FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FM 3-05.105 NTTP 3-11.30 AFTTP(I) 3-2.35 USSOCOM Pub 3-11

Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Operations Forces in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environments
September 2001

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program or by other means. This determination was made on 15 August 2001. Other requests for this document will be referred to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, ATTN: AOJK-DT-JAA, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28310-5000. DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOREWORD
This publication has been prepared under our direction for use by our respective commands and other commands as appropriate.

CHARLES R. HOLLAND General, U.S. Air Force Commander in Chief United States Special Operations Command

WILLIAM G. BOYKIN Major General, U.S. Army Commanding United States Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School

R. G. SPRIGG Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy Commander Navy Warfare Development Command

LANCE L. SMITH Major General, U.S. Air Force Commander Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center

PREFACE
1. Scope
This publication provides tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for the planning and execution of special operations forces (SOF) nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense operations. It provides a basis for understanding the requirements of individual SOF personnel operating in NBC environments as well as the requirements of joint force staff planners. TTPs support planning to meet the requirements of different scenarios. Across the range of military operations, it also provides guidance for commanders who determine force structure, equipment, material, and operational requirements necessary to conduct the missions and collateral activities herein described.

2. Purpose
This publication has been prepared by direction of the Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC) who has recognized the need to share the skills developed by individual components within the SOF community. Each SOF element brings unique capabilities to an operation that can be improved upon from the knowledge of other elements. This publication compiles existing joint doctrine, principles, and known multi-Service/component TTP for NBC defense preparedness. It establishes a single “how to” guide for use by individual SOF personnel and SOF components supporting Joint Task Force/Joint Special Operations Task Force (JTF/JSOTF) operations. It is a guide intended to enhance SOF force protection, survivability, and readiness in NBC environments.

3. Application
The TTPs described in this publication apply to the commanders and staffs involved in special operations as well as individual SOF operating elements. This publication contains established joint and Service doctrine, and supplements joint and Service TTPs.

4. Implementation Plan
Participating component command's and subcomponent's offices of primary responsibility will review this publication, validate the information, and incorporate for use.

5. User Information
a. This entire publication is “For Official Use Only.” Distribution is authorized to US government agencies only to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination. This determination was made on 27 October 2000. See Appendix S, “Administrative Instructions,” for additional distribution guidance. b. The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) – Center for Operations, Plans, and Policy (SOOP-PJ-D) developed this publication with the joint participation of its components and Service subject matter experts. USSOCOM will review and update this publication as necessary. c. This publication reflects current joint and Service doctrine, organizations, personnel, responsibilities, and procedures. Changes in Service protocol, appropriately reflected in joint and Service publications, will likewise be incorporated in revisions to this document. d. USSOCOM encourages recommendations for improving this publication. Key all comments to the specific page and paragraph and provide rationale for each recommendation. Send comments and recommendations directly to: Commander in Chief United States Special Operations Command Attn: USSOCOM SOOP–PJ-D 7701 Tampa Point Blvd MacDill AFB FL 33621-5323

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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Field Manual No. 3-05.105

Headquarters Washington, DC, 28 September 2001

FM 3-05.105 NTTP 3-11.30 AFTTP(I) 3-2.35 USSOCOM Pub 3-11

Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Operations Forces in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environments

Contents
Page

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY............................................................................................ ix Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................1-1 Purpose ....................................................................................................................1-1 Special Operations (SO) Principal Missions .............................................................1-1 SO Collateral Activities .............................................................................................1-5 Chapter 2 SOF OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS AND POTENTIAL NBC THREATS.............2-1 General .....................................................................................................................2-1 Section A. SOF AOR Operating Environments....................................................2-2 Urban Areas..............................................................................................................2-2 Desert Areas.............................................................................................................2-2 Low Terrain, Temperate Zone Areas........................................................................2-2 Mountain Areas.........................................................................................................2-2 Jungle Areas.............................................................................................................2-3 Cold Weather Regions .............................................................................................2-3 Maritime Environments and Riverine Areas .............................................................2-4

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Atmospheric Environments ...................................................................................... 2-4 Section B. Potential Threats ................................................................................. 2-5 Biological .................................................................................................................. 2-5 Chemical .................................................................................................................. 2-5 Toxic Industrial Materials ......................................................................................... 2-6 Riot Control .............................................................................................................. 2-6 Nuclear ..................................................................................................................... 2-6 Radiological.............................................................................................................. 2-7 Chapter 3 PLANNING STAFF NBC CONSIDERATIONS IN PREMISSION ACTIVITIES....... 3-1 Purpose .................................................................................................................... 3-1 Mission Analysis....................................................................................................... 3-2 Mission Planning ...................................................................................................... 3-5 Mission Preparation.................................................................................................. 3-8 Chapter 4 NBC CONSIDERATIONS IN PREMISSION ACTIVITIES....................................... 4-1 Purpose .................................................................................................................... 4-1 General..................................................................................................................... 4-1 Section A. Principles of NBC Defense ................................................................. 4-2 Avoidance................................................................................................................. 4-2 Protection ................................................................................................................. 4-3 Decontamination ...................................................................................................... 4-3 Section B. NBC Premission Activities ................................................................. 4-4 Mission Analysis Considerations.............................................................................. 4-4 Mission Planning Considerations ............................................................................. 4-4 Mission Preparation Considerations ........................................................................ 4-6 Chapter 5 NBC CONSIDERATIONS DURING INFILTRATION, EXECUTION, AND EXFILTRATION ....................................................................................................... 5-1 Purpose .................................................................................................................... 5-1 General..................................................................................................................... 5-1 Section A. Air Planning Considerations .............................................................. 5-1 Infiltration, Execution, and Exfiltration Requires Detailed Planning.......................... 5-1 Section B. Maritime Planning Considerations .................................................... 5-4 Infiltration, Execution, and Exfiltration Requires Detailed Planning.......................... 5-4 Section C. Land Planning Considerations .......................................................... 5-6 Infiltration, Execution, and Exfiltration Requires Detailed Planning.......................... 5-6 Section D. Stay Behind Operations Considerations .......................................... 5-8 Stay Behind Operations Are an Alternative to Infiltration ......................................... 5-8

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Section E. SOF Platform NBC Defense Considerations .....................................5-8 Air .............................................................................................................................5-8 Maritime ..................................................................................................................5-12 Ground....................................................................................................................5-14 Appendix A Appendix B Appendix C Appendix D Appendix E Appendix F Appendix G Appendix H Appendix J Appendix K Appendix L Appendix M Appendix N Appendix O Appendix P Appendix Q Appendix R Appendix S SOF ORGANIC NBC DEFENSE ASSETS ............................................................. A-1 SOF COMPONENT AND SERVICE COMMON NBC EQUIPMENT ...................... B-1 U.S. ARMY THEATER NBC DEFENSE ASSETS .................................................. C-1 U.S. MARINE CORPS ORGANIC ASSET .............................................................. D-1 NBC RISK ASSESSMENTS/VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS TOOL ....................... E-1 NBC WARNING MESSAGE AND THREAT CONDITION SYSTEM ...................... F-1 NBC HAZARD PREDICTION..................................................................................G-1 NBC RECONNAISSANCE (SURVEY TECHNIQUES) ........................................... H-1 SAMPLING TECHNIQUES ......................................................................................J-1 DECONTAMINATION OPERATIONS .................................................................... K-1 NBC CASUALTY PROCESSING AND HANDLING TECHNIQUES .......................L-1 FORCE PROTECTION ASSESSMENT..................................................................M-1 COMPONENT NBC SUPPORT STRUCTURE....................................................... N-1 TECHNIQUES TO REDUCE AND LIMIT CONTAMINATION ................................O-1 FOREIGN NBC EQUIPMENT RECOGNITION AND CAPABILITY/LIMITATION SUMMARY .................................................................. P-1 INTERNET/ONLINE REFERENCES ......................................................................Q-1 REFERENCES ........................................................................................................ R-1 ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS ...................................................................... S-1 GLOSSARY.............................................................................................................G-1 Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ......................................................... Glossary-1 Part II Terms and Definitions.................................................................... Glossary-5 FIGURES Figure 4-1. The Principles of NBC Defense .............................................................4-2 Figure 5-1. Advantages and Disadvantages of Air Infiltration/Exfiltration.................5-2 Figure 5-2. Advantages and Disadvantages of Water Infiltration/Exfiltration ...........5-4 Figure 5-3. Advantages and Disadvantages of Land Infiltration/Exfiltration .............5-7 Figure 5-4. Aircraft Decontamination Types ...........................................................5-11 Figure C-1. NBC Defense Covers ........................................................................... C-9 Figure D-1. CBIRF NBC Defense Equipment.......................................................... D-2 Figure E-1. Nuclear Risk Assessment..................................................................... E-9 Figure E-2. Biological Risk Assessment................................................................ E-10 Figure E-3. Chemical Risk Assessment ................................................................ E-11

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Figure G-1. Chemical Operational Planning Considerations .................................. G-1 Figure G-2. Weather Effects on Chemical Agents.................................................. G-4 Figure G-3. Atmospheric Indication of Biological/Chemical Attack Prospects ........ G-5 Figure G-4. Biological Operational Planning Considerations .................................. G-7 Figure G-5. Weather Effects on Biological Agent Dissemination............................ G-9 Figure G-6. Nuclear Operational Planning Considerations ................................... G-11 Figure G-7. Nuclear Radiation Exposure Status Guidelines ................................. G-13 Figure H-1. Fundamentals NBC Reconnaissance ...................................................H-1 Figure K-1. Principles for Planning Decontamination Operations ............................K-1 Figure K-2. Planning Considerations for Conducting Decontamination Operations ................................................................K-2 Figure K-3. Planning Decontamination Operations..................................................K-3 Figure K-4. Considerations for Planning Decontamination Site Reconnaissance ............................................................................K-4 Figure K-5. Immediate Decontamination Actions.....................................................K-4 Figure K-6. Operational Decontamination Concept of Operations (with vehicles) .......................................................................................K-5 Figure K-7. Thorough Decontamination-Detailed Equipment Decontamination ......K-8 Figure K-8. Thorough Decontamination-Detailed Troop Decontamination ..............K-9 Figure K-9. SOF Element Decontamination Options .............................................K-10 Figure K-10. Expedient Personnel Decontamination System ................................K-13 Figure K-11. Expedient Personnel Decontamination System Rucksack and System Components..................................................................K-19 Figure K-12. Aircrew Decontamination Station #1 .................................................K-22 Figure K-13. Aircrew Decontamination Station #2 .................................................K-23 Figure K-14. Aircrew Decontamination Station #3 .................................................K-24 CHECKLISTS Special Precautions Checklist.................................................................................. 2-4 Assets Review Checklist .......................................................................................... 3-3 Planners Host Nation Interoperability Checklist ....................................................... 3-6 Securing NBC-Related Site Checklist ...................................................................... 3-6 NBC Environment Specific Considerations.............................................................. 4-5 NBC Environment Course of Action Considerations................................................ 4-5 Mission Concept Briefing Considerations ................................................................ 4-5 AIR Checklist for Prelaunch Considerations ............................................................ 5-2 AIR Checklist for Enroute Considerations................................................................ 5-3 AIR Checklist for Infiltration/Exfiltration Considerations ........................................... 5-3 AIR Checklist for Recovery Considerations ............................................................. 5-3

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MARITIME Checklist for Prelaunch Considerations .................................................5-5 MARITIME Checklist for Enroute Considerations.....................................................5-5 MARITIME Checklist for Infiltration/Exfiltration Considerations................................5-5 MARITIME Checklist for Recovery Considerations ..................................................5-6 LAND Checklist for Prelaunch Considerations .........................................................5-7 LAND Checklist for Infiltration/Exfiltration Considerations........................................5-7 LAND Checklist for Recovery Considerations ..........................................................5-8 Considerations for Stay Behind Operations..............................................................5-8 Pre-Attack Techniques to Limit Contamination ........................................................5-9 During-Attack Techniques to Limit Contamination ...................................................5-9 Post-Attack Techniques to Limit Contamination.....................................................5-10 Decontamination Flight Considerations ..................................................................5-11 Maritime Techniques to Limit Contamination .........................................................5-12 Maritime Decontaminants.......................................................................................5-13 Patrol Coastal Craft Shipboard Actions for Taking on Contaminated SOF Personnel .......................................................................................................5-13 MK V Shipboard Actions for Taking on Contaminated SOF Personnel..................5-14 Threat Analysis Checklist ........................................................................................ E-1 NBC Plans and Operations Checklist...................................................................... E-2 NBC Guidance and Doctrine Checklist.................................................................... E-6 Joint Force Training and Exercise Checklist ........................................................... E-6 NBC Readiness Checklist ....................................................................................... E-7 Route Recon Critical Tasks Checklist ..................................................................... H-3 Zone Recon Critical Tasks Checklist....................................................................... H-4 Area Recon Critical Tasks Checklist ....................................................................... H-4 Survey Critical Tasks Checklist ............................................................................... H-4 Surveillance Critical Tasks Checklist....................................................................... H-5 Sampling Guidance Checklist...................................................................................J-2 Critical Background Information Checklist................................................................J-6 Commander’s Inherent Responsibilities Checklist .................................................. K-5 Individual Decontamination Responsibilities Checklist ............................................ K-5 SOF Decontamination Element Actions at the Decontamination Site Checklist ..... K-6 Decontamination Site Critical Tasks Checklist ........................................................ K-6 Commander’s Responsibilities Checklist................................................................. K-6 Equipment/Logistical Requirements Checklist ........................................................ K-7 Decontamination Site Operation Checklist .............................................................. K-7 Decontamination Site Closure Checklist ................................................................. K-7 Thorough Decontamination Considerations Checklist............................................. K-9

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Thorough Decontamination Close-Out Procedures Checklist ...............................K-10 Unsupported SOF Element Decontamination Steps..............................................K-11 Expedient Personnel Decontamination System Tactical Planning Guidelines.......K-12 Generic EPDS Mission Sequence .........................................................................K-12 One Piece Cut Out Steps .......................................................................................K-13 Two Piece Cut Out Steps .......................................................................................K-14 One Piece Cut Out Procedure Checklist................................................................K-16 Two Piece Cut Out Procedure Checklist................................................................K-17 EPDS Key Decontamination Considerations Checklist..........................................K-18 Decontamination of Exfiltration Platform Considerations.......................................K-20 Individual NBC Defense Readiness Checklist ........................................................ M-2 Commander’s NBC Defense Readiness Checklist ................................................. M-3 NBC Primary Duty Personnel NBC Defense Readiness Checklist ......................... M-3 NBC Additional Duty Personnel NBC Defense Readiness Checklist...................... M-4 NBC Medical Personnel NBC Defense Readiness Checklist ................................. M-5

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Executive Summary

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

• • • • • •

Provides an Introduction to Special Operations Principal Missions and Collateral Activities Conducted in an NBC Environment Discusses the Operating Environment and the Effect of NBC Hazards on the Battlespace Provides Commander and Staff Planning Considerations for Planning and Conducting Operations in an NBC Environment Provides Operational Element Considerations for Planning and Conducting Operations in an NBC Environment Addresses the Considerations for Infiltration, Execution, and Exfiltration when in an NBC Environment Provides Detailed Considerations Across the Range of Activities in an NBC Environment

Introduction to a New Dimension of Operations
SOF assets must become completely proficient in the skill’s necessary to survive in an NBC environment. The ability to operate successfully when an NBC hazard exists will depend on having validated procedures, conducting realistic training, and possessing the means to vigorously execute any mission. Where proliferation has occurred in regions of potential conflict, deterrence of an adversary’s nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons employment is a principal US national objective. To support deterrence, commanders must ensure that their forces and supporting facilities are visibly able to operate effectively in NBC environments. Should deterrence fail, US forces will need to survive, fight, and win in a contaminated battlespace. Key to operational success may be the ability to mitigate the effects of NBC weapons employment, and eliminate or reduce the adversary’s NBC capabilities in order to reduce the burden on passive and active defense systems. The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the Services have the primary responsibility for organizing, training, and equipping their forces for the full range of potential operations. This includes appropriate professional military education and leader development, planning guides, and supporting actions with emphasis on current threats and combatant command planning considerations. USSOCOM must train and prepare forces to meet the requirements for planned, contingency, and unexpected but plausible operations in NBC environments in the geographic combatant commands’ areas of responsibility. The command also is responsible for appropriate military actions within the United States to counter adversary threats and employment of NBC weapons directly against the US homeland. Such domestic military activity is subject to constitutional, statutory, and policy direction.

SOF Missions and Activities
The principal missions and collateral activities remain the same, NBC hazards only make them more difficult. The components of USSOCOM are a highly trained force that prepares for operations in varied environments around the world. The addition of NBC hazards to what may already be harsh operating conditions has established the requirement to improve NBC defensive skills. In the conduct of the nine special operations forces (SOF) principal missions and eight collateral activities, staff planners and personnel must consider and practice defensive measures to minimize the hazards of an NBC tainted battlespace.

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Executive Summary Operating Environments and NBC Hazards
SOF must operate and survive in some of the harshest environments around the world. NBC defense capabilities must be incorporated as standard operating procedure. The areas of responsibility in which SOF operate may contain several environments, each with a distinct set of NBC planning factors and considerations. Varying from the intense heat of the desert to the frigid arctic, NBC hazards behave differently. How an NBC hazard acts in an environment requires unique planning and operational considerations which must be addressed fully to ensure both the safety and success of SOF elements.

