and centered about the volume boundary points. This entry only applies if the SPC attribute entry is Y. The corresponding volume IDENTITY must be defined as friendly. The SPC width is defined in the ACO. No buffers are used. 2-76. When defining coordinates for volume/asset, the system incorporates latitude-longitude (LAT-LONG), MGRS, and Geographic Reference (GEOREF) as alternate input formats. This enhances the flexibility of the system and eliminates hand conversion of other coordinates into UTM. The system allows entry of UTM, GEOREF, MGRS, and LAT-LONG formats in Tabs 70, 71, and 72. Use the coordinate system used in the ACO to enter data into Tab 71. Aerial Routes 2-77. All aerial routes and similar ACM receive safe passage corridor attribute (SPCA). The ID volumes must be friendly. 2-78. The Tab 71 SPC TOLERANCE data entry field only applies if the SPC attribute is also selected on the page. This value is used to correlate tracks with the safe passage corridor based on the track heading. The SPC TOLERANCE is the allowable deviation in degrees from the corridor centerline (the corridor centerline is defined by a series of points, also entered on the page). The normal tolerance is 30 degrees. 2-79. The software defines safe passage corridor width to the nearest tenth of a kilometer. Width may range from 1.0 km to 20.0 km. Each time an aircraft enters an SPC and correctly aligns with the corridor heading within the period specified called the Safe Corridor Alignment Interval, it receives positive credit. However, if an aircraft turned too early, it violated the heading condition of the corridor segment it was entering. Pilots have some heading flexibility while turning within the bounds of the SPC. There is an area designated around the SPC bend that allows for correlation with either corridor segment heading. A circle with a radius equal to 3/4 the width of the corridor is defined in the FU evaluation, decision, and weapon assignment (EDWA) logic processing. The center of this circle is the center line point at the bend as currently defined for the SPC in the data base. If an aircraft is found to be inside the SPC borders but does not align with the heading of the corridor segment, then a check is run to determine if it lies within one of those circles. If this is the case, the aircraft is inside a corridor bend and the heading checks for both connecting corridor segments are to be performed. This ensures that the aircraft will pass either heading condition as it

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navigates through the turn so that SPC credit will be preserved, even if the aircraft turns early or late. Speed in Safe Passage Corridors 2-80. The speed entries provide another range of values used to correlate tracks with the defined volume. Both minimum and maximum speed values (the lower and upper target speed limit respectively) must be entered if speed is to be used for volume correlation. 2-81. The track heading (HDG) entries are used to correlate tracks with the particular volume defined on the page. The value provides a range of headings allowed for volume correlation (the heading range is measured clockwise from first entry to second). 2-82. The two altitude entries, shown as altitude (ALT), have units of measure either in kilometers or kilo feet, based on the Tab 14 ENGLISH or METRIC entry. This information provides a range of altitudes to be used for correlation of the volume with reported tracks. Buffers are not added to altitudes listed in the ACO unless specified. Define Safe Passage Corridors 2-83. After the volumes and points are defined via data entries to Tab 71, BATI processing allocates the volumes and points to the Patriot batteries. Volumes and point allocation information is displayed in Tabs 61 and 5. Units and points are based on the following: • Cylinder Volume = 1 unit/1 point. • Polygon Volume = 1 unit/1+ number of sides = points. • Corridor Volume = n units = n segments/n points = 5n segments. • General Point = 1 unit/0 points. • PIDON/IFFPID = 1 unit/2-12 points. 2-84. The maximum number of volumes or points allocated to a single Patriot battery is 55. The maximum number of points allocated to a Patriot battalion is 250. The maximum number of points includes all volumes or points allocated to the FP. If an excess exists, an alert informs the operator which FP has excess geodata. The excess GEODATA alert is displayed during FU deployment planning and in the command function. The operator must select Tab 61 to see how many units and points are exceeded. 2-85. There are also limits to the number of active volumes or active points allocated to FP. The maximum number of active volumes or active point units allocated to a single Patriot battery is 27 units and 150 points. If an excess exists, an alert is displayed which informs the operator which FP has excess active geographical data. Tab 61 shows how many active volumes and active points are excess for each FP. MISSILE ENGAGEMENT ZONE 2-86. The portion of the missile engagement zone (MEZ) out to and just beyond the launch range of Patriot batteries is a prohibited volume attribute

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(PVA). In rear areas the entire MEZ may be a PVA. Airspace control measures (ACM) run through the PVA providing minimum risk to friendly aircraft and missiles. 2-87. Friendly and enemy air bases within the low-altitude detection range of Patriot may be designated either friendly or hostile origin volumes, respectively. Friendly air bases are normally within a MEZ or a restricted volume to protect friendly aircraft. 2-88. The entire MEZ is a restricted volume attribute (RVA). ACM run through the RVA providing minimum risk to friendly aircraft and missiles. TAB 72—GENERAL PURPOSE MAPS ENTRY 2-89. Tab 72 General Purpose Maps is a 20-page tab and is available during ICC initialization and TAC OPS. Tab 72 is identical at the ICC and ECS. Tab 72 provides the operator with the capability to create and display general information lines, general purpose maps, general points, or other general areas of interest. Tab 72 is shown in Figure 2-15.
GENERAL PURPOSE MAPS ENTRY (cccc) = IDENTITY (n) = MS1 DISPLAY; 1=ON, 0=OFF (n) = MS3 DISPLAY; 1=ON, 0=OFF (nn.n) KM = RADIUS (n) = LINE 1=YES, 0=NO (n) = COORDINATE FORMAT 0=UTM, 2=LAT,LON 1=MGRS, 3=GEOREF ENTER TAB SETS FORMAT PG nn OF 20 PGS *72*

BOUNDARY/LINE/CENTER PTS (nn)= SELECT PG

ccccc)= SELECT ID

Figure 2-15. Screen Display of Tab 72

2-90. such

General information lines can be used to display a forward support coordination line (FSCL), forward edge battle area (FEBA), forward line of own troops (FLOT), IFF off line, or a country/political boundary, et cetera. Entering only one coordinate point creates a general point. An area of interest is used for general information and can be created by entering three or more coordinate points. All general purpose maps are for display purposes only. Tab 72 input can be in any four coordinate formats: universal transverse macerator (UTM), military grid reference system (MGRS), latitude/longitude (LAT/LONG), or world GEOREF. Coordinated data points can be entered either by data field entry or cursor hooking point. General purpose maps can be downloaded to the tactical data base via data base transfer. Patriot did not have the capability to display general purpose maps as borders and joint operation boundaries. Previously, narrow SPCs

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were used to mark boundaries that are not required for tactical operations. This wastes points and computer processing time and is an improper use of volume entries of Tab 71, All Volumes and Point Entry. General mapping capability is considered necessary to add situational awareness for AD operations and is used as such by all AD units. For example, based upon the location and subsequent deployments, a Patriot battalion could have coverage into an adjacent area operating with different identification and engagement constraints. With boundaries available as display only information, the operator could more accurately apply the published tactical directives. General purpose mapping displays enhance the operator's familiarization with an area and prove very useful in unfamiliar theaters of operation. 2-91. General purpose mapping gives the system the capability both at the ICC and ECS to identify for display any line, point, or area to be used for general operator information but not used in EO processing. The volumes and points identified in Tab 71 are not affected by this capability. The display definition contains entry of UTM, GEOREF, LAT-LONG, or MGRS coordinates, and identity (free form) and entries by cursor placement. The capability allows definition of twenty individual displays and is available during initialization and tactical operations. Data buffer transfer from the ICC to the ECS is provided. Displayed points and lines are in low brightness so as to be distinct from other displays. 2-92. Tab 72, General Purpose Maps Entry, allows the operator to define, control, and display general purpose maps. The tab is available in both initialization and tactical operations. A free-form identity operator entry is provided for the purpose of naming the map. Data entry of up to eight coordinate points is provided by keyboard entry or cursor placement and hooking via Tab 72. Special case items and general point (ICC, CRG, FSCL) are entered in Tab 72. The MASK TERR/MAPS S/I at the ECS expands the function for selecting general maps. The Gen Points S/I at the ICC must be selected to display general points entered in Tab 72. If Tab 72 is selected during tactical operations, the console at which it is displayed is removed from EO due to the secondary use of the hook keys. TAB 73—KAA 63 TABLE 2-93. One source of Mode 1 and Mode 3 SIF codes is the KAA-63 code tables. Tab 73 is used to enter Mode 1 and Mode 3 KAA-63 codes, on four pages. Two sets (tables 3 and 4) of Modes 1 and 3 data can be inputted for different 48 half-hour intervals. 2-94. Tab 73 has a capacity of 48 Mode 1 codes and 48 Mode 3 codes per table/set. Both present and future sets may consist of either Table 3 or Table 4. Normally, odd day codes are entered in Table 3, while even day codes are entered in Table 4. After code changeover time, the following day's codes are entered in the superseded table. Entering zeros in the first data field can clear the entire table. At least one set of codes is required, based on the SIF table selection (Table 3 or 4), in Tab 6. It is advisable to have the future set of codes available in the data base in case the present set is compromised. Tab 73 format is shown in Figure 2-16.

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TIME 0000 0200 0400 0600 0800 1000 TIME 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 2200

M1 ( ( ( ( ( ( ) ) ) ) ) ) M1 ( ( ( ( ( ( ) ) ) ) ) ) ( ( ( ( ( (

KAA-63 TABLE-AM TABLE M3 TIME M1 M3 ) 0030 ( ) ( ) ) 0230 ( ) ( ) ) 0430 ( ) ( ) ) 0630 ( ) ( ) ) 0830 ( ) ( ) ) 1030 ( ) ( ) TABLE-PM TABLE TIME M1 M3 1230 ( ) ( 1430 ( ) ( 1630 ( ) ( 1830 ( ) ( 2030 ( ) ( 2230 ( ) (

TIME 0100 0300 0500 0700 0900 1100 TIME 1300 1500 1700 1900 2100 2300

M1 ( ( ( ( ( ( ) ) ) ) ) ) M1 ( ( ( ( ( ( ) ) ) ) ) ) ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( (

M3

PAGE 1 * TIME ) 0130 ) 0330 ) 0530 ) 0730 ) 0930 ) 1130

OF 2* *73* M1 M3 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) *73* M3 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

KAA-63 M3 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

) ) ) ) ) )

PAGE M3 ) ) ) ) ) )

2 * OF 2* TIME M1 1300 ( ) 1530 ( ) 1730 ( ) 1930 ( ) 2130 ( ) 2330 ( )

Figure 2-16. Screen Display of Tab 73-KAA 63 Table, Pages 1 and 2 2-95. Mode 1 and 3 code entries are octal (base 8) numbers. The software accepts all KAA-63 octal entries as legal entries. Codes must be carefully checked after each entry in the tab. 2-96. Tab 73 is available for data entry during initialization and TAC OPS at the ICC. A buffer transfer is required to transmit Tab 73 KAA-63 codes to the Patriot batteries. KAA-63 SIF codes are handled as communication security (COMSEC) information as specified in the unit's standing operating procedures (SOPs). TAB 74—COMPASS ROSE TABLES 2-97. Another source of Mode 1 and Mode 3 SIF codes are the compass rose tables. Compass rose tables provide a means to correlate Modes 1 and 3 SIF with aircraft headings. Tab 74 is used to enter Modes 1 and 3 compass rose codes. Compass rose codes are changed in friendly aircraft based on the flight path heading. Two tables numbered 1 and 2, of Modes 1 and 3 data can be inputted for 9 heading categories. Tab 74, initialization data entries are shown in Figure 2-17.
COMPASS ROSE TABLES MODE1 MODE3 MODE1 MODE3 HEADING: 0-45 TABLE 1:( ) ( ) TABLE 2:( ) ( 45-90 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 90-135 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 135-180 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 180-225 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 225-270 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 270-315 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 315-360 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ORBIT ( ) ( ) ( ) ( *74* ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

Figure 2-17. Screen Display of Tab 74, Compass Rose Tables

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2-98. Each table can be used as either the present or future code set. At least one table per set of codes is required, based on the SIF table selection (Table 1 or Table 2), in Tab 6. It is advisable to have the future set of codes entered in case the set currently in use is compromised. Tab 74 is available for data entry during initialization and during TAC OPS at the ICC. Compass rose IFF codes are handled as COMSEC information, as specified in the unit standing operating procedure (SOP). Compass rose SIF correlation technique and Tab 74 are seldom used.

TAB 76—COUNTER-ARM THREAT PARAMETERS
2-99. Tab 76 (Figure 2-18) supports the system capability to identify and counter antiradiation missiles (ARMs). Tab 76 is the same at the ICC and ECS. An ARM is an air-to-surface missile (ASM) which is launched from an aircraft known as an ARM carrier (ARMC). System default values should be used unless directed by the battalion S3 of higher echelon. Tab 76 is automatically or manually sequenced during initialization and TAC OPS. See Chapter 3 for tactics to counter ARMs. The following explains the ARM threat parameters for classification and countermeasures using Tab 76: • Page A of Tab 76 allows entry of ARM classification parameters to identify an ARM. ARM classification parameter identifies flight characteristics that the system will associate with an ARM missile. When all of these parameters are met by a track, the system will classify it as an ARM. Page B of Tab 76 allows for entry of ARM countermeasures. Any counter antiradiation missile (CARM) measures that are authorized on this page will be automatically activated when the operator at the ECS enables the CARM S/I. Normally, low power is authorized when ARM attacks are imminent or in progress and the ABT/TBM threat is minimal. However, the TD needs to balance the benefit of low power reducing the “targetability” of the Patriot radar set (RS) versus the greater range at which ARMs can be detected in high power. Reduced search is normally not used. Frequency diversity is normally authorized. ARM engagement mode is normally automatic.
PAGE A *76*

COUNTER ARM THREAT PARAMETER MAX ARM CLASSIFICATION PARAMETERS (nnn) KM = RANGE 0 TO RMAX (nn) KM = ALTITUDE 0 TO AMHMAX (nnnn) (nnnn) M/S = SPEED 0 TO 9999 (nn) (nn) DEG = DIVE ANGLE 0 TO 90 (nn) DEG = APPROACH ANGLE 0 TO 90 (nn) SQ. M = TARGET CROSS SECTION 1 TO 99 MIN

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COUNTER ARM THREAT PARAMETER ARM COUNTERMEASURES (n) = LOW POWER (n) = REDUCE SEARCH (n) = FREQUENCY DIVERSITY (a) = ARM ENGAGEMENT MODE

PAGE B *76* 1 1 1 A = = = = ON ON ON AUTO 0 0 0 M = = = = OFF OFF OFF MANUAL

Figure 2-18. Screen Display of Tab 76, Counter-ARM Threat Parameters TAB 78—LAUNCH DECISION PARAMETERS 2-100. Tab 78 receives the launch decision parameters. Engagement threshold parameters provide data for information processing. The system uses this information to determine which missile to launch for a particular enemy target. The Tab 78 format is shown in Figure 2-19.
LAUNCH DECISION PARAMETERS *78* ( , )KF = THREAT MODIFIER ALTITUDE THRESHOLD _ . TO HMAX ( ) = MISSILE DEPLETION RULE; 1=BY LS, 0=EVENLY OVER ALL LS ( . )DEG = TARGET TO-MASK ANGLE THRESHOLD 0.0 TO 5.0 ( )M/S = MIN SPEED THRESHOLD FOR TBEQ 000 TO 150 MISSILE CUT-OFF THRESHOLDS: THREAT CUT-OFF THRESHOLDS: ( ) = HIGH TBM 00 TO 15 MISSILES ( )=HIGH TBM 1 TO 9 ( ) = LOW TBM 00 TO 15 MISSILES ( )=LOW TBM 1 TO 9 ( ) = HIGH ABT 00 TO 15 MISSILES ( )=HIGH ABT 1 TO 9 ( ) = LOW ABT 00 TO 15 MISSILES ( )=LOW ABT 1 TO 9 ( ) = LOW HAWK 0 TO 9 MISSILES

Figure 2-19. Screen Display of Tab 78 2-101. The threat modifier altitude threshold is used for ICC threat assessment processing. This setting establishes an altitude threshold used for the assignment of the high-altitude asset threat category (ATC). With this setting, tracks reported at an altitude above the threshold will be assigned an ATC value of 10, which has the effect of placing the target at a lower position on the to-be-engaged queue (TBEQ). Use of this setting is based on known threat capabilities and the desire to defer high-altitude engagements based on the tactical situation. If this is not the case, the track modifier altitude threshold value should be the maximum Patriot search altitude. The recommended setting is the maximum altitude of the highest aircraft in an anticipated attack. 2-102. The missile depletion rule is also set by way of Tab 78. Missiles may be depleted evenly across all launching stations (LSs) or just one LS at a time. This parameter applies to Patriot batteries only. There is also a missile depletion rule setting at the ECS. These settings must be kept consistent between the ICC and the subordinate Patriot battery. The recommended setting for this parameter is 1 (depletion by LS) to facilitate reloading. 2-103. The target-to-mask angle threshold parameter applies to Patriot only. This setting is the angle by which the intercept point must exceed the elevation angle to the masked region below the intercept point. The intent of the target-to-mask angle threshold is to provide an early warning to the TD or TDA that a target is about to enter a masked region. The warning will be

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provided when the target reaches the target-to-mask angle threshold above the masked terrain elevation angle (see Figure 2-20).

THREAT FLIGHT PATH TARGET-TO-MASK ANGLE

1
LNIP LNIP

2

1

The threat location at time of masking alert with a target-to-mask angle.

2

The threat location at time of masking alert without a target-to-mask angle.

Figure 2-20. Target-to-Mask Angle Threshold
2-104. The minimum speed threshold for the TBEQ setting applies to Patriot batteries if the proper authorization is set through Tab 78. A target will not be placed on the fire unit TBEQ unless the target speed exceeds the minimum speed threshold. Value should be above clutter remains. Recommended value is P4-4 mps. Targets flying slower than this value will be classified as a slow target. 2-105. Tab 78 format allows missile cutoff and threat cutoff thresholds high and low for both TBMs and ABTs. Hawk missile cut off threshold low is also provided. Missile cutoff thresholds for Patriot and Hawk are used together for ICC engagement processing. Missile cutoff threshold "high" TBM and ABT indicates the number of ready missiles at which the ICC will begin to prioritize missiles by only allowing FUs to automatically fire at high priority threats. For example, if the high missile cutoff threshold for TBM and ABT setting is 15, when the number of ready rounds is 15 or less, then subordinate FUs will be commanded to engage threats having high ATC values. This processing continues until the low missile cutoff threshold is reached. At this point, ECSs are automatically commanded to engage threats having ATC values above the low threshold threat cutoff value setting. The recommended value for high missile cutoff is half the number of ready missiles authorized at the Patriot batteries, 15 missiles. The low missile cutoff recommended value is one-fourth the number of ready missiles, 8 missiles. Recommended value for Hawk is 6 for a platoon, 9 for a battery.

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2-106. High threat cutoff threshold for TBM and ABT indicates the ATC of targets that may be engaged when the high missile cutoff threshold has been reached. For example, if the high threat cutoff threshold for TBM and ABT is 3, then subordinate fire units will be ordered to engage threats having ATC values of 1 or 2. This processing continues until the low missile cutoff threshold is reached. At this point, ECSs are ordered automatically, to engage threats having ATC values above the low-threshold cutoff value setting. 2-107. The recommended value for high threat cutoff for TBM and ABT is set to protect all assets and defended areas equal to asset priority. ICC engagement processing uses these parameters based on the engagement mode. In the automatic engagement mode, the ICC will not send automatic engage commands to ECSs unless these conditions are met. The TD or TDA must initiate engagements if lower ATC threats are to be engaged. When conducting an engagement in the semiautomatic engagement mode, the TD or TDA is alerted (with a low missile alert) that the missile cutoff threshold has been exceeded. Recommended high threshold is 8. Recommended low threshold is 2. TAB 79—IDENTIFICATION PARAMETERS 2-108. The safe corridor alignment interval setting is used to correlate tracks within the safe passage corridor (SPC) for ID processing (see Figure 2-21). As a track enters each segment of an SPC, the track receives a certain amount of time to align to the corridor and be recognized (correlated). This period is defined as the safe corridor alignment interval. If the heading of the track comes within a certain tolerance of the corridor centerline azimuth and the track is flying in the proper direction defined for the SPC, then the safe corridor alignment interval applies. If the track meets the corridor's tolerance within the specified alignment interval, then the track ID score is updated for SPC correlation. The TD or TDA defines safe passage corridor tolerances and directions in Tab 71. While the default value for the safe corridor alignment interval is 20 seconds, the recommended value is 35 seconds. This value can be adjusted and set based on the known capabilities and previous actions of friendly aircraft in the operations area.
( ( ( ( ( ( ( IDENTIFICATION PARAMETERS )S =SAFE CORRIDOR ALIGN, INTERVAL )KF =MIN SAFE VEL ALT THRESHOLD )KTS =MIN SAFE VELOCITY )KF =POP-UP ALTITUDE THRESHOLD )KF =POP-UP MAXIMUM RANGE EXTENT )KTS=MAX VEL BELOW POP ALT THRESH )KTS=POP-UP MAX VELOCITY THRESHOLD *79* 00 cn.n 000 cn.n 000 0000 0000 TO TO TO TO TO TO TO 99 HMAX nnn nn.n nnn nnnn nnnn

Figure 2-21. Screen Display of Tab 79
2-109. Patriot battery software can recommend or assign a hostile identity to a pop-up target. In the manual ID mode, the software provides ID recommendations to the operator. A pop-up target is a low-altitude, relatively fast or a very fast track at any altitude within a specified range. Altitude range and speed thresholds used to classify tracks as pop-up targets are

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contained in Tab 79. Tab 79 sets firing platoon identification parameters and shows target velocity thresholds. 2-110. Tracks located between the FU location and the PID/IFPID on-lines are evaluated for pop-up criteria (if an IFPID is defined, assigned, and activated through Tabs 71 and 5). Note that tracks located in a friendly origin volume are exempt from the pop-up evaluation, and classification of a track as a pop-up will have a permanent effect upon the ID score of the track. The criteria for a Pop-up may be authorized in both forward and rear areas, but is normally not authorized to Patriot batteries when friendly air forces have air superiority because friendly tracks will receive the negative identifier. The tactical director (TD) must use the aerial intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and coordinate with the S2 during planning. The TD recommends pop-up criteria to the S3/battalion commander based on mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, and civilian considerations (METT-TC) and observation, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach (OCOKA). 2-111. Minimum safe velocity (MSV) authorizes Patriot batteries to use the MSV criteria in the ID weight set. MSV classification is applied to low- and slow-flying tracks. Tab 79 contains altitude and speed thresholds used to apply the MSV criteria. If a PIDON/IFPID has been established in the data base, minimum safe velocity evaluation is used on targets between the PIDON/IFPID and the Patriot battery location. If the PIDON/IFPID has not been defined, then MSV evaluation is performed on all tracks. The MSV classification temporarily affects the track ID score, and MSV ID scoring is performed only when the track remains below the MSV threshold. In the automatic ID mode, ID assignment is made using the MSV criteria (if authorized), while an ID recommendation is provided in the manual ID mode using MSV. The MSV authorization should normally be considered for use by Patriot batteries in both the forward and rear operations areas. Usually, safe velocities and altitudes are identified in the ACO or special instructions (SPINS). 2-112. The slow target engagement authorization allows Patriot batteries to engage tracks classified as slow targets. The minimum speed used for the slow target classification is defined in Tab 78 as the minimum speed threshold for TBEQ. Slow target engagements should not normally be authorized, as this helps to keep the TBEQ clear at the ECS. Slow target engagements should be authorized if helicopter attacks or enemy airmobile operations are anticipated. Slow target engagements should specifically not be authorized if friendly helicopter forces are operating in the Patriot coverage area.

DEPLOYMENT/COMMAND PLANNING
2-113. The deployment planning Tab 50 (see Figure 2-3) will appear for the second time during initialization. The TD/TDA should select DEPLOYMENT/COMMAND PLANNING for the initialization mode. TAB 51—DEPLOYMENT/COMMAND PLANNING CONTROL

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2-114. Tab 51, DEPLOYMENT/COMMAND PLANNING CONTROL, allows selection of the current deployment data (active deployment) and provides access to initialization tabs organized by different deployment functions. DEPLOYMENT, PLANNING MODE, and DEPLOYMENT FUNCTION selections in Tab 51 are shown in Figure 2-22. Select new plan reallocation planning mode and COMM DATA BASE deployment function.
DEPLOYMENT/COMMAND PLANNING CONTROL ( ) =PLANNING MODE ( ) =DEPLOYMENT FUNCTION 1 =NEW PLAN/REALLOCATION 1 =ASSETS MODIFICATION 2 =CHANGE PLAN 2 =VOLUME MODIFICATION 3 =REVIEW PLAN 3 =COMM DATABASE 4 =FP DEPLOYMENT 5 =ASSETS ALLOCATION 6 =VOLUME ALLOCATION 7 =ALTERNATE SECTORS 8 =ICC/CRG DEPLOYMENT 0 =DEPLOYMENT INPUT COMPLETE *51*

Figure 2-22. Screen Display of Tab 51, Deployment and Command Planning Control
2-115. Tabs 67 and 68 are only available in initialization. Tab 69 is available in initialization or in TAC OPS through the COMMAND PLAN mode. Selection of the active deployment data can be made when changes are required or can be made to the active deployment data by way of BATI. The number of pages for each tab is also indicated. Track reporting filter information is provided for Hawk FUs and extra-battalion units. The initialization data parameters required supporting the ICC, subordinate fire units, and extra-battalion units are covered next. Net loading considerations, direct links and direct link relay requirements, and communications initialization data changes are addressed separately thereafter. Tab 2 appears next; however, no entries are required at this time. Figure 2-23 outlines the communication initialization requirements.

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Tab 67 — ICC Communications • • • • ICC / Bn Designator Letter RLRIU Address Set Number ATDL-1 1st/2nd Address TADIL A/B/J Bn Address, Upper and Lower Track Numbers

• RRT Ports 1-4 Configuration • Direct Link Relay Number • Direct Relay Type

Tab 68 — Fire Unit Communications

• • • • • • • •

Deployment FP Type (Patriot / Hawk) Number Hawk ATDL -1 Address Defaults Link Station to “1” Link Station Modem Hawk FP Altitude Track ID Reported to Hawk FP Hawk FP Maximum Range Limit / Sector Bounds Altitude Track Reporting Limits

Up to 12 pages for a maximum of 12 Fire Units Tab 69 — Extra-Battalion Communications Control and Track Filter

Track identification reporting and output filter controls designated tracks reported from the ICC to the defined units.

PAGE A • Communications • Unit Type ID Code - Address • Unit Type • Link Address - Non-PADIL • Link Station with Modem • Link Station without Modem • Direct Link Number • Direct Link Relay Indicator

• • • • •

PAGE B Track Filter Control Special Information Reporting Track Heading Limits Non-Patriot Tracks Track Position Limits

Up to 9 A/B Page combinations for a maximum of 9 Extra-BnCombinations

Figure 2-23. Communication Initialization Requirements

BATTALION COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL DATA ENTRY
2-116. ICC communications control data is entered through Tab 67 (Figure 224) that sets up data communications for the ICC itself. The battalion letter designation tells the software which routing logic radio interface unit (RLRIU) address to use (subordinate Patriot batteries must know this letter for entry on the FU version of Tab 68.). The RLRIU address designates the ICC as part of the Patriot data communications network, and allows the ICC to accept messages addressed for the battalion.

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BATTALION COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL DATA ENTRY *67* ( ) =BN ID/SOURCE S/I:A-F PLANNED DEPLOYMENT NET LOAD= PERCENT ( ) =RLRIU ADRS SET NO:1,2 =BN RLRIU ADRS ( )=BTOC: 0=NO,1=YES ( )/( )=1ST/2ND ATDL-1 ADRS UNIT ADRS UNIT ADRS UNIT ADRS FP 1 FP 7 CRG 1 TDL-A TDL-B TDL-J FP 2 FP 8 CRG 2 BN ADRS = ( ) ( ) ( ) FP 3 FP 9 CRG 3 LOWER TRK= ( ) ( ) FP 4 FP 10 CRG-4 UPPER TRK= ( ) ( ) FP 5 FP 11 CRG-5 RRT PORTS:A/S:1( ) 2( ) 3( ) 4( ) FP 6 FP 12 CRG-6 ( )=DIRECT LINK RELAY NO. 1-5 ( )=RELAY TYPE:0=UP/DOWN, 1=LATERAL

Figure 2-24. Screen Display of Tab 67
2-117. Each ICC must have a unique letter designation, A through F, accommodating up to six Patriot ICCs that can be part of any ultrahigh frequency (UHF) distributed data network. The lowest-lettered battalion (A) is assigned to be the TOD master for the network. 2-118. Within the battalion net, the TOD master is the lowest-numbered Patriot battery on line when the ICC initializes communications. The RLRIU address set selection (1 or 2) is used for communications to other ICC networks (master, subordinate, and lateral Patriot ICCs). This allows the software to differentiate between ICCs when direct link relays are used between ICCs. RLRIU addresses set requirements for direct links and direct link relays discussed below. 2-119. Army Tactical Data Link-1 (ATDL-1) addresses allow the ICC to communicate with units using the ATDL-1 protocol, especially Hawk units. (Subordinate Hawk FUs must know the first ATDL-1 address for data communications to the ICC.) It requires two addresses to accommodate the maximum number of reported tracks. The Tactical Digital Information Link A, B, and J for a battalion address allows the ICC to communicate to extrabattalion units using the TADIL A, B, and J protocol, especially auxiliary units. TADIL- A, B, and J requires lower and upper track number entries in order for the software to establish a block of TADIL A, B, and J track numbers for use by the ICC. There should be a minimum of 634 (decimal) between upper and lower track numbers. The direct link relay number and relay type are used to designate the ICC as a direct link relay, and to automatically pass messages between two other Patriot battalions. Requirements for direct links and relays are covered later in this chapter and in Chapter 5. The RRT port configurations are designated either as asynchronous for an internal clock, or as synchronous, to be used as an external clock source. 2-120. Tab 67 entries must be coordinated with all units communicating with the ICC. Both communications control data (data link addresses) and track reporting parameters (geographic location and ID filter settings) must be identified as part of the communications plan, and disseminated. Tab 67, software data communications requirements, must be addressed in conjunction with communications hardware requirements (patching, communications routing list [CRL], antenna azimuths, frequencies, and so forth) as parts of the overall communications plan. TAB 68—FP COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL + HAWK FP TRACK FILTER

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2-121. Tab 68 enters FU communications control and track reporting requirements. Each page of Tab 68 is used for entry of communications data for an individual fire unit subordinate to the ICC. Figure 2-25 shows the format for Tab 68.
FP COMM CONTROL + HAWK FP TRACK FILTER PAGE 1 *68* =DEPLOYMENT NUMBER PLANNED DEPLOYMENT NET LOADING= PERCENT )=FP TYPE: 1=PATRIOT, 2=HAWK-2, 3=HAWK-3 =HAWK ATDL-1 ADDRESS ALL ENTRIES BELOW APPLY TO HAWK FPS ONLY: )=LINK STATION: 1 THRU 6=CRG NUMBER, 7=ICC )=LINK STATION MODEM NUMBER: 1 THRU 5 ) =HAWK FP ALTITUDE , , ) =TRACK ID REPORTED TO HAWK UNITS:U=UNKNOWN,H=HOSTILE,F=FRIEND )KM=HAWK FP MAXIMUM RANGE LIMIT FILTER/SECTOR BOUNDS , ) TO ( , ) =MIN/MAX ALTITUDE ABV MSL TRACK REPORTING LIMITS

( ( ( ( ( ( (

Figure 2-25. Screen Display of Tab 68
2-122. Unit designation via Tab 68 sets up the system software for data communications to these FUs. If an FU is defined for communications in Tab 68, then enter the fire unit location in Tab 59. There is a maximum of 12 FUs, and up to six of these may be Patriot fire units. The page number used to define the fire unit designates the FU number. Patriot batteries are designated by only one entry, the unit type. The other entries in Tab 68 are used to set up Hawk FU data communications. The Hawk ATDL-1 address is displayed by the software based on the numbers of Hawk FUs and/or page of the tab. The link station entry informs the software of the modem location used for the Hawk FU. Modems working together with the Hawk ATDL-1 are connected to an RLRIU that can be located at a CRG or within the ICC itself. This entry allows the software to affiliate a modem with a Patriot specific RLRIU address for communications on the network. The number of the modems working together with Hawk ATDL-1 link must also be known by the software to establish connection to the RLRIU within the link station. 2-123. Tab 68 provides a track reporting filter capability that applies to Hawk FUs. These settings are used when it is desired to filter tracks reported from the ICC to the Hawk fire unit. Track reports may be filtered or limited based on— • • Track position and altitude. This geometric filter limits tracks reported by track position and altitude. Area definition. Tab 68 allows definition of the size of the area in which the tracks will be reported to the Hawk FU. Recommended size is 60 km. The altitude of reported tracks may also be limited by the minimum and maximum altitude entries. Tracks with reported altitude outside the band defined by the minimum and maximum altitude entries will not be reported to the Hawk FU. Altitudes above mean sea level (MSL) are required. Minimum altitude should correlate to lowest surface level. Maximum altitude is METT-TC dependent but normally allows Hawk to focus on the threat it is capable of defeating, the low- to medium-range. Recommended value is 10 kf. If a high altitude threat exists, this value should be 45 kf. Entry of the Hawk FU emplacement altitude in Tab 68 is also required to support filtering by target altitude.

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Track identification. IDs may be designated in Tab 68 for the Hawk track reporting filter. Entry of specific track IDs (unknown, hostile, or friend) designate the identification of tracks reported to the Hawk FU. If an ID designation letter is not filled into Tab 68, that track ID designation will not be reported to the ICC. All three IDs should be passed to Hawk. Communications control data. The data must be part of the communications plan and coordinated with subordinate fire units. Track reporting filter information must also be coordinated with subordinate Hawk FUs because these settings place limitations on the remote tracks observed at the Hawk FUs. Remote track reporting to Hawk from the ICC must be sufficient to provide Hawk early warning and awareness of the overall tactical situation outside Hawk radar range.

TAB 69—EXTRA-BN COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL + TRACK FILTER 2-124. Tab 69, page A, is used for extra-battalion unit communications control and track reporting filter entries. Figure 2-26 shows an example.
EXTRA-BN COMM CNTRL DATA + TRACK FILTER PAGE nA *69* PLANNED DEPLOYMENT NET LOADING= nnn PERCENT (ac)=UNIT ID CODE/ADDRESS S/I (zzheeeennnnn)=UTM COMM LOCTN (nn)=UNIT TYPE: 2=MICC 5=TSQ73 7=AUX/TDL-B 10=HEU/TDL-A 0-HEU/ATDL-1 3=LICC 6=GEHOC 8=HUX/TDL-A 11=HEU/TDL-J 1-HEU/TDL-B 4=SICC 9=AUX/TDL-J 12=AUX/PADIL (ccc)=LINK ADDRESS: NON-PADIL LINKS ONLY (n)=LINK STA W/MODEM:1-6=CRG NO.,7=ICC (n)=LINK STA MODEM NO.:1 THRU 5 1=HI,0=LO (n)=LINK STA W/O MODEM:1=ICC ONLY,2=OTHER (n)=DIRECT LINK NUMBER:1 THRU 5 ( )=DIRECT LINK RELAYED 1=YES, UNIT ID CODES: HEU=HE BN A-F= BA-BF AUX1-3= A1-A3 0=NO

Figure 2-26. Screen Display of Tab 69, Page A
2-125. Track reporting to the extra-battalion unit defined in Page A can be limited in the following areas: • Special information reporting. • Track heading, altitude, and position limits. • Planned deployment net loading. • Non-Patriot track information. 2-126. The unit ID code or address S/I entry is used in conjunction with the unit type entry to define the extra-battalion element. The software will recognize the extra-battalion element and then allow data communications. Extra-battalions communications may be defined using ID codes and unit type entries to identify the unit. Extra-Battalion Communications Control 2-127. Tab 69 accommodates a maximum number of nine extra-battalion units for ICC. The link address entry tells the software the link address (ATDL or TADIL) of the defined unit (unless a Patriot MICC, SICC, or lateral ICC [LICC] has been defined by the ID code and unit type entries). The format of the address must be compatible with the protocol of the defined unit type (the unit type entry is used to define the protocol used, while the ID

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code address S/I entry sets up the address switch on the console). Non-Patriot units (not an MICC, SICC, or LICC) require a link station with modem data entry because the RLRIU location interfacing the modem must be known. The modem number also must be initialized. Requirements for non-Patriot units with modems are essentially the same as Hawk FUs (as previously discussed for Tab 68). Operators should note that Patriot units work together directly with the routing logic radio interface units (RLRIUs) that comprises the distributed data network. Patriot units use the Patriot air defense information language (PADIL) protocol. Non-Patriot units, which use ATDL1 or TADIL-B protocols must be connected to a modem that is connected to the link station RLRIU. The RLRIU converts the ATDL-1 or TADIL-B protocol to PADIL for transmission to other Patriot RLRIUs on the network. The use of modems for Hawk FUs and ATDL-1 or TADIL-B extra-battalion units must be carefully planned because there are a finite number of modems for network interfaces. There are five modems at a CRG and six at an ICC (five usable). Additional four modems are installed in the ICC to support SMU operations. The link station without the modem entry in Tab 69 indicates where the defined extra-battalion unit directs link entry to the network. The direct link number identifies the RLRIU address used by the RLRIU to support the direct link. The direct link relayed entry is required to establish the direct link, as a direct link relay will be discussed later. Tab 69 entries for TADIL-A and TADIL-J links are only available with U.S. and NATO Patriot systems upgraded with Configuration-2, PDB-4, and communications Phase I modification. 2-128. A capability at the ICC allows for higher echelon (HE) to provide target ID information through the Tactical Command System (TCS). The current auxiliary (AUX) ports can be initialized as AUX-PADIL links to receive HE data. The data is received at the TCS and is translated to Patriot PADIL language and sent to the ICC through CP8. Extra-Battalion Unit Track Filter 2-129. Page B, Tab 69 defines the extra-battalion unit track filter settings. There is a corresponding page B of Tab 69 for each extra-battalion unit defined in page A (Figure 2-26). Page B format is shown in Figure 2-27.
EXTRA-BN TRACK FILTER CONTROL PAGE ac =UNIT ID CODE/SOURCE ADDRESS S/I (n)=SPECIAL INFORMATION REPORTING ALLOWED: 1=YES, 0=NO (nnn)D TO (nnn)D=TRACK HEADING REPORTING LIMITS (nn.n) TO (nn.n) =TRK ALTITUDE REPORTING LIMITS NON-PATRIOT TRACK ***TRACK POSITION LIMITS**** ID PRI AMPS REPORTING AOI INPUT (aa)(aa)(aa)(aa) UTM CTR =(zzheeeennnnn) (zzheeeennnn) (aa)(aa)(aa)(aa) E-W EXTENT=(nnn)KM (nnn)KM (aa)(aa) (aa) N-S EXTENT=(nnn)KM (nnn)KM (aa)*SPACES DELETE* ALL LINKS TDL-A+J ONLY B *69* UNIT ID CODES HEU=HE BN A-F= BA-BF AUX1-3= A1-A3

Figure 2-27. Screen Display of Tab 69, Page B, Extra-BN Track Filter
2-130. Special information reporting should not be transmitted to the extra-battalion unit unless the unit has a legitimate use or need for this information. Since the Patriot system has a unique ID process, it may be advisable to filter out certain primary identity amplification (PRI ID AMP) to avoid confusion on some non-Patriot data links. Otherwise, track filtering

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should be implemented only when link saturation is anticipated due to heavy track load. Under link saturation conditions, filtering by position and ID should be considered first. 2-131. The track heading limits settings should only be used when the tactical situation dictates based on unit location in relation to the anticipated threat. Track heading limits is a filter criterion that directs the ICC software to only report tracks with headings between the entered limits. If used, headings away from the linked unit would be filtered. 2-132. The track altitude limits settings should not be set for Patriot units. The Patriot ICC can display and order engagements of tracks at all altitudes. If an altitude filter is to be applied to a subordinate Hawk or German Hawk operations center (GEHOC), then the maximum altitude limit should be set to the highest engagement altitude available at the defined extra-battalion unit. Track altitude limits establish an altitude band for ICC track reporting to the extra-battalion unit. 2-133. The track position limits should not be applied under normal operating conditions. If filtering is required to prevent link saturation, then the Northing and Easting extents should be consistent with overlapping and adjacent coverage with the extra-battalion unit. This applies to extra-battalion ICCs and GEHOCs. Filter settings must be coordinated with extra-battalion units so that a thorough understanding of the air picture is maintained. Units should note that certain information would not be reported to them from the ICC. The UTM center, the Easting extent, and the Northing extent establish the track position filter. These entries establish a rectangular volume used for track reporting (the extents are the rectangle height and width from the UTM center). The ICC will not report tracks outside this volume to the extra-battalion unit. Tracks inside the volume will be reported, if heading, altitude, or ID does not filter them out. 2-134. Non-Patriot track primary (PRI), identity (ID), and amplification (AMP) data fields provide special information reporting to the extra-battalion unit. Special ID information may be reported to the extra-battalion unit using the entry provided in Tab 69. The ID PRI AMP filters apply to ATDL-1 or TADIL A, B, and J tracks by ID. Tracks with the ID PRI AMPs displayed in Tab 69 will be reported to the extra-battalion unit. Blanking ID PRI AMPS on Tab 69 stops the reporting of tracks with the ID to the extra-battalion unit. Track filter settings do not apply to lateral ICC extra-battalion units defined in Page A. Communications control parameters required by Tab 69 entry should be part of the communication plan and closely coordinated. The number and types of extra-battalion units and use of direct links and direct link relays in the battalion network affect net loading. The signal officer (SIGO) must ensure that the planned net configuration is feasible. Filter settings (Table 2-1) for defined extra-battalion units are based on the tactical situation, type of extra-battalion unit, the extra-battalion unit's need to know, mission, and known capabilities, and link saturation conditions.

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COMMUNICATIONS NET LOADING
2-135. The system automatically computes deployment net loading and the results displayed in Tabs 67, 68, and 69. Net loading must be considered when planning the battalion distributed data network. Net loading should be kept below 100 percent to ensure reliable data communications are maintained and to prevent loss of information caused by network overloading. The command and control section in Chapter 4 covers net loading. Table 2-1 provides an indication of how units, direct links, and direct link relays contribute to multirouted net loading. Note: Net loading related to battalion command and control is also discussed in Chapter 4.

Table 2-1. Net Loading Considerations COMMUNICATIONS ENTITY
LATERAL DIRECT LINKS

PERCENT LOADING
14.52

REMARKS
MAXIMUM OF FIVE DIRECT LINKS ALLOWED (WITHOUT ANY TYPES OTHER DIRECT LINKS OR RELAYS). LOADING FOR CRG AND ECS LINK STATION WITHOUT MODEMS ONLY. DIRECT LINKS TIED TO ICC (NOT ROUTED THROUGH CRG/ECS) DO NOT LOAD THE NET. MAXIMUM OF ONE (THERE IS ONLY ONE MASTER) ALLOWED. LOADING FOR CRG AND ECS LINK STATION WITHOUT MODEMS ONLY. DIRECT LINKS TIED TO ICC (NOT ROUTED THROUGH CRG/ECS) DO NOT LOAD THE NET. MAXIMUM OF ONE DIRECT LINK RELAY ALLOWED. LOADING FOR CRG AND ECS LINK STATION WITHOUT MODEMS ONLY. DIRECT LINKS TIED TO ICC DO NOT LOAD THE NET. THE DIRECT LINK RELAY ENTRY IN TAB 67 DETERMINES DIRECTION OF LINK. SAME AS ABOVE.

MASTER— >SUBORDINATE BATTALION DIRECT LINKS LATERAL DIRECT LINK RELAYS

21.79

14.52

MASTER— >SUBORDINATE BATTALION DIRECT LINK RELAYS

21.79

Table 2-1. Net Loading Considerations (Continued) COMMUNICATIONS ENTITY
OVERHEAD FOR PATRIOT BATTERY NORMAL BATTALION OVERHEAD PATRIOT BATTERY HAWK FIRE UNIT

PERCENT LOADING
2.47 2.40 10.17 5.08

REMARKS
COUNTS IF BN HAS ONE OR MORE PATRIOT BATTERIES IN THE NET. ALWAYS APPLIES. UP TO SIX PATRIOT BATTERIES DEFINABLE (OUT OF A MAXIMUM OF 12 FIRE UNITS). UP TO 12 HAWK FIRE UNITS DEFINABLE (OUT OF A TOTAL OF 12 FIRE UNITS). LOADING FOR CRG LINK STATION MODEMS ONLY. USE OF MODEMS IN THE ICC DOES NOT LOAD THE NET.

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ATDL-1/PADIL MODEM

7.26

USE OF PADIL MODEMS REDUCES DATA RATES. LOADING FOR CRG LINK STATION MODEMS ONLY. USE OF ICC MODEMS DOES NOT LOAD THE NET. MAXIMUM OF FOUR TADIL-B UNITS DEFINABLE. LOADING FOR CRG LINK STATION MODEMS ONLY. USE OF MODEMS IN THE ICC DOES NOT LOAD THE NET.

TADIL-B MODEM

7.70

INITIALIZATION REQUIREMENTS FOR DIRECT LINKS 2-136. Direct links are initialized in BATI via Tabs 67 and 69 data entries. A direct link allows the ICC to communicate with another (extra-battalion) ICC without using a modem. The advantage of using a direct link is the faster data exchange rate between ICCs. A direct link allows data transfer at the 32 kilobits per second (kbps) data rate, while the data transfer rate with a modem is 1,200 bits per second, (more information may be transmitted over the link). There are more exit nodes available for interfacing other ICCs. This provides the SIGO with more flexibility when configuring the network for intra-battalion communications. 2-137. The disadvantage of using a direct link is the additional net loading required by the direct link. Although there are five direct links (numbered from 1 to 5), the 21.79 percent net loading realistically limits the number of direct links in use. (Use of a direct link relay must be given a direct link number. Therefore, direct link relay counts against the maximum number of five direct links. 2-138. To explain direct link initialization requirements for Tabs 67 and 69 entries, it is necessary to use an example. Figure 2-28 depicts the use of two different direct links.

MICC Bn “A”

DIRECT LINK 5

CRG or ECS

(Routed through CRG/ECS)

LICC Bn “B”

DIRECT LINK 3
SICC Bn “C”

(Direct routed between ICC’s)

This example network shows a master ICC (BN “with a direct link to a subordinate ICC (BN “C”) and another direct link to a lateral ICC (BN “C”) which is routed through a CR or ECS.

Figure 2-28. Direct Link Initialization

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2-139. Tab 67 entries are required at the three ICCs for communications control. Table 2-2 shows example data entries for the three ICCs. The Remarks column of the table contains selections made in Tab 67.

Table 2-2. Tab 67, Entries for Deployment Example DATA ENTRY
BN ID LTR/SOURCE

AT MICC
A

AT SICC
C

AT LICC
B

REMARKS
EXAMPLES ONLY. EACH ICC WITHIN EACH BN NET MUST HAVE A DIFFERENT BN LETTER DESIGNATION. ONE IS USED AS AN EXAMPLE ONLY. NOT REQUIRED—NO DIRECT LINK RELAY. NOT REQUIRED—NO DIRECT LINK RELAY.

RLRIU ADDRESS SET NUMBER DIRECT LINK RELAY NUMBER RELAY TYPE

1 NONE NONE

2 NONE NONE

2 NONE NONE

MASTER ICC 2-140. Table 2-3 shows how the MICC defines the SICC and LICC in Tab 69 using the two direct links. The required entries stipulate that the MICC must know the battalion ID of the other ICCs (entered in Tab 67 at the other ICCs as shown above). Since direct link 3 is directly connected to the ICC ("ICC only" entered for link station without modem), this direct link does not contribute to net loading. Direct link 5, from MICC to LICC, is routed though a CRG or ECS ("Other" entered for link station without modem), and therefore raises net loading 21.79 percent in the MICC battalion net. 2-141. Table 2-3 does not contain all Tab 67 required data entries (such as ATDL-1 and TADIL-B addresses), but depicts only the entries pertaining to the direct link requirements. Notice that all ICCs are using a different ID code or battalion letter designation and different RLRIU address sets for each direct link. The direct link relay and relay type entries are not used for direct link initialization. (These entries have been shown in Table 2-2 to make this point.) Required use of these entries for direct link relays is discussed in the next section. 2-142. Tab 69 must be used to define the direct links during BATI. Each ICC in the deployment example is required to define the other ICCs as extrabattalion units in Tab 69. Since the SICC (Battalion C) does not communicate directly to the LICC (Battalion B), but communicates through the MICC (Battalion A), only the MICC needs to be defined as an extra-battalion unit by the SICC. The same requirement applies to the LICC, where only the MICC has to be defined in Tab 69 at the LICC.

Table 2-3. Tab 69 Entries for Example Deployment—MICC

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DATA ENTRY
UNIT ID CODE/ADDRESS S/I UNIT TYPE

FOR SICC
BN C

FOR MICC OR LICC
BN B

REMARKS
THESE ENTRIES MUST AGREE WITH THE BN ID DESIGNATIONS ENTERED ON TAB 67 AT THE OTHER ICC. BN C IS DEFINED AS AN SICC EXTRA-BN UNIT AT THE MICC. BN B IS DEFINED AS AN ADJACENT ICC (ACTUAL TAB FORMAT) OR LATERAL ICC (LICC). THE SICC LINK STATION WITHOUT MODEM ENTRY IS "ICC ONLY" BECAUSE IT IS DIRECTLY LINKED WITH THE MICC. THE "OTHER" ENTRY IS USED FOR THE LICC BECAUSE THIS DIRECT LINK IS ROUTED THROUGH A CRG OR ECS AS DEPICTED IN THE EXAMPLE DEPLOYMENT. ENTRIES DEPICTED IN THE EXAMPLE DEPLOYMENT. THE SICC IS USING DIRECT LINK NUMBER 3, AND THE LICC IS USING DIRECT LINK NUMBER 5. A DIRECT LINK RELAY IS NOT USED IN THIS EXAMPLE. DIRECT LINK RELAYED ENTRIES = NO.

4 (SUBORD ICC) 1 (ICC ONLY)

3 (LATERAL ICC) 2 (OTHER)

LINK STATION WITHOUT MODEM

DIRECT LINK NUMBER

3

5

DIRECT LINK RELAYED

0 (NO)

0 (NO)

SUBORDINATE ICC 2-143. Table 2-4 shows how the SICC defines the MICC in Tab 69 using direct link number 3. Table 2-4 also indicates that Tab 69 entries used to define the MICC at the SICC must correspond to the data entries made at the MICC itself. By defining the MICC, Battalion C defines itself as an SICC.

Table 2-4. Tab Entries for Example Deployment SICC

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DATA ENTRY
UNIT ID CODE/ADDRESS S/I UNIT TYPE

FOR MICC
HE 2 (MICC)

REMARKS
THE HE ENTRY IS USED BECAUSE BN A IS AN MICC IN RESPECT TO BN B BN A IS DEFINED AS AN MICC EXTRA-BN UNIT AT THE RELAY ICC (BN B) WHICH IS AN SICC THE LINK STATION WITHOUT MODEM ENTRY IS “ICC ONLY” BECAUSE BN B IS DIRECTLY LINKED WITH THE MICC DEFINED ON TAB 69 (THE “OTHER” ENTRY ONLY IS USED WHEN THE DEFINED DIRECT LINK IS ROUTED THROUGH A CRG OR ECS). THIS ENTRY AS DEPICTED IN FIGURE 2-28. THE ICC IS USING DIRECT LINK NUMBER 3, FOR THE DIRECT LINK TO THE MICC (BN A). DIRECT LINK NUMBER 3 TO THE MICC IS NOT BEING RELAYED, THEREFORE THE ENTRY IS NO.

LINK STATION WITHOUT MODEM

1 (ICC ONLY)

DIRECT LINK NUMBER

3

DIRECT LINK RELAYED

0 (NO)

LATERAL ICC 2-144. Corresponding Tab 69 data entries at the LICC are shown in Table 2-5. In the deployment example, the relationship between the LICC and the MICC is lateral. Battalion B depicted as the LICC in relation to Battalion A may be an MICC itself and have direct links to its own subordinate ICC. The ID code, unit type, and link station must correspond with the entries made on Tabs 67 and 69 at other units. It should be noted that initialization entries for Tabs 67 and 69 must corresponded but must be made from each ICC’s frame of reference.

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Table 2-5. Tab Entries for Example Deployment—LICC DATA ENTRY
UNIT ID CODE/ADDRESS S/I UNIT TYPE

FOR MICC
BN A

REMARKS
THE LICC MUST USE BN A AS A SOURCE ADDRESS FOR THE MICC. THE MICC HAS DEFINED ITSELF AS BN A ON ITS OWN TAB 67. THE LICC DEFINES THE MICC AS ANOTHER LICC (AS DEPICTED IN THE EXAMPLE DEPLOYMENT). FROM THE BN B POINT OF REFERENCE, BN A IS NOT AN MICC, BUT A LATERAL ICC. THE LICC (BN B) LINK STATION WITHOUT MODEM ENTRY FOR THE MICC (BN A) IS "OTHER" BECAUSE DIRECT LINK 5 IS ROUTED THROUGH A CRG OR ECS. MATCHES BN A TAB 69 ENTRY SHOWN ABOVE. THE LICC IS USING DIRECT LINK NUMBER 5 TO BN A. THIS ENTRY MUST MATCH THE MICC ENTRY IN TAB 69 PAGE USED TO DEFINE THE LICC IN FIGURE 2-29. A DIRECT LINK RELAY IS NOT USED IN THIS EXAMPLE, DIRECT LINK RELAYED ENTRIES = NO.

3 (LATERAL ICC) 2 (OTHER)

LINK STATION WITHOUT A MODEM

DIRECT LINK NUMBER

5

DIRECT LINK RELAYED

0 (NO)

2-145. Direct link relays are also initialized in BATI through Tabs 67 and 69 data entries. A direct link allows an ICC to relay data communications with two other ICCs. The main advantage of using a direct link relay is flexibility in configuring the UHF network. As with direct linking, direct link relays contribute to net loading of all three battalions involved in initializing the direct link relay. Direct link relay must be planned with caution and considered only when net loading is not critical. There is only one direct link relay allowed within a battalion UHF net. To explain direct link relay initialization requirements for Tabs 67 and 69 entries, it is necessary to use another deployment example. Figure 2-29 depicts the use of a direct link relay among three ICCs. It shows an SICC acting as a relay unit for another SICC, which allows communications from the relayed SICC to the MICC. Notice this configuration requires three separate direct links numbers for the direct link relay.

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DIRECT LINK 2 (Routed through CRG / ECS) DIRECT LINK RELAY ICC

SICC Bn B

CRG or ECS

DIRECT LINK 1 (Directly routed between ICCs )

SICC Bn C RELAYED ICC MICC Bn A

RELAYED ICC

This example network development shows an SICC (Bn B) acting as a direct llink relay to relay data communications from another SICC (Bn C) to the MICC (Bn A).

Figure 2-29. Deployment Example Using a Direct Link Relay
2-146. Tab 67 entries are required at the three ICCs for communications control. Table 2-6 shows data entry examples for the three ICCs. Selection considerations in Tab 67 are in the Remarks column. It shows that only the relay ICC has to define the direct link relay in Tab 67. The relay ICC must be initialized with a different RLRIU address set from the relayed ICC because the software has to transpose source codes to enable the direct link relay to function. Source codes are used to address messages to units in conjunction with the RLRIU address. The direct link relay requires a specific set of source codes and therefore must use one of the five available direct link numbers. A direct link relay number entered in Tab 67 establishes the direct link as a relay in the software. This initialization data entry cannot conflict with the other direct link numbers used to separately link the relaying ICC to each of the relayed ICCs. As shown in Table 2-7, all direct link number assignments must be different, for example— The direct link relay number is 3. The direct link number of the direct link between Battalion A (MICC) and Battalion B (the relay SICC) is 1. • The direct link number of the direct link between Battalion B (the relay SICC) and Battalion C (the relayed SICC) is 2. 2-147. The only location where the direct link relay number and relay type entries are made is in Tab 67 of the relay ICC. Tab 67 entry fields pertaining to direct link relays are not used at the relayed ICCs. • •

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Table 2-6. Tab 67, Entries for Direct Link Relay DATA ENTRY
BN ID LTR/SOURCE ADDRESS S/I RLRIU ADDRESS SET NUMBER

AT MICC
A

AT SICC
B

AT SICC
C

REMARKS
EXAMPLES ONLY. ICCs WITHIN A BATTALION NET EACH REQUIRE DIFFERENT BN LETTER DESIGNATIONS. THE RELAYING ICC (BN B) MUST USE A DIFFERENT RLRIU ADDRESS SET NUMBER THAN THE RELAYED ICC. THIS REQUIREMENT PERTAINS ONLY WHEN DIRECT LINK RELAYS ARE INITIALIZED. ENTRY NOT REQUIRED FOR RELAYED ICC BUT REQUIRED FOR RELAYING ICC. THE DIRECT LINK RELAY IS ASSIGNED A NUMBER AT THE RELAYING UNIT. THIS NUMBER MUST BE DIFFERENT THAN THE DIRECT LINK NUMBERS USED BETWEEN THE RELAY ICC AND EACH RELAYED ICC ENTERED IN TAB 69. THIS ENTRY IS REQUIRED ONLY IF A DIRECT LINK RELAY NUMBER IS ENTERED ON TAB 67. THE DIRECTION OF THE DIRECT LINK RELAY IS REQUIRED FOR USE IN THE NET LOADING COMPUTATION. SINCE THE DIRECT LINK RELAY IS GOING FROM MICC TO SICC THROUGH THE RELAY, THE DIRECTION IS UP/DOWN. THIS ENTRY IS NOT REQUIRED AT THE RELAYED ICCs.

1

2

1

DIRECT LINK RELAY NUMBER

NONE

3

NONE

RELAY TYPE

NONE

0 (UP/ DOWN)

NONE

2-148. The other direct link numbers are defined on Tab 69. Tab 69 initialization data requirements for the example network deployments are discussed for each ICC. Tab 69 entries for Battalion B relay ICC, will be discussed first and are depicted in Table 2-7.

Table 2-7. Tab 67 Entries for a Direct Link Relay—SICC (BN B)
Direct Link Relay entry of 3 Relay Type = 0 for UP/DOWN 2-149. This link is relayed from Battalion A to Battalion C and from Battalion C to Battalion A through Battalion B. Since Battalion A is an MICC and Battalion B and Battalion C are both subordinate ICCs (SICCs), relay type is UP/DOWN. 2-150. Table 2-8 shows the required entries in Tab 69 at Battalion C (the relayed ICC), via Battalion B with the direct link relay to the MICC

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(Battalion A). The unit ID entry of HE and the unit type entry of 2 establishes Battalion A as the MICC in relation to battalion C, an SICC. The link station with modem entry of 2 (other) is used here because direct link 2 uses a CRG or ECS to connect the direct link from Battalion C to Battalion B as shown in deployment example. Direct link 3 between Battalion C and Battalion A is relayed, requiring a 1 (yes) entry in Tab 69, direct link relayed field.

Table 2-8. Tab 69, Entries for Direct Link Relay—Relayed SICC FOR MICC DATA ENTRY
UNIT ID CODE/ADDRESS S/I UNIT TYPE HE 2 (MASTER ICC) 0 (OTHER) 3 1 (YES)

REMARKS
THE HE ENTRY IS USED BECAUSE BN A IS AN MICC IN RESPECT TO BN C. BN A IS DEFINED AS AN MICC EXTRA-BN UNIT.

LINK STATION WITHOUT MODEM DIRECT LINK NUMBER DIRECT LINK RELAYED

THE LINK STATION WITHOUT MODEM ENTRY IS "OTHER" BECAUSE BN C IS LINKED WITH BN B THROUGH A CRG OR ECS. SEE FIGURE 2-29. THIS IS THE THIRD DIRECT LINK FOR THE UHF NETWORK DIRECT LINK NUMBER 3 TO THE MICC (BN A) IS BEING RELAYED THROUGH THE RELAY ICC (BN B). THEREFORE, THE DIRECT LINK RELAYED ENTRY IS YES.

2-151. Table 2-9 contains Tab 69 entries for Battalion A. The MICC must define both SICCs as extra-battalion units in Tab 69. At Battalion A, unit ID code entries for Battalion B and Battalion C must correspond to the battalion ID code address S/I entries in Tab 69 at Battalion B and Battalion C. Both unit type entries are the same (subordinate ICC). For the link station without modem entries, Battalion B requires an ICC only entry, while Battalion C requires an "other" entry. (The direct link from Battalion C is routed through a CRG or ECS as previously discussed.) Direct link number entries (1 and 2 for Battalion B and Battalion C, respectively) correspond to Tab 69 direct link number entries for the MICC (Battalion A) at both SICCs. Direct link 1 for Battalion B is designated as not relayed, while direct link 2 is designated as relayed. Again, these entries correspond with the Tab 69 entries for Battalion A made at both SICCs. To summarize, configuration of a direct link relay contributes heavily to net loading. Establishment of the initialization data parameters in Tabs 67 and 69 for all three ICCs involved with the relay must be carefully planned and closely coordinated.

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Table 2-9. Tab 69, Entries for Direct Link Relay—Relayed MICC DATA ENTRY FOR RELAY SICC
BN B

FOR RELAYE D SICC
BN C

REMARKS

UNIT ID CODE/ ADDRESS S/I UNIT TYPE

THESE ENTRIES AT THE MICC MUST CORRESPOND WITH THE TAB 67 SICC ENTRIES CONTAINED IN TABLE 2-7. BN A IS DEFINED AS AN MICC EXTRA-BN UNIT AT THE RELAY (BN B) WHICH IS AN SICC. THE LINK STATION WITHOUT MODEM ENTRY IS "ICC ONLY" FOR BN B BECAUSE BN A IS LINKED INTO THE RELAY ICC (BN B). THE LINK STATION WITHOUT MODEM ENTRY IS "OTHER" FOR BN C BECAUSE BN C IS LINKED THROUGH A CRG OR ECS INTO THE RELAY ICC (BN B). THE RELAYED MICC IS USING DIRECT LINK NUMBER 3, FOR THE DIRECT LINK TO THE SICC (BN C) THROUGH THE RELAY ICC, BN B. THE MICC IS ALSO USING DIRECT LINK NUMBER 1 TO COMMUNICATE TO BN B. DIRECT LINK NUMBER 3 TO THE MICC (BN A) IS BEING RELAYED THROUGH THE RELAY ICC (BN B), THEREFORE THE DIRECT LINK RELAYED ENTRY IS "YES". DIRECT LINK NUMBER 1 LINKS THE MICC (BN A) DIRECTLY TO THE RELAY ICC (BN B). THE DIRECT LINK RELAYED ENTRY IS "NO" FOR THIS LINK ONLY (TAB 69).

4 (SUBORD ICC) 1 (ICC ONLY)

4 (SUBORD ICC) 0 (OTHER)

LINK STATION WITHOUT MODEM

DIRECT LINK NUMBER

1

3

DIRECT LINK RELAYED

0 (NO)

1 (YES)

Battalion Communications Configuration 2-152. Battalion communications configuration control data is input via Tab 2. There are certain constraints on changing communications initialization data in Tabs 67, 68, and 69. One constraint exists when the active deployment data set is under consideration. Another constraint involves active communications control. TAB 2 2-153. Tab 2 will appear for the second time. Again, no entries are required at this time. TAB 51 2-154. Tab 51 (see Figure 2-22) will appear for the second time. Enter FP DEPLOYMENT for the DEPLOYMENT FUNCTION.

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TAB 59—FP DEPLOYMENT SUPPORT + LOCATION SUMMARY 2-155. Battery locations and orientation data entered in Tab 59 are used by BATI to allocate assets and volumes. The number of the deployment set under consideration is displayed on the tab as 1=BN DEPLOYMENT NUMBER. When Tab 59 is selected, fire unit locations and orientations are shown on the tactical display as entered on the tab. The format of the first page of Tab 59 is shown in Figure 2-30.
FP DEPLOYMENT SUPPORT + LOCATION SUMMARY PAGE A *59* 1=BN DEPLOYMENT NUMBER ( )=CURSOR TYPE: 0=PATRIOT 1=HAWK ( )D=TRIAL AZIMUTH =HOOKED TRIAL LOCATION FP LOCATION –UTM -LATITUDE-LONGITUDE- PTL STL1 STL2 STL3 1 ( )( : : . , ) ( : : . , )( )( )( )( ) 2 ( )( : : . , ) ( : : . , )( )( )( )( ) 3 ( )( : : . , ) ( : : . , )( )( )( )( ) 4 ( )( : : . , ) ( : : . , )( )( )( )( ) 5 ( )( : : . , ) ( : : . , )( )( )( )( ) 6 ( )( : : . , ) ( : : . , )( )( )( )( )

Figure 2-30. Tab 59, Page A, FP Deployment Summary
2-156. The cursor type selection determines the type of fire unit (Patriot or Hawk) and the corresponding symbology displayed. When CURSOR TYPE 0 is selected, the planner is able to move the Patriot FP symbology on the display in conjunction with the cursor. Data entry of the tabs TRIAL AZIMUTH and HOOKED TRIAL LOCATION places the symbol on the display at the desired location and orientation (azimuth). Figures 2-31 and 2-32 depict the Patriot and Hawk fire unit symbology shown on the tactical display in conjunction and under the control of Tab 59.
PATRIOT
(CURSOR TYPE 0)

DISPLAYED SECTOR IS ROTATABLE BY ENTRY OF TRIAL AZIMUTH (ENTERED PTL IS FINAL DISPLAY)

SEARCH BOUNDARY (SOLID LINE)

TRACK BOUNDARY (DASHED LINE)

HAWK
(CURSOR TYPE 1)

CURSOR POSITION DENOTES FP LOCATION

n

PATRIOT BATTERY DESIGNATION NUMBER

nn

Notes: 1. Text and arrow annotations with symbols are explanatory only and not displayed with the cursor. 2.Unit designations (flags and numbers) do not move with the cursor. 3. Not to scale.

HAWK FIRE UNIT DESIGNATION NUMBER

SIZE OF SYMBOL = SECTOR BOUNDS AS ENTERED IN TAB 68 (DEFAULT VALUE = 90KM)

Figure 2-31. Hawk and Patriot Symbology via Tab 59

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THIS EXAMPLE COMBINES PATRIOT AND HAWK FP AS DEFINED ON TAB 59, SHOWING RELATIVE FIRE UNIT AND BATTERY POSITIONS AND OVERLAPPING COVERAGE

+

SYMBOLOGY (SLAVED TO CURSOR AT A TRIAL LOCATION WITH TAB 59 CURSOR TYPE 1 SELECTION {HAWK})

8

11

HAWK FP 11 SYMBOL RADIUS (SECTOR BOUNDS) DEFINED BY TAB 59 ENTRY (PAGE B)

“ FINAL” PLANNED HAWK FP8 LOCATION AS ENTERED ON PAGE B TAB 59

3

5

“FINAL” PLANNED PATRIOT FP5 LOCATION WITH 35-DEGREE PTL AS “FINAL” PLANNED PATRIOT FP3 ENTERED ON PAGE A TAB 59 LOCATION WITH 0 DEGREE PTL AS ENTERED ON PAGE B TAB 50

NOTES: 1. Text and arrow annotations with symbols are explanatory only and not displayed with the cursor. 2. Unit designations (flags and numbers) do not move with the cursor. 3. Not to scale.

Figure 2-32. Tab 59 Deployment Example
2-157. Since the symbol is displayed in conjunction with other defined fire units on the tactical display, relative locations and overlapping coverages are depicted for selection of the best fire unit or battery TRIAL LOCATION and TRIAL AZIMUTH. Final data may then be entered in the LOCATION-UTM FIELD, PTL, and secondary target line (STL) 1 through 3 fields. Primary target lines (PTLs) and secondary target lines (STLs) do not apply to Hawk fire units (CURSOR TYPE 1); but as a minimum, PTLs are required entries for Patriot batteries (CURSOR TYPE 0). Latitude and longitude positions are displayed in conjunction with UTM position entries and vice versa. FP locations may be entered in either UTM or latitude and longitude formats when one is entered; the other will be displayed after the tab is entered. 2-158. Page B of Tab 59 is used only for Hawk fire units (FPs 7 through 12) and cannot be used to define Patriot batteries. Note that the TRIAL AZIMUTH field is missing because it is not applicable to Hawk fire units. The CURSOR TYPE selection is no longer needed on page B. Figure 2-33 provides the format of page B, Tab 59.

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FP DEPLOYMENT SUPPORT + LOCATION SUMMARY PAGE B =BN DEPLOYMENT NUMBER =HOOKED TRIAL LOCATION FP LOCATION –UTM -LATITUDE-LONGITUDE7( ) ( : : . , ) ( : : . , ) 8( ) ( : : . , ) ( : : . , ) 9( ) ( : : . , ) ( : : . , ) 10( ) ( : : . , ) ( : : . , ) 11( ) ( : : . , ) ( : : . , ) 12( ) ( : : . , ) ( : : . , )

*59*

Figure 2-33. Tab 59, Page B, FP Deployment Summary (Hawk FUs)
TAB 51 2-159. Tab 51 (Figure 2-22) will appear for the third time. Enter ASSETS ALLOCATION for the DEPLOYMENT FUNCTION. TAB 70 2-160. Tab 70 (Figure 2-11) appears for the second time. Defended assets are automatically to batteries by BATI. ABT assets must be within a P4-5 kms area in front of the battery and for TBMs the assets must be within the highest Pk foot print area. If more than six ABT assets or three TBM assets are assigned to a battery, the TD/TDA must take action to deactivate excess assets. TAB 51 2-161. Tab 51 (see Figure 2-22) appears for the fourth time. Enter VOLUME ALLOCATION for the DEPLOYMENT FUNCTION.

VOLUMES ALLOCATION
2-162. Volume allocations in Tab 61 (Figure 2-34) are used to activate or deactivate volumes and points for individual Patriot batteries. (Data entered for each Patriot FP in Tab 59 is initially used to allocate volumes and points.) The activity status displayed in Tab 61 next to the volume or point ID reflects the overall system activity status either A=Active, B=Behind, I=Inactive, T=Time, *=Time Controlled Volume Revoked by the operator, or blank for the volume or point. Tab 61 can be used to make the volume or point inactive for individual FPs if the overall status is active. Volumes and points are activated when the ID volume is added to the FP’s Tab 61. Spaces between volumes in Tab 61 indicate the number of units used. For example, a threesegment corridor will display the volume ID and two blank data fields before the next volume title is displayed. Tab 61 is available in initialization and in TAC OPS/CMND PLAN. It reflects activity status changes made in TAC OPS by Tab 5.

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VOLUMES ALLOCATION OOOOO DELETES VOLUME ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ): ): ): ): ): ): ): ): ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ): ): ): ): ): ): ): ): ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ): ): ): ): ): ): ): ): ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ): ): ): ): ): ): ): ):

PAGE ( ( ( ( ( ( ( (

OF 3 FOR FP 61* TOTAL UNITS: DELETE TOTAL POINTS: DELETE ): ( ): ( ): ): ( ): ( ): ): ( ): ( ): ): ( ): ( ): ): ( ): ( ): ): ( ): ( ): ): ( ): ( ): ): ( ): ( ):

Figure 2-34. Tab 61, Volumes Allocation
2-163. There are three pages of Tab 61 volumes and point's allocation data in the tactical data base for each FP. There is only one set of volumes and points in the data base as defined by Tab 71. 2-164. The TD/TDA ensures that the total number of units and points for each firing battery are correct. Otherwise, excess data must be deleted. Each battery may have 55 units or 250 points actively assigned before EXCESS VOLUMES FPn alert appears. 2-165. If alternate search sectors controls are not required, go to paragraph 2-171. If alternate search sector controls are required, go to paragraph 2-167. TAB 51 2-166. When Tab 51 (Figure 2-22) appears for the fifth time, enter ALTERNATE SECTORS in the DEPLOYMENT FUNCTION data field. ALTERNATE SEARCH SECTOR CONTROL Tab 55 will appear. TAB 55—ALTERNATE SEARCH SECTOR CONTROL (ABT AND TBM) 2-167. The only difference between the ICC and the ECS version of Tab 55 (Figure 2-35) is that the ICC version can accommodate alternate sector control ABT and TBM entries for up to six Patriot batteries. There are two pages (ABT and TBM) of Tab 55 data maintained for each Patriot battery at the ICC. The ICC maintains data for the Patriot batteries in the tactical data base in up to 10 data sets per side of the EDR/ODS/TSD. This provides the capability to change Tab 55 data for all Patriot FPs by changing the active deployment during initialization or during TAC OPS and CMND PLAN (such as, ON-LINE INITIALIZATION).

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ALTERNATE SEARCH SECTOR CONTROL – ABT FP -PAGE A *55* SECT 1 SECT 2 =BN DEPLOYMENT NO. ( )D ( )D=DROP FROM LEFT SIDE IN 1 DEG INCREMENTS TO MAX-5DEG ( )D ( )D=DROP FROM RGHT SIDE IN 1 DEG INCREMENTS TO MAX-5DEG ( ) ( ) =DROP LOWER SHORT TO MEDIUM RANGE ROWS TO MAX-1 ROWS ( ) ( ) =DROP UPPER SHORT TO MEDIUM RANGE ROWS TO MAX-1 ROWS ( ) ( ) =DROP LOWER LONG RANGE ROWS TO MAX-3 ROWS ( ) ( ) =DROP UPPER LONG RANGE ROWS TO MAX-3 ROWS ( )( ) ( )( )=DROP SEGMENTS 1=HORIZON 3=LOWER MED 5=LONG RANGE ( )( ) ( )( ) USING 4 FIELDS:2=SHORT-POP 4=UPPER MED A=ALL SEGMENTS (MAX)KM = DROP LONG RANGE SEARCH (MIN)KM = DROP SHORT RANGE SEARCH ALTERNATE SEARCH SECTOR CONTROL – ABT SECT 1 ( )D ( )D ( ) ( ) ( ) SECT 2 ( )D=DROP ( )D=DROP ( ) =DROP ( ) =DROP ( ) =DROP FP -PAGE B *55* =BN DEPLOYMENT NO.

FROM LEFT SIDE IN 1DEG INCREMENTS TO MAX-15DEG FROM RGHT SIDE IN 1DEG INCREMENTS TO MAX-15DEG LOWER TBM ROWS 0 TO 8 UPPER TBM ROWS 0 TO 14 SEGMENTS USING ONE FIELD: 6=LTBM 8=XTBM B=BOTH

Figure 2-35. Tab 55, Alternate Search Sector Control, ABT and TBM
2-168. Tab 55 data is transmitted on the data link to and from Patriot batteries by data buffer transfer. The TD/TDA may request Tab 55 data from the Patriot batteries through the BATI receive and compare FP data (RCFD) process. The TD/TDA may also transfer data to on-line Patriot batteries. Data buffer transfers from the ICC must be handled with caution. If the ICC has no ABT and TBM surveillance parameters in the tactical data base (entered for the battery on TACI in Tab 55), then a data buffers transfer made from the ICC will wipe out all data entered at the battery. Tab 55 information is derived from the defense design process and considers emissions control (EMCON). 2-169. Normally, the TD/TDA do not use this tab to reduce the azimuth or range limits of the ABT search sectors. Dropping long range search may be a manual saturation alleviation technique. Likewise, the TD/TDA normally does not reduce the size of the TBM search sectors. TAB 51 2-169. Tab 51 (Figure 2-22) appears for the sixth time. Enter ICC/CRG DEPLOYMENT in the DEPLOYMENT FUNCTION data field.

ICC/CRG DEPLOYMENT
2-170. Tab 62 (Figure 2-36) is the ICC and CRG deployment and communications assignment tab. The ICC location is used to report the location of the ICC data links. The ICC location in Tab 62 should not be changed during TAC OPS. Entering HE as a communications link is especially important since it allows data exchange with higher headquarters over TADIL-B.