Planning Considerations
Detailed analysis and planning Planners at every level must provide the most complete and accurate information provide a basis for successful mission available to ensure mission success and personnel survival. Deliberate or time accomplishment in an NBC environment. sensitive planning must now be expanded to address the NBC dimension.

Responsibilities
Commanders can no longer overlook an Individual SOF personnel, theater special operations commands, and joint task force/ joint special operations task force commanders and staffs must recognize an NBC threat. adversary’s capability to use NBC weapons. Any use of these weapons will have a significant impact on the outcome of a single mission, as well as national and coalition objectives. The potential use of NBC weapons and their effects must be considered when planning any special operations (SO) mission. Commanders must ensure all personnel are proficient in the individual and collective NBC defensive skills required to carry out their respective missions in NBC environments. Training must be designed to ensure that SOF units can execute their mission essential tasks under all circumstances.

Summary
This publication, derived from multiple sources, is a guide for all personnel and planners working with or within the SOF community. For those unfamiliar with the requirements of SOF operations, it serves as an introductory guide to SOF NBC planning considerations. SO principal and collateral missions are portrayed in NBC environments to show how future operations require awareness beyond customary thinking. To assist commanders, staffs, and personnel in successful mission planning and execution, this publication has included those considerations that must be incorporated into an NBC way of thinking. The tactics, techniques, and procedures provided are intended to facilitate joint special operations planning.

Conclusion
The key to preparing SOF for future operations in NBC environments depends upon how well commanders and staffs maximize the skills and information available today. This publication provides tactics, techniques, and procedures applicable to the conduct of joint operations in an NBC environment.

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
“SOF may be tasked to perform missions for which they are either the best suited among available forces or the only force available. When assigned a mission by a controlling headquarters, that mission becomes the mission and the focus of the assigned unit, even if it is not a primary mission or a common collateral activity. Under these circumstances, SOF provide the tasking commander with a candid assessment of its capabilities, limitations, and risks associated with employment in nontraditional missions. When tasked to do these missions, SOF execute with the same professionalism demanded of primary missions. In an ideal world, SOF would be used only in operations for which they are specifically trained and equipped. In reality, circumstances often dictate the use of SOF for other missions.”
JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations

1. Purpose
This publication provides a defensive “how to” guide for special operations forces (SOF) personnel and planners preparing for and conducting operations in NBC contaminated environments. It also serves to familiarize conventional staffs with the dynamics of SOF operational support. It describes tactics, techniques, procedures, and capabilities tailored to the requirements of the NBC dimension in special operations (SO) missions and activities.

SOF missions and activities take on a new dimension when an NBC environment exists.

2. Special Operations (SO) Principal Missions in NBC Environments
Pursuant to 10 United States Code (USC) 164, 10 USC 167, and the Unified Command Plan, eight activities have been designated as principal SO missions for SOF. Pursuant to CJCSI 3210.01, “Joint Information Warfare Policy,” and Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC) directive, information operations (IO) has been designated as the ninth principal SO mission. Furthermore, USCINCSOC has recognized the probability of operating in an NBC environment exists; therefore, SOF must specifically organize, train, and equip to be successful in that environment. The term “NBC environment” includes the deliberate or accidental employment or threat of NBC weapons and attacks with other chemical, biological, or radiological materials or toxic industrial materials (TIMs). The following is a discussion of the nine SO principal missions. Where possible, the discussion will include examples of situations that can confront planners and personnel conducting SO missions in an NBC environment.

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a. Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Counterproliferation (CP) refers to the activities of the Department of Defense (DOD) across the full range of US Government (USG) efforts to combat proliferation. Included are the application of military power to protect US forces and interests; such as, intelligence collection and analysis, support to diplomacy, arms control, and export controls with particular responsibility for assuring US forces and interests can be protected should they confront an adversary armed with WMD. The application of military power may include actions taken to seize, destroy, render safe, capture, or recover WMD. WMD are defined as weapons capable of destroying large numbers of people utilizing nuclear, biological, chemical, and/or radiological means. The mere presence of these weapons could produce an intentional or unintentional NBC operating environment. If directed, SOF can conduct or support direct action (DA), special reconnaissance (SR), combating terrorism (CBT), and information operations (IO) missions to deter and/or prevent the acquisition of WMD, neutralize proliferation where it has occurred, and operate against the threats by WMD to defeat them. SOF are tasked with organizing, training, equipping, and otherwise preparing to conduct operations in support of USG CP objectives. Specific CP activities conducted by SOF are classified and further discussion of CP is beyond the scope of this publication.

“WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION - weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Can be nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, but excludes the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon.”

JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms For additional information on CP of WMD, refer to JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations. b. Combating Terrorism (CBT). These are actions, including antiterrorism (AT) (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (CT) (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. Terrorists pursue a variety of objectives using selected tactics. Examples of terrorist objectives include: publicity for the group’s cause, demonstrating their power and the government’s inability to protect the populace, revenge, acquiring logistical support, and causing a government to overreact. Preferred terrorist tactics include assassination, kidnapping, hostage taking, hijacking, raids, seizures, bombings, sabotage, hoaxes, environmental destruction, and uses of technology and special weapons. The Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for protecting its own personnel, equipment, bases, installations, ships, and deployed forces. While DOD is not the lead USG agency for combating terrorism, it assists the Department of State for incidents outside the United States, the Department of Justice for incidents within the United States, and the Department of Transportation and/or the Federal Aviation Administration for certain aviation incidents. When directed by the National Command Authorities (NCA) or the appropriate combatant commander, SOF involvement in combating terrorism activities can include such antiterrorism measures as protecting people, facilities, and events from terrorist attack. Counterterrorism measures include hostage rescue, recovery of sensitive materials from terrorist groups, and attacking terrorist infrastructure. Specific examples of combating terrorism activities are classified and beyond the scope of this publication. For further information on AT, refer to JP 3-07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism. c. Foreign Internal Defense (FID). This is participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. SOF’s primary contribution in this interagency activity is to organize, train, advise, and assist host nation (HN) military and paramilitary forces. Should an NBC threat exist, training provided could cover basic masking techniques for protection against riot control agents to full individual protective equipment (IPE). By training host nation (HN) forces on NBC defense, SOF contribute to the deterrence of an adversary’s use of NBC weapons. During the Gulf War, in Operation DESERT SHIELD, SOF were involved in NBC defense technique training and the equipping of Saudi Arabian HN personnel and other coalition forces. A FID program in an NBC environment requires additional operational and logistic planning factors beyond those normally considered in a non-NBC environment. For further information on FID, refer to JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID). d. Special Reconnaissance (SR). These are reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by SOF to obtain or verify, by visual observation or other collection methods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of actual or potential enemies. SOF’s highly developed capabilities of access to denied and hostile areas, worldwide communications, and specialized air/naval platforms with sensors enable SOF to conduct SR against operational and strategic targets beyond the range of conventional reconnaissance forces. SR includes NBC reconnaissance, area assessment, environmental (hydrographic, geological, and meteorological) reconnaissance, coastal patrol and interdiction, target and threat assessment, and poststrike

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Introduction
reconnaissance. In addition to reconnaissance and surveillance, SR overt information collection may be conducted to determine the need for, or viability of, contemplated operations. The following illustrates considerations which can affect SR conducted in an NBC environment. • A Navy SEAL (sea-air-land) team, infiltrated by submarine and while conducting SR, locates a suspected enemy theater ballistic missile (TBM) forward operating base (FOB). As the team observes the FOB, an allied aircraft strikes the target, unaware of the team’s presence. Upon destruction of the target, it is realized the FOB was a chemical storage facility for TBMs and the team is contaminated. The team returns to the submerged submarine and reenters the dry deck shelter (DDS). The amount of decontamination that was achieved by being in saltwater is unknown. To avoid contaminating the submarine and its crew, the team remains inside the DDS until the submarine exfiltrates to a safer area where the team members can be thoroughly decontaminated and provided medical treatment. • An Army SF (Special Forces) team, conducting SR from two hide sites and a mission support site, is tasked to perform point detection as a means of standoff detection for a conventional force. All three sites show positive readings for chemical contamination and it is determined the team will begin showing effects of contamination which, if left untreated, may result in death. The joint special operations task force (JSOTF) commander must determine whether to keep the team in place until link-up or extract them, possibly compromising US intentions and alerting the enemy as to the depth of SOF operations in the enemy rear area. If the team is to be extracted, critical decisions will be made regarding a clean aircraft picking up contaminated team members. For further information on SR, refer to FM 31-20-5, Special Reconnaissance Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Special Forces and JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. e. Direct Action (DA). These are short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive surgical actions by SOF or SO capable units to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or materiel. DA mission activities include raids, ambushes and direct assaults, standoff attacks, terminal guidance operations, precision destruction operations, recovery operations (including noncombatant evacuation), anti-surface warfare, mine warfare, and amphibious warfare. When conducting DA against an adversary’s NBC capabilities, SOF must consider the collateral effects of the strike. These collateral effects may cause NBC hazards that could affect SOF operating in the area. An example of a DA mission conducted in an NBC environment follows. • As part of a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO), SOF elements are sent to evacuate American citizens from a remote location in the vicinity of a chemical plant. Local nationals set the plant ablaze, spreading chemical toxins over the area and possibly contaminating the American citizens. The JSOTF commander must contend with the mission complications of: contamination by toxic industrial materials (TIMs), SOF aircraft entering contaminated areas to pick up American citizens who have no personal NBC protective equipment, and resultant casualties. For further information on DA, refer to JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. f. Psychological Operations (PSYOP). PSYOP are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The fear of the horrific capability of NBC weapons can cause unreasoned panic in many groups. PSYOP themes can educate and reduce fears in friendly populations, influence neutral nations, and be turned against hostile nations threatening use of NBC weapons. An example of PSYOP conducted in support of NBC defense operations follows. • The US, as part of a multinational force, deploys a JTF to a friendly country to compel a regional despot to withdraw from illegally occupied territory. The despot threatens use of chemical and biological weapons against the friendly country, multinational force, and a neutral country in the region. The JTF and multinational force develop a coordinated/integrated PSYOP campaign comprised of multiple themes, objectives, and aims. One theme is directed to the civilian populations of the friendly and neutral countries to prepare them for possible NBC attack and supports their respective national defense plans. Another theme is directed towards the world community and seeks condemnation of the despot for violation of international laws and treaties banning use of NBC weapons. A major theme is directed towards the despot’s government, armed forces, and general population. This theme highlights the extreme moral variance that use of NBC weapons has with the primary religion of the rogue country and implies the likelihood of strong retaliation with specific examples of consequences.

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Chapter I
For further information on PSYOP, refer to JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations; and JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations. g. Civil Affairs (CA). A commander has an inherent responsibility to establish and maintain effective relations between military forces, civil authorities, the general population, resource providers, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and institutions in friendly, neutral, or hostile areas where military forces are employed. The conduct of such relations is called civil-military operations (CMO). Properly executed CMO can reduce potential friction points between the civilian population and the joint force, specifically by eliminating civilian interference with military operations. Use of CA forces and units specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct CA activities in support of CMO can assist the commander in dealing with civilians affected by NBC environments. The following is an example of CMO conducted in an NBC enviornment. • A joint force commander (JFC) is preparing to conduct joint urban operations (JUO) in support of a host nation (HN) against an external neighboring adversary who recently captured and occupied a strategic HN port city. A fanatical religious terrorist organization, traditionally supported by the external adversary, is active in this city. The terrorists claim to have biological agents and threaten release against the city’s population if the HN and JFC retake the city. The JFC directs his CA forces to assist HN officials evaluate HN capabilities and to enhance mitigation of the threat if carried out. CA generalists assess anticipated requirements and realistic HN capabilities, to include evacuation and transportation routes that will not interfere with military operations. CA specialists work with HN civil defense, and medical and public health counterparts to develop and implement a coordinated emergency civil response plan. CA personnel set up a civil-military operations center (CMOC) to coordinate support for the HN from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations (IOs), and the United Nations, all of whom have offered help. CA and HN officials coordinate closely with PSYOP, public affairs, and other public information agencies to provide factual information and rumor control. For further information on CA, refer to JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations; JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations; and JP 3-57.1, Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs. h. Unconventional Warfare (UW). UW involves use of indigenous or surrogate forces that are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed by SOF in support of US national objectives in the full range of military and paramilitary operations. UW includes guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. UW is complicated by the presence of NBC weapons. Proficient in local languages, SOF assist indigenous forces with combat skills training, NBC defense training, intelligence, communications, PSYOP, civic action projects, and medical support. Working in these activities can either be conducted in support of conventional forces, acting as a force multiplier in an integrated theater campaign, or as part of a stand-alone unconventional operation. However, regardless of the manner in which UW is conducted, the threat or active use of NBC weapons can further complicate normal operational and logistic sustainment factors as well as uncover cultural fears never before actualized. Examples of UW conducted in an NBC environment follow. • An SF team is preparing for insertion and linkup with an indigenous force not possessing NBC defensive equipment. Because the hostile government recently used chemicals against portions of the rebellious indigenous population, the USG decides to equip the force with IPE. A command logistical and training problem confronts the SF team when the supported indigenous force demands NBC protection for their families located within the camp and a nearby city. • The USG decides to inoculate the supported indigenous force and their families against a biological hazard. As word spreads that the SF team has inoculated the force and their families, large numbers of other indigenous personnel arrive at the clandestine base pleading for inoculation. For further information on UW, refer to FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations and ST 31-187, Standing Operating Procedures for Special Forces Operational Detachments in Unconventional Warfare. i. Information Operations (IO). Information operations are a means to support the objectives of the National Security Strategy by enhancing decision superiority and by influencing foreign perceptions. SOF continuously conducts information operations as part of daily operations to achieve information dominance and national security objectives. SOF implementation of IO will allow SOF to attain a relative advantage in the information environment, which in-turn, will shift the central focus from predominately SOF operations using direct action to obtaining information dominance. • Information Operations (IO) involve actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. IO apply across all phases of an operation and the range of military operations, and at every level of war. Information warfare is IO conducted during time of crisis or conflict (including war)

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to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries. Defensive IO activities are conducted on a continuous basis and are an inherent part of force employment across the range of military operations. IO may involve complex legal and policy issues requiring careful review and national-level coordination and approval. • All SOF principal or collateral missions may employ information operations tasks. Likewise, all SOF missions may be supported through the employment of IO capabilities. The increasing requirement for SOF to participate in military operations other than war (MOOTW) is based upon inherent capabilities that may be employed in peacetime to deter a crisis, control crisis escalation, project power, or promote peace. An adversary's nodes, links, human factors, weapon systems, and data are particularly lucrative targets, capable of being affected through the use of lethal and nonlethal applications of coordinated SOF IO capabilities. • SOF IO plans support regional and transnational security objectives in coordination with, and complementary to, other USG activities as part of an overarching political-military strategy. SOF IO effectiveness is greatest during times of peace when SOF are in a premium position to assist in deterring the eruption of violent conflicts or the development, transport, and use of NBC weapons. IO may influence and shape perceptions/intent of target audiences, offering an alternative to kinetic solutions. • The unique capabilities of SO enable the JSOTF to support the joint force commander (JFC) by accessing, altering, degrading, delaying, disrupting, denying, or destroying adversary information systems throughout the full range of SO. • Synchronization of SO tactical and operational theater-level IO activities in concert with other DOD and national agencies significantly enhances SO IO effectiveness on a strategic level. SO psychological operations, civil affairs, and public affairs further assist in managing foreign perceptions, particularly regarding NBC threats requiring a continuous effort that spans peace, crisis, and conflict. • Mature SOF IO capabilities, consisting of both offensive and defensive measures; provide force protection for SOF that may be required to operate in high threat or high-risk NBC environments. Information protection is a prerequisite for SOF force protection and achieving decision-superiority and mitigation of NBC threats. For further information on IO, refer to JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.

3. Special Operations Collateral Activities in NBC Environments
SO principal missions are enduring and will change infrequently; however, SO collateral activities will shift more readily because of the changing international environment. SOF are not manned, trained, or equipped for collateral activities. SOF conduct collateral activities in an NBC environment using the inherent capabilities resident in the principal missions. Collateral activities conducted under actual or threatened NBC conditions require the same adjustments as made for the principal missions. The following discussions include examples of situations that may confront planners and individuals conducting collateral activities in an NBC environment. a. Coalition Support. Coalition support improves the interaction of coalition partners and US military forces. It includes training coalition partners on tactics and techniques, assisting with communications interface to integrate them into the coalition command and intelligence structure, and establishing liaison to coordinate for combat support and combat service support. SOF teams assigned to coalition units often provide the JFC (joint force commander) with an accurate evaluation of the capabilities, location, and activities of coalition forces, thus facilitating JFC command and control (C2). This activity was first employed during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM and has been critical in subsequent multinational operations. Past successes of these operations in assisting and integrating coalition units into multinational military operations has made it likely that coalition support will become an important aspect of future multinational operations. Examples of considerations confronting planners and personnel in an NBC environment follow. • An SF coalition support team (CST) is planning to link up with a supported force from a country not possessing adequate stocks of individual NBC defensive equipment. While the team will carry its required minimum deployment package of NBC clothing and equipment, serious problems will arise if an NBC attack occurs and the team goes into full protective posture in the presence of an unprotected supported force. To accomplish its mission of improving the interaction between the coalition partner and US military forces, the team’s highest priority becomes coordinating for the US to supply adequate amounts of NBC protection to the supported force. Failure to procure the equipment will effect the post-attack sustainability of the mission and threaten the welfare of the team.

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b. Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR). CSAR involves a specific task performed by rescue forces to effect the recovery of distressed personnel during war or military operations other than war (MOOTW). With the expanding role of counterforce in US counterproliferation of WMD, CSAR missions may occur to rescue forces involved in the strike of an adversary’s NBC capability. CSAR may have to be conducted in the hazards created by the collateral effect. Planners and personnel conducting CSAR in these environments must use NBC hazard avoidance and protection principles. Joint doctrine states that each Service and USSOCOM are responsible for performing CSAR for their respective forces. SOF maintains an inherent and/or organic capability to conduct self personnel recovery and/or CSAR within its core mission force structure. When CSAR requirements exceed theater joint CSAR (JCSAR) capabilities, SOF may be directed (on a case-by-case basis) to perform JCSAR missions. However, JCSAR taskings will be conducted at the expense of core SOF mission readiness and/or capabilities. The unique ability of SOF to penetrate hostile defense systems and conduct joint air, ground, or sea operations deep within hostile or denied territory at night, or in adverse weather, make SOF highly suited for this mission. Based on these capabilities, the JFC may task SOF to participate in the joint search and rescue center. • CSAR in an NBC environment brings about many challenges. First, CSAR in any environment requires extensive mission preparation, coordination among all CSAR components, and a clearly defined chain of command. Often, personnel and equipment will be forward deployed to a launch location in order to shorten response time into the AOR. An NBC environment greatly increases the need for coordination. An important planning factor is to make some decisions prior to mission notification that can reduce response times. An example is whether to limit the travel of rescue assets to only clean environments. A critical factor in making such a decision may be the limited decontamination materials/procedures available for aircraft, especially non-pressurized cabins in helicopters. Contaminating a recovery asset early in a conflict may render the asset unusable or require all personnel to wear full individual protective equipment (IPE) when in contact with the asset. Secondly, aircrew will have to be wearing their aircrew ensemble prior to launch. Certain situations may not allow a crew to don IPE after mission notification. Thirdly, the aircraft should be configured to handle contaminated personnel (i.e. line aircraft cabin with nonabsorbing material to reduce contamination transfer to aircraft). Recovery assets required to operate in an NBC environment should carry additional decontamination material and ground ensembles for expedient field decontamination. Finally, recovery personnel should be prepared to conduct the recovery rendezvous with the survivor in full IPE. For further information on CSAR, refer to JP 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR). c. Counterdrug (CD) Activities. CD activities are active measures taken to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. The CD mission is very similar to FID and UW missions. Using their skills in cross-cultural communication, SOF train host nation (HN) CD forces on critical skills required to conduct small-unit CD operations. SOF CD activities are in support of the geographic combatant commander’s regional CD campaign plan or the US Ambassador’s countryspecific CD plan. PSYOP units, as part of the geographic combatant commander’s overt peacetime PSYOP program, provide tailored CD-specific PSYOP support to regional CD activities. CA units support US and HN efforts abroad by assisting in the planning, and organizing of CD operations. Whenever SOF are conducting CD against an adversary there is an inherent chemical [TIM] hazard risk. SOF commanders must conduct a vulnerability analysis to determine risk, active defense measures, and passive defensive measures. An example of a CD activity conducted in this toxic environment follows. • A SOF-trained HN CD force is planning to conduct small-unit operations to locate and destroy clandestine cocaine laboratories. The laboratories are known to store large quantities of chemicals required for production. These chemicals, if combined and set ablaze, can create toxic hazards. Accordingly, the SOF team has ensured the CD force is equipped with appropriate IPE and trained in tactics, techniques, and procedures for operating in toxic environments. For further information on CD, refer to JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations. d. Humanitarian Demining Operations (HDO). These are operations by US forces supporting a DOD program to help selected HNs establish their own demining organizations capable of conducting long term and self-sustaining operations to reduce or eliminate the suffering and threats to the safety of its civilian populations caused by landmines and associated unexploded ordnance. SOF teams train HN cadre in techniques to locate, identify, and destroy landmines and unexploded ordnance. PSYOP teams assist the HN governments in developing and implementing mine awareness programs to train local populations in the identification, avoidance, and procedure to report locations of landmines and unexploded ordnance until these threats are removed. CA teams train the HN demining headquarters in management, administration, logistics, communications, and command and control of its subordinate elements. CA assets also provide liaison with the USG, UN, international organizations (IOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to coordinate support of the HN demining infrastructure. An example of an HDO conducted in an NBC environment follows.

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• SOF-trained HN demining elements inadvertently explode several chemical mines in a minefield next to and upwind from an inhabited small town. The resulting contamination of the town’s population causes the SOF/HDO team to react in support of the HN. The SF medical specialists, supported by the remainder of the team, conduct an initial assessment and render aid. Coordinating with USG agencies in country, CA personnel advise and assist the HN demining organization in mitigation of the incident through HN, international organizations, NGOs, and US resources. PYSOP personnel assist the HN government with the public information program and other appropriate themes to the HN population. For further information on HDO, refer to JP 3-15, Joint Doctrine for Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare. e. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA). FHA involves programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. FHA provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of HN civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA. SOF units are well suited to perform FHA activities in remote areas because of their rapid deployability, regional orientation, organic communications, and ability to sustain operations under adverse environmental conditions. SOF can assess the needs of an area quickly and communicate this assessment to a JFC or ambassador designing a plan to alleviate suffering. In support of FHA, CA is particularly important in organizing civilian infrastructure; PSYOP are integral to fostering popular support. Participation in FHA requires significant interagency coordination. For further information on FHA, refer to JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. f. Peace Operations (PO). PO encompasses peacekeeping operations (PKO) and peace enforcement operations (PEO) conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace. Although PO are guided by the six principles of military operations other than war (objective, security, unity of effort, legitimacy, perserverance, and restraint), the principles of war should be considered in those peace operations where combat operations are possible. SOF, because of their capabilities are ideally suited for peace operations and are often the lead military organization when participating in these types of missions with conventional forces. For further information on PO, refer to JP 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations. g. Security Assistance (SA). SA consists of groups of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as amended) and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (as amended), or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. The primary SOF role in SA is to provide mobile training teams (MTTs) and other forms of training assistance. Personnel conducting SA are prohibited by law from performing combatant duties. SOF are particularly effective in SA because they use the same regional orientation, communications, mobility, and expertise developed for FID and UW missions. SA is a particularly valued mission because SOF train themselves in skills useful in operations other than war while they train or otherwise assist foreign military forces. An example of SA conducted in a potential NBC environment follows. • A SOF MTT planning to provide training (to include NBC defense TTP) to a friendly foreign military force is aware that many soldiers within the supported force do not shave for cultural and religious reasons. Beards prevent an airtight seal with US supplied masks. Therefore, the team advises the supported force commander to issue his soldiers disposable razors to be carried in their mask carrying cases and to be used prior to the threat of an NBC attack (normally up to three days of beard growth does not hinder mask seal). The team also advises procurement of masks which close around the neck as a long-term solution. For additional information on SA, refer to JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense; JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance; and JP 3-57, Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs. h. Special Activities. Special activities are actions conducted abroad in support of national foreign policy objectives. These activities are planned and executed so that the role of the USG is not apparent or acknowledged publicly. SOF may perform any of their primary missions during special activities, subject to the limitations imposed by Executive Order 12333. Special activities require a Presidential finding and Congressional oversight.

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CHAPTER II
SOF OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS AND POTENTIAL NBC THREATS
“NBC warfare is not a separate, special form of war, but instead a battlefield condition just like rain, snow, darkness, electronic warfare, heat and so on. Units must train to accomplish their wartime missions under all battlefield conditions. Whenever NBC is separated from other training events, we condition our soldiers to regard operations under NBC conditions as a separate form of warfare.”
Officer comment during chemical training SOLID SHIELD '87 Army Chemical Review, January 1988

1. General
NBC weapons and hazards can directly influence the battlespace and physical environment in which SOF operate. The most notable influences of the physical environment are weather and terrain. Weather conditions are the “uncontrollable wildcard” of NBC employment and provide useful clues to probable times and places for NBC use (i.e., employment windows). Diligent tracking of weather conditions aids in the assessment of risks to SOF from NBC weapons, as well as toxic industrial materials (TIM) hazards. In concert with weather conditions, the terrain influences where NBC effects may concentrate (e.g., chemical agents in low-lying areas) and in many cases, it influences enemy NBC targeting (e.g., exploiting or creating chokepoints). The areas of responsibility (AORs) in which SOF operate may contain several environments, each with a distinct set of NBC planning factors and considerations.

Trained to operate in the world’s environments, SOF must adapt standard operating procedures to NBC threats.

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Chapter II SECTION A. SOF AOR OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS 2. Urban Areas
a. Urban structures such as sewers, storm drains, reinforced concrete buildings, subways, and basements, etc., can protect against spray attacks of chemical or biological agents and the effects of nuclear blast and radiation. However, this exchange for overhead cover creates other problems. Chemical agents tend to act differently in urban areas and will tend to collect in low areas; nonpersistent agents may enter buildings or seep into piles of rubble. SOF personnel should avoid these low areas. Also, SOF personnel should attempt to shut down ventilation systems in urban structures to prevent the spread of vapor or aerosol hazards. The persistency of an agent can greatly increase when it has settled in these areas. Once an attack has occurred, detection of chemical contamination becomes very important. Personnel must thoroughly check areas before attempting to occupy or traverse them. b. The stable environment of an urban area may increase the persistency of live biological agents and the effectiveness of toxins. Existing food and water supplies are prime targets for biological agents. Personal hygiene becomes very important. Leaders must establish and consistently enforce sanitary and personal hygiene measures, including immunizations. They also must ensure that all personnel drink safe water and never assume that any local water is safe. c. The population density of an urban area must be considered. During planning, the potential of encountering a large number of contaminated, panicked, injured, and dying people must be considered. d. Urban areas can be susceptible to an adversary's use of TIMs as a weapon, especially if there is a sizable chemical industry or storage facilities associated with the area. SOF should be aware of potential hazardous materials they may encounter. For additional information see FM 3-4, NBC Protection, Appendix A.

3. Desert Areas
Desert operations may present additional problems. Desert daytime temperatures can vary from 90°F to 125°F resulting in unstable temperature gradients that are not particularly favorable to biological/chemical (BC) attacks. Evaporation of chemical agents during the day will rapidly create a downwind hazard and an inhalation problem. However, with nightfall, the desert cools rapidly, and a stable temperature gradient occurs creating the possibility of night or early morning attacks. For additional information see FM 3-4, NBC Protection, Appendix A.

4. Low Terrain, Temperate Zone Areas
a. An adversary's use of BC (biological/chemical) or TIMs can be effective in this environment when forces are not prepared. Use of these weapons (nonpersistent) are more efficient when employed at night and during periods of inversion conditions. Terrain features such as tall grass or scrub brush have the tendency to retard the flow of an agent cloud, thus reducing the overall size of the contamination. Also, the grass and brush may absorb the chemical agent, which would not pose a significant effect on the mission. However, movement through the area requires care be taken as the absorbed agent may be released when the vegetation is disturbed or crushed, creating a secondary toxic hazard. Persistent agents can cling to vegetation, creating surface exposure and an off-gasing during daylight. TIMs, such as chlorine, may tend to meander, as would a fog. b. Movement of a biological aerosol over grass and brush reduces the concentration as the particles impact on vegetation and settle out of the air. However, the cover provided by vegetation protects the biological agent from the weather and; thus, favors its survivability, specifically wet aerosols. For additional information see FM 3-6, Field Behavior of NBC Agents.

5. Mountain Areas
a. Terrain and weather in mountainous areas magnify the requirement for a high degree of NBC defense preparedness. Rugged terrain limits the employment of large forces, reduces maneuver, and impedes logistical support. Shelters are difficult to dig and may require improvisation using existing rocks, snow, and timber. However, this same terrain may also provide caves, ravines, and cliffs as a natural source of protection.

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SOF Operating Environments and Potential NBC Threats
b. Chemical agents are heavier than air and will settle in valleys and depressions. Subject to mountain breezes, agents will move down and within the valley. Thus, high dosages are less likely on crests or sides of ridges or hills. c. Radiation contamination will be erratic due to rapid changes in wind patterns but at the same time, the range of thermal effect increases with the clarity of mountain air. The location of hot spots may be erratic. Additionally, a nuclear blast can produce rock and snow slides. d. Colder mountainous temperatures may affect biological agents in the same manner as cold weather. For additional information see FM 3-4, NBC Protection, Appendix A.

6. Jungle Areas
a. Tropical climates require the highest degree of individual discipline and conditioning to maintain effective NBC defensive readiness. Leaders and staff planners must expect and plan for a rapid decrease in unit efficiency. They also must anticipate heat casualties. Strict adherence to field sanitation is necessary. In addition, they must ensure that special precautions are taken to maintain unit NBC defense equipment in usable condition. The rapid mildew, dry rot, and rust inherent in jungle areas necessitate this requirement. b. Dominant climatic features of jungle areas are high, constant temperatures; heavy rainfall; and very high humidity. These features increase the survivability of biological agents. In thick jungle there is usually little or no wind, and the canopy blocks most of the sunlight from the ground, thus providing excellent conditions for adversary use of biological agents and toxins. c. The same canopy that may provide slight shielding from radiation may also enhance blast effect with tree blow-downs and projectiles. Also, a lack of penetrating wind may result in decreased downwind hazards. d. A jungle canopy creates good overhead cover from aircraft spray. However, persistent agents delivered by artillery or bombs may penetrate the canopy before being released, thus creating a hazard in the immediate area of impact. e. Additionally, rains can wash radiation into water collection areas producing hot spots. For additional information see FM 3-4, NBC Protection, Appendix A.

7. Cold Weather Regions
a. Cold weather conditions create many added problems in NBC defense. During the winter months, 45 percent of the North American landmass and 65 percent of the Eurasian landmass are characterized by extreme cold and deep snow. These areas include Korea, China, Bosnia, Kosovo, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and the United States. The former Soviet Union developed procedures to weaponize a series of agents to be effective in extreme cold weather. Some of those agents do not have known freezing points. In temperatures from -20° to -40°F, agents such as Sarin [GB] become like a thickened Soman [GD]. Choking agents have increased persistency from 0° to -40°F. Even hydrogen cyanide [AC] which solidifies at -14°F can be disseminated as fine particles, thereby increasing its effective time and threat. Mustard agents employed through pyrotechnic devices create effective vapor hazards far below the freezing point of mustard. b. Most decontaminants have reduced effectiveness at temperatures below 0°F. In field conditions decontaminant effectiveness would be reduced due to impurities in agents and decontaminants. Present detection technology is not effective in cold environments. An agent must be in liquid or vapor form and in significant quantities in order to be detected by currently available equipment. In cold environments agents may be undetectable, yet still hazardous. c. Frozen contamination must be prevented from being tracked into a warmed area such as a tent, heating to form a vapor and then producing a deadly off-gassing hazard. Agents mixed with frozen water can adhere to protective clothing, thereby preventing removal of the hazard. These hazards may occur as temperatures increase from night to day and decrease from day to night. d. Special precautions and actions to be considered for conducting cold weather chemical decontamination:

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Special Precautions Checklist
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Whenever possible, conduct detailed troop decontamination (DTD) in a warm tent, gross contamination must be removed prior to DTD. Provide warming tents for contaminated soldiers working on the decon line. Place chemical agent alarms in all warming tents. In most cases the alarms would not detect contamination outside. Drain all decon equipment of water during storage to prevent water freezing and damaging the equipment. Minimize digging because it increases the risk of vapor hazards. Contaminates may be trapped in frozen layers below the surface. When soldiers dig, the layer becomes exposed to the surface, where the temperature creates a different vapor pressure. The change in vapor pressure may create a new hazard. Check a core snow sample when entering a new assembly area. Contaminants can become occluded in snow and ice. This makes detection difficult and may increase the spread of contamination. Snow may drift for miles. Contaminants may be trapped in a layer beneath the surface. NBC recon teams should take samples of snow from several layers by digging in a few areas. Test the snow with detection paper - M8 or M9 paper. If possible, warm the snow to a liquid and test it with a chemical agent monitor (CAM). Mission oriented protective posture does not prevent cold weather injuries.

e. Use of nuclear weapons in arctic conditions can increase the effects and potential casualties at greater distances from ground zero (GZ). Personnel should be aware of potential snow blindness and burns, avalanches as far as 30 kilometers (km) from GZ, quick thaws and freezes, and frozen material/snow storms. f. In cold temperatures, biological agents are more persistent. For additional information refer to FM 3-4, NBC Protection, Appendix A; and TC 3-10, Commander’s Tactical NBC Handbook.