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ICC/CRG DEPLOYMENT + COMMUNICATIONS ASSIGNMENT PAGE A *62* ( ) =DEPLOYMENT NUMBER ( ) =HOOKED TRIAL LOCN UNIT ID CODES: ICC=IC,BN A-F=BA-BF,CRG1-6=C1-C6,FP 1-12=01-12,HEU=HE,AUX 1-3=A1-A3 UTM LOCATION COMMUNICATIONS LINKS ANTENNA AZIMUTHS ICC( )( , , , , , , ) CRG1( )( , , , , , , ) CRG2( )( , , , , , , ) CRG3( )( , , , , , , ) CRG4( )( , , , , , , ) CRG5( )( , , , , , , ) CRG6( )( , , , , , , ) ICC/CRG DEPLOYMENT-FP ) =DEPLOYMENT NUMBER COMM ANTENNA LINKS AZIMUTHS 1( , , ) 2( , , ) 3( , , ) 4( , , ) 5( , , ) 6( , , ) COMMUNICATIONS ASSIGNMENT PAGE B COMM ANTENNA LINKS AZIMUTHS , ) , ) , ) , ) , ) , ) *62*

(

FP FP FP FP FP FP

FP 7( FP 8( FP 9( FP10( FP11( FP12(

BN BN BN BN BN BN

UNIT ID CODES: A=BA ICC=IC B=BB HEU=HE C=BC AUX 1=A1 D=BD AUX 2=A2 E=BE AUX 3=A3 F=BF

Figure 2-36. Tab 62, Pages A and B
2-171. Initialization Tab 62 has features designed to help communications planning along with data entry for initialization. Tab 62 is available for use in conjunction with the TACTICAL DISPLAY to help plan the battalion communications network connectivity. Tab 62 function is similar to Tab 59 in that data items entered into the tab are processed, and the computed information is displayed both in the tab and as tactical display symbols. BATI computes communication links and antenna azimuths from Tab 62 data entries. 2-172. CRG UTM locations must be entered in Tab 62. Tab 62 entry of the CRG location lets the ICC know that the CRG routing logic radio interface unit (RLRIU) exists in the distributed data network. (With a CRG UTM location entry in Tab 62, the ICC accepts information sent from the CRG RLRIU address.) The CRG's UTM location is also used for deployment planning purposes. The CRG's symbol is displayed for planning communications links and antenna azimuths to the CRG under Tab 62 control. UTM locations and communications entries in Tab 69 are used to display communications unit locations at the ICC only. This information is used in conjunction with deployment planning through Tab 62. The display enables the signal officer (SIGO) to plan links and antenna azimuths for the communications unit supporting the extra battalion unit defined in Tab 69. 2-173. When a UTM LOCATION data entry is made and Tab 62 is entered, the communications domain of the unit is shown on the tactical display. Figure 2-37 shows the communications domain symbols used. FP

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communications domain symbols are also automatically displayed in Tab 59 LOCATION, and Tab 68 firing platoon TYPE entries. Extra-battalion unit COMM LOCATION data entries made in Tab 69 is also used for communications planning. Communications domain symbols are automatically displayed for the extra-battalion units at the communications exit unit location. 2-174. Planned communications links are established between units by entry of the UNIT ID CODE within the COMM LINK field. For example, if a planned communications link is desired between the ICC and CRG 3, C3 would be entered in one of the COMM LINK data entry fields for the ICC. Entry of Tab 62 would then cause the link to be displayed between the units on the tactical display. BATI processing would then automatically display the “ICC” UNIT ID CODE in one of the COMM LINK fields for CRG 3. The maximum number of communications links is shown in the following table.

Table 2-10. Maximum Communications Links Allowable MAX # OF ALLOWED COMM LINKS
3 4 3 2

DEFINED UNIT TYPE AND DESIGNATION
LOCAL ICC (IC) CRG (1-6) PATRIOT BATTERIES (FP 1-6) HAWK FIRE UNITS (FP 7-12) EXTRA-BN (BA-BF, HE, A1- A3)

ALERT DISPLAYED WHEN MAX NUMBER OF COMM LINKS EXCEEDED
ENTRIES NOT COMPATIBLE ENTRIES NOT COMPATIBLE ENTRIES NOT COMPATIBLE ENTRIES NOT COMPATIBLE— HAWK ENTRIES NOT COMPATIBLE

UNIT LOCATION ENTRY ON
TAB 62 TAB 62 TAB 59 TAB 59

UNIT TYPE ENTRY ON
NA NA NA TAB 68

1

TAB 69 (AS UTM COMM LOC)

TAB 68

2-175. Use of Tab 62 entries and alerts ensures that each unit can support the number of planned links. If a third communications link is entered for a Hawk fire unit on Page A, and Tab 62 is entered, an ENTRIES NOT COMPATIBLE-HAWK alert would be displayed because Hawk fire units are allowed a maximum of two links. Communications links for a typical deployment are shown in Figure 2-37. Communications links defined in Tab 62 consider the type of unit only. Note that location and unit type information for display is provided from entries in Tabs 59, 68, and 69. Terrain elevation data is not considered in link processing. This means that a line-of-sight (LOS) analysis must be performed to ensure that the planned communications link is viable.

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COMMUNICATIONS DOMAIN SYMBOLOGY

EXAMPLE COMMUNICATIONS DEPLOYMENT
THIS EXAMPLE COMBINES THE ICC, A CRG, AND A BATTERY AS DEFINED ON TAB 62, SHOWING COMM LINK DOMAINS, RELATIVE UNIT POSITIONS, AND COMM LINK AZIMUTH 20 KM

+
SYMBOL MOVES WITH/SLAVED TO CURSOR POSITION

UNIT SYMBOL AND DESIGNATION NUMBER DISPLAYED UPON ENTRY OF TAB 62

CRG 3 POSITION

5
Notes: 1. Text and arrow annotations with symbols are explanatory only and not displayed with the cursor. 2. Unit designations (flags and numbers) do not move with the cursor. 3. Not to scale.
LOCAL ICC POSITION BATTERY/FIRE UNIT POSITION

Figure 2-37. Communications Symbology and Example Deployment
2-176. Tab 62 also provides ANTENNA AZIMUTH information for each COMM LINK entered. Azimuths are computed using the unit location data from Tab 62 and Tab 59 entries. ANTENNA AZIMUTH data is computed after the link is defined (by COMM LINK entries) and Tab 62 is entered (via the ENTER TAB key). The example in Figure 2-37, in the CRG 3 to FP 5 link, shows the ANTENNA AZIMUTH for CRG 3 is calculated based on unit positions and displayed in Tab 62 as 107 degrees. The back azimuth of 287 degrees would be automatically displayed in the FP 5 ANTENNA AZIMUTH field for this link to CRG 3 in Tab 62. 2-177. The data entered in Tab 62 is used for other purposes besides communications planning. As previously discussed, the ICC LOCATION entered in Tab 62 is a required entry used for coordinate conversion along with communications network planning. The CRG LOCATION entries in Tab 62 are additionally used to define the CRGs in the communications network. Failure to enter CRG locations will inhibit data transmission through the CRG. There are three sets of Tab 62 ICC and CRG deployment data. The number of the deployment set under consideration is displayed in the tab as the DEPLOYMENT NUMBER. TAB 51 2-178. Tab 51 (see Figure 2-22) appears for the seventh time. Enter DEPLOYMENT INPUT COMPLETE in the DEPLOYMENT FUNCTION data field.

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TAB 50 2-179. Tab 50 (see Figure 2-3) appears. Enter DATA INPUT COMPLETE in the SELECT INITIALIZATION MODE field. TAB 98—DATA BASE CONTROL 2-180. The Data Base Control, Tab 98, (Figure 2-38) allows the operator to name data base and specify which data base will be the OB tactical data base or TNG data base after BATI input is complete. Tab 98 is used to write the tactical data base to the ICC disk. Up to 10 data bases can be stored on each side of the ICC disk. The operator must designate the data number 0-9, a 12-character alphanumeric data base name, and a Data Base User (OB or TNG).
DATA BASE CONTROL (n) / (cccccccccccc) / (ccc) DATA BASE NUMBER/NAME/USER (n) TACTICAL DATA BASE NUMBER CURRENT DATA BASES DATA BASE USERS n-cccccccccccc-ccc n-cccccccccccc-ccc OB = Tactical / OB n-cccccccccccc-ccc n-cccccccccccc-ccc TNG = Training n-cccccccccccc-ccc n-cccccccccccc-ccc n-cccccccccccc-ccc n-cccccccccccc-ccc n-cccccccccccc-ccc n-cccccccccccc-ccc *98*

Figure 2-38. Data Collection Control
TAB 2—BN COMMUNICATIONS CONFIGURATION CONTROL 2-181. Communications with fire units and extra-battalion units must be disallowed before making any changes to the active deployment communications initialization data in Tabs 68 and 69. Outgoing communications are controlled via Tab 2. The format of Tab 2 is shown in Figure 2-39. Tab 2 must be manually selected.
BN COMMUNICATIONS CONFIGURATION CONTROL REINITIALIZE (aacc) RLRIU: ICC, CRG1-6, FP1-6 TOD MASTER: COMM STATE: A=ALLOW, D=DISALLOW, M=MONITOR HEU =(a) FP1 = (a) FP 7 = (a) BNA AUX1 =(a) FP2 = (a) FP 8 = (a) BNB AUX2 =(a) FP3 = (a) FP 9 = (a) BNC AUX3 =(a) FP4 = (a) FP10 = (a) BND FP5 = (a) FP11 = (a) BNE FP6 = (a) FP12 = (a) BNF FP BN CURRENT NET LOAD: nnn PERCENT *2*

= = = = = =

(a) (a) (a) (a) (a) (a)

Figure 2-39. Tab 2, BN Communications Configuration Control

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2-182. When communications are in use, changes in the active deployment communication data base are prevented by the system software. This constraint exists to prevent disruption of active data communications with fire units and extra-battalion units. If changes are desired to the active deployment communications control data during TAC OPS or CMND PLAN, then communications to the unit(s) affected by the changes must be disallowed through Tab 2. CMND PLAN is a BATI process that is available during ICC TAC OPS. The CMND PLAN mode lets the TD change certain initialization data, while the TDA conducts normal TAC OPS activities (or vice versa). Use of the CMND PLAN mode is discussed in the initialization procedures in this chapter. 2-183. Tab 2 is available when deployment function 03=COMM DATABASE, is selected by way of Tab 51 in the CMND PLAN mode during TAC OPS. Tab 2 is automatically displayed first and last in the deployment function 03 sequence. Tab 2 is used to disallow communications to the desired units and to re-allow communications after changes are made to data entries in Tabs 68 and 69. If any changes are attempted to unit communications data with active communications (communications allowed through Tab 2), changes are prevented and the COMM ALLOWED-TAB 2 alert is displayed as a reminder. Tab 2 is displayed for review purposes only and is not active in BATI before the transition to TAC OPS. Not all of the active deployment communications initialization can be changed in TAC OPS CMND PLAN, regardless of the active communications state of operation. Local ICC communications initialization parameters in the active deployment data set (in the tactical data base) cannot be changed during TAC OPS/CMND PLAN. Changes to the active deployment are limited to protect the software communications function. Transition to the initialization mode from TAC OPS is required to make unlimited changes to the active deployment data parameters. This allows the system to thoroughly check the integrity of the communications data base processing which is not possible during TAC OPS. Changes to active deployment ICC communications control data are limited to the direct link relayed and relay type entries. The other Tab 67 parameters cannot be changed. The changes to these parameters affect communications to all defined fire units and extra-battalion units. TAB 0—TABULAR DISPLAY INDEX 2-185. During ICC initialization, Tab 0 is available to the operator. This information tab appears automatically during manual initialization. It can also be called up by entering 0 at the keyboard, or by pressing the CONTR DATA INDEX S/I. The tab consists of two pages which the operator can view by pressing the ENTER TAB key. The cursor and HOOK key is used to select tabs or verify tab data during manual initialization. See Tab 0 as shown in Figure 2-40.

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TABULAR DISPLAY INDEX *0* TACTICAL TAB INDEX *1* FIDOC / OPRNL PRAMS CHANGE *2* COMMO CONTROL / STATUS DATA *3* LS TEST RESULTS *5* ASSET + VOLUME STATUS *6* IFF/SIF + TOD CONTROL *7* LS CONTROL + WIND SPEED *8* FP CONTROL *9* REORIENTATION CONTROL *13* DATA BASE SELECTION

*14* *30* *54* *55* *68* *70* *71* *72* *73*

PAGE 1 OF 2 *0* TARGET DISPLAY CONTROL RETRIEVE XMTR BITE DATA RADAR FREQUENCY CONTROL ALTERNATE SEARCH CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL ASSET/DEFENDED AREAS VOLUMES DEFINITION GENERAL PURPOSE MAPS ENTRY KAA-63 TABLES

TABULAR DISPLAY INDEX *74* COMPASS ROSE TABLES *76* ARM THREAT PARAMETERS & CMs *78* LAUNCH DECISION PARAMETERS *79* IDENTIFICATION PARAMETERS *81* RS LOCATION/ALIGNMENT DATA *85* LS LOCATION/ALIGNMENT DATA *90* DATA COLLECTION CONTROL *95* RADAR MAPPING CONTROL *96* INITIAL SEARCH LOWER BOUND

PAGE 2 OF 2

*0*

Figure 2-40. Tab 0, Tactical Initialization Tab Index, Pages 1 and 2
TAB 5—ASSET STATUS/CONTROL 2-186. Tab 5 is a two-page tabular display available during TAC OPS. This tab shows the allocation and status of the defined ABT/TBM volumes on pages 1-3 (Figure 2-41) and assets on pages 1-3 (Figure 2-42).
ASSET STATUS/CONTROL ID PRI FP 1 2 3 4 ccccc(a)c a a a a ccccc(a)c a a a a ccccc(a)c a a a a ccccc(a)c a a a a ccccc(a)c a a a a ccccc(a)c a a a a ccccc(a)c a a a a ccccc(a)c a a a a *VOLUMES PG 1-3 PAGE ID STAT FP 1 2 3 4 ccccc a a a a ccccc a a a a ccccc a a a a ccccc a a a a ccccc a a a a ccccc a a a a ccccc a a a a ccccc a a a a nn 5 a a a a a a a a OF 12 6 a a a a a a a a *5*

5 6 a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a

A=ACTIVE B=BEHIND I=INACTIVE O=OUT OF COVERAGE

Figure 2-41. Tab 5, Pages 1-3, Volumes

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FM 3-01.87

ASSET STATUS/CONTROL ID PRI FP1 2 3 4 5 6 ( )( )( )( )( )( ) ( )( )( )( )( )( ) ( )( )( )( )( )( ) ( )( )( )( )( )( ) ( )( )( )( )( )( ) ( )( )( )( )( )( ) ( )( )( )( )( )( ) ( )( )( )( )( )( )

*ASSETS PG 1-3 PAGE OF ID PRI FP1 2 3 4 5 6 ( )( )( )( )( )( ) ( )( )( )( )( )( ) ( )( )( )( )( )( ) ( )( )( )( )( )( ) ( )( )( )( )( )( ) ( )( )( )( )( )( ) ( )( )( )( )( )( ) ( )( )( )( )( )( )

12 A=ACTIVE B=BEHIND I-INACTIVE O=OUT OF COVERAGE

*5*

Figure 2-42. Tab 5, Pages 1-3, Assets
2-187. Tab 5, pages 1-3, displays the FP allocation and status of each ABT and TBM asset (page 1 is for TBM ASSETS TB01-18 and pages 2-3 are for ABT assets AT19-54). The status displayed reflects the overall system status, the activity status of the asset for the FP from Tab 70 and whether the asset is behind or out of coverage based on the geometry. Both ABT and TBM assets can be made either ACTIVE or INACTIVE using Tab 5 as allocated to individual Patriot batteries. (Asset status, by FP, on Tab 5 differs from the overall system status set in Tab 70). If the asset is designated as either BEHIND or OUT-OF-COVERAGE, then Tab 5 cannot be used to change the asset activity status. 2-188. Tab 5 at the ICC allows the operator to display all of the assets and volumes that have been initialized in the data base. Assets are displayed in priority order, within each category, and by numerical order. Activation of a volume being activated is also shown in Tab 61 and Tab 71. Deactivation of a volume at the ECS will only be acknowledged at that ECS and not at the ICC, until the ICC updates the volume status by an ENTR TAB action. Pages 4 through 12 of Tab 5 can be used to activate or deactivate allocated volumes, time-controlled volumes, and points for each FP defined. Tab 5 format is shown in Figure 2-43. ASSET STATUS/CONTROL *VOLUMES PG ID PR1 FP1 2 3 4 5 6 ID PR1 ( ) ( )( )( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )( ) 4-12 FP1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) PAGE 4 5 6 )( )( ) )( )( ) )( )( ) )( )( ) )( )( ) )( )( ) )( )( ) )( )( ) OF 12 *5*

2 ( )( ( )( ( )( ( )( ( )( ( )( ( )( ( )(

3 )( )( )( )( )( )( )( )(

A=ACTIVE B=BEHIND I=INACTIVE O=OUT OF COVERAGE

Figure 2-43. ICC Tab 5, Pages 4-12, Volumes
2-189. Volume and point information displayed by Tab 5 in TAC OPS is similar to assets information on page 1. Tab 5 groups volume ID by Patriot

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FP (one Patriot battery per page). The STAT data field displays if the volume is active (A) or inactive (I). Entries to the STAT data field are accepted if the activity status is not B or blank (no communications with the FP). Changes made to volume status or to activity status via Tab 5 are reflected in BATI Tabs 61 and 71. 2-190. Volumes are displayed in order by type and priority as hostile ID volumes (including hostile combined weapon control volumes), friendly ID volumes (including friendly combined weapon control volumes, weapons control only volumes (without leading ID volume attribute), IFFON Line, IFPID LINE. 2-191. For each volume identified in Tab 71, a time to activate and deactivate can be entered. The operator, upon receipt of the ACO, can access Tab 71 and enter the activation and deactivation time for each volume as per ACO request. All times include day (dd), time (hhmm), month (mm), and year (yyyy). If the fields are blank, the STAT field of Tab 71 or Tab 5 will control the activation and deactivation of the volume. If a time is entered then Tab 5 will indicate a (T). The volume active/inactive status can be specified to change in unison to comply with the ACO and thus avoid a mixture of old/new ACOs. The ECS Tab 71 is the same as the ICC Tab 71 except that it is set up for 55 units and 250 points. Asset Allocation

2-192. Asset allocation is initially made using fire unit employment planning information entered in Tab 59. As Patriot batteries come on line (or communications become active), then BATI reallocates assets based on reported locations, PTLs, and azimuths. After processing, asset status information is then available for display via Tab 5 in TAC OPS. Tab 5 is updated when— • An asset overall activity status is changed using Tab 70. • Inputs are made to Tab 70. • The active deployment is completed. • A Patriot battery status changes to limited or full operations. • A Patriot battery location and azimuth is initially reported. • A change of a Patriot battery azimuth (reorientation) is reported. • The retrieve and compare FP (RCFP) data process is completed. • A successful data base transfer to Patriot battery(ies) is completed. 2-193. Definition of assets (location size and priority), and allocations to Patriot batteries are made based on the assigned mission and emplacement of the subordinate fire units within system constraints. There are limits to coverage provided by subordinate fire units; therefore, deployment planning must ensure that adequate weapons coverage for assets is maintained. There are also limits upon the active number of assets allocated to each Patriot battery. Asset priorities must be designated judiciously, especially when the available coverage is thin and the number of assets is high. Fire units themselves are assets. 2-194. To summarize, initialization and control are accomplished using different tabular displays. Tab 70 is used to define the asset and set the

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overall activity status. Tab 5 displays the status of the asset for each Patriot battery and is used to make active or deactivate “in-coverage” assets allocated to each Patriot battery during TAC OPS.

FIRE UNIT TACTICAL INITIALIZATION
2-195. The process of initializing the Patriot fire unit is called tactical initialization (TACI). It consists of four basic procedures: standard emplacement, standard emplacement with data base read, short-term reinitialization, and long-term reinitialization. Each of these procedures are used under specific conditions. This section does not address each procedure in detail, since they are defined in the TMs. However, standard emplacement (STD EMP), which is the most complete, will be addressed. The other initialization procedures are a duplicate or subset of STD EMP. 2-196. The initialization procedures are used to establish and define the system battle parameters and to create a data base that is used for reinitialization and recovery operations. At the fire unit, one manstation (MS) is designated as the initialization sequence controller. This is accomplished when the ECCM ASSIST switch-indicator is selected. All automatically sequenced initialization tabs are forced to that manstation. Either manstation can be the sequence controller. Normally, MS 1 is the sequence controller. At the appropriate time, MS 3 assists in the initialization by entering launcher data or common data base items if a data transfer is not anticipated. It should be noted that initialization is an extremely important phase of Patriot operations. Care must be taken by the crew to ensure that the procedures defined in the technical manual are followed. Failure to strictly follow the defined procedure will result in degraded system operations. 2-197. Standard emplacement is used the first time a data base has to be created. This is normally performed after moving to a new location and if the previous data base is not applicable, there is no previous data base or configuration management changes the data base. A standard emplacement will always be used when no data base is available. Recording of a configuration management change because of system modification must be performed on both side A and B of the FU disk. The standard emplacement (STD EMP) with DATABASE READ is used when the site-peculiar data is not applicable. Site-peculiar data is that data that is unique to a specific site, such as radar location and alignment, launcher location and alignment, mapping, and search sector control. This initialization procedure should be used when moving into a new location and that the common data base items and non-site-peculiar data are still valid. During this initialization procedure, the crew only has to input the site-peculiar information, thereby reducing initialization time. 2-198. Long-term reinitialization is a procedure used to reinitialize all data tabs. Because it is a reinitialization procedure, it requires a valid data base. This procedure is used when the system has been down for a prolonged period (extended maintenance, for example) but has not moved from its location. It is normally used when mapping functions must be performed, such as mapping STLs that were not previously mapped, or to update the existing

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terrain map. This initialization sequence follows the STD EMP sequence but does not allow the operator to enter data in the radar location, Tab 81. Shortterm reinitialization is a procedure used to reinitialize the system. It also requires a valid data base. This procedure is generally used to access tabs (except Tab 68, which is available but not changeable) that are not available during on-line tactical operations so those minor updates to the data base may be made.

FIRE UNIT STANDARD EMPLACEMENT
2-199. Standard emplacement consists of an automatic sequencing of tabular displays and alerts that directs the operator through the initialization process. The specific steps to perform a standard emplacement will not be discussed here since they are defined in the technical manual. However, the automatic initialization sequence will be followed and the four methods of emplacement will be described. A detailed discussion of each tabular display and its interactions on the system and the ICC will be provided. 2-200. The following are prerequisites for automatic emplacement (AE) of the FU: Three satellites are within the field of view of the FU. Both the PLGR and the NFS are required for an automatic emplacement. If one or the other is not available, then neither of the units may be used. • Both the RS and LSs must be in REMOTE for the AE function to be successfully completed. 2-201. With the upgrade of the AE, there are now five methods of acquiring the data needed for emplacement of the fire unit, RS and LS. They are shown in Table 2-11 listed in order of preference. • •

Table 2-11. Emplacement Types

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SOURCE OF DATA FOR TAB 81 AND TAB 85
TYPES METHOD UTM ALT AZIMUTH ROLL CROSS ROLL 1 AUTO AE PLGR PLGR NFS NFS NFS AUTOMATIC 2 PLGR PLGR NFS NFS NFS DATA ADR REENTRY 3 3 MANUAL PADS PADS PADS M2 M1 M1 W/PADS MANUAL 4 MAP MAP M2 M1 M1 W/OUT PADS MAP MIXED PLGR/ PADS PADS PADS M1 M1 4 MODE PADS Notes: 1. Data automatically inputted via software and data link. See Appendix C for procedures. 2. Data previously derived from automatic emplacement (hard copy of Tabs 81 and 85 apply only to TACI. K7 is updated). This is applicable only if the RS and LSs have not been moved. 3. M1 is the gunner's quadrant; M2 is the aiming circle. 4. See Appendix E for procedures.

2-202. An automatic emplacement at an FU results in the best location and angular confidence levels being sent to the ICC. The FU alerts LOCATION DATA CONFIDENCE LEVEL of SURVEY = O and ALIGNED BY of SURVEY = O are sent to the ICC when the final automatic emplacement is achieved. Considering these inputs, the ICC establishes the initial correlation cells. ICC site calibrations are accomplished on all FUs whether they were emplaced manually or automatically. Because of the accuracy of the precision lightweight global positioning system receiver (PLGR) and north finding system (NFS), SITE ERROR alerts are not expected when site calibrations are performed on FUs that were automatically emplaced. 2-203. If SITE ERROR alerts are repeatedly observed, the ICC operator should perform the following: Determine which FU is continually defined in the alert. Determine if the FU was emplaced manually or automatically. If the FU was emplaced automatically, have the crew members check that there is no radar set (RS), PLGR or NFS fault. • Time permitting, have the FU crews perform a new automatic emplacement. • If the FU was manually emplaced, have crew members recheck the alignment and ensure that the data was entered correctly. • Confirm that the data in Tab 81 is correct. 2-204. If SITE ERROR persists, the FU should then perform the semiannual preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) checks. If out of tolerance, intermediate maintenance (IM) should be notified. Note: If the alert reports a large difference (1,000 meters or more), then the TD or TDA should check Tab 12 to ensure that the ECS crew did not make an obvious error in entering data. The reported location received should be confirmed by voice with the battery to ensure that the correct universal transverse mercator (UTM) (Patriot) or latitude and longitude (Hawk) were entered. If everything appears to have been entered correctly and the system reports no • • •

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site error, an effort to correlate targets between batteries should be attempted. If correlation occurs without problems, the battery should be considered correctly positioned. If not, the battery must reboot its data. TAB 12—FP LOCATIONS/BOUNDARIES-BN 2-205. The current azimuth of Patriot batteries displayed in Tab 12 should also be noted. Prior minor azimuth changes indicate that site calibration has occurred and the FP azimuth was corrected. Figure 2-44 shows the Tab 12 format. Note: FP1 through 6 is reserved for Patriot FPs and FP7 through 12 is reserved for Hawk and THAAD FPs.
FP LOCATIONS/BOUNDARIES – BN UTM LOCATION PTL STL1 STL2 STL3 CURR AZ PAGE 1 LF-BOUNDS-RT *12*

FP 1 2 3 4 5 6 BN

FP 7 8 9 10 11 12 BN

FP LOCATIONS/BOUNDARIES – BN UTM LOCATION PTL

PAGE 2

*12*

Figure 2-44. Tab 12, FP Locations/Boundaries–BN
2-206. If a fire unit is entered in Tab 59, then entries for FU communications will be required in Tab 68. If an FU is defined in Tab 68 in the normal initialization sequence, then the software will expect a location and PTL entry in Tab 59 to complete initialization. Fire unit communications data requirements will be discussed later as part of the communications control and track reporting parameters' category. 2-207. The entries for Tab 91, FP data acquisition mode (Figure 2-45), Tab 81 RADAR LOCATION/ALIGNMENT DATA ENTRY (Figure 2-46), and Tab 85, LAUNCHER LOCATION/ALIGNMENT (Figure 2-47), vary based on the type of emplacement used. The required operator inputs for each method are shown below. 2-208. Normally, the automatic emplacement (AE) capability will be used to emplace and ready the unit for action. When performing an AE, the RS and LS can be at any azimuth because the PLGR and the NFS rotate with the shelter. However, it is always a good practice to align the system, RS and LS,

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at the mechanical stow azimuth. This will always provide a known reference of where the alignment was accomplished. This alignment reference could then be used when the RS or LS has to be returned to the alignment position for manual data entry. When performing an automatic data reentry (ADR) or a manual emplacement, the RS and LS must be emplaced using a secondary method to determine position and azimuth data for the RS and LS(s). The AE METHOD DATA ENTRY FIELDS for each tab must be filled in as follows: • Tab 91. § Data Acquisition Mode. § STD Emplacement Type (1) Auto. § UTM = Approximately RS LOC (if necessary). Tab 81. § UTM World Model. § Wind Speed. Tab 85. § LS Number. § Depletion Priority.

• •

FP DATA ACQUISITION MODE SELECT/CONTROL *91* ( ) = DATA ACQUISITION MODE: ( ) STD EMP TYPE: 1 = AUTO 0 = MANUAL 0 = STANDARD EMPLACEMENT ( ) UTM = APPROX RS LOC 1 = LONG TERM REINIT 2 = SHORT TERM REINIT (*) READ DATABASE 3 = STANDARD EMPLACEMENT WITH DATABASE READ -

Figure 2-45. Tab 91, FP Data Acquisition Mode Select/Control
RADAR LOCATION/ALIGNMENT DATA ENTRY LONGITUDE UTM DEG MIN SEC E/W zzheeeeeennnnnnn ( ) ( ) ( . ) ( ) ( ) MODEL LATITUDE ALTITUDE DEG MIN SEC N/S METERS ( ) ( ) ( . ) ( ) ( ) IS RS AT EXACT ALIGNMENT AZIMUTH? ( )=1=YES 0-NO. IF NO, REALIGN RS. RADAR LOCATION/ALIGNMENT DATA ( )=LOCATION DATA CONFIDENCE LEVEL 0 =SURVEY 1=MODIFIED SURVEY 2=MAP ( )=ALIGNED BY 0 =SURVEY 1=COMPASS ()=WIND SPEED 0 =BELOW GALE 1=GALE + ABOVE ( ) MILS = RS EMPLACEMENT AZIMUTH ENTRY PAGE 2 OF 2 *81* AIMING CIRCLE + GUNNERS QUADRANT INPUT IN MILS EL RDR TO MIR =( . ) BRNG RDR TO NREF =( . ) EL RDR TO NREF TOP =( . ) EL RDR TO NREF BOT =( . ) BRNG NREF TO RDR =( . ) ROLL =( . ) CROSS ROLL =( . ) PAGE 1 OF 2 *81*

(*)= UTM WORLD MODEL 0 = INTERNATIONAL 1 2 3 4 5 = = = = = 1880 CLARKE 1866 CLARKE WGS-84 EVEREST BESSEL

Figure 2-46. Tab 81, Emplacement TAB

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LAUNCHER LOCATION/ALIGNMENT ()=LS NUMBER (1)=LS EMPLACE TYPE 1=AUTO 0=MANUAL ( ( )UTM )METERS ALTITUDE BRNG BRNG BRNG ELEV

*85* INPUT BELOW IN MILS NREF TO LS = ( . ) LS TO NREF = ( . ) LS TO RDR = ( . ) LS TO RDR = ( . ) LS ROLL = ( . ) LS CROSSROLL = ( . )

( )=DEPLETION PRIORITY 01=HIGHEST ( )MILS=LS EMPLACEMENT AZIMUTH

Figure 2-47. Tab 85, Emplacement Tab, Automatic Data Reentry
2-209. The automatic data reentry (ADR) method can be used for employing the FU at the same location. If three satellites are not available or the PLGR and NFS become inoperative after an automatic emplacement, then the ADR method can be used for emplacing the FU at the same location as long as no outrigger pads have been lifted on the RS or any LS. The ADR method uses the data that was originally derived from either manual or automatic emplacement using hard copies of Tabs 81 and 85. Tab 91, FP DATA ACQUISITION MODE SELECT/CONTROL, is used to enter data from a manual emplacement. Data is entered in the appropriate data field as defined below— • Tab 91. – Data Acquisition Mode. – STD EMP Type (0) Manual.

Tab 81. – UTM World Model. – Altitude. – RS at Exact Alignment Azimuth. – Location Data Confidence Level. – Aligned By. – Wind Speed. – Mils = RS Emplacement Azimuth. – Roll/Cross Roll. • Tab 85. – LS Number. – UTM. – Meters Altitude. – Depletion Priority. – Mils = LS Emplacement Azimuth. – LS Roll/Cross Roll. 2-210. An additional emplacement method is available to allow launchers to be emplaced manually with automatically emplaced radar. This mixed mode emplacement will allow the operator to manually emplace a launcher in either TACI or K7. Launchers that are in a mixed mode emplacement do not require GPS and NFS equipment. If emplaced in automatic mode, manual data may no longer be entered. Launchers must then be deassigned then

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reassigned. The procedure for mixed mode emplacement is defined in Appendix E and requires strict compliance for missile acquisition to occur.

BATTERY TACTICAL INITIALIZATION
2-211. TACI provides the ECS with data parameters necessary for C2 of engagement operations. The ECS tactical data base contains data parameters that control tactical system operations. TACI is a set-up process that must be performed prior to tactical operations. The ECS system functions vital to mission accomplishment are— • Track management. • Communications. • Display and system control. 2-212. TACI works hand-in-hand with the ICC BATI. This cooperation is especially important because both the ECS and ICC must maintain a common data base for proper command and control from the battalion level. TACI defines FIDOC, identification (ID), assets and defended areas, volumes, and the battery search sectors. TACI is required to set up the system before battery tactical operations can be performed. TACI is also important because the tactical data base parameter values must be set properly for optimum tactical operations. TAB 90—DATA COLLECTION CONTROL 2-213. Tab 90 at the ECS is similar to Tab 90 at the ICC. The ECS Tab 90 is used in conjunction with the Data Coll S/I. Page one of the tab is for internal data collection control and page two is for external control. The major differences are— • Page one has a data field for MAXIMIZE EDR COLLECTION. During K-7 operations the only time that this data field can be changed is just prior to the ACK. STARTS DATA COLL-MEDIA OK? The default value is YES and the operator should not change the value unless directed. If Y=YES is selected, the data collection record size will be 4096 words written to the EDR. If N=NO is selected, the data collection record size will be 2500 words written to the EDR that each data record being sent to any external data collection device will contain a maximum of 2500 words. Page two has an additional data field for AUTO MODE SWITCHING. During K-7 operations, the only time this data field can be changed is just prior to the alert ACK STARTS DATA COLL-MEDIA OK? The default value is YES and the operator should not change this value unless directed. If 0=OFF is selected, data collection mode switching must be manually performed by the operator. If 1=ON (DEFAULT) is selected, data collection mode switching will occur automatically. The operator should not change from default value of 1 unless directed.

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DATA COLLECTION CONTROL - INTERNAL ( ( ( ) = DATA COLLECTION DEVICE: ) = RE-START WHEN DEVICE FULL:

PAGE 1 OF 2

*90*

1 = EDR -TAPE-, 2 = ODS2 -DISKY = YES, N = NO

) = REPLACE MEDIA: Y = YES, N = NO “YES” = REMOVE AND LABEL DATA COLL MEDIUM, AFTER ENTR ( ) = MAXIMIZE EDR COLLECTION Y = YES, N = NO HOURS : MINUTES COLLECTION DEVICE WILL BE FULL IN: :

Figure 2-48. Data Collection Control, Page 1
DATA COLLECTION CONTROL - EXTERNAL ( )= EXTERNAL DATA COLLECTION: ENGINEERING TEST PARAMETERS ON = 0 ( 0 ) ( ) = DRIVE ) = AUTO MODE SWITCHING ( (c c c c c) = MRT IDENTIFIER 1 = 0 = NTO, NT1 OFF, 1 = ON 0 = OFF, 1 = ON 2 OF 2 *90*

Figure 2-49. Data Collection Control, Page 2

TACTICAL INITIALIZATION
2-214. TACI establishes the ECS tactical data base and allows certain data parameters to be input into the system before tactical operations are initiated. TACI data parameters (Figure 2-50) have been categorized to help understand how ECS processing uses initialization data. Tabular displays are used to input and display the data parameters in each category. Some data categories are used internally by the weapons control computer (WCC) and are not related to battalion C3. Other categories provide data for ECS displays. The tactical control officer (TCO) and the tactical control assistant (TCA) control the TACI process. Other tactical operations (TAC OPS) tabular displays that are related to initialization tabs and which impact on TACI are included.

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TACI INITIALIZATION STRUCTURE

CATEGORY

TABULAR DISPLAYS TAB 91

DATA ACQUISITION SEQUENCE RS AND LS LOCATION ALIGNMENT DATA STATIC DATA FILE ALTITUDE BANDS AND SPEED CATEGORIES COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL AND DATA TRANSFER RADAR CONTROL PARAMETERS WEAPONS CONTROL AND RADAR MAPPING DATA ALTERNATE SEARCH SECTORS SURVEILLANCE DATA IFF/SIF PARAMETERS END OF MANUAL INPUT DATA

TAB 85

TAB 81

TAB 14

TAB 68

TAB 99

TAB 54 TAB 95 TAB 96 TAB 55 TAB 73 TAB 74 TAB 98 TAB 97 TAB 92

TAB 6

Figure 2-50. TACI Data Parameters

DATA INITIALIZATION SEQUENCE
2-215. Tab 91 is the first to appear after system booting and is available only in TACI. It provides the operator with initialization selections. Which initialization procedure to select and under what conditions is described in fire unit tactical initialization paragraphs. Automatic Alignment Process 2-216. The automatic alignment process, using PLGR and NFS data, is initiated through Tab 91. When Tab 91 appears, select either entry 0 or 3 for the data acquisition mode. The automatic alignment process is applicable only when selecting 0 = STANDARD EMPLACEMENT or 3 = STANDARD

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EMPLACEMENT WITH DATABASE READ. Automatic emplacement is the primary method, select 1=AUTO in the STD EMP TYPE data field. 2-217. AUTO emplacement method is selected with either STANDARD EMPLACEMENT or STANDARD EMPLACEMENT with DATABASE READ. A UTM coordinate is required in the UTM=APPROX RS LOC data field. If MANUAL emplacement type is selected, then the UTM seed is not required. If one is entered, the alert ENTRIES INCOMPATIBLE appears. This UTM coordinate is the initial location seed UTM data for the PLGR and NFS at the RS and LS. The UTM may be determined from a map spot, but should be as close to the RS location as possible. For NFS alignment accuracy, this UTM coordinate can be no more than 40 kms from the actual radar location. AUTO Emplacement Process 2-218. The AUTO emplacement process is initiated when entering AUTO in Tab 91. The alert RS AUTO EMPLACING is displayed in the auxiliary alert line of the controlling manstation. Tab 85 may also be entered at this time to expedite LS automatic emplacement. The other manstation may continue with the initialization process with those tabs that are permitted or planned. 2-219. If a valid initial location and/or azimuth cannot be obtained from the PLGR or NFS because of a fault, or if the PLGR data is below an acceptable level, Tab 91 will reappear with the alert RS/LS AUTO EMPLACEMENT FAILED. The operator is required to monitor the alert line for any equipment fault alerts. Select page 4 of the Fault Data tab to determine if any PLGR or NFS faults are indicated. If none are indicated, attempt an automatic emplacement again. If the automatic emplacement fails while the operator is in the mapping sequence (Tabs 92, 95, 96, and 97), then Tab 91 will not automatically appear. The operator should reboot the system and attempt another automatic emplacement. 2-220. During the second auto emplacement attempt the fire unit should take the following actions: Notify battalion. This allows the battalion to organize its resources to support the fire unit. • The S3 notifies position azimuth determining system (PADS) of an impending mission. • The S4 and logistics readiness center (LRC) consults with the battalion EMMO on troubleshooting procedures. • Notify the launcher crew that a manual emplacement may be required. This allows the launcher crew to gather the required assets and to stand by if the second AEE fails. 2-221. If a second auto emplacement attempt fails, then the MANUAL EMPLACEMENT METHOD should be accomplished and notify battalion. Notify the all personnel that a manual emplacement is required. •

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ROLL-CROSSROLL ALIGNMENT
2-222. The importance of Tab 81 cannot be overemphasized. The data from this tab affects all major system areas in terms of surveillance, target position and reporting, missile acquisition, and triangulation. This tab establishes the exact location and pointing angle of the radar, which are extremely important parameters. The operator must ensure that the procedures defined in the TM are adhered to when entering data. A Patriot basic rule that must be followed is: whenever entering data in Tab 81, the radar must be at the position at which it was aligned. 2-223. Three factors affect the boresight of the radar: the pointing azimuth, roll, and crossroll. When manufactured, the radar antenna is mechanically boresighted perfectly level with the radar (zero roll and crossroll) to ensure accurate alignment. Because this condition cannot be achieved in the field environment, the boresight of the radar must be electronically adjusted. Roll and crossroll are the electronic "Kentucky windage" used by the WCC to boresight the radar. 2-224. Roll is the side-to-side level of the radar, while crossroll is the front to rear level. When the roll and crossroll readings entered in Tab 81 reflect the actual level of the radar set base, then the boresight of the radar is correctly aligned. With errors in the roll and crossroll, the boresight is wrong, target positions reported will be incorrect, and the acquisition beam for the missile will be positioned incorrectly. 2-225. To understand the effects of crossroll, refer to Figure 2-51. The figure shows the radar set boresight (top) with zero crossroll and shows the effects of positive and negative crossroll errors in relationship to tracking a target (bottom). Zero crossroll and boresight are necessary.

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ZERO CROSSROLL
E TIV GA ROLL NE SS O CR

BORESIGHT

Figure 2-51. Zero Crossroll and Boresight
2-226. This can be visually demonstrated by placing a flashlight at the end of a table and shining it on the wall. The point where the light strikes the wall represents the boresight tracking position of the radar. To see the effect of crossroll errors, raise only the rear of the flashlight off the table. The light should strike the wall below its original position. This is negative crossroll. By raising only the front of the flashlight, the effect of a positive crossroll error can be seen. 2-227. The effects of roll on the boresight of the radar are similar to crossroll and can be seen in Figure 2-52. Since roll is parallel to the radar beam, the effect is minimal near the center of the search sector and greatest at the edges. If errors occur in both roll and crossroll, the effects combine to cause a greater error in the boresight of the radar.

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BORESIGHT

ZERO CROSSROLL

Figure 2-52. Boresight and Crossroll Errors
2-228. Roll and crossroll errors at the launching station affect missile acquisition in the same way. Considering the pointing azimuth, roll and crossroll values inputted in Tab 85, the WCC predicts the location of the missile in space for acquisition by the radar. Missile acquisition beams are steered based on roll and crossroll values. The WCC compensates for uncertainty characteristics in the missile's flight, such as missile speed, air density, and wind velocity (these values are fixed average value constants in the software used to calculate missile location at acquisition). Errors in radar roll and crossroll add to errors in computing missile location errors. This can lead to failure of the system to acquire missiles after launch. Tab 81 is only available in TACI, in all four initialization procedures.

RADAR ALIGNMENT PROCEDURES
2-229. In the automatic emplacement mode, use Tab 81 for RADAR LOCATION/ALIGNMENT DATA ENTRY when the PLGR has returned at least one valid location. When the NFS has provided a valid response, the initialization sequence is allowed to continue and Tab 81, page 1 (Figure 2-53), appears on the controlling manstation.

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RADAR LOCATION/ALIGNMENT DATA ENTRY LONGITUDE UTM DEG MIN SEC E/W ZZHEEEEEENNNNNNN ( ) ( ) ( . ) ( ) ( ) LATITUDE ALTITUDE DEG MIN SEC N/S METERS ( ) ( ) ( . ) ( ) ( ) IS RS AT EXACT ALIGNMENT AZIMUTH? ( )=1=YES 0=NO. IF NO, REALIGN RS.

PAGE 1 OF 2 ( )= 0 = 1 = 2 = 3 = 4 = 5.=

*81*

UTM WORLD MODEL INTERNATIONAL 1880 CLARKE 1886 CLARKE WGS-84 EVEREST BESSEL

Figure 2-53. Tab 81, Radar Location and Alignment Data Entry
2-230. The World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS-84) was added to the UTM WORLD MODEL data field. The RS location, altitude, and IS RS AT EXACT ALIGNMENT AZIMUTH? data fields come up blank and are inaccessible (cursor denied) because the final RS position has not been fully determined. The operator is required to make an entry in the UTM WORLD MODEL data field. The data entry for this field is taken from the topographic map of the area of operations. In the auto emplacement mode, software subroutines compensate for the differences between the PLGR world models and the world models entered in this tab. All batteries in the battalion must use the same world model (WGS-84). The WGS-84 world model is compatible with the use of the PLGR and JTIDS communications. 2-231. In the manual mode, page 1 of Tab 81 provides for the entering of the radar location in either UTM or latitude and longitude. When one data parameter is entered, the other is automatically computed when the tab is entered. Accurate radar location data is currently provided by the position and azimuth determining system (PADS) organic to battalion. The location entered in this tab is automatically sent to the ICC and displayed in Tab 12 at the ICC when data communication is initially established. The altitude data for input in this tab is also provided by the PADS and is required to be accurate within 10 meters. This data is provided to the ECS on the Radar Location and Alignment form. See Appendix A. 2-232. UTM WORLD MODEL provides the specific grid system used in the development of the maps used. A standard conversion is applied in several of the Patriot algorithms, depending on the map model selected. Consequently, the UTM WORLD MODEL selected must be the same throughout the battalion. The UTM WORLD MODEL is normally defined in the legend of military maps. 2-233. Is the RS at exact alignment azimuth? Data field is an entry used to remind the operator to ensure that the radar is in fact at the align position. There is no software check between this entry and the radar. The data field will accept any entry made by the operator even if the radar is not at the aligned position. It is in the tab strictly as a reminder to the operator. As previously mentioned, when entering data in Tab 81, the radar must be at the aligned position. This entry reaffirms this rule. 2-234. Page 2 of Tab 81 (Figure 2-54) is accessed by ENTER Tab which accesses any multipage tab. As with page 1 data, the information on this page is extremely critical. It will affect both fire unit and ICC operations. When this tab appears in the automatic mode, the RS EMPLACEMENT AZIMUTH,

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ROLL, and CROSSROLL data fields display NFS information. The LOCATION DATA CONFIDENCE LEVEL and ALIGNED BY data fields remain blank. Changes to these data fields are not allowed (cursor denied). The initial location confidence level reported in the azimuth error state (AES) to the ICC is 2=MAP. This is based on the first data reading from the PLGR. At the completion of a successful automatic emplacement, this is changed to 0=SURVEY for both location and alignment. The operator is required to make a WIND SPEED entry.
RADAR LOCATION/ALIGNMENT DATA ENTRY ( )=LOCATION DATA CONFIDENCE LEVEL 0 =SURVEY 1=MODIFIED SURVEY 2=MAP ( )=ALIGNED BY 0 =SURVEY 1=COMPASS ( )=WIND SPEED 0 =BELOW GALE 1=GALE + ABOVE ( ) MILS = RS EMPLACEMENT AZIMUTH PAGE 2 OF 2 *81* AIMING CIRCLE + GUNNERS QUADRANT INPUT IN MILS EL RDR TO MIR =( . ) BRNG RDR TO NREF =( . ) EL RDR TO NREF TOP =( . ) EL RDR TO NREF BOT =( . ) BRNG NREF TO RDR =( . ) ROLL = ( . ) CROSS ROLL = ( . )

Figure 2-54. Tab 81, Page 2, Radar Location and Alignment Data Entry
2-235. On page 2 of Tab 81 the normal TACI sequence continues. While the operators are performing normal TACI sequence, automatic requests for additional PLGR readings continue. When the number of samples achieve the appropriate level, a final RS position is defined. This final position is then used to update the initial radar location. An updated LOCATION DATA CONFIDENCE LEVEL is sent to the ICC to recalculate all RS location and altitude related information.

MANUAL ALIGNMENT PROCEDURES
2-236. In the manual mode, leveling of the M2 aiming circle, alignment to the north reference stake, and the measurement of the required angles must be accomplished with extreme care and accuracy to ensure that the best radar alignment is achieved. 2-237. AIMING CIRCLE + GUNNER'S QUADRANT INPUT IN MILS data determines the pointing azimuth of the radar. It is provided to the operator via the radar alignment form, which is completed by a crew member during emplacement. 2-238. Elevation radar data record to mirror (EL RDR TO MIR) is an angular measurement in mils from the radar M2 to the radar mirror. The angle will vary depending on the height of the individual making the measurement or the height of the M2 above or below the radar mirror. This measurement, when calculated with the other angles, will determine radar pitch. This measurement is important and is required. 2-239. BRNG RDR TO NREF is a bearing measured clockwise in mils from the radar M2 to the north reference M2. This entry is one of the data points in determining the radar-pointing azimuth. Extreme care and accuracy must be taken when measuring this angle.

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2-240. EL RDR TO NREF TOP data is needed only if the launcher line-ofsight emplacement procedure is going to be used to determine launcher location. If PADS provides the launcher location, then no entries are required in this data field. To perform this measurement, a survey rod is required with the NREF M2 aiming circle. The combination of this data and the subsequent data field, in conjunction with the angles measured in the LS line-of-sight procedure and in Tab 85, provide LS location. 2-241. EL RDR TO NREF BOT data field is the same as the previous data field and is a measurement from the radar M2 to the bottom of the NREF survey rod. The combination of these two data fields provides the distance from the radar to the NREF M2. No entry is required if PADS provides launcher location data. 2-242. BRNG NREF TO RDR is a bearing measured in mils clockwise from the NREF M2 to the RDR M2. This data in combination with BRNG RDR TO NREF will provide the radar-pointing azimuth. Extreme care must be taken when measuring this angle. Time permitting, a two-man approach should be used; that is, two crew members take the measurements at both aiming circles to confirm that they come up with the same answer. 2-243. ROLL is a measurement taken in mils with an M1 gunner's quadrant on the radar to determine the actual roll of the radar. This measurement is also used in determining the radar-pointing angle. Time permitting, the twoman rule also applies here. Measurements must be taken at the aligned position. 2-244. CROSSROLL is a measurement taken in mils with an M1 gunner's quadrant on the radar to determine the radar's pitch angle. As with all alignment measurements, extreme care should be taken in taking the roll and crossroll measurements. A common error in taking these measurements is to fail to annotate correctly the direction of the "arrow" by indicating a plus or minus sign. Time permitting, the two-man rule also applies here. Measurements must be taken at the aligned position. Supplementary roll and crossroll measurements will be taken at the radar-pointing angle (PTL or STL) after transitioning to tactical operations. This value will be used as a reference for follow-on supplemental roll and crossroll measurements made every 24 hours. If a difference of more than 2 mils is noted, then the radar must be rotated to its aligned position, roll and crossroll measured, and the system reinitialized with the new values. Refer to the radar TM for proper radar set supplementary roll and crossroll procedures. 2-245. When manually emplacing the system, soldiers may use the NFS to obtain roll and crossroll readings if they are operational. When the system is manually emplaced, roll and crossroll is not automatically updated by the system. Soldiers must verify roll and crossroll every 24 hours as outlined above. Tolerances for manual alignment are ±2 mils for the RS and ±3 mils for the LS.

LOCATION DATA CONFIDENCE LEVEL
2-246. LOCATION DATA CONFIDENCE level data field is used to indicate the level of confidence of the location accuracy of the radar. The level of

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confidence selected in this data field has a direct application with the ICC site calibration process. The entry made in this data field results in an azimuth error state (AES) being applied to this fire unit and transmitted to the ICC when communications are established. The AES received from the fire unit will dictate the amount of azimuth correction applied during site calibration, as well as the correlation box sizes used in target correlation at the ICC. An accurate AES will ensure smaller correlation boxes and smaller azimuth correction by the ICC. Again, as with the other alignment data, care should be taken as to which entry is applied to this data field. The following guide will be used in determining which confidence level to apply: 0 = SURVEY—applied if the radar is within 10 meters of the known location. • 1 = MODIFIED SURVEY—applied if the radar is between 10 and 40 meters of the known location. • 2 = MAP—applied if the radar is between 40 and 120 meters of the known location. The radar location must be resurveyed if its position is more than 120 meters from a known location. 2-247. ALIGNED BY is the confidence level of the radar alignment performed. This entry, in conjunction with the location confidence level, provides the AES. An accurate pointing angle of the radar will result in a smaller AES. The radar alignment performed must be within one degree. The following will be used in determining which confidence level to apply: 0 = SURVEY—applied if the alignment was performed with survey accuracy and the pointing angle of the radar is known to be within 7 mils. The north reference provided by PADS and the alignment performed with the M2 aiming circle do not provide the survey accuracy necessary for this selection. • 1 = COMPASS—used for the majority of Patriot alignments using the M2 aiming circle. This method ensures survey accuracy is achieved. The known pointing angle must be within 1 degree. If the pointing angle error is larger than 1 degree, the radar must be resurveyed. The selection of compass results in a larger initial correction factor being used in the ICC site calibration process. 2-248. WIND SPEED data field changes the ICC correlation and triangulation box sizes as a function of the wind speed at the fire unit. An entry in this data field affects the AES reported to the ICC. Considering the AES reported, the ICC applies the appropriate correlation and triangulation parameters. If the wind speed is above 35 nautical miles per hour (41 statute miles), then 1 = GALE + ABOVE is selected. The wind speed data control is located in Tab 81, page 2. • •

TAB 14—TARGET DISPLAY CONTROL
2-249. Tab 14 is available in TACI and on-line during TAC OPS. Page 1 of this tab allows the operator to define English or metric units for display and initialization of altitude and speed. The tab defaults to English altitude and metric speed, so the operator must ensure that altitude and speed entries support the data base entries. In initialization, the altitude and speed affects Tabs 71, 78, 79, and 92. During TAC OPS, these entries affect track

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amplifying data, tag data on the situation display, and range in Tab 14 (Figure 2-55). If initialization data is to be entered manually, the other MS may assist in the initialization process at this point.
TARGET DISPLAY CONTROL (1)= ALTITUDE UNITS FOR TARGETS/MASK/VOLUMES 1=ENGLISH, 2=METRIC PAGE 1 *14*

(2)= SPEED/RANGE UNITS: FOR TARGETS/CURSOR 1=ENGLISH, 2=METRIC TARGET DISPLAY CONTROL LO (20) (10) (03) (-3) (090) HI (79)aa (20)aa (10)aa (03)aa (180)aaa (120)KM = = = = = = BOUNDARIES OF ALTITUDE BANDS, BAND A BAND B BAND C BAND D MEDIUM SPEED CATEGORY LIMITS, PAGE 2 -3 TO *14*

000 TO 514 m/s

= JAMMER STROBE LINE DISPLAY RANGE, RMIN-RMAX

Figure 2-55. Tab 14, Target Display Control, Pages 1 and 2
2-250. BOUNDARIES OF ALTITUDE BANDS, page 2 of Tab 14, provides the operator with the ability to select the altitude bands to be displayed. The altitude defined for each band is controlled via the altitude band switchindicators A through D, in the Situation Display Select - Track Data console group. When directed, specific altitude bands may be entered. These bands should be tactically meaningful as an aid to quick recognition by the operator. The altitudes defined in this tab affect only the display. 2-251. MEDIUM SPEED CATEGORY LIMITS entry establishes the speed range for the medium speed and heading target vector that protrudes from each target. The defaulted speed range for the target vector is 90 to 180 meters/second. 2-252. JAMMER STROBE LINE DISPLAY RANGE entry is for display purposes only and controls the range to where the jam strobe will extend. The FU jam strobe extends from the middle of the screen to the range defined in this tab. If, for example, RMAX is entered, the strobe will extend to the system's maximum range. It is recommended that the default value be used. It should be noted that when the strobe is hooked, the strobe extends from the center of the display down to the fire unit location. TAB 68—DATA COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL 2-253. Tab 68, DATA COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL (Figure 2-56) is the means by which the software is made active to provide fire unit digital communications with the ICC. It is through this tab that the fire unit's number that the battalion it is reporting to, and the battalion's assigned RLRIU addresses, are entered. Within a Patriot battalion, A Battery is FP 1, B Battery is FP 2, and so on up to FP 6. The battalion letter, A through F is the battalion's designation. There should not be two Patriot battalions with

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the same letter designator in the same communications Consequently, brigade normally assigns the letter designator.
DATA COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL ( ) =LOCAL FP NUMBER: 1 THROUGH 6 ( ) =ICC/BN DESIGNATION: A-F ( ) =RLRIU ADDRESS SET NUMBER: 1 OR 2 =RLRIU ADDRESS

network.

*68*

Figure 2-56. Screen Display of Tab 68
2-254. RLRIU ADDRESS SET NUMBER defines which RLRIU set is used within the battalion. Either set may be used, but all elements in the battalion must have the same set. The battalion SIGO determines which set is to be used. There are two sets of RLRIU addresses (1-2) in the Patriot communications software. The RLRIU address that must be entered into the various RLRIUs depends on which set is used and the fire unit number. If the LOCAL FP NUMBER and the RLRIU ADDRESS SET NUMBER do not match the setting on the RLRIU, the operator is provided an alert informing him of the error. The operator must change the FP NUMBER, RLRIU SET NUMBER, or the actual setting on the RLRIU. RLRIU sets are listed in Table 2-12.

Table 2-12. RLRIU Address Assignments

BN A
UNIT
PFP 1 PFP 2 PFP 3

BN B
RLRIU ADDRESS SET 2
21 22 23

RLRIU ADDRESS SET 1
01 02 03

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PFP 4 PFP 5 PFP 6 ICC ICC (A) ICC (B) ICC (C) ICC (D) ICC (E) ICC (F) CRG 1 CRG 2 CRG 3 CRG 4 CRG 5 CRG 6 ALL

04 05 06 N/A 41 42 43 44 45 46 11 12 13 14 15 16 00

24 25 26 N/A 41 42 43 44 45 46 31 32 33 34 35 36 00

DATA BUFFER TRANSFER
2-255. A data buffer transfer is the transfer of common data base initialization items, such as volumes, assets, IFF codes, and FIDOC parameters from the ICC to subordinate fire units. This is the recommended process for supporting the initialization of common data base items. It minimizes initialization time, reduces the potential for error, and standardizes the data base throughout the battalion. At the ECS, the crew is alerted when the ICC transfers a data base to the fire unit. These alerts inform the crew of the status of the transfer (transfer incoming, complete, incomplete, delayed, or failed). The alert UPDATE DATABASE must be acknowledged and update data base in Tab 8 to complete data base transfer. The tabs transferred by the ICC are Tabs 1, 5, 6, 55, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 78 (page 1), 79, and PTL and STL data for Tab 95. TAB 99—FP DATA TRANSFER CONTROL 2-256. Tab 99 (Figure 2-57) is available only in TACI and allows the operator to select a data transfer from the ICC. If data communications with the ICC are established and the ICC is in tactical operations (not initialization), then a data transfer will be requested. Otherwise, do not request a data transfer at this time in the initialization sequence. The common data base items can be transferred by the ICC anytime during fire unit initialization or while in tactical operations without a request being made in this tab. The tab entries are self-explanatory.

FP DATA TRANSFER CONTROL ( )=REQUESTS INITIALIZATION DATA FROM ICC 1 =REQUESTS DATA 0 =NO REQUEST

*99*

Figure 2-57. Tab 99, FP Data Transfer Control

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TAB 54—RADAR FREQUENCY CONTROL 2-257. Tab 54 is available in TACI and K7 (Figure 2-58). It allows the operator to specify what frequency(ies) the radar will operate in. During peacetime training operations, the data for this tab is defined by the major command to which the Patriot battalion is assigned. During wartime operations, the ADA brigade operation order specifies the frequencies for use by the battalion, and procedures for the W-code assignment within the battalion. Unit TSOP should be followed when selecting frequency sets and establishing the fire unit's standard frequency. The appropriate frequency separation should be used when assigning W-code sets and standard frequency for each unit. During peacetime training operations, the area frequency coordinator or post frequency management office should be contacted to determine what sets and which frequencies are authorized.
RADAR FREQUENCY CONTROL ( ( ( ( 0( 1( 2( 3( )=FREQUENCY DIVERSITY AUTHORIZED; 1=YES, 0=NO )=FREQUENCY CODE SET: WCODE )=STANDARD FREQUENCY )=1 FOR FULL FREQUENCY SET, OR SELECT FREQUENCIES BELOW; ) 4( ) 8( ) 12( ) 16( ) 20( ) 24( ) 28( ) 1=INCLUDE FREQ. ) 5( ) 9( ) 13( ) 17( ) 21( ) 25( ) 29( ) 0=EXCLUDE FREQ. ) 6( )10( ) 14( ) 18( ) 22( ) 26( ) 30( ) ) 7( )11( ) 15( ) 19( ) 23( ) 27( ) 31( ) *54*

Figure 2-58. Tab 54, Radar Frequency Control
2-258. Patriot TSOPs and directives address when and how frequency diversity is to be authorized. FREQUENCY DIVERSITY AUTHORIZED data field allows the authorization for frequency diversity. It may be authorized (1=YES) TACI and K-7. Even when authorized, frequency diversity cannot occur until the ECCM ENABLE switch-indicator is selected during tactical operations. When the ECCM ENABLE switch is selected, the frequencies defined in Tab 54 are distributed within the search matrix by beam. If a specified level of interference is detected in a particular beam, the frequency associated with that beam is modified. When the COUNTER ARM mode S/I is enabled, the frequency diversity occurs within the frequencies defined in Tab 54. 2-259. FREQUENCY CODE SET W-CODE establishes the frequency range that the system will use. There are several W-code sets selectable in the system. During peacetime, operation W-code set 1 is the allowed set. However, not all frequencies within this code set are authorized. The theater frequency manager will determine the frequencies to use. 2-260. STANDARD FREQUENCY data field defines the standard frequency. It is the single frequency that the radar operates in when frequency diversity is not authorized. The appropriate frequency separation must be adhered to so that mutual radar interference does not occur. The number entered in this field equates to a specific frequency within the overall bandwidth for the radar. 2-261. FOR FULL FREQUENCY SET, OR SELECT FREQUENCIES BELOW is defined as follows. By selecting a 1 in this data field, all the 32 frequencies will be used when frequency diversity is authorized. If the

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operator wants the system to only diversify in specific frequencies, then an entry of 1 = INCLUDE FREQ or 0 = EXCLUDE FREQ must be made in each of the frequency data entry fields (0 to 31).

RADAR MAPPING
2-262. Radar mapping is an important function within the Patriot system as it establishes the lowest angle that the radar will search. If pointed too high, aircraft can fly undetected under the search beams. If pointed too low, the radar will expend precious radar time resource canceling clutter from ground returns to the lower search beam. Mapping performs two functions. The first is the establishment of the operational search lower bound (OSLB) and the second is the establishment of the system clutter map. Because of mapping's importance, a detailed explanation of the process and the specific functions of the operator in conjunction with each tab are provided in the TM. This section will only highlight each tab and discuss its overall use. TAB 95—RADAR MAPPING TRAIN CONTROL + SUMMARY 2-263. Tab 95 (Figure 2-59) determines the target line and the left and right limits of the azimuth and is the initial tab of the mapping sequence. TAB 95 is available in TACI and for display only in K-7. Once the mapping sequence is started, the manstation performing the mapping is locked in mapping until completion. The operator defines the radar PTL and three STLs, and if applicable, the antitactical missiles (ATM) search will skew. He then performs radar reorientation and defines the sector width to be mapped.
RADAR MAPPING TRAIN CONTROL + SUMMARY ) D=CURRENT RS AZIMUTH )D=PTL ( )D=STL1 ( )D=STL2 ( )D=STL3 )D=TBM SEARCH SECTOR SKEW BEARING ANGLE: -15 TO +15 )=RADAR TRAIN COMMAND: 0=RS TO PLT 1=RS TO STL1 2=RS TO STL2 3=RS TO STL3 4=RS TO AZ ( ) AZIMUTHS MAPPED: TO , TO , TO , TO ( )=PASSIVE EMPLACEMENT 1=YES 0=NO NO OSLB DATA AVAILABLE ( )D=LEFT MAPPING BOUND AZIMUTH ( )D=RIGHT MAPPING BOUND AZIMUTH ( ( ( ( *95*

Figure 2-59. Tab 95, Radar Mapping Train Control + Summary
2-264. The NFS requires one minute for spin-down after obtaining the azimuth, roll, and crossroll. During this time, commands entered in Tab 95 will not be processed. This generally is not a problem because there are several tabs (Tabs 14, 68, 99, and 54) that require data input before reaching Tab 95. However, if STANDARD EMPLACEMENT WITH DATABASE READ was selected, there is a possibility of getting to Tab 95 before the required NFS spin-down time has elapsed. If Tab 95 is entered before the spin-down has completed, a FUNCTION REJECT alert will appear and the train command will not be executed, and Tab 95 will not reappear. To correct this condition, the operator must recall Tab 95. To do this, the following steps must be followed: • • Set the WPS CTR S/I to OFF. Select Tab 95 via the Select Tab process.

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• •

Set the WPS CTL S/I to ON (estimate that at least 1 minute has passed since page 2 of Tab 81 was entered). Reenter the data and enter Tab 95.

TAB 96—INITIAL SEARCH LOWER BOUND DATA ENTRY 2-265. Tab 96 is available in TACI (Tab 96 can be viewed but not modified in K7). It allows the operator to define the five-point initial search lower bound (ISLB), the lower elevation of the long-range search sector, or skip all mapping. The five-point ISLB is important because it allows the radar to be emplaced silently and still have an accurate lower search capability. It also provides the start point for the initial search during mapping. A number of ISLB points (from 1 to 5) may be entered. The number of ISLB points is driven by the terrain contour in the sector being mapped. The ISLB points are normally determined and provided by the unit RSOP team. The longrange segment minimum tactical elevation allows the operator the ability to raise the lower elevation of the long-range search sector from 0 to 30 degrees. For example, this would be done if there is a high mountain range in the long-range search sector that the long-range search beams would detect, even considering earth curvature. The SKIP ALL MAPPING function is used when the system is to be emplaced "silently." If this function is selected, the system will not radiate at all for mapping and the ISLB will become the operational search lower bound (OSLB) when in tactical operations (see Figure 2-60).
INITIAL SEARCH LOWER BOUND DATA ENTRY POINT 2 POINT 3 POINT 4 POINT 5 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )=MILS BEARING ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )=MILS ELEVATION + -200 *96*

POINT 1 ( ) ( )

ENTER ELEVATION IN ONLY ONE FIELD ABOVE FOR LEVEL INITIAL BOUND BEARINGS TAKEN WITH M2 AIMING CIRCLE ALIGNED WITH RS AZIMUTH ( ( )D=LONG RANGE SEGMENT MINIMUM TACTICAL ELEVATION: 00 TO 30 )=0 TO SKIP ALL MAPPING: INITIALIZATION RADIATION PROHIBITED

Figure 2-60. Tab 96, Initial Search Lower Bound Data Entry
TAB 97—MAPPING DISPLAY/CONTROL SELECT ENTRY 2-266. Tab 97 is only available in TACI. It allows the operator to determine which mapping process to select (Figure 2-61).
MAPPING DISPLAY/CONTROL SELECT ENTRY ( ) A C 0 1 ( ) = SELECT MAPPING DISPLAY OR CONTROL SEQUENCE = DISPLAY A – AZIMUTH/ELEVATION/RANGE – MODIFIED RHI = DISPLAY C – AZIMUTH/RANGE – CONSTANT ELEVATION PPI = SKIP CLUTTER MAP OR RETURN TO RADAR TRAIN CONTROL = PERFORM CLUTTER MAP – VALID ONLY AT PTL = 0 TO 7 = NUMBER OF AZIMUTHS TO SKIP WITH DISPLAY A. *97*

Figure 2-61. Tab 97, Mapping Display and Control Select Entry
2-267. The SELECT MAPPING DISPLAY OR CONTROL SEQUENCE field will accept either one digit or letter (A, C, 0, or 1):

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A = DISPLAY A—should be selected when the terrain contour is irregular. It produces an irregular OSLB. For example, the left side of the sector is higher than the right side (terrain sloping), or the terrain in the center of the sector is higher than the sides. "A mapping" maps all 69 beams individually and provides each beam return to the operator. This is the most difficult mapping display to perform and visualize with what the returns are providing. With “A mapping” the operator has the option to ship azimuths to reduce mapping time and can command the system to compute (interpolate) the skipped azimuths. C = DISPLAY C—should be performed when the terrain contour is level. It produces a single OSLB. "C mapping" maps all 69 beams at one time, like a fan. The radar returns are provided to the operator after each time he moves the fan up or down to establish a lowintensity contiguous grazing display. This display is easy to interpret. 0 = SKIP CLUTTER MAP OR RETURN TO RADAR TRAIN—allows the operator to skip the clutter map process. This selection only applies if the sector being mapped is the PTL. If an STL is being mapped and this entry is selected, the mapping process will return to Tab 95. 1= PERFORM CLUTTER MAP—the mapping process must always end with the mapping of the PTL. If a clutter map is to be performed, then this option is selected. A clutter map is only done at the PTL when in TACI or at the current azimuth when in TAC OPS. The best clutter map is the TACI clutter map because the radar performs several "samples" per beam during this process. This is why the TACI clutter map takes two to five minutes to be performed. 0 TO 7 = NUMBER OF AZIMUTHS TO SKIP WITH DISPLAY A— entry only applies to A display mapping. It allows the operator to skip some of the 69 beams. If no beams are to be skipped, the "0" is entered and all 69 beams will be presented to the operator. If "5" is selected, the first beam is presented, the next five beams are skipped, and the seventh beam is presented with the next five being skipped, and it continues.

TAB 92—MASKED AREAS DRAWING CONTROL 2-268. Tab 92 is available only in TACI and is the last tab in the mapping sequence. Along with the tab, a circle divided in three equal search sectors is displayed on the situation display. The individual sectors represent the PTL and STL(s) mapped, to cover the full 360 degrees. The masked terrain map (MTM) done during A mapping is displayed in the sectors mapped. These points are represented in the legend in Tab 92 (Figure 2-62). They consist of dots (....), dashes (- - -), pluses (+++), asterisks (****), and zeros (000). Each of these indicators equates to a different altitude. The altitude for each is displayed in Tab 92. The operator indicates the masked areas by connecting the like indicators using the situation display cursor. These masked areas, commonly called fences, are also set to the ICC and are only used for display purposes. They are started during tactical operations through switch action.

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To save time, the drawing of masked areas can be done while the clutter map is in process.
MASKED AREAS DRAWING CONTROL )M*100 = ALTITUDE LABEL FOR DESIGNATED MASK TERRAIN AREA ) = PROCESS CONTROL: BLANK = CONTINUE THIS SECTOR-1 1 = ADVANCE TO NEXT SECTOR-2 2 = END MASKED AREAS DRAWING ALTITUDE SYMBOL CODING: .... = 000a TO 000a -—- = 000a TO 000a +++ = 000a TO 000a *** = 000a TO 000a 000 = 000a TO 000a *92*

( (

Figure 2-62. Tab 92, Masked Areas Drawing Control
2-269. With the completion of Tab 92 and the radar clutter map, the mapping sequence is completed. The manstations involved in mapping are automatically released.

ALTERNATE SEARCH SECTOR CONTROL
2-270. Tab 55, Alternate Search Sector Control (Figures 2-63 and 2-64), is a two-page tab. It is the last automatically sequenced initialization tab. It allows the operator to tailor the ABT and TBM search sector, for elevation, azimuth, and range. The complete ABT sector can also be dropped. Two tailored search sectors (SECT 1 and SECT 2) may be defined, which are made active during tactical operations by the ALTER SECTOR 1 or 2 switchindicators. The tab is formatted so the entries in SECT 1 on pages 1 and 2 are controlled by ALTER SECT 1 S/I. Actual recommended values for this tab are difficult to standardize or define because they are mission, enemy, terrain troops and time available (METT-TC) dependent. Actual application will be based on mission and system performance. To emphasize, only the search sectors are affected by these entries. Tracking will continue in these areas. If the ICC inputs this data and data buffer is transferred, the tab will be filled.

ALTERNATE SEARCH SECTOR CONTROL-ABT PAGE A *55* SECT 1 SECT 2 ( )D ( )D=DROP FROM LEFT SIDE IN 1 DEG INCREMENTS TO MAX-5DEG ( )D ( )D=DROP FROM RGHT SIDE IN 1 DEG INCREMENTS TO MAX-5DEG ( ) ( ) =DROP LOWER SHORT TO MEDIUM RANGE ROWS TO MAX-1 ROWS ( ) ( ) =DROP UPPER SHORT TO MEDIUM RANGE ROWS TO MAX-1 ROWS ( ) ( ) =DROP LOWER LONG RANGE ROWS TO MAX-3 ROWS ( ) ( ) =DROP UPPER LONG RANGE ROWS TO MAX-3 ROWS ( )( ) ( )( )=DROP SEGMENTS 1= HORIZON 3=LOWER MED 5=LONG RANGE ( )( ) ( )( ) USING 4 FIELDS:2=SHORT-POP 4=UPPER MED A=ALL SEGMENTS ( )KM = DROP LONG RANGE SEARCH ( )KM = DROP SHORT RANGE SEARCH

Figure 2-63. Tab 55, Page A, Alternate Search Sector Control ABT

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2-271. The DROP FROM LEFT SIDE and DROP FROM RIGHT SIDE entries can reduce the azimuth from the left and right ABT search boundary. These can be reduced in 1-degree increments, to no more than 5 degrees of the search sector. 2-272. The DROP LOWER SHORT TO MEDIUM RANGE ROWS and DROP UPPER SHORT TO MEDIUM RANGE ROWS entries allow the operator to drop search beam rows in short- and medium-range search, thereby changing the lower and upper elevation search angles. 2-273. The DROP LOWER LONG RANGE ROWS and DROP UPPER LONG RANGE ROWS entries allow the operator to drop search beam rows in long-range search, thereby changing the lower and upper elevation search angles. 2-274. The DROP SEGMENTS field uses four data entries associated with each sector control (SECT 1 and 2). Activation of these entries results in the entire search sector being deactivated. The operator may drop all of the five surveillance search sectors. Short pop and lower medium elevation search sectors cannot be dropped independently; other sectors must be dropped with them. As a basic rule, the system will not allow a hole in search coverage. You may reduce it from the bottom or from the top, but you cannot take a section from the middle. 2-275. The DROP LONG-RANGE SEARCH entry allows the operator to reduce the maximum long-range search. Currently, the radar searches to radar maximum (RMAX) range. This entry allows the operator to reduce the range to where the radar will only search out to the range defined in this data field. 2-276. The DROP SHORT-RANGE SEARCH entry allows the operator to reduce the short-range search of the radar. Currently, the radar searches from radar minimum (RMIN) to RMAX range. The previous entry allows the operator to move RMAX in. This entry allows the operator to move RMI out so that short-range search will begin farther away from the radar. This range must be at least 4 kilometers less than the range applied in the drop longrange data field.

SECT 1 ( )D ( )D ( ) ( ) ( )

ALTERNATE SEARCH SECTOR CONTROL – TBM PAGE B *55* SECT 2 ( )D=DROP FROM LEFT SIDE IN 1DEG INCREMENTS TO MAX-15DEG ( )D=DROP FROM RGHT SIDE IN 1DEG INCREMENTS TO MAX-15DEG ( ) =DROP LOWER TBM ROWS, 0 TO 8 ( ) =DROP UPPER TBM ROWS, 0 TO 14 ( ) =DROP SEGMENTS USING ONE FIELD: 6=LTBM 8=XTBM B=BOTH

Figure 2-64. Tab 55, Page B, Alternate Search Sector Control—TBM
2-277. The DROP FROM LEFT SIDE and DROP FROM RIGHT SIDE entries provide the operator with the ability to reduce the TBM search sector. This reduced TBM search is in 1-degree azimuth increments to a maximum of 15 degrees for each side.

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2-278. The DROP LOWER TBM ROWS and DROP UPPER TBM ROWS entries allow the operator to reduce the elevation of the TBM search sector. This reduction of elevation search sector is accomplished by eliminating beam rows from the lower or upper portion of the search sector. 2-279. The DROP SEGMENTS USING ONE FIELD entry allows the operator to drop two of the three TBM search sectors, either individually or simultaneously, through this entry. The middle TBM sector may not be dropped. 2-280. During engagement operations, Tab 55 is used to drop specific ABT search sectors. The horizon, short-range, pop-up and lower medium-range search sectors may be dropped at the TBM alert by way of ALTER SECT 1 switch-indicator. This assists in minimizing clutter returns. It is appropriate for TBM-only missions. In the ABT mission, the dropping of ABT search sectors other than long-range should not be performed. Dropping long-range may be considered as a manually induced saturation alleviation process. 2-281. Upon entering Tab 55, the automatic initialization sequencing tabs are completed. The operator must then input the launcher location data and a Tab 6 entry if this was not done concurrently by manstation 3 during initialization. The common data base items must also be entered at this time if a data transfer was not accomplished. If a data base transfer was performed, the operator should check and may make a hard copy of the following tabs at the ECS for reference: Tabs 1, 6, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 78, and 79. TAB 85—LAUNCHER LOCATION/ALIGNMENT 2-282. Tab 85 is extremely important (Figure 2-65). Incorrect data will result in failed missile acquisition and the loss of a missile. Care must be taken when performing these functions, because the alignment data entered into the computer will determine location and pointing angle of the launcher. 2-283. The PLGR and NFS of each LS require the input of "seed" data like the RS. The seeding operation for the LS is automatically applied through the ECS. This minimizes errors and is necessary for the differential data acquisition function of LS emplacement. Valid readings are used to compute the Northing, Easting, and elevation differences between the RS and LS locations in Earth Centered Coordinates. These Earth Centered Coordinates are converted by system software to FU local coordinates and then to UTM coordinates for display in Tab 85. 2-284. Tab 85 is available in TACI and during tactical operations to facilitate changes and late arriving launchers. LS emplacement can be performed either manually or automatically. The automatic emplacement process applies to both local and remotely deployed LSs. As it does with the RS, Status Monitor also maintains the status of each LS’s PLGR, NFS, and communications equipment. Status Monitor checks begin when Tab 85 is entered and the LS is in sync. It consists of 16 pages to accommodate the two banks of eight launchers each. The first 8 pages are for bank A, with the second 8 pages for banks B to F.

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LAUNCHER LOCATION/ALIGNMENT ( )=LS NUMBER ( )=LS EMPLACE TYPE 1=AUTO 0=MANUAL ( ( ( ( )UTM )METERS ALTITUDE )=DEPLETION PRIORITY 01=HIGHEST )MILS=LS EMPLACEMENT AZIMUTH BRNG BRNG BRNG ELEV

*85* INPUT BELOW IN MILS NREF TO LS = ( . ) LS TO NREF = ( . ) LS TO RDR = ( . ) LS TO RDR = ( . ) LS ROLL = ( . ) LS CROSSROLL = ( . )

Figure 2-65. Tab 85, Launcher Location and Alignment
2-285. The LS NUMBER data field designates the launcher number or address. It is already filled in with the appropriate number (1A to 8A) for the first eight launchers. The operator must enter the LS number for the last eight pages (1B-F to 8B-F). The number on this tab must coincide with the address and bank switch on the launcher from which the data was provided. The data is provided to the ECS crew by a launcher crew member, on the Launcher Alignment form (see Appendix A). 2-286. The LS EMPLACE TYPE data field determines the emplacement mode for the LS. Enter 1 for automatic emplacement or 0 for manual emplacement. If MANUAL is selected, the data is entered as normal, and the rules associated with manual data entry apply. If AUTO is selected, the operator need only enter the LS number, if not already displayed. The LS must be in the Remote Mode for automatic emplacement, otherwise the operator is alerted LS na LOCAL—NFS DISALLOWED. 2-287. The DEPLETION PRIORITY entry defines the depletion order for launchers. This entry is based on the MISSILE DEPLETION RULE entered in Tab 78. If deplete BY LS was selected in Tab 78, then this entry will be used to deplete the launcher according to the priority established in the tab. It should be noted that this is not the determining factor in selecting a launcher. If all the other factors in launcher selection are met, the priority will apply. 2-288. When Tab 85 is entered, Status Monitor begins communicating with the selected LS and initiates the automatic emplacement process. Once the automatic emplacement is completed for selected LS, the operator is provided with the following two alerts: LSna AUTO EMPLACEMENT COMPLETE informs the operator that LSn has completed a successful emplacement. • HARDCOPY LSna DATA TAB 85 informs the operator to make a hard copy of that particular Tab 85 for the site data book. If Tab 85 is selected, the LS number, UTM, azimuth, altitude, roll and crossroll are displayed. • If AUTO was selected, the cursor is denied in these fields, and the only entry the operator can make is in the DEPLETION PRIORITY data field. 2-289. If the operator receives the alert LSn EMPLACEMENT FAILED, the operator must check page 4 of Fault Data tab to determine if there are any faults with the LS, PLGR, NFS, or communications equipment. If the failure •

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is caused by poor satellite data, the LS should be placed to "local" and a crew member should determine the PLGR parameters. 2-290. The UTM location is a UTM coordinate provided by the PADS. There are also line-of-sight and non-line-of-sight procedures in the launcher TM for determining launcher location if PADS data is not available. The launcher emplacement accuracy relative to the radar is ±10 meters. 2-291. The METERS ALTITUDE field is the altitude of the launcher above sea level in meters. The data field will accept a 100 meters below sea level entry. The altitude is normally provided by the PADS system.

MISSILE DEPLETION RULES
2-292. Launch decision parameters are input via Tab 78. Engagement threshold parameters provide data for information processing. The system uses this information to determine which missile to launch. The MILS=LS EMPLACEMENT AZIMUTH data field displays the azimuth angle of the LS as determined by the NFS (if applicable) or is entered from a hard copy by the operator. 2-293. The INPUT BELOW IN MILS data entries in this area are a function of survey data type provided. If the launcher UTM, altitude, and orienting line are provided, the Patriot Launcher Location Alignment Data Form 2 is used. If the launcher UTM location, altitude, and alignment data are not available, then Form 1 is used. Copies of forms and launcher alignment procedures at an unsurveyed site are available in TM 9-1440-600-10. 2-294. If the launcher UTM location is provided, the BRNG NREF TO LS data entry is always entered as 3200 mils. If the launcher UTM is not available, this angle is measured from the NREF M2 aiming circle to the launcher M2. 2-295. If launcher UTM data are provided, the BRNG LS TO NREF entry is the true azimuth of the launcher measured through the canister alignment pins, subtracted from 6400 mils. This computation is done by the launcher crew member using Patriot Launcher Location Alignment Data Form 2. The ECS operator enters the resultant data. If the launcher UTM location data is not available, then this angle is measured from the launcher M2 to the NREF M2. 2-296. BRNG LS TO RDR is the angular measurement from the launcher M2 to the radar M2. This measurement is only needed if the PADS were not used to determine location. If PADS was used, no entry is required. The launcher line-of-sight procedure will define this measurement which, used with the subsequent measurement, determines launcher location. 2-297. ELEV LS TO RDR is the angular measurement from the radar M2 to the top of the survey rod collocated with the radar M2. This is similar to the above angle and is not needed if PADS provided the launcher location. It is part of the launcher line-of-sight procedure to determine launcher location. 2-298. LS ROLL is the measurement of the launcher's roll in mils using the M1 gunner's quadrant at the aligned position. The measurement must be

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made as accurately as possible. Care should be taken to ensure that the direction of the arrow on the M1 is annotated by affixing the correct plus or minus sign to the angular measurement stakes. Toward the front or curbside of the launcher, the sign will be positive. 2-299. LS CROSSROLL is the measurement of the launcher's pitch in mils using the M1 gunner's quadrant at the aligned position. LS supplemental roll and crossroll are needed if the launcher is not on a handstand. Once the launcher has been trained to the firing azimuth, the PLGR will automatically update the data base. The alignment azimuth of the launcher must be marked on the LS azimuth bullring. The roll and crossroll will be measured at the PTL. This provides a reference for the supplemental roll and crossroll measurements that must be taken every 24 hours. If the difference between the reference and the daily "reading" is more than 2 mils, the LS must be reinitialized with updated roll and crossroll data. This will require that the launcher be returned to the aligned stow position, the roll and crossroll measured, and the LS reinitialized with the new values in Tab 85. See TM 91440-600-10 for supplementary roll and crossroll measurement procedures. When manually emplacing the system, soldiers may use the NFS to obtain roll and crossroll readings if they are operational. When the system is manually emplaced, roll and crossroll is not automatically updated by the system. Soldiers must verify roll and crossroll every 24 hours as outlined above. TAB 6—IFF/SIF CODE CONTROL 2-300. Tab 6 (Figure 2-66) is automatically displayed during initialization although this tab is part of the data transferred tabs. Most of the specific data items of this tab will not be discussed in this section, but are covered in detail in paragraphs 2-38 through 2-45 of this chapter.

IFF/SIF CODE CONTROL ( )=IFF/SIF STATE ( )=SIF TABLE ( )=CR AUTOMATIC CHANGE ( )=MODE4 CODE ( )=MODE4 LOW RANDOMNESS ( )=MODE4 CODE HOLD ( )=MODE 1 CORRELATION ( )=MODE 3 CORRELATION YEAR( ) DAY( ) UNUSED SIF CODES: CR TABLE

CMND VALUES: A=AUTO, M=MANUAL 1,2=CR;3,4=KAA-63 1=YES, 0=NO A,B OR Z=ZEROIZE 1=YES, 0=NO 1=YES, 0=NO 1=USE, 0=DON’T USE 1=USE, 0=DON’T USE ; CODE PAIRS IN 3, IN 4

*6* CODE ENTRY FORMS: KAA63 *73* CROSE *74*

Figure 2-66. Tab 6, IFF and SIF Code Control
TAB 98—DATA BASE CONTROL

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2-301. Tab 98 is available only in TACI and must be selected by the operator. This tab is selected when the operator has completed all data entries and reviewed all the tabs in the initialization process. Upon entering this tab (Figure 2-67), the initialization process is concluded. The operator is then provided with two alerts that must be acknowledged for the data base to be written. Upon completion of the data base write, the operator is directed to enter tactical operations.
DATABASE CONTROL *98* ) IS MANUAL DATA INPUT COMPLETE? 1 = YES, 0 = NO )/( )/( ) DATABASE NUMBER/NAME/USER ) TACTICAL DATABASE NUMBER CURRENT DATABASES DATABASE USERS K7=TACTICAL S/W LAT=LIVE AIR TRAINER TNG=TRAINING -

( ( (

Figure 2-67. Tab 98, Database Control
2-302. The final update process is initiated at the end of initialization after Tab 98 has been entered and a complete set of RS data has been averaged. Tab 81 is automatically converted to hard copy with the final emplacement data. 2-303. Units must use PLGR-based PTOD whenever possible. Units without access to automated PLGR-based PTOD will manually enter PTOD. Controlling units will provide the PTOD and if possible base it on PLGR PTOD. If two adjacent units have no controlling unit, then the lowest numbered unit will provide the PTOD. The operator can now use the percentage value displayed on page 4 of the FAULT DATA Tab to make emplacement time line decisions. If some or all LSs have not auto emplaced when TACI is finished, the TCO or TCA must evaluate the emplacement status to determine how close to completion each LS is. Mission requirements and the emplacement status for the LS to auto emplace are key factors in making this decision. A rule of thumb is: if emplacement status indicates more than 70 percent, the unit should remain in TACI until the LS is auto emplaced. If emplacement status indicates less than 30 percent, the unit should go to the tactical operation software K7. Between 30 percent and 70 percent requires decisions based on the mission and on the number of LS already auto emplaced. 2-304. The common data base items that are normally provided to the fire unit as parts of a data base. The common data base items are in Tabs 1, 5, 6, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 78, and 79.

GLIF THRESHOLD
2-305. New software, PDB-4.2, updates Tab 1 with another page to include the capability to select a GLIF and track-while-scan (TWS) velocity threshold (36 km/hr to 144 km/hr). This will provide track and engagement capability for slow speed track threats in clutter. The default value is set to 40 m/sec. If

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that threat value is not saved to the TACI data base, then it will return to the default value when the software is rebooted. (See Figure 2-68.)
FIDOC + OPERATIONAL PARAMETERS CHANGE PAGE 3 OF 3 *1* (n) = TBMA DIVE CALCULATION 1 = ON, (nn) aa = TBMA DIVE ALTITUDE nn TO nn (nn)D = TBMS DIVE ANGLE nn TO nn (n) = URBAN LOW ALT TRAJECTORY CONTROL (a) = TBMA NOMINAL OVERRIDE Y = YES, NOTE: YES ALSO TURNS OFF DIVE CALC (nn) M/S = GLIF + T-W-S VELOCITY THRESHOLD; 0 = OFF aa DEG 1 = ON, N = NO 10 TO 40,

0 = OFF

NOMINAL = 40

Figure 2-68. Tab 1, Page 3
• • • TBMA NOMINAL OVERRIDE default is N = No. GLIF + TWS VELOCITY THRESHOLD must be determined according to the threat and METT-TC. The default value is 40m/sec. If the input to TBMA NOMINAL OVERRIDE = Y, then, on ENTR TAB, TBMA DIVE CALCULATION will be reset to OFF (0) if required. A subsequent entry of no requires the TBMA DIVE CALCULATION to be set to ON by the operator.

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2-1

Chapter 3

Patriot Air Battle Operations
This chapter addresses Patriot air battle operations that consist of two major missions, countering the tactical ballistic missile (TBM) threat and countering the air breathing threat (ABT). The ABT threat includes fixed and rotary winged aircraft, tactical air to surface missiles (TASMs) or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Also addressed are crew responsibilities and the division of labor in the ICC and ECS. It provides a detailed explanation of software implementation, detection, identification, engagement operations, kill assessment, TBM, ABT, and mixed defense design functions. The software implementations of firing doctrine, tactical operations, and recommended parameters are also discussed. The classified material corresponding to Patriot air battle operations in this chapter will be found in Chapter 3 of (S/NF)ST 44-85-1A(U), which contains the classified values referenced by a code number in bold and underlined (for example: P4-123).

PATRIOT CREW RESPONSIBILITIES
3-1. Patriot crew responsibilities and the division of labor within the ECS and ICC are divided into two functional areas—weapons control and friendly protection. Each functional area is assigned to one operator. This idea is deemed effective because it evenly distributes operator tasks, exploits system automation, and retains the appropriate officer-NCO division of responsibility. Although this section does not outline the exact procedures to be used during the air battle, it does specify areas of responsibility and authority for each crew member and it explains recommended display console configurations. ENGAGEMENT CONTROL STATION CREW 3-2. The ECS is operated by a crew of three, one officer and two enlisted personnel. The officer (usually a lieutenant) is called the tactical control officer (TCO). He operates manstation (MS) 3 and performs the friendly protect function. One enlisted soldier operates MS 1 and is called the tactical control assistant (TCA). He performs the weapons control function. A communications specialist is the second enlisted soldier and operates the communications equipment at MS 2. Three separate crews man the ECS during 24-hour operations. TACTICAL CONTROL OFFICER 3-3. The TCO is the officer in charge (OIC) of the Patriot battery fire control crew and is responsible for everything that happens or does not happen during battery air battle operations (refer to Table 3-1). He is responsible for

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identifying all targets. He should have the FRNDLY PROT and (as appropriate to the tactical situation) the ECCM ASSIST S/Is enabled in the Console Mode group. The FRNDLY PROT S/I enables alerts associated with the identification processing (ID, conflicts, violations, et cetera). The A-scope is displayed at this manstation. Other switches should be activated as outlined in the tactical control officer's responsibilities in Table 3-1. Table 3-1 TCO Functions and Responsibilities

FUNCTION
Friendly protect

RESPONSIBILITIES
Identify targets. Ensure system is in assigned search, identification, and engage mode.

CONSOLE
Manstation 3

Verify activation/deactivation SIF and Mode 4. Identify false targets based on track amplifying data tab and situation display.

SWITCH ACTION CONSOLE MODE
Friendly protect ECCM assist (as required)

Monitor situation display and alert messages.

MAP DATA
Identification areas WPN control areas Defended areas Mask terr/maps Monitor party line for air battle.

TRACK DATA
Friends Unknowns Track numbers Other switch-indicators as required.

Apply or remove cease fire, hold fire, or engage hold. Monitors clutter conditions and activate clutter mapping. Perform A-scope evaluation. Make firing doctrine changes. Direct radar emission control schedule. Direct system reorientation. Monitor status alerts and assess selected alerts.

3-4. The TCO ensures, through Tab 1, that the system is in the assigned identification mode. He monitors the situation display, alert line, and tabular display area. He uses the Track Amp Data tab display to identify targets while in the manual identification mode and confirm identity while in the

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automatic ID mode. The TCO also uses this tab and the situation displays to assist him in determining clutter and false targets. False targets are normally indicated as such with a "false" or "slow" indicator in the ENGST/M data field of the Track Amp Data tab. These targets may also exhibit erratic speed, direction, and altitude indications. If these tracks are false targets, the TCO (if not busy) may consider dropping track. 3-5. The alert states and majority of the firing doctrine changes will be accomplished at the ICC and data-transferred to each battery. The TCO will monitor these transfers and ensure through tabular display (Tabs 1, 5, 6, 70, 71, 73, and 74) and the situation display that the changes have been implemented. The TCO will implement changes that are provided to the battery through voice communications. These changes will include activation and deactivation of assets, volumes, IFF codes and tables, identification weight sets, hostile authorizations in Tab 1 (Pop-up, ECM, MSV, and Slow Target Engage) SIF authorization, and ID mode. This also ensures the unit is in the correct ALTERNATE SEARCH SECTOR CONTROL radar search mode. 3-6. To ensure that nonhostile aircraft are not engaged, the TCO is responsible for applying the engagement overrides (HOLD FIRE, CEASE FIRE, ENGAGE HOLD, or change target ID to friend) according to the current rules of engagement. The TCO is also responsible for removing engagement overrides. The CEASE FIRE override may be removed by the TCA as dictated by the situation. 3-7. Manual IFF interrogation of targets is performed by the TCO. He monitors the SIF and IFF response evaluation of targets via the Track Amp Data tab. The enabling or disabling of Mode 4 Enable and SIF Enable S/I is his responsibility in coordination with the TCA. 3-8. The TCO will perform ECM target evaluation when time permits. He uses the A-scope presentation when required to assist him. The TCO also monitors system operations and performs manual clutter map as necessary. 3-9. System reorientation orders are received and acknowledged by the TCO. The actual reorientation is performed by the TCA. 3-10. The TCO monitors the TAC OPS net (party line 2) for target identification information from the ICC. He maintains close coordination with the TCA and keeps the battery command post (CP) advised. The TCO provides guidance and leadership as appropriate. If only one console is operational, the TCO operates it and performs TCA functions as well as the friendly protect function. TACTICAL CONTROL ASSISTANT 3-11. The TCA (refer to Table 3-2) monitors and initiates all engagements. In the automatic engagement mode, the system engages targets more efficiently than the operators. The TCA's primary task is to monitor and operate the system in order to engage hostile targets. Therefore, he is responsible for controlling all system functions that effect engagement. The TCA must have the WPNS CNTR and EQUIP control switch-indicators (S/Is) enabled in the Console Mode group. The alerts associated with weapons control,

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engagements, radar status, and radar faults are displayed on MS 1 as a result of enabling the WPNS CNTR switch-indicator. Other switches should be made active as outlined in Table 3-2 below. Table 3-2 TCA Functions and Responsibilities

FUNCTION
Weapons Control

RESPONSIBILITIES
Engage targets centralized (semiautomatic) Engage targets as directed by battalion engage targets in selfdefense. Decentralized (semiauto) engage targets as directed by the TCO. Engage targets in the TBE QUEUE.

CONSOLE

Engage targets in self-defense. Autonomous (semiauto) engage targets as directed by the TCO. Engage targets in the TBE queue. Engage targets in self-defense. Decentralized (automatic) monitor engagements. Autonomous (automatic) same as decentralized (semiauto).

Manstation one

SWITCH ACTION CONSOLE MODE
Weapon control Equipment control
MAP DATA

Weapons control volumes Defended areas
TRACK DATA

Reorient system. Place system in assigned mode of control. Activate SIF enable when required. Activate MODE IV enable when required. Activate ECCM enable when required. Place system in correct engagement and search mode. Place appropriate launchers to operate. Check that system is in assigned weapons control status. Activate/deactivate areas enable.

Unknowns (Weapons Free) Hostiles Track Numbers LNIP PIP Other Other switch/indicators as required

Activate/deactivate radiation, control alternate search sectors. Monitor situation display for alert messages. Monitor party line 1 for air battle conditions and status panel. Monitor system monitor alerts assess selected alerts. Monitor system test indicators.

3-12. The TCA ensures that the system is in the correct engagement mode, search mode, and mode of control. Furthermore, he is responsible for configuring the system according to the current alert state. This may include

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correct configuring system for the correct weapon control status, depressing the areas enable switch, activating SIF enable, activating mode IV enable, changing from threshold low to threshold high, or activating ECCM enable. He also controls system radiation (off, active, or passive) based on direction provided by the TCO, ICC, or battery CP. He places the radar in the appropriate search mode (ABT or TBM) as directed. The TCA activates the launching stations. The TCA also monitors the status panel for launching station status and missile count. The display areas that are monitored by the TCA include the situation display, tab area, alert line, and the status panel. These are not listed in priority. Their importance depends upon the tactical situation. 3-13. The TCA engages targets employing the rules of engagement and supplemental fire control measures in effect. In the centralized mode of control and semiautomatic engagement mode, all engagements are directed by the battalion fire direction center (FDC). This is the normal method of engagement operations. The TCA acknowledges the fire control order and engages the target. If the target must be engaged immediately, the ICC operator must augment the engage command with a voice command such as "Engage your target 005 now!" The right to self-defense is never denied, but the TCA must announce the intention to engage a self-defense threat to the TCO and double-check self-defense criteria and procedures before engagement. In some situations, such as when friendly air forces have air superiority or when the possibility of fratricide exists, self-defense engagements may be restricted (but not denied) by the airspace control authority. Situation awareness is of prime importance under these circumstances. 3-14. In the decentralized mode of control and in the semiautomatic engagement mode, the TCA manually engages targets when directed by the TCO in the order of the to be engaged (TBE) queue. In the automatic engagement mode, he monitors the engagements. The TCA provides kill assessments as appropriate. Depending on the ROE, normally in the autonomous mode, the TCA places the system in weapons hold and does not fire except in self-defense or in response to a formal order. 3-15. The TCA monitors cease fires applied to targets within his area of responsibility. He may apply engagement hold on a target as appropriate. The TCA monitors the air defense control (ADC) net (party line 1). 3-16. Strobe engagements are performed by the TCA when directed by the TCO. Strobe engagement method is the preferred method of engagement against ECM strobe targets. COMMUNICATIONS OPERATOR 3-17. The communications operator monitors and operates the systems communications equipment. As such, he monitors the tactical FM sets, makes periodic checks of the data links, routing logic radio interface unit, and the three UHF stacks. He is responsible for having the assigned address in the RLRIU, ensuring all communications equipment is configured according to the current communications plan, and passing and receiving tactical reports to and from the battery CP (SAMSTAT, missile count, and engagement

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reports). He assists the TCO in making assessments of communication faults. He monitors the antenna mast group (AMG), and rotates and elevates the UHF antennas when required. The communications operator implements all communications ECCM in the ECS, including the use of UHF power amplifiers. The communications operator is also responsible for implementing the battery's part of the battalion communications plan, properly patching all channels, and coordinating communications plan changes with the ICC and battalion communications control. He is also responsible for passing and receiving tactical reports to and from the battery CP (SAMSTAT, missile count, and engagement reports). ICC CREW 3-18. The ICC is operated by a crew of three—one officer and two enlisted soldiers. The officer is normally a captain or a senior lieutenant and is called the tactical director (TD). The TD performs the friendly protect function. One enlisted soldier (operator/maintainer) operates manstation 1 (MS 1). He performs the weapons controls function and is called the tactical director assistant (TDA). The second enlisted soldier operates manstation 2 (MS 2) and is called the communications operator. There are three separate crews that man the ICC during 24-hour operations. TACTICAL DIRECTOR 3-19. The TD is responsible for the battalion air battle operations. Specifically, the TD's most important duty is identifying all targets. The TD has the FRNDLY PROT switch-indicators activated. Alerts associated with identification and engagement overrides are displayed on this manstation. Other switches should be activated as outlined in Table 3-3. 3-20. The TD ensures that the ICC and ECSs are in the assigned state of readiness, state of emission, and ID mode. The TD monitors the battalion status panel and communications status with the FUs and higher echelons. The TD selects appropriate tabs and monitors subordinate unit status and air battle parameters. If entered data is incorrect, the TD applies the correct condition via electronic data transfers or voice. The TD supervises the battalion radiation schedule and unit search modes (TBM/ABT). In addition, the TD maintains maintenance schedules, ensuring that the battalion is prepared to perform its air defense mission. 3-21. The TD is responsible for resolving target identification. This ensures that friendly aircraft are protected and not engaged. The TD directs IFF/SIF interrogations as required by the situation. The TD is responsible for applying all engagement overrides (HOLD FIRE, CEASE FIRE, or ENGAGE HOLD). 3-22. The TD monitors the higher echelon net and alert messages, and responds to all except engage commands. The TD normally coordinates directly with the brigade or master battalion level TD. The TD monitors party line 2. 3-23. The TD assesses the operability of MS 3 and the environmental control unit, monitors' communications status, and directs the actions of the

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communications operator when faults exist. When one console is out of action, the TD operates the other console and performs both TD and TDA functions. Table 3-3 TD Function and Responsibilities FUNCTION RESPONSIBILITIES

Friendly protect

Identify targets. Resolve identification conflicts. Ensure that FDC is in assigned state of readiness and DEFCON.

CONSOLE

Assign states of readiness and DEFCON to batteries. Ensure that batteries are in assigned identification search and engage mode. Monitor battalion status panel and note FDC equipment and higher echelon communications status. Ensure that the battery IFF/SIF is correct.

Manstation 3

SWITCH ACTION

CONSOLE MODE

Friendly protect
MAP DATA

Call up FU status tab and note battery status. Monitor the situation display and alert messages. Apply/release hold fire, cease fire, and engage hold as required. Apply/release IFF/SIF interrogation as required. Monitor higher echelon alerts and respond to all engage commands.

Identification areas WPNS CONTROL volumes Defended areas
TRACK DATA

Friends, unknowns Track numbers
SOURCE/ADDRESS SELECT

Monitors, status monitor alerts and assess selected alerts. Monitor and operate party line 2.

Source – all, HEU Other switch/indicators as required.

TACTICAL DIRECTOR ASSISTANT 3-24. The TDA monitors and initiates all engagements. In the semiautomatic engagement mode, the TDA assigns all engagements to subordinate batteries (or battalions, when operating in the master battalion role). In the automatic engagement mode, the TDA monitors and assigns engagements within the battalion. The TDA should have the ENGAGE CNTR and EQUIP CNTR switch-indicators enabled. The alerts associated with weapons control, engagements, and equipment status appears on this manstation. The TDA starts other switches as outlined in Table 3-4.

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3-25. The TDA is responsible for performing all functions associated with engaging targets under the supervision of the TD. The TDA monitors the battalion status panel and ensures that the batteries are in the assigned mode of control and weapon control status, including areas enabled. The TDA monitors the batteries' equipment and communications status indicators, as well as missile inventory of each battery and for the battalion. 3-26. The TDA calls up appropriate tabs and notes the batteries' operational and missile statuses. The TDA ensures that the batteries and the FDC are in the assigned engagement mode. The TDA directs the batteries to activate or deactivate radar search mode and IFF based on the TD's orders and the battalion emission control (EMCON) plan. The TDA keeps continuous track of FU radar search mode, IFF, and operational status. 3-27. In the semiautomatic engagement mode, the TDA assigns all engagements as directed by the TD within the battalion. The TDA assigns engagements using the TBE queue that indicates which targets are most threatening and the best battery for the engagement. The TDA responds to all higher echelon engagement alerts and takes appropriate action. The TDA's authority to order engagements is provided by voice command or alert message from higher echelon when the battalion is operating centralized to higher echelon. When the battalion is decentralized, the TDA's authority to engage is based on the rules of engagement and supplemental fire control measures in effect. 3-28. The TDA monitors cease fires and hold fires applied to targets within his area of responsibility and may apply engage hold on a target as appropriate. The TDA monitors status monitor alerts, assesses weapons control computer, peripherals, and MS 1 faults, and monitors the system built-in test equipment (BITE) panel. The TDA normally monitors the ADC on party line 1.

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Table 3-4 TDA Function and Responsibilities FUNCTION RESPONSIBILITIES

Weapons control
CONSOLE

Assign engagements from TBE queue. Check battalion status panel and ensure that all batteries are in the correct state of alert. Assign engagement and search mode and weapon control status to include AREAS ENABLE.

Manstation 1

SWITCH ACTION CONSOLE MODE

Note batteries’ equipment status, communications status, and radar frequency code. Ensure FDC is in assigned engagement mode and weapons control status. Direct radar activation/deactivation. Monitor situation display tab area and battalion status panel. Monitor and operate party lines. Monitor status monitor alerts and assess selected alerts. Monitor system test indicators. Monitor higher echelon alerts and respond as required.

Engage control equipment control
MAP DATA

Weapons control volumes defended areas
TRACK DATA

Unknowns (weapons free) hostiles track numbers LNIP PIP

SOURCE/ADDRESS
Source/all Other switch/indicators as required.
COMMUNICATIONS OPERATOR

3-29. The communications operator (MOS 31F) is responsible for monitoring and operating the battalion task force data and voice communications. The communications operator monitors CRG status and the network link status via the Communications Fault Data tab and make periodic checks of the data links, RLRIUs, modems, and the three UHF stacks. The communications operator initializes the joint tactical information distribution system (JTIDS) terminal and switch multiplexer unit (SMU), and monitors them for proper operation via Communications Fault Data tab. The communications operator assists the TD in making assessments of communications faults. They monitor the antenna mast group and are responsible for rotating and elevating the UHF antennas when required. The communications operator implements all communications ECCM in the ICC including the use of the power amplifiers. The communications operator is also responsible for implementing and monitoring the battalion communications plans, properly patching all channels, monitoring the CRGs, and coordinating changes to the plan with the ECS and CRG communications operators and battalion communications control. They are also responsible for passing and receiving

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tactical reports to and from the battalion tactical control station (TCS) (SAMSTAT, missile count, and engagement reports).

ICC AIR BATTLE OPERATIONS
3-30. The ICC functions as a fire distribution center performing automated threat assessment and fire distribution for local fire units (Patriot, THAAD, or Hawk) as well as subordinate battalions while operating as a master battalion. The ICC also performs extensive automated air battle management and coordination functions. These include target correlation, identification conflict resolution, engagement coordination, and kill assessment. ICC AIR DEFENSE FUNCTIONS 3-31. The ICC provides the following air defense functions for efficient battle management and command and control— • Maintains air picture data. – System triangulation. – System calibration. – Surveillance cueing against TBM tracks. – Correlation of sensor data on air tracks. – System oriented correlation. – Smallest possible correlation cell sizes used. Manages and distributes track reports. – Maintains battalion or master battalion in status data. – Distributes target engagement status. – Inputs into engagement decision. – Monitors equipment status and readiness. Uses all available information to identify tracks and disseminate track identity to subordinate FUs or battalions, adjacent battalions, and higher echelon. – Determines ID. – Resolves ID conflicts. – Resolves conflicts in data. – Performs threat evaluation and threat ordering independently of the FUs, on a master battalion or a battalion wide basis, using all available data. Assigns or pairs targets to specific FUs or battalions for engagement based on the commander's and/or computer's assessment of which FU will be most effective in conducting the engagement.

FIRE DIRECTION CENTER OPERATIONS 3-32. Basic functions of the FDC in command of a battalion or master battalion are— • Controlling and coordinating the engagement and identification actions of subordinate FUs and battalions.

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• •

Coordinating with adjacent battalions. Reporting to, accepting, and executing direction from higher air defense headquarters.

FIRING DOCTRINE 3-33. Page one of Tab 1 is used to enter subordinate fire platoon and battalions (BN). Alert states, DEFCON air defense warning (ADW), missile attack warning, and chemical/biological/radiological environmental warning states for each subordinate battalion. Page 1 also reports the local ICC alert state commanded by higher echelon unit (HEU) and allows entry of the achieved local ICC alert state. 3-34. Air defense systems provide command and control, and the following functions must be performed: air picture generation (track management), target identification, threat assessment, and fire distribution. In support of these functions, the ICC becomes part of the total air defense architecture with overall decision responsibility in the functional areas listed above. The ICC relies on track data and status from its subordinate units and higher headquarters and performs independent evaluations of the ICC's integrated air picture. 3-35. Data flows into and out of the ICC over digital data links supplemented by voice communications. The ICC has the capability for manual entry of voice told data into its computer when voice communications are being used as a backup for digital data links. This, and data received over the digital data links, must be organized, assembled, and operated on to develop system status, track information, and action recommendations. This data is provided to the commander or operator by means of pictorial situation displays, tabular data displays, alert messages, and hard copy printouts. The ICC computer programs can perform tasks independently, accept operator input through manual controls, and respond to these inputs by implementing required actions. 3-36. The display and control (D&C) function provides operator interaction with the ICC software system. D&C accepts and processes all keyboard entries and switch actions. D&C also presents data to the operator in both tabular and situation displays, as well as front panel and battalion status panel indicators and readouts. Tabular data may be presented as a hard copy printout as well as a cathode ray tube (CRT) display. 3-37. The D&C function uses data from all the other functions for display generation. Track data is taken from track management. System initialization and status monitor data include FU locations, volumes, corridors, available equipment including communications, and operational modes. Command and coordination software provides launch-now-interceptpoints (LNIPs), predicted intercept points (PIPs) and to-be-engaged queue data (Figure 3-1). The various Patriot subsystems provide message alert data. In turn, operator actions can include the manual input of voice told messages as well as engagement, system control, and track evaluation switch actions. Many of these actions will initiate other functions.

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TRK TH ID ESTAT/S FP TLR TLL E/MI - TRK TH ID ESTAT/S FP TLR TLL E/MI Figure 3-1. ICC To Be Engaged Queue 3-38. The display and control programs provide, on a real-time basis, control of the display and communications equipment within the ICC besides performing the following command and coordination functions: Management of target track data received from its own firing batteries, adjacent Patriot units, and higher echelons. This includes correlation of track data, ECM data, and engagement status data received from multiple sources. • Status monitoring detects improper operation or failure of hardware elements within the ICC, data links with other air defense elements, and the operational status of the units within its command. • Evaluation of track identity data received from firing batteries, adjacent battalion, and higher echelon to ensure proper resolution of any conflicting identification data received from multiple sources. Both passive and active identification parameters are considered in this process. • Threat assessment to determine which enemy targets are to be engaged, the order of engagements, and which firing battery should conduct the engagement. 3-39. Results from all these processes are displayed to the operators. The system, depending on the designated method of control and mode of operation, will either automatically issue the appropriate engagement commands to the firing batteries or wait for an operator initiated engagement command. Provisions are made for operator override of any automatically initiated engagement action. •

TRACK MANAGEMENT
3-40. The track management software are a key element of the ICC. It ensures the continuity of track data within the battalion and brigade. Track management performs track correlation, site calibration, triangulation, and saturation alleviation, and exchanges this information with its local fire units and subordinate or adjacent battalions. 3-41. No search or track functions are performed at the ICC. All track data is provided to the ICC from its local fire units or external element, higher echelon, or other battalions. Whenever the ICC receives a track, it opens a battalion track data record (BNTDR). BNTDRs are designated as either local

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or remote. Local BNTDRs are tracks that are being updated by a local fire unit or subordinate battalion. Remote BNTDRs are tracks that are being updated by a source other than a local unit, such as a higher echelon or an adjacent battalion. Local tracks are displayed at the ICC with a high brightness and remote tracks are displayed with a low brightness. Remote tracks are not displayed at a Patriot fire unit. 3-42. The ICC will establish and maintain different track numbers for each BNTDR. This is necessary for a common track due to each reporting source having its track numbering assignment system. Up to 12 FU track numbers on a common track can be maintained based on each FU reporting the track. The ICC also stores up to 6 battalion track numbers to account for subordinate or adjacent battalions. Additionally, 3 auxiliary, 1 ATDL-1, 1 TADIL-B, and 1 NATO track number can be maintained. The FU numbers are used for correlation and communications purposes between the ICC and FUs. To facilitate display and voice coordination, a common ATDL-1 number is maintained on all battalion to battalion data links for each common track. 3-43. The ICC track management process also maintains an input file for each track reported by the batteries. The Patriot fire unit input buffers and the Hawk input buffers contain all the information for ID, IFF, ID history, position, and engagement status reported by the unit on the track. The Hawk input data buffers are used by the ICC software programs for ID determination and conflict resolution, and track status maintenance and reconstruction. TARGET CORRELATION 3-44. Correlation is the function of comparing the individual track reports from each reporting source and, if appropriate, combining these reports into a single track file. The ICC performs automatic target correlation on all tracks that pass an initial check. This check addresses the age of the track, when it was last updated, if it is slow, false, has no velocity, or is not a virtual target. If it passes these criteria, the ICC will attempt to correlate the track by using track number, track position, velocity, and range rate. These correlations have to meet variable correlation boxes that are defined as a function of the type of track (local or remote), the type of radar, (Patriot or Hawk pulse acquisition radar [PAR], continuous wave acquisition radar [CWAR], or highpowered illuminator radar [HIPIR]) and the accuracy of the radar emplacement. The Patriot correlation boxes are the most restrictive. CORRELATION BOXES 3-45. Correlation boxes require two operator inputs to determine the initial correlation box values for the FU location and azimuth uncertainty. The inputs in the FU’s Tab 81 during initialization that affect correlation are LOCATION CONFIDENCE and ALIGNED BY. The location uncertainty is the maximum distance error between the "true" radar location as determined by these methods: maps, modified survey, or survey. The azimuth uncertainty is the maximum deviation of true azimuth of the radar to measured azimuth as determined by the method of alignment—compass and survey. Initial correlation boxes are then computed as a function of both

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alignment values (location uncertainty and alignment uncertainty) and radar tracking accuracy, respective range of the target, and some time delays versus maximum target motion parameters. It is emphasized that these are the initial correlation boxes. The variable correlation box sizes not only consider the parameters just defined but also recalculate the alignment uncertainty values (independent values for azimuth and elevation) based upon site calibration results. SITE CALIBRATION 3-46. The site calibration process is an automatic function performed at the ICC that attempts to continually improve alignment data for the Patriot fire units using only targets of opportunity. The process is divided into two unique categories of azimuth calibration, pitch and roll (or roll and crossroll) corrections. 3-47. Azimuth calibration selects correlated target with favorable trajectory characteristics for possible use. Then the calibration process selects two fire units that are both tracking the correlated target, then calculates the computational uncertainty of the calibration process. This determines what the new azimuth uncertainty would be if this target data were used to calibrate these specific fire units and is a function of the target FUs geometry. The location uncertainties translate into a large minimum obtainable azimuth uncertainty. Conversely, if the radar location uncertainty is the smallest possible, then the azimuth calibration process has the potential to reduce the correlation box azimuth uncertainty to the smallest possible radar location uncertainty. 3-48. When a good target and fire unit pairing is found (one that would improve or reduce one or both of the fire units azimuth uncertainty), then five data points (20 seconds) are gathered to enable integration over time and minimize the effects of errors in the message transfers. The process then computes the azimuth correction for the fire units. A comparison is made to determine if the correction values are larger than the previous azimuth uncertainty. If this is the case, then the process has detected an inconsistency in the data or in other terms, a site error, and alerts the operator. 3-49. Site errors are caused by two phenomena. The first is when the radar azimuth determined from initialization has an uncertainty greater than what was defined in the Tab 81 ALIGNED BY data field. An example is that 0=SURVEY was entered and the error uncertainty was such that 1=COMPASS should have been entered. This is usually detected on the first calibration attempt of a fire unit. The second case is when the initialized radar location deviated from the true location by more than the distance defined for the LOCATION DATA CONFIDENCE LEVEL indicated on Tab 81 (0=SURVEY, 1=MODIFIED SURVEY, and 2=MAP). This condition does not usually cause a site error until several calibrations have been done, and it usually results in bouncing the calculated azimuth around the true azimuth. This eventually causes a correction larger than the previous azimuth uncertainty. Both of these conditions will cause site error alerts. When the ICC operator observes this, the unit that reported most often should investigate it. As an example, the operator will see Site Error FP1,

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FP2 and Site Error FP2, FP4. Fire unit 2 should be directed to recheck its alignment data. Roll and crossroll calibration is a process that smooths the elevation differences between fire units within the battalion to improve the battalion's pitch and roll as a whole. This process does not generate a site error alert. 3-50. An automatic emplacement at an FU results in the best location and angular confidence levels being sent to the ICC. The FU alerts LOCATION DATA CONFIDENCE LEVEL of SURVEY = 0 and ALIGNED BY of SURVEY = 0 are sent to the ICC when the final automatic emplacement is achieved. Considering these inputs, the ICC establishes the initial correlation cells. ICC site calibrations are accomplished on all FUs whether they were emplaced manually or automatically. Because of the accuracy of the precision lightweight global positioning system receiver (PLGR) and north finding system (NFS), site error alerts are not expected when site calibrations are performed on FUs that were automatically emplaced. 3-51. If site error alerts are repeatedly observed, the ICC operator should perform the following: Determine which FU is continually defined in the alert. Determine if the FU was emplaced manually or automatically. If the FU was emplaced automatically, have the crew members check that there is no radar (RS), PLGR, or NFS fault. • Time permitting, have the FU crews perform a new automatic emplacement. • If the FU was manually emplaced, have crew members recheck the alignment and ensure that the data was entered correctly. • Confirm that the data in Tab 81 is correct. 3-52. If site error persists, the FU should then perform the semiannual preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS). If out of tolerance, intermediate maintenance (IM) should be notified. If the alert reports a large difference (1,000 meters or more), then the TD or TDA should check Tab 12 to ensure that the ECS crew did not make an obvious error in entering data. The reported location received should be confirmed by voice with the battery to ensure that the correct Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) (Patriot) or latitude and longitude (Hawk) were entered. If everything appears to have been entered correctly and the system reports no site error, an effort to correlate targets between batteries should be attempted. If correlation occurs without problems, the battery should be considered correctly positioned. If not, the battery should first attempt to clear the fault by rebooting the system. If site error still occurs, the unit must reinitialize the system. 3-53. Alerts are generated by the site calibration process along with the "site error" alert. The ICC will receive the alert FPn AZIMUTH = nnn if the azimuth at a particular fire unit is corrected more than 0.5 degrees. When the ICC operator observes this alert, he should select Tab 12, FP LOCATION/BOUNDARIES-BN, and note the azimuth range in the CURR AZ data field. As a matter of practice, this tab should be selected and hard copies made each time communications are initially established with a subordinate unit. • • •

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3-54. The fire unit will also generate the alert UPDATE DATABASE TAB 8 when the following conditions occur: A corrected radar azimuth—a site calibration occurred and the corrected azimuth was sent to the battery. • An updated azimuth uncertainty—the azimuth error state (AES) has changed due to a calibration. • An updated elevation uncertainty—the AES has changed due to a roll or crossroll correction. • A data buffer transfer—the ICC has sent a data buffer transfer to that unit. 3-55. The operator should perform a data base update upon receipt of the alert UPDATE DATABASE—TAB 8 to ensure that the corrected information is written on the data base. If necessary, verify the roll and crossroll, PLGR and NFS information, and as a last resort, have the survey section survey the equipment position again. 3-56. The current azimuth of Patriot batteries displayed in Tab 12 should also be noted. Prior minor azimuth changes indicate that site calibration has occurred and the FP azimuth was corrected. Figure 3-2 shows the Tab 12 format. Note: FP1 through 6 are reserved for Patriot FPs and FP7 through 12 are reserved for Hawk and THAAD FPs. •

FP LOCATIONS/BOUNDARIES – BN PAGE 1 FP UTM LOCATION PTL STL1 STL2 STL3 CURR AZ BOUNDS-RT 1 2 3 4 5 6 BN FP 7 8 9 10 11 12 BN
Figure 3-2. Tab 12, Pages 1 and 2 TRIANGULATION

*12* LF-

FP LOCATIONS/BOUNDARIES – BN UTM LOCATION PTL

PAGE 2

*12*

3-57. The triangulation process provides the Patriot system with the capability to counter ECM. There may be occasions when the jamming source

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is able to deny range data to the fire unit. When this occurs, that track is reported to the ICC as a strobe with azimuth and elevation. This strobe will also be detected by other fire units within the battalion and reported to the ICC, provided there is overlapping coverage. The ICC then performs a strobe correlation process, called triangulation, to determine the target's range and provides this information to the reporting fire units. The triangulation process is performed with data from adjacent Patriot battalions and subordinate Patriot battalions (MICC to SICC). 3-58. As with target correlation, triangulation also has boxes associated with its processing—Tab 81 and the radar azimuth corrections from site calibration. The triangulation boxes are also based on the geometry of the target to fire units and tracking accuracies of the jamming tracks. In addition, with the missing track component of range, the triangulation process is more sensitive to alignment errors, especially at longer ranges. This leads to the caution that observing correlation at the ICC is not the only indication of "good enough" survey data. If site error alerts are observed, they should be investigated, or the triangulation performance will be unacceptable. The triangulation process uses a variety of track reports in deriving at the appropriate solution. These include: three strobes, a skin track and strobe with range estimate, two strobes with range estimates, and a strobe and strobes with range estimate. A range estimate track is one where target range is estimated. 3-59. Triangulation provides an effective method of countering ECM (Figure 3-3) as follows: • • • Fire units automatically report strobe track data to the ICC. The ICC automatically provides fire units the triangulated solution with range. ECM track evaluation, engagement, and missile guidance.

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ECS

RS

ICC DETERMINES TRACK POSITION AND SENDS THE INFORMATION TO ALL FIRE UNITS

RS ICC ECS

TRACK DATA FROM FIRE UNITS

ACTUAL JAMMER POSITION

RS ECS

Figure 3-3. Patriot Triangulation SATURATION ALLEVIATION 3-60. Saturation alleviation is invoked when the number of tracks at the ICC is greater than a prespecified system level to ensure that the most important battalion track data record (BNTDR) is retained. The least important are dropped. The two types of saturation alleviation are when the number of tracks is too great and when the radar is saturated with too many actions. The ICC has eight levels of saturation alleviation, which are displayed to the left of the ICC alert line. The following is a description of each level: • • NULL—no tracks being dropped; display field is blank. HWK ST—displayed when the pulse acquisition radar (PAR), continuous wave acquisition radar (CWAR), or subordinate battalion strobes are being dropped. REMOTE—displayed when a local or subordinate battalion remote track is received, does not correlate, and there are no BNTDRs available. This level deletes "old remotes," then HEU remotes, and then adjacent battalion remote friends, one by one, to accept all local first track and subordinate battalion remote tracks. FRND-1—displayed when a local or subordinate battalion remote track is received, does not correlate, no BNTDRs are available, and all "old" and HEU remote BNTDRs have been deleted. This level deletes long-range friendly tracks to accept all local, first track, subordinate battalion remotes, and Patriot missile (PAM) tracks.

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FRND-2—displayed when a local track is received, does not correlate, no BNTDRs are available, and all "old" HEU remotes and long-range friends have been deleted. This level deletes medium-range friendly tracks to accept all local, first track, or subordinate battalion remote tracks. • FRND-3—displayed when a local or subordinate battalion track is received, does not correlate, no BNTDRs are available, all "old" and HEU remotes, and all long- and medium-range friendly tracks have been deleted. This level deletes friendly tracks that are between medium- and short-range to accept all local first track and remote tracks. • FRND-4—displayed when a local or subordinate battalion track is received, does not correlate, and no BNTDRs are available. All "old" HEU, and long- to short-range friends have been deleted. FRND-4 deletes short-range friends to accept all local and subordinate battalion track reports. • THREAT—displayed when a local or subordinate battalion track is received, does not correlate, and no BNTDRs are available. All "old" and HEU remotes and all friends have been deleted. The THREAT level deletes non-engaged hostiles and unknown BNTDRs and unresolved strobes, one by one, in order of enemy threat status (low threats first, medium threats next, and unresolved strobes and triangulated strobes last). 3-61. Tracks that are never deleted are high threat, engaged, unevaluated, Patriot missiles, virtual targets, alert and hooked tracks. Also tracks being processed are never deleted from the TBEQ, process for engagement (PFE), or the BNTDRs.

TARGET IDENTIFICATION
3-62. With an accurate air picture established, the next process is track identity evaluation. When tracks correlate, the ICC compares IDs, sets the appropriate hostile or friend description, and displays and resolves identity conflicts. 3-63. The ICC accepts ID data from all sources listed in the track management section (see Figure 3-4). The ICC automatically performs ID conflict resolution (see Table 3-5) hierarchically that considers the unique qualities of the various reporting units (for example, a reporting sourcespecific hierarchy). These processes ensure a common, best ID result throughout the battalion. Using embedded conflict resolution tables, the ICC resolves most conflicts automatically. In cases that require operator input, the manual resolution procedure, designed to aid in a rapid decision action by the operator, is used. Patriot fire units report all identification data with identity to the ICC such as— • • • IFF results. Identification and weapons control volume correlation. Identification evaluation results.

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• • •

Additional ID data available on a track to the FU when it first reports the track. ICC automatically determines the correct track ID and forwards it to higher echelon and to reporting fire units. Higher echelon identities are automatically accepted.
REEVALUATION

FROM FIRE UNITS VOLUME CORRELATIONS IFF OTHER ID PARAMETERS

MERGE TRACK ID DATA

COMPOSITE ID INFORMATION

AUTOMATIC ID RESULT

TO FIRE UNITS AND OTHER ICCs

TRACK ID INFORMATION

ECS RS

ID INFORMATION AND BATTALION ID

ICC
TRACK ID INFORMATION

ECS RS

Figure 3-4. Battalion ICC Identification Table 3-5 Examples of ID Conflict Resolution

A BATTERY
TRACK 1 TRACK 2 TRACK 3 TRACK 4 UNKNOWN FRIEND HOSTILE FRIEND

B BATTERY
FRIEND FRIEND UNKNOWN HOSTILE

ICC ACTION
Send A battery the friend ID No action required Send B battery the hostile ID Resolve the ID conflict at ICC

PASSIVE IDENTIFICATION DETERMINATION 3-64. The ICC receives ID history information on tracks from its Patriot digital information link (PADIL) protocol units. The ID history information is exchanged via PADIL with other ICCs (lateral, subordinate, or higher echelon) enabling the most complete ID history file to be maintained on each aircraft throughout the command. This ID history information exchange includes— • • • IFF response. Friendly or hostile origin volume correlation. Safe passage corridor correlation.

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• • • •

Minimum safe velocity correlation. Restricted and prohibited volume correlation. Pop-up criteria violation. ECM emitter.

FRIENDLY PROTECTION 3-65. The ICC automatically inhibits the engagement of a track identified as a friend, unknown, or assumed friend and prohibits the operator from engagement of such tracks. The ICC automatically sends a HOLD FIRE command to any FU or battalion initiating engagement of friends or assumed friends.

TARGET ENGAGEMENT
3-66. The ICC automatically assesses the threat of all tracks reported to it. The first step in the process is consideration of the track's eligibility for engagement (see Figure 3-5). The ICC determines the track's eligibility automatically by considering its identification with its weapon control status—WEAPONS HOLD, WEAPONS TIGHT, or WEAPONS FREE. In a WEAPONS HOLD volume, no targets are recommended for automatic engagement. In a WEAPONS TIGHT volume, only hostile ID tracks are recommended. In a WEAPONS FREE volume, both hostile and unknown identified targets are recommended. Friends and unknown assumed friends are never recommended.

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Residual Area W EAPONS TIGHT V l Patriot Fire Unit W EAPONS HOLD VOLUME

Patriot Fire Unit

W EAPONS FREE V l

Fire Units report to the ICC weapon control volum e correlation on each track ICC assigns the track the m ost restrictive weapon control status, if there is a: • fli EAPONS HOLD over W EAPONS TIGHT or W EAPONS FREE W • W EAPONS TIGHT over W EAPONS FREE Engagement eligibility is based on weapon control status: • W EAPONS HOLD— Hostiles (requires operator confirm ation to engage) • W EAPONS TIGHT— Hostiles • W EAPONS FREE— Hostiles and unknowns

Figure 3-5. Engagement Eligibility

THREAT ASSESSMENT
3-67. Threat assessment must perform two major subfunctions, target evaluation and engagement control. Target evaluation includes both classification and identification of tracks based on track position, track history, IFF interrogation, and information provided from both extra- and intra-battalion sources. Logic must be provided to protect friendly aircraft by preventing or terminating engagement against them. Engageable tracks must be examined for their potential enemy threat to battalion assets. Engagement control must provide for FU selection and target assignment considering operator and higher echelon’s input as well as FU capabilities and prespecified selection criteria. ENGAGEMENT STATUS 3-68. Engagement status data must be provided to the display and control and communications control functions. Threat assessment processing must receive FU status including missile inventories from status monitor, target position data from track management, and engagement directives from both display and control, and communications control functions.

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THREAT EVALUATION 3-69. The ABT threat assessment process continually reevaluates each eligible enemy target to determine its threat to a defended asset (up to 36 assets can be defined) or to the general area of the battalion. The threat assessment process considers an enemy track location, speed, heading, altitude, and its predicted intercept point relative to each asset location. The targets are continually threat ordered automatically, and are based upon the priority assigned to the asset they are threatening. The 18 most threatening targets are presented on the TO-BE-ENGAGED DATA 1 tab for the operator's use. WEAPON SYSTEM SELECTION 3-70. The ICC automatically considers all potential candidates for target engagement. Potential candidates that the ICC can consider are FUs either directly subordinate to the ICC or in a subordinate battalion. The FUs' unique system capabilities, operational status, engagement status, missile availability, and launch now intercept points for the target are all considered to determine if that unit should be selected for the engagement. 3-71. The selection process also considers which type of weapon to employ. A preference in the selection process can favor one weapon type over another. This, in turn, ensures balanced participation in the air battle by all types of FUs. The candidate selection is continually updated to account for changes in FU and target status to ensure that the current most appropriate FU is the one selected for the engagement. 3-72. The ICC automatically selects a primary and secondary FU for each eligible target to provide options to the operator in the semiautomatic engagement mode. If the FU selected for the engagement is in a battalion subordinate to the ICC, the engagement is addressed to that battalion.

METHODS OF CONTROL
3-73. The ICC can function in either a centralized or decentralized method of control. Centralized is where the ICC directs the subordinate units’ (FUs and/or battalions) engagements. In a decentralized method of control, the ICC allows subordinate units to conduct their engagements while it performs a management-by-exception role. In the battalion role, the ICC can direct all the engagements of its subordinate FUs (centralized to the ICC), or allow the subordinate units to be decentralized. 3-74. Decentralized allows subordinate units to conduct their own engagements while performing a management by exception function, and cueing the ICC operator when a decentralized battalion is not conducting a high-priority engagement. The ICC can also function as a subordinate ICC in either method of control, centralized to higher echelon (awaiting command on engagements) or decentralized from higher echelon (actively directing its engagements). 3-75. The ICC performs the engagement assignment process in either the semiautomatic or automatic engagement mode. In either mode, the operator

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can command an engagement (for example, engage shoot-look-shoot, salvo, or ripple) on any eligible target by manual selection or in response to a higher echelon command. The operator can manually select the FUs or battalions for the engagement, or allow the system to automatically make the selection. 3-76. In the semiautomatic engagement mode, the operator can use the TO-BE-ENGAGED DATA 1 tab, which provides the top 18 threats, to review and sequentially select each track for engagement by performing a pushbutton sequence (versus finding and manually hooking track symbols on the situation display). The system then automatically selects the most appropriate fire unit or battalion for the engagement and issues an engage command. In the automatic engagement mode, the ICC conducts all engagements at the optimum launch time, automatically selecting the most appropriate fire unit or battalion for the engagement. 3-77. In the semiautomatic engagement mode, the PROCESS-FORENGAGEMENT switch provides a method by which the operator can review a target before its optimum engagement time and select it for engagement later. The resulting engagement command will be issued, later and automatically, at the optimum launch time for the preselected target and the current, best FU pairing (Figure 3-6). 3-78. The ICC continually monitors and coordinates engagements regardless of the engagement mode or method of control selected. Engagement monitoring occurs with every engagement to ensure proper reactions and responses are continued until intercept. All engagements by subordinates are displayed, along with the predicted intercept point (operator-selectable). 3-79. The ICC also coordinates kill assessment data from the FUs. The ICC then transmits the data over ATDL-1, TADIL-B, and PADIL as engage status to units that are tracking the target being engaged.

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Process for Engagement for FU A

Hostile Assigned (A or B) Based on: Weapon Type, Weapon’s Availability, Friends Nearby, and Weapon Lethality

Hostile Assigned to FU A Hostile Assigned to FU B

Fire Unit A

Fire Unit B

Fire Unit Track Sectors

Figure 3-6. Fire Unit Selection Example 3-80. When the ICC receives an engagement announcement and firing message from a subordinate, adjacent, or higher echelon unit, it automatically sends a cease fire command on the subject target to subordinate units (Patriot, Hawk, and AMDTF units). The cease fire command will be canceled automatically if the engagement is unsuccessful, thereby quickly allowing another fire unit to initiate a new engagement on the surviving hostile.

STATUS MONITOR
3-81. The status monitor function provides fault detection at the ICC, controls the ICC mode, and monitors battalion status. Battalion status includes both communications and FU capabilities. The status monitor also provides a time mark to synchronize battalion time and maintain the battalion geometry and status data. 3-82. Inputs to status monitor include FU status messages and communications line status through the communications controls function, BITE data, and manual inputs from display and control. The status monitor employs display and control to initiate status alerts to the ICC operators. It also uses communications control to initiate status messages to higher echelon. 3-83. The ICC continually monitors the status of all on-board hardware as well as the operational status of all of its subordinate units. The equipment status of the ICC, all Patriot, Hawk, and task force FUs is always provided

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for the operator's review, and the operator is alerted to any change in that status. 3-84. The operational and engagement status of all subordinate units is provided by tabular displays. This status is also displayed on the battalion status panel. This status is also used in the ICC's fire distribution process to determine which fire unit or battalion is currently the most appropriate for the engagement of each candidate target. Communications status to all subordinate, adjacent, auxiliary, and higher echelon units, as well as relays, is continually monitored and provided to the operators through tabular display and status panel presentation. 3-85. This group of programs, very similar to those at the ECS, provides automated assistance for rapid location of failed components within the ICC. The fault isolation display-aided maintenance procedures called up by the operator will display the step-by-step repair procedures to permit the operator to isolate the problem.

FIRE UNIT SURVEILLANCE
3-86. Patriot is a sectored search, track, and engagement system. The search sector can be controlled independently of the track sector. Surveillance performs both search and track functions in the air-breathing threat (ABT) and tactical ballistic missile (TBM) mode of operations. The Patriot surveillance software has been enhanced as a result of radar hardware improvements and new radar waveforms such as pulse Doppler. This has resulted in the detection and track of smaller radar cross-section targets and improved overall system surveillance performance. 3-87. Before any action can be taken on a target, it must first be detected. The function of the search portion of the surveillance software is to search for and detect targets. The system uses three basic search modes—ABT active search, ABT passive search, and TBM search. ABT active and passive search are used predominantly to detect aircraft, while TBM search is used to detect TBMs, but can also detect aircraft.

ABT SEARCH SECTORS
3-88. The ABT search sectors are at +45 degrees of the radar pointing angle. _ The ABT search range is from RMIN of P4-6 kilometers to RMAX of P4-7 kilometers, with an elevation up angle from P4-8 to P4-9 degrees. The ABT search sector is composed of five search volumes—horizon (HORZ), shortrange pop-up (SRP), lower medium-range (LMR), upper medium-range (UMR), and long-range (LR) (Figure 3-7). 3-89. The FU can search for ABT targets in either the active or passive search mode. In the active search mode, the radar sends out RF energy, using a variety of waveforms in all volumes within the entire search region in all volumes. In the passive mode, the radar scans the sectors in receive mode only. The receiver is open and will process external RF energy. 3-90. The external RF energy must be in the Patriot frequency band. Typically, this energy is in the form of radar jamming. This jamming must be

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sensed as continuous jamming to be processed in the passive mode. The system will process this interference as a strobe, which will be used by the ICC in the triangulation process. The ICC can downtell externally queued tracks to the FUs when in passive search mode or in active search mode. Tracks will be displayed within the assigned FU search sector. The passive search mode is not applicable in TBM search, and the radar will not transition to the TBM search mode when in passive search.
ALT

PTL

UMR

LMR SRP FU TOP DOWN VIEW FU HORZ RANGE HORIZONTAL VIEW

LR

Figure 3-7. Sample ABT Search Sectors 3-91. Along with the two ABT search modes defined, the fire unit surveillance function also performs the wedge edge process. The radar measures the level of jamming detected and compares it with a threshold for each search beam. The results are then placed into a wedge edge file at the FU, which is mapped to each search beam record. The wedge cell file is then consolidated by a process that locates the ECM wedges in each row, combines rows, calculates elevation, and transmits the appropriate wedges to the ICC that consolidates the wedge cell file. The wedge data from several fire units is used to determine the range of closely spaced standoff jammers (SOJs), escort screening jammers (ESJs), or self-screening jammers (SSJs). This information is then used in performing the Patriot SOJ countermission using the virtual target. See (S/NF)ST 44-85-1A(U) for further details on the ABT search sectors.

TBM SEARCH SECTORS
3-92. The TBM search mode consists of a combination of ABT and TBM search sectors. The TBM search sector is ±45 degrees of the pointing angle for the radar and up to P4-10 degrees in elevation. The search range is from P4-11 kilometers RMIN to P4-12 kilometers RMAX. The TBM search sector may be skewed from the ABT radar pointing angle by ±15 degrees; however, skewing is not recommended. The TBM search sector itself consists of three

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sectors: lower TBM (LTBM), upper TBM (UTBM), and extra high TBM (XTBM) (Figure 3-8).
ALT PTL XTBM UTBM UMR LTBM

LMR SRP HORZ RANGE HORIZONTAL VIEW

FU TOP DOWN VIEW

FU

Figure 3-8. Sample TBM Search Sectors TRACK PROCESS 3-93. After the search process has detected a target, it is given to the track process. The track function selects the optimal radar track rate and waveform to continue track on that target until it leaves the fire unit track coverage. The track rate and waveform are selected based on the range and altitude of the track. The FU track coverage is ±60 degrees of the radar pointing angle and P4-13 degrees to P4-14 degrees in elevation. The track range is from P4-15 kilometers RMIN to P4-16 kilometers RMAX. After a stable track has been obtained on a target by the fire unit, its position and status are reported to the ICC. Tracks that are in preclassification status or designated as clutter are not forwarded to the ICC. In the passive search mode, targets within an FU track sector may be downtold from the ICC. The ICC provides azimuth, range, and elevation to the FU. The FU will schedule the radar to perform a single search action at the position provided by the ICC. The FU will acquire and track only the told-in target until it is engaged, dropped, or leaves the FU's sector. Once the target is under track, a track data record (TDR) is opened on the target. When a TDR is established, the identification of enemy aircraft and threat assessment processes are initiated. See (S/NF)ST 44-85-1A(U) for further details on the TBM search sectors. 3-94. The formation size is reported by the track function and is reflected in the data fields of the Track Amp Data tabs in the ICC (ID/S) and FU (ID/SZ/IDS). The size of the formation is dependent on the return received due to several closely spaced aircraft or one large aircraft. There are specific range and angle parameters that will result in the objects within the formation being defined separately and placed in individual TDRs. The formation size reported and displayed by Patriot is from 2 to 7. A blank in the

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formation size indicates a single track is being reported. Because of the reflections received from several closely spaced aircraft or one large aircraft, the formation size is not entirely accurate. This means that if a 3 is displayed, there may not in fact be three objects. It means that there is more than one object in that TDR. 3-95. If the fire unit cannot determine the target's range (strobe track) due to ECM, the target's azimuth and elevation are sent to the ICC. The ICC will attempt to compute the target's range through triangulation. Triangulation is the computation of target location based on track and strobe data of three or more fire units. Once range has been determined, the ICC will send the computed range to all fire units. Another function to assist in tracking during a critical period, is fire unit support. This process is performed through the ICC and supports tracking of engaged targets. The ICC continually sends range data on a track, if available from another fire unit, to the fire unit engaging the target. If the fire unit loses range on the target, it is available through this process and the engagement is continued. 3-96. The operator can only influence the tracking process by dropping track on a target or by turning off the radar (CEASE RADIATE). During tactical operations, selecting the DROP TRACK switch-indicator can drop a hooked track. All information on the target is discarded at the FU. If the radar is searching and the target is still in the search sector, it will probably be redetected and placed back under track. If other fire units had been tracking the target during this time, the ICC will have retained the target status and identification history and will send it to the FU. When CEASE RADIATE is invoked, all search and track actions are terminated, resulting in the loss of all targets and destroying any missiles in flight.

A-SCOPE OPERATIONS
3-97. The operator can also use the A-scope display to assist in determining target track type. The A-scope display presents two digitized ranges versus amplitude traces on the tabular display area. The A-scope display is associated with the alert, nnn USE A-SCOPE, and the A-SCOPE switchindicator. For the alert to be displayed on a manstation, that manstation must have the ECCM ASSIST switch-indicator selected. The nnn USE A-SCOPE alert is generated when surveillance detects and tracks a target as a repeater jammer. The alert is informing the operator that assistance is required to further classify the jamming target. The alert will appear once a minute if no action is taken. The operator should hook the target, acknowledge the alert, and select the A-SCOPE switch-indicator. A dual trace will appear in the tab display area with a target (TGT) definition data field. The operator should review the dual trace and determine if the target is a quiet track, repeater jammer, or unknown track type. 3-98. If the upper and lower traces are the same and the separation distance is the same (Figure 3-9), the track is probably quiet and a 0 should be entered in the data field. This will cause the system to attempt to track the target with quiet track waveforms.

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PROBABLY A QUIET TRACK

Figure 3-9. A-Scope Quiet Track 3-99. If the upper and lower traces are the same and the separation distance is as depicted in Figure 3-10, the target is probably a repeater and a “1” should be entered. The system will continue to track the target as a repeater. The alert, nnn USE A-SCOPE, will be displayed every two minutes on that track.

PROBABLY A REPEATER TRACK

Figure 3-10. A-Scope Repeater Track 3-100. If the operator cannot determine what the target is (quiet or repeater), then a “2” should be entered in the data field. The system will continue as before and the alert will be displayed every minute.

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3-101. If a glob of many traces appear on both lines, it is probably clutter, and the operator should enter a “2” in the data field and push the DROP TRACK switch-indicator on that target. 3-102. A-scope cannot be selected on all targets. If the target is being processed by a pulse doppler waveform, then the A-scope function is not allowed on that track. The operator is alerted when this condition exists. If only a single trace appears, the target is being tracked as either a quiet, continuous, or noncontinuous jammer. If a dual trace appears, the target is being tracked as a repeater jammer. The range displayed is an estimated range of the target. 3-103. When A-scope is selected, it is mutually exclusive of the tab display and static data displayed on the situation display. Volumes, assets, and other data, if displayed, will be erased. When A-scope is cleared, the static data will automatically be redisplayed. 3-104. The ECCM ASSIST switch-indicator should not be selected unless the operator anticipates the use of A-scope (alerts from the system to use A-Scope). Nonuse of the A-scope process will not degrade system capability. A-scope should be used in performing the antihelicopter SOJ mission. This is described later in this chapter.

TARGET CLASSIFICATION
3-105. When surveillance establishes a new track, EDWA begins preclassification and classification track processing. The classification process is discussed in the next section. PRECLASSIFICATION PROCESS 3-106. The preclassification filter (PCF) attempts to determine if a new track is actually an aircraft, or if it is chaff or clutter. The principal characteristics of chaff and clutter tracks are: never moving far from the original position, erratic speed changes, very low speeds, and spurious high speeds. It is important to realize that a track that begins as chaff or clutter may switch to a valid ABT. The opposite is also possible, but unlikely. 3-107. Targets that are continuous (range denying) jammers, targets told-in from the ICC, and targets classified as TBM tracks bypass the PCF. In each of these cases, it is assumed that the track is real. All other tracks are periodically reevaluated by the PCF until they are determined to be real (or the track is dropped). No further EDWA processing is performed on a track until this occurs. Tracks that have not passed the PCF are not uptold to the ICC. They are displayed at the FU as general points with speed and heading symbology. The operator may manually bypass the PCF by hooking the general point and identifying it through ID switch action (not recommended). 3-108. The primary test in the PCF determines if a track has moved a significant distance from its first recorded position. The required distance is a small percentage of the track's original range. Tracks passing this test must also pass additional tests for track characteristics that are consistently outside the acceleration or velocity capabilities of enemy tactical aircraft. All

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tests must be passed before the track can pass the PCF. These additional tests can be divided into two categories, slow speed tests and false target tests. Slow Speed Tests 3-109. Slow speed tests consist of short-term and long-term tests. The shortterm test checks the current speed against a threshold entered by the operator in Tab 78. The track fails this test if it is below that speed. 3-110. The long-term test compares an average track speed to a different (fixed and inaccessible to the operator) threshold. This takes into account that although clutter speed may be intermittently high, the average speed will remain low. The track fails this test if it is below the fixed threshold. False Target Tests 3-111. False target tests consist of maximum speed, change of speed, track quality, track misses, and false target history. The maximum speed test compares track speed and altitude to the Patriot ABT design threat maximum speed and altitude. The track fails this test if its speed or altitude profile exceeds this maximum. 3-112. The change of speed test determines if a track exhibits drastic changes in speed at low altitudes. The test also determines changes greater than the maximum "G" limit of the design enemy aircraft. 3-113. Track quality testing is determined as follows. Surveillance predicts a track's position and where it will be the next time that the software schedules another periodic tracking action. If the radar return from the track action indicates that the target was not where it was expected to be, then the differences are compared to (fixed and inaccessible) present or defaults thresholds. If the differences exceed the thresholds, then the track fails this test. 3-114. Testing for track misses is similar to the previous test. In this case, the position differences are so large that no valid radar return for the track is received. The total number of misses and the total number of consecutive misses since the last PCF evaluation are compared to (fixed and inaccessible) present or default thresholds. If either threshold is exceeded, the track fails this test. Clutter and Chaff Tracks 3-115. Clutter and chaff tracks are erratic by nature. Sometimes they appear to be real ABTs for short periods of time. False target history tests try to prevent tracks that currently look "real" from passing the PCF filter by averaging the past performance of the track. If the track was false for 9 out of the last 15 evaluations, then it is not allowed to pass the PCF on this evaluation. There is an exception to this rule. If the track has not been false for the last 4 evaluations and is not false on this evaluation, then it is allowed to exit the PCF. (See ECCM OPERATIONS on page 3-86, procedures for dealing with ECM operations.)

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3-116. A chaff or clutter track may appear real for a period of time. The PCF is not completely effective in preventing chaff and clutter tracks from being considered for engagement. Some of these tracks pass through the filter. To help prevent engagements in these cases, both the slow speed tests and the false target tests are repeated every time EDWA reevaluates the target (approximately every four seconds). Tracks that fail these tests will be classified as slow or false, respectively. This will inhibit automatic engagement and require reconfirmation for manual engagements. CLASSIFICATION PROCESS 3-117. The target classification process evaluates track velocity, altitude, and rate of climb or dive against a set of performance characteristics that differentiate between confirmed classifications (ABT, TBM A, TBM-B, and unengageable TBM) and presumed classifications (presumed ABT and presumed TBM). 3-118. The following discussion is for information purposes only. The operator has no input into the classification process. Classifications cannot be changed by operator action. The operator cannot visually distinguish the presumed classifications. The rules of engagement are identical for presumed ABT and ABT, and for presumed TBM and TBM. Presumed ABTs and ABTs share the same visual symbology. Presumed TBMs (PTBMs), TBM As, TBM Bs, and unengageable TBMs are represented by the same symbol on the display. TBM As and TBM Bs can be distinguished by the TBM A or TBM B indicator presented below the ESTAT/S field in the FU Track Amplifying Data tab. 3-119. An unengageable TBM can be distinguished by hooking it and observing that no LNIP is displayed (indicating that engagement is not possible) and observing that the Track Amplifying Data tab shows no status in the ESTAT/S field and no TBM A or TBM B indicator. Confirmed TBM classifications do not change. A TBM B, for example, may be unengageable due to its trajectory being outside the TBM engagement volume, but TBM B will still be displayed in the Track Amplifying Data tab. 3-120. All tracks are initially classified as presumed ABTs. Targets that achieve a confirmed classification exit the classification process. Targets with presumed classification are periodically reevaluated to determine if they can be assigned a confirmed classification. 3-121. A TBM cannot sustain flight within the ascent or descent limits that define ABT performance for very long. If the performance of a presumed ABT remains below that of a TBM A for a fixed time, it is classified as an ABT. An ABT classification is also assigned if a presumed TBM exhibits characteristics that are never associated with TBMs. These include emitting ECM and beginning a climb after it has been observed to be definitely descending. If the range of a presumed TBM is changing very slowly, then the track is most likely clutter interference. In this case, classification is set to presumed ABT to force the track through the PCF. 3-122. A track will probably be assigned a classification of TBM A if the track exceeds the maximum performance of most ABTs but is less than the minimum performance of any TBM B. One of the exceptions is for tracks

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exhibiting a climb rate at higher altitudes than the capability of specific highperformance aircraft. These tracks are classified as presumed TBM and periodically reevaluated. They should eventually receive a confirmed classification since an ABT cannot climb at this rate indefinitely. 3-123. If the track exceeds the maximum performance of a TBM A, it will be classified as a TBM B. TBM B trajectories are so high and their velocities are so great that their performance almost never overlaps that of TBM As or ABTs. 3-124. Tracks that fall above the maximum performance of TBM Bs are classified as unengageable TBMs. These tracks are moving too fast for Patriot capability and cannot intercept tracks exceeding P4-17 mps.

IDENTIFICATION
3-125. Once a target is classified as an ABT (or possible ABT) the system undergoes periodic identification reevaluation to determine identity (ID). The FU can assign IDs of friend, assumed friend, unknown, or hostile automatically (in automatic ID mode) and the operator can assign these IDs manually (in either ID mode). The true friend ID is automatically assigned only when a valid Mode 4 IFF response is received; it cannot be manually assigned. The special friend ID, normally assigned only by ID switch action, may also be automatically assigned when battery tracks correlate with higher echelon tracks, in which case the FU accepts the ID. Targets that are classified as PABTs lose any ID information they have acquired if they are reclassified as a TBM. All TBMs are considered as hostile. 3-126. The FU acquires two types of ID information, passive and active. Passive ID criteria are: the presence of continuous ECM that prevents the radar from acquiring range, correlation with generalized ID volumes (friendly origin, hostile origin, prohibited, and restricted volumes), safe passage corridors (SPCs), minimum safe velocity (MSV), and pop-ups. The only active ID criteria are SIF and Mode 4 IFF interrogation responses. GENERALIZED VOLUMES 3-127. The generalized volume is designed to accommodate two specific functions. The first is the multipurpose volume and the second is to incorporate additional criteria into the volume correlation. A volume may be created with multiple attributes assigned to the volume. For example, RV, PV, WEAPONS HOLD, WEAPONS TIGHT, WEAPONS FREE, SPC, and friendly or hostile origins may be assigned to one volume. Besides the physical (spatial) correlation within this multipurpose volume, the target may have additional criteria for correlating with a volume. These correlation criteria are limits on a track's ground velocity (speed) and on a track's heading. Additional criteria are optional and the conditions for correlation can differ from volume to volume.

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ATTRIBUTES 3-128. There are two primary types of attributes that can be assigned a volume. They are identification attributes and weapons control attributes. A volume may contain identification, weapons control, or both types of attributes. The identification attributes are further defined in two categories, friendly or hostile attributes. The friendly attributes are friendly origin and safe passage corridor. The hostile attributes are hostile origin, restricted volume, and prohibited volume. A volume may contain either friendly or hostile attributes but not both friendly and hostile. There are three weapons control attributes: WEAPONS HOLD, WEAPONS TIGHT, and WEAPONS FREE. A volume may not have more than one weapon control attribute at a time. OVERLAPPING VOLUMES 3-129. To account for the possibility of overlapping volumes, an order of precedence has been established for identification and weapons control attributes. For identification, friendly attributes take precedence over hostile attributes. If a volume with a friendly attribute(s) overlaps with a volume of a hostile attribute(s) (shared airspace), a track that correlates with both volumes would be given the attributes (identification flag [s]) of the friendly ID volume. The most restrictive weapons control mode attribute from all volumes with which a target correlates during a given evaluation is applied to the target. WEAPONS HOLD will take precedence over WEAPONS TIGHT or WEAPONS FREE. WEAPONS TIGHT will take precedence over a WEAPONS FREE. It is important to note that this new order of precedence does not affect the use of the residual weapons control mode. Correlation with a weapons control volume takes precedence over the residual weapons control mode regardless of how restrictive. For example, a track that correlates with a WEAPONS FREE volume with a residual state of WEAPONS HOLD will be given the WEAPONS FREE control mode. VOLUME TYPES 3-130. A distinction must be made between dual-purpose volumes and pure weapons control volumes. Dual-purpose volumes have both identification control attributes and weapons control attributes. Pure weapons control volumes consist solely of a weapon control attribute. The weapons control volumes enabled condition (areas enabled) applies only to pure weapons control volumes. A target is tested for correlation with a pure weapon control volume only if the volumes enabled condition is in effect. A weapons control attribute from either a dual-purpose volume or from a pure weapon control volume is applied to a target only if the target correlates (meeting all correlation criteria) with either type of volume. ID PROCESSING 3-131. Some basic rules govern the evaluation, decision, and weapon assignment (EDWA) passive ID processing logic for generalized volumes. They include the following—

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• •

The origin volume check is performed first and is done regardless of where the target is, relative to the PIDON/IFFPID. Minimum safe velocity, safe passage corridor, prohibitive volume (PV) and restrictive volume (RV) attribute checks, and pop-up checks are performed only if the target is between the unit, and the active PIDON/IFFPID or the PIDON/IFFPID does not exist or is not active. In maintaining the order of precedence of friendly over hostile, safe passage corridors are checked for RVs and PVs. Targets correlating with the SPC bypass the RV, PV, and pop-up checks. Volume correlation checks for the RV and PV attributes are done in the same evaluation.