8. Maritime Environments and Riverine Areas
a. Maritime Environments. SOF operating in maritime environments have the potential of encountering chemical, biological, or radiological attacks from the shoreline; however, a chemical attack is considered the most likely. Delivery of a nonpersistent chemical agent, in favorable climatic conditions, is no different across open water from that of low, rolling terrain. The effects of wind and heavy surf will tend to disperse a chemical cloud. Direct use of persistent agents against deploying forces is not considered feasible, but contamination of a beach would provide a formidable barrier. Note – mustard agents can remain for extended periods of time on the surface of the water. Surface vessels operating in support of SOF risk being attacked by artillery, missile, or air depending on their offshore location. The feasibility of the use of biological agents, except against large targets, would be considered low, however, radiological contamination as a barrier should be considered in any plan. b. Riverine Areas. Operations on and around rivers present situations that have a potential to disrupt operations. Use of both persistent and nonpersistent agents will require SOF to establish mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) levels that could degrade personnel effectiveness. During inversion climatic conditions, nonpersistent chemical agent clouds have the tendency to follow a river’s path when channeled by the high grass and brush along the banks. See Appendix G, “NBC Hazard Prediction.” Persistent agent could be used to contaminate the riverbanks. For additional information refer to FM 3-6, Field Behavior of NBC Agents.

9. Atmospheric Environments
a. SOF planning involving aviation assets should consider the possibility of both external and internal aircraft contamination. Three primary regimes need to be considered: • Operating/Staging Bases. The possibility of NBC use against airfields where SOF aviation assets are operating should always be considered. Airfields are typically wide-open and have well known, publicly available, and highly accurate coordinates making them easy to target. To minimize the effects of NBC attacks, SOF personnel, aircraft, supplies, and support assets should be dispersed and covered (situation permitting). The typically clear, wide-open nature of most airfields

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will allow nonpersistent chemical agents to disperse quickly. Assets should be protected against NBC contaminants that adhere to surfaces – covering allows quick reuse after an attack. • En Route. The likelihood of NBC contamination while airborne is remote, with the odds decreasing as altitude increases. Increasing altitude, however, increases the risks of detection by threat systems, and must be weighed against mission requirements. Flying through rain and clouds increases the possibility of partial decontamination to outside surfaces when transiting to and from objective areas. • Objective Area Operations. The greatest potential for contamination is during objective area operations – infiltration/ exfiltration (infil/exfil), airdrop, or other operations that require SOF aircraft to operate in close proximity to the ground. The aircraft will typically be “opened up,” increasing the possibility of internal aircraft contamination from the effects of NBC agents and the blast from propellers/rotors and contaminated personnel/equipment requiring infil/exfil. SOF aircrews must be prepared to operate in an NBC environment and anticipate the additional requirements of passengers during missions. b. The decision to send aircraft into situations where they will likely become internally contaminated should consider the inability to effectively decontaminate (decon) aircraft in a timely manner and doing so will likely require the aircraft to be maintained and flown in a “dirty” condition.

SECTION B. POTENTIAL THREATS 10. Biological Agents
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defines a biological agent as a microorganism (or its toxin) that causes disease or deterioration of material. Biological agents are generally directed against the respiratory system to maximize the organism’s ability to diffuse directly into the bloodstream and bodily tissue. Individual protective equipment (IPE) generally provides protection against a biological warfare (BW) attack. a. Generally, biological warfare agents may be classified into two broad groups: • Pathogens—microorganisms that produce disease in humans, animals, and/or plants (e.g. protozoa, fungi, bacteria, rickettsia, and viruses). • Toxins—any toxic substance that can be produced by a living organism. b. Most organisms are naturally occurring and can be found in almost any environment. Without proper hygiene and appropriate vaccines, they have the capability to rapidly cause incapacitating or lethal illness. When employed as a warfare agent, biological agents can be disseminated in aerosol form, by vectors such as mosquitoes and ticks, or through contaminated food or water. For additional biological agent operational planning considerations see Appendix G, "NBC Hazard Prediction."

11. Chemical Agents
a. Chemical warfare (CW) agents produce both immediate and delayed effects that will degrade operations through lethal, incapacitating, or other damaging effects to individuals as well as contamination of equipment, supplies, and critical terrain features. The types of chemical warfare agents that could be encountered by USSOCOM forces are classified as lethal and incapacitating. Agents may exist as solids, liquids, or gases. In addition, toxic industrial materials (TIMs) and potentially dangerous herbicides/pesticides could be encountered accidentally or employed by an adversary. b. CW agents are grouped according to use. They can either be lethal or incapacitating. Lethal agents produce serious injury requiring medical attention (death may occur when used in field concentrations). Incapacitating agents produce temporary physiological or mental effects and may not require medical treatment to recover. Both types of agents may hinder the ability to carry out the mission. • Lethal agents are chemical substances intended for use in military operations to kill, seriously injure, or hinder military operations through their physiological effects. They are classified as nerve, choking, or blood agents. Nerve agents are considered the primary agents of threat to the US military because of their high toxicity and effectiveness through multiple

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routes of entry. Nerve agents attack the body’s nervous system. Even small quantities are extremely toxic and can cause death in less than 15 minutes, if not treated. • Incapacitating agents include blister (mustards) and compounds that effect the nervous system (BZ, LSD, etc.). Note – blister agents such as mustard when received in high enough doses and/or not treated properly may be lethal. Attack by these agents may cause additional constraints by taxing the logistical force to provide additional medical support personnel and treatment. c. Lethal and incapacitating agents may be disseminated by artillery, mortar shells, rockets, bombs, or aircraft spray. They may be persistent or nonpersistent and produce immediate casualties among unprotected troops, restrict friendly use of terrain, objectives, and equipment, degrade friendly combat effectiveness by forcing protective posture and creating confusion and stress, especially among leaders. d. Nerve agents also have been produced and used by terrorist groups as evidenced by the use of Sarin [GB] in the Tokyo, Japan subway attack. For additional chemical agent operational planning considerations see Appendix G, “NBC Hazard Prediction.”

12. Toxic Industrial Materials (TIMs)
Although less lethal than current chemical warfare agents, industrial materials often are available in enormous quantities, do not require expensive research programs, are easily mass produced, do not violate the Chemical Weapons Convention, and can still produce mass casualties. TIMs could be released from industrial plants or storage depots through battle damage, as consequence of a strike against a particular facility, or as a desperation measure during military operations. They could also be utilized as improvised chemical weapons and have potential for inclusion in clandestine programs or contingency plans. Note: IPE does not protect against all TIMs, e.g., IPE will not protect the wearer from ammonia-based or chlorinebased industrial chemicals. For additional TIM operational planning considerations see Appendix G, “NBC Hazard Prediction.”

13. Riot Control Agents (RCAs)
RCAs are chemicals that produce temporary irritating or disabling effects when in contact with the eye or when inhaled. Generally used in the control of violent disorders, they can be effectively employed to contaminate terrain and to cause degrading effects on individuals, requiring them to use IPE for protection. US policy does not classify RCAs as chemical warfare agents. Presidential Executive Order 11850 establishes the national policy for the use of RCAs by US forces in combat. For additional RCA operational planning considerations see, Appendix G, “NBC Hazard Prediction.”

14. Nuclear
Nuclear weapons are similar to conventional weapons insofar as their destructive action is due mainly to blast or shock. However, nuclear explosions can be millions of times more powerful than the largest conventional detonations. For the release of a given amount of energy, the material mass required for a nuclear explosion would be much less than that of a conventional explosion. Nuclear effects are divided into four categories — blast/overpressure, heat and light (thermal radiation), radioactivity (alpha, beta, gamma, and neutron), and electromagnetic pulse (EMP). a. Blast/Overpressure. The blast wave created by an explosion produces a shock front that travels rapidly away from the fireball behaving like a moving wall of highly compressed air (approximately 900 miles/hour). When this blast wave strikes the surface of the earth, it is reflected back causing a second wave to be formed, which will eventually merge with the first wave (called Mach effect). When this occurs, the “overpressure” will essentially double. Winds generated by the blast of the weapon could reach several hundred miles per hour at ground zero, and be as high as 70 mph as far as six miles away. b. Thermal Radiation. Immediately after a detonation, weapon residues emit primary thermal radiation (x-rays) which are adsorbed within a few feet of air. This energy is then re-emitted from the fireball as thermal radiation consisting of ultraviolet, visible, and infrared rays. There are two distinct thermal pulses that result from the detonation.

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• First Pulse: Lasts about a second, high temperatures, and can cause flash blindness or retinal burns. • Second Pulse: Lasts about 10 seconds, carries about 99 percent of the thermal radiation energy, and causes skin burns and fires. c. Radioactivity. A detonation emits various forms of nuclear radiation (alpha, beta particles, gamma rays, and neutrons) that are referred to as initial and residual radiation. The initial radiation is emitted within the first minute of the detonation, and residual is that radiation released after that time. • Initial radiation: Requires extensive shielding, creates additional radiation contamination, and can affect materials such as those used in electronic systems (e.g., radio and radar sets, gyroscopes, and computers). • Residual radiation: Primary hazard is fallout. d. Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP). An electromagnetic signal produced by a nuclear detonation is commonly known as EMP. EMP induced currents and voltages can cause electronic component equipment failure, affecting a wide range of electric and communication equipment, global positioning systems, command control nodes, vehicle ignition systems, avionics, and fire control systems. For additional nuclear operational planning considerations see, Appendix G, “NBC Hazard Prediction.”

15. Radiological
Nuclear threats are associated with the explosive detonation of special nuclear material. The radiological threat deals with radiation hazards and radioactive materials that may be in more common use. The threat of low level radiation exists in all operations. This threat can exist in certain expended rounds (depleted uranium), damaged or destroyed equipment, or contaminated shrapnel. It also may occur from inadequate nuclear waste disposal, deterioration of nuclear power facilities, damage to facilities that routinely use radioactive material/sources, and the direct employment of radioactive materials/compounds by an adversary (terrorism). Specialized detection equipment is required to detect lower levels of radiation. For additional radiological operational planning considerations see, Appendix G, “NBC Hazard Prediction.”

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CHAPTER III
PLANNING STAFF NBC CONSIDERATIONS IN PREMISSION ACTIVITIES
“… SOF face an operational environment characterized by accelerating geopolitical change, rapid technological advancement, evolving threats, constrained resources, and potential new roles. These factors require innovative thinking and new ways to shape change to provide the widest array of options in protecting America’s interests. And the truth is, business as usual will not provide the capabilities needed to deal with the transnational and asymmetric threats of tomorrow.”
SOF Posture Statement 1998 H. Allen Holmes Fmr. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict) General Peter J. Schoomaker Commander in Chief U.S. Special Operations Command

Commanders at all levels must understand the NBC threat environment to be able to give accurate detailed “commander’s guidance.”

1. Purpose
This chapter provides planning considerations to supplement those already in place when conducting deliberate or timesensitive planning for operations in an NBC environment. Primarily designed for JTF/JSOTF staff planners, these considerations can be applied to any staff involved in the planning for operations in an NBC environment. Detailed mission planning is vital to SOF mission success. Planners at every level must provide the most complete and accurate information available to ensure mission success and personnel survival. SOF NBC planners must be brought in early in premission activities and utilized continuously until mission completion.

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Mission analysis involving NBC, whether during time-sensitive or deliberate planning, must be able to focus staff planners throughout the decision making process. This is accomplished by applying a narrowing down process. A series of questions is used to assess the suitability, feasibility, and acceptability of undertaking a special operation in an NBC threat environment. The following considerations should be incorporated into existing mission analysis standing operating procedures (SOPs) when faced with an NBC threat. a. Analyze Higher Headquarters Order – determine mission and intent, concept, time lines, adjacent units missions, assigned area of operation (AO), review for NBC protection guidance and specified/implied NBC defense tasks, such as exposure guidance. Evaluate potential SOF employment for appropriateness, feasibility, and supportability early in the planning cycle and prior to target assignment (joint targeting coordination board representation). Provide clear guidance to commanders for planning and executing SO. • Is this an appropriate mission for SOF? SOF should be used against those key strategic or operational targets that require unique SOF skills and capabilities. If the targets are not of operational or strategic importance, then SOF should not be assigned. SOF should not be used as a substitute for other forces. • Does this mission support the theater campaign plan? If the mission does not support the JFC’s campaign plan, then there are probably more appropriate missions available for SOF. • Is this mission operationally feasible? Does it require SOF to operate in an NBC environment longer than they can sustain themselves? The Joint Services Lightweight Suit (JSLIST) will provide effective protection from contamination for up to 24 hours once contaminated. Current protective undergarments provide limited protection (up to 12 hours) against vapor exposure only. Butyl rubber gloves provide 6 hours of protection from contamination. Protection factors less than the 24 hours provided by the JSLIST must be planned for (maritime – salt water degrades protection factor). SOF are not structured for attrition or force-on-force warfare and should not be assigned missions that are beyond their capabilities. Planners must consider the vulnerability of SOF units to larger, more heavily armed or mobile forces, particularly when in hostile territory. • Are the required operational resources available to support the mission? Some SOF missions require support from other forces for success. Are these resources capable of supporting in an NBC environment? Support involves aiding, protecting, complementing, and sustaining employed SOF. Support can include airlift, maritime transport, intelligence, communications, and logistic support. Even though a target may be vulnerable to SOF, deficiencies in support may affect the likelihood for success or may entirely invalidate the feasibility of employing SOF. SOF chemical detachments must be considered in planning and prepared to perform "dirty" exfiltration decontamination. • Does the expected outcome justify the risk? Commanders should recognize the high value and limited resources of SOF and ensure that the benefits of the mission are worth the risks. Assessment of risk should consider not only the potential for loss of SOF units and equipment, but also the risk of adverse effects on US diplomatic and political interests should the mission fail. b. Conduct Initial Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace – define the operational environment. Describe the battlespace effects; evaluate the adversary; determine most probable/most dangerous adversary course of action (COA) (including TIM considerations); determine adversary offensive and defensive NBC capabilities; determine adversary NBC usage intent; determine threat values; superstitions, fears, religious beliefs, etc., which may be exploited to deter use of NBC weapons. Determine enemy centers of gravity, vulnerabilities, and limitations. Analyze how the enemy conceptionalizes the situation and the opposing friendly situation. Identify water sources and any local demands against that water supply. Decon sites are located away from local water supplies to prevent contamination of that water source. c. Determine Specified and Implied Tasks – review the plan/order for further specified or implied NBC defense tasks. d. Review Available Assets – review the status of available assets (forces, equipment, supplies, HN support) to support identified tasks.

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Planning Staff NBC Considerations in Premission Activities
Assets Review Checklist
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Availability of detection and identification equipment. Availability of collective protection for rest and relief. Medical pretreatments, prophylaxis, treatments, and evacuation. Decontamination of equipment and casualties. Resupply of expendable gear (e.g. clothing, IPE, masks, gloves, drink bags, medical kits, etc.). Equipment recovery and evacuation of contaminated equipment and personnel. Mortuary affairs – policy, standards, and procedures. Emergency destruction and evacuation of munitions – US or captured. Safe transportation and handling of NBC samples.

e. Determine Constraints – shortage of mission essential assets at the individual/unit/theater level is an immediate constraint on operational capabilities. Other NBC defense constraints include items such as levels and rates of supply, rates of usage, decon throughput capability, water availability, protective suit life expectancy, environmental considerations, military and civilian NBC training readiness, and HN NBC support requirements. Note: include an assessment of psychological impacts of US forces having chemical/biological defense equipment that is not available to HN personnel. f. Identify Critical Facts/Assumptions – determine NBC facts or assumptions that are specific to mission situations. Apply Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, Troops and Support Available, Time Available, and Civil considerations (METTTC) to assist in making determinations. • Analyze the situation in the context of METT-TC. •• Mission refers to the ability of personnel to accomplish the required tasks (while wearing protective equipment) and the criticality of the mission in relation to force survivability (how much risk is acceptable). •• Enemy refers to enemy activity. For example, it would be somewhat fruitless to attempt the “thorough” or “reconstitution” levels of decontamination if chemical-laden missiles were continually impacting or excessive sniper or special forces activity existed. •• Terrain and weather refers to the suitability of the land in regards to decontamination operations. This assessment includes composition, degree of roughness and/or vegetation, vertical slant, availability of water sources, available space, etc. •• Troops and support available refers to the ability and proficiency of personnel. Sufficient personnel (both in the context of numbers and training) may not exist to effectively conduct large-scale decontamination operations. To a degree this factor is interrelated with the “mission” component. On one hand decontamination operations may not be required for a group of people who can function effectively in IPE while at least the appearance of extensive decontamination operations may be needed to motivate personnel who have been psychologically affected by the use of chemical agents. The length of time that personnel have already been at MOPP4 will impact the criticality of decontamination efforts. Personnel will almost certainly need to find or create (decontaminate) a clear area after 36 hours of MOPP4 while this is not nearly as critical at the 2-hour point. •• Time available refers to the timing associated with, or required for task completion. Generally speaking, “thorough” or “reconstitution” decontamination operations are exceptionally time consuming. The factor “time” itself brings options with it. For example, if an area is not needed for mission operations, it can be clearly identified with warning placards and left to weather. •• Civil refers to the local populations that are either contaminated or may become contaminated. For example, a SOF element, possessing complete IPE, may operate in a local village where there is no IPE available. What are the implications of the village coming under NBC attack, and the post attack welfare/sustainability of the protected SOF? What are the likely reactions of the surviving populace and the logistical considerations for scores of sick and dying littering the area, etc.?