VOLUME CORRELATION 3-132. The passive identification process first checks the target's spatial correlation with the volumes defined. If the target correlates spatially, then the speed attribute is checked next. After the speed check, the heading check is performed. These attributes (speed and heading) are checked based on the entries made in Tab 71. If no entry was made for an attribute, the check is bypassed. The target must correlate with all attributes to be given credit for correlating with a volume. If the target fails to meet either the spatial correlation or any of the additional attributes assigned to that volume, then the target does not correlate. 3-133. The safe corridor alignment interval entered in Tab 79 (0 to 99 sec) still works the same for friendly volumes entered with an SPC attribute, corridor width, and direction in Tab 71. The safe corridor alignment interval also applies to the heading criteria entered for a friendly volume (with an SPC attribute but without corridor width). For targets which correlate with a friendly volume that is not a corridor (SPC attribute without width or heading entered in Tab 71), additional evaluations are allowed to correct an incorrect speed or to get back into the volume (spatial correlation) before the target loses SPC credit. DEFINITION 3-134. Generalized volumes are defined in Tab 71 during initialization according to the applicable ACO. The operator may alter the parameters of these volumes during tactical operations through Tab 71 or deactivate them through Tab 5. PASSIVE ID LINE 3-135. Identification volumes such as prohibited volumes (PVs), restricted volumes (RVs), and safe passage corridors (SPCs) are not considered for correlation beyond the Passive ID Line (PIDON) or IFF Passive ID Line (IFFPID). Therefore, if a PIDON/IFFPID is active, a target within any of these volumes that is beyond the PIDON/IFFPID will not receive credit for correlation. The IFF passive ID line/IFF on passive ID line replaces FSCL for passive ID processing.

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ECM EMMITTERS 3-136. The presence of continuous ECM (that prevents radar range acquisition) tags a track with the ECM ID history indication. This ID indicator is displayed on the Track Amplifying Data tab beside ECM EMIT. This is a permanent hostile indicator. Only continuous ECM is allowed to set ECM history, because quiet (non-ECM emitting) friendly tracks sometimes receive credit for the two other Patriot ECM categories (noncontinuous and repeater). This can occur when a friendly aircraft crosses in front of a jamming source or due to the presence of chaff or clutter. Thus, the ECM history indicator will usually be associated with a strobe. The target may appear as a range-resolved jammer due to triangulation or radar burns. Radar burn-through occurs on a strobe at a relatively short range when the power of the Patriot radar allows it to defeat the ECM and obtain a skin track. The operator may choose to have the system automatically ID all tracks that carry ECM history as hostile through Tab 1. This will not affect tracks that have been manually identified by the ICC or FU, identified by HE, or identified as a true friend. The selection is normally not used. It is likely that any friendly aircraft jammers operating in forward areas will be identified as hostile if this selection is made. FRIENDLY ORIGIN 3-137. Friendly origin (FORG) and hostile origin (HORG) volume correlation are performed once (immediately after the preclassification filter has been passed). It is not possible for a track to correlate with both a FORG and HORG. Correlation with either of these volumes is displayed beside the ORIGIN indication in the Track Amplifying Data Tab, FORG correlation is displayed as F, and HORG correlation is displayed as H. 3-138. PROHIB VOL/RESTR VOL. PV and RV correlation are performed on every reevaluation after the preclassification filter has been passed. When a PV correlation occurs, PVs are not tested on subsequent reevaluations. The same is true for RVs. Correlation with a PV is displayed in the Track Amplification Data tab beside PROHIB VOL. RV is displayed beside RESTR VOL. 3-139. SAFE CORR. SPC correlation is temporary and is performed on every reevaluation after preclassification. However, if correlation is lost with an SPC during one reevaluation, SPC history is not immediately lost. Only if a previously correlated track fails to correlate in position or velocity with an SPC on 4 consecutive reevaluations or has failed to correlate in heading within initialized limits (Tab 71, CORR TOLERANCE) for more than a preset time interval (Tab 79, SAFE CORRID or ALIGN. INTERVAL), correlation will be lost. This is to account for targets in a turn within a corridor. SPC history credit is displayed on the Track Amplifying Data tab beside SAFE CORR. 3-140. SAFE ELV. The minimum safe velocity (MSV) test is performed on every reevaluation after preclassification, only if it has been authorized in Tab 1 and the track is within the PIDON/IFFPID. MSV is a temporary friendly indicator. A track receives credit on each reevaluation that its altitude and velocity are below the MSV thresholds defined in Tab 79. It loses

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MSV credit if it exceeds either MSV thresholds upon reevaluation. MSV history credit is displayed on the Track Amplifying Data tab beside SAFE VEL. A discussion of a possible use for MSV (and pop-up) follows the section on pop-up. 3-141. POP-UP. The pop-up test is performed only when authorized in Tab 1. It is a permanent indicator. If pop-up is authorized and the ID mode is automatic, then the ID of a track will become hostile when the track is within the popup maximum range extent, and the low-altitude pop-up velocity is exceeded or the pop-up maximum velocity is exceeded. These thresholds are set via Tab 79. The tab entry threshold range limit can be from 0 km out to 100 km. The same restrictions apply as for ECM hostile authorization. Tracks that are manually identified by the ICC or FU, identified by HE, or identified as true friend will not be automatically identified as hostile. An alert, nnn ID VIOLATION—POP-UP, will be displayed if the ID cannot be automatically changed. Pop-up history is displayed on the Track Amplifying Data tab beside POP-UP. 3-142. There are three important limitations on pop-ups. Only incoming aircraft are evaluated for pop-up, pop-up evaluation is not done beyond the value defined in Pop-up Maximum Range Extent (Tab 79), and pop-up criteria are never applied within a FORG. 3-143. Use of pop-up and MSV could occur, for example, if the force commander defines as a friendly criteria that all returning friendly aircraft maintain speeds below a certain level at certain altitudes. To address this friendly criteria, the operator could initialize the POP-UP ALTITUDE THRESHOLD and MAX VEL BELOW POP ALT THRESHOLD above the defined levels in Tab 79 (based on known Patriot velocity altitude errors). The POP-UP MAX VEL THRESHOLD can be set to a much higher value to avoid tagging returning friendly aircraft above the defined altitude level as pop-up (threshold range limits are 0 to 100 km). The MIN SAFE VEL ALTITUDE THRESHOLD and MIN SAFE VEL THRESHOLD could also be set to the same error-adjusted values as the low-altitude, pop-up thresholds. The result of this would be to identify all inbound aircraft above the defined friendly limits as hostile and to weigh all aircraft (inbound or outbound) below the limits towards the friend threshold. 3-144. Although pop-up and MSV can meet the previously defined friendly criteria, generalized friendly and hostile volumes can also be defined that meet it with more flexibility and less risk of misidentification. A one-way SPC with the appropriate velocity and altitude thresholds can meet the friendly criteria more closely. It will only apply to returning aircraft. MSV does not have any heading criteria. A generalized RV or combined RV and PV, created above the SPC volume with appropriate speed and heading criteria, would weight correlating aircraft towards the hostile threshold without ignoring other passive ID factors (such as FORG or SPC correlation). Also, these volumes can be limited in area if desired. The IFFON/IFFPID and the tracking boundaries limit pop-up and MSV.

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ACTIVE IDENTIFICATION PROCESSING 3-145. The software control of the active ID process mode is now a separate function from the IFF interrogation. Tab 1 selection of ID mode is separate from the new Tab 6 function of IFF/SIF STATE AUTO or MANUAL. Tab 6 now controls the active ID process, and Tab 1 now controls the passive ID process. The active process is based on track SIF and IFF responses. With the IFF/SIF STATE in the AUTO mode, SIF Mode 1, 2, and 3 interrogation is performed automatically one time for each range resolved track that passes the preclassification filter and is within the IFFON/IFFPID line. In Tab 6, the operator may choose to allow only the Mode 1 response, only the Mode 3 response, or both Mode 1 and 3 responses to be used for SIF history determination (according to the SOP for the theater). There are three possible SIF history statuses—positive SIF (PSIF), conflict SIF (CSIF), and negative SIF (NSIF). EVALUATION RESULTS 3-146. The evaluation results of IFF responses are displayed in the lower part of the Track Amplifying Data tab for Modes 1 and 3 in the line RESPONSE (RSPS). The Track Amplifying Data tab is in Figure 3-11.
TGT NO TYPE: GEOREF THRT TLR TLL ESTAT/M ID/SZ/IDS CONFLICT ID: RECOMMEND ID: ORIGIN: SAFE VEL: ECM EMIT: POP UP: SAFE CORR: PROHIB VOL: RESTR VOL: IFF EVAL:

ALT

SPEED 1

HDNG 2 3

RANGE

ELEV

IFF CONDITION: MODE: 4 CODE: RESPONSE: QUALITY:

Figure 3-11. Track Amplifying Data Tab 3-147. Patriot does not evaluate Mode 2 as part of the ID process. The Mode 2 RESPONSE will normally be blank but may display a reply if the interrogated aircraft has a Mode 2 code set. Possible values for the other modes are displayed and their meanings are described as follows: • • NOT INT—The track has not been interrogated. The IFF EVAL field will be blank until interrogation has occurred. NO RESP—The track was interrogated, but did not respond to the interrogation. This will occur when an aircraft without a working IFF transponder is interrogated. INVALID—The track was interrogated, but failed to respond correctly. One reason this occurs for Modes 1 and 3 is that the KAA-63 codes the aircraft responds with do not match the KAA-63 code for this time entered in Tab 73. VALID—The code received from the aircraft matches the code entered in Tab 73. Valid Mode 4 responses will create a True Friend symbol on the display, and the software will not allow further

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interrogations. True Friends must be observed to ensure it follows EDWA and does not threaten friendly forces. 3-148. IFF CONDITION item contains explanations of IFF conditions and codes displayed on the track amplification data tab and are defined as follows: EMER—This is displayed when the aircraft IFF transponder has its emergency switch turned on at the time of the interrogation. The aircraft may set this switch for diverse reasons. Normally, a problem exists that the pilot feels will prevent him from meeting friendly aircraft control measures. The presence of EMER does not mean that a VALID response will be received. Targets tagged with EMER can be treated as a friend. The operator receives the alert, nnn EMERGENCY IFF CODE, on a track that responds with EMER. • IP—This is displayed when the aircraft IFF transponder has its indicate position (IP) switch turned on at the time of the interrogation. The aircraft presumably uses this switch when it is voice commanded to do so by its controller. It is used to identify a particular aircraft or the aircraft’s position. There is no defined use for this item in Patriot. • GARBLE—This item is displayed when an interrogation results in two responses spaced so that one interferes with the other. This can happen when two aircraft are very close together when interrogated, or due to jamming in the IFF frequency. Closely observe tracks and reinterrogate when tracks are no longer in proximity to each other, within the same IFF wedge, or ECM strobe. A garbled IFF response should never be used to ID a track. • MULT REPLY—This item is displayed when interrogation results in two or more responses spaced so close together that the IFF interrogator cannot tell which is which. This is caused by the same reasons as GARBLE. Closely observe tracks and reinterrogate when tracks are no longer in proximity to each other, within the same IFF wedge, or ECM strobe. A MULT REPLY IFF response should never be used to ID a track. • SPOOF—This item applies only to Mode 4 interrogations. It is set when ECM is detected in the IFF frequency during an interrogation response. Closely observe tracks and reinterrogate when tracks are no longer in proximity to each other, within the same IFF wedge, or ECM strobe. An IFF response that is being spoofed should never be used to ID a track. 3-149. The CODE field refers to Mode 4 HIGH or LOW thresholds. Modes 1 through 3 are read in octal or are blank. The QUALITY field is used only when compass rose codes are entered in Tab 74. These codes are not used in most established theaters and are not planned in most contingency theaters. Patriot crews should, however, be aware of the parameters of their use so that they may easily be used if the situation demands. •

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AUTOMATIC IDENTIFICATION 3-150. If the SIF FRND entry in Tab 1 is set to YES and positive SIF is detected on a track, the ID is set to friend regardless of other ID. The ID will not be changed again automatically. This does not change the ID of tracks that are already manually identified, identified by HE, or are true friends. 3-151. Conflict SIF is possible only if both Modes 1 and 3 are selected in Tab 6 and the response is valid for one mode and invalid for the other. CSIF does not have any ID weight in weight set 3, so it does not have any effect on automatic ID. It is displayed beside IFF EVAL in the Track Amplifying Data tab as confirmed (CONF). 3-152. Positive SIF is generated if the IFF response(s) for the selected mode(s) is valid. PSIF provides a friendly weight. It is displayed beside IFF EVAL as positive (POS). 3-153. Negative SIF is generated if the IFF response(s) for the selected mode(s) is not valid. NSIF provides a hostile weight. It is displayed beside IFF EVAL as NEG. TARGET IDENTIFICATION EVALUATION 3-154. ID evaluation processing is performed on each reevaluation. The weights assigned for each of the ID history indicators that are set for the track are summed and compared to the fixed ID thresholds. In the automatic ID mode, the ID is changed whenever the weight sum passes one of the ID thresholds. In the manual ID mode, the ID is calculated, but the ID is not changed. The RECOMMEND ID field in the Track Amplifying Data tab will reflect the automatically calculated ID, and the operator will be alerted (nnn RECOMMEND ID = aaaa, where aaaa = UNK, HOST, FRND, or AFND) whenever it differs from the ID currently held by the track.

INTERACTION OF FIRE UNIT AND ICC IDENTIFICATION PROCESS
3-155. The preceding portion of the ID processing section dealt only with local FU processing. This portion ties FU ID processing in with ICC ID processing. 3-156. The ICC acts as arbiter and distributor of FU ID and ID history. When two or more FU tracks correlate into one track at the ICC, the ICC downtells all ID and ID history information from any source to all tracking FUs. ORIGIN VOLUME CHECKS 3-157. When an FU track passes the PCF, the origin volume checks are performed. If a correlation occurs at the ICC, a check is made to determine which FU has the oldest (earliest detection) track. If an older track exists, its ID history for FORG or HORG is sent to the FU reporting the new track. This FU erases its current origin history, accepts the downtold history, and uses it for automatic ID and manual recommended ID determination. SAFE PASSAGE CORRIDORS AND MINIMUM SAFE VELOCITY RULES 3-158. The SPC and MSV ID history parameters are processed by the ICC using a simple rule—if any correlating FU currently has SPC (or MSV) history, then all correlating FUs are downtold SPC (or MSV) history. Due to

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differing FU aspect angles, velocity, heading, and siting errors, it is possible for one FU to determine that an aircraft flying close to an SPC boundary correlates while another FU does not. Differing velocity measurements can cause the same problem with MSV. ICC processing of ID history parameters ensures that if one FU detects them on a track, all FUs will use them for ID determination. HISTORY INDICATOR 3-159. The ECM history indicator is also downtold to all correlating FUs. Directional ECM may cause a target to be tracked as a continuous jammer at one FU, but not at another. The ICC also distributes PV and RV ID history indicators. SIF IDENTIFICATION INDICATOR 3-160. For the SIF ID history, the ICC maintains the most positive history received and downtells it to correlating FUs. One FU may receive an invalid response due to its aspect angle with the aircraft's transponder antenna, while another FU receives a valid response. It is also possible that the aircraft transponder is overloaded by interrogation requests from other units (Hawk, Stinger, et cetera) at the time of one Patriot FU interrogation, but is free at the time another FU interrogates. PREVIOUS IDENTIFICATION HISTORY 3-161. Another major reason for sharing of ID history is illustrated in Figure 3-12. The ID history for a track that flies across the coverage of several FUs is maintained and disseminated so that an FU that acquires a track can use all previous ID history for ID determination.

FLIGHT PATH SPC

FRIENDLY ORIGIN

Figure 3-12. Track ID History

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MANUAL ID 3-162. Manual ID processing is relatively simple. When the fire unit operator manually IDs a track using the HOST, FRND, UNK, or SPEC switches, the ICC will be notified via the ID CONFLICT alert. The ID, chosen by the ICC to resolve the conflict, is downtold and the FU automatically accepts it. IDENTIFICATION HISTORY PRECEDENCE 3-163. IDs that are downtold from the ICC with an automatic ID source will generally replace a locally derived automatic ID. ICC manual IDs or IDs with an HE source are always accepted.

ENGAGEMENT ELIGIBILITY
3-164. Various factors must be examined for each target evaluation which affect engagement eligibility. These include target ID, residual weapon control state, target correlation with weapons control volumes, threat eligibility, and target speed (slow and false target criteria). A friendly identity (Special Friend, True Friend, Friend, or Assumed Friend) negates the need for any threat assessment. In the case of an Unknown identity, it must be determined which weapon control state the target is in. If no threat assessment is performed, the target is not processed for engagement. A hostile identity makes the target immediately eligible for manual engagement, but the automatic engagement eligibility of the target is prohibited if it has correlated with a WEAPONS HOLD volume or if residual WEAPONS HOLD applies. WEAPON CONTROL STATE 3-165. A local weapon control status (WCS) is determined for all ABTs. This local WCS is directed to the ICC. The ICC downtells the most restrictive WCS to all correlation FUs. The FUs apply this WCS to the tracks. Precedence rules are established to assign one WCS to a target that may correlate with overlapping coverage with a different WCS. The most restrictive state applies. Correlation with a WEAPONS HOLD volume is more restrictive than a WEAPONS TIGHT volume, and in turn with a WEAPONS FREE volume. The residual state is taken only when there is no correlation with a volume that has a weapon control state attribute. THREAT ELIGIBILITY 3-166. Threat eligibility is based on target range, velocity, and heading. Only when a track is close enough to have an acceptable Pk is it threat assessed. Figure 3-13, provides a visual representation of this process. The eligible target range threshold and the maximum acceptable intercept range can be altered using the operator range bias in Tab 1. This bias should only be used if directed by the force commander. If a track is close enough to be threat assessed, it is checked for either inhibiting condition.

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NO TARGET OUTSIDE THE ELIGIBLE TARGET RANGE THRESHOLD IS THREAT ASSESSED

NOT ASSESSED

ANY TARGET THAT IS PREDICTED TO PENETRATE THE MAXIMUM ACCEPTABLE INTERCEPT RANGE IS THREAT ASSESSED

ASSESSED NO OUTBOUND TARGET BEYOND THE MAXIMUM ACCEPTABLE INTERCEPT RANGE IS THREAT ASSESSED ALL TARGETS WITHIN THE MAXIMUM ACCEPTABLE INTERCEPT RANGE ARE THREAT ASSESSED

MAXIMUM ACCEPTABLE INTERCEPT RANGE (BASED ON Pk)

BATTERY LOCATION

Figure 3-13. Threat Assessment THREAT ASSESSMENT 3-167. After a target qualifies as an eligible enemy threat, the target will undergo detailed threat assessment. Detailed threat assessment consists of threat category assignment, TBEQ processing, and launch decision processing. ASSET THREAT CATEGORY 3-168. Threat category assignment associates 1 of 10 asset threat categories (ATCs) with each ABT target based upon which asset or areas are threatened (see Table 3-6). Eligible TBM targets are processed separately. ATCs 1 through 9 (ATC 10 is assigned to ABTs) can be assigned to TBMs as follows: • • • Assign the ATC of the highest priority threatened asset to ABT targets below the high-altitude threshold. Assign ATC 9 to ABT targets below the high-altitude threshold that do not threaten any asset. Assign ATC 10 to ABT targets that are above the high-altitude threshold.

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Table 3-6 Asset Threat Categories ASSET PRIORITY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 ASSET THREAT CATEGORY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

HIGHER

LOWER GENERAL AREA THREAT HIGH-ALTITUDE THREAT

TIME TO FIRST LAUNCH AND TIME TO LAST LAUNCH 3-169. The terms time to first launch (TTFL) and time to last launch (TTLL) are defined here because they are used extensively. Asset threat categories are discussed in this and following discussions. 3-170. TTFL is an estimated time it takes for the target approaching the battery to be engaged with intercept occurring within an acceptable probability of kill. The acceptable kill probability region is within the azimuth limits of the track sector and within a range value based on the target's altitude and ECM history. The boundary can be moved in and out by entering an engagement range bias on Tab 10 at the ICC or Tab 1 at the ECS (see the discussion of range bias in Chapter 2). This parameter is added to the boundary value and moves the acceptable kill range in and out. Current TTFL is displayed as time to launch release (TLR) in the Engagement Data tab. A target that is detected at long range and flies toward the battery will have a large TTFL. 3-171. As the target comes closer, the TTFL decreases and reaches 0 seconds when the target's LNIP enters the high kill probability region. If the estimated target flight path does not cross into the acceptable region (crossing target), TTFL is not displayed or is displayed as +99 seconds. Also, if the target is presently in the engagement boundary, but the intercept point is outside of it, TTFL is not displayed (receding target). The launch decision process computes the TLR value displayed on the engagement data display for each TBEQ target. When the system is in the automatic engagement mode, TLR indicates the time remaining before the target is automatically engaged by the system. TTFL and delays in launch due to radar guidance availability are taken into account, and the target is continuously displayed on the TBEQ for operator review before automatic engagement. If the launch is being delayed because of lack of guidance resources, the letter D appears in front of the release time on the display. The operator review (override) time is initialized and can be changed through Tab 1. In the automatic mode, when a dash is shown in front of the release time, the operator review (override) time is delaying the engagement. In the semiautomatic engagement mode, TLR is equal to TTFL.

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3-172. Time to last launch (TTLL) is the time remaining to the last opportunity to initiate an engagement so intercept will occur before the target penetrates the asset boundary. This is a very forgiving calculation. It assumes that the target is heading directly towards the center of the asset at its current speed. It also assumes that the Patriot missile has to fly to the farthest point on the asset boundary to perform the intercept. Also, a delay time, equal to the maximum time from engagement initiation to missile launch, is considered. Thus, if the target is not heading directly towards the asset, an engagement at TTLL=0 will be intercepted outside the asset boundary.

THREAT ASSESSMENT PROCESS
3-173. The first step in the threat assessment process is to determine if the target is above the enemy threat and altitude thresholds (Tab 78). If it is, it is assigned an ATC of 10 (high-altitude threat), and the display of TTLL is suppressed. High-altitude threats should only be engaged upon command. They are not a direct threat to the FU or any of its assets. 3-174. The software then calculates a TTLL for the target to each asset that the target is approaching. If none of these TTLLs is less than a fixed-asset threat threshold, then the target is a general area threat. In this case, the TTLL displayed is the smallest TTLL for any asset it is approaching. The maximum value for TTLL is 99 seconds. If the target is receding from all assets, the display of TTLL is inhibited. 3-175. If the TTLL is below the asset threat time threshold for an asset that it is threatening, the highest priority defended asset is chosen. If more than one asset with the same priority is threatened, then the one with the smallest TTLL is chosen. The chosen asset ID is displayed with its ATC under threat (THRT) in the Track Amplifying Data and Engagement Data tabs. SELF-DEFENSE 3-176. The alert “nnn SELF DEFENSE THREAT” is generated by processing in the threat assessment logic that determines when a track is an enemy threat to the FU. This logic assumes an instantaneous turn towards the FU at the current target speed. The TTLL for the target is calculated based on the FU's minimum range engagement boundary. If the TTLL is less than 24 seconds and the track is eligible for engagement, the alert is displayed. Sometimes this causes confusion (see Figure 3-14). A track may get the alert just before its LNIP becomes invalid. If so, an engagement is not possible. This should occur only when the target does not overfly the FU.

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TTLL <24 SECONDS (ASSUMING INSTANTANEOUS TURN)

MINIMUM RANGE ENGAGEMENT BOUNDARY

Figure 3-14. Self-Defense Threat ABT KILL ASSESSMENT 3-177. Whenever it is determined that an intercept on an ABT is complete, kill assessment processing is begun. The kinetic energy of the target is measured at the time of intercept. The kill assessment (KA) state of the target is set to probable kill (Pk) at intercept. Intercept occurs when the missile reaches the predicted intercept point and the fuze is made active by detecting an object in its field of view. The KA status of a track is displayed to the operator on the situation display. The # symbol modifier will blink on and off on the track while the KA state is Pk. The Pk modifier does not indicate that the track was killed. The current track kinetic energy is periodically reevaluated for a period of time (P4-14 seconds). For a multiple engagement, the kill assessment period will be restarted when the second intercept occurs. Multiple firings on formations are not considered complete until the last intercept. The KA of the track is set to confirmed kill (CK) if the track's energy decreases significantly before the time expires. The track's energy is calculated by looking at the heading, altitude, speed, and size before and after the intercept. The # symbol will not blink for a track with a KA of CK. KILL ASSESSMENT 3-178. The track KA is set to no kill (NK) for several reasons—the track continuously emits (range denying) ECM, track energy increases; or the KA evaluation time expires before track energy is observed to increase or decrease significantly. The # symbol is removed when a KA state of NK is assigned to the track.

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TESTS 3-179. These are all commonsense tests. If a track continues to fly at the same speed for a period of time after intercept, or it begins accelerating, then it has not been killed. A killed track also does not continue to emit continuous ECM. KA processing is not performed for TBMs. If the intercept goes to completion, the KA state is set to Pk. If the intercept fails the KA state is set to NK. CHANGING THE KILL ASSESSMENT 3-180. The KILL and NO KILL switches at the FU will change the kill assessment (KA) state of a track to confirmed kill (CK) or no kill (NK), respectively. These switches should never be used. There is no information available to the operator that will allow him to make this decision.

TACTICAL BALLISTIC MISSILE CONSIDERATIONS
3-181. PDB-4 improvements to the weapon system includes upgraded missile and software that enhances asset defense against TBMs. Throughout this document the various TBMs will be referred to as Type A and Type B. The Type A TBMs are short-range missiles with a range of 300 kilometers or less. The Type B TBMs are medium-range missiles with a range of 300 to 1,000 kilometers. All of these TBMs can now be countered by the Patriot system. The following are recommendations for the tactical exploitation of those capabilities. 3-182. Plan For The "worst case" TBM threat. Plan to fight against the most difficult TBM that the IPB indicates the enemy possesses. In most cases, these will be the longer range TBM Bs that fly at greater speeds and altitudes. An altitude bias of –4 km should be used against TBMs type B. In some cases, however, the TBM Type A, with shorter, slower, and flatter trajectories, may be the most dangerous. Although this reduces the battle space of the unit in altitude and time, it provides a better Pk at the required altitude. The increased Pk offsets the reduced number of possible simultaneous engagements. If only a threat of TBM A exists, the altitude bias should not be used. The battalion commander and staff (S3 or S2) must determine whether other altitude bias settings should be used. Usually, doctrinal recommendations from USAADASCH and the Patriot Project Office will be provided. 3-183. Fight in the automatic TBM engagement mode since the system is designed to fight in the automatic TBM engagement mode. Once the system has classified a target as a TBM, the engagement decisions are very limited. Since the operator has little time to make decisions, he cannot distinguish current advance low-radar cross section (ALRCS) ABTs from regular ABTs. If guidance enhanced missiles (GEMs) are required to counter an ALRCS ABT threat, the software must be tailored to select one. 3-184. Overlap TBM coverage for mutual protection between batteries, to thicken the defense, and to share the limited number of protected assets that may be entered into the system at the battery. All batteries have a TBM engagement capability through active search or told-in tracks from the ICC.

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TBM tracks also may be transmitted to adjacent battalions whose FUs are threatened. 3-185. When the battalion's mission is to provide asset defense (such as protecting an airfield or harbor area) against TBMs, two-fifths or more of the batteries should be in the ABT and TBM surveillance mode, respectively. Where the primary enemy is ABTs, one- to two-fifths of the batteries in the TBM surveillance mode may be enough to provide necessary protection. 3-186. TBM polygon assets and the possibility of multiple launch sites make it feasible to split the launch sites with the RS PTL and align launch stations to the specific azimuth of the launch sites. This reduces missile fly out time. If single launch sites are the only threat, then align both the RS and LSs toward the launch sites.

ATM CAPABILITY
3-187. The PDB-4 upgrade has modified the ICC and FU software to accommodate the changes in hardware and consequently has greatly enhanced the system's ATM capability. With the hardware improvements, the Patriot system can now counter a larger spectrum of TBMs. It also provides for greater asset defense in addition to improving the self-defense capability. HARDWARE 3-188. The hardware changes in the system have primarily been in the Patriot guidance enhanced missile. These consist of improvements to the S-band fuze reaction time, improved sensitivity of the C-band track via missile (TVM) seeker, and higher TVM data rate. The improvement in sensitivity of the TVM seeker is accomplished through the addition of three low-noise C-band amplifiers to the front end of the receiver. This low noise amplifier change requires modifications to the seeker antenna monopulse feed and to the intermediate frequency (IF) receiver. The S-band fuze improvement requires changes to the fuze processor to provide greater sensitivity and earlier detection of targets. The higher TVM data rate in the missile hardware changes a programmable read-only memory in the timing and control unit. SOFTWARE 3-189. Overall, there have been two major functional improvements in the software to counter TBMs. First, the system has an improved overall defense capability against a wider range of TBMs. Furthermore, there is a capability to provide limited TBM defense for critical assets within the high lethality engagement zone. This is in addition to the normal FU self-defense capability. All the software functional areas (surveillance, guidance, EDWA, and status monitor) have been modified to provide this enhanced TBM capability. The FU software accounts for the availability of the GEM and will select the appropriate missile for the mission being conducted.

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Target Classification 3-190. The target classification modifications include the addition of the new Type B TBM and logic changes that account for updated intelligence data on aircraft performance. The classification process also includes told-in processing from other ICCs. The target characteristics and flight profiles of various threat aircraft, TM, and TBM targets are compared to performance boundaries defined within the software. From these flight profiles, the logic will distinguish aircraft and TMs, from TBMs, arriving at a specific classification for every track. The target classification process provides several categories of classification within a presumed or confirmed category. 3-191. Presumed ABT (PABTs) target classifications are applied to targets whose previously observed flight profiles do not demonstrate characteristics that would allow a confirmed classification. All targets are initially classified with the default of PABT. 3-192. Targets with the presumed classification continue to be processed by the classification logic so that they may be positively classified. Before the determination of a positive classification, the target maintains a presumed status but is treated equivalent to a confirmed classification for engagement purposes. A PABT will be treated as an ABT track, and a presumed tactical ballistic missile will be treated as a TBM A. 3-193. Targets that have not yet received a confirmed classification are processed by the classification logic each time it is evaluated by EDWA. Once a target receives a confirmed classification, it is no longer processed by the classification logic. Therefore, its classification will not change due to local processing. A target may have a classification change due to a told-in classification from the ICC. If a presumed TBM is determined to be emitting ECM, its classification is changed to ABT. 3-194. The classification logic distinguishes TBM Bs. The TBM B threat is easily discriminated from TBM As and ABTs by its greater flight dynamics and higher altitude. The TBM B velocity profile almost never overlaps profiles for TBM As or ABTs. 3-195. The classification logic compares target climb rate versus altitude against the maximum altitude attributed to any aircraft. If the maximum altitude rate or velocity profile is exceeded but is less than that for a TBM B, the target is classified as a TBM A. If the climb rate is greater than most aircraft, but within the capability of specific high-performance aircraft, a PTBM classification is assigned. The logic accounts for the small probability of an aircraft climbing rapidly at high altitudes and ensures that the target will continue to be processed by the classification logic until a confirmed classification is established. The classification logic sets a target dive indicator if the descent rate of the target exceeds a specific threshold. If, after this indicator is set, the target is observed to be climbing, the classification is set to ABT. This logic assumes that TBMs will not change from a dive phase to an ascent phase. 3-196. A level flight time test is performed for ambiguously classified targets with an altitude less than 15 kilometers and an altitude rate within the performance region of both ABTs and TBMs. If over a prescribed time frame,

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the target remains in this region of altitude uncertainty, it is classified as an ABT. This logic is based on the fact that any TBM, at apogee, will exceed the altitude rate threshold within the prescribed time. Threat Assessment 3-197. The threat assessment process has been enhanced to include critical asset defense and accommodation of a ballistic trajectory used for a TBM B ground impact point (GIP) calculation. ABT (seen as AT on the display) assets will be threat assessed against a radius from the center point not the actual size of the ABT asset, while pure TBM (seen as TB on the display) assets will be assessed against the entire asset. 3-198. The threat assessment logic determines if a TBM is a threat by predicting the TBM GIP. The GIP is determined by predicting the TBM trajectory from its current position to the ground. Due to the trajectory differences between TBM As and TBM Bs, different trajectory logic is required. For a target to enter the threat assessment logic, it must have reached its apogee and be on the downward descent of its ballistic trajectory during periodic TBM threat evaluations. The trajectory predicted for TBM A targets will initially be ballistic, with a dive angle toward the target during the final phase of flight. TBM B targets are predicted to fly without a dive maneuver. 3-199. A ground impact point area prediction uncertainty is defined around the GIP. This area is called the GIP box. It is a representation of where the system thinks the missile will impact plus additional area to account for system error. The software uses the location of the highest priority asset in the GIP area of uncertainty to determine if the trajectory prediction should be modified for a dive maneuver or remain ballistic. If the asset is beyond the predicted ballistic GIP, then no dive maneuver is calculated for Type A TBMs. If the asset is between the ballistic GIP and the missile, dive maneuvers are then calculated for Type A TBMs. The area of uncertainty around the ballistic GIP has been defined large enough to contain the most severe turn-down maneuver expected. 3-200. This GIP box has varying dimensions based on type of TBM. The lengthwise direction of a GIP box is along the direction vector of the TBM trajectory. This rectangular area of uncertainty is used to determine if the battery or an asset is potentially threatened (site location within the uncertainty box centered around the predicted GIP) or whether an active asset is potentially threatened. This GIP box is never displayed, only the GIP. For further details on the GIP box, see (S/NF)ST 44-85-1A(U). 3-201. The GIP is always computed but is displayed only when certain parameters are met. If the TBM is threatening the FU or an activated asset, the GIP is automatically displayed. If the TBM is non-threatening, the GIP is displayed only when the target is hooked. The GIP box is never displayed, see Figure 3-15.

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TBM Trajectory

Ground Impact Point

GIP Box

Figure 3-15. GIP Box 3-202. There are certain visual queues that an operator can observe which will provide a quick indication if the TBM is engageable. If the TBM is threatening the FU or an asset, the system will automatically display the TBEQ symbology and the GIP. The ATC value displayed for this TBM target will be that of the FU or the asset. If there are no active assets and the FU is not threatened, then only the TBM symbol will be displayed. When this particular target is hooked, the GIP will be displayed, and if the target is engageable, an LNIP will also be displayed. The ENGST/M in the Track Amp Data tab will indicate impact point out (IPOUT). The ATC value for this track will indicate ATC 9, a general area threat. If no LNIP is displayed upon hooking this track and there is no status in the ENGST/M data field, then the TBM is not engageable. The key elements in observing TBM engageability are the TBEQ symbol or an LNIP. If either is displayed, then a TLR and a TLL should be displayed in the Engagement Data and Track Amp Data tabs. 3-203. As with any target under engagement, the various engage modifiers (Cease Fire = CEASF, Hold Fire = HOLDF, and Engage Hold = EHOLD) also apply to TBMs. However, there are several engage modifiers that are unique to TBM targets. • Engage Inbound (ENBND) indicates that the TBM is engageable and threatening the FU or an asset. It also indicates that the TTFL, which is also time to launch release (TTLR) is greater than zero. Impact Point Out (IPOUT) indicates that the TBM is engageable but that the predicted ground impact point (GIP) is not threatening the FU or an active asset. When the target is hooked, the system will display a GIP and an LNIP if the TBM is engageable and threatening. Pending Engagement (PENG) indicates that there is an engagement pending on this target by another FU. This status is displayed when an FU with a better score is going to conduct the engagement. Battery scoring is discussed in the paragraph below.

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3-204. Once the GIP is initially calculated, based upon TBM flight path, the FU and assets are then evaluated to determine which is most threatened. The evaluation logic first evaluates the FU to determine if the TBM is a selfdefense threat. If the FU coordinates are within the GIP box, the TBM is determined to be a self-defense threat. As such, the asset threat category (ATC) is set to the highest priority value (ATC=1), regardless whether other assets are also threatened. 3-205. If the FU is not within the GIP box, the other active assets are evaluated. The system uses the following procedures to determine if an active asset is threatened. If any of the multipoint TB asset coordinates are within the GIP box, the TBM is determined to be an asset defense. For an AT asset, software first draws (but does not display) a circle with a radius of 2 kilometers around the ABT asset. If the GIP box intersects this 2-kilometer circle around the ABT asset, the system will consider the ABT asset threatened and process that TBM for engagement. If the GIP box does not intersect the circle, the ABT asset is not threatened, and the system will not produce an automatic engagement (Figure 3-16). Causes No Engagement Causes Engagement

Asset

Figure 3-16. ABT Asset with GIP Boxes 3-206. In the case of a TBM B threat, the closest asset to the GIP, if it is within the GIP box, is chosen as the most threatened and the ATC is set accordingly. In the case of a TBM A, when two assets of equal ATC are between the GIP and the TBM, the asset closest to the GIP is chosen as the most threatened. The reason for this rule is that generally a TBM A tends to dive in the terminal phase. 3-207. All active assets that have been entered in Tab 70 will be evaluated for TBM asset defense. It should be noted if an asset is to be provided TBM protection, care must be taken to ensure that the asset's location is within the

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high lethality defended area described in the next section. If no asset is threatened, the TBM is categorized as a nonthreat. Tactical Ballistic Missile Engagement Zones 3-208. Once the TBM is determined to be a threat to the FU or another active asset, the TBM trajectory is evaluated for engagement consideration. The predicted trajectory is correlated with a predefined engagement zone. This is to determine if the trajectory is predicted to enter the airspace of high lethality or engagement zone for engagement, as shown by the shaded areas in Figure 3-17. Top view of a defended area is at Figure 3-18. For further details see (S/NF)ST 44-85-1A(U).

TBM

M ax

Altitude Min

Range Figure 3-17. Defended Area Side View

Max

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PTL

Figure 3-18. Defended Area Top View
3-209. Generally, the engagement zone is predefined. The maximum engagement range and altitude are defined so that the LNIP prediction logic will attain intercept in a high lethality region. 3-210. The upper altitude limits and outer ground range limits are different for TBM A and TBM B threats and are a function of the type of missile, ATM (PAC-2) or ATM 1 (GEM), used to engage the threat. The Pk values for ranges and intercept altitudes for a mission kill using the ATM and ATM 1 missiles for TBM A and the various TBM Bs available in the world are contained in Table 3-8. 3-211. The altitude and ground range engagement zones will render the TBM as engageable if the LNIP is predicted within these zones or if the LNIP is predicted to land within these zones (TTFL is greater than zero, see Figure 3-19). These engagement zones are the maximum system capabilities for Patriot, and the area on the ground can be defended with a limited degree of protection. The most forward areas of the GIP may only cause a single intercepter to be launched, which will dramatically decrease the Pk.

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Dive Point Altitude

TBM B ( ) Does Not Dive

TTFL = 0

Type A

TTLL = 0 Type B Range Intercept Boundary for Last Launch

Figure 3-19. Intercept Boundary
3-212. With the post deployment build-4 (PDB-4) software and remote launch, the Pk area has translated into a Pk region that extends much further from the fire unit due to the remote launch capability and improved trajectory shaping. This increased zone is due to the Pk footprint moving with the remotely emplaced launcher(s). 3-213. The TBM A engagement zone for a local launcher is determined from the fire unit. Based on the incoming trajectory of the TBM, the shaded area illustrates the region where the system will be able to perform the normal two-missile engagement of the TBM. The first intercept should occur at the top of the volume, with the second intercept occurring within the volume. 3-214. For a remote launcher, this is a two-missile engagement area, regardless of how far the remote launcher is from the fire unit. This is because the engagement zones of the remote launchers reduce in size as the launchers move forward, providing a maximum engagement zone of P4-18 kms. Consequently, the two-shot region and the associated high Pk area for a TBM B only extend out to P4-19 kms. See (S/NF)ST 44-85-1A(U). 3-215. There are some limitations on the size of the extended Pk region. For TBM As, the Pk region will generally extend as a function of the remote launcher range. This TBM A restriction is due to classification concerns identified in (S)FM 44-100A(U). This large area is possible because of the relatively low speed and altitude of a TBM A, allowing the Patriot missile sufficient time to align and counter the incoming threat. For a TBM B, there is a limitation on how far from the fire unit the high Pk zone will extend. This

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restriction is due to the reduced engagement zones as the remote launcher is moved forward in the various regions (remote LS engagement zones). The TBM B will have a variable Pk region out to a variable range (see [S/NF]ST 44-85-1A[U]). Any portion of the Pk curve that extends beyond the two-shot region range will have a Pk of less than shown on the chart. The shaded area in Figure 3-20 illustrates this condition.

Low Pk

Remote LS

Figure 3-20. TBM B Remote Launch Pk Restriction
3-216. The varying limitation on the high Pk only applies to TBM Bs. This is due to the TBM engagement zones, which defines the area in which the system will perform the two-missile engagement at the incoming threat. 3-217. The Patriot system has a limited capability against a medium-range TBM. Patriot TBM threat set is defined as a TBM launched beyond P4-20 kms and within P4-21 kms. As long as the speed of this does not exceed the system's unengageable TBM limit and conforms to the engageability parameters, it will be engaged. If it does exceed the unengageable TBM limit, the system will not allow a manual nor an automatic engagement. The following Pk parameters are for local and remote launchers. The Pk footprint moves with the remote launchers, and launcher emplacement restrictions in terms of range from the FU still apply. The range is greater due to surveillance improvements resulting from the low noise receiver modification. 3-218. As previously mentioned, Pk curves are associated with the launchers. Consequently, remote launchers can be used to increase the Pk regions against this threat. There are some additional restrictions associated with the use of remote launchers against this long-range threat. Earlier detection resulting from the surveillance improvements is necessary to account for the extended downrange area. Based on the aforementioned, remote launchers should not be emplaced beyond P4-22 kms from the FU. Consequently, if a

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long-range TBM threat really exists, then (-4km/13kft) should be entered in ECS Tab 1, page 2, and TBM ENGAGEMENT ALT BIAS data field. The defended area footprints vary according to the type of missile used for the engagement (ATM, ATM1, or Standard), and the type of TBM threat. See (S/NF)ST 44-85-1A(U). 3-219. The engagement zones determine the window of time (TTFL to TTLL) in which an engagement is initiated. This is to ensure intercept will occur within the high-lethality zone. 3-220. The Patriot batteries calculate a TBM engagement selection parameter, which is used to score the FU's ability to successfully engage a TBM under track that has been determined to be either a self-defense or asset threat. This selection parameter score is exchanged between the FUs and the ICC. The FU that computes the best score will be designated the primary engagement candidate for the TBM under evaluation. Other FUs will not automatically engage the TBM unless it becomes a self-defense threat. 3-221. The essential factors used in determining the selection parameters are as follows (listed in order of greatest to least influence on the total score): • Self-defense threat to the local FU. • Severity of engagement load at the local FU. • ATM missiles availability at the local FU. • Range of impact point from the local FU. 3-222. It is unlikely that two or more FUs will compute an identical score for a given TBM, unless the FUs are collocated. In the automatic engagement mode, the normal cease fire process, initiated when one FU engages the TBM, precludes multiple FUs engaging a single TBM. In the manual engagement mode, it is possible to shoot through a cease fire from another battery. Given the lack of time to make engagement decisions against TBMs, manual command and control procedures will preclude multiple engagements when directed from higher and engaging in the manual mode. 3-223. The ICC primarily serves as a relay point between FUs for the selection parameter exchange and does not evaluate the score on its own. The ICC automatically determines which FU(s) is tracking the TBM and ensures that each FU receives the other's score.

REMOTE LAUNCH
3-224. This section defines LS emplacement criteria, the engagement decision and weapons assignment process at the FU and the defense design considerations when implementing remote launch (Figure 3-21). TBM defense design is based on launcher locations and the footprints related to the defended area for the launcher, not the radar. Establish the TBM defense design around the footprints for the expected threat. There are two separate locations where launchers may be positioned to counter the threat: local launchers and remote launchers phase-I. Orient the radar PTL pointing towards the center of the threat launch locations. The launchers must be pointed directly at a threat launch location to achieve the smallest crossing

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angle and highest Pk. Whenever possible, orient launchers in pairs towards the threat launch locations for redundancy.

VHF Fiber-Optic Cable

P4- 23

kms

Local

Remote

Figure 3-21. Local and Remote Launcher Emplacement
LAUNCHER EMPLACEMENT 3-225. LSs are categorized according to emplacement geometry, as shown in Figure 3-22. Local LSs must be located within P4-24 kilometers of the radar coordinates, and within the sector limits of 80 degrees from the radar PTL. A remote LS is defined as any LS exceeding the P4-25 kilometer radius from the radar. Remote LS emplacement is constrained by RS to LS communications and by missile acquisition. The maximum radial distance imposed by these constraints is not to exceed P4-26 kilometers. The remote launch sector limits are defined as the track sector limits.

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Maximum Range From Radar

Rem ote Launcher Region

PTL
Track Bounds Track Bounds

Local Launcher Region

Lim ited Launcher Placem ent Allow ed Behind Track Sector

Figure 3-22. Launcher Emplacement Geometry
3-226. The remote LS train angle limits are discussed below. One set of limits applies to the entire remote region and another to the local launchers. Remote launcher: – Located beyond local LS range limit (from the RS). Not to exceed P4-27 kilometers from the RS. – Located within the track sector of the RS. – Train angle limits are 45 degrees of the PTL. • Local launcher: – Located within P4-28 kilometers of the RS. – Located with the track sector of the radar. – Limited placement behind track sector. • Train angle limit dependent on location: – +35o (if the LS is within +10o of PTL). – -35o to +5o (if the LS is within -80o to -10o of PTL). – +35o to -5o (if the LS is within +80o to +10o of PTL). – +45o (if the LS is in the remote launch region). 3-227. Communications line-of-sight (LOS) is required for both the local and remote launchers. As a rule, if communications have been established with the remote LS, it should be suitable for missile acquisition. LOS is required for VHF communications and to ensure missile acquisition will not be impeded by multipath signal reflections (Figures 3-23 and 3-24). While LOS may be achieved, the surrounding area must be free of large reflective surfaces (buildings, lakes, and large rocky hills). If terrain or artificial •

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features between the RS and LS exceed 2o (local LS) or 0.5o (remote LS) above LOS, radar acquisition of the missile may not occur.

MISSILE ACQUISITION

LOS

LOS
Figure 3-23. Line-of-Sight Between ECS and RS and LS
MISSILE ACQUISITION

??

??

LOS

LOS

Figure 3-24. No Line-of-Sight Between RS and Missile
3-228. The success of remote launch operations depends on ECS to LS communication to engage a remote ABT track before actually tracking it using an adjacent radar that is tracking the ABT track. The tracking radar detecting the ABT track provides the target data to the nontracking radar. When the nontracking radar engages the track on remote, the midcourse

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guidance and TVM will provide missile uplink by the nontracking radar before obtaining line of sight to the target. At extended range, the communication link is susceptible to many factors as indicated below. The associated considerations and operator actions will ensure a greater likelihood of establishing and maintaining communication with remote launchers: • • Atmospheric conditions—Weather and temperature changes affect the signal-to-noise ratio. Terrain—Terrain changes also effect the signal-to-noise ratio. Each location has its attributes. Generally, as elevation increases, so does signal strength. At longer ranges, it is advantageous for the LS and ECS to be at the highest elevations possible. Line of sight—This is necessary for data link upgrade (DLU) communications with remote LSs. Surrounding noise—Background noise has an effect on the signal-tonoise ratio.

• •

REMOTE LAUNCHERS AUTOMATICALLY EMPLACED 3-229. There are some functional capabilities that are restricted from being conducted from a remote LS. The strobe engagement mode (SEM) and the SOJC engagement of a virtual target cannot be performed from a remote LS. Only local launchers may be used for these two functions. Also, the remote launch capability requires the DLU. FIRE UNIT EDWA PROCESSING 3-230. Target processing has been modified to account for a defense design using remote launchers. The engagement parameters are different for remote and local launchers because of the decreased missile fly-out time from the remote LS to the intercept point. The parameters affected include time-tofirst-launch (TTFL), time-to-last-launch (TTLL), missile time-of-flight (TFLT), and the launch-now-intercept-point (LNIP). As Figure 3-25 indicates, when choosing a remote LS over local LS, TTFL and TTLL decrease. The missile TFLT normally is less for a remote LS, because the total flight distance from the LS to intercept is less for the remote LS.

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Altitude

Ground Impact Local LS Remote LS

Range

Figure 3-25. Missile Fly-Out Time
3-231. For remote launch, threat assessment has incorporated LS selection logic. With remote launch for TBMs, engagement decision parameters are dependent upon the LS selected. Remote launchers are favored in LS selection if remote launchers contain the correct type of missile available for TBMs. 3-232. Remote LSs are favored for TBM asset defense— When it is too late to engage with local LS to defend a remote asset. When the total ATM missile inventory at the local LSs has decreased to a specific low missile limit. • When only ATM missiles are available at all launchers. 3-233. Under certain conditions a remote LS may not be advantageous, even though one of the previously stated factors exists. When these conditions exist, a local LS is chosen, if possible. These conditions are as follows: Only non-ATM missiles are available at the remote LS, and ATM missiles are available at local LS for TBM engagement. • The TBM trajectory is not anticipated to enter the engagement zone of any of the remote LSs. • There is unfavorable engagement geometry at all remote LSs, and the local LS geometry is better. These conditions result from the ABT LS dead zone test, the TBM LS engagement zone, and a TBM distance and angle check. 3-234. Generally, local LSs are favored for ABT defense and for TBM self-defense of the battery. The shorter distance from battery to impact point results in more favorable engagement geometry. Remote launchers are more effective for asset TBM defense. THREAT ASSESSMENT AND LAUNCH STATION ASSIGNMENT 3-235. Before entering the TBEQ, all targets are assessed, assuming the LSs are collocated with the RS, to determine asset threat category (ATC), LNIP, • • •

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TTFL, and TTLL. When the target enters the TBEQ, either from the automatic process or from an operator engage switch action, the appropriate LS is selected and a missile is reserved on that LS for an eventual engagement. If the selected LS becomes unacceptable, EDWA will assign another LS collocated with the radar, or reassess the target again when it reenters the TBEQ. LAUNCHER SCORING 3-236. An LS scoring system determines the best ready LS from all the launchers evaluated. A score is computed for every LS evaluated. The LS must be in remote and must contain at least one available missile. LSs that are not scored will not be selected during the current weapons assignment evaluation. There are several constraints that prevent LS scoring for a particular LS. For example,— • The LS is currently in use. • The predicted intercept is in the LS dead zone. • SEM and SOJC engagements are restricted to local launchers. 3-237. LS scoring is based on several elements. The specific parameters selected are a function of whether it is an ABT or TBM engagement. The ABT engagement is further defined for long range (>25 kilometers) and short range (<25 kilometers). The operator has no control over the LS scoring parameters other than the depletion rule set in Tab 78. The elements for scoring are— • • • • • • • • • • LS intercept angle acceptability check (37o) for ABT only. TTLL criticality. Missile types for enemy threats (ATM for TBM engagement, SOJC for SOJC). Patriot missiles initial turn angle (TBM only). Distance and angle from impact point to LS (only for TBM engagements). LS assignment preference (TBM uses a remote LS, self-defense uses a local LS). Missile frequency availability. Missile address conflicts. LS missile depletion. LS number.

LAUNCHER STATION ACCEPTABILITY CRITERIA 3-238. Once an LS is chosen, the threat evaluation process attempts to use the same previously selected LS to determine ATC, LNIP, TTFL, and TTLL. The selected LS may be used on subsequent evaluations. However, the acceptability of the selected LS is reevaluated every second while the target is on the TBEQ or hooked. The acceptability criteria are as follows: • • Has a new LS has come on-line? The LS must still be available.

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• •

The missile must still be reserved and available for the pending engagement. The missile must also be appropriate for the current classification. The case in which the missile may no longer be appropriate is after a classification change from a presumed state to a confirmed state requiring a different missile type (for example, PABT to TBM A or PTBM to ABT). For ABTs, the LNIP must be outside the LS dead zone, and the dead zone is not predicted to interfere with asset defense. For TBMs, the LNIP must still be within the LS engagement volume. If no LNIP is entered, the TBM will enter the LNIP in the future. A remote LS is rejected if the LNIP is closer to the radar than to the LS. This precludes tail chase engagements. LS is rejected if an intercept is predicted behind the LS. A target becomes a strobe and a remote LS is assigned.

MISSILE RESERVATION AND PREEMPTION 3-239. Once an LS is selected, a particular missile on that LS is reserved while the target is on the TBEQ until the engagement starts or the target is deleted from the TBEQ. The reserved missile is not available for other engagements during the time it is reserved. Specific conditions may exist which will allow preemption of the reserved missile as described below: • • • • A higher priority target has entered the TBEQ and there are no LS or missile resources available. An engagement initiated by the operator cannot be honored, because there is no LS or missile resource. LS goes off-line with a missile assigned to a high priority target on the TBEQ. An auto-engage target is ready for engagement, but has no missile assigned.

REMOTE LAUNCH STATION ENGAGEMENT ZONES 3-240. The TBM engagement zone has changed with the implementation of remote launch. The altitude and range of the TBM engagement zone are still a function of the type of TBM and the type of Patriot missile used. The only difference is that the TBM engagement zone moves with the LS. For local LSs, the range is measured from the RS. For remote LSs, the range is measured from the remote LS. The altitude is always measured from the RS. For general planning purposes, the Pk curves for remote TBM engagements are measured from the LS location. 3-241. The TBM engagement zone for remote launchers is similar to the zone for local launchers, but with the zone transposed to the remote LS location. This increases the maximum engagement boundary from the radar for each respective remote LS. The engage boundary increase is not one-for-one in terms of range.

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3-242. The range of the remote launcher TBM engagement zone is a function of how far forward the remote launcher is emplaced. There are four regions forward of the radar that effect the range of the TBM engagement zone. See Figure 3-26.

4

3

2
REMOTE LS REGIONS

1

LOCAL LS REGION

Figure 3-26. Launcher Emplacement Regions
3-243. The size of the TBM engagement zone for each of these regions is also a function of the type of enemy TBM threat and the type of Patriot missile used. The altitudes of the engagement zone remain unchanged. The engagement zones for a TBM A threat, because of its speed and altitude, remain constant. The engagement zones for the TBM B are affected by radar detection range. For a TBM B with an ATM1 missile, if the launcher is P4-29 kilometers forward, the engagement zone does not move out to P4-30 kilometers from the radar. For TBM Bs, the engagement zone reduces in range as the launcher moves forward of the radar. 3-244. The tables above illustrate how the TBM engagement zone changes in range as a function of which region the remote launcher is in. For example, the maximum engagement range for a Type A TBM with an ATM1 missile is P4-31 kilometers; such as, a launcher emplaced P4-32 kilometers from the radar. 3-245. For a Type B TBM with an ATM1 missile, the maximum engagement range is P4-33 kilometers from the radar; such as a launcher emplaced at P4-34 kilometers from the radar. Note that the engagement zone (EZ)

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reduces in range the farther a launcher is emplaced from the radar. As a general rule a two-shot engagement is used for any remote launcher. The maximum engagement zone is P4-35 kilometers for a Type B TBM with an ATM1 missile (Figure 3-27).

EZ 4 EZ 3 EZ 2

EZ 1 REGION 2 REGION 4 REGION 3

LOCAL REGION 1

Figure 3-27. LS Remote Regions
3-246. It is recommended that remote launchers be emplaced no further than P4-36 kilometers from the radar. Limiting the distance between the LS and the ECS helps to ensure reliable communications (DLU range) and provides the best Pk over the greatest area. 3-247. The ABT engagement zone is also a function of range and altitude from the radar. The ABT altitude and range curve is still used to calculate TTFL for all launchers (local and remote) for all ABT engagements.

LAUNCHER DEAD ZONES
3-248. There is a region forward of each launcher referred to as the "dead zone." This region applies to both local and remote launchers and its size is a function of where the launcher is emplaced from the radar. The dead zone results from the system’s ability to detect a low-flying target, acquire the missile, and intercept the target. For local launchers, the dead zone is P4-37 kilometers. For remote launcher, the size of the dead zone is relative to how far forward the LS is emplaced from the radar. The further forward the launcher, the greater the dead zone.

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3-249. The launcher emplacement regions (defined in Remote LS Emplacement Zones) also apply to the dead zones. The dead zones are irregular in shape and have a base value and wing component on the left and right side of the region. Figure 3-28 is an illustration of the dead zones.

PTL REGION 3

REGION 2

DEAD ZONE

DEAD ZONE

LOCAL

Figure 3-28. Launcher Dead Zones
3-250. The dead zone range can be calculated using the following equation: Dead Zone = Base Value + Wing Component Base Value—A base value is defined for each central region with a different value based on the range ring. The base values are as follows: – Local LS P4-38 kms – Remote LS out to region 2 P4-39 kms – Remote LS out to region 3 P4-40 kms • Wing Component—To determine the wing component, reduce P4-41 kilometers from the Base Value for every P4-42 degrees the target LNIP is beyond the central region. For example, if the remote launcher is emplaced at region 3, the base value of the central region is P4-43 kilometers. If the LNIP is P4-44 degrees off the central region, P4-45 kilometers would be added to the base value making the wing components P4-46 kilometers for this launcher. Note: The launcher dead zone only applies to the ABT engagements and not TBM engagements. FIRE UNIT DISPLAY PROCESSING 3-251. The launcher graph display (LGD) has been modified to accommodate remote launch capability. The display now has two scales, one for local launchers and one for remote launchers. The LGD is displayed for a manual emplacement when Tab 85 is entered and for an automatic emplacement • •

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upon completion of the automatic emplacement. If there are no remote launchers, the normal LGD is displayed; otherwise, the extended LGD is displayed. An on-screen scale CHANGE LEGEND is displayed anytime a launcher is emplaced beyond P4-47 kilometers. This legend appears in the lower right portion of the situation display and informs the operator of how to change the LGD scale. The on-screen legend is— • • TO SELECT n KM RANGE SCALE—PRESS HOOK (Displayed when the extended LGD is displayed). TO SELECT nn KM RANGE SCALE—PRESS HOOK (Displayed when the normal LGD is displayed and a remote launcher is emplaced).

ICC PROCESSING 3-252. The ICC battalion command and control (BCAC) software has been modified to account for battery processing of remote launchers. For the ICC to correctly assess enemy targets relative to a battery, it must know the remote LS positions to appropriately calculate TFLT, LNIP, TTFL, and TTLL. All Patriot battery LS positions are uptold if the FU has any remote LS. The FU also reports the LS that it has selected for a particular target. If the FU does not report an LS assignment for a particular target, the ICC will use the FU position for performing threat assessment. 3-253. At the ICC, an asset defense file (ADF) is developed which lists the closest batteries to active assets defined. This is a course check to determine if a threatened asset can be defended. With the arrival of remote launch, the ADF now considers the closest batteries of the closest remote launcher(s) reported by the batteries. As previously discussed, the fire unit(s) now sends the remote launcher locations to the ICC. The ICC ADF only considers the remote launcher(s) reported from its local fire units. An MICC's ADF, for example, does not include the remote launchers from a subordinate ICC. The MICC's ADF considers the subordinate ICC's batteries and its own locations as well as any remote launchers reported from its own batteries. The closest battery, local battery, or local battery remote launchers are used for the threat assessment calculations and fire unit selection. TACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS 3-254. The defense design process is essentially unchanged, although minor modifications incorporate remote launch. It is recommended that remote region 3 be the maximum region for the emplacement of remote launchers (METT-TC dependent). 3-255. Remote launch is a battalion-level decision. Deploy remote launchers as a last resort. Plan the defense to use only local launchers first. If the defense needs to be improved and if it can be by using remote launch, do so. However, realize that remote launch operations place a greater demand on the battalion's resources (personnel, equipment, maintenance, and logistics). 3-256. Short-term missions such as initial lodgment protection force build-up protection missions, and protection of staging and assembly areas may all be operations suited for remote launch. Available airlift may require the

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commander to take minimal fire control equipment with maximum fire power. For example, a single battery supplemented with eight additional LSs can provide maximum defense until additional batteries can be airlifted to their site. 3-257. Distribution of LS sections or platoons is critical and must be based on mission. The distribution of LSs has a direct impact on the distribution of firepower based on availability of ready missiles. Factors involved in this decision include the following: Expected enemy threat—What does the intelligence community define as the expected threat? What is the worst case scenario for a dedicated attack? What are enemy targeting techniques for a given target (for example, troop area, air base, fire unit)? If attack is expected to come in waves, will it be a mixture of enemy vehicles such as TBMs, HARMs, CMs, followed by ABTs, or will each wave be dedicated to a specific threat vehicle? What is the expected time interval between waves? • Asset priorities—The area commander's defended asset list of priorities for asset defense will determine during defense design. • Self-defense—First priority for consideration will always be given to the battery to provide self-defense protection. • Launch station Pk curves—Each individual LS has its own associated Pk curve. The Pk curves for local and remote LSs are the same. Local LSs can support the defense of a remote asset against TBMs within the Patriot system parameters. Remote LSs expand the high Pk region to cover remote assets. They reduce missile fly-out times for extended range TBM engagements. Remote LSs and their associated Pk curves may be positioned too far forward of the battery to provide protection of the parent battery. The firepower dedicated to the support of a remote asset may be lost to the self-defense of the battery and any asset behind the remote LS. 3-258. Remote launchers must always be deployed in launcher sections. Single launchers will never be deployed to support a remote launch mission. Deploying by sections maintains section integrity, reduces the logistical burden on the battery, and simplifies security problems. What is more important, section deployment allows remote launchers to maintain firepower on simultaneously arriving TBMs. With only one LS available, the engagement of multiple TBMs is constrained by the rate of fire from a single LS. With two launchers present, multiple TBMs are served from separate launchers at the maximum rate of fire for the system. The launch rate with a single LS may cause single-shot engagements of TBMs rather than the doctrine of two-shot engagements that result in a lower Pk. This defeats the original purpose of deploying a remote LS. Factors involved in this decision include the following: • • Plan to fight against the most difficult TBM that the IPB indicates the enemy possesses. Do not use remote launch if the mission is against only ABTs. Using remote LS does not increase the system Pk against ABTs. Remote LSs limit the battery's effectiveness against low-altitude ABTs. •

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Distribute remote LSs by section and maintain at least half of the battery's launchers as local. Self-defense capability must be maintained to protect any assets. Remote launchers cannot provide protection of the fire battery, while local LSs can provide protection of all assets. 3-259. During the action analysis phase of tactical decision making, participation by the S4 is critical. The logistics estimate should be used to select feasible courses of action for further analysis (for example, is remote launch supportable for this course of action). The S4 considers organization strength data to accurately estimate many of the requirements for supplies and services. He analyzes the following areas: The demands for and on missile resupply. The demand for additional maintenance assets. The need for any additional services (for example, transportation demands). 3-260. Due to the above considerations and the current Patriot support concept, remote launch may be more conducive in a non-mobile environment. For example, a tactical situation where a Corps is in the defense or an EAC Patriot unit is required to defend static assets (airport of debarkation [APOD] or seaport of debarkation [SPOD]). It is recommended that battalions develop standing operating procedures that account for all the logistic and security implications concerning remote launch (site security, missile reload, crew rotation, maintenance, refuel, and rations resupply). Suggested ideas for support are as follows: Host unit support—This idea requires the fire unit to coordinate with the defended asset to establish a support relationship. The defended asset may provide common support such as security, fuel, billeting, and rations. All other support will have to come from the fire unit itself. The advantage of this concept is that it uses the defended assets' resources, which reduces the assets required from the fire unit, to accomplish the mission. • Daily consolidated support—This idea requires the fire unit to establish a site routine where all the support functions are done on a daily basis to reduce the demands upon the fire unit assets. All actions are done on a scheduled basis that is controlled by the fire unit's command post. Emergencies can be handled on an exception basis that is also coordinated through the fire unit's command post. • As required support—This idea requires the fire unit to establish good communications with the remote launch section to support operational requirements (emplacement operations and maintenance support). This idea requires the establishment of a small control section at the remote launch site putting a greater demand upon the resources of the fire unit. 3-261. The battalion may use any one or a combination of the support concepts in their standing operating procedures. The remote launch capability is more conducive for static situations. The tactical capability may out-weigh the support considerations. • • • •

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3-262. Remote launch may be used to maintain or extend coverage during asset movement. This may be accomplished by prepositioning launchers in the defended area along a route of march. 3-263. Reconstitution is limited to like-equipped LSs because remote LS must be DLU equipped. During the defense design process, the S3 must consider on-line reconstitution to maintain protection over assets. This only applies if two or more batteries are in proximity and have overlapping fields of fire. Figure 3-29 shows a defense that lends itself to on-line reconstitution.

ASSET 4 ASSET 3 LS7A LS5A LS6A LS8A LS7B LS8B

ASSET 5 LS6B LS5B

LS2B LS2A LS3A LS1B LS1A LS4A

LS3B

LS4B

B BTRY A BTRY Figure 3-29. Reconstitution Possibilities
3-264. Should A or B Battery (Figure 3-29) become nonoperational, all the LSs protecting Asset 4 can be used by the operational battery. All emplacement constraints for the LSs over Asset 4 must be met for both batteries. The LS must be within angular limits, range limits, LOS limits, and PTL support limits. 3-265. Launchers used for remote must be automatically emplaced. The launchers have to be reemplaced by the gaining unit automatically. To accomplish this The crew members at the remote LS must— – Ensure the correct LS address is set. – Change frequency, hopsets/transmitter set (if different). – Set net start time. • The crew members at the ECS must— – Ensure that the other ECS has deassigned the remote launcher. – Establish the remote LS Tab 85 data base. – Ensure the remote LS is in SYNC. – Reorient the LS as needed to support the PTL. 3-266. Each battery in the battalion will load all six hopsets and appropriate lockout sets in each radio. Each battery will then operate on a unique hopset •

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and its assigned lockout set. When a group of remote launchers are to be transferred to another battery, the launcher operator must ensure that the launcher is at the alignment position (normally stow). If not, the operator must rotate the LS to the alignment position, change the launcher address, radio hopset, and set the time to coincide with the receiving unit. The PLGR system provides a very accurate time source for the system. 3-267. The primary function of remote launchers is to intercept TBMs; the missile load should be all GEMs. If this is not possible, the mix of GEM and ATM missiles should be balanced between the local and remote locations. The same missile selection rules still apply for TBM and ABT engagements allowing all missiles to be used for these engagements (ATM1 and ATM engagements from local launchers only). If radar frequency pairs are lost, the remaining missiles with the same frequency pairs will not be selected for firing. This will reduce the number of available missiles on that launcher. No more than two missiles with the same frequency pair should be loaded on one launcher. Missile dash numbers are stenciled on the rear of the missile canisters. 3-268. The GEM Pk curves are a result of the enhancements to the Patriot system hardware and software modifications. These include hardware modifications that result in earlier detection and software improvements for remote launch, enhanced missile trajectory shaping, and better fusing. The synergism of these improvements results in a larger region of higher Pk. The actual Pk values are defined in (S)FM 44-100A(U). 3-269. With this policy, the LS crewmen will only have to verify the remote LS setup. The ECS operator will only have to enter the sharable remote LS into the data base. This cannot be done in advance because of communication protocol between the ECS and LSs. The LS only talks when spoken to. If two ECSs have the same LS in their data base, both will try to establish communications with the LS. This will result in the LS not synchronize to either ECS.

PATRIOT MISSILES
3-270. The Patriot missile inventory includes four different missile types. They are referred to as the Standard, SOJC, ATM, and ATM1 missiles. The standard and SOJC missiles are also referred to as PAC-1 missiles, while the ATM missile is the PAC-2, and the ATM1 missile is the GEM. There are no visual differences between the missiles. Reading the noun nomenclature from the data plate on the canister makes identification as to which type missile is in the canister. Nomenclature and missile type is as follows: • MIM-104A Standard • MIM-104B SOJC • MIM-104C ATM • MIM-104D ATM1 (GEM) 3-271. Using the system software, the operator can identify the type of missiles uploaded on the launchers by observing the Missile Inventory tab S/I (see Figure 3-30). With the fielding of each new missile, all the capabilities of the previous missile were retained. The LS ID, missile status, and missile

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count will appear blank when the LS is inactive. U-UNKNOWN is reserved for the PAC-3 missile.
LS1 MISSILE STATUS-LAUNCHER BANK A LS2 LS3 LS4 LS5 LS6 LS7 SELECTABILITY A-SELECTABLE B-NOT SELECTABLE C-NOT AT TEMP D-S+A CHARGED E-READY PAGE 1 LS8 S/I

HAZARD STATUS— 1-NO HAZ-NO MISFIRE 2-NO HAZ-MISFIRE 3-HAZ-NO MISFIRE 4-HAZ-MISFIRE

MISSILE TYPE— MSL POSITION 1-STD FROM BEHIND 2-ASOJ UL-UR 3-ATM LL-LR 4-ATM1 U-UNKNOWN

LS1

MISSILE STATUS-LAUNCHER BANK B-F LS2 LS3 LS4 LS5 LS6 LS7 SELECTABILITY A-SELECTABLE B-NOT SELECTABLE C-NOT AT TEMP D-S+A CHARGED E-READY

PAGE 2 LS8

S/I

HAZARD STATUS— 1-NO HAZ-NO MISFIRE 2-NO HAZ-MISFIRE 3-HAZ-NO MISFIRE 4-HAZ-MISFIRE

MISSILE TYPE— MSL POSITION 1-STD FROM BEHIND 2-ASOJ UL-UR 3-ATM LL-LR 4-ATM1 U-UNKNOWN PAGE 3 7A 8A S/I

MISSILE INVENTORY – BOTH BANKS MISSILES— TYPE HOT COLD LAUNCHER AVAILABILITY— 1A 2A 3A 4A 5A 6A

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

STD ASOJ ATM ATM1 NO GUIDANCE FREQUENCIES— MISSILES

Figure 3-30. Missile Inventory S/I, Pages 1 to 3
STANDARD MISSILE 3-272. The MIM-104 Standard missile was the first missile type fielded with Patriot and contained an analog fuze. This fuze was replaced by a digital version of the fuze with the fielding of the MIM-104A. Both of these missiles provide excellent performance against ABTs and adequate performance against certain TBMs. The warhead fragment size limits performance against TBMs to a Mission Kill. SOJC MISSILE 3-273. To counter the long-range ECM threat, use the MIM-104B or SOJC missile. The guidance and navigation hardware was modified to allow the SOJC missile to fly a lofted trajectory to the jamming source and seek out the strongest emitter during the terminal phase. To achieve the lofted trajectory needed to maintain missile maneuverability at long range, missile acquisition is delayed for the SOJC mission. The SOJC missile can fly five times longer than the standard missile without the uplink/downlink between the RS and

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missile. The SOJC missile retains the same performance against ABTs and TBMs as the standard missile. PATRIOT ANTITACTICAL MISSILE CAPABILITY 2 (ATM) 3-274. The ATM MIM-104C is used to counter the advanced TBM threat. A new warhead and a dual-mode fuze were added to the missile. The new warhead contains a more powerful explosive and larger fragments designed to place sufficient kinetic energy on the warhead section of enemy TBMs to achieve a warhead kill. The dual-mode fuze allows the ATM missile to retain ABT performance and optimize TBM fuzing. The system software based on the mission selected for the missile sets the fuze mode. PATRIOT GUIDANCE ENHANCED MISSILE (ATM-1) 3-275. Patriot GEM missiles provide improved capability against TBMs and advanced ABTs. The GEM improves system effectiveness and lethality against high speed TBMs and incorporates a footprint with increased Pk. The GEM also has increased lethality against advanced low radar cross section ABTs. The modifications to the PAC-2 missile include an improved sensitivity of the C-band track-via-missile (TVM) seeker, improved S-band fuze reaction time, and higher TVM data rate. The improvement in sensitivity of the TVM seeker is accomplished through the addition of three low-noise C-band amplifiers to the front end of the receiver. This low noise amplifier change required modifications to the seeker antenna monopulse feed and to the intermediate frequency (IF) receiver. The S-band fuze improvement changed the fuze processor to provide greater sensitivity and earlier detection of targets. The higher TVM data rate is incorporated into the missile hardware via a change to the programmable read-only memory in the timing and control unit. LAUNCHER CONFIGURATIONS 3-276. Missiles will be loaded on launching stations to facilitate reload according to mission priorities. When the unit has a mix of missile types, the different types will be evenly distributed across the launching stations. If the unit has a TBM-only mission, the ATM missiles will be loaded in the upper positions on the launching station, and the ATM1 missiles will be loaded in the upper left/lower left or upper right/lower right positions. If the unit has an ABT-only mission, a standard and an SOJC missile will be loaded in the upper positions. If the mission is mixed, TBM and ABT, the ATM or SOJC missiles will be loaded in the same manner as the ATM1 missiles (upper left/lower left, upper right/lower right). These configurations in a mixed missile type basic load will facilitate reload without removal of nonexpended missiles. 3-277. Distribute the GEMs on the launchers so that the loss of a launcher will not significantly reduce ATM capability. This will provide for redundancy in case of launcher malfunction. GEMs should be loaded on the upper left and lower left positions or upper right or lower right positions for easy access for missile reload. Furthermore, even distribution will maximize launch rate of

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these missiles. For example, if the battery has four GEM missiles, then put the missiles on two separate launchers. 3-278. Each missile has a pair of assigned frequencies that are set at the factory. These frequencies are used for communication with the missile. Along with ensuring that the launcher is configured with the correct type of missiles (STD, SOJC, ATM, and ATM1), the TCO and battery warrant officer must ensure that a correct frequency mix is also distributed on the launcher. The missile distribution should not exceed two missiles with the same frequency pair per launcher. This will minimize the loss of a launcher due to the radar exciter group not being able to support certain frequencies. SYSTEM INFORMATION 3-279. Information about uploaded missiles is available to the operator in page 1 of the Fault Data tab, the Missile Status, and the Missile Inventory tab. The guidance frequencies information in the Fault Data tab indicates the number of missiles that are supported in frequency by the radar. Those missiles that have no frequency support are not usable for engagements. The Missile Status and Missile Inventory tabs give the operator a "by missile" indication of the missile status. Pages 1 and 2 show the status by launcher for each bank. Missiles with no guidance frequencies supported by the radar will show a B for NOT SELECTABLE. Page 3 is a missile summary by type for all the available launchers.

FIDOC AND OPERATIONAL PARAMETERS
3-280. The commander now has the ability to provide some tailoring of the Patriot system to counter the expected TBM threat within the theater of operations. This tailoring is done by way of page 2 of ICC Tab 1 (Figure 3-31, pages 1 through 3 of Tab 1).

FIDOC + OPERATIONAL PARAMETERS CHANGE PAGE 1 OF 3 ( )ADRS: 1=ALL SUBORD FP, 2=SLCT FIDOC+OPNL PRMTRS FP 1 2 3 4 5 6 ( ) = TBMA ENGAGEMENT MODE; A=AUTO, M=MANUAL ( ) = TBMB ENGAGEMENT MODE; A=AUTO, M=MANUAL ( ) = TBMA MOF CONTROL; R=RIPPLE, S=SLS ( ) = TBMB MOF CONTROL; R=RIPPLE, S=SLS ( ) = URBAN LOW ALT TRAJ CTRL; 1=ON, 0=OFF ( ) = TBMA DIVE CALCULATION; 1=ON, 0=OFF ( ) = TBMA DIVE ALTITUDE; TO ( )D = TBMA DIVE ANGLE; TO DEG

*1*

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FIDOC + OPERATIONAL PARAMETERS CHANGE ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ) ) ) ) ) = = = = = )aa )aa ) = ) =

PAGE 2 OF 3

*1*

FP SEARCH MODE A=ABT, T=TBM GND LVL INTRF FLTR 0=OFF, 1=HRZN, 2=1+SRPOP, 3=1+2+LOMED TRACK-WHILE-SCAN- INTRF FLTR 0=OFF, A=AUTO, M=MANUAL TBMA ENGAGEMENT MODE A=AUTO, M=MANUAL TBMB ENGAGEMENT MODE A=AUTO, M=MANUAL = TBM ENGAGEMENT RANGE BIAS -n.n TO +n.n aa = TBM ENGAGEMENT ALT BIAS -n.n TO +n.n aa TBMA MOF CONTROL R=RIPPLE, S=SLS TBMB MOF CONTROL R=RIPPLE, S=SLS PAGE 3 OF 3 *1*

FIDOC + OPERATIONAL PARAMETERS CHANGE (n) = TMBA DIVE CALCULATION (nn) aa = TBMA DIVE ALTITUDE (nn)D = TBMs DIVE ANGLE

1 = ON, 0 = OFF nn TO nn aa nn TO nn DEG 1 = ON, 0 = OFF

(n) = URBAN LOW ALT TRAJECTORY CONTROL

(a) = TBMA NOMINAL OVERRIDE Y = YES, N = NO (nn)M/S = GLIF + T-W-S VELOCITY THRESHOLD;10 TO 40, NOMINAL = 40

Figure 3-31. ICC Tab 1, FIDOC and Operational Parameters Change
3-281. The PDB-4.2 update has modified the K-7 operational software only. Tab 1, page 3, has been updated to include the capability to modify the velocity threshold that identifies tracks to be dropped from processing using track while scan (TWS) and GLIF criteria. Tracks traveling faster than the default velocity threshold found in page 3 of Tab 1 are not considered for GLIF or TWS processing by the software. For operational conditions where GLIF/TWS could not previously be activated due to lower velocity targets of interest, this modification allows the capacity to retain track while still allowing filtering of slow tracks and clutter below the threshold value. A modified velocity threshold value is not saved to the TACI data base and will revert to the default value when the software is rebooted. The default value for this velocity threshold is unchanged from the PDB-4 version of software, and the PDB-4 GLIF/TWS capability is retained if the threshold is left unmodified. 3-282. The PDB-4.2 software allows a TBM A classification for targets that exceed the PDB-4 altitude threshold limits but are not fast enough to be classified as TBM B. The surveillance, EDWA, and guidance logic have been modified to provide improved system performance versus a TBM A, other than the nominal threat. TAB 1, Page 3, has been updated to enable or disable the enhanced processing of this threat. It is recommended that the tab control be enabled only if information is available which indicates that a non-Nominal threat is active in the theater of operation. The purpose of selecting non-Nominal threat altitude threshold is to ensure the software selects the proper missile, GEM or PAC-2, for engagements. This selection is not saved in TACI. When the software is rebooted, it will revert back to the default value (disabled).

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3-283. When enabling the nominal override, the missile selection for TBM A changes. The system will primarily select the GEM when the TBM GIP is within P4-48 km radius from the selected launcher. Outside P4-49 km radius the system will select a PAC II missile. The missile selection criteria is based on the higher Pk achieved by the GEM against the nominal targets within the P4-50 km radius. FIRE PLATOON SEARCH MODE 3-284. FUs will be directed to the TBM search mode as determined by battalion operations. The number of FUs in TBM search will be predicated on the coverage required and EMCON. TBM A ENGAGEMENT MODE 3-285. This engagement control field gives the operator the ability to select an engagement mode for TBM As. This data field is defaulted to Manual, for TBM A AUTO ENGAGE OFF. The entries in terms of TBM engagements will be based on the enemy threat to be countered. If TBM As are not a threat to the battalion or its assets (that is, the battery or asset is at least P4-51 km from the TBM A launch point), then engagements of TBM As should be manual. In this case, leave data field default. If both TBM As and TBM Bs are threats to the battalion, then both TBM A ENGAGEMENT MODE and TBM B ENGAGEMENT MODE will be automatic. The “nnn SELF-DEFENSE THREAT” alert will not be displayed if a TBM A meets the self-defense criteria, and the system TBM A ENGAGEMENT MODE is in the automatic mode. TBM B ENGAGEMENT MODE 3-286. This engagement control field gives the operator the ability to select an engagement mode for TBM Bs. This data field is defaulted to A, for TBM B AUTO ENGAGE ON. The entries in terms of TBM engagements will be based on the enemy threat to be countered. If Type B TBMs are not a threat to the battalion or its assets, in this case, leave data field default. If both TBM As and TBM Bs are threats to the battalion, then both TBMA ENGAGEMENT MODE and TBMB ENGAGEMENT MODE will be automatic. In the automatic mode the “nnn SELF-DEFENSE THREAT” alert will not be displayed if a TBM B meets the self-defense criteria. TBM ENGAGEMENT RANGE BIAS AND ALTITUDE BIAS 3-287. The TBM RANGE and ALT BIAS will not be used unless directed by a field bulletin. It has been determined, as a result of continued analysis conducted on ATM and GEM (ATM1) performance, that the optimum altitude for TBM B intercept is P4-52 kilometers. Consequently, for a TBM B mission, a (-4km/-13 kft) must be entered in ECS Tab 1, page 2, TBM ENGAGEMENT ALT BIAS. This entry is not saved on the data base and must be reentered after each boot of the system. TBM A AND B METHOD OF CONTROL

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3-288. The TBM A and B method of control should be left at the default value of Ripple versus TBM A and B, when first arriving in the theater of operations. This option should not be changed unless intelligence information or engineering data is provided indicating that adequate system performance is achievable against the existing enemy threat with a single missile. TBM SEARCH SECTOR SKEW BEARING ANGLE 3-289. The TBM Search Sectors Skew is the angle that the TBM search sector was rotated during initialization. TBM sectors skew cannot be done during tactical operations and can be different from the ABT search sector. TBM sectors skew should not be used. 3-290. Using Tab 95, Radar Mapping Train Control, the TBM search sector can be skewed ±15 degrees. This sector should not be skewed unless IPB information has provided data that the expected TBM trajectories are different from the ABT PTL or secondary target line (STL) assigned. Reorienting to an STL may be considered to counter the TBM threat, while operations along the PTL will primarily counter the ABT threat. Once the TBM search sector has been skewed in TACI, it cannot be changed while in tactical operations. Care should be taken in assigning skewed TBM search sectors. If the sector has to be changed, the operator must return to TACI. ENABLE TBM A DIVE CALCULATION 3-291. Certain types of TBM As can perform a terminal dive maneuver after missile apogee. To account for this dive maneuver capability, the TBM A threat process has a dive computation used to determine and provide a dive trajectory prediction. The LNIPs and GIPs are computed with the updated diving trajectory prediction (the dive computation is only used for TBM As, in Figure 3-32). There are several criteria necessary for the height of dive computation to be applied. First, as with all TBM threats, the ballistic GIP is determined. Second, the battery or asset must be threatened by the TBM A (that is, located within the GIP box). Lastly, the battery or asset must be between the incoming missile and the GIP (TBM A appears to overfly the asset). Given that all these criteria are met, a straight line is projected at default P4-53 degree angle from the ballistic trajectory to the asset. All intercept calculations (LNIP, TTFL, TTLL, and so forth) are then made based on the updated trajectory prediction that includes the dive point. 3-292. Not all TBM As can or will perform a dive maneuver. Tab 1, page 3, enables or disables the dive calculation as appropriate. The enabling or disabling of the dive calculation is based on the enemy TBM. If the IPB indicates that there are no enemy Type TBM As in the theater of operations that can perform the dive maneuver, then the dive calculation should be disabled. If the threat includes TBM As that dive, then the dive calculation should be enabled. When performing a point or specific asset defense to counter the diving Type TBM A, the dive calculation should be enabled. However, when performing an area defense in which synthetic or false assets are input to provide a large area of coverage, the dive calculation should be disabled. The default value for the dive calculation is 1 for enabled.

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Direction of Flight

TBM Ballistic Trajectory Prediction Height of Dive Dive Angle Ground Impact Point

Uncertainty/ GIP Box

Figure 3-32. TBM A Dive Calculation
URBAN LOW-ALTITUDE TRAJECTORY CONTROL 3-293. This function prohibits intercepts under the minimum intercept altitude. This feature is selected when the defended asset engagement zones overlays a populated area. The feature is not selectable by asset; it applies to all TBM intercepts and can be selected during TACI or K7. 3-294. When enabled, the software logic will monitor the Patriot missile altitude to prevent it from being commanded into the ground or from chasing a TBM into the ground during TBM engagements. If the logic detects that the missile is predicted to detonate below the minimum threshold of P4-54 kilometers above ground level and has a downward vertical velocity, the intercept is aborted. The missile is commanded to climb until the rocket motor has burned out and its altitude is at least 3 kilometers above the local ground level. Then a destruct command is sent to the missile. SELF-DEFENSE 3-295. Fire unit TBM self-defense has the highest priority, whether the FU is entered as an asset or not. However, when entering the FU as an asset, it must be assigned the highest ATC or equal to the highest asset ATC. Special logic has been applied which ranks FU TBM self-defense threats highest on the TBEQ. This logic also reserves guidance, launcher, and/or missile resources to protect the FU if there is a conflict between an asset and the FU. 3-296. The FU operator will be provided the alert “nnn SELF-DEFENSE” if the FU is in the manual TBM engage mode. The operator should acknowledge the alert, which hooks the target and then engages it.

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ASSET DEFENSE 3-297. The Patriot system can provide TBM asset defense, ABT asset defense, or a combination of both. When an asset is defined in Tab 70, it will be labeled as a TB for TBM asset or AT for an ABT asset. When activated, the Patriot system will provide either ABT and/or TBM defense if as described above. The intercept point is within the high-lethality region (engagement zone) for TBMs. A 2-km radius is entered in Tab 70 for AT threats, and the threat is assets against the TBM GIP box. For large assets to be defended, multiple points (a minimum of three, up to a maximum of eight points) can be defined such that a TBM impacting anywhere within this defended region is certain to be assessed as a threat. 3-298. Tab 70 now allows the following four measures when initializing assets for TBM defenses: Enter the TBM asset as a point defense (this method is not recommended as it assesses the threat the same as PDB-3). When defined as a point, the actual radius will be used for the threat assessment when engaging the TBM. When entering a center point with a radius, the software uses the entered radius for threat assessment and not a 2-km radius as with ABT/TBM assets. In order for the system to engage the TBM, the TBMs GIP box must intersect the defended asset’s defended area. • Enter a TBM asset as a point with a radius when there are vast distances between TBM assets that exceed GIP box parameters. The radius entered can be from 00.1 to 99.9 kms. However, the S3 must ensure that the radius entered does not exceed the high lethality region of the TBM warhead. • Enter the TBM asset as a polygon asset. This is the recommended method when having to defend a large TBM asset or area. A minimum of three points can be entered, up to a maximum of eight points. (This allows the S3 to tailor the defended asset). • Enter the ABT/TBM asset as a point with a radius. This will allow an asset to be threat assessed against an ABT threat and will ensure a GIP assessment against a TBM threat. 3-299. After emplacing the firing batteries to achieve optimal TBM defense of assigned assets, a determination must be made as to the most appropriate UTM point for asset definition through Tab 70. If both an asset and the battery are threatened, then the TBM is assessed as a self-defense threat. If multiple assets are threatened, then the TBM is assessed as a threat to the highest priority asset. 3-300. A probable kill is the normal, if an FU initiates a kill assessment state for TBMs indicating successful intercept. It is determined by the guidance function when the missile achieves a negative closing velocity and does not respond to a subsequent uplink query. For ABTs, a follow-on energy calculation is performed, with a time-out, to indicate if target breakup and consequent deceleration have occurred. Based upon remaining energy at the conclusion of the time-out, a confirmed kill or no kill is determined. This process is not attempted by the FU for TBMs because of the TBM speed, •

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intercept altitudes, and difficulty in measuring lack of deceleration in time to consider any further reengagement (paragraph 3-177 discusses ABT kill assessment in greater detail). 3-301. The ICC’s kill assessment logic for TBMs is the same as it is for ABTs. There is an energy calculation performed at the ICC as a backup for the FU ABT energy calculation, which is also active for TBMs. The reason for not changing this test for TBMs was because of TBM speeds and intercept altitudes. The TBM was assumed to have long since impacted the ground and dropped track when the timer would have normally expired. The other confirmed kill test at the ICC that applies to all target types is: if all tracking FUs have dropped the target after a probable kill, then a confirmed kill is declared. 3-302. The software will assist the operator in identifying TBM debris and inhibit the automatic engagement of debris. The debris may result from TBM breakup after intercept or during reentry into the atmosphere. A series of TBM velocity and range rate tests have been added to the TBM threat assessment process. 3-303. An Engage Hold condition is automatically applied to any TBM that meets any of the criteria defined below. The Engage Hold condition will inhibit the automatic engagement of that track. The process consists of the following four checks: total velocities, ground velocity, smooth range rate, and invalid LNIP. 3-304. If any of the above criteria are met, an Engage Hold is placed on the TBM. It should be noted that the Engage Hold is a local condition and is not transmitted to the ICC or other fire units. The Engage Hold will be displayed in the ENGST/M data field of the Track Amp Data tab and the Engage Hold symbol will be placed around the target. 3-305. The Engage Hold inhibits the automatic engagement of these targets; however, the operator may manually engage these targets. The operator will be unable to engage any target with an invalid LNIP. To engage the track, the operator must hook the track and press the ENGAGE switch-indicator. The engagement will occur when the release time goes to 0. 3-306. The determination of whether to engage debris is difficult. Current software does not provide an indication on the size of the debris, only that it meets the velocity criteria for debris. The operator has no indication of whether the debris is a large object that can still do damage when it impacts or a small object that will not cause any damage. 3-307. As a rule, the operator will not engage debris. Currently, there is no way of making an informed decision on the size of the debris, and there is no guarantee that the engagement will further destroy the falling object. 3-308. The battalion S3 may consider the following when deciding whether to authorize the engagement of debris: • • • Is missile conservation needed? How survivable, how recoverable, how critical, and how vulnerable is the asset? Is the use of warhead decoys or chaff possible?

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MISSILE SELECTION
3-309. There are now four types of missiles in the field. Table 3-7 is a summary of the software missile selection logic that will accommodate the specific engagement selected. If the mission is an ABT engagement, then the standard missile is selected first. If there are no standard missiles, then an SOJC missile will be selected, followed by an ATM, then ATM1 missile. The EDWA logic first determines which launchers have the required missile for the engagement, and then selects the best launcher. The operator can not change the logic for missile selection. The only control the operator has in this process is by selecting or deselecting (Operate or Standby) specific launchers. This selection criterion incorporates the PDB-4.2 software upgrade. Selection of the GEM for all TBM Bs is done in PDB-4.1 update software. The TBM A nominal override capability found in Tab 1 is accomplished in the PDB-4.2 update.

Table 3-7 Missile Priority Assignment

TYPE MISSILE

ABT
NON-QUIET TARGETS RCS FILTER IN MAINT. RCS = HI RCS = MED RCS = LO (A) (A) (A) (B) (C)

SOJC

TBM A
TAB *1*
NOMINAL OVERRIDE = YES OR NO AND LS DISTANCE FROM GIP IS GREATER OR EQUAL TO P4-55 kms.

TBM A
TAB *1*
NOMINAL OVERRIDE = YES LS DISTANCE FROM GIP IS LESS THAN P4-56 kms.

TBM B ARM

A STD SOJC ATM ATM1 1 2 3 4

B 4 3 1 2

C 4 3 2 1 3 1 2 4

4 3 1 2

4 3 2 1

4 3 2 1

4 3 1 2

NOTES: ATM IS A PAC-2 MISSILE. ATM-1 IS A GEM. IF RADAR CROSS SECTION (RCS) IS NOT MAINTAINED BY THE SYSTEM, THE RCS IS ASSUMED TO BE HI. RCS TESTS APPLY ONLY TO QUIET TARGETS. IF THREAT IS IN THEATER, ENTRY OF YES IS REQUIRED AND A COMBINATION OF PAC-2 AND GEMs MUST BE LOADED ONTO THE LAUNCHERS.

MISSILE DISTRIBUTION 3-310. The anticipated enemy threat and the FU's mission must be considered when distributing missile types. For example, a high-value asset within range of enemy TBMs should be protected by an FU with predominantly ATM missiles. Other considerations include the threat in the days following the first attack. FIRING PROCEDURES

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3-311. The system will automatically schedule and prioritize ATM engagements. It will fire two missiles to achieve the Pk defined. However, according to Patriot ATM firing doctrine, the automatic shoot-look-shoot (SLS) logic is to shoot one missile at all TBMs with the same ATC and approximately the same TTLL, before firing the second shot. This ensures that each TBM with the same ATC is engaged at least once before impact. Both engagements of higher priority TBM targets will be scheduled before the first engagement of a lower priority target. AUTOMATIC HARD COPY OF TBM DATA 3-312. The system provides for the automatic hard copy of specific TBM data at the FU. This automatic hard copy will be for TBM tracks only and will be performed at three specific events—detection, engagement, and intercept. The information will be automatically printed on the hard copy unit without operator intervention, similar to a test action number (TAN). The data is printed approximately 10 seconds after initial detection. Two lines will be output for each TBM and event. Figure 3-33 describes the field in the hard copy data. The TBM “y” position is equivalent to altitude. The units for speed and altitude will always be printed in metric.
DETECT ENGAGE INTCPT TOD TBM X, Y, Z POSITION IN METERS

TBM X Dot, Y Dot, Z Dot VELOCITY IN METERS/SEC HEADING IN DEGREES

hh :mm: ss hh :mm: ss

nnn nnn T

T event event

sxxxxx yyyyy zzzzzsxxxx zzheeeeeennnnnnn

syyyy szzzz zzheeeeeennnnnnn F vvvv ccc

TBM TYPE A or B

TBM UTM POSITION

GIP UTM POSITION

RAID SIZE

TOTAL VELOCITY IN METERS PER SECOND

Figure 3-33. TBM Automatic Hard Copy Format

ATM MISSION
3-313. The ATM mission is conducted at the FU and coordinated through the ICC. As previously mentioned, the FU operates in the automatic TBM engagement mode, minimizing operator intervention, in the rapid reaction required to counter the threatening TBMs. Manual engagements of engageable nonthreatening TBMs should not be performed unless specifically directed by higher echelon. The following are tactical implications of the TBM

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software. These impacts are to be implemented to ensure that Patriot ATM capability is optimized. ROLE OF THE INFORMATION AND COORDINATION CENTRAL 3-314. The ICC has a limited role in the TBM defense arena, consisting of engagement coordination and automatic downtells. In the area of engagement coordination, the ICC relays the engage status with cease fire, hold fire, and other engagement statuses as it does in the ABT mission. As previously mentioned, the ICC also relays the FU TBM scores between tracking FUs. The ICC will also display the FU with the best score in the primary FU data field of the ICC Track Amp Data tab. The ICC operator should not use this indicator as a means of determining which FU should engage the TBM. TBM engagements are decentralized down to battery level (which engages TBMs in the automatic mode). 3-315. The ICC still performs automatic downtells to subordinate Patriot FUs. These downtells are based on the predicted path of the TBM and its proximity to the assigned FUs and assets. If the path of the TBM is predicted to pass within P4-57 meters of an FU and P4-58 meters of an asset, an automatic downtells is sent to the FU. 3-316. The ICC should not attempt to engage TBM tracks. These tracks will not appear on the ICC's To-Be-Engaged Data 1 tab, so the operator will not know if they are truly threatening. The ICC should ensure that the FUs have entered the proper search and engage mode parameters to counter the enemy threat.

ECCM OPERATIONS
3-317. The Patriot system counters ECM in a variety of ways. The fire unit performs the main effort to neutralize ECM. Using the repertoire of waveforms within the radar, frequency diversity, or a combination of both, the Patriot system is effective in the ECM or chaffs environment. If jamming is so intense that the radar cannot determine target range, then the fire unit reports the information as a strobe (azimuth and elevation) to the ICC, which then performs triangulation and provides the needed range data to the fire unit. 3-318. Triangulation requires track data from several fire units on the same target source, so overlapping coverage is an important element in Patriot defense design. The standoff jammer counter (SOJC) feature, using the virtual target (VT) process provides the Patriot system with an excellent capability against a range denied formation of SOJs. The strobe engagement mode (SEM) also provides the fire unit with the capability to engage rangedenied targets. The Patriot system has been extensively tested in severe ECM environments, to include the complete range of jamming, chaff, and their combinations, and has performed outstandingly. FIRE UNIT ECCM OPERATIONS—STROBE ENGAGEMENT MODE

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3-319. The SEM provides the fire unit operator with the ability to engage range-denied tracks. Jamming targets with sufficient power can be range denied to the Patriot radar. When this condition occurs, the track data on that target is processed as a strobe track, which only has azimuth and elevation data. This strobe data is sent to the ICC and, provided there is overlapping coverage, is processed by ICC triangulation, which will determine the target's range. This range is then provided to the fire units. At the fire unit, the strobe line will disappear and the target symbology will appear at the designated range. The normal engagement process will then apply to this target. In the fire-unit-to-fire-unit (FUFU) mode, each unit does the triangulation. Triangulation is the normal means of countering range-denied targets. 3-320. Target range—Target range is an absolute requirement for an engagement. Missile initial turn, apogee, and TVM are some of the items based on range. If range cannot be provided via triangulation, the ECS operator can still conduct an engagement on a range-denied target via SEM. 3-321. Methods of deriving range—There are two methods of deriving range in SEM operations. The first is a defaulted range of P4-59 kilometers that is set in the software and cannot be changed by the operator. The other is a range estimate that can be entered by the operator using the situation display cursor and the RANGE EST switch-indicator. An FU operator will perform the following procedures in conducting a SEM. 3-322. Using default value—The operator hooks the strobe of interest. Strobes normally appear from the FU location to the range designated in Tab 14. Once the strobe is hooked, it will extend down to the FU location. The operator will then engage. The default value of P4-60 kilometers is used for the programming of the missile's initial turn and apogee. Missile position, radar position, and TVM are used in determining the actual range of the target. The default method is the preferred option because it provides the most effective capability against a close-in to long-range strobe target. 3-323. Using range estimate—The operator can also engage a strobe track using the range estimate method. To conduct this engagement, the operator first hooks the strobe track. Using the situation display cursor, the operator places the cursor at the expected or provided range of the jammer then pushes the RANGE EST switch-indicator in the Engagement Initiate group. The hooked strobe will move along the strobe line to the range designated on the CRT. The operator then engages the target. The missile's initial turn, apogee, and TVM are programmed on this estimated range. The target's actual range is then determined when the missile is airborne through the missile's position, radar position, and TVM. This method is the least preferred of the two options, due to the uncertainty of the range provided by the operator. 3-324. Tactical considerations—The strobe engagement mode should not be used unless the fire unit is operating in the autonomous method of control. When operating as an integrated battalion, the ICC can provide accurate range data by way of triangulation. The ICC will also use the wedge edge process and provide a virtual target at the appropriate range of an SOJ formation. When employing the strobe engage mode, the default range

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method should be used. This will ensure that a close-in target is detected. It is uncertain where the operator would get an accurate range to be used with the range estimate method. ICC ECCM OPERATIONS 3-325. The ICC supports the ECCM process through the track management software that performs target correlation, triangulation, and SOJC operations. This data is used to correlate the target position and transmit this data to the FU. 3-326. Tab 15, Operator Correlation + Track Number Change (Figure 3-34), is used during tactical operations when a jamming track cannot be rangeresolved by two FUs. The TD or TDA must correlate the jammer position by entering two FU track numbers of the jammer. Both track numbers must be from the same track numbers (two letters and three digits for ATDL-1 and NATO tracks or four digits for TADIL-B tracks). The numbers are both strobe track numbers and one strobe and one range-resolved track number. 3-327. Tab 15 is also used during tactical operations to change track numbers. Changes may be necessary to resolve track number conflicts (changes enter the track management and track correlation process). The new track number must be the same as the original, whether TADIL-A/B, ATDL-1, TADIL-J, or NATO. Illegal track number entries will be recognized in the case of TADIL-A/B versus ATDL-1, TADIL-J, or NATO. Illegal track numbers will cause an alert, a reject message to appear on the display. An error entry between ATDL-1 and NATO will not be recognized.
OPERATOR CORRELATION + TRACK NUMBER CHANGE ( ) COMMAND: *15*

1 = CORRELATE JAMMER POSITION 2 = CORRELATE NRT-LOCAL TRACK 3 = CHANGE TRACK NUMBER ( ) ( )

Figure 3-34. Tab 15, Operator Correlation and Track Number Change
STANDOFF JAMMER COUNTER TACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS 3-328. Current software provides an improved capability to counter formations of standoff jammers (SOJs) at long range, and formations of selfscreening jammers (SSJs). This capability referred to as standoff jammer counter (SOJC) is an amplification of the existing wedge edge process that allows the creation of a virtual target (VT). The following are recommendations for the use of this capability. 3-329. Batteries should not create VTs of their own. The ICC should be the only control center that creates VTs. The tactical director (TD) alone has the tools to determine range and width of the enemy aircraft. Because wedges are not displayed at the batteries, the batteries generally do not have the range information of the jamming formation.

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3-330. Use the width of the formation to determine the number of VTs that need to be created. This is a judgment call on the part of the TD. He should create VTs evenly spaced across the wedge to increase the probability of providing a good range. 3-331. If more than one VT is to be created, each should be sent to the separate batteries providing the wedges. This will evenly distribute firepower and minimize the impact on each battery's multiple simultaneous engagement capabilities. 3-332. A firing doctrine should be maintained. Fire one missile at each VT, then evaluate, and fire again if necessary. 3-333. SOJC missions must be planned ahead of time. For the S3, this means placing batteries where they will be most likely to successfully engage at relatively long ranges, and it may also mean dedicating a battery or batteries to this mission. The long fly-out times, the manual operator actions, and the heavy use of TVM involved dictate that the battery has as few other distractions as possible. 3-334. SOJC should be used sparingly and wisely. Jamming formations should be considered as high-priority targets. In determining when to initiate an SOJC engagement, the operator must consider the following: SOJC engagements are manual. They require several operator actions, and therefore compete heavily for the operator's time. • SOJC engagements are lengthy (due to missile flight time), therefore reducing the total number of available missiles in flight and available missiles in TVM. • The engagement reduces missiles available for engagement, preventing or delaying engagement of higher priority ingressing ABTs or TBMs. 3-335. The VT provides a point in space for stable missile flight in a heavy ECM environment. The SOJC missile has been fielded. The PAC-2 missile incorporates all the specifications for SOJC. This will simplify the problem of determining how to distribute missiles. TECHNICAL EXPLANATION—SOJC MISSILE 3-336. The SOJC missile is basically the standard missile with improvements to the guidance section. These enhancements were in the home-on-jam processor, front-end automatic gain control (AGC), and improvements to the on-board computer. These modifications provide for improvements against specific types of ECM and overall improvement in an ECM environment. ECM WEDGES 3-337. The wedge edge process provides information that allows the ICC operator to determine the range and lateral extent of an SSJ formation. This process is the keystone to the SOJC mission. As with triangulation, this capability is optimized in a coordinated battalion defense that maximizes overlapping coverage. The overlapping coverage ensures the generation of •

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wedges from multiple sources, resulting in intersecting wedges, which is critical in determining range. 3-338. The surveillance function at each battery performs the wedge edge processing. Surveillance measures the level of jamming and compares it with a threshold for each search beam. If the threshold is exceeded, then that beam is mapped to a wedge cell matrix. The wedge cell matrix is then processed to determine the edges of the wedge by elevation and rows. Sufficient continuous jamming must be detected in a minimum of six contiguous horizontal beams to generate a wedge. However, jamming is not required to exist in all six beams. It must exist in the first two beams and the last two beams, and only single missed beams are allowed in between. These wedges are then sent to the ICC for display. Each battery may send a maximum of 12 wedges, with no more than 4 wedges per elevation band. 3-339. There are four elevation bands, with "A" being the highest and "D" the lowest. When each band contains 4 wedges, a limiting process eliminates the shortest wedges in the upper two elevation bands until the maximum number of 12 wedges is reached. The elevation bands are only displayed at the ICC and are controlled through altitude selection (ALT A, B, C, and SELECT ALT S/Is). The total number of wedges being displayed, the total number of "hot" SOJC missiles, and the total number of active VTs being sent by the battery is now displayed on Tab 4. (It should be noted that wedge edges are not displayed at the battery.) The ICC operator is alerted when the batteries are providing ECM wedges. The wedges can then be displayed through the ECM WEDGES S/I. The wedges are displayed with the point of origin at the battery with the right bound being a solid line and the left a dashed line (Figure 3-35).

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FP1 FP2 FP3

TAB AREA

Figure 3-35. ECM Wedges Displayed at the ICC
3-340. The wedge edge process is not new and has been in the software for some time. It now provides a key element of the SOJC process and is the principal tool in determining where to place the VT. 3-341. Virtual Target—The VT is a system-generated artificial target, a point in space that is used to provide a fixed point for early missile flight. The VT is translated to a battalion and battery track data record (TDR) and provides a stable point in the jamming formation for the initial stage of the missile's trajectory. The VT is used during the initial phase of the missile's flight to establish the optimum apogee and preserve missile velocity by minimizing inflight maneuvering. The in-flight maneuvering is caused by the missile attempting to maintain track on a Centroiding Strobe. The Centroiding Strobe is caused by the multiple SOJs' information with crossing flight paths. 3-342. The VT enhances the guidance function when engaging an SOJ formation. It is used to program the initial turn and provides the best apogee for the range. Missile fly-out is the same as for any engagement except for the final stage of the flight. After approximately one-third of its flight toward the VT, the real target is selected. The normal TVM passive correlation, acquisition, and tracking are performed throughout its flight. During the final P4-61 seconds of the flight, the missile is commanded to "on-board home on jam" (OBHOJ) and continues toward the selected target. The more powerful the jamming, the better the missile's homing capability.

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3-343. To ensure real target acquisition by the missile, the VT must be placed in the vicinity of multiple jammers or real targets. A VT may be created within specific bounds on the scope. However, if a real track is not within certain range and angle gates of the VT, the operator will receive the alert NO REAL TGT/RE-ENG when he attempts to engage the VT. The operator can acknowledge the alert and engage the track. 3-344. VTs may be created at the ICC or batteries. FUs should only create VTs with the assistance/coordination with the ICC. To create a VT, the operator must position the situation display cursor at the display location where he wants the VT to appear. It must be noted that VTs can only be created at ranges of 55 kms or more. The intensity of the jamming source that produces the wedge edge will vary at times, thus allowing the system to triangulate individual targets for short periods of time. The range of these targets is a further indication of the range at which the VT should be created. 3-345. The operator then selects Tab 4 (Figure 3-36) through keyboard entry, and enters a C in the TARGET CONTROL data field. At the ICC, the operator also enters the FU number that the VT is being sent to in the FU ADDRESS data field. Upon entering tab, the ICC display coordinates are translated to system coordinates, and the VT's location is sent automatically to the designated FU and forced on the display. The operator may create up to three VTs per Patriot battery.
ASOJ VIRTUAL TARGET CONTROL ( ) =TARGET CONTROL— C=CREATE, D=DROP TARGET nnn RANGE FP TO CURSOR, aa nn WEDGE COUNT n VIRTUAL TARGET COUNT nn HOT ASOJ MISSILE COUNT ASOJ VIRTUAL TARGET CONTROL + ECM WEDGE STATUS ( )=TARGET CONTROL— C=CREATE, D=DROP ( )=FP ADDRESS, 1 TO 6 FP1 FP2 FP3 FP4 FP5 FP6 ICC BNA BNB BNC BND BNE BNF CURSOR-FP RNG — VIRTUAL TARGETS— HOT ASOJ MSLS — WEDGES— BAND A BAND B BAND C BAND D *4* *4*

Figure 3-36. ICC Tab 4, Virtual Target Control
3-346. In Figure 3-37 the ICC operator created three VTs and spread them across the lateral expanse of the jamming formation. While all three can be sent to one FU, it should not be normal procedure to assign more than one VT to an FU at any one time. This is because when a VT is created, a TVM slot is reserved for that VT. Creation of more than one VT per FU might result in degradation of the FU's self-defense option due to lack of TVM slots. The VT appears as a hostile target symbol with the "S" modifier. The VT is automatically transmitted to the appropriate FUs and is forced on the display.

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S S

S

FP1 FP2 TAB FP3

Figure 3-37. Virtual Targets Displayed at the ICC
3-347. The VT is not a real track, so the following conditions apply: If a VT is created at a subordinate Patriot battery, it can be displayed at the ICC. • The ICC does not use the VT in any correlation attempts. • VTs are not forwarded to higher echelon, adjacent battalions. • The following switch-indicators do not apply to a VT: TRAILS, ENG HOLD, CEASE FIRE, SPEC, FRND, UNK, HOST, IFF, TRACK AMP DATA, KILL, NO KILL, RIPPLE, SALVO, RANGE EST, and A SCOPE. The use of any of these conditions will result in a NOT ALLOWED FOR VIRTUAL TARGET alert. 3-348. The time to intercept, engage, and other modifiers such as hold hire are displayed with the VT. The missile fly out and predicted intercept point (PIP) are also displayed during mid-course phase. During that phase, the VT is the PIP. The VT will remain fixed and TTFL, TTLL, and LNIPs are not calculated. The PROBABLE KILL modifier will appear on the VT during the kill assessment phase. The VT is dropped approximately four seconds after intercept. •

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3-349. To drop a VT, the ICC operator hooks the VT, selects Tab 4, enters a D in the TARGET CONTROL data field, and enters the tab. This sends a drop track message to the appropriate battery. 3-350. The automatic engagement mode does not apply to VTs. VTs will not be automatically engaged. The PFE, SELECT FP, 2ND FP, or direct assignment to a battery is ignored, and the command is sent to the tracking battery. 3-351. The battery should only conduct one VT engagement at a time. The appropriate TVM slot is selected and reserved when the VT is assigned to or created at the battery. Therefore, VTs should not be assigned or created unless an engagement is to follow immediately. SOJC TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 3-352. Jamming formations should be considered as high-priority targets and engaged. This will force the jammers to retreat outside of Patriot range, thereby becoming less effective. The VT process should be used whenever an SOJ formation at long range or an ingressing SSJ formation is detected. The ICC is the best node for determining that there is a jamming formation. The wedge edge process at the ICC provides the operator with the tools to determine range and lateral expanse of the formation. Virtual targets cannot be created inside of P4-62 kilometers from a battery or beyond the instrumented range of P4-63 kilometers. VTs cannot be created outside the track angle limits of the battery. If the FU attempts to create a VT beyond these limits, the alert ENTRY OUT OF RANGE is displayed. If the ICC attempts to create a VT beyond these limits, the alert TARGET OUT OF COVERAGE—FPnn is displayed. The optimum range for the VT is between P4-64 kilometers to P4-65 kilometers. Role of the Firing Battery (ECS) 3-353. As stated earlier, the battery can also perform the SOJC function in terms of creating and engaging VTs using Tab 4. It is keyboard selectable and used to create and drop VTs. The battery is able to engage VTs, either commanded from the ICC or self-initiated. Engage commands sent from the ICC will result in the alert “nnn ENGAGE.” The operator acknowledges the alert, which hooks the target, and presses the ENGAGE S/I. SOJC Firing Doctrine 3-354. The battery should not conduct self-initiated SOJC engagements. Generally, the battery does not have the information on the jamming formation's location (range). As previously mentioned, this information is derived from the wedge edge process which is only displayed at the ICC. If range information and the lateral expanse of the SOJ formation is made available to the battery, via voice or send pointer on the suspected location, then a VT may be created and engaged by the battery.

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ECCM Engagement Mode Selection 3-355. If the choice at the battery is between selecting the strobe engage mode or creating a VT, then the SEM should be selected. Develop a VT to be used against a jamming formation where range has been determined. The battery does not have range on the strobes displayed unless it is provided from an external source. Consequently, if the battery elects to engage a strobe beyond the defaulted range of P4-66 kilometers, SEM is the preferred method. 3-356. Range is an important element in determining where the VT should be created. At the battery, this range must be provided from other than the battery itself. While operating in the FUFU mode, an experienced operator may determine the location of the formation by observing occasional triangulated tracks within a certain area of the strobes. This can then be used as the range point for creating a VT. 3-357. Some hostile aircraft have jammer equipment that may prevent processing form establishing a reliable range. The jammer symbol will appear at a greater or lesser range than the actual aircraft, but on an indicated azimuth from the radar. 3-358. Since the range to the jammer is not available, it is not eligible for automatic engagement. Range denying targets appear on the display with a strobe line extending from the target symbol halfway to the radar location. The strobe line appears when STRBS is selected or the range denying target is hooked. Before beginning any jammer engagement, review the FAULT DATA tab for the presence of a CP fault that may prevent a successful engagement, as indicated by 10-TVMCP. The following engagement methods will be used: • Software estimate range (preferred): – Verify the jammer symbol with strobe line halfway to radar location. – Hook the jammer symbol. – Verify that strobe line now extends to radar location. – Press ENG. – The PIP and missile symbols appear when engagement is accepted and target remains hooked. – The strobe line is eliminated from display when the software determines the range. The target symbology alternates between jammer, unknown, or hostile. Operator estimate range (alternate): – Verify the jammer symbol with strobe line halfway to radar location. – Hook the jammer symbol. – Verify that strobe line now extends to radar location. – Use the cursor stick to move the cursor to the known range of the jammer. The cursor does not have to be on the target line, because the software will only consider range.

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Press RANGE EST and verify that jammer symbol now moves along the target line to the range selected. The range estimate may have to be redesignated many times prior to pressing ENG. – When a range estimate is entered, the software range estimating cannot be performed. – If an incorrect range estimate is entered and the operator wants to return to the software method (preferred), the track must be dropped. When the track is reacquired, the software method may then be used. – If the jammer symbol remains in the selected range for more than 4 seconds, press ENG and monitor the engagement. – If the range data is less than 30 seconds old, the target symbol jumps to the designated range, then returns to its original location within 4 seconds. Move the cursor over the target symbol and press RANGE EST. The target range is redesignated. – Press ENG and monitor the engagement. 3-359. The following method must be performed in addition to the operator responses to an engage fail alert as indicated in TM 9-1425-602-12-2: – If the missile symbol does not appear. If the target symbol never moves: – If the engagement was a software estimate range engagement, re-engage by the software estimate range method. – If the engagement was an operator estimate range engagement, reengage by the operator estimate range method. • If the target symbol moves rapidly and never stabilizes: – If the engagement was a software estimate range engagement, wait 10 seconds for the strobe line to reappear and reengage by the software estimate range method. – If the engagement was an operator estimate range engagement, drop the track and reengage by the software estimate range method when the track is reestablished. • If the target symbol stabilizes in the range, verify the target now that the range is known, and: – If the target is to be reengaged, wait 10 seconds for the strobe line to reappear by the software estimate range method. – If the initial engagement was an operator estimate range method, position cursor over the target symbol and press RANGE EST, then ENG. • If the target is not to be reengaged, perform the following: – If the initial engagement was the software estimate range method, no further action is required. – If the initial engagement was the operator estimate range method, drop the track. 3-360. The role of the ICC has a key role in the SOJC mission. It is the control center that will determine (from information provided by the batteries) if there is a jamming formation and where the formation is located. It is from the battery display of wedges that the ICC operator will make the • •

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determination on where and how many VTs to employ. The distance between where the wedges cross will determine the number of VTs to be created. This will be a judgmental call by each operator. ANTIHELICOPTER STANDOFF JAMMER MISSION 3-361. Patriot may be used to counter the helicopter-borne communications jamming aircraft. To perform this mission, the Patriot battalion operations section must be informed through the IPB or other means of the general location of the anticipated jamming aircraft. Once the general area is known, the Patriot fire units covering that area can then perform the procedure defined. If the intelligence information is provided before the anticipated mission time, then a modified search sector may be considered. An alternate search sector, ALT 1 or 2, can be developed tailoring the search sector toward the known area. The following procedures should be performed by the systems operators to ensure target detection and destruction. 3-362. The key element at the fire unit in conducting the antihelicopter jamming mission is the ability of the operator to pick out the enemy helicopter from surrounding clutter. Because of the slow speed of helicopters resulting from nap of the earth flying or hovering, the track detected as a helicopter will probably not meet the criteria of the preclassification filter. As such, the track will appear on the display as a general point (preclassification symbol). The operator now has to determine if the track is clutter, a slow-flying aircraft, or the targeted helicopter. The following steps will assist the operator in making that determination: • • • The operators must be provided with the general area that the enemy helicopter is anticipated to appear. If an alternate sector has been defined, then it should be activated. The operator should monitor that area of the scope and pay particular attention to the general point symbols that appear in the area of interest. He may consider offsetting and increasing the scale in the area of interest to assist him in selecting the target. General points that appear to have movement should be hooked and forced out of the preclassification filter by making them unknown. This will also cause the track information to be sent to the ICC where it may correlate with other fire unit track data, thereby providing additional information. The operator should apply the TRAILS switch-indicator and select the Track Amp Data tab display. The track velocity, heading, and general flight profile should be monitored to assist in the target determination. The flight path displayed by the trails should also be monitored to see if the track is flying an SOJ orbit. Each manstation can display up to four trails at one time (see Figure 3-38). A-scope should be selected on the track. The traces are depicted in Figures 3-39, 3-40, and 3-41 show the types of returns that can be expected from a helicopter SOJ, slow aircraft, or clutter.

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If the determination is that the track is not a threatening helicopter, the operator should "drop track" on the target and perform this procedure on the other general points. If it is determined that the track is a threatening helicopter, the operator should inform the ICC who will make the target hostile and direct an engagement on the target.

U

FP TAB AREA

Figure 3-38. Helicopter SOJ Trails Example

Figure 3-39. Example of a Helicopter A-Scope

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Figure 3-40. Example of a Quiet Aircraft A-Scope

Figure 3-41. Typical A-Scope Clutter
3-363. The ICC's function in the antihelicopter operation is to provide amplifying information to the batteries. This information will assist them in making their determination on whether the track is a threatening helicopter. 3-364. The ICC will also define the general area where the mission aircraft is expected. The information will be provided to the ICC from higher echelon or from battalion tactical operations center (BTOC). Once the area is determined, the ICC operator can provide this information to the fire units via "pointer" or create a hostile volume via Tab 71, and data transfer this volume to the affected units. 3-365. The ICC operator will perform basically the same evaluation of the tracks in the suspected area to locate the enemy helicopter. He will note if there is any correlation among the fire units that have overlapping coverage of that area (real targets will correlate, but clutter tracks should not). If it is determined that the track is the threatening enemy helicopter, the ICC operator must downtell that to those fire units with overlapping coverage that are not reporting the track. The track may still be in the preclassification phase or a clutter blanked region of that fire unit. Tracking the mission aircraft with multiple fire units will also ensure FU engagements support the engaging fire unit drops track during the engagement. 3-366. When the helicopter has been detected and identified as hostile, the ICC operator should send an engage command to one of the tracking fire units. The ECS operator will engage the hostile helicopter when in range. 3-367. Tactical Considerations—Long-range engagements beyond P4-67 kilometers will require P4-68 channels in a TVM slot and will affect the system's multiple simultaneous engagement capability. Batteries may be required to move closer to the forward line of troops (FLOT) or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) to conduct this mission, because the earth's curvature inhibits detection of the helicopter SOJ. Batteries given this mission should remain EMCON silent until directed by the ICC to search for the enemy helicopter.

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GROUND LEVEL INTERFERENCE FILTER
3-368. The ground level interference filter (GLIF) was designed to improve radar performance by blanking the detection location of low level, slow moving clutter tracks, such as ground vehicles. This blanking results in fewer surveillance validation actions, thereby providing more radar resource time. GLIF was initially implemented in the horizon search sector only, out to a range of P4-69 kilometers. Experience over the past several years has shown that a significant number of vehicular tracks are being detected above the horizon sector and beyond the range of the original filter. This is especially true for emplacements with a depressed operational search lower bounds (OSLB) that results in this type of clutter being detected in non-GLIF sectors. To alleviate this problem, the original GLIF has been modified to add two additional search volumes and increase the range. 3-369. GLIF processing is now performed in more than just the horizon sector. The first element in GLIF processing is the creation of the GLIF map (actual blanking by beams). This map is always constructed and based on range, elevation, and speed parameters. Initial radar detections that are placed under track are checked to see if they are within a range of P4-70 kilometers, within the GLIF search sectors, and below a speed of P4-71 meters per second. If the track meets this criterion, then the 600-meter range cell, where the initial detection occurred, is blanked within the GLIF map for that beam. A timer is also applied to that beam and is relative to the frame time of the sector search. If no detections are made within that beam for approximately P4-72 minutes, the blanked positions within that beam are cleared. The timer is not determined and the GLIF map is not cleared when the system is in Passive Search or Cease Radiate. The GLIF map and all GLIF parameters are reset on a system reboot or reorientation. Although the GLIF map is always created, it is only used to discard detection’s if the volumes are defined as active in ECS Tab 1, page 2. It is also important to note that the GLIF map is not cleared if 0 is selected in Tab 1, but those detections are processed against the map. 3-370. GLIF is now implemented in three of the ABT search sectors. They are the horizon (HRZN), short-range pop-up (SRPOP), and the bottom two rows of the lower medium-range (LM) search sectors. The activation and deactivation of GLIF within these sectors are selectable through ICC Tab 1, page 2. 3-371. The tab entries are— 0 = GLIF OFF. 1 = GLIF in horizon search only. 2 = GLIF in horizon and short-range pop-up sectors. 3 = GLIF in horizon, short-range pop-up, and the bottom two rows of the lower medium-range sectors. 3-372. The enhanced GLIF will apply processing of the map depending on what is defined in Tab 1. For example, if only HRZN is selected in Tab 1, then the processing will be applied, by beam, to the initial position in that sector only. If all three sectors are selected in Tab 1, then the processing will be applied, by beam, to the initial position from the horizon sector up to the • • • •

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bottom two rows of the lower medium-range sector. Figure 3-42 is an example of how this is accomplished.

LMR

LMR

SP SP HZ

GLIF DETECTION LMR

LMR SP SP

HZ GLIF BLANKING BY BEAM
Figure 3-42. GLIF Detection and Blanking
3-373. The upper section of Figure 3-42 illustrates a deployment where all three sectors were authorized in Tab 1, and detections that met the GLIF criteria were made as indicated. The lower illustration is a graphic depiction of how the blanked area associated with each of those detected would be applied to the GLIF map. As previously mentioned, the 600-meter range cell, where the initial detection occurred, would be blanked. Subsequent detections that correlate with the blanked area of that beam would be discarded. 3-374. The GLIF range has also been increased. The GLIF range has been increased from P4-73 kilometers to P4-74 kilometers. The selection of which GLIF entry to apply is a function of the terrain and the establishment of the OSLB.

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3-375. When performing radar mapping, it has always been recommended that the operator conduct a map reconnaissance. As part of this map reconnaissance, the operator should now evaluate which search sectors, if any may receive ground returns based on an anticipated lowering of the OSLB. This terrain analysis will then assist the operator in determining which GLIF setting to initially select. As part of this map reconnaissance, the operator should be aware of road networks that traverse the radar search sectors and can result in vehicular traffic being detected and tracked. The default value for GLIF in Tab 1 has been changed to 0 = OFF. Any system’s reboot, reorientation, or zero degree slew will set the GLIF indicator to the default value of 0 or OFF. 3-376. Rules for GLIF selection are as follows: • • Enable GLIF volumes incrementally. The operator should be aware of display patterns of slow-moving tracks that may appear as general points moving with a steady direction that coincides with a road network. The operator should also be aware of the symptoms of radar loading, such as dropping friendly tracks and/or long-range hostile tracks. A GLIF entry of 2 may be considered if the OSLB is lowered more than two degrees. A GLIF entry of 3 should never be used unless it has been determined that the lower rows of the lower medium-range search sector are subject to detecting ground returns. This condition can result if the system is looking across a valley and the OSLB has been severely lowered to detect tracks flying within the valley. Over time, the GLIF process can blank an area that coincides with a road network. Helicopters, when flying the nap of the earth, do take advantage of road networks. If an enemy helicopter threat is anticipated, the GLIF processing should be set to OFF. The operator may deselect GLIF processing when concerned with system detection within the GLIF areas.

• •

TRACK WHILE SCAN
3-377. The Track While Scan (TWS) process can be used in conjunction with the GLIF. The GLIF function is applied to the lower elevation medium-range search beams. The GLIF is effective against repetitive ground vehicle traffic and TWS is applied to all elevation angles and range (except the very longrange region beyond the system maximum range). The GLIF is effective against the following unwanted tracks or clutter: • • • • Ground vehicles—These objects are defined as automobiles, trucks, trains, and et cetera. Surface vessels—These objects operate over water and include boats, ships, buoys, and et cetera. Large stationary point sources—These objects are defined as towers, buildings, or large man-made objects. Biological clutter—These objects are large birds, flocks, or large swarms of insects.

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3-378. To maintain track of unwanted tracks, a separate set of 300 Interface Data Records (IDRs) has been established within a TWS file. The IDRs are established for rejecting future detections and improve system resource time. 3-379. The unwanted tracks or clutter can be identified automatically by the system or manually by the operator. In order to be identified by the TWS process as unwanted, the track or clutter must meet the following parameters: they must be “quiet” (non-jamming) and must have a speed of 90 MPH (40 M/S) or less. 3-380. When unwanted tracks or clutter are identified by the TWS process, an IDR is established and the track is dropped (not displayed). When the object is detected again, its position is compared to the TWS file. If it correlates with an existing IDR, then the IDR position is updated. 3-381. The TWS is an FU process and is only available in K7. Page 2 of FU Tab 1 controls the activation of TWS. For the process to function, either Manual or Automatic must be selected. 3-382. Track While Scan states— OFF = The default setting. AUTO = An IDR will automatically be established for any object that meets the parameters or any track that is manually dropped by the operator that meets the parameters. • MANUAL = An IDR is established for any track that is dropped by the operator and meets the parameters. 3-383. Clearing the TWS file— Select OFF on Tab 1 page 2. A radar reorientation will clear the IDRs and reset the activation state to OFF (a “zero degree slew” is a radar reorientation). • A single IDR will be cleared if no correlation has been made within the last 90 seconds. 3-384. Tactical considerations: • Radiating over land—Place TWS in the MANUAL mode. This will start the TWS process for clutter tracks dropped by the operator. AUTOMATIC should be selected if the display becomes cluttered (in excess of 20) with nor-real tracks. However, helicopters performing nap-of-the-earth maneuvers can operate below 40 MPS. TWS should be in the OFF mode if an enemy helicopter threat is defined for the FU area. Radiating over water—Place TWS in the AUTOMATIC mode, GLIF in the OFF mode. Combined—Address the worst of the two cases (if more unwanted tracks or clutter appear over land, treat the emplacement as if over land and vice versa). If the operator is not sure, place GLIF in the ON mode and TWS in the MANUAL mode. • • • •

• •

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COUNTER-ANTIRADIATION MISSILE OPERATIONS
3-385. To survive the ARM threat, Patriot has several capabilities and features which can be used to address each of the phases of the ARM battle. These capabilities include the Configuration 2, counter ARM (CARM), changes as well as elements of other programs such as the BTOC and classification discrimination identification (CDI), which have spin-off benefits for CARM. The Configuration 2 CARM modifications are discussed below. 3-386. Passive and active countermeasures may be implemented by the operator at the ECS based on default or tailored settings in the CARM tabular display. Passive measures include modification of the radar emissions to reduce susceptibility to ARM lock-on and tracking. Active countermeasures are related to engagement of the ARM carrier or ARM with a Patriot missile. These features are automatically enabled upon operator selection of the CARM Mode S/I. 3-387. Tab 76, COUNTER ARM THREAT PARAMETERS (Figure 3-43) is a two-page tab that is available at the ICC and ECS. Page A is used to enter parameters used in the ARM evaluation process. Parameters used for ARM evaluation are target range, altitude, speed, dive angle, approach angle, and target cross section. Page B of the tab is used to enable or disable ARM countermeasures to be taken by individual FUs under ARM attack. Page B also selects the engagement mode. Information pertaining to this tab can be found in (S/NF)ST 44-85-1A(U).
COUNTER ARM THREAT PARAMETERS PAGE MIN MAX ARM CLASSIFICATION PARAMETERS ( )KM = RANGE 0 ( )KM = ALTITUDE 0 ( )( )M/S = SPEED 0 ( )( )DEG = DIVE ANGLE 0 ( )DEG = APPROACH ANGLE 0 ( )SQ.M = TARGET CROSS SECTION 1 COUNTER ARM THREAT PARAMETERS ARM COUNTERMEASURES = LOW POWER = REDUCED SEARCH = FREQUENCY DIVERSITY = ARM ENGAGEMENT MODE A TO TO TO TO TO TO RMAX AMHMAX 9999 90 90 99 *76* 0=OFF 0=OFF 0=OFF M=MANUAL *76*

PAGE B 1=ON 1=ON 1=ON A=AUTO

( ( ( (

) ) ) )

Figure 3-43. Tab 76 Counter ARM Threat Parameters
3-388. As shown in Figure 3-44, the ARM battle begins with the targeting of the system by hostile reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) and concludes with the terminal dive of the ARM itself. In each phase, relevant system features and capabilities are highlighted. The CARM modifications are discussed below.

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PHASE I
RISTA (TARGET PATRIOT UNIT)

PHASE II
DETECTION AND SEEKER LOCK-ON (BY AIRCRAFT ENROUTE) LAUNCH

PHASE III
ASCENT TURN DOWN

PHASE IV
TERMINAL

PASSIVE EMPLACEMENT CONCEALMENT EMCOM PROCEDURES PASSIVE SURVEILLANCE

LOW POWER MODE REDUCED SEARCH FREQUENCY DIVERSITY PASSIVE SURVEILLANCE ARM CARRIER ID AND ENGAGEMENT CONCEALMENT EMCOM PROCEDURES

ARM ID AND SELECTIVE MANUAL ENGAGEMENT FREQUENCY DIVERSITY REDUCED SEARCH

AUTO ARM ENGAGEMENT MANUAL ARM ENGAGEMENT

U.S. AIR FORCE - U.S. ARMY Joint Stars

Figure 3-44. Overall CARM Concept
3-389. CARM modifications are a set of software modifications, which improve the capability of Patriot system to counter the tactical air-to-surface ARM threat through enhanced situational awareness, and passive and active ARM countermeasures. Enhanced situational awareness is achieved with the capability of the system to identify real and potential antiradiation missile (ARM) carriers in its battle space through the integration of CDI data at the ICC and the capability for FUs to identify ARMs in flight using observed kinematics and other track characteristics. This information is used to generate operator alerts and warnings that, in turn, permit the appropriate selection of countermeasure options. Classification criteria can be tailored to the characteristics of the expected ARM threats in a given theater through the use of tabular displays. Classification of ARMs will also enable the system to automatically use unique rules for optimum selection of Patriot missile, LS, guidance rules, and fuze delay settings for ARM engagements. 3-390. Passive and active countermeasures may be implemented by the operator at the ECS based on default or tailored settings in the CARM tabular display. Passive measures include modification of the radar emissions to reduce susceptibility to ARM lock-on and tracking. Active countermeasures are related to engagement of the ARM carrier or ARM with a Patriot missile. These features are automatically enabled upon operator selection of the CARM Mode S/I, which replaces the Weather Mode S/I.

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However, the Weather Mode function is now an automated operation. The activation of the CARM S/I will be verbally reported to the ICC when the FU is in the CARM mode. 3-391. The key changes for CARM include new target classification or types, a new system mode, new alerts and warnings, and a new initialization tabular display. Figure 3-45 shows each of these changes are supported by more detailed software modifications.
• SPECIAL TARGET NUMBERING • AUTOMATED USE OF EXTERNAL DATA

ARM CARRIER

TARGET TYPES

• • • • ARM

TASM DISPLAY SYMBOL IMPACT POINT DISPLAY SPECIAL CLASSIFICATION LOGIC SPECIAL AUTOMATIC/MANUAL ENGAGEMENT LOGIC – LS SELECTION – MISSILE SELECTION – METHOD OF FIRE – PRIORITY – THREAT DETERMINATION LOGIC

COUNTER ARM MODE

• CUSTOMIZED SUITE OF COUNTERMEASURES – LOW POWER – FREQUENCY DIVERSITY –REDUCED SEARCH • GENERAL ARM THREAT W ARNING • ARM CARRIER ALERT • ARM ATTACK W ARNING • PERMITS TAILORING OF CARM MODE COUNTERMEASURES • PERMITS TAILORING OF ARM CLASSIFICATION LOGIC

ALERTS AND W ARNINGS

INITIALIZATION TAB

Figure 3-45. CARM Overview
3-392. Tracks can be classified as ARMs or ABT flagged as ARM carriers. An ABT track will be flagged as an ARM carrier based on external positive ID data that is provided by external sources to the ICC. This data is correlated with local ICC tracks and downtold to the ECS. ARM carriers are designated by target number "Ann." Any friendly identification will remove the ARM carrier designation. 3-393 An ABT track will be flagged as an ARM carrier based on external positive ID data that is provided by external sources to the ICC. This data is correlated with local ICC tracks and downtold to the ECS. ARM carriers are designated by target number "Ann." Any of the following events will remove the ARM carrier designation: • • • • Valid Mode 4 IFF. Positive SIF and SIF is authorized. Composite ID is reset to friend or true friend. ICC downtell of ID changes.

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3-394. ARMs are a classification of target, which will be displayed using the tactical air-to-surface missile (TASM) symbol. The TASM symbol is a V with a horizontal slash through it (V). The impact point is a V with a line below it (V). Along with the target display, the predicted impact point may also be shown. 3-395. In order to classify ARMs as a unique target type, distinct from TBM and ABT, several software tests have been incorporated. The ARM classification process occurs throughout the ARM flight, while a parallel TBM or ABT process also takes place. 3-396. The first software test uses positive and negative ARM checks. If the track receives a negative ARM classification at any time, then the parallel TBM or ABT logic will immediately provide a classification and the track will never again be considered for ARM ID. This enables the system to always have a ready TBM or ABT classification or ID to eliminate delays in changing from ARM to another track category. Any one of the following tests may generate a negative ARM classification: • True friend, friend, or positive SIF response to IFF/SIF interrogation. • Target exceeds altitude, total velocity, and vertical velocity limits. • Inconsistent flight phases (ascent, turndown, and descent). 3-397. In order for the system to satisfy positive ARM processing, two preconditions must be met in addition to passing one of three sets of tests. The two preconditions are— Target does not exceed ground range limit (this value can be set in Tab 76). • Target does not exceed RCS limit (this value can be set in Tab 76). 3-398. The three sets of tests are— SET 1: track originates from formation split of an ARM carrier or is a new track that correlates with a known or presumed ARM carrier. • SET 2: target altitude and acceleration during ascent phase are within ARM limits for a minimum required period of time. • SET 3: target dive angle and heading off of LOS flight profile during descent phase is within ARM limits for a required period of time. The system checks if the horizontal angle between the radar LOS to the ARM and the ARM velocity vector is within the approach angle specified in Tab 76. The system also checks if the vertical angle between the radar LOS to the ARM and the ARM velocity vector is within the dive angle specified in Tab 76. 3-399. The second ARM algorithm discrimination method uses velocity and vertical velocity to distinguish higher speed arms. The third ARM algorithm discrimination method uses the boost and descent phase of lower speed ARMs. 2-400. Set 1 ARM test uses track split/correlation methods to aid in any ARM classification type. Set 2 ARM test discriminates between High Speed-1/2 or Low Speed ARM types using altitudes, velocities, and vertical velocity measurements. If an ARM classification type is set by the set 3 test, the classification type will be a Nominal ARM. • •

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3-401. The system allows tailoring of the ARM classification logic to the tactical situation by specifying minimum and/or maximum values for kinematics and physical characteristics. This capability reduces the chances of misclassification when the tactical scenario presents an ARM with known characteristics. Once a target has been classified as an ARM, the system processes it differently for engagement to include threat determination, LS selection, missile selection, method of fire, and engagement priority. 3-402. If the automatic engagement mode is selected, the system makes an additional test to determine if the ARM is actually guiding to and threatening the radar. This test is similar to Set 3 positive ARM indicators shown above, but the heading limits are more restrictive. 3-403. In order to conserve missiles, the system attempts to use shoot-lookshoot (SLS) whenever it predicts that there is an adequate amount of time. If there is insufficient time for SLS, the system selects modified ripple method of fire. 3-404. ARMs are ATC-1 targets. Self-defense ARM engagements will be prioritized at the same level as self-defense TBM engagements. 3-405. Activation of the CARM S/I, the system will immediately implement one or more countermeasures as specified in Tab 76 at initialization. The four selectable countermeasures are— Frequency diversity—This countermeasure ensures that the system is spreading the radar emissions over the full set of frequencies enabled by the operator. This makes ARM guidance more difficult for some ARMs and forces others to use a less sensitive, wideband mode (such as, forces the ARM carrier to fly in closer toward the radar prior to launching its ARM). • Reduced search—This countermeasure extends the ABT search frame times in the horizon and short-range pop-up sectors and drops the long-range search sector. This reduces the number of pulses available for the guidance accuracy of the ARM. • ARM automatic engagement mode—This countermeasure will enable the system to automatically engage ARMs threatening the FU. 3-406. The following provides the operators with better situational awareness and facilitates their decision to select the CARM Mode S/I. The system will provide the operators with three levels of warnings: • General ARM threat warning—The system provides a general alert "ARM Threat Warning" that indicates that an ARM attack has occurred at another FU. It will be routed by the ICC digital data link (DDL) to an FU that does not have the CARM mode S/I activated. ARM carrier alert—The system provides an alert "NNN ARM Carrier" that indicates the target number is an ARM carrier (based on external source data). Engagement may be required regardless if the system assesses the track as a nonthreatening ABT. The alert will be generated when a track is first identified as an ARM carrier. ARM attack alert—The system provides an alert "NNN ARM Attack" to indicate that an ARM has been identified as attacking (self•

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defense) the local FU. This alarm is generated only if a Patriot FU is tracking the ARM. Note: The Weapon Control S/I must be selected at each console in order for both TCA and TCO to receive ARM associated alerts. 3-407. The sequence of events and associated CARM actions are from the perspective of Patriot operator actions. The ARM countermeasures and advantages are relative to attack phase. Patriot operations from emplacement through ARM engagements are illustrated in Table 3-8.

Table 3-8 Sequence of Events in the ARM Battle PATRIOT SYSTEM
SITE SELECTION AND PREPARATION EMPLACEMENT AND INITIALIZATION

CANDIDATE ARM COUNTERMEASURES ACTIONS
SELECT RS SITES MINIMUM VISUAL/IR/SLAR PATTERN RECOGNITION

ADVANTAGES
DELAYS OR DEGRADES RISTA DETECTION AND TARGETING DELAYS OR DEGRADES RISTA DETECTION AND TARGETING.

ATTACK PHASE
1

USE PASSIVE EMPLACEMENT CAPABILITY AVOID OTHER UNNECESSARY SIGNATURES (RF, IR, VISUAL). INITIALIZE CARM MODE PARAMETERS TAILORED FOR OPERATIONAL SCENARIO VIA TAB 76 (BASED ON USAADASCH AND PPO INPUT). USE CDI/INTEL LINKS TO REMAIN QUIET UNTIL THE AIR BATTLE STARTS (TIBS, HIGHER ECHELON).

1

PRE-AIR BATTLE OPERATIONS

DELAYS OR DEGRADES RISTA DETECTION AND TARGETING. DENIES OPPORTUNITY FOR ARM ATTACK. IF PASSIVE, DENIES OPPORTUNITY FOR ARM ATTACK. PROVIDES AWARENESS OF POTENTIAL ATTACK AND GIVES OPERATOR A CUE TO ENABLE CARM MODE IF APPROPRIATE

1

AIR-BATTLE

FIGHT PER SOP PASSIVE OPERATIONS OR ACTIVE OPERATIONS.

-

ARM THREAT WARNING DISPLAYED (WHEN ARM AND/OR ARM CARRIER REPORTED) ARM CARRIER WARNING WITH TARGET NUMBER DISPLAYED ARM ATTACK WARNING WITH TARGET NUMBER CONTINUE AIR BATTLE

INCREASE OPERATOR SITUATIONAL AWARENESS.

2

ENABLE CARM MODE. ENGAGE ARM CARRIER TARGETS ACCORDING TO RULES OF ENGAGEMENT.

PROVIDES CUE TO ENABLE CARM MODE. FOCUSES ATTENTION ON SPECIFIC THREAT. FOCUSES ATTENTION ON SPECIFIC THREAT.

2

CONFIRM CARM MODE ENABLED ENGAGE ARM (AUTO OR MANUAL)

4

DESELECT CARM MODE WHEN ICC OPERATOR GIVES VOICE COMMAND

PERMITS OPERATOR TO RESUME NORMAl OPERATIONS WITHOUT CARM MODE RESTRAINTS.

-

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3-408. Tab 76 will be used to tailor the ARM classification logic to the tactical threat and select the countermeasures. This will be used when the CARM Mode S/I is activated. ARM CLASSIFICATION PARAMETERS. 3-409.The values in Tab 76, page A, should be set according to the specific enemy ARMs in the regional threat if this information is available and provided by USAADASCH and the PPO for potential conflicts in various regions. The smallest parameter bounds, which encompass all tactical air-tosurface ARMs in the theater, are desired in order to reduce the potential for misclassification. If the ARM threat is not known, the parameter values should be set at greater bounds to keep from excluding a potential threat. ARM COUNTERMEASURES 3-410. Restrictive ROE that prevent the system from engaging targets other than TBMs will negate the benefits of this feature and will seriously jeopardize the survivability of the radar in an ARM threat environment. Therefore prior coordination of rules of engagement and aggressive pursuit of management by exception engagements are necessary. 3-411. The use of countermeasures in the CARM mode may have benefits to enhance radar survivability, but it introduces performance tradeoffs. Thus, selection of countermeasures (Tab 76, page B) must be tailored to the mission and tactical situation of the individual FU. Table 3-9 discusses benefits and drawbacks of each countermeasure and recommends conditions for their activation or deactivation.

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Table 3-9 Selection of Countermeasures Countermeasure
Low power

Default
OFF

Purpose
Reduces the transmitted power of the radar in order to force ARM carriers to penetrate closer to the radar before being able to lock the ARM seekers on Patriot and launch. This increases the exposure of the carrier to Patriot engagement or engagement by other friendly AD. Ensures that the system is spreading the radar emissions over the full set of frequencies enabled by the operator. This makes ARM guidance more difficult for some ARMs and forces others to use a less sensitive, wideband mode. This countermeasure extends the ABT search frame times in the horizon and short-range pop-up sectors and drops the long-range search sector. This reduces the number of pulses available to the ARM.

Impacts
1. Not permitted when the radar is in TBM/ABT surveillance mode. 2. Will reduce detection range for targets with small RCS.

Recommended Uses
OFFFUs in TBM/ABT mission or in a cruise missile defense mission or in tactical environments with small RCS.

Frequency diversity

ON

All frequencies may be detected.

ONFor all nominal missions. OFFIf frequency diversity is strictly prohibited in all cases.

Reduced search

OFF

Targets may ingress into coverage more deeply before detection than with nominal frame times.

ONFUs in nominal ABT only missions without significant terrain masking. OFFFUs in cruise missile, small RCS target defense roles or in terrain masking environments or where pop-up targets pose a significant threat. ONBy default, needed for short reaction time engagement operations.

ARM automatic engagement mode

ON

This countermeasure enables the system to automatically engage ARMs that are selfdefense threats.

Same considerations for other types of automatic engagement operations.

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3-412. EDWA calculates a ballistic ground impact point for a track when it is classified as an ARM, even before it is considered a threat to the fire unit (ATC = 9). The ARM is considered to be a threat to the fire unit if either of the following exists: If the ARM flight path is directly towards the fire unit and the ARM GIP box touches the fire unit location, the GIP is re-computed and the GIP symbol is displayed on the situation display at the fire unit location. The ATC changes to 1. • If the ARM flight path is not directly at the fire unit and the ARM GIP box touches an imaginary horizontal line P4-75 km, left or right and perpendicular to the PTL. The ARM GIP is re-computed and the GIP symbol is displayed on the situation display at the fire unit location. The ATC changes to 1. 3-413. In general, the CARM mode S/I should only be elected during a threatening condition due to the performance tradeoffs that may be imposed by the countermeasures. In order to obtain the full benefit from these countermeasures, the S/I should be selected under the following conditions: The battalion is in the TBM mode. The battalion is in any other mode other than TBM and has received any one of the three ARM alerts. • Under the discretion of the commander. 3-414. When the ICC operator determines the ARM attack, ARM carrier, or ARM warning condition no longer to be present, a voice command should be issued to secure from CARM mode. Upon receipt of this command, the ECS operators should deselect the S/I and verbally inform the ICC. 3-415. ARM carriers (designated by “Ann” target numbers) should be considered for selective long-range engagement according to the preplanned ROE. Such an engagement may remove the threat of an ARM attack and save missiles (nominally two per ARM) which would have been expended if the carrier were allowed to launch them. This engagement may also protect another radar that may have been targeted by the carrier. Restrictive ROE which prevent the system from engaging ABT targets will negate the benefits of this feature. 3-416. Automatic ARM engagement is preferred due to the potentially short timelines available for manual engagement in self-defense. An ARM may be identified prior to its terminal dive and engaged manually. However, there are potential disadvantages to manual engagement action— • • The ARM classification logic may not have completely settled (for example, a negative ARM indicator may not yet have been violated). The ARM may not have been successfully guiding to the radar and would not have been threatening, resulting in the waste of one or two Patriot missiles. When manually attempting to engage the ARM, the system WILL NOT LAUNCH the missile until missile release time equals 0. • • •

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Chapter 4

Command and Control
This chapter addresses Patriot command and control (C2) processes. Command and control is the integrated process a commander uses to synchronize personnel, communications, facilities, equipment, and procedures to accomplish missions. The air defense C2 process must perform four steps: acquire, assess, determine, and direct. This chapter concentrates on the control portion of C2 of Patriot operations.

PATRIOT COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE
4-1. The Patriot control structure supports air battle management (engagement operations) through coordinated positive control (real-time operational data) and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for air defense systems to supplement and back up real-time data. Patriot-peculiar hardware and software, integrated by communications equipment, intelligence, and IFF sources, form the technical interface, which Patriot operators use to direct the firing of missiles in destroying enemy targets. This technical contact, along with positive control, procedural control, and operators, is the Patriot control structure, which is also referred to as engagement operations. 4-2. There are four levels of C2 that affect Patriot engagement operations: battery, battalion, ADA brigade, and joint. Patriot also must integrate into joint controlling levels like the control and reporting center (CRC), normally operated by the Air Force, or tactical air operations center (TAOC) operated by the U.S. Marine Corps. Each Patriot level of engagement operations exists as part of a hierarchy to supervise and execute defensive counterair missions against TBMs and ABTs. 4-3. At the battery level, the purpose of engagement operations is to fire missiles at hostile ABTs in the semiautomatic mode, normally while centralized to the battalion ICC, CRC, or TAOC. TBM engagements will be decentralized to the FU level and are conducted in the automatic mode of operation. 4-4. At the battalion level, the purpose of engagement operations are aircraft identification, friendly protection, and coordination of engagements control between Patriot batteries. For ABT engagements, the battalion operates either centralized or decentralized to ADA brigade control, CRC, or TAOC. TBM engagements are decentralized to the FU level. 4-5. At the ADA brigade, the command and control of engagement operations is to assist in aircraft identification for friendly protection. The ADA brigade will interface with the joint controlling authority. Patriot ABT engagements will normally be managed by exception. TBM engagements are decentralized to the FU level.

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4-6. At the joint engagement operations level, operations include aircraft identification, friendly protection, target assignment to ground or air platforms, data flow between services, and management of data link configurations and architectures.

PATRIOT COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCESSING
4-7. Data links are integral to the C2 process. Data links include PADIL, TADIL-A, TADIL-B, TADIL-J, and ATDL-1. The Patriot battery can establish three PADIL links using three UHF stacks available in the ECS. A battery can only establish direct PADIL communications link to an ICC, CRG, or another Patriot battery. The PADIL link to the ECS processes six target identifications: assumed friend, friend, special friend, true friend, unknown, and hostile. Both battalion and brigade can use any and all data links and communications media. The communications media that data (in the form of data links) passes over the airwaves includes HF, UHF, SATCOM, and Troposcatter. Patriot PADIL is the primary communications media between units. The other data link media are critical to external long-range data links that are essential for ADA support of the battle. 4-8. The interrelationships of ID volumes, weapon control status areas, residual volumes, and certain status indicator switches in system control and situation display select groups on the console are important to understand. There are five ID volumes, four of which are unique to Patriot and Hawk. Friendly origins, hostile origins, prohibited volumes, and restricted volumes are not used by any system outside Patriot and Hawk Phase III. The five ID volumes are— Safe passage corridors (passed by airspace coordination order as low-level transit routes [LLTRs]). • Friendly origin volumes. • Hostile origin volumes. • Prohibited volumes. • Restricted volumes. 4-9. Patriot weapons control volumes may be initialized with additional attributes such as altitude, heading, speed, or labeled as WEAPONS FREE, WEAPONS TIGHT, or WEAPONS HOLD to allow the operator to reserve portions of the display for special engagement parameters. For example, friendly suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) operations would be a good candidate for a WEAPONS HOLD volume. The three weapons control statuses are— • • WEAPONS HOLD—Do not fire except in self-defense or in response to a formal order. This is the most restrictive weapon control status. WEAPONS TIGHT—Fire only at ABT targets positively identified as hostile according to the prevailing hostile criteria. Positive identification can be effected by a number of means to include visual identification (aided or unaided) and meeting other designated hostile criteria supported by track correlation. This does not apply to TBMs since they are always considered hostile. •

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WEAPONS FREE—Weapons can fire at any air target not positively identified as friendly. This is the least restrictive weapon control status. 4-10. Residual volumes (that is, those areas not contained in a volume defined by Tab 71) may be designated either during initialization or during tactical operations by S/I as WEAPONS FREE, WEAPONS TIGHT, or WEAPONS HOLD. The software requires a residual volume, and the default is WEAPONS TIGHT. 4-11. On the ICC and ECS console, within the situation display select group, two status indicator switches, WPN CONTR AREAS and ID AREAS, affect the display of ID volumes and weapon control status areas. These switches affect the display but do not affect how the software processes targets in the activated volumes and areas. 4-12. The WPN CONTR AREAS switch, when lit, displays all weapon control status areas associated with an ID volume in Tab 71 including display of combined volumes. For example, a Tab 71 entry of FLOT associates a friendly volume or origin with a WEAPONS TIGHT weapon control status. The ID AREAS switch, when lit, displays all ID volumes and associated weapon control status areas. 4-13 On the console, within the system control group, the WPNS HOLD, WPNS TIGHT, and WPNS FREE switches change the residual volume and how the software processes targets located in residual volumes for engagement eligibility. The AREAS ENABLE switch forces the software to process all weapon control status areas not associated with an ID volume.

MASTER ICC OPERATIONS
4-14. The ICC has the capability to function as a master ICC fire distribution element. The MICC controls subordinate ICCs (SICC) and GEHOCs. Major features of an MICC include— • • • • • Increased external and internal interfaces. Brigade wide track management. Automatic fire distribution and battalion engagement assignment. ID and IFF coordination. Display enhancements.

MICC COMMUNICATIONS 4-15. The ICC can work together with nine external elements. These may be five subordinate or lateral battalions (GEHOC, ICC if subordinate, and/or MICC if lateral). External links to higher echelons control are the CRC, tactical air operations center (TAOC), and airborne warning and control system (AWACS). These three TADIL-B auxiliary links are not designed for air battle operations, but designed for information inputs. The MICC has up to 12 external links directly tied to FUs (of which 6 may be Patriot and 6 may be Hawk FUs).