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• In addition to the factors associated with METT-TC the following items must be considered. •• Agent Toxicity. While the use of skin decontamination kits associated with “immediate” decontamination is always required, extending the effort into the “personal” level or above may not be required for a variety of reasons. One factor is agent toxicity. For example, if personnel are well trained and protected, the contact hazard associated with miniscule drops of mustard agent (HD) (lethal dose (LD) 50 of 1400 mg per person) does not begin to approach the contact hazard of VX (LD of 5 mg per person – a figure 280 times deadlier). Operational decontamination activities are potentially more beneficial with VX because the human penalty associated with inadvertent contact, e.g. through a hole in a glove, is much higher. •• Agent Persistency. It is probable that some threat agents could have largely dissipated before an installation could get to the point of focusing concentrated decontamination efforts. For example, given a missile ground burst with Sarin (GB) the agent should be effectively weathered in 18 minutes under typical weather conditions of 20°C temperature and three knot wind speed. •• Specific Hazard to Personnel. Personnel must assess whether the hazard is one of contact, inhalation, vapor skin penetration, skin penetration through cuts or scratches only, or ingestion. The answer(s) to these questions provides insight to the type (if any) and extent of decontamination that may be required. •• Type of Contaminated Surface. Chemical agents are removed from some surfaces easier than others are. For example, agents can be easily removed from metal while they cannot be removed from untreated wood or concrete block. The type of surface includes such factors as composition (metal or wood), surface shape (smooth, rough, crinkled, multiple bends or catch basins, etc.), and ability to manipulate the surface (turning over dirt is much easier than turning over runway surfaces). •• Extent of Contamination. The three considerations in this area are total area coverage (small areas are potentially workable where decontamination of large areas is generally not cost effective), the concentration of agent(s) in the area (surface deposition of g/m2 with resulting vapor hazard of mg/m3), and the criticality of the item or area in question. If the items are not essential to mission operations it is easier and safer to let them weather. •• Present or Forecasted Weather Conditions. The effect of weather will play an important part in any decontamination decision, both in terms of the need for the operation and in terms of what effect the weather will have on personnel. Increases in temperature and/or wind speed will result in decreased agency persistency times. However, these same conditions may resuspend agents in dusty or powder form and make it more difficult for personnel to work at MOPP 4. •• Equipment Limitations. This is a critical factor. SOF leadership must accurately compare the numbers and types of decontamination assets available with the decontamination results desired. For example, there may be sufficient M291 kits to handle skin decontamination but insufficient M295 kits to effectively use them for operational decontamination operations. Further, many agent’s characteristics of insolubility with water and limited hydrolysis are determining factors why certain decontamination apparatus, such as the M17, can move contamination (to a degree) from one place to another but cannot neutralize the agent to the point an overall reduction in MOPP easily occurs. g. Conduct Risk Assessment – detailed assessment of risks and mitigating measures during course of action (COA) development. See Appendix E, “NBC Risk Assessment and Vulnerability Analysis Tool.” h. Determine Initial Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) – list less than 10 questions that focus on a specific event and provide intelligence required to support a single critical decision. i. Determine Initial NBC Operation Plan – determine key events or triggers that will initiate NBC actions. Prioritize use of NBC assets. Identify likely NBC or TIM hazard areas (these areas become named areas of interest (NAI)). j. Plan Use of Available Time – overlay friendly timelines with projected enemy timelines to mitigate or exploit the visible windows of risk or opportunity. k. Conduct a Mission Analysis Briefing – brief mission analysis products and recommended restated mission. Key NBC factors should include discussion of NBC and TIM hazards, their associated risks, and critical mitigation measures.

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l. Develop Initial Commander’s Intent – include conditions for success with respect to adversary, the terrain, or the desired end state. m. Issue Commander’s Guidance – key NBC aspects of command guidance include CCIR, risk guidance, priorities of support, (avoidance, protection, decontamination, recon, and smoke), time lines, and rehearsals. n. Issue a Warning Order – a warning order is issued unless the threat is immediate. NBC guidance in unit warning orders is generally restricted to minimum protective posture or time-sensitive requirements, e.g., initiating medical immunizations and prophylaxis, initiating contamination avoidance measures, preparation of medical treatment facilities to receive NBC casualties, and/or preparation for decontamination operations. o. Review Facts/Assumptions.

3. Mission Planning
The effects of NBC weapons can negate the operational advantages afforded SOF because SOF have limited NBC defense infrastructure. Therefore, SOF rely heavily on threat assessment, early detection, contamination avoidance, and self-decontamination. Deployed SOF may operate dismounted and carry all essential equipment with them. If threat analysis does not accurately identify NBC risks, commanders may not consider individual protective equipment (IPE) to be mission essential and may deploy their units without adequate NBC protection. Assuming IPE is available, extended periods in MOPP may be unacceptable under all but emergency conditions. Timely and accurate intelligence, use of field expedients, foreign or captured NBC equipment, and maximum use of weather and terrain are key considerations for SOF operating in NBC environments. Designated SOF detachments are uniquely trained to infiltrate deep into adversary rear areas to confirm or deny the adversary’s NBC capability. The role of SOF in counterforce operations is an integral element of the deliberate planning process. Mission planning must not be limited to individual NBC defensive measures. Planning must consider the overall mission, intent, and subsequent impact. a. Detailed mission planning based on specific, comprehensive, and current intelligence is vital to successful execution of SO missions and, potentially, the very survival of a SOF element. Collection and analysis gives appropriate attention to regional NBC threats. Intelligence assets define the operational environment, describe the battlespace effects, evaluate the adversary, determine most probable/most dangerous adversary COA (including TIM considerations), determine adversary offensive and defensive NBC capabilities, and determine adversary NBC usage intent. SOF personnel must have a thorough knowledge of the operational area, to include geographic, political, social, economic, informational, military (enemy order of battle and operational concepts), and environmental conditions. Also, for some missions, SOF personnel must know the language, customs, ethnic and religious affiliations, and antagonisms of the local population that may affect mission execution (e.g. custom of wearing a beard precludes a tight seal on a gas mask). This level of area orientation is best achieved through previous operational experience, MTTs, deployments for training in the area, or intensive pre-employment study of the intended operational area. b. SO missions must be planned completely — insertion, resupply, fire and maneuver support, extraction — prior to committing the force. The nature of the target, enemy situation, environmental characteristics of the operational area, methods of insertion and extraction, length of force exposure, tactical considerations, logistic requirements, and the size and composition of the command and support structure dictates the size and capabilities of the assigned force. Planners must consider the NBC defense procedures utilized by components when involved in joint operations. Note - consider establishing component working groups to resolve interoperability issues. c. SO mission planners ensure adequate situational awareness is a central concern for commanders and staffs. A welldeveloped and exercised, component compatible NBC warning and reporting system provides a significant measure of protection by assisting forces to avoid the hazard. Accurate and timely understanding of the hazard and its effects minimizes the possibility of either excessive or inadequate protection of the force, maintaining a protective posture longer than necessary, or misusing scarce NBC defense assets such as early warning, detection, reconnaissance, surveillance, and decontamination units. These assets are combat multipliers and must be managed effectively to support the campaign plan and protect capabilities with high vulnerabilities to the effects of NBC weapons. For additional warning information see Appendix G, “NBC Hazard Prediction.” d. SOF missions must include a plan for medical support – management and treatment of casualties, impact of NBC casualties on a mission. Medical NBC defense should be fully integrated into the deliberate planning process in order to

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maximize readiness. Key elements include casualty estimation, prophylaxis, diagnostics, mass casualty management, evacuation of contaminated patients, patient decontamination, evacuation of decontaminated patients to medical treatment, and requirements for stand-by or surge medical operations. JFC’s planning should recognize that NBC attacks have the potential to create mass casualties. The treatment and evacuation of NBC casualties will be difficult and hazardous both to the patients and to medical personnel. e. Planners must ensure interoperability of SOF with conventional forces that either host or support their activities. Common standards for NBC defense, especially training and equipment, must be established in order to maximize effectiveness and prevent inadvertent vulnerabilities in joint force capabilities. Gaps in the NBC defense capabilities of multinational coalition forces must be addressed in order to ensure coalition cohesion and effectiveness in both planning and operations. This is especially true during time-critical contingency operations. For example, if SOF are operating from naval surface vessels during forced entry operations, they must be prepared to function compatibly with the host vessel in the areas of weapons, communications equipment, shipboard logistics, and NBC defense procedures. f. Planners must ensure interoperability of SOF with Host Nation (HN) forces and equipment.

Planners Host Nation Interoperability Checklist
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Determine communications procedures and links to give deployed SOF elements NBC situational awareness. Threat early warning. Threat description (type/level/estimated effects) and updates. Situation-specific guidance on local NBC response. Primary US and/or foreign agencies responsible for providing NBC situational awareness. Determine technical NBC detection capabilities of HN. Determine HN alarm signals and procedures. Determine HN decontamination capabilities for personnel, aircraft, and equipment. Decontamination equipment type/condition/availability. Decontamination procedures. Levels of HN training (currency and proficiency). HN plans/capability for decontaminating HN personnel. Estimated overall effectiveness of HN decontamination capability. Determine specialized decontamination equipment and/or procedures SOF elements must possess while residing on HN installations. Determine HN equipment compatibility – air and ground components. Consider the emergency recall requirements for unsupportable NBC hazard situations.

g. Regardless of the level of security involved, key planners from all disciplines (e.g., intelligence, fire support, communications, logistics, PSYOP) must be involved in all phases of SOF mission planning. Commanders should evaluate all SO operational mission criteria in considering mission advisability. h. SOF missions require clear rules of engagement (ROE) for execution, which could encompass a diverse set of tasks, for example: Securing NBC-Related Sites Checklist
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Disabling or confiscating NBC weapons and materiel, including emergency operations to dispose of dangerous materiel that cannot wait for normal processing. Detaining enemy or third country nationals associated with NBC weapons or who otherwise might be considered war criminals. Countering efforts to remove NBC assets from an adversary country. Caring for displaced civilians and enemy prisoners of war in accordance with international law and interacting with nonmilitary entities, especially to provide information to international organizations and news media to counter disinformation efforts related to NBC weapons. Special considerations for American citizens, ambassadors, and precious cargo, to include medical care and IPE.

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Planning Staff NBC Considerations in Premission Activities
i. Staff Responsibilities - NBC Specific • J-1 NBC Responsibilities - when faced with an enemy willing to use NBC weapons to produce mass casualties, the J-1 needs to be exploring short-notice personnel replacements for SOF personnel as well as NBC defense units. In the law enforcement arena, the J-1 should consider that current doctrine requires providing NBC protection and training for enemy prisoners of war (EPWs). • J-2 NBC Responsibilities - when faced with an enemy capable of causing mass casualties through the use of NBC weapons, the J-2’s primary concern is determining the enemy’s NBC capabilities and intent, such as weapon inventory, location, and likelihood of employment (how determined they are to use it). A J-2 works with the NBC special staff, analyzes, and interprets how weather and terrain may determine where NBC weapons could be used against friendly forces (participate in an NBC vulnerability analysis) as well as develop NBC specific priority intelligence requirements (PIRs)/intelligence requirements (IRs). Also, the J-2 ensures that the statement of intelligence interest (SII) includes NBC capabilities. In addition, the J-2 considers possible collateral damage to friendly troops and noncombatants if attacking NBC storage and delivery areas and industrial targets that house toxic chemicals. • J-3 NBC Responsibilities - the J-3 considers how to develop the NBC Defense Task Organization for components, analyzes the effects that an NBC attack will have on friendly COAs, and recommends actions in response to an NBC attack. • J-4 NBC Responsibilities - the J-4 develops policy for linking HN civil defense support as well as equipping and training identified mission-critical civilians, contractors, third country nationals, and DOD personnel. J-4 logistics planning should include component LNOs to facilitate component support. In addition, the J-4 ensures that an NBC logistic system for supplies and repairs is in place and ready to perform. The J-4 coordinates and monitors the status of equipment, expenditure of IPE and supplies, and the movement of NBC assets. The J-4 may also be required to locate and use alternate main supply routes (MSRs) due to NBC contamination and to critique plans based on NBC equipment shortages. The J-4’s engineering responsibilities include assisting in construction of decontamination sites. The J-4’s transportation responsibilities include keeping ports and airfields operational and clear of contamination. The surgeon oversees J-4 medical responsibilities. • J-5 NBC Responsibilities - the J-5 ensures that NBC considerations have been included in both operation plans (OPLANs) and concept plans (CONPLANs). The J-5 coordinates HN approval of decon sites, operations and equipment/facility support. The J-5 also must participate in recommending the JFC’s response to NBC attacks. When developing COAs, the J-5 must consider both previous NBC employment and possible future NBC employment by enemy forces. The J-5 also develops the friendly force nuclear weapon employment policy for the theater if an authorization for use is received from the NCA. • J-6 NBC Responsibilities - the J-6 focuses on the theater forces’ ability to send and receive NBC reports. This includes having a dedicated net (if deemed necessary by the JFC) for NBC reporting and ensuring that components have communications capabilities to communicate with both joint and multinational forces. • J-7 Training/Exercise/Readiness NBC Responsibilities - the J-7 has several key responsibilities. The J-7 ensures that component NBC readiness in the areas of plans, personnel, equipment, interoperability training, doctrine, and exercise is at an acceptable level. If any are not acceptable, the J-7 assists in rectifying the situation. The J-7 ensures that meaningful NBC scenarios are included in joint force and component level training and exercises. • Chemical Officer/NCO NBC Responsibilities – the chemical officer ensures NBC trained personnel are used as subject matter experts prepared to advise the commander and staff as to the effects of NBC on all aspects of a mission. A chemical officer must ensure the coordination between SOF elements, multinational forces, and HN assets for NBC equipment, information dissemination, defensive operations, and emergency response. Special plans are also included to protect nonmilitary personnel from NBC threats. • Surgeon/Medical Officer NBC Responsibilities - the surgeon ensures that medical personnel within the theater are prepared to provide medical support for NBC injuries and contaminated casualties. The surgeon is responsible for ensuring the immunization status of both the medical staff members, as well as all military personnel for which the surgeon is responsible. In addition, the surgeon coordinates the availability of Class VIII medical supplies. Medical personnel must be briefed on agent symptoms and be aware of known enemy BC agents within the theater as well as radiation exposure limits (RES – radiation exposure status). Often times, biological agent symptoms could be misdiagnosed as common cold symptoms, until it is too late. Quantities of antidotes and related treatment supplies must be on hand and resupply ordered. In addition, the surgeon/medical staff supports the theater mortuary affairs (MA) staffs.

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• Theater Mortuary Affairs NBC Responsibilities – theater mortuary staffs ensure contaminated cadavers are properly handled and evacuated. • Civil Military Operations (CMO) Staff NBC Responsibilities – CA personnel on the CMO staffs must be prepared to negotiate for HNS particularly in the areas of loading/unloading ships and planes as well as decontamination assistance. CA personnel also deal with issues such as providing protective equipment to civilians, HNS, and multinational members. • Public Affairs NBC Responsibilities - the public affairs section prepares to issue press releases dealing with US policy regarding the use of NBC weapons as well as explaining the nature of such weapons. This can help gain support for the United States around the world. The public affairs staff should also be prepared to release articles showing how the United States prepares and trains for this type of warfare. These articles and releases are coordinated with higher headquarters prior to release to the media. This, in turn, can help deter the enemy from using such weapons against the United States. • Legal Officer NBC Responsibilities - the legal officer prepares to advise the JFC on the rules of engagement for nuclear weapons as well as RCAs IAW EO 11850. In addition, the legal officer prepares to advise on the furnishing of NBC training and equipment to civilians and the legal ramifications of attacking NBC or industrial targets. The joint force will require a clear ROE for execution of their mission, which could encompass a diverse set of tasks. For additional ROE considerations refer to page 6, paragraph h, ”Securing NBC-Related Sites Checklist.” • Chaplain NBC Responsibilities - when faced with an enemy capable of causing mass casualties using NBC weapons, the chaplain can contribute to maintaining morale. In addition, by continuing to provide religious services, even if in MOPP4, the chaplain provides an important spiritual need for the troops.

4. Mission Preparation
At this stage of premission activity, SOF refines support requirements and tailors training to specific NBC mission requirements. a. Intelligence Support of SOF • Timely, detailed, tailored, and fused all-source intelligence is vital in identifying relevant targets, COA development, and mission planning and execution. The ability to interface with theater and national intelligence systems and assets is critical for SOF mission success. Additionally, SOF mission accomplishment may hinge on target or intelligence updates provided by other government agencies. A JSOTF, if formed, must also have these same interfaces. • The nature of many SOF objectives and tactics require intelligence support that is frequently more detailed than that needed in conventional operations. SOF often require intelligence to avoid enemy forces, regardless of size or composition, as opposed to information that would allow conventional forces to engage an enemy. • Intelligence support to SOF in MOOTW requires an expanded focus of the standard scope of intelligence functions. This is particularly true in FID operations where intelligence must contain aspects related to political, informational, economic, and cultural institutions and relationships, as well as enemy and friendly forces and target specific data. • SOF missions are particularly sensitive to HN and enemy collection efforts. Counterintelligence support is also considered in protecting sensitive SOF missions across the range of military operations. Commanders at all levels should be well informed of the capability and effectiveness of HN intelligence and security services to collect information on SOF units and personnel. For additional specific guidance on intelligence support refer to, Joint Pub 3-05.3, Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures, Joint Pub 3-05.5, Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures, and the Joint Pub 2-0 series of publications. b. Meteorological and Oceanographic Support of SOF Meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) support services are critical to the success of SOF missions. From initial planning through execution, environmental intelligence should be included in the decision making process. Unique local conditions may expedite or negate a particular COA. A study of general climatology, hydrography, and specific weather forecasts for the operational area may provide the commander with the information necessary to choose the best windows of opportunity to

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Planning Staff NBC Considerations in Premission Activities
execute, support, and sustain specific operations. Potentially, the execution decision may be based on exploiting certain adverse weather and METOC conditions to provide cover for operations while avoiding those environmental conditions that will hamper operations. However, these decisions often require finesse and judgment to ensure that, while the weapon systems are operating near their environmental limits, they do not exceed them. With the increased reliance on space capabilities, the SOF commander must also be kept informed of environmental effects on space operations. METOC support personnel can also provide information that will allow the SOF commander to plan for the possibility of the loss of one or more critical space-based systems. c. Logistic Support of SOF The commander, theater special operations command (SOC) or the commander, joint special operations task force (JSOTF) determines SOF in-theater logistic requirements for the geographic combatant commander. Logistic support for SOF units is provided through one or more of the following. • Service Support. The logistic support of SOF units is the responsibility of their parent Service except where otherwise provided for by support agreements or other directives. This responsibility exists regardless of whether the SOF unit requiring support is assigned to the Service component, the SOC, or joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC), or a JSOTF. SOF logistic support includes the sustainment and replenishment of all classes of supply, maintenance, transportation, facilities, and services. • Joint In-theater Support. The majority of SOF missions require joint logistic planning and execution. When the theater Service component cannot satisfy its Service SOF support requirements, the geographic combatant commander determines if another Service component can satisfy the requirement through common or joint servicing arrangements. Joint logistic arrangements also may be used when normal Service support cannot satisfy requirements. SOF often require nonstandard arrangements when operating in locations geographically separated from established theater Service support infrastructures. Geographic combatant commanders and theater Service component commanders, in coordination with the theater SOC, are responsible for ensuring that effective and responsive SOF support systems are developed and provided. • SO - Peculiar Support. SO-peculiar equipment, materials, supplies, and services are defined, as those items and services required for SOF mission support for which there is no broad conventional requirement. Responsibility for developing and acquiring SO-peculiar equipment and for acquiring SO-peculiar materials, supplies, and services belongs to USCINCSOC. This support will be provided to theater-deployed SOF via USSOCOM Service component logistic infrastructures and in coordination with theater Service components. For additional discussion of SOF logistic support, see Appendix N, “Component NBC Support Structure,” JP 3-05.3, Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures; and the JP 4-0 series of publications. d. Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Support of SOF • Command, control, communications, and computers (C4) support to SOF is global, secure, and jointly interoperable. It must be flexible so that it can be tailored to any mission and add value to the SOF operational capability. C4 systems support the full range of SO worldwide. Normally, command and control of SOF is through SOF channels. SOF must be able to communicate anywhere and anytime utilizing national capabilities to the maximum extent possible. The SOF operational unit must have a variety of methods for communicating, reporting, and querying available resources, regardless of geographic location. C4 systems must never compromise the SOF operational unit on the ground, in the air, or at sea. • SOF C4 support consists of multiple and varied groups of systems, procedures, personnel, and equipment that operate in diverse manners and at different echelons, from national to unit levels. C4 systems support discrete as well as collective functions. SOF missions normally are controlled at the lowest level that can accomplish the needed coordination, although political considerations may require control at higher national levels. To provide for necessary control, SOF C4 systems offer seamless connectivity from the lowest to the highest levels. • SOF C4 systems must be interoperable with each other, with conventional forces, with US national resources, and with allies and HNs. They must integrate not only with state-of-the-art systems (the NBC Warning and Reporting System), but also must be capable of integrating with less sophisticated equipment often found in less developed nations. For more detailed discussion on C4 support to SOF, see Appendix F, “NBC Warning and Reporting System (NBCWRS),” J P 3-05.3, Joint Special Operations Operational Procedure; and the JP 6-0 series of publications.

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e. PSYOP and CA Support of SOF. The theater SOC submits requests for PSYOP and CA support to the supported combatant commander, who consolidates, validates, and submits the requests to the Joint Staff for a deployment order, or as part of an overall OPLAN. PSYOP and CA support will be provided to the theater SOC based on mission requirements, availability, and priorities established by the combatant commander or JTF commander. CA and PSYOP support provide the SOF commanders and their indigenous counterparts the ability to motivate and mobilize crucial segments of the population to enhance the probability of mission success. For more detailed discussion of PSYOP and CA support see JP 3-05.3, Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures; JP 353, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations; JP 3-57, Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs; and JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs. f. Public Affairs Support of SOF. The political sensitivity of many SO, especially in peacetime, mandates that thorough and accurate public affairs guidance be developed during the operational planning stage and approved for use in advance of most operations. Public affairs planning should accurately reflect the objective of the mission for domestic audiences and be consistent with both the overall PSYOP effort and operations security (OPSEC) requirements. The commander having operational authority develops proposed public affairs guidance that is coordinated with supporting commands and government agencies, as appropriate, prior to forwarding that guidance to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) for approval. For further information see JP 3-61, Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations. g. Legal Support of SOF. SOF missions frequently involve a unique set of complex issues. There are federal laws and executive orders, federal agency publications and directives, and theater ROE that affect SOF activities. These guidelines become especially important during sensitive peacetime operations when international and domestic laws, treaty provisions, and political agreements affect mission planning and execution. Commanders must seek legal review during all levels of planning and execution of SO missions, to include planning of the theater ROE. h. Space Support of SOF. As space-based support to military operations continues to improve, SOF commanders and planners should be aware of potential space support operations and its integration with SO. i. Combat Camera Support of SOF. Combat camera provides still and video documentary products that support PSYOP and other special operations missions. Many teams supporting SOF are specially equipped with night vision and digital image transmission capabilities. Combat camera also provides gun camera image processing for theater and national use. Combat camera imagery is used to show allies, adversaries, and civilian populaces the effects of US operations and to counter enemy disinformation with on-screen or gun camera evidence. j. Medical Support of SOF. SOF medical support is characterized by an austere structure and limited number of medical personnel with enhanced medical skills. SOF medical personnel provide emergency treatment and a basic level of medical care at the team level. Medical support provided to SOF units in the area of operations is planned and conducted by SOF surgeons and medical personnel. Provision of medical support beyond this capability depends on the thoroughness of advanced planning so that the conventional medical support structure umbrella is extended to cover the lack of internal capability or to meet requirements for additional medical assets (i.e., antidotes (nonorganic), advanced trauma life support, surgical intervention, evacuation, and medical logistics). Certain operations also may require security requirements be in place to preclude compromising the names of SOF personnel upon entry into the conventional medical system. Preparation includes prophylaxis and the practice of certain NBC procedures to achieve a level of proficiency that allows safe mission accomplishment. Medical personnel must be briefed on agent symptoms and known enemy chemical and biological agents within the theater. Often times, the early stages of biological agent symptoms can be misdiagnosed as common cold symptoms.
For additional discussion of SOF medical support see Chapter II, “SOF Operations and Environment Considerations;” Appendix E, “NBC Risk Assessments/Vulnerability Analysis Tools;” Appendix G, “NBC Hazard Prediction;” and JP 4-02, Doctrine for Health Services Support in Joint Operations.

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CHAPTER IV
NBC CONSIDERATIONS IN PREMISSION ACTIVITIES
“The keystone of SOF mission planning is that the operational element executing the mission MUST plan the mission.‘ JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations

1. Purpose
This chapter provides planning considerations to supplement those already in place when conducting deliberate or timesensitive planning for operations in an NBC environment. These considerations are primarily designed to assist SOF elements in receiving the most complete information and resources available to ensure mission success and individual survival.

Routine detailed planning becomes more complicated when an NBC environment must be considered.

2. General
The keystone of SOF mission planning is the operational element that will plan and execute the mission. The inherent qualities of SO involve detailed planning and foresight. Intelligence preparation of the joint special operations area is critical to all planning and foresight when an operational area contains an NBC threat. The operational commander uses this intelligence information to adhere to the principles of NBC defense (see Figure IV-1) while formulating a risk assessment (see Appendix E, NBC Risk Assessment/Vulnerability Analysis Tool). Based upon this assessment, decisions will be made that involve tradeoffs between the amounts of protective equipment, rations, ammunition, and supplies, etc. that can be carried and still complete the mission.

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Chapter IV SECTION A. PRINCIPLES OF NBC DEFENSE
Consistent with JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments, the principles of NBC defense are applied at every level of planning.

PRINCIPLES FOR NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL DEFENSE

Contamination:
Avoidance Protection Decontamination
Figure IV-1. Principles of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense

3. Avoidance
Contamination avoidance is the best defense against enemy use of NBC weapons. Avoidance reduces the risks of being exposed to NBC agents and minimizes the effects of NBC hazards. Operating in a contaminated environment makes everything more difficult and time consuming. a. The principle of avoidance includes the following elements: • Detection - learning of the presence of NBC threats through intelligence, live agent, or mechanical identification methods. • Identification - provides multiple levels required for protection, treatment, verification, or confirmation. • Prediction - timely and accurate warning allows SOF to make accurate predictions regarding contamination locations and their actions. Predictions range from manual to sophisticated computer models. • Warning and Reporting - joint doctrine requires two specific NBC responsibilities, the first is to verify first use of NBC weapons for the NCA. The second is to inform US forces, allies, and friendly forces of impending or actual use of NBC weapons by the enemy. • Marking - marking contamination is a possibility for SOF but is mission dependent and must have reuse or critical resources mission application as a rationale. • Relocate or Reroute - relocating or rerouting is a viable option for SOF who are mobile; however, this option is less likely for aerospace support operations. Preplanning, support, and mission dictate the viability of this principle in SO. b. The four steps in contamination avoidance are: • Passive defense measures are those measures taken to reduce the probability of being hit by NBC weapons or to reduce the effects of NBC hazards. Operational security measures such as good communications, light discipline, and good camouflage reduce the chances of a SOF element being targeted. Dispersion, covering and protecting equipment, and using overhead cover reduces the effectiveness of an attack.

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• Once an NBC attack has occurred, everyone who might be affected by the hazard is warned. This gives SOF elements time to protect themselves against a possible hazard. The NBC warning and reporting system (NBCWRS) is used for warning and reporting NBC hazards. • By locating, identifying, tracking, and predicting NBC hazards, commanders can make informed decisions for operating in and around these hazards. Locating, identifying, and tracking NBC hazards is accomplished through NBC reconnaissance. NBC reconnaissance may be conducted by specialized SOF NBC detachments, but it can be equally performed by any SOF detachment or designated team from a SOF support unit. Predicting NBC hazards is best accomplished during detailed intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB). • When operations in a contaminated environment become necessary, take measures to limit the amount of individual exposure. Maximize the use of collective protective shelters, conduct operational decontamination to limit the spread of contamination, and enforce good MOPP discipline. For additional exposure guidance see Appendix G, “NBC Hazard Prediction.”

4. Protection
a. Force protection involves actions taken by a commander to reduce the vulnerability of his personnel to an NBC attack. A vulnerability assessment (see Appendix E, NBC Risk Assessment/Vulnerability Analysis Tool) to determine the probable impact of an NBC attack on SOF elements is conducted both prior to and after initiation of NBC warfare. This assessment is used in conjunction with METT-TC information to reduce force vulnerability. b. The protection principle includes typical NBC defense measures involving use of individual protective equipment (IPE) to be worn or carried, automatic masking criteria, and shelters (both simple and complex depending upon mission, (e.g. overhead protection poncho to collective protection systems). Medical countermeasures are also included in this principle. • Individual Protective Equipment - IPE is provided for SOF ground personnel, aircrews, groundcrews, and naval forces as specified by the geographic combatant commander. The levels of protection are determined by conducting MOPP analysis. Leaders, generally at shipboard, installation, or battalion level, conduct a MOPP analysis based on the unit’s particular situation. The analysis finds the balance between reducing the risk of casualties and accomplishing the mission. Commanders must recognize the significant increase in time required for mission execution in MOPP 3 or MOPP 4 and anticipate the effects of that degradation on subsequent missions. Leaders must also understand the increased water consumption requirements. The use of MOPP involves risk. Commanders must analyze their units’ needs for protection to lower their units’ risk. FM 3-4, NBC Protection, contains a detailed discussion on MOPP analysis and leaders should carefully analyze their operational situation to determine what level should be used. MOPP analysis enables leaders to select the appropriate MOPP level. During MOPP analysis the commander considers: mission, work rate and its duration, probable warning time, terrain, weather, time of day, unit training, additional protection available, and alarm placement. • Shelters - shelters range from overhead protection of simple devices such as plastic, and ponchos to sophisticated collective protection systems. Additionally, procedures for sealing and closing doors/windows; shutting down heating/cooling and ventilation of vehicles, aircraft, bunkers, and buildings should be considered. These shelters may be provided to staffs during mission planning, SOF detachments in isolation, or as rest areas to allow personnel to rotate through, giving them a break from MOPP 4 for a period of time. • Medicine - vaccination, immunization, and use of auto injectors are included in this principle.

5. Decontamination
a. Decontamination consists of the removal, destruction, or neutralization of contamination. The principles of decon are: • Decontaminate as soon as possible - the most important principle that is considered before any other is to decontaminate as soon as possible. Contamination hazards can force SOF elements into higher levels of MOPP and immediately begin to degrade operational ability. The sooner contamination is removed, the sooner an element can reduce MOPP levels and begin restoring effectiveness.

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• Decontaminate only what is necessary to continue the mission. • Decontaminate as far forward as possible to avoid spreading contamination to other areas of the operational area. Safety and security are important considerations for contaminated SOF elements. SOF elements plan to establish a permissive environment to begin decontamination. Within that permissive environment decon assets should establish decon sites as far forward as possible. • Decontaminate by priority - clean important items of equipment first and less important items of equipment last. This maximizes the benefit of decon assets and quickly restores operational use. b. Considerations for when to conduct decontamination: • Consider the lethality of agents when planning decon - some highly toxic agents can kill or incapacitate if they contact exposed skin for only a few minutes. (During decon should accidental skin contamination occur the individual must stop breathing, mask (if removed), give the alarm, and decontaminate the contaminated skin immediately.) • Consider how IPE degrades operational ability through increased levels of MOPP. Use of tools and weapons become awkward. The protective mask reduces fields of view and increases the difficulty associated with using optical sights and night vision devices. Extended operations can physically tire and mentally discourage personnel. Personnel cannot eat while wearing a protective mask. Urinating and defecating are potentially hazardous tasks. Resting and sleeping are also difficult. • Consider equipment limitations. Agents can gradually penetrate the mask, hood, and protective clothing. Once contaminated, protective clothing is only effective for a limited time. Some specialized mission equipment cannot be used in IPE. Note: IPE is not effective against most toxic industrial chemicals (TICs). c. The four types of decontamination are immediate, operational, thorough, and reconstitution. • Immediate - minimizes casualties, saves lives, and limits the spread of contamination. Immediate decon is applied individually to skin, personal clothing and equipment. • Operational - minimizes contact or transfer hazards and sustains operations. This is performed by individuals, crews, teams, or units on specific parts of essential equipment, material, or work areas, and only when operations require such action. • Thorough - reduces contamination to the lowest possible level. This is accomplished by units or wings, with or without external support on personnel, equipment, material or work areas when operations, manning, and resources permit. • Reconstitution - eliminates contamination to restore mission critical resources therefore permitting unrestricted use. This is accomplished by units or wings with external support on mission critical aircraft, equipment, material, work areas, and terrain after hostile actions have terminated or as directed by higher authority.

SECTION B. NBC PREMISSION ACTIVITIES 6. Mission Analysis Considerations
The hazards of operating in an NBC environment require a higher degree of mission analysis, planning, and mission specific training than that normally associated with established primary missions and collateral activities. Mission analysis conducted by a higher headquarters provides operational element commanders with sufficient information to begin mission planning. Commander’s intent must be clearly understood.

7. Mission Planning Considerations
a. Mission Receipt. The operational element receives higher headquarters’ planning guidance. The commander reviews the guidance and activates an operational element for planning.

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NBC Environment Specific Considerations
!

! !

! ! !

Communications requirements (particularly in terms of timeliness, NBC warning formats, and interface with nonspecial operations systems). Political and legal (including ROE) constraints to consider in planning. Availability of NBC ready infiltration and exfiltration means. See Chapter 5, NBC Considerations During Infiltration, Execution, and Exfiltration. Clarification of the specific intelligence requirements that include NBC threat indicators. Availability of specialized equipment. Success criteria.

b. Information Exchange. The operational element reviews all available information to ensure that all members understand current information and how operating in an NBC environment must be planned completely. Element members with specialized NBC skills provide their perspective and guidance. c. Restating the Mission and Producing Planning Guidance. Based on a review of higher headquarters’ mission statement and commander’s intent, mission tasks, information received to date, and infiltration/exfiltration feasibility, the operational element leadership develops a comprehensive list of specified/implied tasks and a restated mission. Based on the operational element’s knowledge of the skills, capabilities, current and achievable standards of NBC training and resources, courses of action are developed. NBC Environment Course of Action Considerations
! ! ! !