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MASTER BATTALION TRACK MANAGEMENT 4-16. The brigade track management function is one of the main benefits of using the MICC. The MICC software maintains correlation of track data from Patriot units, Hawk FUs, subordinate battalions, auxiliary inputs, and higher echelon. The MICC and SICCs share this correlated air picture within operator determined filter limits. The MICC software correlates and triangulates tracks and downtells a track to SICCs not reporting that track. The logic also supports improved acquisition by accelerating track data rates to subordinate units in support of a cover and engage command when the MICC has reporting responsibility and local Patriot data is available. 4-17. The ICC can filter tracks to external (higher echelon, lateral, or subordinate) battalion elements. Page B of Tab 69 (refer to Chapter 2) controls this feature. Even with communications allowed, the filter portion of Tab 69 is accessible when using the COMMAND/PLAN function. The altitude filter is for three-dimensional data only. This filter will not affect Hawk CWAR or PAR tracks. The following are some C2 observations regarding Tab 69— The special information reporting data field allows transmission of special information to the battalion defined on page A. • Track filter entries provide the capability to filter by heading altitude, position, and identification. Do not apply filters except for special cases such as link saturation. The only reason to filter by ID is if a specific track ID is causing joint data link problems. • The software requires the operator to reenter IDs in exactly the same field they were deleted from. • Normally, do not apply the leading filter. • Normally, do not apply the altitude filter. If a tactical situation develops and the S3 directs, consider setting the altitude filter to an AMDPCS or GEHOC subordinate units only, and set the filter to the highest acquisition radar altitude available to that battalion. • Normally, do not apply the position filter. If the tactical situation dictates, consider setting no less than 100 kilometers Northing by 100 kilometers Easting providing an area 200 kilometers by 200 kilometers for subordinate battalions. 4-18. The MICC designates a single ATDL-1 track number that is common to subordinate battalions. When fire units directly subordinate to the MICC detect a track first, the software will open a track data record for a local battalion and assign a track number. If a subordinate battalion detects a track first, the MICC accepts the already assigned track number and opens its track record for correlation purposes. 4-19. If the MICC correlates a local track (directly tied FU) with an existing battalion track record, the previous track number remains intact. If a subordinate track correlates with an existing MICC track, the MICC requests the subordinate to accept the MICC track number. 4-20. A subordinate accepts the MICC track unless the subordinate is a Hawk assigned HPI ATDL-1 track number. The MICC will transmit the Hawk HPI ATDL-1 track number to all local and external units. •

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4-21. When a brigade ADTOC track number correlates to an HE track, the MICC uses the ADTOC track number. If the HE track number does not correlate to an ADTOC track, the MICC sends the HE track to all other units. 4-22. The enhanced MICC software performs triangulation solutions composed of any combination of FUs, local Patriot FUs, lateral ICCs, or subordinate ICCs. The MICC does not use Hawk strobes for triangulation. Hawk strobes are not the same as Patriot strobes because they do not provide elevation data and are therefore of questionable quality. A created triangulation solution provides target position and velocity to each reporting unit. The MICC follows the triangulation rules outlined below— • • • • Three strobes are necessary and must come from three separate Patriot batteries. One strobe may be from a Patriot battery in a lateral ICC. Two strobes may be from Patriot batteries in a subordinate ICC. A directly tied fourth Patriot battery can provide a strobe input, though not required.

MASTER BATTALION AUTOMATIC FIRE DISTRIBUTION 4-23. The MICC fire distribution follows the SICC logic (refer to SICC discussion in Chapter 2). The MICC equally considers all local and subordinate battalion FUs based on the reported operational status of each FU. The MICC selects the battalion with the primary FU or selects the local FU if it is primary. If a subordinate battalion is centralized to the MICC, TBEQ ordering and automatic engagement release is equal to local FUs. When a subordinate battalion is decentralized to the MICC, there is no automatic engagement release and DECBN appears under the ESTAT data field for the TBEQ and the AMP Tab. MASTER BATTALION ID AND IFF COORDINATION 4-24. The MICC identification processes help ensure a common ID throughout the data net. The improvements are— • • • • • Automatic ID sharing between battalions. MICC normally governs ID. Hawk HPI unique track ID accepted. IDs implemented via joint level ID resolution tables. ICC operators resolve conflicting IDs.

MASTER ICC COMMUNICATIONS
4-25. The primary concern when deploying a Patriot battalion in the MICC configuration is to determine whether the hardware and software can handle the planned deployment. Master ICC communications must be able to operate with external links to FUs and subordinate battalions. 4-26. The following chart (Figure 4-1) allows the SIGO to determine if the planned deployment is viable, based on the number of local fire units and number of external links needed. Use of this chart will preclude overloading

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the data link. The chart is relatively simple to use. The SIGO simply lines up the number of directly subordinate Patriot batteries along the left side with the number of directly subordinate Hawk FPs along the top, and reads the number of allowable external links in the center of the chart (subject to the limitations noted). For example, if the task force contained four Patriot batteries and four Hawk FPs, the allowable number of externals is four.

NUMBER OF THAAD OR HAWK FIRE UNITS NUMBER OF PATRIOT FIRE UNITS

0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6

1

2

3

4

5

6 8 7 6 4 3 1 -

7 8 6 5 4 2 1 -

8 7 6 4 3 1 -

9 10 11 12 6 5 4 2 6 4 3 5 3 4 -

10 10 10 10 10 9 10 10 10 9 10 9 8 6 5 4 8 6 5 4 8 7 6 4 3 8 6 5 4 2 8 7 6 4 3 1 8 6 5 4 2 1

NUMBER OF EXTERNAL LINKS ALLOWED
Figure 4-1. Link Planning 4-27. A second method of ensuring that the net load is below 100 percent is shown in Figure 4-2. This chart allows the SIGO to determine the total net load percentage before initialization. On the chart, local fire units are the Patriot, THAAD, and/or Hawk units that are tied to the battalion. External modem units are any battalion or higher level ATDL-1, PADIL, or TADIL-B connected to the battalion (any external unit tied directly to an ICC modem does not count). Refer to Chapter 2 for a description of direct links. Direct relay links heavily load the net and limit operational application.

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MULTIROUTED NETWORK LOADING COMPUTATION FORM
NUMBER OF UNITS Patriot FU Hawk AFP** ATDL-1/PADIL Modems** TADIL B Modems** Lateral Direct Links* Master/Sub Sub/Master Direct Links* Lateral Direct Link Relays* Master/Sub Sub/Master Direct Link Relay 3 4 2 1 1 X X X X X X X X PERCENT LINK LOADING 10.17 5.08 7.26 7.70 14.52 21.79 14.52 21.79 NA 2.47 2.40 TOTAL LINK LOAD * Direct links which are connected at CRGs and ECSs only. Direct links tied directly to the ICC do not load the net. ** Modems which are connected at CRGs only. Modems used directly from the ICC do not load the net. Figure 4-2. Link Load Computational Form (example) 92.44 6 Total Modems Used TOTAL PERCENT LINK LOADING 30.51 20.32 14.52 7.70 14.52 NUMBER OF MODEMS USED NA 3 2 1 NA NA NA

Overhead for Battalion with Patriot Batteries 1 or more: Enter 2.47. No Patriot Batteries: Enter 0 Nominal Battalion Overhead

MICC DISPLAY
4-28. A system weapon control tab is available via S/I to provide functions of displaced switches. The SYST/WPN CONTR S/I is on the console between the HAWK ENG SUM and ICC STATUS tab. This tab is the data base for method of control (MOC) weapons control state (WCS), and areas enable for the ICC and subordinate battalions and FUs. Though the tab is the data base for subordinate battalion ID mode, it only displays the ID mode for the local ICC. ID mode control for the local ICC and FUs is via Tab 1.

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4-29. The System Control and Weapons Control tab provides for addressing all subordinate elements. Only the local ICC and selected (SLCT) subordinate elements use the source address function. ENTER TAB processes the commands established in the fields. For example, selecting all with the WCS data field command to TIGHT and hitting ENTER TAB enters WCS TIGHT into the data bases of local FUs and subordinate battalions. The local ICC must recall the tab and place itself in WCS TIGHT using the local function. Only an MICC configuration displays lateral ICC parameters, and only an MICC can enter a change for another Patriot battalion. For a discussion of weapon control status and areas enable, see battery level operations. 4-30. The Site Amplifying Data tab provides the MICC operator with the ability to monitor specific data for subordinate battalions. This data is a replication of the data displayed on the battalion and FP status panels and other Battalion Status tabs. The site amplifying data is provided in a tabular display that is selected via a keyboard hooking process. To select a Site Amplifying Data tab, the operator must ensure that the subordinate battalion locations are displayed on the situation display. These locations, to include the subordinate battalion FUs, are provided from the subordinate battalion when communication is established with them. To display the battalion and FP symbology flag, the operator must have SECTOR BOUNDS and/or GENERAL POINTS S/Is selected. The operator then places the situation display cursor over the flag of the battalion of interest and presses SEL TAB, HOOK, SEL TAB. The Site Amplifying Data tab for that battalion will automatically be displayed. The battalion flag does not have to be hooked to get the tab. The operator may hook a subordinate unit flag of a battalion, and the Site Amplifying Data tab for that battalion will appear. 4-31. The Site Amplifying Data tab consists of three different pages (see Figure 4-3). Page 1 addresses the items displayed on the battalion status panel. Page 2 is available only if the hooked battalion has one or more Patriot batteries assigned. The data on page 2 replicates the information found in the Battalion Status and Operational Assessment tabs. It also provides the battalion authorization in terms of pop-up, ECM, MSV, SIF. Up to six battalion displays will be provided. Page 3 provides the status of ABT and TBM search, missile guidance, and launch commands.

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SITE AMPLIFYING DATA- BN : PG 1 *SEL SITE* TYPE: ADW MSL ATK CBR DEFCON SOA MOC IDM IDWS WCS-AE EQPT COMM MSLS EQPT/ FP SOA MOC WCS-AE FSA FSB COMM MSLS FP FSA FSB COMM MSLS 1 7 2 8 3 9 4 10 5 11 6 12 SITE AMPLIFYING DATA – BN PAGE 2 PATRIOT UNITS: OPR SRCH ID ID ABT TBMA TBMB TBMA TBMB MISSILES-HOT: FP MODE MODE MODE WS ENGA ENGA ENGA MOF MOF STD ASOJ ATM 1 2 3 4 5 6 BN AUTHORIZATIONS: - - - SITE AMPLIFYING DATA – BN UNITS: TBM MSL LNCH SRCH TRKG GUID CMD STAT STAT STAT STAT PAGE 3 *SEL SITE*

*SEL SITE*

PATRIOT ABT SRCH FP STAT 1 2 3 4 5 6

Figure 4-3. Site Amplifying Data Tab 4-32. The ICC's Track Amp Data tab display facilitates the ICC's capacity to control 12 FPs or to function as a master battalion. The information provided has remained the same except that the tab has been reformatted placing the TRKNG FP data fields to the bottom of the tab and adding data fields for FPs 7-12 (Hawk only). A BN data field has been added to indicate the subordinate battalion (BN A, BN B, and so on) reporting the track. The ATDL-1 track number appearing to the right of the FP number is the Hawk assigned track number and may be referred to when operating with Hawk (for example, "Your track AH204") (See Figure 4-4.)

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TRK

THRT

ID/S

ESTAT/S

UNIT

TLR

TLL

E/MI

GEOREF

ALT

SPEED

HDNG

TYPE

AGE

IFF CONDITION: MODE: 4 1 CODE: RSPS: TRKNG FP: 1/ 2/ 7/AH204 8/

2

3

3/ 9/

4/ 10/

5/ 11/

6/ 12/

CONFLICT ID: RECOMMEND ID: ORIGIN: IFF EVAL: SAFE VEL: SAFE CORR: PROHIB VOL: RESTR VOL: ECM EMIT: POP UP: BN/

Figure 4-4. ICC Tactical Tab S/I Track Amp Data

FIRE UNIT TO FIRE UNIT OPERATIONS
4-33. The fire unit to fire unit (FUFU) capability within the Patriot system allows fire units to conduct a coordinated air battle without an ICC. In the FUFU mode of operations, fire units perform triangulation, track correlation, engagement coordination, and support. The ICC track management software has been implemented at the fire units, so that those functions are now available at the fire unit. The ICC site calibration process is not performed at the fire unit. The normal process for fire unit saturation alleviation still applies. Track data with position, identification, engagement coordination (HOLD FIRE, CEASE FIRE) and weapons control is exchanged between fire units. Fire units perform track correlation only when communication with the ICC has been lost. ID conflicts are provided, requiring manual resolution. The weapons control state on each track is also shared with all fire units. Each fire unit performs triangulation using shared data from at least two other FUs. This provides range data on these tracks to the other units. FIRE UNIT TO FIRE UNIT COMMUNICATIONS 4-34. FUFU communications messages are processed with the normal acknowledgment scheme. The broadcast mode is used to transmit volatile track and jammer update messages. Transition from ICC to FU control to FUFU control is a simple process if multirouted communications were previously established. In this case, units involved are activated by way of Tab 2 (Figure 4-5). FUFU operations may not be a viable option if UHF communications links must be reconfigured. The anticipated ICC downtime will dictate the need to configure the communications network for FUFU operations.

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BN COMMUNICATIONS CONFIGURATION CONTROL REINITIALIZE ( ) RLRIU— ICC,CRG1-6,FP1-6 TOD MASTER— COMM STATE— A=ALLOW,D=DISALLOW,M=MONITOR HEU =( ) FP1 = ( ) FP 7 = ( ) BNA = ( ) AUX1 =( ) FP2 = ( ) FP 8 = ( ) BNB = ( ) AUX2 =( ) FP3 = ( ) FP 9 = ( ) BNC = ( ) AUX3 =( ) FP4 = ( ) FP10 = ( ) BND = ( ) FP5 = ( ) FP11 = ( ) BNE = ( ) FP6 = ( ) FP12 = ( ) BNF = ( )
COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL + TOD MASTER REINITIALIZE ( ) RLRIU: ICC, CRG1-6 OR ALL, FP1-6 A=ALLOWED D=DISALLOWED PRIME PATH CNTRL COMMO STATE: ECS DLT MODES: 1A =( ) 1 =( ) ICC -( ) AUTO =( ) 2A =( ) 2 =( ) FP1 -( ) RADIO =( ) 3A =( ) 3 =( ) FP2 -( ) FIBER OPTICS =( ) 4A =( ) 4 =( ) FP3 -( ) REPORTED DLT MODES: 5A =( ) 5 =( ) FP4 -( ) AUTO/MANUAL 6A =( ) 6 =( ) FP5 -( ) RADIO SILENCE 7A =( ) 7 =( ) FP6 -( ) FIBER OPTICS 8A =( ) 8 =( )

*2*
FP BN CURRENT NET LOAD: PERCENT *2* R=RADIO F=FIBER

TOD MASTER: Fpnaaa Bnaaaa

Figure 4-5. ICC and ECS Tab 2 FIRE UNIT TO FIRE UNIT OPERATIONS CONTROL 4-35. Fire unit to fire unit (FUFU) operations are used when the ICC voice or digital communications have been lost because the ICC is relocating or is nonoperational. This transition provides for the digital data and voice communications exchange, but does not address the transfer of control. Battalion procedures must be established to define the level of control, and authority is transferred during FUFU operations. A master battery operation may be considered where one battery is designated as the controlling unit, but because the FU only displays tracks within its search/track sector and not remote tracks, the air picture available at a master battery is not the complete battalion air picture. This severely limits the effectiveness of the master battery concept. If the battalion chooses to use this approach, the battery most rearward in the defense should be used as the master battery because it most likely has overlapping coverage with units forward of it. The software does not support a master battery concept so control is by voice only. Because each FU generates its own track numbers, the send pointer function along with IM ENGINEERING is the only reliable means of ensuring that the same track is being discussed at each FU. Fire unit to fire unit operations only supports the capabilities previously defined. FIRE UNIT TO FIRE PROCEDURES 4-36. If voice or digital communication is still available, the ICC directs fire units to transition to FUFU operations. If both voice and digital communications are lost with the ICC for more than five minutes, the fire units should independently transition to FUFU operations. It should be noted that a continuous effort must be made to reestablish communications with the ICC through any means (UHF, FM, and AM). Fire units must operate in this condition autonomously, even when FUFU operations are not achieved.

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This allows for a logical degradation to autonomous operations and a quick recovery to FUFU, or battalion operations. If communications are established with either a fire unit or the ICC, the air battle is again coordinated. 4-37. Once the ICC has directed FUFU operations, the ICC operator selects Tab 2 and disallows communications with the fire units. When notified to assume FUFU operations, the ECS operator selects the INDEP S/I in the System Control group. Tab 2 is then selected, and communications disallowed with the ICC and allowed with the fire units that are participating in the FUFU operations. 4-38. When Tab 2 is entered, the operator will monitor the FU status panel communications light. The light changes to red or yellow for approximately 15 seconds while Status Monitor checks the FUFU communications status. Once the message acknowledgment threshold is passed, the communications light will return to green. A yellow light indicates that one or more fire units are experiencing bad communications. The light returns to green if the bad communications links are eliminated or if they return to an acceptable threshold. 4-39. With the establishment of communications between fire units, the SECTOR BOUNDS switch-indicator is selected. The sector bounds of the fire units with communications and within the geographic area of the fire unit are displayed. A quick indication that communications have been lost with a particular fire unit is the disappearance of its sector bounds. 4-40. In the FUFU mode, the fire unit operator can send tab, pointer, and free form message to other FUs in the network. The TCA continues to conduct the air battle using the TBEQ as the key indicator in performing engagements. The ENGST/M data field of the Engagement Data and Track Amp Data tabs must be monitored closely to ensure that targets with cease fire are not engaged, thereby minimizing redundant engagements. The alert “nnn NO ENG-CEASE FIRE” will be displayed on the alert line. 4-41. The TCO will perform his duties as friendly protector. He continues to use the Track Amp Data tab as a key indicator of track identification. He can also use the IM Engineering data tab to coordinate track numbers with other fire units in the network (See Figure 4-6). The FU data field, which is the bottom field in the tab, provides an indication of which fire units are correlating and their target track number. There are six positions in the FB data field across the bottom of the IM Engineering tab. Position 1 on the left is FU 1; position 2, FU 2; and so on with position 6 on the extreme right being FU 6. Position 1 will indicate FU 1's target number. From position 2 on, 100 is added to each position's target number. Figure 4-6 shows an example of the IM Engineering tabs for a target with a track number of 23 at FU 1. The fire unit that has hooked the target and displayed the IM Engineering tab will have its position blank, as indicated by position 4. The target is number 69 at FU 2, 85 at FU 3, and 37 at FU 5. FU 4's target would be displayed on the situation display and on TRACK AMP when selected. This example assumes that all six FUs are tracking the target. Ensure that FUs 1 through 5 are identified as 0 through 4 followed by the track number.

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IM ENGINEERING DATA TGTN/RT: TOBS : XL AZIMUTH: TNNA : YL ELEV : TR/JT : ZL RANGE : DRANG : XLD VEL : DSINA : YLD HEADING: DSINB : ZLD ALT : FF : DX MMODE : TVMMOD : DY RECMODE: LPDC : DZ FB: 023 169 285 437 NUMSRC FU1 FU2 FU3 FU4 FU5

: : : : : : : : : :

TOTR TOBLCM PRIMRY FSID RTRID RTRI RFST CLASS PRI TOF

: : : : : : : : : :

Figure 4-6. IM Engineering Data Tab TRANSITION BACK TO ICC CONTROL 4-42. The ICC operator must first establish voice communications with the fire units and determine if there are any ongoing engagements. The ICC waits until ongoing engagements are completed. Transition to ICC control while engagements are ongoing may cause in-flight missile destruction. This may happen if a fire unit is providing FU engagement support, or if target range is due to triangulation. Engagement support is the process by which target range data is being provided to the engaging fire unit because it does not have its range on the target. This can be due to the unit dropping the track during the engagement. By definition, triangulated tracks require data from other FUs to perform the range solution. Concluding communications while this data is being provided to the fire unit will result in missile destruction. Therefore, transition to ICC control during the peak of an air battle is not recommended. 4-43. If there are no engagements, then the ICC directs the fire units to transition to ICC control. Upon direction to transition to ICC control, the fire unit operator selects Tab 2 and disallows communication with the fire units and allows communication with the ICC. The ICC operator selects Tab 2 and allows communication with the fire units. 4-44. When Tab 2 has been entered at both the ICC and FU, the digital communications process reverts to ICC control. The FP Status Panel at the ICC indicates the correct communication status as the units return under ICC control. The FU method of control should indicate INDEP at this time. Once digital communications have achieved a yellow or green state, the ICC commands the unit(s) to the centralized method of control through the SOURCE/ADDRS and CNTR CONTR S/Is. 4-45. Normal operations are resumed when the units have transitioned to the centralized method of control. FUFU is a degraded mode of operations for the batteries only, with loss of C2 and identification capabilities from higher echelon. All FU capabilities for track capacity, identification, and engagements remain the same.

DATA LINKS
4-46. The designs of each data link is different and serves a different purpose. Data link differences are important to understand because, for example,

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initializing TADIL-B to a CRC does not provide the same information as initializing ATDL-1 to a CRC. Who Is In Control? 4-47. Higher echelon units (HEU) above Patriot control the data link configuration through joint link configuration control. If a controller from a joint echelon orders a link shutdown or questions identification procedures, the Patriot TD must comply. Data Link to Use With HEU 4-48. Choosing which type of data link to use for the HEU link is critical. Use the PADIL data link whenever the HEU is an ICC. PADIL provides advantages including data type, amount, and rate. The following guidance should be followed when establishing links to higher echelons other than an ICC. 4-49. Always initialize ATDL-1 to a Hawk unit (whether HEU, lateral, or subordinate). Initializing TADIL-B to an HEU ATDL-1 results in increased miscorrelation of air tracks, increased dual designations, increased ID conflicts. Patriot PTL data will be transmitted to the HEU. 4-50. Always initialize TADIL-B when establishing a joint level link to a CRC, TACC, or TAOC. Initializing ATDL-1 on these links creates track number problems, ID conflicts, and miscorrelation. 4-51. Always initialize TADIL-J when establishing a joint level link. This joint link may be with an AWACS, Air Force Theater Air Control system (TACS), or selected fighter aircraft(s). 4-52. Do not initialize to a higher echelon on any link type other than HEU. Doing so creates numerous problems initializing to higher or any other battalion or brigade element. Initializing HEU on an AUX link results in the following commands not processing properly— • • • • • • • • • • • Engage. Engage Ripple. Cease Engage. Assign. Cover. Cease Fire. Hold Fire. Charge data. Orders. ID difference. IFF/SIF negatively affected.

TROPO LINKAGE USING HSDIO CARD
4-53. Place the high-speed input/output (HSDIO) card into the LGM (Loop Group Modem) in the TROPO van, remove a digital phase lock module assembly (DPLMA) card (Patriot uses it to hook DNVT) and insert the HSDIO card. Connect the four-wire WF-16 cable to the ports on the TROPO

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van and run the wire to the ECS entering through the hole in the floorboard. Cut a patch cord and plug into the RLRIU port. If the distance between the ECS and the TROPO van does not allow reliable communications to be established, a remote multiplexer combiner (RMC) must be used. Place the RMC on the tailgate of the ECS and connect it to the TROPO van using a CX-11230 coax cable. Replace a DPLMA circuit card in the RMC with an HSDIO circuit card and connect it to the ECS via the WF-16 wire as described above. Since there is a built-in HSDIO card in the Configuration 2 Patriot ICC, the additional HSDIO card should be placed in the TRC-170 TROPO van that is located at the same end of the Patriot ECS (Figure 4-7).

TROPO HSDIO CARD

CONFIGURATION 2 ICC HAS BUILT-IN HSDIO CARD

NL

PATRIOT ECS

4CO WIR NN E L EC AN TIO N

N N LA O E CTI IR W NE 4- ON C

PATRIOT ICC

TROPO

Figure 4-7. TROPO Linkage

DATA LANGUAGES
4-54. Data links are integral to engagement operations. The data links include PADIL, TADIL-A, TADIL-B, TADIL-J, and ATDL-1. Battery-level engagement operations use only the PADIL data link. Both battalion and brigade levels can use any data links and communications media. The communications media, in the form of data links, include HF, UHF, SATCOM, and Troposcatter. Though UHF is the primary Patriot communications medium, the other media are critical to the reliable, long-range data links that are so essential for ADA support of air and land operations. 4-55. PADIL is a secure point-to-point full duplex link (transmits and receives simultaneously) for exchanging information between Patriot battalions and batteries at a rate of 32 kbps. PADIL provides two-way, simultaneous exchange with multirouting to enhance survivability.

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4-56. PADIL data communications is capable of operation in either the high frequency (HF) or ultrahigh frequency (UHF) bands. PADIL is used within Patriot battalions for command and control, intelligence reporting, target ID, historical information, track updates, and system maintenance monitoring. Patriot batteries are PADIL capable only. The ICC, however, is TADIL A/B/J and ATDL-1 capable. Thus, the ICC must serve as the interface for the Patriot battery (Figure 4-8). Currently, the only mode of operation that PADIL can perform is point-to-point.

AMG ICC

AMG ECS AMG ECS PADIL NETWORK ECS AMG

Figure 4-8. PADIL Distribution Net (example) 4-57. PADIL may not be used with any communications system with a nominal signal delay of 0.4 seconds or more. This is because the RLRIU maintains PADIL message packets in short-term memory as a means to compare and delete old messages in the multirouted system. For example, tactical satellite (TACSAT) communications systems induce a delay caused by signal transmission time to the communications satellite and return. This delay is longer than the RLRIU memory, so that all PADIL messages passed via TACSAT are in effect new messages because the RLRIU cannot compare and throw out old messages. Direct TACSAT PADIL links are possible between ICCs and between the ICC and ECS; however, such links introduce anomalies in the system. The time of day clock becomes erratic, and depending on the amount of traffic, the link itself will become degraded or poor. 4-58. TADIL-A (Figure 4-9) is a half duplex (transmits and receives in alternating time frames) secure netted link which exchanges digital information for tracks and track management. It allows one way, sequential data exchange, and normally operates in a roll call (polling) mode under control of a net control station (NCS). The TADIL-A radio is located in the TCS of the BTOC.

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USAF

USMC

USN

USAF USN LINK-11/TADIL-A NETWORK ALLIES ALLIES ALLIES CUSTOMS

Figure 4-9. TADIL-A Distribution Net (example) 4-59. TADIL-A can operate in either the HF or UHF bands. When operating in the HF band, TADIL-A provides omnidirectional coverage in excess of 300 nautical miles (NM) from the transmitting site. When operating in the UHF band, the link provides omni-directional coverage to approximately 25 NM ship-to-ship, 150 NM ship-to-air or 100 NM air-to-ground. Greater distances are possible with SATCOM shots. Testing has demonstrated ranges in excess of 1600 NM. SATCOM relay to support an alternate network, such as TADIL-A, would be based on the limited availability of SATCOM resources and the high number of priorities during operations to support theater level to national command authority communications needs. 4-60. The TADIL-A antennas should be remoted to the maximum tactically feasible distance on the rear roadside of the BTOC. This minimizes communications interference with the JTIDS, CTT, and MSE radios. Consult the area frequency manager to deconflict frequencies. TADIL-A modes of operation are explained below. 4-61. Broadcast (many to many) —This is a mode of operation in which a net participant transmits successive reports without being interrogated by the NCS. Broadcast is initiated manually and continues until manually stopped. 4-62. Roll Call (Polling)—This is the normal mode of operation in which each net participant transmits, in turn, when his address is polled by the NCS. The time it takes the NCS to poll each station once is called net cycle time. More participants mean a longer net cycle time. The longer the net cycle time, the older the target data becomes before it is transmitted to each participant. This is significant for air defense users because the older the data, the less likely it will be of immediate use to the system operator. A long net cycle time reduces the likelihood that tracks will correlate. TADIL-A does not carry TBM information.

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4-63. Short Broadcast (SBC)—A net participant can transmit a single block of local data without being interrogated by the NCS. When operating in the SBC mode, which is used only as required for certain tactical situations, transmission of data is initiated manually. 4-64. Net Synchronization—This consists of a continuous series of preambles. It is initiated manually by the operator and continues until manually stopped by the operator. Operationally, it is often used as a first step in verifying radio frequency connectivity between units. 4-65. Net Test—This consists of a 21-frame repeating test pattern. This test pattern is a subset of the address codes. The transmission begins with preamble frames and a phase reference frame and is then followed by a test pattern. 4-66. Net Test Mode—This is a test of connectivity between units. It is also a useful signal for setting the data terminal set (DTS) audio input and output levels. The net test signal should be input to the DTS at 0 dB/m. The net test also checks the DTS's Patriot unit address-receive circuits. 4-67. Radio silence is the absence of any transmission. A Patriot unit in radio silence will receive data from other members of the net but will not respond if it is polled. AWACS operators prefer this operating mode for Patriot (receive only). The early warning information supplied by low fidelity sensors will not correlate with Patriot data leading to uncertainty of combat ID. 4-68. UHF multipath occurs when the transmitted signal follows paths of different lengths. The received signals are out of phase with each other causing interference and phase error. As a result, units operating within a ground wave coverage area and within the ionospheric refraction zone will be subject to multipath interference. The fading in and out of the signal can be monitored on the audio channel. In UHF, multipath transmissions may occur when the signal is reflected from a large metal structure. Two actions that can be taken are the relocation of operating units or changing of frequencies. Higher frequencies are better than lower frequencies during the day. 4-69. UHF shadowing occurs when the signal is blocked by an obstruction. Relay availability is an important consideration when planning UHF links over extended areas. E2C and E3A aircraft operating on the same frequency as the desired link will normally provide this function given the 24-hour stationing that they normally provide in an operational environment. 4-70. TADIL-B (Figure 4-10) is a secure point-to-point full duplex link for the transferring of data from land-based units. Links also exist between airborne and land-based intelligence units. TADIL-B provides two-way simultaneous data exchange between systems. 4-71. TADIL-B communication is capable of operation in either HF, UHF satellite communications (SATCOM), or through landline. When operating in the UHF band, TADIL-B provides a line of sight (LOS) that may provide coverage of up to 80 kms over level terrain, but the planning range is 40 kms. Currently, the only mode of operation that TADIL-B can perform is point-to-point.

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CRC PADIL BATTALION ICC PATRIOT FIRE UNITS

TADIL-B

BRIGADE ADTOC

TADIL-B/ATDL-1

TADIL-B/ATDL-1 ATDL-1 HAWK FIRE UNITS

HAWK BATTALION

Figure 4-10. TADIL-B Distribution Net (example) 4-72. TADIL J. TADIL-J (JTIDS) is a time-division-multiple-access netted or point-to-point link for exchanging digital information or fixed data formats. It is used by airborne, land-based, and shipboard tactical combat operations. TADIL-J is a secure jam resistant, nodeless, high-capacity data link that uses the class 2M terminal and the J series message formats for communications. 4-73. JTIDS offers various performance capabilities dependent on its mode of operation. The network criteria include the number and types of participants, line-of-sight (LOS) constraints, the use of relay, and the electromagnetic compatibility requirements. Depending on the network and the number and types of other tactical digital information links, the planner will specify additional initialization parameters to tailor the network to the specific implementation. 4-74. Once the planning parameters have been specified, network initialization information is disseminated to network participants through the operation task order LINK or equivalent message. The unit signal officer must ensure the following gross throughput requirements are met by the specific configuration as part of the planning process: 8486 kbps 4428 kbps (100 objects) 7771 kbps (100 objects) 10350 kbps (200 objects) 12928 kbps (300 objects) 13148 kbps (400 objects) • Patriot BTOC/ICC to JSN 6853 kbps • Patriot BTOC/ICC to THAAD Btry 7909 kbps 4-75. The terminals have two effective range settings. The normal range mode is 300 NM. The extended range mode is 500 NM. The actual range is further constrained by the fact that JTIDS 2M terminal is a LOS radio and broadcasts within the UHF frequency spectrum. Consequently, they are • • • THAAD Btry to Patriot BTOC/ICC JTAGS to Patriot BTOC/ICC Joint Surveillance Network (JSN) to Patriot BTOC/ICC

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constrained to LOS. Maximum broadcast range from surface to an aerial platform is 300 NM. Maximum range from a surface node to another surface node is LOS, antenna, and terrain dependent. It is currently planned to have an aerial relay to support JTIDS users operating over extended ranges. Availability is not a surety and is a function of the theater net design. Dead time setting must support range of the external JTIDS interface. 4-76. There are three modes of operation possible with the 2M message structures—broadcast, point-to-point, and message format. Some message structures provide the capability for higher data throughput, but at the expense of antijam capability, and in some cases extended range. Choosing the correct mode comes from an understanding of the emplacement requirements and the tactical situation. For example, against a highly mature threat, a high degree of antijam and security is required. Against a less capable threat, a reduced antijam capability can be allowed. See initialization of systems for further information. The following message structures are available. 4-77. Standard double pulse is the standard and most rugged frequency hopping procedure between 960 MHz and 1215 MHz. The transmissions have the highest information security and jam protection. Communications are effective in both normal and extended range modes. Packed 2 double pulse provides twice the throughput as the standard double pulse, but each message is only transmitted once, decreasing the antijam margin. Packed 2 double pulse provides the same throughput as packed 2 single pulse, with each message being transmitted twice, but at the expense of extended range capability. Packed 4 single pulse quadruples the throughput of standard double pulse but at a loss of antijam margin and extended range. 4-78. There are three access modes. In the dedicated access mode, specific time slots are assigned to a specific user, and only this user transmits in those time slots. Dedicated access assigns slots based on user needs. Reception is certain when the transmitter and receiver are in LOS. In the contention access mode, a block of time slots is shared by a number of users. Each user independently and randomly selects a time slot from the group and transmits. When not transmitting, the users listen to all the time slots in a group. Contention access is more flexible because another terminal can start transmitting without having to receive specific transmit slots. However, the probability of reception depends on how many platforms are transmitting. A terminal receiving multiple transmissions will receive the transmission from the closest unit first. In the time slot reallocation (TSR) access mode, no controlling terminal is used. Reallocated time slots are available for use on the next transmission for each terminal. Enhanced surveillance and timely C2 are the principle advantages of TSR (now being developed). The net control station (NCS) will establish the access mode. 4-79. The communications takes approximately three to four minutes to load the JTIDS initialization program in the LCU from the hard drive. Only Patriot peculiar entries will be discussed here. 4-80. Enter the battalion participant ID number which can be obtained from the NCS or select the number of the preinitialized ID. Then the JTIDS Net Entry menu must be completed with the unit peculiar data. The next

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required step is to enter unit position data, followed by host link initialization. 4-81. WGS-84 is used as the JTIDS world model. Therefore, whenever possible, WGS-84 should be used as the Patriot world model. 4-82. ATDL-1 is a secure point-to-point full duplex link for exchanging digital information among Army systems and between Army/Marine C2 systems. ATDL-1 data communications is capable of operation in HF, UHF, SATCOM, or through land lines. ATDL-1 is used for C2, intelligence reporting, target information, and track updates. Currently, the only mode of operation that ATDL-1 can perform is point-to-point (Figure 4-11).

CRC PADIL BATTALION ICC PATRIOT FIRE UNITS

ATDL-1

BRIGADE ADTOC

ATDL-1

ATDL-1 ATDL-1 HAWK FIRE UNITS

HAWK BATTALION

Figure 4-11. ATDL-1 Distribution Net (Example)

4-21

Appendix A

Patriot Data Sheets
This appendix contains data sheets used during manual emplacement of both the Patriot radar and launching stations. For more information, read the section on manual emplacement procedures found in Chapter 2.

MANUAL ORIENTATION AND ALIGNMENT DATA SHEETS
A-1. All data obtained during manual orientation and alignment are recorded on special data sheets. These sheets are then hand-carried to the ECS crew members for data input during initialization. Extreme care must be taken to ensure that alignment data collected is precise and input accurately during initialization. The manual emplacement data sheets are as follows: • • • • • Patriot Radar Location/Alignment Data Sheet (Figure A-1). Patriot Radar Supplemental Roll and Crossroll Data Sheet (Figure A-2). Patriot Launcher Location/Alignment Data Sheet (Form 1) (Figure A-3). Patriot Launcher Location/Alignment Data Sheet (Form 2) (Figure A-4). Patriot Launcher Supplemental Roll and Crossroll Data Sheet (Figure A-5).

TECHNICAL MANUALS
A-2. The technical manuals provide step-by-step procedures for setting up the M2 aiming circle and determining orientation and alignment. These procedures are found in the operator level technical manuals (TMs). When conducting manual orientation and alignment, use the radar operator manual TM 9-1430-601-10-1 and for the launcher, use the launcher operator manual TM 9-1440-600-10.

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FM 3-01.87

PATRIOT RADAR LOCATION AND ALIGNMENT DATA
LONGITUDE LATITUDE
Z Z h e e e e e e n n n n n n n

UTM
AND

METERS ALTITUDE EL RDR TO MIR
Elevation of Mirrors from radar M2.

BRNG RDR TO NREF
Bearing of Radar M2 sighted on NREF M2.

. . . . . . .
UTM WORLD MODEL
0 = International 1 = 1880 Clark 2 = 1866 Clark 3 = 1856 Clark 4 = Everest 5 = Bessel

EL RDR TO NREF TOP*
Elevation of Range Pole Top from Radar M2.

EL RDR TO BOT*:
Elevation of Range Pole Bottom from Radar M2.

BRNG NREF TO RDR
Bearing of Radar M2 from NREF M2.

ROLL CROSSROLL AZIMUTH RING READING
DATE TIME PTL STL#1 STL#2 ALIGNMENT STOW AZ MARK CREW CHIEF CERTIFICATION POINT 1 ( ) ( )

LOCATION DATA CONFIDENCE LEVEL:
0 = Survey, 1 = Modified Survey, 2 = Map

ALIGNED BY:
0 = Survey 1 = Compass

WIND SPEED:
0 = Below Gale, 1 = Gale + Above INITIAL SEARCH LOWER BOUND DATA ENTRY POINT 2 POINT 3 POINT 4 POINT 5 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) = MILS BEARING ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) = MILS EL ±200

* = Elevation measurements required only for unsurveyed site.

Figure A-1. Radar Location/Alignment Data Sheet

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PATRIOT RADAR SUPPLEMENTAL ROLL AND CROSSROLL
TIME REFERENCE
Taken as soon as possible after the RS is slewed to the PTL.

ROLL Z

CROSSROLL

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

SUPPLEMENTAL
(24 hours later)

Z

• DIFFERENCE SUPPLEMENTAL
(24 hours later)

Z

• DIFFERENCE SUPPLEMENTAL
(24 hours later)

Z

• DIFFERENCE SUPPLEMENTAL
(24 hours later)

Z

• DIFFERENCE

• = If either the supplemental roll or crossroll differs by more than 2 mils from the reference reading, return the RS to the align stow position and realign per TM or crew drill procedures. Provide the new data to the ECS for entry in Tab 81, and upon slewing the RS to the PTL, start new supplemental roll and crossroll data sheet.

Figure A-2. Radar Supplemental Roll and Crossroll Data Sheet

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FORM 1 PATRIOT LAUNCHER LOCATION AND ALIGNMENT DATA
USED WHEN ALIGNING ON UNSURVEYED SITE

LS NUMBER

BRNG NREF TO LS
Bearing of reference M2 sighted on launcher M2.

. . . . . .
UL UR LR LL

BRNG LS TO NREF
Bearing of launcher sighted on reference M2.

BRNG LS TO RS
Bearing of launcher M2 sighted on radar M2.

EL LS TO RS
Elevation of launcher M2 sighted on radar M2.

ROLL

CROSSROLL

MISSILE UMBILICALS CONNECTED

Note: For LOS emplacement, fill in all items.
Figure A-3. Launcher Location and Alignment Data Sheet (Form 1)

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FORM 2 PATRIOT LAUNCHER LOCATION AND ALIGNMENT DATA
USED WHEN LS UTM, ALTITUDE, AND ORENTING LINE ARE PROVIDED AT A SURVEYED SITE

LS NUMBER
Z Z h e e e e e e n n n n n n n

UTM

METERS ALTITUDE

ORIENTING AZIMUTH
LS M2 stake to position stake.

. . . . . . .
UL LL UR LR

BRNG NREF TO LS
Bearing of reference.

TRUE AZIMUTH OF LS
Azimuth from launcher M2 through canister alignment pins.

BRNG LS TO NREF
Subtract from 6400 mils and enter here.

ROLL

CROSSROLL

MISSILE UMBILICALS CONNECTED

ALIGNMENT AZIMUTH POSITION

Note: For UTM emplacement, fill in all items.

Figure A-4. Launcher Location and Alignment Data Sheet (Form 2)

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PATRIOT LAUNCHER SUPPLEMENTAL ROLL AND CROSSROLL
TIME REFERENCE
Taken as soon as possible after the RS is slewed to the PTL.

ROLL Z

CROSSROLL

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

SUPPLEMENTAL
(24 hours later)

Z

• DIFFERENCE SUPPLEMENTAL
(24 hours later)

Z

• DIFFERENCE SUPPLEMENTAL
(24 hours later)

Z

• DIFFERENCE SUPPLEMENTAL
(24 hours later)

Z

• DIFFERENCE

• = If either the supplemental roll or crossroll differs by more than 3 mils from the reference reading, return the LS to the align stow position and realign per TM or crew drill procedures. Then provide the new data to the ECS for entry in Tab 85. After training the LS to the firing azimuth, start a new supplemental roll and crossroll data sheet.

Figure A-5. Launcher Supplemental Roll and Crossroll Data Sheet

A-6

Appendix B

Radar Mapping
This appendix provides guidance and procedures for performing all types of radar mapping operations (see radar mapping in Chapter 2). The battery commander determines whether mapping is required; however, the possibility of RF detection by the enemy during the mapping sequence requires that the battalion commander or the S3 make the tactical decision to map or not to map during passive defense operations. Mapping may disclose the battery's location to the enemy before Patriot is ready to fight. Not mapping affects system capability to engage low-flying aircraft.

DATA ACQUISITION
B-1. Before fire unit emplacement, site data must be determined and collected for the initialization process by the RSOP team. The following are considerations and procedures for establishing the ISLB: Single or multipoint ISLB data are entered in Tab 96 for each search azimuth assigned (PTL and STLs). • Tab entries (single or multiple) are based on terrain (RS UTM to visible horizon, normally 10 kilometers). Note: Normally, the RS is not to be positioned with prominent terrain features between the RS UTM and RMIN. If there are prominent terrain features (positive or negative elevations) between the RS UTM and RMIN, they must be considered when calculating up to five points. For example, if there is a sloping hill in front of the RS, determine the elevation at RMIN. The same applies to a depression. B-2. The RSOP OIC recommends ISLB, because— The RSOP team is physically on the ground to be occupied by the RS. The RSOP team has a topographical map. The RSOP team carries an M2 aiming circle that is used to determine elevation angles. B-3. The RSOP OIC validates the assigned PTL. The battalion S3 assigns the PTL based on required area of coverage, threat, and anticipated hostile avenue-of-approach. The RSOP OIC may recommend a change to the radar location, based upon terrain or some physical obstruction not shown on the map. B-4. Once the radar site is selected and the PTL is validated, the RSOP OIC makes a recommendation on the type of ISLB to use, that is, single or multiunit. The RSOP OIC will transmit the proposed location to the battalion commander for approval. B-5. Using a topographic map, prominent terrain features are determined by reading elevation contour lines. Changes in altitude, positive or negative, of • • • •

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greater than 20 meters between the radar UTM location to be approximately 10 kilometers from the RS. The left and right radar search sectors of the assigned PTL, should be considered for possible entries using the multipoint ISLB procedures. As described in the following M2 aiming circle procedures, the location of the prominent terrain feature and its amount of sector coverage must also be considered. Note: Using left and right radar search sectors of the PTL allows for terrain features in areas covered by most STLs as well as the area covered by the PTL. However, if the search sector of an assigned Secondary target line extends beyond the left and right boundary of the PTL, then another single or multipoint entry would be required.

PRELIMINARY MAPPING PROCEDURES
B-6. Before the actual terrain mapping, the system goes through a logical sequence of events. After RSOP and M2 data has been collected, and the system is emplaced, the system initialization process is as follows— 1. The ICC downloads data to the ECS database. Tab 54 has been entered. 2. SET WPN CONTROL alert—When the WPN CONTR switch/indicator is enabled, the WCC is commanded to send mapping displays to one or both manstations. 3. Assuming MS 1 is being used, MS 3 can enter mapping at any time by also enabling WPN CONTR. If MS 3 enters the mapping process, it is locked in until the end of the mapping sequence. B-7. ENTER RS AZIMUTH COMMAND alert—When this alert is acknowledged, Tab 95 will appear (Figure B-1). The current azimuth will be shown in the data field RS AZ = which is the same azimuth as shown on the HCU printout, which appeared after Tab 81, RS location, was entered.
RADAR MAPPING TRAIN CONTROL + SUMMARY D=CURRENT RS AZIMUTH )D=PTL ( )D=STL1 ( )D=STL2 ( )D=STL3 )D=TBM SEARCH SECTOR SKEW BEARING ANGLE: -15 TO +15 )=RADAR TRAIN COMMAND: 0=RS TO PTL 1=RS TO STL1 2=RS TO STL2 3=RS TO STL3 4=RS TO AZ ( ) AZIMUTHS MAPPED: TO , TO , TO , TO ( )=PASSIVE EMPLACEMENT 1=YES 0=NO NO OSLB DATA AVAILABLE ( )D=LEFT MAPPING BOUND AZIMUTH ( )D=RIGHT MAPPING BOUND AZIMUTH ( ( ( *95*

Figure B-1. Tab 95, Radar Mapping Train Control + Summary B-8. Enter radar PTL and STLs as appropriate. If STL(s) is to be mapped, the RS must be commanded to the STLs first, then to the PTL. After the PTL is mapped, the mapping sequence concludes.

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WARNING
To prevent injury, ensure that all personnel are clear of the radar before entering the train command. Visual inspection and audible alarm procedures are required. B-9. Enter radar azimuth train commands to PTL. Next, enter tab and reorientation occurs. After reorientation, Tab 95 will reappear. B-10. CHECK ACTUAL RS AZIMUTH alert appears. Acknowledge the alert by pressing ALERT ACKNOWLEDGE. B-11. Observe the D=CURRENT RS AZIMUTH data field in Tab 95. Visually confirm RS heading. Should the RS AZ exceed +2 degrees of commanded _ azimuth, the alert RS AZIMUTH FAULT will appear. Manually return the radar to the last alignment position, recall Tab 95, and perform the procedures again. B-12. The alert SOUND ALERT BEFORE RADIATING appears. Acknowledge the alert. Crew members visually inspect the RS to ensure it is positioned correctly. B-13. ENTER TERRAIN MAP CONTROLS alert appears. Acknowledge the alert. B-14. Enter Tab 95 again. Then Tab 96 will appear. Enter single or multipoint ISLB data provided by RSOP (Figure B-2).
INITIAL SEARCH LOWER BOUND POINT 1 POINT 2 POINT 3 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) DATA ENTRY POINT 4 POINT 5 ( ) ( )=MILS BEARING ( ) ( )=MILS ELEVATION + -200 *96*

ENTER ELEVATION IN ONLY ONE FIELD ABOVE FOR LEVEL INITIAL BOUND BEARINGS TAKEN WITH M2 AIMING CIRCLE ALIGNED WITH RS AZIMUTH ( ( )D=LONG RANGE SEGMENT MINIMUM TACTICAL ELEVATION: 00 TO 30 )=0 TO SKIP ALL MAPPING: INITIALIZATION RADIATION PROHIBITED

Figure B-2. Tab 96, Initial Search Lower Bound Data Entry B-15. In level terrain, if the elevation does not vary by more than 4 mils from either level or from the starting point at the PTL, enter the average positive or negative mils reading in the first data field (elevation). The azimuth would be entered 0000. This is a single point ISLB. B-16. In unlevel terrain, select the five most prominent terrain features and enter the azimuth and either positive or negative elevation readings. Up to five terrain features can be entered for each assigned search azimuth, two of which can be beyond the search sector (one on each side).

Notes: 1. Two through five entries constitute a multipoint ISLB.

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2. While data entries in Tab 96 can receive an elevation of up to +200 mils there can only be a 140-mil separation between the _ most positive and the most negative elevation readings. B-17. Long-range sector lower elevation angle entry will be 00.0 unless otherwise directed. This elevation raises the lower elevation of the radar long-range search sector. It can be used if a large mountain range exists in the long-range sector that would be detected by long-range search actions. B-18. SKIP MAPPING—dependent upon the state of emission (SOE) control assigned the battery at time of emplacement, radiation may be prohibited. If so, enter a 0 in the appropriate data field of Tab 96. No mapping, to include clutter mapping, will occur. When this function is used, the RS is commanded to the PTL only, the ISLB and the left/right mapping boundary bearings (max) must be entered in Tab 96. B-19. The applicable entries are made on Tab 96. When the tab is entered, the TERRAIN MAP WAITS RADIATE ENBL alert will appear. B-20. The operator starts the external alert for 10 seconds. This is followed by pressing the RADIATE DISABL S/I (light OFF = radiation ON). B-21. The MAPPING IN PROGRESS alert appears. This alert informs the operator that automatic mapping of the sector is being performed. This process can take up to 50 seconds.

MAPPING DISPLAY AND CONTROL SELECTIONS
B-22. If mapping was permitted, Tab 97 will appear when the auxiliary MAPPING IN PROGRESS alert disappears (Figure B-3). The operator will make selections depending on time constraints and the mission. If the skip mapping function in Tab 96 was directed, then Tab 97 will not appear.
MAPPING DISPLAY/CONTROL SELECT ENTRY ( A C 0 1 ( ) = = = = ) = SELECT MAPPING DISPLAY OR CONTROL SEQUENCE DISPLAY A – AZIMUTH/ELEVATION/RANGE – MODIFIED RHI DISPLAY C – AZIMUTH/RANGE – CONSTANT ELEVATION PPI SKIP CLUTTER MAP OR RETURN TO RADAR TRAIN CONTROL PERFORM CLUTTER MAP – VALID ONLY AT PTL = 0 TO 7 = NUMBER OF AZIMUTHS TO SKIP WITH DISPLAY A. *97*

Figure B-3. Tab 97—Mapping Display/Control Select Entry B-23. DISPLAY A—Allows the operator to map up to 69 azimuth positions, one at a time. AZIMUTH/ELEVATION/RANGE modified range height indicator (RHI) consists of 21 horizontal traces on the lower portion of the CRT (Figure B-4). Each trace represents one of the 21 radar elevation beams. Radar returns are displayed along each beam. The complete presentation provides a side view of both range and elevation of radar returns along a single azimuth. The returns are displayed in high and low intensities. The lower intensities represent grazing returns. High intensity returns indicate masking terrain.

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Note: Display A enables the ECS operator to map up to 69 azimuth positions, one at a time. It can also be used to map masked terrain, when such data is to be obtained.

Figure B-4. Display A B-24. DISPLAY C—If the terrain is fairly level, the operator can map an entire sector at one time. It can also be used to determine ISLB. Display C AZIMUTH/RANGE - CONSTANT ELEVATION PPI (Figure B-5) depicts up to 69 azimuths (can be less for STLs) at elevation beam 9 in plan position indicator (PPI) format. It is recommended that C mapping always be performed when C mapping may be the only mapping required, or it may be used for rapid preliminary mapping to determine the ISLB. PPI consists of 15 traces on the upper portion of the CRT. The 15 traces are grouped in 3 sets of fans. Each fan represents 5 adjacent azimuths at a specific elevation. Radar returns are displayed along each azimuth. The center trace represents the azimuth currently being mapped.

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Figure B-5. Display C B-25. Display C shows the ECS operator what he can expect to map in Display A. In case of fairly level terrain, he can map an entire sector at one time. It can also be used to determine the ISLB. B-26. Display D—A supplemental display used for mapping review. It may also be used to elevate a designated OSLB after each pass through the sector with Display A. Display D is a more finite presentation of Display C, but should resemble key terrain points. See Figure B-6.

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69 Azimuth beam positions, each at the designated OSLB elevation for that azimuth.

High intensity returns indicating masked terrain at that azimuth.

Tab 93 if azimuths have been skipped or no Tab display if final review. Low intensity grazing returns indicating a contiguous OSLB. Note: Display D is a supplemental display used for review. It may also be used to elevate or lower a designated OSLB after each pass through the sector with Display A.

Figure B-6. Display D B-27. Display D and Tab 93, sector mapping review control (Figure B-7) appears following completion of A mapping. Tab 93 allows the operator to compute the missing OSLB for the remaining azimuths or to repeat the mapping of those azimuths missed.
( )= SECTOR MAPPING REVIEW CONTROL 0 = COMPUTE MISSION MAP DATA 1 = REPEAT DISPLAY OF SKIPPED AZIMUTHS *93*

Figure B-7. Tab 93 B-28. The first option in Tab 97 is 0 = SKIP CLUTTER MAP OR RETURN TO RADAR TRAIN CONTROL—this entry has two functions dependent on the current azimuth of the RS. If the RS is at an STL, 0 is entered, and Tab 95 will reappear allowing a new RS azimuth (for another STL or the PTL) to be entered. If the RS is at the PTL and 0 is entered, initialization clutter mapping will be skipped.

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B-29. The second option in Tab 97 is 1 = PERFORM CLUTTER MAP — Valid only at PTL, this allows clutter mapping at the PTL upon completion of operator controlled mapping. Considering terrain, this clutter mapping may take up to five minutes. Clutter map A is only performed at the PTL. B-30. Selecting 0 TO 7 = NUMBER OF AZIMUTHS TO SKIP WITH DISPLAY A is used to reduce mapping time. Zero is the recommended entry if the terrain is rough. After selections are made, press ENTER TAB.

MAPPING PROCESS
B-31. In Display C (Figure B-5, page B-6), the initial display presents returns based on the ISLB (up to +9 degrees) entered in Tab 96. The displayed ISLB _ can be lowered 8-quarter beam widths or raised 12-quarter beam widths from the entered ISLB using the cursor position keys up and down. Note: There must be a five-second pause between cursor up or down actions to allow for software to paint the sector display. Also, it is the operator's responsibility to keep count of tab cursor actions. If based on these actions, the ISLB in Tab 96 is to be changed. B-32. The cursor position keys are used to display the elevation that contains the fewest high-intensity returns. The lowest intensity or grazing returns is displayed. B-33. The ISLB becomes the OSLB (operational search lower boundary) by pressing the HOOK key. If the HOOK key is pressed, the OSLB is for all 69 azimuths, including the azimuths in Display A, basically locking the ISLB cursor at the OSLB position. In Display A it is possible to unlock the OSLB cursor for a particular azimuth(s) by use of the CANCEL HOOK key. B-34. If ENTER TAB is used without HOOK, the ISLB will default to the Tab 96 entry. Tab 97 (refer to figure B-3, page B-4) reappears when ENTER TAB or HOOK is accomplished in Display C. The following actions can now be taken: • • Enter A—Select Display A for individual azimuth mapping. Enter 0—If at the PTL, clutter mapping will be skipped. If at an STL, Tab 95 will reappear for entering a new RS azimuth to be used for another STL or the PTL. • Enter 1—To perform clutter mapping at the PTL B-36. In Display A, RHI presentation (Figure B-8), two cursor symbols are provided to assist mapping operations. A key controlled cursor (ISLB/OSLB) is used for setting the OSLB. On the first azimuth displayed, the key controlled cursor will appear at the ISLB entered in Tab 96. On subsequent azimuths, the key controlled cursor will follow the ISLB line. The operator cursor is used for setting masked terrain map (MTM) points. On every azimuth displayed, there are three cursor controlled hooked points for use in masked terrain mapping. The first MTM point is set at the bottom of the OSLB beam at RMIN. The operator sets the other two. Figure B-8 provides an example of a set OSLB and two hooked MTM points.

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LOW INTENSITY RETURNS

HIGH INTENSITY RETURNS

OSLB

OSLB SET

SELECTED MTM POINTS RADAR SITE SELECTED OSLB

TERRAIN PROFILE

kms

Figure B-8. Example of a Set OSLB and Two Hooked MTM Points Note: This is only if an ISLB was not hooked in C map. If an OSLB was set in C map (hooking the ISLB), the key controlled cursor will be positioned at that OSLB for all 69 azimuths. CANCEL HOOK can be used to unlock the cursor for a particular azimuth. Extreme care should be taken in selecting the OSLB as, once set, the radar will not search below it. B-35. In the PPI (Figure B-9), the fan description is as follows: • • • Fan A—Equates to beam row 7, which is the lower elevation (1/2 beam width) beneath the ISLB, or previously set OSLB. Fan B—Equates to beam row 9, which is the ISLB, or previously selected OSLB. Fan C—Equates to beam row 11, which is the upper elevation (1/2 beam width) above the ISLB, or previously set OSLB.

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AZIMUTH BEING MAPPED

CURRENT AZIMUTH

RADAR RETURNS

C B A

Figure B-9. Display A, PPI presentation B-36. The center trace represents the current azimuth displayed. The two traces above center are the left two azimuths of current; the two traces below center are right two azimuths of current (Figure B-10).

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RETURNS CORRELATED IN ELEVATION AND AZIMUTH INDICATING CONTIGUOUS TERRAIN CURSORS

ADJACENT AZIMUTHS

ELEVATION BANDS FOR CORRELATION OF RETURNS AT ADJACENT AZIMUTHS AT SELECTED ELEVATIONS UNCORRELATED RETURNS

Figure B-10. Azimuth being Mapped B-37. In the RHI/PPI, the RHI alone is used primarily to set the OSLB. The two displays together (RHI and PPI) are used to establish MTM points. B-38. In setting the OSLB, refer to Figure B-8, on page B-9 and observe the following procedures: • At the first azimuth viewed, the ISLB key controlled cursor appears at the Tab 96 entry. This cursor can be moved up or down only. The cursor does have a wrap-around feature so that when stepped down past SKIP, the cursor will reappear at the top of the RHI. The range and intensity of the returns in the RHI must be considered when moving the OSLB cursor. The range of the RHI from left to right is approximately 42 kilometers. If there are no high-intensity returns close in to the unit (within 10 kilometers), the OSLB cursor can remain in that position if the ground is level and 0 was selected in Tab 96. It may be lowered if the terrain was sloping down from the radar and 0 was selected in Tab 96. However, if the ground was sloping and a negative value was entered in Tab 96, then the cursor, for this beam, would not be lowered any further. The main concern is to ensure that the search beam is not pointed in the ground. In

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establishing the OSLB, the cursor will be placed two beam positions above the close-in, high-intensity returns. • Once the key controlled ISLB cursor is set at the appropriate elevation beam, the HOOK key is pressed, and the ISLB now becomes the OSLB azimuth. B-439. Azimuth skipping (Figure B-11)—If there are no returns on the RHI presentation, take the key controlled cursor down to the word SKIP and press HOOK, followed by ENTER TAB.

SKIP

KEY CONTROLLED CURSOR

CURSOR

Figure B-11. Mapping Cursors B-40. Masked terrain mapping is accomplished by viewing both the PPI and RHI presentations (Figure B-4, page B-5). The purpose of MTM is to point out terrain features that could mask an aircraft. On each RHI presentation, up to three points could be set: one when the OSLB is hooked, the other two by the operator. Hook only returns above the OSLB, no returns—no hook. B-41. Using the combination of PPI and RHI displays, the determination of which points to hook can be made. The PPI provides a horizontal display at the three elevation beams covering the center azimuth plus two azimuths on either side. From the PPI, you can determine slope and/or density of terrain. From the RHI, you can determine the elevation for that terrain. Looking at Figure B-8, page B-9, a good rule of thumb is to hook high left and high right. This is based not only on elevation, but also on the distance between the terrain features. Note: Hooked MTM points can be changed by positioning the cursor over the original hooked point (cursor on top of cursor and pressing the CANCEL HOOK key on the control keyboard. B-42. Remember that, based on the displays, it is not always necessary to hook MTM points, that is, if no returns exist above the OSLB. Note: Interpolation of MTM points will be accomplished by the WCC for a skipped azimuth if there are hooked MTM points on each adjacent azimuth. If more than one consecutive azimuth is skipped, no interpolation will occur. B-43. Tab 93 (Refer to figure B-7, page B-7) will only appear if any Display A azimuths were skipped in Tab 97. Zero is the recommended entry. The computer will then set the OSLB for those unmapped azimuths. This is based on the operator selected OSLB azimuth before and after the skipped azimuth(s)—interpolation. The skipped azimuths will be presented if a 1 is entered in Tab 93.

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Note: Tab 93 will only appear when 1 to 7 azimuths were skipped during Display A mapping as entered in Tab 97. Tab 93 will not appear for azimuths on which the SKIP cursor function was used. Automatic computer interpolation will be accomplished for those azimuths. B-44. Display D (Refer to Figure B-6, page B-7) and the HORP display (Figure B-12) will appear with the PRESS ENTER TAB TO CONTINUE alert. This display is intended to review and evaluate the selected OSLB. The HORP display (Figure B-12) is a horizontal plot of the ISLB and the OSLB. The ISLB entered in Tab 96 is averaged and the results displayed as a dashed line on the HORP. The OSLB created by the operator is displayed as an asterisk line on the HORP. The operator should compare the OSLB to what the terrain actually looks like (visual or from a topographical map) to ensure that there is some comparison. If grossly in error, the operator should perform the mapping procedure again. Upon acknowledging the alert and entering the tab, Tab 97 and Display D will reappear.

LT AZ
ELEVATION (DEGREES) +5 +4 +3 +2 ISLB +1 0 -1

RS AZ

RT AZ
+5 +4 +3 ELEVATION (DEGREES)

** * *** * * * *** * ** * ** ** * * ** *** *** * * * *
OSLB

+2 +1 0 -1 ISLB

AZIMUTH

0 = REFERENCE

X = TRAINEE

Figure B-12. HORP Display B-45. Tab 97 can now be used to return to Tab 95 if the RS is at an azimuth other than the PTL or, if at the PTL, can direct or skip clutter mapping. Upon entering the tab, the DRAW MASKED AREAS MAP alert will appear. When acknowledged, Display E and Tab 92 will appear. B-46. Display E (Figure B-13) is a PPI presentation of all the masked terrain points, within a given sector (up to three), which have been mapped with Display A. It is used in conjunction with Tab 92 (Figure B-14) which appears simultaneously. Both appear as a result of entering Tab 97 with the RS at the PTL.

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MTM FENCE WITH ALTITUDE LABEL
20

MTM CODED ALTITUDE SYMBOLS

*** *

*****

25

EQUATES TO OSLB
Figure B-13. Display E
MASKED AREAS DRAWING CONTROL ( )M*100 = ALTITUDE LABEL FOR DESIGNATED MASKED TERRAIN AREA ( ) = PROCESS CONTROL: BLANK = CONTINUE THIS SECTOR-1 1 = ADVANCE TO NEXT SECTOR-2 2 = END MASKED AREAS DRAWING ALTITUDE SYMBOL CODING: ... = 000a TO 000a --- = 000a TO 000a +++ = 000a TO 000a *** = 000a TO 000a 000 = 000a TO 000a *92*

Figure B-14. Tab 92, Masked Areas Drawing Control
B-47. Keyboard selected tabular displays must not be called up while Tab 92 is displayed. Tab 92 will clear and cannot be recalled. Display E and Tab 92 will appear whether skip mapping (Tab 96) or C map only was accomplished, even though masked terrain cannot be drawn. Tab 92 is a mandatory software entry for the sequence controller (normally on MS 1). If mapping

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was accomplished on both consoles, Display E and Tab 92 will appear on both consoles. This is not normally the software Sequence Controller, that is, console is not in ECCM ASSIST. However, MS 3 can clear the CRT by entering a 2 in the second data field, followed by ENTER TAB. MS 1 will continue with masked terrain drawing if Display A was used. B-48. If STL(s) were mapped, the display and tab will not appear until PTL mapping is completed. Display E appears at the PTL (Figure B-13). Surrounding the center of the crow’s-foot is a ring of symbols equating to the OSLB elevation. Within the sector will be clusters of coded altitude symbols. These symbols are based on the MTM points hooked during Display A mapping. These clusters equate to hills or mountains within the sector that can be correlated to a topographical map. B-49. Each sector is able to have a maximum of six masked terrain corrals (three-sided dashed lines). The operator hooking both sides of the cluster draws these corrals. The WCC will create the depth. Due to the six-corral limitations, concentration on the most significant (highest) terrain features is essential. Note: A common pitfall is drawing masked areas without first planning for the use of the six masked areas. The operator can run out of masked areas by drawing too many around less significant terrain features. An advisable procedure is to draw masked areas around the most significant terrain features first, and then move on to the less significant features. B-50. The most accurate method of assigning corral altitudes is to refer to a topographical map for that particular hill or mountain. In place of that, use of the average elevation (from Tab 92—appropriate symbology) is recommended. This altitude assignment is for operator information only, and the same number can be used for more than one masked terrain. The display of meters or feet was selected in Tab 14. For example: if the masked area (***) has altitudes from 350 meters to 410 meters, the average altitude is 380 meters. The altitude is rounded to the nearest 100 meters, so the first entry in Tab 92 will be 04. The same entry is made for other corrals surrounding "*" symbology. B-51. Upon completing the PTL sector, a 1 is entered in the second data field to advance to the next sector to be mapped (STL). When masked terrain drawing is completed, a 2 is entered in the second data field of Tab 92, resulting in the alert MASKED AREAS MAP COMPLETED. If a 1 is entered and there are no more sectors to be mapped, Display E and Tab 92 will clear, and the alert will appear.

CLUTTER MAPPING
B-52. Initialization clutter mapping is an automatic software process with the operator acknowledging and complying with applicable alerts. During initialization, this process will occur only with the radar at the PTL. Clutter mapping is selected on Tab 97 (refer to Figure B-3).

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B-53. If operator authorized via a 1 entry in Tab 97, the clutter map process will be accomplished at this time simultaneously with Display E and Tab 92 being displayed. The following alerts will appear: • CLUTTER MAP WAITS RADIATE-ENBL—Operator sounds the external alarm and presses the RADIATE-DISABL S/I (light OFFradiation ON). • CLUTTER MAP IN PROGRESS—This alert will be displayed every 60 seconds until the clutter map is completed. This process may take up to 5 minutes. Note: The clutter map update programs (CMUP) S/I is not illuminated during TAC clutter mapping. B-54. The system maps ground clutter within the beams of the OSLB and within two elevation beams above the OSLB (horizon and short-range popup). The results of this clutter map will be written on the data base tape upon completion of initialization. This procedure is accomplished in standard emplacement and long-term reinitialization. It should be noted that the clutter mapping process is relative to the OSLB setting. Note: If clutter mapping was not performed during initialization, an automatic clutter map will be accomplished the first time the system is in RADIATE ENABLE. At this point, the RS can be commanded to the PTL or an STL in PASSIVE SEARCH. The radar being in a listen mode only, no reorientation or zerodegree slew clutter mapping can be accomplished. The first time the radar is commanded to ACTIVE SEARCH, an automatic clutter map will be accomplished. This process can take up to 40 to 50 seconds. B-55. In K-7 (tactical operations software), the clutter map is updated on a continual basis during ACTIVE SEARCH; however, it has a low priority relative to most radar actions. The operator can effectively raise the priority of the clutter map update by the following two methods: • By pressing the CLUTTER MAP UPDATE switch-indicator, the WCC will initiate the clutter map process at a higher priority; however, this method can take up to 15 minutes to complete (depending on WCC activity). During the period that the clutter map is in progress, the S/I will remain illuminated. Upon completion of the clutter map process, the operator must update the recovery storage unit (RSU) data base. Note: Before suspension of tactical operations (with exception of march order), writing an EMP recovery tape is required to record the latest clutter map update data. Note: Prior to suspension of tactical operations (with exception of march order), a data base update is required to record the latest clutter map update data. The highest priority for clutter map update occurs when a reorientation command is given to the radar. This clutter map process is completed within 40 seconds and is automatically written to the data base. Another method of achieving this clutter map is to perform a 0-degree slew. This procedure is covered in TM 9-1430-600-10-1. Note: The clutter map update procedures, less the reorientation command to an STL or PTL, are usually performed in response to increased clutter appearing on the CRT. It should be noted that if performance of the preceding procedures does not clear the increased

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clutter, a long-term reinitialization with Display A mapping is recommended. B-56. CLUTTER MAP COMPLETE—This alert informs the operator that the clutter mapping process is finished. If Display E and Tab 92 have been completed when this alert appears, when acknowledged, the alert ENTER ALTERN SEARCH CONTR DATA will appear and the operator can continue with initialization. If Display “E” and Tab 92 have not been completed when the clutter mapping process is finished, the alert is acknowledged and the operator(s) continues with masked areas drawing. Note: The RADIATEDISABL S/I will remain off although radiation has ceased.

MAPPING INTERFERENCE
B-57. Both man-made and natural interference can prevent or hamper the manual mapping process. Excessive interference is interference that appears across most or all azimuths. It can be man-made, caused by ECM or chaff, and/or it can be natural, caused by severe weather. Manual mapping should not be performed in a severe weather, ECM, or chaff environment. Clutter map updates should not be accomplished when the above interference is present. This could result in large areas being blanked due to interference such as a large thunderstorm. Be aware of what outside environmental conditions are causing the clutter before performing any type of a clutter map update. B-58. Non-excessive interference is either man-made or natural that usually appears on a limited number of azimuths (Figure B-15). The recommended procedure is to skip the affected azimuth(s). The WCC will automatically interpolate the OSLB for the affected azimuth(s), based on the previous and next azimuth's OSLB settings. Use of the SKIP cursor function prevents the interference from being entered in the map data file.

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C

B

A

ECM INTERFERENCE

Figure B-15. Example of ECM Interference

B-18

Appendix C

Automatic Emplacement
This appendix discusses detailed procedures for automatic emplacement of the Patriot system. Patriot relies on the proper alignment of the radar set and launching stations. It is important for the alignment to be performed accurately and quickly. The precision lightweight GPS receiver (PLGR) and the North Finding System (NFS) have been incorporated in the Patriot FU to provide automatic emplacement (AE).

AUTOMATIC EMPLACEMENT OVERVIEW
C-1. Automatic Emplacement consists of the following three hardware components: • PLGR. • NFS. • GPS-North Reference System Input Output (GNIO) interface. C-2. Together these units automatically perform the operator alignment functions that generate location, azimuth angle, roll, and crossroll for the system. Fire unit software programs are modified to account for this new capability. The software portion of the AE is explained in Chapter 2. A block diagram of the software flow for the automated location and alignment is seen in Figure C-1. See TM 9-1425-600-12 for more information.
LS
LAM /LMM PLGR PLGR

DLU ECS DLU RLRIU W CC RW CIU
RAM/RMM

GNIO
NFS

LCU RS
PLGR

CUG IOCT RWCIU

IOCT DACU GNIO
NFS

Figure C-1. Automatic Emplacement System Block Diagram C-3. When the AE option is selected, the PLGR will require fewer manual input steps, thus simplifying and reducing operator tasks. The PLGR can acquire positioning satellites quickly and at the same time provide reliable

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data. This allows the Patriot system to assume mission status with more reliable RS and LS emplacement data. ECS initialization in the automatic mode will receive radar and launcher data in Tabs 81 and 85 automatically. C-4. LS emplacement guidelines, mixed mode emplacement procedures and automatic data reentry as discussed in this manual have not changed. For PLGR equipped units, the decision point for transitioning from TACI to K7 has changed. Due to the reduced emplacement timeline if more than 4 minutes have elapsed since entry of Tab 85, the unit should remain in TACI until the LS is auto emplaced. If less than 2 minutes have elapsed, the operator should go to K7. If between 2 and 4 minutes requires a decision by the TCO based on the mission and on the number of LS auto emplaced. Given the reduced timeline for PLGR, it is likely that all LS will be auto emplaced before the completion of TACI providing that Tab 85 is entered immediately after Tab 91 has been entered. C-5. The AE may fail for either an equipment problem or poor satellite data. Equipment problems will be reflected on page 4 of the Fault Data tab and the operator should take the appropriate action to clear the faults. For an RS fault the operator can reboot the radar or for LS faults the operator could deassign/reassign the particular launcher. These actions send a reset to the individual GNIO module. If this does not clear the fault, then AE diagnostics must be run. C-6. Poor satellite data failure occurs when the satellite coverage is unsatisfactory, or even though there are sufficient satellites, their geometry is not good. In some cases, even if the satellite coverage is predicted to be good, one or more satellites may be off-line and the operator will be unaware. If the automatic emplacement fails due to poor satellite data, the operator should direct a crew member to go to the radar PLGR and, viewing the front display, determine the status of the following parameters. If the parameters are within the tolerance defined below, and then another AE should be attempted by rebooting the system. If they are not within the specified tolerance, then a manual emplacement should be conducted. C-7. Operator can now use the percentage value displayed on page 4 of the Fault Data tab (Figure C-2) to make emplacement time line decisions. If some or all LSs have not auto emplaced when TACI is finished, the TCO or TCA must evaluate the emplacement status to determine how close to completion each LS is. Mission requirements and the emplacement status for the LS to auto emplace are key factors in making this decision. The guideline is, if emplacement status that indicates more than 70 percent, the unit should remain in TACI until the LS are auto emplaced. If emplacement status indicates less than 30 percent, the unit should go to K7. When the RS data is between 30 percent and 70 percent this requires an operator decision based on the mission and on the number of LS already auto emplaced.

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GPS + NFS STATUS EMPLACE RS GPS = GO LS GPS NFS STATUS RS NFS = GO 1A GO GO DONE EMPLACEMENT 2A DGRD DGRD 10 PCT STATUS = DONE 3A NOGO GO FAILED 4A GO DGRD DONE 5A GO GO 85 PCT 6A GO GO 70 PCT 7A GO GO FAILED 8A GO NOGO DONE

PAGE 4 OF FAULT DATA S/I EMPLACE LS GPS NFS STATUS 1A RS 2A 3A 4A 5A 6A 7A 8A

Figure C-2. Fault Data Tabular Display, Page 4 C-8. The alert, RS or LSna EMPLACEMENT FAILED, is displayed when the system has failed to calculate a final position for the RS or LS(s). After two automatic emplacement failures for either a hardware problem or poor satellite coverage, a normal manual emplacement should be performed. C-9. If the operator receives the alert, LSna EMPLACEMENT FAILED, the operator must check page 4 of the Fault Data Tab to determine if there are any faults with the LS, PLGR, NFS, or communications equipment. If the failure is caused by poor satellite data, then the LS should be placed to "local" and a crew member should determine the PLGR parameters. If they do not meet the parameters defined above, then the following decision process must be considered. C-10. If the failure was due to a hardware problem, the hardware must be fixed. Another automatic emplacement must be attempted at the next appropriate satellite coverage time. C-11. If the problem was due to poor satellite coverage, then the operator may emplace the launcher(s) manually according to the mixed mode emplacement procedure defined in Appendix E. If time is not a factor, the operator may wait until the next appropriate satellite coverage period and perform an automatic emplacement.

DETERMINING SATELLITE COVERAGE
C-12. The PLGR uses data from earth orbiting satellites to determine location and elevation. Readings obtained in UTM coordinates, latitude, longitude, and elevation, are provided to the ECS operator by way of tabular display. A minimum of three satellites is required to allow the PLGR unit to determine its position on the earth in three dimensions. Because the Patriot system requires the three dimensions in terms of Northing, Easting, and Altitude, three satellites are required to achieve its automatic emplacement requirement.

PRECISION LIGHTWEIGHT GPS RECEIVER
C-13. PLGR is one component of the AE that operates passively, gathering positioning data from a number of satellites, allowing an unlimited number of users to simultaneously acquire precise position and navigation data under all weather conditions any time of day or night. PLGR provides location and

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elevation data for each LS and RS. A minimum of three satellites is required to ensure accurate location and altitude information. C-14. The global positioning system is made up of three major segments: space, control, and user. The GPS space segment consists of 24 satellites (21 navigational and 3 operational spares) orbiting the earth in six orbital planes. The satellites continuously transmit RF (radio frequency) signals to earth that contain the satellite's position and time of day. The satellites operate in circular 20,200 kilometer orbits with precise spacing within the orbits to ensure that a minimum of three satellites are in view of any user for worldwide coverage (Figure C-3).

THE TIME IS… MY POSITION IS...

Figure C-3. GPS Satellites C-15. The Patriot time of day (PTOD) clock can be altered or changed by the lowest numbered FU even though the ICC is on line. The PTOD entry is a manual operation that is normally synchronized via voice with higher echelon unit (HEU). Often, the time is incorrect due to operator error or delayed input. If there is an operator error or delayed input for the PTOD, this will affect the synchronization of HEUs and external communication links. HEUs have no direct control. Once the battalion nets all the FUs together, the time from the lowest numbered unit is used as the master for all units’ PTOD. C-16. The PTOD is an inherent function of the GPS that will be used by the ECS and ICC. PTOD is required to support told-in target correlation and fusion. Timely target cueing and target hand-off also require PTOD. C-17. The Patriot system will now use GPS standard time to ensure that external synchronous communication links can be correctly established, that airspace control orders are established at their proper time, and that external

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source data fusion/correlation is correct. GPS standard time shall be used to synchronize TOD for Patriot. By using the GPS standard time, operator input will no longer be required for time synchronization. At this point, Patriot will be in time synchronization with all other GPS time users. C-18. The control segment consists of a number of monitor stations and ground antennas located throughout the world. The monitor stations passively track all satellites for position and time data and pass this information to the master control station. The master control station determines the satellite orbits and provides updated position and time messages for each satellite (Figure C-4).