Tactics in an NBC environment. NBC prepared infiltration/exfiltration means. Required task organization (LB Teams, subject matter expert (SME) attachments). Guidance on specific techniques to be employed such as decontamination procedures.

d. Staff Estimates Preparation. For operations in an NBC environment, specific skills and mission requirements may create the need for a “special staff” type estimate. e. Commander’s Estimate and Decision Preparation. The operational element commander after conducting an internal COA selection briefing and “murder board” prepares a mission concept (MICON) briefing for the higher commander. f. Mission Concept Briefing. This is an informal briefing presented to the operational elements next higher commander to receive approval of the operational element’s concept of operation prior to expending time in detailed planning. Key staff members, including SMEs for NBC operations, should accompany the commander. For operations in an NBC environment, the mission concept briefing normally includes:

Mission Concept Briefing Considerations
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

Courses of action (COA) considered. Factors used to evaluate the COAs. Commander’s decision. Specific NBC tasks derived. NBC tactics selected. Task organization (to include requests for required attachments). NBC defense capable infiltration and exfiltration means. Identification of external support required (such as specialized equipment and personnel). General statement of the commander’s concept of operations. Mission essential personnel and equipment. Approval is obtained or further planning guidance is obtained.

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g. Operation Plan. The written OPLAN specifies NBC taskings to subordinate elements and individual members. h. Detailed Planning. There is no established way to conduct missions when the threat of operating in an NBC environment exists. However, there are precautions, techniques, and procedures that can be applied as the situation warrants. Many aspects of operating in an NBC environment are beyond the experience of most personnel. Therefore, to validate operational tactics, techniques, and procedures the use of rehearsals is required. i. Briefback. During the briefback, if the operational element cannot justify any action, that action is reconsidered. Operating in an NBC environment could fail due to a minor oversight. j. Mission Planning Approval. Execute the mission or continue training.

8. Mission Preparation Considerations
Mission preparation and associated training provide a base level of skills that can be modified to overcome the obstacles of working in an NBC environment. a. Training • When time and situation do not permit actual training in the operational area, request that the conditions of the operational area be replicated. • Conduct tactics and techniques training in a replicated NBC environment to allow element members to adjust to the difficulty of operating in IPE. • Cross train and specialty train for NBC required skills. b. Intelligence • Target intelligence packages (TIPs), intelligence summaries (INTSUMs), and situation assessments must be continually updated. • Area studies also require continuous updating. c. Personnel. Personnel turbulence necessitates careful monitoring of replacement NBC skill proficiency when assigning personnel to units in mission preparation. d. Logistics. All levels of command review NBC-specific requirements and availability as related to mission accomplishment. Operational units must provide the numbers and sizes of protective equipment to the next higher logistics unit so that the equipment can be made ready for transport to a decon site for reconstitution. e. Communications. All levels of command review NBC-specific requirements and availability as related to mission accomplishments. Command, control, communications and computers (C4) systems should be sealed in plastic or some other barrier to avoid contamination. Most C4 systems can be operated normally while sealed in plastic.

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CHAPTER V
NBC CONSIDERATIONS DURING INFILTRATION, EXECUTION, AND EXFILTRATION
“SOF mission planning must be planned completely—insertion, resupply, fire and maneuver support, extraction—prior to committing the force.” JP 3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations

1. Purpose
Infiltration, execution, and exfiltration are conducted by air, land, sea, or a combination thereof. These movements are usually joint activities in support of SO components executing a mission. This chapter provides NBC planning considerations to supplement sophisticated techniques, equipment, and standard operating procedures used by SOF elements conducting infiltration, execution, and exfiltration. Sharing component planning considerations facilitates and enhances joint operations in an NBC environment.

2. General
The survivability of SOF assets in an NBC environment depends heavily on the quality of NBC training, use of effective checklists and procedures, and vigorous mission execution. When possible, SOF infiltration/execution/exfiltration adheres to the three basic principles of NBC defense: avoidance, protection, and decontamination. Regardless of component, or size of an operating element, the basic principles apply.

SECTION A. AIR PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 3. Infiltration, Execution, and Exfiltration Requires Detailed Planning Considerations When Operating in an NBC Environment

Different aircraft have different characteristics that must be considered.

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Figure V-1 highlights air infiltration/exfiltration advantages and disadvantages that are considered during the decision-making process.

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF AIR INFILTRATION/EXFILTRATION

Advantages
Flexibility Speed and Accuracy of Delivery Short Exposure to Hostile Countermeasures Precise Navigation Capability of Delivering Supplies in Excess of Individual Loads

Disadvantages
Vulnerability to Hostile Air Detection and Defense Systems Limited in Adverse Weather Conditions Damage or Loss of Equipment Need for Specialty Trained Aircrews Need for Sterilization of Infiltration Site

Figure V-1. Advantages and Disadvantages of Air Infiltration/Exfiltration

a. Prelaunch Considerations: The following checklist may assist air planners during mission preparation.

Checklist for Prelaunch Considerations
! ! ! !

! !

! !

! ! ! ! ! ! !

Prehydrate during planning phase (it is difficult to stay hydrated during operations). Bring additional food and water for en route and return trips and possible en route delays. Bring additional IPE. If a pick up is anticipated: ! Try to isolate a portion of the aircraft for the contaminated personnel and equipment. ! Limit personnel access to the rest of the aircraft. ! Develop a well thought out exit and entrance plan for all contaminated individuals and equipment to limit additional contamination. ! When possible, seal off the exposed area (e.g., lining the aircraft walls and floor with non-absorbent material). Develop emergency-landing procedures for precautionary measures after contamination. Consider bringing clear (allows observation of aircraft components) heavy-duty plastic to line inside of cabin. Plastic should be placed over Kevlar blankets. Preflight aircrew chemical ensembles as well as power connections in the aircraft. Know weather conditions at site and en route effecting NBC use – humidity (for persistent agents), wind direction, temperature, and time of day. Be prepared to wear some sort of undergarment to allow for bodily functions. Know condition and location of possible divert fields for decontamination. Place detection devices on aircrew and aircraft (viewable to aircrew). Make sure atropine, decon kits, and professional gear are accessible after donning IPE. Determine disposition of aircraft after mission. Decon line refresher procedures for crews. Bring decon equipment for crew and the team you may be picking up.

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b. En route Considerations: The following checklist may assist air planners during route planning.

Checklist for En route Considerations
! ! ! ! ! !

!

Avoid known areas of NBC use, if possible. If threat allows, consider flying at higher altitude. C-130 specific: bleed air valve settings, inflow/outflow valve settings, air conditioner settings, and use 100% oxygen. Set up plastic/containment materials (floor, walls, and isolate flight deck...). If flying through NBC environment consider closing up windows/ramp and hatches. Consider when aircrew needs to don aircrew chemical ensemble/ground ensemble; prior to boarding aircraft or at some later time during a mission. Consider flying through available weather condition that might help decon a dirty aircraft.

c. Infiltration/Exfiltration Zone Considerations: The following checklist may assist air planners during infiltration/exfiltration planning.

Checklist for Infiltration/Exfiltration Considerations
! !

! ! ! ! ! !

Is the location contaminated? Is the team/equipment being loaded contaminated? Coordinate on-loading procedures to avoid unnecessary spread of contamination. C-130 specific: flap settings, air conditioner use, and bleed air valves, ramp and door use, onloading passenger location. Will the threat allow an engine/rotor/prop shutdown load/transload to prevent spreading of contamination? Will crew need to be in aircrew chemical ensemble or similar system prior to landing? When possible, consider approaching LZ/HLZ upwind. Keep all hatches/windows/doors/ramp not required for infil/exfil closed. When possible, decontaminate personnel and equipment prior to allowing them to board (threat may dictate otherwise).

d. Mission Recovery Considerations: The following checklist may assist air planners during recovery planning.

Checklist for Recovery Considerations
!

! ! ! ! ! ! !

Is the aircraft returning with a known contaminant (assume aircraft is dirty inside and out)? Notify arrival base of contamination. Check detectors. If threat allows, fly high, pressurized/unpressurized, to decontaminate aircraft. If possible, fly through rainstorms to clean outside of aircraft. C-130 specific: flying at en route airspeeds and altitudes will help decon exterior of aircraft. Helicopter specific: fly "Low-N-Slow" profile over water (saltwater optimum), if available, for aircraft decon. Coordinate recovery activities with all units arriving at same location. Coordinate decon lines – standard life support procedures with all units at same arrival location.

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Chapter V SECTION B. MARITIME PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 4. Infiltration, Execution, and Exfiltration Planning Requires Detailed Considerations When Operating in an NBC Environment

In an NBC environment, the sea, being a natural decontaminant, is an advantage that can also be a disadvantage when you must take into account the degradation of IPE by saltwater.

Figure V-2 highlights water infiltration/exfiltration advantages and disadvantages that are considered during the decisionmaking process.

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF WATER INFILTRATION/EXFILTRATION

Advantages
Long-Range Delivery Capability Relative Freedom from Weather Considerations Up to the Point of Debarkation En Route Operational Briefings, Rehearsals, and Intelligence Updates - Platform Dependant Surface Craft Transport of Large Quantities of Accompanying Supplies and Equipment

Disadvantages
Time Required for Uploading and Transshipment From Offshore Drop-Off Points Vulnerability of Landing Operations to Hostile Shore Defenses Loss of Personnel and Supplies During Ship-to-Shore Movement Limited Cargo Capacity of Submarines, Assault Craft, and Seal Delivery Vehicles Need for Special Training Need for Additional Packaging to Waterproof Equipment Effects of Wind, Sea and Surf. (Degradation of IPE From Water)

Figure V-2. Advantages and Disadvantages of Water Infiltration/Exfiltration

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a. Prelaunch Considerations: The following checklist may assist maritime planners during mission preparation. Checklist for Prelaunch Considerations
! ! ! !

!

! !

!

! ! ! ! ! !

Prehydrate during planning phase (it is difficult to stay hydrated during operations). Bring additional food and water for en route and return trips and possible en route delays. Bring additional IPE. If a pick up is anticipated: ! Try to isolate a portion of the watercraft for the contaminated personnel and equipment. ! Limit personnel access to the rest of the watercraft. ! Develop a well thought out exit and entrance plan for all contaminated individuals and equipment to limit additional contamination. ! When possible, seal off the exposed area (e.g. lining the watercraft walls and floor with non-absorbent material). Consider bringing clear (which will allow you to see through to watercraft working parts) heavy-duty plastic to line inside of cabin. Inspect chemical protective suits and equipment (shelf life). If on loading equipment at an infiltration/exfiltration point know the size of object and gear needed for loading and transloading. Note hatch sizes especially on submarines. Know weather conditions at site and en route effecting NBC use – humidity (for persistent agents), wind direction, sea state, temperature. Be prepared to wear some sort of undergarment to allow for bodily functions. Know condition and location of alternate decon locations. Place detection devices on watercraft (viewable to crew). Make sure atropine, decon kits, and professional gear are accessible after donning IPE. Determine disposition of watercraft after mission. If possible, bring decon equipment, both for crew and the element being infil/exfil.

b. En route Considerations: The following checklist may assist maritime planners during route planning. Checklist for En route Considerations
! ! ! !

! !

Avoid known areas of NBC use (upwind if possible). Consider the use of oxygen. Set up plastic/containment materials (floor, walls, bulkheads, and isolate deck...). When transiting through NBC environment consider closing up portholes/ramp and hatches. Secure ventilation – “Circle William.” Consider when crew needs to don IPE prior to loading watercraft or at some later time during a mission. Consider driving through available weather conditions that might help decon a dirty watercraft.

c. Infiltration/Exfiltration Point Considerations: The following checklist may assist maritime planners during infiltration/ exfiltration planning. Checklist for Infiltration/Exfiltration Considerations
! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

Is the location contaminated? Is the element/equipment being loaded contaminated? Confirm on-loading procedures to avoid unnecessary contamination. Will the threat allow an engine shutdown during load/transload to prevent spreading of contamination? Will crew need to be in IPE prior to landing? Take precautions to protect IPE. When possible, approach infil/exfil point upwind. Keep all hatches/portholes/doors/ramp not required for infil/exfil closed. When possible, decontaminate personnel and equipment prior to allowing them to board; however, threat may dictate otherwise.

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d. Mission Recovery Considerations: The following checklist may assist maritime planners during recovery planning.

Checklist for Recovery Considerations
! ! ! ! !

Is the watercraft returning with a known contaminant (assume watercraft is dirty inside and out)? Check detectors. If possible, navigate through rainstorms to clean outside of watercraft. Coordinate recovery location with all units arriving at same location. Coordinate decon lines – standard life support procedures with all units at same arrival location.

SECTION C. LAND PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 5. Infiltration, Execution, and Exfiltration Planning Requires Detailed Considerations When Operating in an NBC Environment

Applying Rogers Rangers Standing Order #3 in an NBC environment is more difficult than usual. “When you’re on the march act the way you would if you was sneaking up on a deer: see the enemy first.”

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Figure V-3 highlights land infiltration/exfiltration advantages and disadvantages that are considered during the decision-making process.

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF LAND INFILTRATION/EXFILTRATION

Advantages
Minimum Logistics Support Concurrent Area Familiarization and Intelligence Minimum Interservice Coordination

Disadvantages
Time Required Increased Vulnerability to Enemy Detection and Interdiction Limited Capability for Carrying Supplies and Equipment

Figure V-3. Advantages and Disadvantages of Land Infiltration/Exfiltration

a. Prelaunch Considerations: The following checklist may assist ground planners during mission preparation.

Checklist for Prelaunch Considerations
! ! ! !

! ! ! !

Prehydrate during planning phase (most likely you will not be able to stay hydrated during operations). Bring additional food and water for en route and return trips and possible en route delays. Bring additional IPE = ground ensemble(s) and mask(s). Consider weather conditions en route and at site that may effect NBC use – humidity (for persistent agents), wind direction, temperature, and time of day. Be prepared to wear some sort of undergarment to allow for bodily functions. Make sure atropine, decon kits, and professional gear are accessible after donning IPE. Coordinate disposition of contaminated equipment after mission. Coordinate decon line procedures for all involved.

b. En route Considerations: Avoid known areas of NBC use (upwind if possible). c. Infiltration/Exfiltration Zone Considerations: The following checklist may assist ground planners during infiltration/ exfiltration planning.

Checklist for Infiltration/Exfiltration Considerations
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Is the location contaminated? When possible, decontaminate personnel and equipment as soon as possible although threat may dictate otherwise.

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Chapter V
d. Mission Recovery Considerations: The following checklist may assist ground planners during recovery planning. Checklist for Recovery Considerations
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Is the element returning with a known contaminant? Check detectors. Coordinate recovery location with all units arriving at same location. Coordinate decon lines – standard life support procedures with all units at same arrival location.

SECTION D. STAY BEHIND OPERATIONS CONSIDERATIONS 6. Stay Behind Operations are an Alternative to Infiltration. Prepositioning caches before a hostile force overruns or occupies a joint special operations area allows SOF elements to train and organize in their operational area and requires less external logistics support.
Considerations for Stay Behind Operations
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Plan/coordinate for resupply – cache, air resupply …RECONSTITUTE. Decon as soon as possible using immediate, and when feasible, thorough decon procedures.

See TC 31-29, Special Forces Operational Techniques, for detailed information on stay behind operations.

SECTION E. SOF PLATFORM NBC DEFENSE CONSIDERATIONS
Each SOF delivery means has its own set of characteristics that personnel must be familiar with to operate safely in an NBC environment.

7. Air

Aircraft decontamination operations have been and will be manpower and material intensive.

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NBC Considerations During Infiltration, Execution, and Exfiltration
Contamination in the battlespace causes unique problems for aviation. Since an aircraft uses its high mobility to maneuver across the entire battlespace, avoiding contamination is very difficult. Once an aircraft is contaminated, it is very difficult to decon. Therefore, aviation units need to prepare effective standing operating procedures (SOPs) emphasizing contamination avoidance, protection, and methods to decon each type of aircraft using either immediate, operational, or thorough decon procedures. a. Contamination avoidance is critical due to the difficulty in decontamination. Aircrews must be aware of NBC hazards. For instance, an aircraft that hovers or lands in a contaminated area could splash contamination onto itself. Likewise, contaminated passengers or ground crews pose a danger of transferring contaminants into the aircraft where they are difficult to remove. Aircraft can become contaminated by flying through a vapor cloud. Hazards that incapacitate personnel for a short time on the ground can be fatal at higher altitudes. Proper implementation of contamination avoidance and contamination control measures will directly influence the amount and extent of decontamination operations required in a post-attack environment.