SATELLITES

MONITOR STATIONS

MASTER CONTROL STATION

GROUND ANTENNAS

Figure C-4. GPS System C-19. The user segment consists of the passive navigation sets. The passive navigation set contains a receiver section and a computer section. The receiver processes the RF signals from the satellites and sends the satellite position and time to the computer section. By using the data transmitted from the satellites, the computer section can derive the navigation set's position coordinates and elevation. By monitoring any changes in the navigation set position over time, the speed of the user set can be calculated for mobile units (Figure C-5).

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SATELLITE 1 SATELLITE 1

THE TIME IS… MY POSITION IS...

SATELLITE 1

USER EQUIPMENT

MY POSITION IS… MY ELEVATION IS… THE TIME OF DAY IS… MY SPEED IS...

Figure C-5. GPS Navigation Information C-20. PLGR provides accurate position, altitude, velocity, and time information on a continuous, worldwide basis. This information is provided at two accuracy levels through the standard positioning service (SPS) and the precise positioning service (PPS). SPS is a civil position and navigation service providing the lower accuracy available to any user. The PPS is a military service providing higher accuracy. PPS is restricted to US and allied military forces and, if in the national interest, to selected civil users. The satellite transmits a coarse acquisition (CA) code and a precise code (P code). The user is able to obtain a more accurate position and velocity solution, a circular error probability (CEP), when using a P code (10 meters CEP) than when using a CA code (100 meters CEP). C-21. PPS is implemented with selective availability (SA) features. SA denies the unauthorized real-time user of the full PPS accuracy. Cryptographic measures are integral to SA requiring cryptographic keys to gain access to full PPS accuracy. C-22. PPS is also implemented with antispoofing (AS) features. These protect PLGR users from transmitters that intentionally mimic PLGR navigation signals (spoofing or meaconing). Cryptographic measures are also part of the AS feature. The cryptographic keys are stored in the PLGR receiver using a standard automated net control device or KYK-13. Two types of cryptographic keys are used by the PLGR. They are group unique key (GUK) and cryptographic key weekly (CKW). The GUK is normally good for a year, while the CKW is good for 7 days. The Army is currently issued the GUK codes yearly. C-23. The Patriot PLGR requires cryptographic codes. There are two types of codes: the SA and the AS codes. These codes are loaded with an automated net control device. The SA code is a one-year code and is the only code that is used with the Patriot PLGR.

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C-24. The PLGR is located in the curbside utility bay of the RS and on the turntable pedestal on each launcher. On the RS, the PLGR antenna is attached to the top of the main antenna array, while on the launcher the PLGR antenna is attached to the DLU antenna mast support. C-25. While the PLGR/NFS combination removes the operator from the survey loop, it is not as simple as turning the ON/OFF switch to ON. There are some critical time lines that must be understood by the TCO and TCA at the battery and by the S3, TD, and TDA at the battalion. The time periods for three requirements listed below must elapse before the WCC will have location and altitude data for Tabs 81 and 85: • RS PLGR position fix. • LS PLGR position fix. • RS to LS differential distance calculation. C-26. For the RS PLGR to get a position fix, the PLGR must have power applied, be in the field of view of three satellites, and receive an approximate UTM location seed. When these conditions are met, the initial position fix should be available within five minutes or less. The same conditions and time apply to the LS PLGR. The radar and launchers must be in "remote" for the data to be sent to the WCC. To obtain RS to LS differential distance, the LS and RS PLGRs must have obtained a position fix based on 15 consecutive position fixes at 18-second intervals. The time to compute this differential distance is 4.5 minutes. C-27. The differential distance computation is required because of missile acquisition and spherical error probable (SEP). SEP applied to measurement states that 50 percent of the time the measurement is within the error limits. This also means that 50 percent of the time the measurement is outside the error limits. C-28. The launcher emplacement accuracy requirements for Patriot missile acquisition are that LS locations be within 10 meters in each axis relative to the RS. The SEP for the PLGR is 10 meters. The radar location is the base for all relational measurements in the Patriot system. The location error for the launcher is noted in relation to the radar, see figure C-6. As the PLGR has an SEP of 10 meters, the UTM location fix received by the PLGR will fall outside the relative error allowed for missile acquisition half of the time. To ensure that the UTM location used for the LS is within acceptable error limits, the WCC will sample the UTM location of each PLGR 15 times, compute the differential distance, and average these readings to establish the UTM location of the LS. This process also ensures that the RS and LS PLGRs are using the same satellite constellation and removes any satellite bias errors. Tests conducted at Raytheon facilities in Massachusetts and at White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) using known survey locations established that 15 samples are adequate to ensure the LS location falls within the accuracy error limits. Factors that effect PLGR location fixes are satellite positions, masking, vegetation, and buildings. Determination of altitude for the LS, relative to the RS, uses the same 15 samples consecutively with the location samples. C-29. PADS should not be used to confirm the accuracy of the PLGR. Its accuracy is a function of how accurate the alignment stake is, and whether

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the initialization and operating procedures were followed. Most important is the relative position between the radar and the launchers. The PLGR accuracy and the subsequent processing of the PLGR data provide the necessary relative position accuracy to ensure missile acquisition and conduct the Patriot mission (Figure C-6).

10-METER LOCATION ERROR ALLOWED

RADAR LOCATION

LAUNCHER

Figure C-6. Launcher Emplacement Accuracy C-30. Given these fixed times, a time line that reflects automatic emplacement can be established. This time line represents the longest time needed to establish accurate data and should be used as a planning/decision tool during TACI and K7. The time line assumes that each PLGR is turned on and has warmed up, the ECS to LS DLT synchronization is established, and the RS and LS are in remote (Shown in Figure C-7).

0

GPS SAMPLINGS 4.5 MINUTES

5

10

15

20

MINUTES

Tab 91 ENTERED, Tab 85 (s) ENTERED

NFS SPINDOWN COMPLETED

TAB(s) 85 AUTO EMPLACEMENT COMPLETE

TAB 81 RS AUTO EMPLACEMENT PLGR COMPLETED INITIAL FIX (AVERAGE TIME)

Figure C-7. Emplacement Time Line

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C-31. If the ECS transition from TACI to K7 before the relational data for the LS location and altitude has been established, the sampling process starts again. To establish a decision point on where to transition from TACI to K7, the TCA or TCO who enters Tab 85 will record the time that Tab 85 was entered for each LS. As the TACI process is finished, the TCA or TCO will review the alerts and recall each Tab 85. If all the LSs have established location and altitude as indicated by an alert, and Tab 85 has been filled in, then transition to K7 can occur with all LSs green and ready to fire. If some or all LSs have not auto-emplaced when TACI is finished, the TCO or TCA must evaluate the time line to determine how close to completion the emplacement of each LS is. Mission requirements and the time remaining for the LS to auto-emplace are key factors in making this decision. C-32. As a rule of thumb, if more than 8 minutes have elapsed since entry of Tab 85, the unit should remain in TACI until the LS is auto-emplaced. If less than 4 minutes has elapsed, the unit should go to K7. Between 4 and 8 minutes require a decision based on the mission and on the number of LSs auto-emplaced. When Tab 81 and 85 data from PLGR and NFS is filled in, these tabs must be hard copied and retained in the site data book for that location. This data can be entered manually to reinitialize the LSs and RS if the data base is lost. This can only be done if the LSs and RS have not been moved in horizontal position and if the trainable platforms are returned to the position where ADR data was derived (for example, mechanical stow). C-33. To work in the automatic emplacement mode, the PLGR must be initialized. Initialization is done manually at the PLGR using the front display and keypad. Entries required are datum code (WGS-84), approximate location, elevation, Zulu time, and date. C-34. The following are the cold start procedures for the PLGR: • Cold start procedure is performed once to initialize the PLGR and must be redone whenever the PLGR batteries are removed or replaced. Besides initializing the system, the cold start also includes loading the appropriate codes. Power must be applied and the PLGR must be able to communicate with the satellites. As it can take up to several hours to complete the proper initialization, it would normally be performed in the motor pool before the start of any anticipated use of the system. Code load procedure is a stand-alone procedure that will be used when the system has been previously initialized, but for some reason has lost its codes. The operator receives a 2 HOURS TO PLGR CODES EXPIRES alert when the current code is about to expire. The SA code expires at 2400 hours Zulu time and the new code is automatically transmitted by the satellite(s). This new code is automatically accepted by the receiving PLGR if it is on during the changeover time. If the PLGR is off during the code changeover time, it will attempt to get the new code when it initially communicates with the satellites. The operator can determine if the PLGR has the correct code by noting the mission duration indicator on the PLGR control panel.

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C-35. Once the data is entered, it is retained in memory and is updated by the data received from the satellites. The datum code is obtained from the map datum table on the map covering the area of operations (refer to Appendix F). The map datum is found in the legend of the map and is normally directly below the scale bars and elevation contour interval information. The term "horizontal datum" is the same as map datum. Appendix F indicates that datum code 25 used if the area of operation is within the continental U.S., the PLGR will always use 47 (WGS-84). C-36. The AN/PSN-11 PLGR output location and altitude positions are based on the WGS-84 world model and datum. For Patriot to integrate and pass track data with other air defense elements and/or joint forces, the track coordinates must be referenced to the common world model in use. This is normally the world model of the maps used in the area of operation. Currently, there are few maps made with WGS-84 world models. During the initialization sequence, the entry in Tab 81 for world model is obtained from the map legend for the area of operation. The software in the world model selected in Tab 81 transforms map datum coordinates from the PLGR and all coordinates for Tabs 81 and 85, are displayed in the selected world model coordinates. All FUs will use the same world model. If no world model is available on the map legend or from other sources, then WGS-84 is used. C-37. The PLGR has on board BIT. The display unit displays a failure code and test sequence number when a fault is detected by BIT. Using the failure code and a fault isolation table in TM 11-5825-291-13, the line replaceable unit (LRU) most likely to have caused the problem must be sent in for repair and replaced with a new PLGR. C-38. The emplacement procedures and crew drills have been modified to account for crew member requirements to initialize, load, and verify the readiness of the PLGR system to support an automatic emplacement. For more information see the RS and ECS crew drills, ARTEP 44-635-13-DRILL and the LS and missile reload crew drill, ARTEP 44-635-14-DRILL. The RS and LS emplacement procedures have been modified to include a VERIFY PLGR A9 OPERATIONAL STATUS paragraphs. These steps ensure that the PLGR and NFS are ready to support automatic emplacement. The procedures result in a self-test being performed on the PLGR and NFS and indicate to the operator if the PLGR has the correct mission code. To retain satellite data and time when vehicle power is removed, the PLGR has a battery to retain the memory. The LS6 BA battery is changed semiannually.

NORTH FINDING SYSTEM
C-39. The NFS part of the AE provides the azimuth, roll, and crossroll information for the RS and each LS. The NFS is also referred to as the bearing-distance-heading indicator (BDHI). C-40. The NFS is located adjacent to the PLGR on both the RS and LS. It is a gyrocompass-based system, which senses the platform attitude with respect to the earth's true north reference. NFS will determine the azimuth orientation of the RS or LS over the range of 0 to 6399.9 mils with a ±2.0 mils

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accuracy. NFS provides roll and crossroll measurements within the range of ±100 mils (±5.6o) with an accuracy of ±2.0 mils. C-41. The NFS provides this azimuth accuracy within the latitude range of 65o South to 65o North (This covers the entire world between the Arctic Circle in the north and the Antarctic Circle in the south.). The NFS also provides azimuth data when operating between 65o to 75o South and 65o to 75o North, but the alignment error will exceed ±2.0 mils. However, this error will not be greater than a factor of 0.063 per degree when operating in this latitude range. C-42. The NFS is required to provide the azimuth, roll, and crossroll data within 2.5 minutes after an alignment command is received from the WCC. The normal operating temperature range is between -32o F and +125o F. The alignment time increases to 8 minutes if operating between -50o F and -32o F. For proper alignment within the 2.5-minute time frame the NFS must be seeded with the approximate UTM location of the NFS. This seed occurs automatically via the WCC when the operator selects automatic emplacement and enters Tab 91. If the UTM coordinate entered in Tab 91 is not within approximately 40 kilometers of the actual location, the NFS will require excessive time in determining accurate azimuth, roll, and crossroll. C-43. The NFS has a local and remote mode similar to the radar and launcher. When power is applied to the NFS, it performs a self-test. Upon successful completion of this test, it reverts to the local mode. The GNIO will report the NFS as no-go while it is in a local condition. The NFS is commanded to the remote mode based on actions taken by the ECS or LS operator. As such, the ECS and launcher operators must ensure that correct procedures are followed. For example, the inadvertent interruption of power while the launcher is in the remote mode may result in an erroneous NFS no-go condition being reported by the status monitor once power is restored. The following actions will command the NFS to the remote mode: During initialization— – The initial system boot will command RS NFS to remote. – Entering Tab 85 with AUTO EMPLACE selected will command that LS NFS to remote. • During tactical operations— – Rebooting the system will initiate a remote command that reinitialize the radar and the launchers NFSs defined in the data base. – An actual launcher reorientation will initiate a remote command to the NFS. A "0" degree slew will not initiate the remote command. – Deassigning and then reassigning a launcher via Tab 07 and Tab 85 will initiate a remote command to that launcher's NFS. – When the ECS detects a launcher mode change from local to remote, initiate an NFS remote command to that launcher. C-44. The following procedure can result in a launcher NFS no-go condition if the NFS is in the local mode. If the launcher is placed into local via the LS key rather than from the ECS, and then powering down, conditions will be •

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established for a subsequent NFS fault. At this point, the ECS would see a "LSna MODE FAULT" because the LSs are in local, and the ECS has it in remote. The NFS no-go condition will occur when the LS is powered-up and placed in remote. At this point, the LS NFS is in local (a no-go condition) and the ECS will not sense a change from local to remote because it already has that launcher in remote. Consequently, no NFS remote command will be sent by the ECS, resulting in an erroneous NFS no-go condition. C-45. The NFS does not require any adjustment or calibration at the organizational level. The interface cable for the NFS is hardwired with jumper wires to provide the correct azimuth, roll, and crossroll orientation and rotation. This prevents the interchange of RS and LS interface cables for the NFS. C-46. The NFS has a built-in self-test that is accomplished within 20 seconds of power application. BIT will detect 99 percent of the NFS mission-oriented faults and isolate the malfunction to a battery replaceable unit (BRU). The NFS BIT is accessible through the maintenance control system (MCS) diagnostics. C-47. Caution should be taken when removing the NFS. If an operator is not familiar with the process, it is easy to mistake the mounting plate bolts for the NFS mounting screws. The NFS mounting screws are Allen head screws and require an extended Allen wrench and torque wrench. For further detail information, refer to TM 9-1430-605-14&P.

AUTOMATIC EMPLACEMENT STATUS MONITOR
C-48. AE tests to the status monitor system are as follows: • TAN 31 (PAS Control and Data Acquisition). • TAN 32 (PAS Routine Equipment Monitor). • TAN 34 (Precise Time of Day and associated status). C-49. These tans use the RTYPE 111. The control portion of TAN 31 message sends the PLGR and NFS UTM seed data and selects the mode of operation for the PLGR and/or NFS. The data acquisition portion of the TAN 31 message retrieves the azimuth, roll and crossroll from the NFS, and the UTM coordinates and altitude from the PLGR. TAN 32 provides the status of the GNIO, PLGR, and NFS. The operator can see the results of TAN 32 actions in the Fault Data Tab, page 4 (Figure C-8), and in the FP Status Tab, page 1 (Figure C-9).

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GPS + NFS STATUS RS GPS = RS NFS = RS EMPLACEMENT STATUS = LS 1A 2A 3A 4A 5A 6A 7A 9A EMPLACE GPS NFS STATUS

PAGE 4 OF FAULT DATA-S/I LS 1a 2a 3a 4a 5a 6a 8a 9a GPS NFS EMPLACE STATUS

Figure C-8. Fault Data Status Tab S/I, Page 4
FP STATUS OPERBLTY PER WCC RS DDL IFF D+C PAS RS AZ GEOREF UTM ALT SEARCH CONTROL-ABT: ALTER1: ALTER2: DROP LNG RNG: DROP SHT RNG: – TBM: SKEW: PAGE 1 OF 2 S/I

DATA BASE IN USE: – – MDM ODS1 UTILIZATION: ODS2 EDR

Figure C-9. Fire Platoon Status Tab S/I C-50. While TANs 31, 32, and 34 only apply to the RS, an identical set of messages and responses apply to the LS via the LAMs/LRMs. This allows the operator to see the status of each LS PLGR/NFS on page 4 of the Fault Data Tab. TAN 34 (demand action 14) is used by the system to automatically obtain the precise time of day and associated status. The TAN 34 is scheduled at start-up and routinely every 26 major cycles. TAN 34 evaluation consists of checking equipment status indicators reported in the RTYPE III RRM. C-51. The seven alerts that status monitor will place on the queue which relate to AE are (aaaaaaaa = GO, NO GO, or DEGRADED and aana = RS or LSna)— • RS GPS/NFS aaaaaaaa • HOURS TO GPS CODE EXPIRES • RS GPS CODE INVALID • LSna GPS/NFS aaaaaaaa • LSna GPS CODE INVALID • aana DO ZERO DEG SLEW-TAB 9 • aana ROLL/CROLL EXCEEDS TOL C-52. These alerts are self-explanatory except for the last two. During normal status monitor functions, the NFS is queried on an hourly basis for roll and crossroll readings on the radar and each launcher. These readings are compared to the emplacement readings to check for settling. If this hourly reading exceeds the supplemental error limits of ±2 mils for the RS and exceeds ±3 mils for the LS, the last two alerts appear. By performing a zero degree slew, the operator forces the software to update the roll and crossroll

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data for that end item. This feature eliminates the need for crew members to perform a supplemental roll and crossroll measurement every 24 hours. Doing a zero degree slew is accomplished by sending the RS or LS from the current position azimuth to the same azimuth.

C-14

Appendix D

RSOP Requirements
This appendix discusses the requirements to properly move and emplace the Patriot battalion and battery equipment. The mission of the RSOP team is to select proper terrain and equipment positions that enable the Patriot battery to perform its assigned mission. The RSOP team performs reconnaissance to prepare two primary areas required for any new location—the fire control area and the launcher area. Additionally, the RSOP team must designate locations for the battery support element. The RSOP team directs the PADS survey party to establish the UTM coordinates, altitude, and orientation azimuths for the RS and each LS.

FIRE CONTROL CONFIGURATION
D-1. The typical emplacement configuration for the fire control section is shown in Figure D-1. Ensure that the ECS, EPP, AMG, and battery equipment are situated to the rear of the radar, thereby keeping them out of the primary and secondary search sectors of the radar set. Data and power cable lengths limit the distance the RS, ECS, EPP, and AMG can be set apart. Individual items of equipment should be positioned at maximum cable length distance from each other, if possible. The radar set must have an unobstructed field of view along the primary and secondary sectors of fire. The ECS is positioned to the rear of the radar set and in a concealed area, if possible, orienting the ECS door away from the radar set to minimize the RF and noise hazard. Additionally, the ECS is connected by 26-pair cable or field wire to the battery command post. The AMG is situated to provide line-of-sight communications to the ICC and adjacent firing batteries. The AMG, due to its stringent requirement for level terrain, is the most stringent piece of Patriot equipment to emplace. The AMG must be level within ½ degree in roll altitude and 10 degrees in crossroll. The principal criteria for position selection are— • • • • • • • Level terrain of not more than a 10-degree slope. Accessibility. An area of 30 by 35 meters (100 by 115 feet). Radar field of view for PTL and STLs. AMG line of sight to the ICC, CRG, or adjacent FUs. Cable length restriction of 23 meters (75 feet) from EPP. AMG leveled within one-half degree (roll/crossroll).

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PTL RS 10 METERS

EPP III

8 METERS ECS

11 METERS

AMG

Figure D-1. Fire Control Emplacement

Table D-1 Patriot System Cable Length TOTAL LENGTH METERS (FEET) 23 (75) 37 (120) 23 (75) 23 (75) USABLE LENGTH METERS (FEET) 19 (60) 30 (100) 19 (60) 19 (60)

CABLE POWER (3 TO RS, 1 TO ECS) RWCIU (ECS TO RS) EPP CONTROL AMG (POWER & RF SIGNAL)

LAUNCHER EMPLACEMENT
D-2. A typical launching platoon emplacement for an ABT mission is shown in Figure D-2. All the launching stations are emplaced within the primary sector and that at least four launching stations are available if the radar set is retrained to cover either of the secondary sectors.

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PTL STL 2 TRACK BOUNDARY STL 1

SEARCH BOUNDARY

LS LS

LS

LS LS

LS

LS LS

Figure D-2. Typical Launcher Emplacement for an ABT Mission D-3. A typical launching platoon deployment scheme with local and remote launchers for a TBM mission is shown in Figure D-3. If missile reload is to be conducted at the launching station site, an additional area next to the launching station is required for the GMT to pull alongside. Remote launchers must be emplaced close to the PTL and within the remote launch capability.
PTL

TRACK BOUNDARY

LS

LS LS LS

LS LS LS

LS

Figure D-3. Typical Launcher Emplacement for a TBM Mission D-4. Minimum distance between the RS and local LSs is due to RF hazards. An area 90 meters around the launching station should remain clear of all personnel and other equipment because of missile backblast and explosive safety distances. The terrain for the launching stations should be level with

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the radar or lower in elevation than the radar. Never select terrain that places the launching stations (local or remote) at a higher elevation than the radar. Figure D-4 shows the position criteria. The principal criteria for position selection are— • • • • • • • • An area approximately 6- by 15-meters (20- by 50-feet). An additional 10- by 15-meter area to the side of a launcher if missile reload is planned at the site. Level terrain of not more than a 10-degree slope. All LSs deployed within the PTL and at least four launchers in each STL. A backblast area of approximately 90 meters behind the LS, clear of personnel and equipment. An area between the RSs and the local LSs of 120 to 1,000 meters. An area between the LSs of at least 90 meters for explosive safety. LS locations within ±80 degrees of the PTL.

90 METERS MISSILE BACKBLAST AREA 120 METERS MINIMUM

FIBER-OPTIC CABLE

RS

EPP III

ECS

AMG

Figure D-4. Position Criteria

5-POINT INITIAL SEARCH LOWER BOUND DATA
D-5. RSOP team members are responsible for determining the 5-point ISLB for the RS. Prior to the fire unit emplacing, visibility permitting, use an M2 aiming circle as follows: • • Place the M2 aiming circle over the RS hub, with the recording motion (azimuth) ring set to 0 mils. Using the nonrecording (orienting) motion knobs, point the M2 down the PTL. Note: A lensatic compass is sufficient for

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determining the PTL (remember to convert magnetic north to true north per the map legend). • Level the elevation micrometer scale and record the reading if other than 0. • Search from 5250 mils to 1150 mils, noting the azimuth and elevation (positive and negative) of prominent terrain feature, from the RS location to 10 kilometers in front of the radar. One point on each side of the search sector can be out of sector, for example, between the search sector boundary and the 90-degree line. D-6. Prominent terrain features are defined as follows: • Positive or negative elevation changes of 4 mils or more. Measured from level to ground (negative) or from level to the top of terrain features (positive). Terrain feature occupies 160 mils or more in azimuth of the RS search sector. Position of the terrain feature in the sector is also considered. Getting the ISLB on the top of positive terrain feature at the edges of the search sector could permit an aircraft coming from the side to approach the battery without being seen. A maximum of 5 points can be entered in Tab 96 (Figure D-5).

• •

POINT 1 POINT 2

PTL POINT 4 POINT 3 POINT 5

MASKING

M2 aiming circle at RS hub stake aligned to with record set to zero Mils. Elevation Set to zero Mils with M2 level.

Figure D-5. 5-Point ISLB

FIBER-OPTIC CABLE DEPLOYMENT (DLU LAUNCHER)
D-7. The RSOP team should deploy fiber optic-cables between the ECS and the two primary LS positions (if fiber-optic cables are to be used). This allows the LS emplacement to observe EMCON procedures. Care must be taken to

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route the fiber-optic cables so that vehicle traffic entering the new location does not damage the cables. When positioning the fiber-optic cables at the LS location, ensure that the cable remains clear of the backblast area (refer to Figure D-4). Initially, daisy chaining the fiber-optic cables from the two primary LSs is acceptable (Figure D-6). As soon as possible, cables should be run directly to each LS.
PTL

FIBER-OPTIC CABLE LAID BY LS CREW

LS LS

LS

LS

LS

LS LS LS

FIBER-OPTIC CABLE LAID BY RSOP TEAM

Figure D-6. Arc Layout D-8. The maximum allowable attenuation of the original optical signal to any receiving optical equipment is 30 decibels (systems specific). The losses associated with Patriot optical equipment are as follows: FOC (300 meters)—.93 decibels (excludes connector losses). Fiber-optic connection—.58 decibels (cable to cable and cable to bulkhead) • Master bus unit (MBU) connection—2 decibels--ECS • Slave bus unit (SBU) connection—2 decibels—two in GEN OFF in first LS. • FOC splice—.5 decibel. Note: SBU connection for the second LS of daisy chain or single LS to ECS is not included in the loss total. D-9. Launchers may be employed in any way that will result in no loss of the 30-decibel signal from the ECS to the second launcher in the daisy chain. Because of the obvious criticality to launcher data, the Patriot manufacturer recommends that the rules for launcher deployment be based on worst case signal degradation. The worst case scenario for Patriot launchers in a daisy chain would be as follows (ECS to LS1 to LS2): • •

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Terrain dictates all FOC cables are needed between ECS and LS. Total cables in the chain are eight. • All cables have one repair splice. Total cable splices in the chain is eight. • LS1 is powered down. SBU optical bypass has been activated (no electrically repeated signal). D-10. Using the information provided above, the total attenuation from ECS to LS2 is 23.24 decibels. System margin is equal to loss budget—system loss. System margin = 30 - 23.24 decibels = 6.76 decibels.

REMOTE LAUNCHER EMPLOYMENT
D-11. Remote launch phase-1 (RL-1) is a capability that allows LSs to be formed into groups controlled by an ECS through the DLU and enhances, but does not replace, capabilities provided by launchers emplaced with fiber-optic cables. The RL-1 capacility was developed to enhance the TBM defense of an asset. During defense design, the operator must ensure that the distance from the controlling RS to the RL1 Launcher Station does not exceed 10 km. This is a limitation of missile capture effected by 2/3 earth curvature. Figure D-7 shows the relationship between the local launchers and the remote launcher group.

GEM MISSILE ANTENNA MAST VHF UP TO 10 km VHF REMOTE LAUNCHERS

ENGAGEMENT CONTROL STATION

FO REMOTE LAUNCHER GROUP

LOCAL LAUNCHER

Figure D-7. Example of a Remote Launcher Group

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D-12. The RSOP team should deploy remote launchers using the same emplacement criteria as any launching station. The terrain for the remote launcher group should be level with the radar or lower in elevation than the radar and close to the PTL. Select terrain that places the remote launching stations within line-of-sight of the radar. The principal criteria for position selection are— • • • • • • • An additional area to the side of a launcher for missile reloads. Level terrain of not more than a 10-degree slope. Launchers deployed close to the PTL and at least two launchers in each RL-1 group. An area between the RSs and the remote LSs of 120 to 10,000 meters. An area between the LSs of at least 90 meters for explosive safety. Remote LSs must have VHF line-of-sight with the ECS. An area that can be defended against ground attack.

D-8

Appendix E

Alternate Alignment Procedures
This appendix describes alternate alignment procedures for the Patriot battery. It also provides an alternative procedure for aligning the Patriot equipment without surveyed emplacement data.

MIXED MODE EMPLACEMENT
E-1. The mixed mode emplacement procedure provides a means of entering launchers data into the fire unit data base. This is a contingency procedure used when full auto-emplacement cannot be performed during TACI or K7 operations. E-2. This procedure should not be used as the normal method of operations. It is emphasized that manual data, which was derived by means other than the procedure defined below, should not be used to emplace a launcher in an automatically emplaced unit. The possible sources of error in manually derived data, coupled with the bias error in the automatic data, make acquisition of a missile fired from a manually emplaced launcher tenuous. E-3. The only acceptable data is PADS data that can be mixed with automatically emplaced radar. Map spot or resection is not acceptable. Strict compliance with the mixed mode emplacement procedure is necessary to ensure some confidence of missile acquisition. Normal emplacement procedures for the launcher must be followed. Mechanical stow is normally used. If launcher data is to be entered during TACI with an RS automatic emplacement, then the operator must wait for the final radar location to be displayed in Tab 81 before starting the mixed mode emplacement procedure. EMPLACEMENT PROCEDURES E-4. The following procedures will be used to perform a mixed mode emplacement: • At the appropriate time, during TACI or K7 operations, the PADS vehicle will be backed up close to the curbside utility bay or to the front of the RS. The reason for this maneuver is to position the PADS as close as possible to the PLGR antenna mounted on the RS. • Obtain the automatically derived data (Tab 81) from the site data book and initialize the PADS using the UTM, altitude, and World Model information. • The PADS vehicle may be moved away from the RS once the initialization data has been entered and when the PADS will allow. The PADS initialization process may now be completed elsewhere. This will allow the fire unit to radiate, if needed.

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E-5. Upon completion of the PADS initialization process, the PADS team will establish a mixed mode reference stake in the battery area (recommend vicinity of the fire control section). This stake will be used to reinitialize PADS if mixed mode emplacement is required in the future. This reference stake is good only for the fire unit that provided the Tab 81 data. Each fire unit will have its reference stake. Refer to Figure E-1. The RSOP team then moves to the launcher positions that are to be manually emplaced and provides normal manual emplacement stakes.

PADS RADAR STAKE

REFERENCE POINT

Figure E-1. PADS Mixed Mode Reference Points E-6. Once the PADS has been initialized using the automatically derived radar data, it will then be dispatched to determine the location, altitude, and north reference for the launchers that are to be manually emplaced. PADS must provide the location, altitude, and north reference data for the launchers, which were initialized with the automatically derived radar data. This will ensure that any PLGR induced bias error has been taken into account. The data from a mixed mode reference stake can only be used for the fire unit that provided the Tab 81 data. E-7. The launcher operators will perform normal alignment procedures using the M2 aiming circle and the M1 gunner's quadrant. The launcher must be as level as possible to null the roll and crossroll effect on azimuth. Extreme caution must be taken when making the M2 and M1 measurements, to ensure the best accuracy possible. The alignment data generated through the manual emplacement mode will be recorded on Launcher Location/Alignment Data: Form-2. It is then provided to the ECS operators for input to the data base during TACI or K7 operations.

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Note: Only data obtained from the M2 and M1 can be used in the mixed mode emplacement. Data from the NFS cannot be used in place of M2 and M1 data. This procedure must be followed when mixing manually and automatically derived data. Not following this procedure may result in a reduced probability of missile acquisition. ROLL AND CROSSROLL TOLERANCES E-8. When the final position for the RS is determined, the PLGR continues to interrogate satellites in preparation to support an LS emplacement. The NFS will not provide azimuth data once the emplacement azimuth has been defined, but will continue to provide roll and crossroll data once an hour during tactical operations or whenever a reorientation occurs. If the new reading exceeds the tolerance (2 mils for the RS or 3 mils for an LS) the operator receives two alerts. Alert "aana ROLL/CROLL EXCEEDS TOL" indicates that the RS or LS roll or crossroll tolerances have been exceeded. The alert "aana DO ZERO DEG SLEW-TAB 9" reminds the operator to update the data base by means of a zero degree slew. For example, if the alert LS3A DO ZERO DEG SLEW-TAB 9 appears, the operator will— • Select Tab 9. • Observe the current azimuth on LS3A in FROM field. • Enter 6 in REMOTE CONTROL field for LS to LS azimuth. • Enter the current azimuth of LS3A in TO field. • Enter tab. E-9. This results in a data update to the data base with the new data and an automatic writes to the data base. If a zero degree slew was performed on an LS, the operator will select Tab 85 for that LS and hard copy the tab for inclusion into the site data base book. The NFS will not perform the hourly roll and crossroll tolerance check for those launchers that were manually entered, during a mixed mode emplacement, even if the launcher is equipped with an operational NFS.

MANUAL ALIGNMENT WITHOUT PADS
E-10. These procedures are to be used only without all PADS data. Before this alignment procedure is used, several critical facts must be considered. Because of the potential inaccuracies of this alignment method, the Patriot battery aligned in this manner should operate in the independent engagement mode. No fire unit to fire unit target correlation through the ICC will be possible. No triangulation of strobes will be possible. Data should not be passed between a fire unit emplaced using this method and any other fire unit or ADA unit. If manual emplacement is to be performed, enter a 0 in STD EMP TYPE data field in Tab 91.

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FP DATA ACQUISITION MODE SELECT/CONTROL (0) = DATA ACQUISITION MODE: (0) STD EMP TYPE: 1 = AUTO 0 1 2 3 = = = = STANDARD EMPLACEMENT LONG TERM REINIT SHORT TERM REINIT STANDARD EMPLACEMENT WITH DATA BASE READ ( ( -

* 91* 0 = MANUAL

) UTM = APPROX RS LOC ) READ DATA BASE -

Figure E-2. Tab 91, FP Data Selection Mode RADAR SET ALIGNMENT E-11. The radar is the base piece for the battery. It provides the location, altitude, and azimuth to which all FU launching stations are aligned. To ensure missile capture at launch, it is critical that the orientation and alignment of the launching stations are made from the radar data. This ensures that even if the location of the RS is not exact, its relationship to the launchers is as exact as possible. E-12. The UTM coordinates for the radar are obtained using map resection. The altitude of the radar is determined from the contour lines on the map. The azimuth of the radar will be obtained by "floating the needle" on the NREF M2 aiming circle. Azimuth alignment of the NREF M2 aiming circle must be to true north (Figure E-3). Extreme care must be taken when setting up the M2 aiming circle at the radar and north reference stake locations to ensure that the M2 is level.
00
BEARING OF RADAR TO NORTH REFERENCE

4800 0

M2 RS

NORTH REFERENCE STAKE

RS

00
M2 RADAR ALIGNMENT STAKE WITH UTM AND ALTITUDE NREF

BEARING OF NORTH REFERENCE TO RADAR

Figure E-3. Radar Set Emplacement

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E-13. Use the most detailed map available. A scale of 1:25,000 is preferable to 1:50,000. When selecting the points on the map that are to be used for the resection, the points must be visible from the radar location and must have an angular displacement from each other of at least 45 degrees. LAUNCHING STATION ALIGNMENT E-14. Select the location of the launching stations to ensure that line of sight exists between the launching station M2, the radar, and the NREF M2 (Figure E-4). Provide a means of communications between the radar crew and the launching station crews to perform the alignment measurements for input into Tab 85. Because the altitude of the launching station in relationship to the radar is critical for missile capture, all launching station altitudes will be measured from the radar altitude reference and taken from map contour lines.

LS

NORTH REFERENCE STAKE BEARING OF LAUNCHER TO NORTH REFERENCE M2 LS BEARING OF NORTH REFERENCE TO LAUNCHER

BEARING OF LAUNCHER TO RADAR SET M2 RS RS M2 NREF

Figure E-4. Launching Station Emplacement RADAR ENTRIES FOR TAB 81 E-15. Do not select Tab 81 before it appears automatically. If the operator manually selects Tab 81 before it appears automatically, it will not reappear again until the final display. It automatically appears when the NFS returns a valid response and the GPS has returned at least one valid response. See the following entries for Tab 81, Page 1:

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• UTM (obtained from map resection). • UTM WORLD MODEL (obtained from map legend). • ALTITUDE METERS (obtained from map contour). E-16. Tab 81, Page 2, displays the NFS data. The operator during initialization accepts this data— • • • • • • • LOCATION DATA CONFIDENCE LEVEL (2 for map). ALIGNED BY (1 for compass). WIND SPEED (as determined) EL RDR TO MIR (measured from RS M2). BRNG RDR TO NREF (measured from RS M2 EL). RDR TO NREF TOP (measured from RS M2 to stadia rod top). EL RDR TO NREF BOT (measured from RS M2 to stadia rod bottom). • BRNG NREF TO RDR (measured from NREF to M2). • ROLL (measured from gunner's quadrant). • CROSSROLL (measured from gunner's quadrant).
RADAR LOCATION/ALIGNMENT DATA Entry PAGE 1 OF 2 *81* LONGITUDE UTM DEG MIN SEC E/W ZZHEEEEEENNNNNNN ( )= UTM WORLD MODEL ( ) ( ) ( .) ( ) ( ) 0 = INTERNATIONAL LATITUDE ALTITUDE 1 = 1880 CLARKE DEG MIN SEC E/W METERS 2 = 1866 CLARKE ( ) ( ) ( .) ( ) ( ) 3 = WGS-84 4 = EVEREST IS RS AT EXACT ALIGNMENT AZIMUTH? 5 = BESSEL ( )=1=YES 0=NO, IF NO,REALIGN RS. RADAR LOCATION/ALIGNMENT DATA ENTRY (2)=LOCATION DATA CONFIDENCE LEVEL 0 =SURVEY 1=MODIFIED SURVEY 2=MAP (1)=ALIGNED BY 0 =SURVEY 1=COMPASS ( )=WIND SPEED 0 =BELOW GALE 1=GALE + ABOVE ( ) MILS = RS EMPLACEMENT AZIMUTH PAGE 2 OF 2 *81* AIMING CIRCLE + GUNNERS QUADRANT INPUT IN MILS EL RDR TO MIR =( .) BRNG RDR TO NREF =( .) EL RDR TO NREF TOP=( ) EL RDR TO NREF BOT=( ) BRNG NREF TO RDR=( .) ROLL=( .) CROSS ROLL=( .)

Figure E-5. Tab 81 E-17. When using manual data entry mode, ensure that A55 and A74 WPN CONTR AREAS is initially off before making the entries for TAB 85. The operator will manually input— • • • • • • • LS NUMBER (number of LS). UTM (leave blank). METERS ALTITUDE (leave blank). DEPLETION PRIORITY (from TSOP). BRNG NREF TO LS (measured from NREF M2). BRNG LS TO NREF (measured from LS M2). BRNG LS TO RDR (measured from LS M2).

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• EL LS TO RDR (measured from LS M2). • LS ROLL (Measured from gunner's quadrant). • LS CROSSROLL (measured from gunner's quadrant).
LAUNCHER LOCATION/ALIGNMEN ( ) =LS NUMBER (0)=LS EMPLACE TYPE 1=AUTO 0=MANUAL ( ( ( ( )UTM ) METERS ALTITUDE )= DEPLETION PRIORITY 01=HIGHEST )MILS=LS EMPLACEMENT AZIMUTH BRNG BRNG BRNG ELEV INPUT BELOW NREF TO LS = LS TO NREF = RS TO RDR = LS TO RDR = LS ROLL = LS CROSSROLL = *85* IN MILS ( .) ( .) ( .) ( .) ( .) ( .)

Figure E-6. Map Spot Method TECHNICAL EXPLANATION E-18. Simple trigonometric rules explain the emplacement of the radar and launching station when using this alignment method. The RS location establishes one corner of a triangle, the NREF stake is another corner, and the LS is the third corner. The top and bottom elevation readings of the stadia rod determine the distance between the RS and the NREF stake (Figure E-7). M2 measurements between the LS and RS, LS and NREF, and RS and NREF determine the angles of the triangle. Given the known distance of one side of the triangle and the angles, the WCC can calculate the UTM coordinates and altitude of the LS in relationship to the RS.

E L E V A T IO N O F R A D A R T O TO P O F N O R TH R E FE R E N CE

S T A D IA ROD M2 RS NREF STAKE
E L E V A T IO N O F R A D A R T O BOTTOM OF NORTH REFERENCE

Figure E-7. Launching Station Emplacement E-19. The following steps explain the procedure of setting up the M2 aiming circle for NREF: 1—Set up and center NREF M2 over stake for the NREF M2. 2—Level NREF M2 taking extreme care to ensure M2 is absolutely level.

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3—Determine the declination angle between magnetic north and grid north from the map legend. If magnetic north is west of grid north, subtract the declination angle from 6400 mils. If magnetic north is east of grid north, add the declination angle to 0 mils. Record this reading as NREF M2 GRID NORTH. 4—Set the azimuth scale and azimuth micrometer scale of the NREF M2 to the NREF M2 GRID NORTH reading determined in step 3. 5—Point the elbow telescope of the NREF M2 in the general direction of north. Note: The aiming circle magnetic compass should not be used near iron or steel masses. 6—Unlock the NREF M2 magnetic compass needle. 7—Open the covers over the NREF M2 orienting knobs. 8—While looking through the magnifier, adjusting the orienting knobs until the magnetic compass needle are centered on the middle reticle. 9—Close the covers on the orienting knobs of the NREF M2. 10—The NREF M2 is now aligned to GRID NORTH. E-20. Once the NREF M2 has been aligned, the radar M2 is used to determine the radar azimuth. The crewman will follow the procedures found in the ECS technical manual TM 9-1430-600-10-1. TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS E-21. Since M2 aiming circle measurements must be taken from the LS to the RS, to the NREF, and the NREF to LS, emplacement time for the fire unit will increase considerably. To ensure LS to RS orientation and alignment is as accurate as possible, take all M2 readings for each LS twice. If the two sets of readings differ by more than .5 mils, retake the M2 readings for those LSs. To ensure the best possible angular measurements, locate the launching stations as close to the RS as possible while not violating RF hazard and explosive safety restrictions. If PADS equipment becomes available after performing these procedures, use the PADS to survey the RS and LS locations and update Tabs 81 and 85 with survey data.

E-8

Appendix F

Worldwide UTM Conversion Procedures and Tables
This appendix discusses how the US Army uses the Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) system as its major reference system for locating field units. Two methods exist to designate a given position within the UTM system: UTM numeric grid and UTM letter grid designations. Currently, all position inputs for the Patriot missile system use the numeric designation system. Letter grid designations provide an alphanumeric representation of a given position and is the common method used to reference a given position from a military map. To ensure that military maps can be used to input position data into the Patriot missile system, operators must be able to convert UTM letter grid positions into UTM numeric positions.

MAPS, WORLD MODELS, AND DATUM
F-1. If the world were flat, navigation would be simple. Every point in the world could be referenced to the edges of the earth and hence to the edge of the map. Unfortunately, the world is not a planar surface but is a spheroidlike object. Things would be much easier if the earth was a perfect sphere. As navigation and cartography evolved, various astronomers and surveyors located around the world began to establish map standards. If phones and satellites had existed, these various mapmakers could have talked and compared notes, which would have resulted in one map standard. However, that is not the way history was made. Each surveyor made his measurements of the earth when developing his maps. Depending on his methods, he determined the polar or equatorial radius of the earth. Considering these measurement each surveyor mapped his portion of the world (Tables F-1 and F-2). As a result, the dimensions of a UTM zone differ from world model to world model. F-2. If you lay a map on top of another map of the same area that uses a different world model, you will notice that the grid lines do not match. The terrain features do not seem to be in the same place. This is due to the different starting points for drawing the map. The starting point is called a datum. Two datum are used when drawing the map. The horizontal datum is the reference point for the planar measurements and the vertical datum determines altitudes. The effect of this different datum is significant.

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Table F-1. Map Datums/Spheroids/Codes MAP DATUM
Adindan ARC 1950 Australian Geodetic 1966 Bukit Rirnpah Camp Area Astro Djakarta European 1950 Geodetic Datum 1949 Ghana Guam 1963 G. Segara G. Serindung Herat North Hjersey 1955 Hu-Tzu-Sham Indian Ireland 1965 Kertau (Malayn Revised Triangulation) Liberia 1964 User entered Luzon Merchich Montjong Lowe Nigeria (Minna) North America 1927 CONUS Alaska and Canada

MAP SPHEROID
Clarke 1880 Clarke 1880 Australian National Bessel International Bessel International International Unknown Clarke 1866 Bessel Unknown Unknown International International Everest Unknown Modified Everest

DATUM CODE
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

MAP DATUM
Old Hawaiian: Maui Oahu Kaui Ordnance Survey of Great Britain 1936 Quornog Sierra Laone 1960 South America: Provisional South America 1956 Corrego Alegre Campo Inchauspe Chua Astro Yacare Tananarive ObservaTory 1956 Tirrbalai Tokyo Voirol Special Datum (SD): SD, Indian Special SD, Luzon Special SD, Tokyo Special SD, WGS-84 Special WGS-74 WGS-84

MAP SPHEROID
Clarke 1866 Clarke 1866 Clarke 1866 Airy International Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown International Everest Bessel Clarke Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown World Geodetic World Geodetic

DATUM CODE
27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

Clarke 1880 Clarke 1866 Clarke 1866 Unknown Unknown

19 20 21 22 23 24

Clarke 1866 Clarke 1866

25 26

Table F-2. Map Legend Information Spheroid Grid Projection Vertical Datum Horizontal Datum Clarke 1866 1,000 meter, UTM Zone 13 Transverse Mercator National Geodetic Vertical 1927 North American Datum

Example: The equatorial width of an International World Model UTM zone is 667,980 m and for Clarke 1866 world model the distance is 667,961 m. This is only a difference of 19 meters. However, the polar length of an International UTM zone from the equator to the northern most point is 9328380 m and for a Clarke 1866 the distance is 9,327,983 m. This is a

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difference of 397 m. An example illustrates the difference. Building 2 on Fort Bliss, Texas is located at 31o 48’ 16.9” N latitude and 106o 26’ 8.3” W longitude. Converting this coordinate into UTM using the Clarke 1866 world model positions, Building 2 is at 13N3641003519498. Conversion using the International world model positions it at 13N3640973519737. Comparing the two points reveals an easting difference of 3 m and a northing difference of 239 m. By using the wrong world model, in this case International, Building 2 is effectively moved north to the middle of Smith-Bliss field. This difference between UTM maps, when translated into azimuth measurements with respect to true north also varies from the equator toward the respective poles. The combined UTM error and azimuth error, if the wrong World Model is selected, will prevent Patriot units from correlating targets or triangulating jam strobes.

UNIVERSAL TRANSVERSE MERCATOR OVERVIEW
F-3. To aid in the use of the following UTM conversion tables, this brief explanation of the UTM system is provided for your information. The UTM system is based on the tangent to the meridian, rather than the equator, of the standard mercator projection. It is used for areas of the world between latitudes 80 degrees south and 84 degrees north. The polar regions, beyond latitudes 80 degrees south and 84 degrees north, are covered by the universal polar stereographic (UPS) system, based on the polar stereographic projection. F-4. The major UTM grid divides the earth into 60 longitudinal zones (each zone is 6 degrees in width) and 20 latitudinal rows (each row covers 8 degrees in latitude). The zones are numbered consecutively beginning with zone 1 (between 180 degrees and 174 degrees west longitude) and proceeding east to zone 60. Each row within a zone is lettered consecutively, beginning with C (between 80 degrees and 72 degrees south latitude) and extending to X (between 72 degrees and 84 degrees north latitude). This particular zone-row combination isolates a unique 6-degree by 8-degree quadrilateral called a "grid zone." The grid zone designation consists of a one- or two-digit number and a letter (See Figure F-1). F-5. Each zone is divided by the central meridian, which runs North and South through the center of the zone. A minor grid system of 100,000-m squares is developed on either side of the central meridian and extends to the limits of the zone. The eastern and western borders of each 6-degree zone conform to the meridians, which cut the outermost 100,000-m squares into partial squares. Each 100,000-m square designation consists of two letters. Starting with 180 degrees and proceeding east along the equator, the 100,000-m north-south squares are lettered A through Z (Omitting the letters I and O). The lettering for the east-west squares in the Southern Hemisphere starts at 80 degrees south latitude and proceeds until the equator is reached. The lettering for the east-west squares in the Northern Hemisphere starts at the equator and proceeds northward to 84 degrees north latitude. The squares, east-west, are lettered A through V (Omitting the letters I and O).

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Figure F-1. Grid Zone Designation F-6. At this point, a position is isolated within any 100,000-m square on earth by a zone number (1-60) and three letters. The 100,000-m squares are further defined numerically in terms of easting and northing. This is the UTM letter grid designation system (Figure F-2). Common military practice is to use a shorthand representation, which drops the first three characters from the complete UTM letter grid designation.

nnaaannnnnn

--- - - - ----- -| | | | | |_ 100's of m-- northing | | | | |_____ 100's of m-- easting | | | |________ 100,000 m grid square designation-- northing | | |__________ 100,000 m grid square designation-- easting | |__________________ Zone grid latitude (C to X) |_____________________ Zone designation (01 to 60)
Figure F-2. UTM Letter Grid Designation

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F-7. Because the 100,000-m square grid designations are defined numerically in terms of easting and northing, any given position can also be defined with only numeric designations. Grid designations in the Northern Hemisphere, the origin of each zone (which is the intersection of the equator and the central meridian of the zone) is defined as 0 meters northing and 500,000 m easting. In the Southern Hemisphere, the origin of each zone is defined as 10,000,000 m northing and 500,000 m easting. Therefore, a position may be defined in UTM numeric designation by specifying the zone, hemisphere, easting and northing (Figure F-3). nnheeeeeennnnnnn

--- - ----------- -------------| | | |________ meters--northing | | |_____________________ meters-- easting | |____________________________ hemisphere (N or S) |_______________________________ Zone designation (01 to 60)
Figure F-3. UTM Numeric Designation UTM LETTER GRID TO NUMERIC GRID CONVERSION F-8. Conversion of UTM letter grid coordinates to UTM numeric coordinates requires converting the 100,000-m grid square easting and northing letter designations to the equivalent numeric easting and northing. The equivalency between the two coordinate designations are shown in Figure F-4. The process to convert easting letter designators to numeric easting is straightforward. The process to convert northing letter designators to numeric northing is complicated by the existence of different surveys for the various section of the earth's surface. These surveys use different spheroidal approximations for the earth and letter the northing grid differently. Patriot currently accepts UTM numeric coordinates from the International, Clarke 1880, Clarke 1866, WGS-84, Everest, and Bessel spheroids. When entering the following tables, the spheroid of the map used to obtain the UTM letter grid coordinates must be known (See Figure F-4).

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__________________________ Zone designation (01 to 60) | ________________________ Zone grid latitude (C to X) | _______________________ 100,000 m grid square-- easting | | | ______________________ 100,000 m grid square-- northing | | | | ___________________ m-- easting | | | | | ______________ m-- northing | | | | | | --- - - - --------- --------nnaaannnnnnnnnn UTM letter grid coordinate ---- ----- ----------- --------| || \ | | | | | \___|__ | | || | \ | | || | \ | --- - - --------- --- --------n n h e e e e e e n n n n n n n UTM numeric coordinate --- - ----------- ------------| | | |________________ m-- northing | | |_______________________m-- easting | |__________________________ hemisphere (N or S) | ____________________________ Zone designation (01 to 60)
Figure F-4. UTM Letter Grid to UTM Numeric Equivalency F-9. To convert a UTM letter grid coordinate into a UTM numeric coordinate, follow the procedures indicated here: • Step 1. Transcribe the zone designation of the UTM letter grid designation to UTM numeric designation. This number does not change. Step 2. If the coordinate is in the Northern Hemisphere, add N to the UTM numeric designation; if not, add S (Refer to Figure F-3, page F-5). Step 3. Find the UTM zone designation (left column) in Table 3 (Figure F-5). Step 4. Find the 100,000-m grid square--easting letter (center column) adjacent to the UTM zone designation (Figure F-5). Step 5. Find the number in the right column corresponding with the 100,000-m grid letter. Add this number to the UTM numeric designation (Figure F-5). Step 6. Transcribe meters easting (five digits) to the UTM numeric designation. Step 7. (See Figure F-6) Find the grid zone latitude letter in the lefthand column of Table 1 or 2 (Northern Hemisphere) or Table 4 or 5 (Southern Hemisphere) based on the spheroid for the map sheet being used. Step 8. (See Figure F-6) Find the 100,000-m grid square—northing letter in the second or fourth column adjacent to the zone grid latitude letter.

• • •

• •

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Step 9. (See Figure F-6) Find the UTM number in the third column, which corresponds to the 100,000-m grid letter and add it to the UTM numeric designation. • Step 10. Transcribe meters northing (five digits) to the UTM numeric designation. F-10. For the following example, refer to Figures F-5, F-6, and F-7. The conversion of 38RPN7634529560 is taken from a map sheet that uses the world geodetic system spheroid to UTM numeric. First (Step 1), transcribe the UTM zone designation (38) of the UTM letter grid to UTM numeric. The R in 38RPN7634529560 is in the Northern Hemisphere, so N is added to the UTM numeric (Step 2) which now reads 38N. Looking at Table 3, zone 38 is found in the second set in the UTM zone column (Step 3). The 100,000-m grid P (Step 4) corresponds to 6 in the adjacent column, which is added to the UTM numeric (Step 5) to make it read 38N6. Add the 5-digit easting of 76345 (Step 6) to make it read 38N676345. The grid zone latitude letter is R, so looking at Table 1 (based on world geodetic system spheroid), we locate the letter R in the left-hand column (Step 7). The 100,000-m grid square— northing letter is N. Because the UTM zone (38) is even, the fourth column of Table 1 is used to locate the letter N (Step 8). Adjacent to the N under the UTM numeric column is the number 27, which is now added to the UTM zone designation (Step 9) to make it read 38N67634527. Now the 5-digit northing of 29560 is added (Step 10) to complete the conversion to UTM numeric which now reads 38N6763452729560 (see Figure F-7). F-11. The Worldwide UTM Conversion Tables (Figures F-8 through F-12) are actual conversion tables used by Patriot. See Figure F-5 for an example of easting conversions and Figure F-6 for northing conversions.

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Figure F-5. Table 3 Easting Conversions Example

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Figure F-6. Table 1 Northing Conversions Example

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___________________________ Zone designation (01 to 60) | ________________________ Zone grid latitude (C to X) | | ______________________ 100,000 m grid square--easting | | | ____________________ 100,000 m grid square--northing | | | | ________________ m--easting | | | | | _________ m--northing | | | | | | --- - - - --------- --------3 8 R P N 7 6 3 4 5 2 9 5 6 0 UTM letter grid coordinate --- - - - --------- --------| | | \ | | | | | \___|__ | | | | | \ | | | | | \ | --- - - --------- --- --------3 8 N 6 7 6 3 4 5 2 7 2 9 5 6 0 UTM numeric coordinate --- - ----------- ------------| | | |________ m--northing | | |_____________________ m--easting | |____________________________ hemisphere (N or S) |_______________________________ Zone designation (01 to 60)
Figure F-7. UTM Conversions

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Figure F-8. Actual Conversion Table 1

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Figure F-8. Actual Conversion Table 1 (continued)

F-12

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Figure F-9. Actual Conversion Table 2

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Figure F-9. Actual Conversion Table 2 (continued)

F-14

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Figure F-10. Actual Conversion Table 3

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Figure F-11. Actual Conversion Table 4

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Figure F-11. Actual Conversion Table 4 (continued)

F-17

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Figure F-12. Actual Conversion Table 5

F-18

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Figure F-12. Actual Conversion Table 5 (continued)

F-19

Appendix G

Fix-or-Fight Criteria
This appendix contains fix-or-fight guidance for planners, S3 officers, and ICC and ECS crews. This guidance is generic in nature and is not intended to be the sole source of information used in the decision-making process for fix-or-fight. Leaders must also consider the mission at hand. In addition, test action numbers (TANs), which accompany status monitor faults, require analysis by the system maintenance technician to determine the true operability of the system.

FIX-OR-FIGHT GUIDANCE
G-1. The fix-or-fight guidelines and synopsis provide guidance to the tactical control officer and the tactical director in deciding the appropriate response to system failures during combat. The objective of fix-or-fight guidance is to allow units to continue to fight as long as possible and logically, despite system failures. SCOPE G-2. Fix-or-fight guidelines take effect when the unit is ordered to Battle Stations. In the training environment, fix-or-fight guidelines are used when the unit is ordered to assume Blazing Skies. Patriot's status monitor and built-in test equipment conduct frequent checks on Patriot's many functions. Whenever the results of a test action are outside established engineering parameters, an appropriate indicator is given to the operator through the display and control console and the fire unit status panel in the engagement control station. The appropriate indicator and alert are presented as soon as possible. DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND RESPONSIBILITIES G-3. The fix-or-fight decision process consists of three elements. An initial decision is made by the TCO when presented with fault indications. The TD at the battalion FDC conducts a review. An analysis and review by the battery and battalion system maintenance technician are also required. Tactical Control Officer Actions G-4. When presented with an equipment fault alert, the TCO will display and make a hard copy of the operational assessment, fault data, and fire platoon status tabs. The TCO notes the set of fault indicators and makes an initial decision to continue air defense operations or to run diagnostics based upon the guidance of the fix-or-fight guidance in Table G-1. The TCO immediately notifies the TD of the fault indications present and of the initial fix-or-fight decision. The TCO informs the battery system technician of the situation,

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requiring an immediate assessment of the fault indications and review of the decision. The TCO furnishes all amplifying information on the residual capabilities to the TD as it becomes available. Table G-1. Fix-or-Fight Synopsis
STATUS MONITOR INDICATIONS HANG or CRASH RS ISOLATED (Alert) Reorientation – NO-GO Radar search ABT–NO-GO Radar search TBM–NO-GO Radar track ABT–NO-GO Radar track TBM–NO-GO Missile guidance–NO-GO Missile guidance–NO-GO Radar track ABT–NO-GO Radar track TBM–NO-GO Radar search TBM–NO-GO Radar search ABT–DEGRADED Radar track ABT–DEGRADED Missile guidance–DEGRADED Missile guidance–NO-GO RECOMMENDED ACTION MUST FIX MUST FIX MUST FIX COMMENTS Must fix if rebooting does not clear the problem. Must fix if rebooting does not clear the problem. Radar indicated azimuth is probably wrong. Targets, which may appear on CRT, can be engaged if they are stable and if the fault data tab does not display TVMAP or RTG. If TVMAP or RTG (or both) are indicated, the unit can be used to support ICC triangulation only.

DECISION

DECISION

DECISION

RTG unable to support the TBM mode. System can be used for ABT mode.

DECISION

Missile guidance–DEGRADED

DECISION

All other indicators

FIGHT

If TVMAP or RTG, no guidance available. A unit without guidance may support BN surveillance if radar search and tracking equals DEGRADED or GO. If FAULT DATA Tab indicates TVMAP, guidance capability is reduced. If the fault data tab displays TVMCP, guidance capability against jammers is reduced. Notify the ICC and battery CP.

Tactical Director Actions G-5. Upon notification of the fault indications on the status monitor the TD checks the fix-or-fight criteria in Table G-1. The TD will review the fix-or-fight decision from the battalion commander's perspective and will consider the following: • • • • Apparent residual air defense capabilities of the battery. Overall equipment status of the battalion. Tactical situation and the battalion's need for the subject battery's residual capability to support the tactical situation. Estimated time available to conduct diagnostics and corrective maintenance before the air battle. The TD will consult with the battalion system maintenance technician as required and recommend the continuation or changing of the initial fix-or-fight decision to the battalion commander or his/her representative.

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System Maintenance Technician G-6. Upon notification of a fight-or-fix decision, the system maintenance technician should report to the engagement control station as soon as possible. The senior maintenance technician (SMT) will gather and analyze all available fault indications. He will also assess the problem and the impact of the problem on the air defense mission and the system's residual capabilities. The SMT will then recommend a course of action as soon as possible to the TCO.

CATEGORIES OF RESPONSES
G-7. Status monitor and built-in test equipment provide an extensive amount of equipment status information to the operator. Much of the equipment status information, however, is not tactically significant during wartime conditions. Therefore, fix-or-fight guidance, considering that an operator must make prompt decisions in response to fault indications during air battle, is drawn from tactically significant fault indicators. Fix-or-fight categorizes the tactically significant faults into response categories of must fix, decision, and fight. There is a subset of the fight category, fight-while-fix, in which the fault can be corrected without interrupting the air defense artillery operations. MUST FIX G-8. During tactical operations, the operator must evaluate fault indications. With some software failure indications the operator determines the “must fix” conditions. For example, if there is no system residual capability and initial immediate operator corrective actions do not clear the fault, the system must be fixed. System Hang or Crash During Normal Operations G-9. A system hang or crash could result from a software failure or from an electromagnetic pulse (EMP). Normally, the operator will immediately attempt to reload the software. If unsuccessful, a decision to fix must result. One condition that can result in the inability to recover from a hang or crash is a fault in the weapons control computer or the tactical data base storage and recovery device, which becomes a necessary fix situation. In addition, a fault condition may occur where displayed data becomes so erratic that the operator realizes the data is unreliable. Reorientation No-Go G-10. A reorientation no-go fault is a serious system fault that will not permit correct system operation. This fault occurs when an attempted reorientation has failed. The result is that the north reference is lost. Actual target positions are probably in error although they appear to be normal on the situation display. Missile acquisition may not be possible, and the system cannot support battalion operations.

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Radar Set Isolated G-11. When RADAR SET ISOLATE alert occurs, this means there are no data communications between the weapons control computer and the radar. The operator should attempt to reestablish that data link by depressing the RADIATE-DISABLE switch-indicator. If the failure persists, he should reload the software. If the failure still persists, the problem must be fixed. DECISION G-12. The fault indications in this category do not mean there is no residual air defense capability retained. Neither do these faults mean that sufficient residual capability exists relative to the air defense mission that a fight is automatically made. Fault indications in this category require a quick correlation between the operational assessment tab, target symbology, and the fault data tab information. Search No-Go G-13. In most cases, a search no-go in the operational assessment tab indicates that the status monitor has detected a condition that prevents successful search and track operations. However, these fault indications can be generated by conditions that do not effect the full envelope of the system's capabilities to search and track. The operator should correlate his operational assessment tab indication with the presence and stability of target symbology on the scope. If all or some of the same target symbols are still displayed and if they are stable, the operator should continue engagements. In case of continued operations, the operators should be aware that some targets within the battery's radar coverage might go undetected. In such cases, the TD should use the adjacent batteries' overlapping coverage in the affected sector to manually oversee the sector. Track No-Go G-14. A track no-go indication in the operational assessment tab normally is accompanied by a search no-go. The same guidance and rationale for a decision apply for a track no-go indication as they do for a search no-go. Missile Guidance No-Go G-15. There are two sets of conditions that can generate a missile guidance no-go in the operational assessment tab. First, missile guidance is never assessed at a level higher than the radar set search and track capabilities. Therefore, every time a radar search or track no-go condition is displayed, missile guidance no-go will be displayed whether or not any fault exists in the guidance system. The absence of actual guidance problems is verifiable by displaying the fault data tab. If TVM-AP is absent from the fault data tab display then the system should be used to engage those eligible stable targets that continue to be displayed. The other set of conditions that can generate a missile guidance no-go are TVM-AP receiver faults. This condition is indicated by TVM-AP being displayed on the fault data tab. In this case, no

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residual missile guidance capability exists and the only decision remaining is whether or not to retain the battery for surveillance support to the battalion. Missile Guidance Degraded G-16. An operational assessment tab indication of missile guidance degrades can be generated by varying degrees of equipment failures that might result in increased miss distance. When TVM-CP is displayed in the fault data tab, missile guidance performance against jamming targets will be significantly reduced and the battery should not be used to engage jammers. The battery can be used to engage triangulated jammers, but if the triangulation support is lost during the engagement, the missile will most likely be ineffective. Therefore, another battery should be selected, if possible, to engage jamming aircraft. The affected battery can still engage quiet targets effectively, as long as the targets remain as quiet targets. If TVM-AP is displayed in the fault data tab together with missile guidance degrade in the operational assessment tab, some guidance degradation may exist. The high lethality envelope might be smaller. However, that the problem was not assessed as a no-go signifies that the problem is not grave. Therefore, the affected battery's firepower should be used, if needed. FIGHT G-17. All other status monitor indicators fall into this category. These faults vary in impact upon the air defense mission from no adverse effect to moderate impact. However, the faults in this category are such that the battery should be used, if needed. In many cases, system contingency modes or redundancies compensate for the lost capability. In other cases, some capability is lost and there is no backup, but the fire unit can still make significant contributions to the battalion's conduct of the air battle. Search and Track Degrade G-18. A degrade in either search or track can result in modification of the normal search and track envelopes for the system. The system is expected to retain all of its functional capabilities within the reduced envelope. Targets under track are expected to be reliable. However, there may be targets within the search coverage that are not displayed (these would be at longer ranges). Target Evaluation Degrade or No-Go G-19. A target evaluation degrade in either search or track can result in modification of the normal search and track envelopes for the system. The system is expected to retain all of its functional capabilities within the reduced envelope. Targets under track are expected to be reliable. However, there may be targets within the search coverage area that are not displayed. Target Identification Degrade or No-Go G-20. A target evaluation degrade or no-go is usually associated with a display error. Distortions on the situation display may confuse the operator,

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and manual switch actions may require repetition. Such faults should be apparent to the operator. If the condition seriously hampers the operator, his tasks can be transferred to the other display console. G-21. Target identification faults refer to the IFF system. Since other means for target identification exist, these faults would result in a decision to continue operations for as long as contingency identification exists. Contingency modes include— • • • Alternate IFF modes in instances where the identification fault applies to only a single mode of the IFF system. Told-In target identification from higher echelons. Passive identification via the automated track history comparison to the passive criteria initialized in the tactical data base.

Reorientation Degrade G-22. This condition indicates that the radar set azimuth is different from expected. It can occur following maintenance, in which the radar set was rotated manually. It can also occur following a radar set retrain command in which the radar set failed to achieve its expected azimuth within two degrees. The system can normally be used if the current azimuth satisfactorily covers the assigned search sector. Otherwise, reorient the radar set to the desired azimuth. Optical Disk CD-ROMs G-23. The tactical storage media contains the software programs and the local site dependent data base. The tactical storage media faults can result in the system being unable to restart, reorientation, or perform system diagnostics. The FU tactical storage media contains the diagnostic and operational software. The TPT replacement (TPTR) tactical storage media contains the TPT data base/scenario replacement sets. The TPT library (TPTL) disk contains the data base/scenario library sets, and the final tactical storage media contains the data collection. A fault in the FU tactical storage media prevents both a rapid reloading and system reorientation.

FIGHT-WHILE-FIX G-24. This category is a subset of the fight category. The only difference between the two is that faults in this category can be corrected without interrupting the battery from its conduct of the air defense mission. C-E Faults G-25. C-E faults are degrades and no-gos in the UHF communications system as shown by the communications indicator on the fire unit status panel. These faults can be due to breakdowns of individual links within the network and can be repaired while the net is operational. If the fault is serious enough to result in a no-go, the battery can continue to fully support search, track, and guidance in an autonomous mode.

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Launching Station Low Fuel G-26. The launching station low fuel warning indicates two hours or less of fuel for the generator. Refueling of individual launching stations is accomplished while the remainder of the system continues operations. Hot Missile Count G-27. The hot missile count can drop due to missile launcher failure or missile failure. Reload or missile replacement is accomplished while the remainder of the battery continues operations. Launching Station No-Go G-28. Launching station corrective maintenance and missile reload is performed without interruptions to the remainder of the battery's operations. If the indication is a digital data link red indication for all activated launchers, the problem is most likely in the data link terminal at the engagement control station. Otherwise, only those launching stations displaying DDL RED require maintenance and the remainder can be used to support engagements.

FAULT ALERT FILTER USE
G-29. To minimize the impact of intermittent fault alerts on the tactical operations, a switchable filter is incorporated into the system. Only faults that are intermittent can be filtered, that is, those faults detected through routine, cyclic status monitor activity. The filter is enabled and disabled by means of the EQUIP CONTR switch-indicator on the display console. ENGAGEMENT CONTROL STATION G-30. Only radar faults that are intermittent can be filtered. Those faults that are detected through routine or cyclic status monitor activity. The filter is enabled or disabled by means of the EQUIP CONTR S/I on the display console. If both EQUIP CONTR switch-indicators are on, then the fault alert filter is disabled and intermittent faults are not reported. If both S/Is are off then the filter is enabled. The TCO will report all radar faults immediately upon initial detection. If the EQUIP CONTR S/I is on at only one manstation, that operator is responsible for reporting the faults immediately. When the filter is enabled, radar faults that are stable for three minutes are reported. Not all faults are filtered by activation of the EQUIP CONTR S/I. Failures to items other than the radar set will continue to be detected, and status displays will be updated to report these faults. Radar set failures that are associated with specific events, such as an RU AZIMUTH FLT generated by a reorientation attempt, will continue to be reported. INFORMATION AND COORDINATION CENTRAL G-31. At the ICC, use of the EQUIP CONTR switch-indicator (S/I) causes fault alerts to be displayed at one, both, or neither console. Enabling and disabling of the filter is performed in the same manner as the engagement

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FM 3-01.87

control station (ECS). Before conducting the air battle, the filter should be disabled (EQUIP CONTR S/I on) to direct alerts to manstation one, since the TDA is a trained maintenance person and able to interpret and assess a majority of the alerts. During the conduct of the air battle, the filter should be enabled (EQUIP CONTR S/I off) at both manstations so that the number of alerts is reduced.

EXECUTING THE DIAGNOSTICS
G-32. If the air defense mission permits, the diagnostic software should be run every 24 hours, particularly for the radar. Status monitor and diagnostics have complimentary strengths. Status monitors thoroughly monitor the system over the region of the performance envelope used at any given site. Those portions of the envelope not used at the site may have faults that will go temporarily undetected by status monitor and remain dormant. G-33. Dormant faults are faults that are not apparent and which may remain undetected until either a specific function is required, a subsequent fault occurs, or a maintenance procedure or functional check is carried out. G-34. Daily execution of diagnostics will virtually guarantee that no dormant faults exist. The diagnostics test the system for both mission-essential and non-mission-essential faults. Periodically running the diagnostics will provide the user with a record of any failing tests in non-mission-essential hardware that may prove useful in troubleshooting status monitor detected faults in mission essential hardware. The diagnostics also cover the performance envelope independent of site specific conditions. These strengths, when coupled with status monitor's ability to test the system dynamically, provide essentially complete coverage for all fault conditions. G-35. When warranted, field bulletins may be issued to identify specific recommendations on areas where diagnostic results should be considered part of the fix-or-fight criteria. Status monitor in the next fielded software build will cover these areas.

G-8

Appendix H

BATI and TACI Flowcharts
This appendix contains BATI and TACI flowcharts that provide the operator with a summary of PDB-4 system initialization and a listing of tabs that are displayed as figures in the manual. These charts are intended to provide a quick reference for ECS and ICC operators. The charts consist of the following:
• • • • • • BATI sequence (Figure H-1). ICC recovery sequence (Figure H-2). Retrieve and compare FP data (RCFD) sequence (Figure H-3). Patriot deployment and command planning sequence (Figure H-4). TACI sequence (Figure H-5). Tab reference table (Table H-1).

H-1

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START

TAB 13 MODE CNTL
(CHANGE ICC MODE)

AUTOMATIC INITIALIZATION TAB SEQUENCE

TAB 90 TAB 58 TAB 01

TAB 40 TAB 43 TAB 54 TAB 70 TAB 71 TAB 74 TAB 76 TAB 78

SELECTIONS

0 = RECOVERY

1 = INITIALIZATION TAB 06

SEE FIGURE H-2 TAB 50 INITIALIZATION CONTROL
(SELECT INITIALIZATION MODE)

TAB 10 TAB 14

SELECTIONS

1 = AUTO DATA INPUT CONTROL 0 = MANUAL DATA INPUT CONTROL

TAB 79

2 = RETRIEVE & COMPARE FPS DATA (RCFD)

ENTER TAB

TAB 00 TAB INDEX
(HOOK TAB NUMBER)

3 = DEPLOYMENT PLANNING 4 = DATA INPUT COMPLETE

ENTER TAB

SEE FIGURE F-3

INITIALIZATION TABS (LISTED AT RIGHT) ARE DISPLAYED AS SELECTED BY OPERATOR FOR DATA ENTRY REVIEW TABS ARE ALSO SELECTED VIA KEYBOARD (SEL TAB ## SEL TAB)

SEE FIGURE F-4

ENTER TAB ALLOWS TRANSITION TO TAC OPS BY PRESSING ENGAGE CONTR SWITCH INDICATOR DATA BASE CONT ENTER TAB. TAB 50 IS DISPLAYED W / INITIALIZATION MODE = 3

TAB 98

TAC OPS TAB 2, BN COMMUNICATIONS CONFIG CNTL
(ALLOW EXTRA BN COMMO)

TAB SELECTION VIA KEYBOARD

FINISH

Figure H-1. BATI Sequence

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START

TAB 13 MODE CONTROL (CHANGE ICC MODE)
SELECTIONS

Note: With RECOVERY selected in Tab 13 the system automatically reads the data base from the ODS tape (or selected tape drive). If DATA BASE READ is unsuccessful, a BN DATA BASE TAPE BAD alert is displayed.

0 = RECOVERY

1 = INITIALIZATION

ENTER TAB. “DATA BASE COMPLETE” ALERT IS DISPLAYED TAB 06 IS DISPLAYED

TAB 6 IFF/SIF CONTROL SEE FIGURE H-1

ENTER TAB PRESS “ENGAGE CONTR” SWITCH TO TRANSITION TO TAC OPS

TAC OPS

OPERATOR SELECTS TAB 02 VIA KEYBOARD
(SEL TAB 02 SEL TAB)

TAB 02 COMM CONTROL

RE-ESTABLISH EXTRA BN COMMUNICATIONS AND ENTER TAB

FINISH

Figure H-2. ICC Recovery Sequence

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START

TAB 50 Initialization CNTL (Select initialization mode) Data Conflicts TAB 74 2 = Retrieve and compare FP data Data Conflicts TAB 73 TAB 90 Data Collection Required data: BNSCC, DLRP, and north reference. Data Conflicts TAB 71 Repeat RCFD steps 2 and 3 repeated for all remaining responding Patriot batteries Data Conflicts TAB 79 Data Conflicts TAB 78

TAB 58 BN Geographic Data parameters

Enter TAB Displays TAB 67 Required data: BN ID, RLRIU address, set #, and 1st & 2nd ATDL-1 address.

Data Conflicts TAB 70

TAB 67 BN Comm Control

Data Conflicts TAB 6

Enter TAB Displays TAB 68 Required data: FP type HAWK ATDL address, link station and modem # (for HAWK only).

ALL DATA BASES COMPARED alert displayed. Tab 12 automatically displayed showing netted FPs

TAB 68 FP Comm Control

TAB nn DATA CONFLICT: FP j.k alert is displayed. All conflicts between data bases printed out on HCU on a tab by tab basis

TAB 12 FP Locations/ Boundaries - BN

Enter tab begins RCFD

RCFD STEP 2 RCFD STEP 1
Communications are initialized with all available Patriot batteries. Data base requests are sent from the ICC. The data base retrieved from the 1st responding battery is stored. FP DATA BASE INCOMING and FP n INCOMING DATA BASE XFER COMPLETE alerts are displayed as each battery responds -or- incoming data XFER failed alert displayed when FP defined in Tab 68 does not respond to ICC request for data XFER (data buffer XFER from next battery is then requested)

RCFD STEP 3
The data base received from the next responding Patriot battery is then compared to the data base from the 1st responding Patriot battery

SEL TAB, SEL TAB displays TAB 50 initialization function set to 1 (automatic data input control)

TAB 50 Initialization CNTL

If communications cannot be established with any FP, the alert NO FPs AVAILABLE is displayed and Tab 50 is redisplayed.

FINISH

Figure H-3. Retrieve and Compare FP Data (RCFD) Sequence

H-4

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START

TAB 50 INITIALIZATION CONTR0L
(SELECT INITIALIZATION MODE)

3 = DEPLOYMENT CMD PLANNING

TAB 51 DEPLOYMENT CMD PLANNING CNTL
(SELECT DEPLOYMENT FUNCT)

All deployment functions are available for selection in Tab 51 review plan mode
Function 01 is not selectable in new plan. Performing function forces completion of function 05. REQUIRED ENTRIES: Asset ID, status, center and radius.

REQUIRED DATA: Active deployment (if defined), deployment for planning and planning mode (new plan, change plan and review plan).

01 = ASSET MODIFICATION
Function 02 is not selctable in new plan. Performing function forces completion of function 06.

TAB 70 ASSETS DATA ENTRY
REQUIRED ENTRIES: Volume ID, status, boundary points or center/radius, and attributes.

ENTER TAB REDISPLAYS TAB 51

ENTER TAB REDISPLAYS TAB 51

02 = VOLUME MODIFICATION

TAB 71 VOLUMES DATA ENTRY

SEL TAB-TWICE REDISPLAYS TAB 51
REQUIRED ENTRIES: FP type, HAWK ATDL address link station and modem number.

Function 03 is required in new plan. Performing function may force completion of functions 04 and 08.

REQUIRED ENTRIES: In TAC OPS CMD plan, disallow commo with affected units. Display only in initialization.

TAB 02 COMM CONTROL
REQUIRED ENTRIES: In TAC OPS or CMD PLAN, reallow commo to units affected units. In Initialization, tab for display only.

03 = COMM DATA BASE

TAB 02 COMM CONTROL
ENTER TAB displays Tab 68

TAB 68 FP COMM CNTL

ENTER TAB displays Tab 67

ENTER TAB displays Tab 69

ENTER TAB redisplays Tab 02

REQUIRED ENTRIES: BN ID LTR, RLRIU address set #, and 1st and 2nd ATDL-1 addresses.

TAB 67 BN COMM CNTL

TAB 69 EXTRA-BN COMM CONTROL

Function 04 is required in new plan. Performing function may force completion of functions 05, 06 and 08.

REQUIRED ENTRIES: FP TYPE, UTM LOCATION, ANC, PTL
(Patriot batteries only)

04 = FP DEPLOYMENT
Function 05 is required in new plan. Performing function may force completion of functions 05, 06 and 08.

TAB 59 FP DEPLOYMENT PLNG
REQUIRED ENTRIES: excess assets and excess active assets must be deassigned from the FP.

05 = ASSET ALLOCATION
Function 06 is required in new plan. function selectable in change plan.

TAB 70 ASSETS DATA ENTRY
REQUIRED ENTRIES: Excess volumes/points must be deassigned from FP with alert EXCESS GEODATA.

06 = VOLUME ALLOCATION
FUNCTION 07 IS NOT REQUIRED IN NEW PLAN, BUT IS SELECTABLE IF NEEDED. FUNCTION SELECTABLE IN CHANGE PLAN.

TAB 61 VOLUMES ALLOCATION

ENTER TAB REDISPLAYS TAB 51

REQUIRED ENTRIES: None.

07 = ALTERNATE SECTORS

TAB 55 ALTERNATE SEARCH SECTORS

Function 08 is required in new plan. Function selectable in change plan.

REQUIRED ENTRIES: ICC location and CRG location. TAB 62 ICC/CRG DEVELOPMENT

08 = ICC/CRG DEPLOYMENT
00 SELECTION IS NOT ACCEPTED UNLESS ALL DEPLOYMENT FUNCTIONS ARE COMPLETE

In initialization mode: redisplays Tab 50

TAB 50 INIT CONTROL

FINISH

00 = DEPLOYMENT INPUT COMPLETE

In TAC OPS/CMD plan enables transition to TAC OPS via ENGAGE CONTR 3/1. Data base tape written upontransition to TAC OPS

TAC OPS

Figure H-4. Patriot Deployment/Command Planning Sequence

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ALERTS
START DATA ACQUISITION

TABS
TAB 91 DATA ACQUISITION

Notes: 1. Auto emplacement of LS will only start if LS is in remote. 2. Alert may appear earlier. Entry of Tab 98 only allowed if RS has completed auto emplacement. 3. Alerts may occur earlier.

STANDARD EMPLACEMENT

NO

YES

EMPLACEMENT TYPE

MANUAL

AUTO NOTE 1

RS STARTS AUTO EMPLACING

TAB 81 FP LOCATION ALIGNMENT DATA

RS AUTO EMPLACING COMPLETE

TAB 81 FP LOCATION ALIGNMENT DATA

TAB 14 TARGET DISPLAY CONTROL TAB 68 DATA COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL TAB 99 FP DATA TRANSFER CONTROL TAB 54 RADAR FREQUENCY CONTROL

ENTER COMM CNTL DATA

ENTER RADAR CNTL DATA

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

Figure H-5. PDB-4 TACI Sequence, Page 1

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ALERTS

TABS
CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE START SEQUENCE
YES

SET WEAPON CNTL S/1
NO

ENTER RS AZ COMMAND CHECK ACTUAL RS AZ SOUND ALARM BEFORE RADIATING ENTER TERRAIN MAP CNTRLS

TAB 95 RADAR MAPPING CONTROL SUMMARY

TAB 96 INITIAL SEARCH LOWER BOUNDARY DATA ENTRY TAB 97 SELECT ENTRY MAPPING DISPLAY/CONTROL

DRAW MASKED AREAS MAP

TAB 92 MASKED AREAS DRAWING CONTROL TAB 55 ALTERNATE SEARCH SECTOR CONTROL TAB 85 LAUNCHER LOCATION ALIGNMENT

ALLOWS FOR TAB 55 CHANGES

MASKED AREA MAP COMPL ENTER ALT SEARCH CONTL

ENTER FIDOC DATA

TABs 1, 6, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 78, 79, 80

TAB 06 IFF/SIF CODE CONTROL

END MANUAL INPUT WITH TAB 98
YES

TAB 98 MANUAL INPUT COMPLETE?
NO

NOTE 2: RS auto emplacement complete NOTE 3: LS na auto emplacement complete

WRITE OR REVIEW TACI DATA BASE ACK ACR WRITES DATA BASE
MANUAL

EMPLACEMENT TYPE
AUTO

HARD COPY LS na DATA TAB 85

TAB 81 AUTO HARD COPY

Figure H-6. PDB-4 TACI Sequence, Page 2

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Table H-1. Tab Reference Table

TABS
0 1 2 4 5 6 10 12 13 14 15 50 51 54 55 58 59 61 62 67

PAGES
2-57 2-9, 2-91, 3-77 2-55, 4-11 3-92 2-57, 2-58 2-11, 2-90 2-13 2-63, 3-16 2-5 2-15, 2-77 3-88 2-6 2-30 2-80 2-51, 2-85 2-8 2-49 2-50 2-52 2-32

TABS
68 69 70 71 72 73 74 76 78 79 81 85 90 91 92 93 95 96 97 98 99

PAGES
2-33, 2-78, I-5 2-34, 2-36 2-16 2-19, I-15 2-22 2-24 2-25 2-26, 3-104 2-26 2-29 2-65, 2-73, 2-74, E-6 2-65, 2-87, E-7 2-7, 2-67 2-64, E-4 2-84, B-14 B-7 2-81, B-2 2-82, B-3 2-83, B-4 2-55, 2-90 2-80

H-8

Appendix I

Task Organization With Hawk
This appendix provides the technical details necessary for a sound tactical understanding of the interoperability between Patriot and Hawk units. When Hawk is task-organized with a Patriot battalion, ICC operators have an array of hardware and software configurations, communications options, tab settings, and capabilities available for interoperability. The ICC crew's ability to master system requirements in a task organization with a Hawk environment is crucial to the combat success of the entire task force. The classified material in this appendix pertaining to task organization with Hawk will be found in (S/NF)ST 44-85-1A(U), which contains the classified values referenced by a code number in bold and underlined (example: P4-123).

ENGAGEMENT OPERATIONS
I-1 Patriot hardware and software ease the complexity of engagement operations in a Patriot pure battalion. Incorporating Hawk into a Patriot battalion provides tactical flexibility but requires battle crews to understand the elements of the technical interface between Hawk and Patriot. Though initializing and maintaining engagement operations in a Patriot/Hawk task force is complex, Patriot software capabilities provide planners and crew the capability to design and execute effective task force operations. I-2. The design of the TF allows Patriot ICC operators to control Hawk Phase III to reduce the possibility of simultaneous engagement. Control configuration, coordination, and Hawk deployment can further reduce simultaneous engagement. For TBM engagements, it may be necessary to use range bias fires for the TF, use Patriot negative range bias (refer to discussion in Chapter 2) but do not use range bias for Hawk.

CAUTION
The design of Patriot and Hawk software optimizes intercept Pk with range bias set to the default values. There is a high risk of negatively affecting system effectiveness when adjusting range bias. TASK FORCE CONFIGURATION I-3. The ICC operator must understand that Hawk configurations at the battery level will include two HIPIR radars for conducting engagements. At the assault fire platoon there is only one HIPIR radar. This affects the engagement operations, because a Hawk battery will be able to conduct more engagements than an FU. In this appendix, an interoperability operation applies to both a battery and assault fire platoons (AFPs) and may be

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referred to as a Hawk fire unit (FU). See Figure I-1 for an example of task force organization.
BASELINE HEU

ICC

PAT R IOT BAT T ERY

HA W K FIR E U NIT

Figure I-1. Example of Task Force Organization TASK FORCE DEPLOYMENT I-4. The Patriot software provides commanders with interoperability functions for Patriot and Hawk TF capabilities. While METT-TC is the driving force behind all ADA planning, especially forming a Patriot/Hawk TF the type of theater and operation provide the framework for METT-TC analysis. The following recommendations are subject to change based on resources available, mission, threat, and the commander's intent. AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE TASK FORCE I-5. Patriot and Hawk systems are complementary. Patriot can engage both TBMs and high and very low level, fast, long-range ABTs. Hawk, with its 360-degree coverage, can engage helicopters and low-level ABTs. Sharing a common battalion command and control increases the combat potential of both systems. DEFENSE DESIGN I-6. The task force will fight with a baseline of five Patriot batteries and four Hawk fire units. This organization provides the battalion task force with the capability of improved jammer triangulation and correlation, and facilitates excellent area coverage. FIGHT FORWARD OF PATRIOT I-7. Air defense artillery doctrine, Patriot selection and fire distribution logic, and Hawk capabilities against helicopter and low-level ABTs support deploying Hawk 10 to 30 kilometers forward of Patriot. If the IPB identifies TBM threats, consider entering Hawk into the Patriot data base as an asset and deploying Hawk within 20 kilometers of Patriot to provide protection against TBMs. Currently, Hawk has limited TBM engagement capability.

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CONTROL IN THE SAME MANNER AS PATRIOT BATTERIES I-8. Hawk should be centralized to the ICC whenever data link capability exists. Normally, Hawk FUs are not decentralized to battery control as long as the data link exists. SUBORDINATE ORIENTATION USING PATRIOT PADS SYSTEM I-9. The accuracy of current methods used to align Hawk is not sufficient to allow TF operations. Hawk HIPIR must be positioned using data provided by PLGR systems or PADS, if available. TASK ORGANIZATION I-10. The software capability of both the Patriot battery and Hawk FU enhances engagement effectiveness by automating the ICC software for Hawk identification, threat assessment, and engagement tasks. The software also accommodates the Hawk Phase III improvements of passive identification, increased update rates on specific track assignments, and improved radar search patterns. This provides Hawk with reduced reaction times and increased probability of automatic and manual HIPIR locks. I-11. The size of the TF is a function of METT-TC and overall system capability. The ICC can control up to 12 subordinate FUs. The combination of FUs controlled depends upon the types of FUs (Patriot or Hawk) assigned to an ICC. Any combination of FUs may be subordinate to an ICC if there are no more than six subordinate Patriot batteries. An operator can assign 12 Hawk FUs, if all FUs are Hawk. Enter Patriot units in the data base through Tab 59 as units 1 to 6; the software will not accept Patriot in fields 7 to 12. Unit 1 can be a Patriot battery with FP2 a Hawk FU until assignment of unit 6, after which the software will accept a Hawk FU. The ICC accommodates FUs by way of the PCP or a battery configuration with communications through the battery command post.

ALIGNMENT METHODS
I-12. Alignment for both weapon systems is critical. The following are descriptions of the methods used for Patriot and Hawk alignment. For the Patriot system, the PLGR is the main tool for determining location, altitude, and a north reference angle required for emplacing Patriot, with PADS system used as the backup. Patriot FUs emplace using true north as the angular reference. This system enables track management to provide excellent track correlation, and strobe triangulation provides the accuracy. I-13. Alignment within the Hawk unit is also important. When operating with Patriot, alignment procedures must be accurate enough to ensure track correlation and rapid HIPIR radar lock. Consequently, when operating within a TF, the survey section assigned to the Patriot battalion should be sent to the assigned Hawk units to provide accurate location, altitude, and alignment data. This will ensure correlation between Patriot and Hawk FUs using the remote three-dimensional air picture.

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TARGET POSITION DATA I-14. When operating with Patriot, Hawk must align to true north. Patriot converts all Hawk target position data to the Patriot north-oriented coordinate system as seen from the ICC system coordinate center (refer to BNSCC and DLRP discussion in Chapter 2). Basing this conversion on the ICC system coordinate center reduces the chance of reporting high-altitude, short-range targets in one position to Patriot and another position to Hawk. The track management correlation process, which uses square correlation cells, is changed to reduce the number of miscorrelation opportunities and number of calculations. The site-oriented correlation (SOC) process now uses a correlation cell adjusted to account for radar dependent errors in range and azimuth. To limit the number of calculations, a large correlation cell, velocity, and height test screens out tracks that should not correlate with the input track. The refined correlation cell test performs the final correlation check. The SOC process is valid for first time Hawk correlation with the ICC (see Figure I-2).

HAWK S IT E O R IE N TE D

P A T R IO T

O R IG IN A L H A W K C O R R E L A T IO N CELL, RADA R TYPE DEPENDANT

Figure I-2. Correlation Cells for Patriot to Hawk Correlation TARGET ACQUISTION DATA I-15. The ICC provides acquisition data to Hawk, if Hawk has no local data on the track. The ICC sets specific parameters in the data message that reports the availability of high-accuracy data to Hawk. Hawk then uses the Phase III enhanced HIPIR three-dimensional search capability on the remote target. For these specific tracks, the ICC increases the track data update rate to Hawk for Weapons Assigned, Cover, or Engaged commands. If Hawk loses lock or coasts a track, the ICC takes reporting responsibility and increases

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the track data update rate. This gives Hawk a higher probability of reacquiring the target. I-16. The air picture provided to Hawk is still controlled through a filtering process provided in Tab 68 (Figure I-3). Besides filtering by altitude and range, the operator can now also filter by identification.
FP COMM CONTROL + HAWK FP TRACK FILTER PAGE 1 *68*

( ) =DEPLOYMENT NUMBER PLANNED DEPLOYMENT NET LOADING=PERCENT ( )=FP TYPE: 1=PATRIOT, 2=HAWK-2, 3=HAWK-3 ( )=HAWK ATDL-1 ADDRESS ALL ENTRIES BELOW APPLY TO HAWK FPS ONLY: ( )=LINK STATION: 1 THRU 6=CRG NUMBER, 7=ICC ( )=LINK STATION MODEM NUMBER: 1 THRU 5 ( ) =HAWK FP ALTITUDE ( , , ) =TRACK ID REPORTED TO HAWK UNITS: U=UNKNOWN,H=HOSTILE, F=FRIEND ( )KM=HAWK FP MAXIMUM RANGE LIMIT FILTER/SECTOR BOUNDS ( . ) TO ( . ) =MIN/MAX ALTITUDE ABV MSL TRACT REPORTING LIMITS

Figure I-3. Tab 68, FU Communication Control + Hawk FU Track Filter I-17. Tab 68, is used to identify the type of battery or platoon assigned to the battalion, how data communications will be established with this FU, and defines the track update filters associated with each of the assigned Hawk FUs. The tab is available during initialization and TACOPS. Tab 68 consists of up to 12 pages, one for each FU defined in the battalion. I-18. The FP TYPE data field is used to define the type of fire unit—Patriot or Hawk. If it is a Patriot FU, then no further information is required or allowed in this tab. The Hawk ATDL-1 address is automatically assigned as a function of which page the FU is entered. FU 1 on page 1 is AH, FU 2 on page 2 is BH, and so on until FU 12 on page 12 is LH. During defense planning it is important that the Patriot battalion provide ATDL-1 addresses for individual Hawk FUs, by voice or hard copy, when initializing their systems. I-19. The Link Station (CRG 1 to 6 or ICC) and Link Station Modem Number must be defined by the Patriot battalion during the defense planning process and transmitted by voice or hard copy. The remainder of the tab addresses the filter definition for Hawk units only. The operator can now filter by altitude (0 to nnnn feet), identity (U=unknown, F=friend, H=hostile), and range (0 to nnn km) according to threat characteristics. The filter range defined, Tab 68 controls the size of the Hawk sector bounds displayed at the ICC. I-20. The Planned Deployment Net Loading (PDNL) will automatically update as FUs are entered by way of Tab 68. ICC operators should monitor this percentage and ensure that the configuration does not exceed 90 percent during peak air battle operations. I-21. The Min/Max Altitude ABV MSL Track Reporting Limits allows the operator to further filter the targets that will be passed on to Hawk FUs. The operator can input a minimum and maximum altitude according to Patriot TSOP that will be applied to the range entered above.

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AUTOMATIC FIRE DISTRIBUTION
I-22. The threat assessment process integrates Hawk FUs into the TBEQ. Consequently, the ICC computes launch now intercept points (LNIPs) for these Hawk FUs and consider the FU in the asset defense logic. Hawk FUs connected to an ICC are now eligible for the automatic engagement process because that ICC computes FU release times. I-23. The FU selection logic considers an increased number of FUs to support TF operations. The logic initially considers Patriot first independently of Hawk FUs. For ABT targets, the logic considers all FUs local to the ICC and at subordinate battalions in the automatic mode. The Patriot ICC selection logic removes Hawk FUs that meet the following criteria: There are no fire sections operationally ready at the FU. The target altitude is higher than the HIPIR engagement altitude set at the FU. • The target is receding from the Hawk FU. • The LNIP is invalid. I-24. The ICC software checks and computes the range and range offset (Figure I-4) to properly assess the Hawk FU priority for target engagement. The target must be heading towards the defended asset and is not receding from the Hawk FU.
FLIGHT PATH

• •

RANGE OFFSET (RO)

HIGH LETHALITY

NORMAL LETHALITY RANGE (RNG) LEGEND: RNG = DISTANCE FROM HAWK FU TO TARGET RO = RANGE OFFSET FROM HAWK FU TO TANGENTAL TARGET PATH

Figure I-4. Range and Range Offset I-25. A Hawk launch now intercept point is computed for each track and a validity check is made for altitude, range, HIPIR cutoff velocity, and missile gimbals limits. If the LNIP is valid, then the Hawk unit is eligible for

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engagement selection by the ICC. If the LNIP is invalid (altitude or range), the FU is no longer considered as a candidate. I-26. Once the two candidates’ (Patriot and Hawk) FU lists have been determined, the recommended FUs (primary and secondary) will be selected. As with the candidate logic, the first step is to prioritize the Patriot FU candidates and then to independently prioritize the Hawk unit candidates. Both the Patriot and Hawk units are tested against a set of disadvantages. These disadvantages are used to order the candidates and used as part of the final selection between Patriot and Hawk. The Hawk disadvantages are • Hawk is at or below the low missile threshold. • Hawk cannot intercept target before target reaches asset. • There is no Patriot backup for the Hawk engagement. • Target is friend protected for Hawk. • The Hawk is busy. • Engagement will result in a nominal lethality intercept. I-27. The selection of the best (primary) and the second best (secondary) FUs is then determined by merging the ordered list of Patriot and Hawk candidates for the target under consideration per the following criteria: • The best Patriot is selected over the best Hawk if that Hawk is busy has missile count below threshold value, or if the target is friendly protected for that Hawk. If both units, best Patriot versus best Hawk, have negative TTLL, then the fewest negatives are selected. If only one is negative, then the other is selected. When both have positive TTLL, preference is given to selecting Hawk. Hawk is always selected if its LNIP is within the highlethality zone. It is always selected (with Patriot as a secondary) provided the Patriot TTLL is predicted to be positive at the predicted Hawk intercept time.

LOCAL ENGAGEMENT CONTROL PARAMETERS
I-28. Tab 10, Local Engagement Control Parameters, has the ability to bias the engagement zone of Hawk assigned to the ICC. This Hawk bias is aggregate in nature; that is, one setting at the ICC affects all Hawk units in the TF, regardless of position on the battlefield. The Hawk bias is limited to +15 kilometers. This can be used similarly to the Patriot range bias and _ provides a means of decreasing the TTFL for Hawk, thus increasing the range at which Hawk receives engagement commands from the ICC. I-29. A positive Hawk range bias facilitates engagement assignment to Hawk at a range to achieve intercept equal to the range bias plus the high-lethality range. It facilitates the selection of Hawk for engagements, but it has no effect upon the FU’s ability to engage at those longer ranges. Targets that are out of range for the Hawk system will not produce the "in range" necessary for an engagement. So regardless of the range at which the FU receives an engagement command, it must still wait for the target to meet system parameters.

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I-30. Negative range bias should not be used for the Hawk units assigned because this would increase the TTFL; in effect, reducing the range at which Hawk could engage. Positive range bias should only be used if it is apparent that Hawk FUs are not being selected as the primary FU over Patriot. As an alternative, using Patriot negative range bias (this will increase Patriot TTFL) should be considered. This would decrease the range at which Patriot could engage, thereby enhancing the probability that Hawk would be chosen for engagement. This alternative has advantages over the use of Hawk range bias in that Patriot Pk would be increased, while Hawk processing of targets for engagement would be unaffected. It must be reiterated at this point that the preferred ways to ensure that Hawk gets first shot are through positioning of Hawk FUs to support engagements. Patriot tactical directors will need additional training.

FRIENDLY PROTECTION
I-31. Friendly protection for Hawk candidate FUs is a function added to the FU selection process to determine if a local Hawk candidate FU is prohibited from engaging a track because of friend protection criteria. A hostile or unknown track is considered friend protected if there is an ICC ID friend or IFF mode IV friend within a specific zone about the hostile or unknown track (Figure I-5).

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ZONE FOR AFP B

ZONE FOR AFP A

N
AZIMUTH

N
AZIMUTH

W

E

W

E

S
HAWK FU SITE A
Figure I-5. Hawk Friendly Protect

S
HAWK FU SITE B

I-32. If a track is in a friend protect condition, the ICC will not automatically assign to Hawk for engagement. The ICC operator will be alerted “ccnnn FRND PROT FP nn/RE-ENG” if he attempts to assign the engagement to site B. He can choose to override the friend protection condition. This friend protection feature is equivalent logic used within Hawk to protect friends near hostile targets due to uncertainty in missile assignments to tracks within certain angular tolerances. Engagement override is not recommended. I-33. The ICC interfaces with Phase III Hawk and accommodates the Hawk low-altitude simultaneous Hawk engagements (LASHE) capability. With the LASHE capability, Hawk can conduct close-in multiple simultaneous engagements. The engagement monitor logic at the ICC accounts for Hawk multiple engagements capability. When Hawk enters the LASHE mode, that status is reported to the ICC and displayed by section in the Hawk engagement summary tab (Figure I-6).

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HAWK ENGAGEMENT SUMMARY PAGE 1 S/I ) = HOOKED TRADK-ID+SIZE FP( ) CEASE ENGAGE COMMAND CURRENT COMMANDS: FS A FS B FP TTI RSPS CMND TRACK-ID MSL STAT TRACK-ID MSL STAT TRACKID 1 2 3 4 30 WILL COVER PA102-U 3 SILNT PA108-H3 5 6 ( HAWK ENGAGEMENT SUMMARY ( ) = HOOKED TRADK-ID+SIZE COMMAND CURRENT COMMANDS: FS A FP TTI RSPS CMND TRACK-ID MSL STAT ID 7 25 RCVD ENGA PA115-H 7 HPISR 8 9 35 CANT COVER PA121-H 4 LASHE 10 11 12 PAGE 1 S/I CEASE ENGAGE FS B MSL STAT TRACK-

FP( TRACK-ID PA115-H PA130-H3

)

Figure I-6. Hawk Engagement Summary Tab (Example) I-34. The threat assessment process provides the integration of Hawk tracks on the TBEQ (Figure I-7). This allows the operator to fight from the TBEQ and greatly minimizes the workload associated with Hawk engagements.
TRK TH ID ESTAT/S FP TLR TLL E/MI PA 02 H ENGI/8 8 02 25 1/06 101 PA S PENG/ 2 15 35 0/23 112 - TRK TH ID ESTAT/S FP TLR TLL E/MI -

Figure I-7. ICC To-Be-Engaged Data Tab (Example) IDENTIFICATION PROCESSING I-35. The identification processing for both Patriot and Hawk has been improved. Phase III Hawk has an automated passive identification scheme that closely parallels the Patriot system. The Patriot passive identification scheme is the baseline. The track processing through the passive algorithm remains fundamentally unchanged. The weight sets and ID sums for Friend, Unknown, and Hostile have not been modified and still apply. The software supports the interoperability functions listed below: • Use Patriot passive identity data when available.

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• Manage the identity data flow. • Resolve conflicts whenever possible. I-36. If the Patriot ICC is in the automatic ID mode, it normally accepts IDs reported over ATDL-1 from Hawk, when Hawk radars are only tracking the target. If the system is in the manual ID mode, the ICC operator is required to accept or reject all identity changes. If a Patriot track correlates with the Hawk track, the Hawk identity will be maintained unless or until the Patriot passive identity has determined a more definite identity or a conflicting identity. For example, if Hawk sends up an identity of Unknown, the target ID will be Unknown. If the track correlates with a Patriot track that has an identity of Unknown or the default assumed Friend condition, the target ID will remain Unknown. If the Patriot ID then becomes Friend, the target ID is automatically changed to Friend. If the system was in the auto ID mode, the operator is alerted in the manual ID mode. CONFLICT RESOLUTION I-37. Automated conflict resolution has been incorporated in the software based on a series of ID conflict resolution tables developed for the various C2 nodes. However, ID conflicts still occur and they require operator intervention. The ICC operator is required to resolve an identity conflict once the alert has been displayed and before the operator can continue to review other alerts. To resolve the conflict, the operator must select an identity for the track and then acknowledge the alert. The sequence is — • Step 1—Acknowledge the alert. This hooks the target and generates the alert "ID S/I REQUIRED." • Step 2—Note ID indicator lights on console to determine target identification at the ICC. • Step 3—Select ID. Determine whether to disagree with the conflict or agree and press the appropriate ID S/I. • Step 4—Acknowledge alert. I-38. If the operator selects automatic ID at the ICC, then conflicting sources will automatically be commanded to accept the ICC identity. The operator in this case does not necessarily become the identity source even though the identity push-button was used. The previously established identity source is maintained. If the operator selects an identity to agree with the conflicting source, then that identity and source will be used. This conflict processing is consistent with the "source-specific" identity resolution tables. The intent is to minimize conflict situations and maximize automatic identity dissemination.

HAWK WEAPONS CONTROL
I-39. The weapons control volume, like all other volume correlation for Patriot, is performed at the ECS and the results sent to the ICC. With Phase III Hawk volume correlation, ICC performs weapon control status and volume correlation for Hawk-only tracks. DATA BASE COORDINATION

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I-40. The TF operations officer must ensure that the data base in use has been provided to Hawk in the TF. This can be accomplished by making a hard copy of the Patriot data base and providing this to subordinate Hawk FUs. Of course, Hawk TCOs must be taught how to read Tab 71, but this has the further advantage that system IDs for airspace control measures become standardized throughout the TF. Phase III Hawk performs volume correlation on the same data base as Patriot. ALTITUDE CORRELATION I-41. For Hawk tracks with altitude such as an HIPIR track, the ICC correlation function uses the altitude provided and performs normal volume correlation. For CWAR and PAR tracks that do not have an altitude, successful correlation with a volume is achieved if the altitude limits for the radar fall within the altitude limits of the volume. For example, if the altitude limit of the radar is 5,000 feet and the volume is from ground level to 30,000 feet, the target would correlate. However, if the lower limit of the volume is 10,000 feet, then the target would not correlate. MULTIPLE VOLUME CORRELATION I-42. For cases of successful correlation within multiple volumes, the most restrictive weapon control status applies (WEAPONS HOLD over WEAPONS TIGHT over WEAPONS FREE). If the track does not correlate with any weapons control volume, then it is checked against the residual state. It should be noted that heading and speed criteria are not assessments used in this correlation unless the track is in a directional control volume. This means that Hawk-only targets displayed at the ICC may carry the wrong weapons control status. For example, if the Patriot data base has a directional WEAPON HOLD volume, Hawk-only targets processed within that volume carry the WEAPON HOLD regardless of the direction in which they are moving.

DEFENSE DESIGN
I-43. Terrain and the mission are major factors in deciding whether to fight as pure battalions or to task-organize. If there is no requirement for overlapping coverage between Patriot and Hawk, then pure Patriot and Hawk battalion operations may be favored. Yet, if there is a requirement to have Hawk operate in Patriot coverage, then TF organizing should be strongly considered. This places both weapon systems under the ICC’s command and control which provides improved track correlation, target identification, threat assessment, weapons assignment, automatic engagements, and friendly protection. These enhanced functions result in more positive target identification and increase system responsiveness and survivability. I-44. If a TF is to be organized, then it should consist of no less than three Patriot FUs. This helps ensure that the TF retains good triangulation with the Patriot batteries.

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I-45. METT-TC assists in determining the exact size of the TF. A mix of three Patriot batteries and four Hawk FUs is a good baseline to start with. This facilitates excellent area coverage and is within the human factor workload of the ICC operators. It also facilitates the assignment of the remaining Patriot batteries and maintains Hawk administrative integrity. HAWK INTEGRATION I-46. The basic philosophy of conducting defense design for Patriot and Hawk TF has not changed. Patriot is to be planned as the "base piece," then augmented by Hawk. The first position consideration of Hawk should be about 10 to 30 kilometers forward in the Patriot sector, in valleys and low areas not covered by Patriot. This ensures that the Patriot air picture is provided to Hawk and that Hawk will detect the low flyers coming up the valleys and in areas not covered by Patriot (Figure I-8). Hawk should be placed within 20 kilometers if TBMs are expected, and Hawk will be treated as a defended asset for Patriot.

ABT DIRECTION OF ATTACK
H H H

H

P P

P

P

Figure I-8. Task Force Deployment (Example) I-47. Hawk engagement of ABT targets forces the threat up into Patriot coverage. If the terrain is not suited for this type of deployment, then Hawk should still be employed between 10 and 30 kilometers forward and within Patriot coverage. This ensures that Hawk FUs are selected for engagement before Patriot, thereby initially using the Hawk missiles to counter the airbreathing target threat. Lastly, Hawk can be deployed on the flanks and rear of the Patriot FUs. Special consideration must be given to the deployment of Hawk Phase III systems to ensure there is minimum or no opportunity for simultaneous engagement of an ABT by both Hawk and Patriot. This can be accomplished only through proper placement of Hawk within Patriot's coverage. I-48. Identification filters should not be applied to the subordinate Hawk units. The range filter should be set to P4-76 kilometers, thereby providing early warning to the Hawk FUs. The altitude filter should be set to P4-77 kft.

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I-49. Hawk should initially operate centralized to the ICC. Both HIMAD systems in the TF have the capability of performing volume correlation in support of weapons control and passive identification. TF operations officer (S3) must now ensure that the data bases generated for the mission considers the Hawk elements assigned. Hawk has the ability to enter by tabular display restricted volumes, prohibited volumes, safe passage corridors, safe velocity, and weapon control status. The weights associated with each volume are initialized by the Hawk operator through the remote control unit and stored in memory. HAWK BLOCK 4 SOFTWARE I-50. To maintain commonality, the Hawk Block 4 software has the same point totals necessary to achieve the identification of Friend P4-78, Hostile P4-79, and Unknown P4-80 to P4-81 as those for Patriot (weight set 3). It should be noted that the Hawk passive identification process does not have a point total for an Unknown or Assumed Friend. I-51. In generating the data base for TF operations, the Patriot senior tactical director or operations officer must minimize confusion and workload by creating a single data base that will support the operations of both systems. Furthermore, he must ensure that the data base generated produces the same identification on a track detected by both systems within the same airspace. The weight sets defined for Patriot are fixed and cannot be changed, whereas the weight sets for Hawk can be initialized and can be changed for each mission. Hence, the following guidance is provided to assist in providing a uniform data base that supports Patriot and Hawk TF operations. I-52. A data base for a TF of three Patriot batteries and four Hawk FUs is shown as an example in Figure I-9. The Hawk restricted volume (RV) is entered in the Patriot system as a hostile volume (HV) with a restricted attribute. Hawk enters it as a single restricted volume (RV). In the Patriot system the prohibited or restricted volume is entered as a hostile volume with prohibited and restricted attributes. In the Hawk system it is entered as a single prohibited volume. The safe passage corridor (SPC) or low level transit route (LLTR) is entered as a single SPC in both the Patriot and Hawk systems.

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IIFFPID H

H H

H

P P
HOO1

P SPC DEFENDED ASSET

Figure I-9. Patriot and Hawk Defense Design (Example) I-53. Patriot Tab 71 shows the comparable Hawk Volume Entry Tab for the RV and PV (see Figure I-10). In the Patriot system, once the volumes have been defined via tabular display, they are then allocated during the deployment phase of initialization to each of the Patriot FUs assigned. They are then transferred or downloaded via data link to each of the Patriot batteries. This process does not apply to Hawk assigned to the TF. Consequently, separate actions are necessary to assure that their data base is provided to them.

(

)=ID ( )=STAT;A/I/T =CURRENT STAT *VOLUMES* PG 1/150 *71* DAY HRS MON YEAR ( . )KM-SPC WDTH ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )=ON ( )=SPC DIRECTN; ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )=OFF F=FWD,R=REV,B=BTH ( ) ( . )KM=VOL RADIUS ( )=COORD FORMAT ( ) ( . )TO(mm.m)aa=ALT 0=UTM 2=LAT/LON ( ) ( )TO(nnn)DEG=HDG 1=MGRS 3=GEOREF ( ) ( )TO(mmm)M/S=SPD ENTAB SETS FORMAT ( ) ( )DEG=SPC TOLERANCE ( ) ATTRIBUTES;Y/N (N)=ORIG USED UNITS: /150 ( )=SPC (Y)=RVA (Y)=PVA USED PNTS: /800 SELECT: PG( ),ID( )

Figure I-10. Tab 71 Hawk Volume Entry

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VOLUME DATA ID XXX STATUS X O INACTIVE 1 ACTIVE ALTITUDE LIMITS (MSL) UPPER XXX LOWER XXX KFT TYPE (2) 1 WCV 2 PROH 3 REST NUMBER OF POINTS X IN LAT/LONG POINT 1 XXXXXX XXXXXX POINT 4 XXXXXX XXXXXX POINT 2 XXXXXX XXXXXX POINT 5 XXXXXX XXXXXX POINT 3 XXXXXX XXXXXX POINT 6 XXXXXX XXXXXX WCV STATUS X 1 FREE 2 TIGHT 3 HOLD FUNCTION X 0 RETURN 1 DISPLAY 3 CORR VOLUME DATA ID XXX STATUS X O INACTIVE 1 ACTIVE ALTITUDE LIMITS (MSL) UPPER XXX LOWER XXX KFT TYPE (3) 1 WCV 2 PROH 3 REST NUMBER OF POINTS X IN LAT/LONG POINT 1 XXXXXX XXXXXX POINT 4 XXXXXX XXXXXX POINT 2 XXXXXX XXXXXX POINT 5 XXXXXX XXXXXX POINT 3 XXXXXX XXXXXX POINT 6 XXXXXX XXXXXX WCV STATUS X 1 FREE 2 TIGHT 3 HOLD FUNCTION X 0 RETURN 1 DISPLAY 3 CORR

Figure I-11. Hawk Volume Entry for Restricted and Prohibited Volumes (Type 2 and 3) I-54. One of the most important items that the TF operations officer must establish is the weight set that each system will use. Patriot normally uses weight set 3 for its passive ID process, and should continue to do so. As previously mentioned, Hawk can initialize on-line the weights for each type of volume. The following weights should be initialized in the Hawk Block IV system to ensure that the same identification is produced by both systems
Restricted Vol Prohibited Vol SPC Vol Positive IFF Max Safe Vel - P4-82 - P4-83 +P4-84 +P4-85 - P4-86 Same as Patriot Weight Set 3 Values

This is a Hawk Hostile indicator. This is similar to Patriot’s maximum velocity pop-up criteria indicator.

using their individual passive process, see Figure I-12. Figure I-12. Hawk Identification Weight Sets I-55. These weights are the same as those of weight set type 3 within the Patriot system. In weight set type 3, the thresholds for target identification are identical for both systems. The use of the above numbers in the Hawk system will result in the same target identification being generated for the same volume violations. I-56. The defense design found in Figure I-9 illustrates that the area where Patriot expects the target to be made hostile (eligible for engagement), is

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entered as a hostile volume with restricted and prohibited volume attributes. This results in a point total of P4-87 because the track violated both the PV and the RV attributes. I-57. As previously mentioned, there is no point sum for Unknown Assumed Friend in the Hawk system. The ID resolution tables inherent in the ICC should result in a like identification being provided to both systems when there is a conflict between Unknown and Unknown Assumed Friend. I-58. Patriot ICC software uses a series of parameters to determine if the approaching TBM will cross the boundary of the Hawk FU. Phase III Hawk has a limited self-defense capability against TBMs. The Hawk self-defense boundary is set in the software and is made active with the inclusion of a Hawk FU in the ICC data base. If Hawk is threatened, Patriot will downtell the TBMs position to Hawk and increase the target's data update rate. I-59. Hawk, by manual-operator action, attempting to lock on, searches the designated area. Once lock-on is established, Hawk will then engage. The engagement command is Fire 2. I-60. Patriot will continue to monitor the TBM and will not engage unless parameters are such that Patriot automatically takes over the engagement. For example, TBM is a self-defense threat. An asset is threatened (this could be Hawk FU defended by a Patriot battery) and no "Cease Fire" is received from Hawk. I-61. This capability, while available in Block IV, is still under analysis and the complete doctrinal or tactical impact has not been fully assessed. There are definite Hawk deployment restrictions (regarding Patriot) that need to be clarified.

HIMAD TASK FORCE TRAINING
I-62. Both Patriot and Hawk operators must be trained to work together to ensure that the high-to-medium altitude air defense (HIMAD) TF functions properly. This section is directed mainly toward Hawk tactical officers and radar operators, but Patriot TDs should read and be familiar with this information. Training and familiarization should be conducted in the following areas: • • • • ICC commands and Hawk responses. Terminology. Track management ID coordination. Accuracy of data.

ICC COMMANDS AND HAWK RESPONSES I-63. The ICC may send commands initiated by the computer or by operator action. At the Hawk FU, it may be difficult to tell whether a command was operator or computer initiated. Patriot TDs and TDAs, used to directing the fires of Patriot batteries over the data link with little or no voice direction, will find that they must talk to Hawk on a more regular basis. The following paragraphs are oriented toward Hawk operators, but they describe what

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happens for both Hawk and Patriot during some of the most common data and voice commands and responses. ICC SEMIAUTOMATIC ENGAGEMENT MODE I-64. In the semiautomatic engagement mode, the Patriot ICC presents a list of targets to the operator. This list, called the to-be-engaged-queue (TBEQ), is presented in order of threat and with recommendations which Patriot or Hawk FU should engage the track. The operator can then review the recommendations, and with two switch actions, issue Engage commands to subordinate batteries or platoons. This is called the "shoot-off-the-queue" method of engagement and is the preferred way to engage. In the automatic engagement mode, the computer issues engagement commands from the same TBEQ, and the TCO can override the decisions of the computer. This method is normally used only when the number of targets available for engagement exceeds the ICC crew's capacity to handle the situation in the semiautomatic mode. I-65. By design, the ICC will not allow an Engage command to be sent to Hawk unless the target is engageable by Hawk. For Patriot operators, this means that the ICC has computed a valid launch now intercept point (LNIP). For the Hawk operators, this means that the target will produce an IN RANGE within a specified and short reaction time. This is because emission control for the Hawk HIPIR is extremely important. Issuing an Engage command to the FU before it can engage the target would require additional or excessive time by the HIPIR before the command can be executed. The ICC operator will get the alert "INVALID LNIP" should the operator manually hook a long-range or receding target and manually send an Engage command to Hawk. I-66. The ICC will not issue an Engage command on a jam strobe that is not range resolved. When the Hawk HIPIR locks on jam or when the radar operator (RO) uses manual range, the FU will report a jam strobe to the ICC. Since the ICC will not issue an Engage command through the data link when this happens, then the situation must be dealt with verbally. Hawk must tell the ICC what is going on with the track and request direction. In some cases, it may be possible to standardize actions to be taken by the Hawk FU, so that the ICC knows what is happening, thus reducing the need for talk. It is important for Hawk operators to understand what actions will produce the HIPIR jam strobe at the ICC, and that such a strobe inhibits the ICC's target correlation, shared ID, and the issue of an engage command. I-67. The ICC will not save engagement commands for a later Hawk response. If a target requires engagement and a specific Hawk unit has been selected and an engage command sent, the ICC will monitor the FU for a timely response. If the FU takes some action (sends "WILCO" or assigns the HIPIR) within a certain time, then a second time period is initiated. During the second time period, the Hawk FU must fire if the command was to engage. During these two time periods, no other FU will be given that target for engagement. Patriot FUs will receive a temporary Cease Fire command. If the designated Hawk FU does not fully respond when the second time period expires, the Cease Fire is removed from the Patriot FUs and the target is

I-18

FM 3-01.87

then evaluated for engagement by other FUs. The TD receives the alert "FP x: DA010 NO ENGAGE." I-68. If the TDA attempts to issue an engagement command to Hawk and there is no HIPIR radar available for assignment, the ICC will issue the alert FU BUSY. High-powered illuminator radars (HIPAR) are considered unavailable for assignment if they are currently firing on another target or if they have previously been issued an Engage or Cover command and the timers have not expired. I-69. The ICC normally uses the Hawk high-lethality envelope for LNIP calculations as the region for engagement recommendations. The Hawk range bias discussed earlier in the section expands the area in which Hawk FUs are considered for engagement recommendation. It does not, however, alter the range at which the Hawk unit will get an IN RANGE and therefore should not be used. This is different from Patriot range bias, in that Patriot units may shoot at targets beyond the range at which the computer determines to be the optimum range. Patriot can engage targets whose time to launch release (TLR) exceeds 0, though this happens at the expense of a lower probability of kill. The recommendation is to use Patriot negative range bias, but only when the deployment of Hawk units, allow Patriot to shoot first every time. I-70. The Cover command can only be issued manually. The TD or TDA must manually hook the target, designate the desired Hawk FU, and send the command. Unlike the engage command, the cover command can be issued on any target, approaching or receding. One exception is; the Cover command will be rejected if the target is beyond the range initiated by the ICC in Tab 68. The alert will be "TARGET OUT OF COVERAGE." I-71. The ICC may manually apply a Cease-Fire by hooking the target and pushing the Cease Fire switch-indicator. If the HIPIR is assigned to that target, a Cease Fire will be received at the Hawk FU. A Cease-Fire may also be manually or automatically applied to a target by control echelons above the Patriot ICC to which a data link exists. I-72. Without any operator action, a Cease-Fire will be sent to Hawk whenever it does not respond within the specified time period to an Engage or Cover command. The response that will inhibit the issue of the automatic Cease Fire is either will comply (WILCO) or the HIPIR assigned status issued by the Hawk FU, and the HIPIR is assigned. If the Hawk FU does not respond, the TD receives a NO RESPONSE alert and a Cease Fire is issued automatically. I-73. The TD or TDA can apply a Hold Fire to a target in the same manner as a Cease Fire and it may be manually or automatically applied to a target by control echelons above the Patriot ICC to which a data link exists. When the HIPIR is assigned to a target that has a Hold Fire applied, every time the HIPIR reports its status to the ICC, the ICC will send a Hold Fire command to the Hawk unit. If the TCO or RO sends a CANTCO or REJECT, and the HIPIR stays assigned to the target, it will appear momentarily that the Hold Fire was removed. However, within seconds, another HIPIR report will be sent to the ICC and the Hold Fire will be reissued.

I-19

FM 3-01.87

I-74. The ICC sends an automatic Hold Fire if the FU is assigned to a track with an ID of unknown assumed friend. For Phase III FUs, the letters AF will appear on the second page of the track data tab and the symbol U will appear as dashed, not recommended. These tracks will continue to be displayed on the Phase III Hawk high threat list, if appropriate. I-75. Hold Fire will be issued automatically whenever the HIPIR is assigned to an ID friend track or if the target ID is changed while the HIPIR is tracking it. The Hold Fire in this last case will be issued immediately, usually before the ID change is visible and the FRIEND ENGAGED lamp is illuminated. I-76. The ICC operator can issue a Cease Engage to a specific Hawk FU, but since this is not a command that the Patriot system uses, there is no switch action for it. The TD issues the Cease Engage command using the Hawk engagement summary tab (Figure I-6). A Cease Engage will automatically be issued in two circumstances. I-77. First, if the HIPIR is assigned to a remote told-in track that is being dropped for lack of radar track updates, the ICC will issue the Cease Engage command to keep from having the FU continue to search for a track on which it cannot provide legitimate location data. If the Hawk radar operator (RO) has detected a track at this azimuth and location and if the radar was originally assigned based on an Engage or Cover command, then it is possible that the continued attempt to acquire lock might be desired. This must be coordinated orally between the TCO and the TD. I-78. Second, when the ICC has determined that the current HIPIR assignment is not as critical as another, it will issue a Cease Engage. Instead of waiting for the Hawk FU to become free, the ICC looks for a timely response. It will automatically issue the Cease Engage command to free up the radar for a new engagement. This Cease Engage for a higher priority target is different from the one above in that the Hawk TCO will observe a command symbol on a different target at the same time the Cease Engage is displayed. TERMINOLOGY I-79. There are certain terms that cause confusion during task force operations. The following list, contains a partial list of common terms: • Engagement. Hawk operators often consider the process of assigning the HIPIR through to the termination of an assignment to be an engagement if there is a missile fired. Patriot's use of the term relates only to firing a missile. Tracking. If the TD asks if the Hawk FU is tracking a target at some location, the TCO usually responds, "No," if the HIPIR is not assigned to that target. Patriot considers it tracking if a track data file has been established. A CWAR or PAR track report sent to the ICC can be the source of this track data file. This can lead to confusion. Patriot TDs and TDAs must understand the word tracking the way the Hawk operators understand it; that is, that the HIPIR is locked on the target in question and is tracking its progress. Hawk

I-20

FM 3-01.87

operators, for their part, may respond to such a question by identifying the radar that is the tracking source. For example, the TCO might respond, "Yes, we are tracking that target with the CWAR." Reboot versus reset the computer. For Patriot operators, rebooting the computer is a standard method of troubleshooting many problems. Especially when trying to fix a problem with a data link, this is a time-proven method. For the Hawk operators, however, resetting the computer has little to do with system operation and is not helpful in the same way as rebooting the Patriot computer.

TRACK MANAGEMENT AND ID COORDINATION I-80. There are calculations made at the ICC to determine whether the tracks sent uplink by Hawk should be correlated into established track files generated with data from Patriot and other Hawk FUs or data from higher echelon sources. If a track report was first downtold to Hawk before the radar detected or acquired the target and took over reporting responsibility, then the new Hawk track report is tested for a miscorrelation with the currently held track. If it is determined that the Hawk track should not correlate with the previously downtold report, miscorrelation "damage control" goes into effect. Previous engagement status and ID, for example, no longer apply to the track, as they were meant for the track originally downtold. I-81. Following a miscorrelation or a later decorrelation, the ICC to readdress the engagement status and ID of the new track. If the Hawk track is not correlated at the initial report or later decorrelates, remote engagement status is corrected and the original track is downtold to recreate the full air picture. With Phase III Hawk, a coordinated ID response is designed into both the ICC and Hawk. I-82. If the track is not correlated, Hawk tracks may become correlated with some other established track, and an ID change will occur. Several ID conflict resolution tables exist at the ICC for use in resolving conflicts, automatically whenever possible. Conflicts are resolved using rules in these tables. These rules are based on the type of systems involved in the ID conflict. In some cases, the TD must be involved in the resolution of the conflict. In most cases, the Hawk TCO will not have to become involved. I-83. If the new uncorrelated Hawk track does not match other established tracks at the ICC, then there is no historical track record. The remaining track will undergo an ID reevaluation. I-84. The track data the ICC receives from a Patriot battery is extremely accurate. For this reason, Phase III Hawk takes the most advantage of this accuracy. The Phase III Hawk HIPIR will be assigned to a Patriot track and will be immediately directed to a point in space versus performing a standard search.

I-21

Glossary
ABT A/I ACA ACM ACO ACP AD ADA ADC ADE ADF ADL ADR ADTOC ADRS ADW AE AES AFND AFP AGC ALRCS Alt ALT AM AMG AMDPCS AMP ANCD air-breathing threat Active/Inactive airspace control authority airspace control measures airspace control order airspace control plan air defense air defense artillery air defense control air defense emergency asset defense file automatic data link automatic data reentry air defense tactical operations center automatic data reentry system air defense warning automatic emplacement azimuth error site assumed friend assault fire platoon automatic gain control advanced low-radar cross section altitude altitude amplitude modulation antenna mast group air/missile defense planning and control station amplifying automated net control device

Glossary-1

FM 3-01.87

AO APOD ARM AS ATC ATDL-1 ATM ATO aux AWACS BATI BCAC BDHI BIT BITE bn BNSCC BRU BTOC btry C2 C3 CA CANTCO CARM CBR CDI C-E CEASF CEP CESO CFAR

area of operations aerial port of debarkation antiradiation missile antispoofing asset threat category Army Tactical Data Link-1 antitactical missile air tasking order auxiliary airborne warning and control system battalion tactical initialization battalion command and control bearing-distance-heading indicator built-in test built-in test equipment battalion battalion system coordination center battery replaceable unit battalion tactical operations center battery command and control command, control, and communications course acquisition cannot comply alert counter-ARM chemical, biological, radiological classification discrimination identification communications-electronics cease fire circular error probable communications electronics security officer constant false alarm rate

Glossary-2

FM 3-01.87

CINC CK CKW CKT CM CMND PLAN CMUP cntl compl COMSEC conf contr CP CPP CRC CRG CRL CRP CRT CSIF CUG CWAR

Commander in Chief confirmed kill crypto key weekly circuit cruise missile command plan clutter map update program control complete communications security confirmed control command post communications patch panel control and reporting center communications relay group communications routing list control and reporting post cathode ray tube conflict SIF control unit group continuous-wave acquisition radar

D&C DACU db dc DDL DEFCON deg DLRP DLT DLTM

display and control digital azimuth and control unit decibel direct current digital data link defense readiness condition degree data link reference point data link terminal data link terminal module

Glossary-3

FM 3-01.87

DLU DNVT DPLMA DTIP DTS EAC ECCM ECCM ASSIST

data link upgrade digital non-secure voice telephone digital phase lock module assembly doctrine and tactics impact package data terminal set echelons above corps electronic counter-countermeasures electronic counter-countermeasures assist S/I (console button used to turn on a function (the ECCM functions of the radar) that has been allowed during initialization. electronic countermeasures engagement control station embedded data recorder evaluation decision, and weapon assignment engage hold elevation emission control electronics missile maintenance officer electromagnetic pulse engage inbound engage engagement status electric power plant electric power unit escort screening jammer evaluation external engagement zone friendly track identity firing battery fire control order fire control section

ECM ECS EDR EDWA EHOLD EL EMCON EMMO EMP ENBND eng ENSTAT EPP EPU ESJ EVAL ext EZ F FB FCO FCS

Glossary-4

FM 3-01.87

FDC FEBA FIDOC FLOT flt FM FO FOC FORG FP frnd FSCL FSK FSOP FU FUFU GEHOC GEM GEOREF GIP GLIF GMT gnd GNIO GPS GUK H HARM HCU hdg HE HEU

fire direction center forward edge of the battle area firing doctrine forward line of own troops fault field manual fiber optics fiber optic cable friendly origin firing platoon friend fire support coordination line frequency shift key field standing operational procedures fire unit fire unit to fire unit German Hawk operations center guidance-enhanced missile World Geographic Reference System ground impact point ground level interference filter guided missile transporter ground GPS-north reference system input/output global positioning system group unique key hostile track identity high-speed anti-radar missile hard copy unit heading higher echelon higher echelon unit

Glossary-5

FM 3-01.87

HF HIB HIDACZ HIMAD HIPIR HOLDF HORG horz host hrzn HSDIO HWK Hawk Hz I/O ICC ID IDR IDS IFF IFFOFF IFFON IFFPID IM indep int IOCT IP IPB IPOUT IR ISLB JCS

high frequency Hawk input buffers high-density airspace control zone high- to medium- altitude air defense high-powered illuminator radar hold fire hostile origin horizon hostile horizon high-speed data input/output Hawk homing all the way killer hertz input/output information and coordination central identification interface data record identification size identification, friend or foe IFF off IFF on IFF passive identification intermediate maintenance independent interrogated input/output control terminal intercept point or indicate position intelligence preparation of the battlefield impact point out of coverage infrared initial search lower bound Joint Chiefs of Staff

Glossary-6

FM 3-01.87

JFACC JTIDS K7 KA KAA-63 kbps kft km kmps LAM LASHE LAT lat lat-lon lcl LCU LGD LGM LICC LLTR LMR LMM LNIP LNR LICC log LOS LR LRC LRM LRU LS

joint forces air component commander joint tactical information distribution system tactical operation software kill assessment IFF codes table for Modes 1 through 4 kilobits per second kilo feet kilometer kilometers per second launcher action message low-altitude simultaneous Hawk engagement live air trainer latitude latitude-longitude local launcher control unit launcher graph display loop group modem lateral ICC low level transit route lower medium range launcher maintenance message launch now intercept point low noise receiver local/lateral ICC logistic line of sight long range logistics readiness center launcher response message line replaceable unit launching station

Glossary-7

FM 3-01.87

LTBM M1 M2 MBU MCS METT-TC MEZ MICC MIM-104 MIM-104A MIM-104B MIR mm MOC MODEM MOF mps MRCTS MRT MS msl MSV MTI MTM mult NATO NAVES NBC NCO neg NFS

lower TBM gunner's quadrant which is used to emplace both the RS and LS aiming circle which is used to emplace the RS and LS master bus unit maintenance control system mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available, and civil concerns missile engagement zone master ICC standard missile standard missile (modified) antitactical ballistic missile (PAC-2) missile ignition request millimeter method of control modulator/demodulator method of fire meters per second missile-round cable test set mission recording tape manstation missile minimum safe velocity moving target indicator masked terrain map multiplexer North Atlantic Treaty Organization navigational enhancement system nuclear, biological, chemical noncommissioned officer negative north finding system

Glossary-8

FM 3-01.87

NK NLOS nm NREF NSIF NTL NTT OBHOJ OD ODS 1/2 ODU OIC OPDAT OPORD OSLB OTM P (code) PABT PAC PADIL PADS PAR PAS PCF PCP PDB-4 PDNL PENG PFE PIDON PIP PIR

no kill non-line-of-sight nautical mile north reference negative SIF non-tactical link non-tactical tape on board home on jam optical disk optical disk system one or two optical disk unit officer in charge operational data operation order operational search lower bound on-line training mode precise code presumed air-breathing threat Patriot ATM capability; Patriot advanced capability Patriot digital information link position azimuth determining system pulse acquisition radar passive alignment system preclassification filter platoon command post post deployment build-4 planned deployment net loading pending engagement process for engagement passive identification on predicted intercept point priority intelligence requirements

Glossary-9

FM 3-01.87

Pk PL PLGR PMCS pos PPI PPO PPS PSIF PTBM PTOD PTL pts PTY PV PVA pwr

probability of kill phase line; party line precision lightweight GPS receiver preventive maintenance checks and services positive plan position indicator Patriot Project Office precise positioning service positive SIF presumed tactical ballistic missile precise time of day primary target line points party prohibited volume prohibited volume attribute power

RAD RAM RCFD RCS rcvr RDR rdr rdr RF RHI RIP RISTA RLRIU RMAX RMC

radius radar action message receive and compare FP data radar cross section receiver radar data record radar radar radio frequency range height indicator ripple fire reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition routing logic radio interface unit (maximum) range remote multiplexer combiner

Glossary-10

FM 3-01.87

RMIN RMM rng RO ROE RRM RRT RS RSOP rsps RSU RTYPE RV RVA RWCIU S/I S2 S3 S4 SA SALVO SAR SATCOM SBC SBU SEM SEP SICC SIF SIGO SINCGARS SLAR SLCT

(minimum) range remote maintenance monitor range radio operator; radar operator; range offset rules of engagement radar response message radio relay terminal radar set reconnaissance, selection, and occupation of position response recovery storage unit radar (message) type restricted volume restricted volume attribute radar weapons control interface unit switch-indicator Intelligence Officer Operations Officer Logistics Officer selective availability salvo fire satellite access request satellite communications short broadcast slave bus unit strobe engagement mode spherical error probability subordinate ICC selective identification feature Signal Officer single-channel ground and airborne radio system side-looking aircraft radar selected subordinate elements

Glossary-11

FM 3-01.87

SLS SMT SMU SOC SOE SOJ SOJC SOP SPC SPCA spec SPOD SPS sq SRP SRPOP SSJ ST STANAG std emp STL STO SYSCON sz tab TAC OPDAT TAC OPORD TAC OPS TACC TACI TACSAT TADIL

shoot-look-shoot system maintenance technician switch multiplexer unit site-oriented correlation state of emissions standoff jammer standoff jammer counter standing operating procedures safe passage corridor safe passage corridor attribute special seaport of debarkation standard positioning service square short-range pop-up short-range pop-up self-screening jammer special text Standardization Agreement (NATO) standard emplacement secondary target line standing tactical order system control size tabular display tactical operations data tactical operations order tactical operations tactical air control center tactical initialization tactical satellite tactical data information link (replaced by appropriate alpha character for data link, for example, TADIL-A/B/J)

Glossary-12

FM 3-01.87

TAN TAOC TASM TBE TBEQ TBM TBM-A TBM-B TCA TCO TCS TD TD-1065 TD-660 TDA TDECC TDR TF TFLT tgt THAAD thrt TIBS TLR TM TMT TNT TOC TOD tol TON TPT TPTR TPTL

test action number tactical air operations center (US Marines) tactical air-to-surface missile to-be-engaged to-be-engaged queue tactical ballistic missile tactical ballistic missile type A tactical ballistic missile type B tactical control assistant tactical control officer tactical command system tactical director high-speed serial data buffer communications multiplexer tactical director assistant target display and engagement control console (Hawk) track data record task force time of flight target Theater High-Altitude Area Defense threat tactical information broadcast system time to launch release technical manual terrain mapping trainer TPT netted trainer tactical operations center time of day tolerance threat order number troop proficiency trainer TPT replacement (disk) TPT library (disk)

Glossary-13

FM 3-01.87

TROPO TSD TSOP TSR TTFL TTLL TTLR TTP TVM TVM-AP TVM-CP TWS TWUD UHF UMR unk UPS USAADASCH USMC UTBM UTM VHF VT WCC WCS WF WGS-84 WH WILCO WSMR WT

troposcatter tactical storage device tactical standing operating procedures time slot reallocation time to first launch time to last launch time to launch release tactics, techniques, and procedures track via missile track via missile-analog processor track via missile-correlation processor track while scan tactical weapon control computer unit diagnostics ultrahigh frequency upper medium-range unknown universal polar stereographic United States Army Air Defense Artillery School United States Marine Corps unengageable TBM; upper TBM universal transverse mercator very high frequency virtual target weapon control computer weapon control status weapons free World Geodetic System 1984 weapons hold will comply White Sands Missile Range weapons tight

Glossary-14

FM 3-01.87

XMTR XTBM

transmitter extra high tactical ballistic missile

Glossary-15

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Glossary-16

Bibliography
AR 310-25. Dictionary of United States Army Terms. 15 October 1983 (Change 1, 21 May 1986). AR 310-50. Authorized Abbreviations and Brevity Codes. 15 November 1985. AR 380-5. Department of the Army Information Security Program. 25 February 1988. (C) AR 380-19-1. Control of Compromising Emanations (U). September 1990. AR 710-2. Inventory Management Supply Policy Below the Wholesale Level. 31 October 1997. ARTEP 44-635-11-Drill. Patriot Crew Drills for Electric Power Plant and Antenna Mast Group. 29 June 1998. ARTEP 44-635-12-Drill. Patriot Crew Drills for Information and Coordination Central (ICC), with Electric Power Unit II (EPU II) and Communications Relay Group (CRG). 29 May 1992 (Change 1, 04 March 1994). ARTEP 44-635-13-Drill. Patriot Crew Drills for Engagement Control Station (ECS) and Radar Set (RS). 13 July 1992 (Change 1, 15 July 1994). ARTEP 44-635-14-Drill. Patriot Crew Drills for Launching Station (LS) and Missile Reload. 30 June 1992 (Change 1, 15 July 1994). ARTEP 44-635-15-Drill. Patriot Crew Drill for Launching Station (LS), Forklift Missile Reload. 03 October 1995. ARTEP 44-635-MTP. Mission Training Plan for an ADA Battalion, Patriot. 03 October 1995. ARTEP 44-637-30-MTP. Mission Training Plan for an ADA Battery, Patriot. 03 October 1995. BR-13394 REV L Raytheon Publication—Dictionary of Acronyms and Terms for the Patriot Missile System (10th Edition, January 1995). DA Pamphlet 310-35. Index of International Standardization Agreements. 15 December 1978. DA Pamphlet 385-1. Small Unit Safety Officer/NCO Guide. 22 September 1993. FM 1-100. Army Aviation Operations. 21 February 1997. FM 3-3. Chemical and Biological Contamination Avoidance. 16 November 1992. (Change 1, 29 September 1994). FM 3-4. NBC Protection. 29 May 1992 (Change 2, 21 February 1996). FM 3-5. NBC Decontamination. 17 November 1993. FM 3-100. Chemical Operations Principles and Fundamentals. 8 May 1996. FM 5-34. Engineer Field Data. 30 August 1999. FM 5-100. Engineer Operations. 27 February 1996. FM 9-6. Munitions Support in the Theater of Operations. 20 March 1998. FM 9-43-2. Recovery and Battlefield Damage Assessment and Repair. 03 October 1995.

Bibliography-1

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FM 22-9. Soldier Performance in Continuous Operations. 12 December 1991. FM 24-1. Signal Support in the AirLand Battle. 15 October 1990. FM 24-18. Tactical Single-Channel Radio Communications Techniques. 30 September 1987. FM 24-33. Communications Techniques: Electronic Counter-Countermeasures. 17 July 1990. FM 34-81. Weather Support for Army Tactical Operations. 31 August 1989. FM 34-130. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. 8 July 1994. FM 44-1-2. Air Defense Artillery Reference Handbook. 15 June 1984. FM 44-100. US Army Air Defense Operations. 15 June 1995. FM 55-65. Strategic Deployment. 03 October 1995. FM 100-5. Operations. 14 June 93. FM 100-103. Army Airspace Command and Control in a Combat Zone. 7 October 1987. FM 101-5-1. Operational Terms and Graphics. 30 September 1997. Joint Publication 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. June 1999. Joint Publication 3-0. Doctrine for Joint Operations. 1 February 1995. Joint Publication 3-01.1. Joint Doctrine for Aerospace Defense of North America. 01 November 1996. Joint Publication 3-01.5. Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense. 22 February 1996. Joint Publication 3-52. Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone. 22 July 1995. Joint Publication 3-56.1. Command and Control for Joint Operations. 14 November 1994. (C)Joint Publication 3-56.20. Tactical Command and Control Procedures for Joint Operations— Joint Interface Operational Procedures Planning Guide (U). May 1987. (Change 1, 1 October 1987). Patriot Data Processing System Requirements (DSPR). (S/NF) Special Text 44-85-1A Patriot Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (U). Draft, 15 May 2000. These international agreements are available on request from the Naval Publications and Forms Center, 5801 Tabor Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19120. STANAG 2034 Land Forces Procedures for Allied Supply Transactions, Edition 4. STANAG 2041 Operation Orders, Tables and Graphs for Road Movement, Edition 4. STANAG 2047 Emergency Alarms of Hazard or Attack (NBC and Air Attack Only), Edition 6. STANAG 2103 Reporting Nuclear Detonations, Biological and Chemical Attacks, and Predicting and Warning of Associated Hazards and Hazard Areas—ATP-45 (A), Edition7. STANAG 2112 NBC Reconnaissance, Edition 3. STANAG 2868 Land Force Tactical Doctrine—ATP-35 (B), Edition 5. STANAG 3700 NATO Tactical Air Doctrine—ATP-33(B), Edition 5.

Bibliography-2

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STANAG 3736 Offensive Air Support Operations—ATP-27(B), Edition 8. STANAG 3805 Doctrine for Airspace Control in Times of Crisis and War—ATP-40 (A), Edition 4. STANAG 3880 Counter Air Operations—ATP-42, (B) Edition 3. STANAG 4162 Technical Characteristics of The NATO Identification System, (NIS), Edition 1. Standard Form 368. Product Quality Deficiency Report. October 1985. TB 43-0142. Safety Inspection and Testing of Lifting Devices. 28 February 1997. (S) TB 380-6-8. Signal Security (SIGSEC) for Air Defense Artillery Battlefield Survivability (U). 15 November 1992. TM 11-5820-540-12. Operator’s and Unit Maintenance Manual for Radio Set, AN/GRC-103C (V)1,2,3,4. and Extension Kit, Mast, MK-1009/GRC-103. 1 July 1988. (Change 1, 1 August 1996). TM 11-5825-291-13. Operations and Maintenance Manual for Satellite Signals Navigation Sets AN/PSN-11 and AN/PSN-11 (v) 1. 15 September 1995 (Change 2, 26 Nov 97). TM 9-1425-600-12. Operator’s and Organizational Maintenance Manual for System Description. (Patriot Air Defense Guided Missile System). 30 December 1994 (Change 2, 28 June 1996). TM 9-1425-602-12-1. Operator’s and Organizational Maintenance Battalion Software User Guide, Volume 1, (Patriot Air Defense Guided Missile System), 15 August 1996. TM 9-1425-602-12-2. Operator’s and Organizational Maintenance Manual Fire Platoon Software User Guide, Volume 2 (Patriot Air Defense Guided Missile System). 15August 1996. TM 9-1425-602-12-3. Operator’s and Organizational Maintenance Manual for On-Line Maintenance Information, Volume 3 (Patriot Air Defense Guided Missile System). 15 August 1996. TM 9-1425-602-12-4. Operator’s and Organizational Maintenance Manual for Off-Line Maintenance Information, Volume 4 (Patriot Air Defense Guided Missile System). 26 May 1995. (Change 1, 12 July 1996). TM 9-1430-600-10-1. Operator's Manual for Engagement Control Station, Truck Mounted, AN/MSQ-104 (Patriot Air Defense Guided Missile System). 30 September 1996. (Change 2, 26 April 1999). TM 9-1430-601-10-1. Operator's Manual for Radar Set, Semitrailer Mounted, AN/MPQ-53 (Patriot Air Defense Guided Missile System). 31 August 1993 (Change 4, 9 May 1997). TM 9-1430-602-10-1. Operator's Manual for Information and Coordination Central, Truck Mounted/AN/MSQ-116 (Patriot Air Defense Guided Missile System). 30 August 1996. TM 9-1440-600-10. Operators Manual for Launching Station, M901 Semitrailer Mounted (Patriot Guided Missile System). 24 September 1993 (Change 3, 24 August 1998).

Bibliography-3

INDEX
A
A-scope operations, 3-29 ABT, 2-4, 2-11, 2-15, 1-16, 2-50, 3-1, 3-23, 3-26, 3-47, G-2, I-13 identification, 2-4, 2-10, 2-28, 1-19, 3-34, 4-5, I-13, I-16 kill assessment, 3-47, 3-48, 3-82 ABT/TBM defended assets, 2-16 generalized volumes, 2-18 air and missile defense task force, 2-17, 3-25, I-2 air battle management, 3-10, 4-1 Air Defense Artillery (ADA), 2-1, 2-8 employment planning, 2-59 planning, 2-5, 2-30, 2-37, 3-65, 4-18, 4-19 airspace control measures, 2-18 airspace control order (ACO), 2-18, 2-20, 2-29, 2-59, 3-36 alternate alignment, E-1 antihelicopter standoff jammer, 3-31, 3-97, 3-99 assets and defended areas, 2-4 asset defense, 3-47, 3-51, 3-63, 3-69, 3-81 asset priority, 2-28, 3-45 ATM mission, 3-85 automatic emplacement, 2-62, 2-69, 2-72, 2-87, C-1 status monitor, 3-25, C-12 battalion initialization structure, 2-2 initialization sequence, 2-3, H-2 geographic data parameters, 2-3 ICC mode and data base selection, 2-5 initialization control, 2-6 requirements for direct links, 2-38, 2-39 battalion FIDOC, 2-9 ID mode, 2-10 ID weight set, 2-10, 2-29, I-16 IFF/SIF control, 2-11 missile depletion rules, 2-27, 2-87, 2-88 battery tactical initialization, 2-66 data collection control, 2-66 data initialization sequence, 2-68 roll-crossroll alignment, 2-70 FP deployment support, 2-47 lateral ICC, 2-41 subordinate ICC, 2-40 master ICC, 2-39, 4-3, 4-5 connectivity, 4-18, 2-52 external links, 4-3, 4-6 counter-antiradiation missile operations, 3-104 ARM countermeasures, 3-108 through 3-110 counter-ARM threat parameters, 2-26 launch decision parameters, 2-26 identification parameters, 2-4, 2-28

D
data buffer transfer, 2-79 data communications, 2-78 data communications control, 2-78, ATDL-1, 2-32, 2-39, 4-14, 4-21 PADIL, 2-38, 3-20, 4-2, 4-7, 4-15, 4-16 TADIL-A, 4-16, 4-17, 3-88 TADIL-B, 2-15, 2-35, 2-38, 4-3, 4-14, 4-18, 4-19 TADIL-J, 2-35, 4-14, 4-19 data links, 4-2, 4-14, 4-16, 4-19 decentralized, 2-8, 3-5, 3-23, 4-5, defense design, 3-50, 3-69, I-2, I-12 deployment/command planning, 2-30, H-5 display and control program, 3-12 doctrinal framework, 1-1

C
clutter and chaff tracks, 3-32 command and control, 2-1, 3-69, 4-1 structures, 4-1 processing, 4-2 command planning, 2-4, 2-6, 2-30, H-5 command, control, and communications, 1-2, 2-2 communications, 2-4, 2-31, 2-33, 2-34, 2-37, 2-46, 2-55, 2-78, 4-3, 4-5 battalion communications, 2-31, 2-35, 2-46 FP communications, 2-33 communications operator, 3-5, 3-9 communications net loading, 2-37

B
battalion initialization, 2-1, n2-2 automatic battalion initialization, 2-5 BATI and TACI flowcharts, H-1 battalion communications control, 2-31, 2-35

E
early warning, 2-27, 4-18, I-13

Index-1

FM 3-01.87

ECCM engagement mode selection, 3-95 ECCM operations, 3-87 ECCM wedges, 3-27, 3-89 emplacement configuration, D-1 engagement control, 2-13, 3-1, 3-78, I-7 engagement operations, 2-86, 4-1, I-1, I-7 standoff jammer, 3-27, 3-88, 3-97 strobe engagement mode (SEM), 3-62, 3-86 virtual target (VT), 3-86, 3-88, 3-90 through 3-94 initial search lower bound (ISLB),3-82, B-1, B-3, B-5, D-4 radar alignment procedures, 2-72 roll and crossroll tolerances, 2-75, E-3 manual alignment, 2-74, E-3 enable TBM A dive calculations,

fight, G-5 fight-while-fix, G-6 must fix, G-3 FP locations/boundaries, 2-63 friendly origins, 2-18, 4-2

local launcher, 3-56, 3-57, 3-65, 3-67 remote launcher, 3-56, 3-57, 3-62, 3-70 location data confidence level, 262, 2-74, 2-76, 3-14, E-6

G
GPS, C-1, C-3, C-5, C-13 GLIF threshold, 2-91 ground level interference filter (GLIF), 3-100 through 3-103

M
manual orentation and alignment, data sheets, A-1 mapping display and control, B-4 master ICC operations, 2-39, 4-3 master ICC communications, 4-5 METT-TC, I-12, 2-29, 2-33 missile selection, 3-78, 3-83, 3-84 missile engagement zone, 2-22

H
hostile criteria, 4-2 weight sets, 2-10, I-10, I-16

I
ICC air battle operations, 3-10, Air defense functions, 3-10 firing doctrine, 3-11, 3-84, 3-88, 3-94 saturation alleviation, 3-18 track management, 3-12, 4-4 triangulation, 3-16, 3-18, 3-86 ICC ECM operations, 3-87

N
north finding system (NFS), 2-65, 2-69, 2-75, C-10

O
operational search lower bound (OSLB), 2-81, 2-83, B-6, B-8

3-79 extra-bn communication control, 2-34, 2-35 F
fault alert filter, G-1 fiber optic cable deployment, D-5 FIDOC and operational parameters, 2-9, 2-91 TBM A engagement mode, 3-78 TBM B engagement mode, 3-78 fire control configuration,D-1 fire unit tactical initialization, 2-60 ABT search sectors, 3-27, 3-100 TBM search sectors, 3-28, 3-79 fire unit to fire unit operations, 4-10 fix or fight criteria, G-1 fix-or-fight guidance, G-1 decision, G-1, G-4

P
passive ID line, 3-36 Patriot crew responsibilities, 3-1 communications operator, 3-5, 3-9 tactical control assistant, 3-3, 3-4 tactical control officer, 3-1, 3-2 tactical director, 3-6, 3-7 tactical director assistant, 3-7, 3-8 Patriot missiles, 3-73 ATM, 3-66, 3-75, 3-84

TBM and ABT defended assets, 2-15 identification, 2-4, 2-34, I-16 identification processing, 3-39, I-10 identification parameters, 2-28 manual ID, 3-43 origin volume checks, 3-41 safe passage corridors, 2-20, 2-21, 3-41, IPB, 2-29, 3-80

J
JTIDS, 3-9, 4-19 through 4-21 JFACC, 2-8

ATM-1 (GEM), 3-48, 3-55, 3-73, 3-75, 3-84 SOJC, 3-73, 3-74, 3-84 standard missile, 3-73, 3-74, 3-84 PLGR, C-1, C-3, C-6, C-7 PTL, 2-48, 2-81, 3-59, 3-79, B-1 point defense, 3-81

L
launcher emplacement, 3-59, 3-66, 3-68, C-7, D-2 launcher dead zones, 3-68

Index-2

FM 3-01.87

R
radar maping process, 3-102, B-1 alternate search, 2-4, 2-50, 2-84 clutter mapping, B-15 data acquisition mode, 2-64 masked areas, 2-83, B-14 preliminary mapping procedures, B-2 radar mapping display, 2-81 Display A, 2-83, B-4, B-5, B-10 Display C, 2-83, B-4, B-5, B-8, Display D, B-6, B-7, B-13, B-14 Display E, B-13 range bias, 2-13, 2-14, 3-79, I-1, I-8 ABT, 2-13 TBM, 3-79 RCS, 3-84 reconstitution, 3-72 remote launcher employment, D-7 launcher emplacement, 3-59, 3-66, 3-68, C-7, D-3 engagement zones, 3-66, 3-68 RSOP, B-1, D-1, D-8, rules of engagement, 2-1, 3-3, 3-5

tactical recommendations, 3-69 target engagement, 3-21 ABT kill assessment, 3-47 engagement eligibility, 3-22, 3-43 engagement status, 3-22 threat assessment, 3-22 threat evaluation, 3-23 time to first launch, 3-45 time to last launch, 3-45 weapon system selection, 3-23 target identification, 3-19 passive identification, 3-20, 3-36 tactical air to surface missile, (TASM), 3-1, 3-106 TCA, 3-3 TCO, 3-1 threat, 3-19, 3-22, 3-23, 3-43, 3-44, 3-46, 3-51, 3-63 assessment process, 3-22 track management, 3-12, 4-4, I-20 track while scan, 3-102 TROPO linkage, 4-15

missile engagement zone (MEZ), 2-19, 3-54, safe passage corridors, 2-20

W
weather mode, 3-105 World Wide UTM conversion procedures and tables, F-1

U
Universal Transverse Mercator overview, F-1, F-3 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), 3-1 RISTA, 3-104 urban low altitude trajectory control, 3-80

S
self-defense, 3-5, 3-46, 3-78, 3-81 standard emplacement, 2-61, 2-64 status monitor, 3-25, C-12

T
tab index, H-8 tactical ballistic missile considerations, 3-48 target classification, 3-31, 3-50 threat assessment, 3-44, 3-46, 3-51 engagement zones, 3-54, 3-65 target classification, 3-31 classification process, 3-33 identification, 3-34, 3-36, 3-39, 3-39, 3-43, I-10 target display control, 3-21

V
volume correlation, 2-10, 3-36, I-11 volumes, 2-4, 2-18, 2-49, 2-57, 3-35 generalized volumes, 2-18 overlapping volumes, 3-35 volume types, 3-35 weapon control status, 3-43 compass rose tables, 2-24 KAA 63 table, 2-24

Index-3

FM 3-01.87 26 SEPTEMBER 2000

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

ERIC K. SHINSEKI General, United States Army Chief of Staff

Official:

JOEL B. HUDSON Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army 0022704

Distribution: Active Army, Army National Guard, and U. S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with the initial distribution number 115827, requirements for FM 3-01.87.

PIN: 078423-000

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