Pre – Attack Techniques to Limit Contamination
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Hangar aircraft if facilities exist. Create shuffle boxes and hand decontamination troughs for entrance into aircraft doors, hatches, and loading ramps. Cover shuffle boxes to prevent exposure to elements and hazards and change in accordance with unit SOPs. Use engine running on/offload (ERO) procedures to the maximum extent possible if under the threat of an attack. Know what areas are contaminated and avoid these, if possible. Pick landing zones that will have a reduced splash effect if an aircraft must land in a contaminated area. To minimize the effect of an attack while on the ground, park close to and downwind of trees and buildings. Limit the spread of contamination into the aircraft from the outside. For example, ground crews at a forward arming and refueling point (FARP) could conduct arming and refueling without requiring the aircrew to exit the aircraft. Aircraft doors and windows remain shut. If doors and windows have been removed then alternative chemical resistant material should be considered. If closure is not possible, some form of external over-taping may be appropriate. Increase the use of chemically resistant covers when not flying. Use engine covers, tire covers, flyaway gear, floors and hatches. If possible, provide overhead cover for parked aircraft. For rotary wing aircraft consider installing doors on those normally configured without. Limit the number of aircraft that must operate in a contaminated area or use aircraft already contaminated. If required to fly “dirty” recognize the debilitating nature of operating in aircrew NBC ensembles. Line the troop compartment with plastic (a field expedient way to limit the spread of contamination) when carrying contaminated personnel or casualties. A plastic curtain can be fastened between the troop compartment and the flight compartment with tape or Velcro to limit contamination transfer. The aircraft’s heater can be used with the curtain to create an overpressure in the pilot’s compartment when the outside air is not contaminated. This will limit vapors from entering the compartment. Apply M9 and M8 detector paper to the landing gear of the aircraft. FARP personnel should always check the M9 and M8 detector paper before servicing the aircraft. M8 detector paper can be affixed by taping it along the edges with M9 paper. Pieces of M9 and M8 detector paper can be placed on the windscreen where the aircrew can see them. Note: M9 paper can show a false positive indication when exposed to petroleum base products typically found in wheel wells and other parts of an aircraft.

During – Attack Techniques to Limit Contamination
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Don mask and gloves. Close all aircraft doors, hatches, ports, and ramps. Depart airfield if time and aircraft readiness status permits. Avoid running environmental control systems (ECS)/aircraft air conditioning systems if contamination is suspected or known to be present. Use a collective filter system on aircraft (if one exists) if contamination is suspected or known. Maintain positive pressure to aid in venting vapors if contamination is suspected or known. When airborne know what areas are contaminated and avoid these areas, if possible.

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Chapter V
Post – Attack Techniques to Limit Contamination
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Conduct inspections without touching or shaking items. Contaminated crews should perform this task. Many inspection points can be inspected visually. Accomplish self and buddy checks for IPE contamination. Utilize shuffle pits and troughs. If the asset was protected by a single sheet of plastic, tarp, etc., remove and replace within one hour, if possible (single covering 2-3 hours of protection). Plastic offers better protection against penetration than canvas, as chemical agents will remain on the surface longer, and possibly “roll” to a degree. Decon personnel must be in full IPE. If a double sheet of plastic or canvas protected the asset, remove the outer layer within one hour and replace. On departure know what areas are contaminated and avoid these, if possible.

b. Decontaminants • Only approved cleaning compounds are used to decon aircraft. Caustic decontaminants such as DS2, STB, bleaches, and sodium hypochlorite are not considered safe. STB corrodes metal components and the aircraft’s skin and DS2 corrodes rubber, plastic, and acrylic-plastic windows. • Soap and water, kerosene, JP8, and diesel fuels are approved as decontaminants on selected parts of the aircraft. JP8 is effective in removing some agents from the aircraft’s skin and components; however, it does not neutralize the agents. Personnel must use care when handling JP8. When using a cloth soaked in JP8, personnel must avoid wiping internal components near the exhaust. If water is available, use it to rinse off the JP8. Many portions of the aircraft are delicate and cannot stand high-pressure water or extreme hot air. • Sodium carbonate is a fair decontaminant against G nerve agents, but it is not effective against V nerve and blister agents. The chemical reaction of the V nerve agent and sodium carbonate is extremely slow and produces a product that is very toxic. Most of the field-expedient decontaminants are corrosive and could cause damage to the aircraft’s skin or acrylicplastic windows. c. Aircraft Decontamination • When an aircraft becomes contaminated, the aircrew must fly in individual protection equipment (IPE) gear. However, wearing IPE gear degrades the aircrew’s ability to perform its job over time. • If air and ground crews are careful when operating in a contaminated environment, cross-contamination from the exterior to the interior can be minimized. The increased airflow over the aircraft’s smooth skin increases the rate of evaporation. However, some agents will migrate to crevices, rivet heads, and joints, and continue to be a hazard. Thickened agents evaporate slowly and may remain a hazard even after prolonged flights. If the interior is contaminated, flying the aircraft with the doors open can help reduce the hazard. The heat from the running engine decontaminates the interior of the engine compartment. However, more active methods of decon may be needed. Use the immediate, operational, or thorough decon methods, with modifications, to perform an aircrew spot decon, aircraft wash down, or detailed aircraft decon (DAD). • The least expensive and safest means of decontamination is weathering. Weathering will remove many chemical agents (HD, THD, GB, GD, and TGD) in a relatively short time. Normally vapor hazards dissipate to an acceptable risk level in less than three hours. In desert conditions, most agents are removed by natural means within two hours. • Forced hot air from AM 32A-60A Start Cart can be used to aid in decontamination; however, follow up decontamination may be required for thorough decon levels (not effective against VX).

CAUTION: M9 detector paper will show false positives if exposed to petroleum products.

• Unit personnel conduct the aircrew spot decon and aircraft wash down, but a chemical decon unit usually conducts the DAD.

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NBC Considerations During Infiltration, Execution, and Exfiltration
• Figure V-4 shows the three types of aircraft decon.

Decon Types

When, Why, Who Performs Decon The crew: decontaminates immediately after contamination to allow continued operations The unit decon crew or decon unit performs decon within 6-24 hours to reduce contact hazards 2 The decon units decon when the mission allows to reduce the hazard to negligible risk levels

Areas to Decon

Types of Decon Agents IEDK (individual equipment decon kit), JP8 1

Aircrew spot decon

Essential operating surfaces on the aircraft

Aircraft washdown

The entire exterior surface of the aircraft 3

Hot, soapy water, surfactant

Detailed Aircraft Decon

The entire exterior surface and selected interior surfaces of the aircraft

10 percent sodiumcarbonate solution (10 pounds of sodium carbonate to 12 gallons of water)

1

JP8 should not be used inside the aircraft. An aircraft washdown is most effective if conducted within 1 hour of contamination. 3 An aircrew post decon is performed to reduce contact hazards inside the aircraft. Do not spray water inside the aircraft.
2

Figure V-4. Aircraft Decon Types

d. In-Flight Aircraft Decon

Flight Considerations
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En route flying will help speed the cleaning process. Flights of at least four hours are recommended. Flights at lower altitudes are more effective. Fly with aircraft configured with gear, flaps, slats down/extended to help clean wheel wells, flap wells, rivet and screw heads, cracks or crevices where contaminant may migrate.

For detailed information on aircraft decon refer to FM 3-5, NBC Decontamination, and AF TO 11C15-1-3,dated 10 June 97. e. Individual Aircraft NBC Decontamination Techniques. Aircraft have some advantages over other vehicles for decontamination. If air and ground crew are careful when operating in a contaminated environment, contamination can be contained on the exterior of the aircraft. This is not always true for SOF peculiar aircraft (MH-6 assault helicopter, AH-6 attack helicopter, MH-60 Blackhawk helicopter, MH-47 Chinook helicopter, MH-53J Pave Low III helicopter, and MC, EC, AC –130 aircraft). SOF aircraft utilize standard decontamination techniques with modified procedures to facilitate decontamination of unique equipment.

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Chapter V 8. Maritime

The largest SOF maritime asset, the coastal patrol craft, must have validated detailed SOPs for operations in an NBC environment.

Contamination in the battlespace can cause problems for maritime operations. As a maritime vessel maneuvers across areas of the battlespace, avoiding contamination can be very difficult. Once maritime vessels are contaminated, they are difficult to decon. Therefore, maritime SOF units need to prepare effective SOPs that emphasize contamination avoidance, protection, and methods to decon each maritime vessel using immediate or operational decon where possible. a. Contamination avoidance is critical due to the difficulty of conducting decontamination operations at sea. Maritime SOF units must be aware of NBC hazards. For example, maritime vessels transiting or beaching in a contaminated area will splash contamination onto themselves. Furthermore, contaminated passengers or crewmembers can transfer contaminants onto the vessel where it is more difficult to remove. Maritime vessels can also pick up contamination while transiting through invisible vapor clouds. Techniques to Limit Contamination
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Through threat assessment of AOR, contaminated areas will be known and can possibly be avoided. Use early warning systems (JWARN). Use detectors, forward looking and distant scanning, as well as point detection. (JSCALD, ICADS and JCAD) Saturation of maritime vessels with saltwater wash-down prior to entering contaminated battlespace to minimize contamination absorption. Travel upwind from insertion/extraction sites to reduce the spread of contamination. Increase the use of chemically resistant covers when not transiting. Use engine covers, boat, and trailer covers to provide overhead cover for vessels not in use. Limit the number of vessels that must operate in a contaminated area or use vessels already contaminated. If required to transit “dirty” recognize the debilitating nature of operating in NBC ensembles. Line the rear deck with plastic (a field expedient way to limit the spread of contamination) when carrying contaminated personnel or casualties. A plastic curtain can be fastened between the rear deck and the cockpit of the MKV with tape or Velcro to limit contamination transfer. Apply M9 detector paper to the boat covers when in storage. Boat crew personnel should always check the M9 detector paper before servicing the vessels.

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NBC Considerations During Infiltration, Execution, and Exfiltration
b. Decontaminants Decontaminants
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Saltwater (saltwater wash-downs). Weathering. STB, bleaches and calcium hypochlorite solution.

c. Maritime Vessel Decon. Craft too small to do anything but individual decon use natural elements such as salt/fresh-water spray during transit or salt-water wash-down. • Seal Delivery Vehicle. Natural element/saltwater can be used to decon craft and personnel aboard. (The submarine community manager is currently developing decon procedures for recovering contaminated SDVs and personnel.) • Patrol Coastal Craft. In anticipation of operating in an NBC environment preparatory measures include pre-attack activation of the countermeasures washdown rig, removal of nonessential topside flammable materials, and continual contamination avoidance. For example, if under chemical attack, active measures to be taken immediately include: individual decon, evasive maneuvering, continual washdown, identification of contaminated areas, and setting PURGE SHIP to flush out vapor hazards.

Shipboard Actions for Taking on Contaminated SOF Personnel
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Watercraft ties up to swimmer platform. Fire hose eductor sprays personnel and craft with 3% to 5% calcium hypochlorite solution. Personnel remain in watercraft, wipe each other off with M-291 or M-295 pads. Include protective masks, gloves weapons, and special equipment. Web gear and ordnance is thrown over board. Personnel depart watercraft, one at a time, as instructed. Weapons, communication gear, and other special/sensitive equipment remain on the swimmer platform with patrol craft crewmember in MOPP 4. Personnel step up, climb ladder, and step into boot wash (9% calcium hypochlorite solution). From boot wash personnel move to station one, remove protective garment utilizing appropriate technique (See Appendix K, Decontamination Operations for detailed individual decon techniques), and discard overboard. Remain in mask. Move to station two. Using appropriate technique (See Appendix K, Decontamination Operations for detailed individual decon techniques) remove boots and any remaining outer protective garments, discard overboard. Remain in mask. Move to shower point in vestibule (SEAL shower). Remove inner garments and mask and shower for at least five minutes. Move to station three, clean area. Utilize detector to determine presence of any remaining contamination (“Hotspots”). If clean, personnel can move to the SEAL prep area. If hotspots are detected return to shower to scrub area and repeat the shower process. Medical personnel must be prepared to triage and administer aid should any personnel become symptomatic. Personnel wait in the SEAL prep area for further direction.

• MK V Special Operations Craft. In anticipation of operating in an NBC environment, preparatory measures include; removal of nonessential topside flammable materials, wetting down with hoses, continual contamination avoidance, and attempting to navigate a course into the wind. For example, if under chemical attack, active measures to be taken immediately are individual decon (See Appendix K, Decontamination Operations, for detailed individual decon techniques), continue hose wet down, evasive maneuvering, and identification of contaminated areas.

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Chapter V
Shipboard Actions for Taking on Contaminated SOF Personnel
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Set a course into the wind to limit the spread of contamination, in and on the craft, and on personnel. Crew (in MOPP4) conducts craft decon from forward to aft using saltwater washdown and 5% calcium hypochlorite (HTH) solution. Aft deck is designated as the “Hot Line” for approaching contaminated vessel (CRRC, RHIB), vessel ties off and immediate saltwater/HTH washdown begins. Personnel climb onto aft deck, conduct individual decon by wiping each other down with M291/M295 decon pads. At the same time, sensitive items and special equipment are secured off to the side of the aft deck. Due to limited space and contamination, the disposition of these contaminated items must be considered in planning. Actions must be taken to decontaminate, contain, or dispose. Personnel then step into boot wash of 9% HTH. Step forward to remove protective garments (See Appendix K, Decontamination Operations for detailed individual decon techniques) and throw garments over the side. Step forward, staying on the hot side and take off boots, discard over the side, remove gloves, discard over the side (See Appendix K, Decontamination Operations, for detailed individual decon techniques). Any type of liner is still being worn at this point. Each person now removes their protective masks and is sprayed down with saltwater and tested for contamination. If declared clean, move to the cockpit for further instructions. If declared still dirty, repeat the process.

• Rigid Inflatable Boat/Combat Rubber Raiding Craft (CRRC ). In anticipation of NBC contamination, craft navigates into the wind to limit the spread of contamination onto the craft and personnel. Utilizing saltwater and HTH, crew decons craft from forward to aft. Personnel decon themselves and equipment (See Appendix K, Decontamination Operations, for detailed individual decon techniques). Disposition of craft is considered during planning. • Dry Deck Shelter. Decon procedures are currently being developed by the Navy submarine community.

9. Ground Vehicles

SOF planners must consider the increased logistical requirements when decontaminating vehicles.

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NBC Considerations During Infiltration, Execution, and Exfiltration
If decon assets are available and the tactical situation permits, ground vehicles should be decontaminated within 1 to 6 hours. Resource intensive, vehicle decontamination operations require personnel support, logistical sustainment, site selection/setup/ security, processing time, and clearance. Disposition of contaminated vehicles is also considered during planning (situation may require abandoning vehicles). SOF peculiar vehicles (Ranger Special Operations Vehicle (RSOV), motorcycles, and Mobile Over Snow Transport (MOST or snowmobile) utilize standard decontamination techniques with modified procedures to facilitate decontamination of unique items. For detailed information on vehicle decontamination refer to FM 3-5, NBC Decontamination.

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APPENDIX A
SOF ORGANIC NBC DEFENSE ASSETS 1. General
The military conducts operations based on the knowledge of its own mission, threat, and NBC defense capabilities. Shared knowledge of available NBC defense resources with the SOF community facilitates planning. SO missions tend to be conducted jointly. Therefore, SOF personnel and planners must know what component resources are available to support mission accomplishment.

2. Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) Assets
a. Chemical Detachment. The SF Chemical Detachment of a SF Group is a 10-man detachment, organized in three-2 man Decon/Recon teams and a headquarters consisting of a captain (O-3) commander, sergeant first class (E-7) NBC staff NCO, staff sergeant (E-6) computer plotter, and a staff sergeant (E-6) NBC NCO. The Detachment’s mission is to provide decontamination support and limited rear area NBC reconnaissance for ARSOF units. The five decon missions performed by the Chemical Detachment are: decon site reconnaissance, employment of the Expedient Personnel Decontamination System (EPDS), dirty exfiltration decontamination, operational decontamination, and thorough decontamination. Thorough decontamination requires augmentation. Chemical detachments conduct NBC reconnaissance in rear areas, primarily to search for a route or location for a special force’s operational base (SFOB) or forward operational base (FOB) to move to after an NBC attack. In addition, detachment personnel can augment the staff of the nuclear, biological, chemical, collection center (NBCCC) and be task organized within individual groups to satisfy mission requirements. • Capabilities: •• The detachment can provide decontamination and limited rear area NBC reconnaissance for SOF units. •• Each team can conduct decon site reconnaissance. •• Each team can establish and operate one dirty exfiltration decon in support of contaminated special forces operational detachment-A (s) (SFODAs) if there is no exfiltration platform or if it is augmented by 13-15 personnel. •• The Detachment can establish and operate one dirty exfiltration decon site in support of SFODAs if there is an exfiltration platform. •• Each team can establish and operate one operational decon site in support of an SFOB, FOB, or advanced operational base (AOB). •• The Detachment can establish and operate one thorough decon site with 31-35 augmentees in support of an SFOB, FOB, or AOB. •• The Detachment can conduct one NBC reconnaissance mission at a time. This can be search, survey, or surveillance. •• The Detachment is mobile, using HMMWVs and M101A1 trailers. •• The Detachment is air assault capable. •• The Detachment is airborne capable. •• The Detachment can establish flame field expedients in support of base defense. • Limitations: •• The Detachment has no organic security assets. It is unable to secure a decon site.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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Appendix A
•• The Detachment cannot support a detailed troop decon (DTD) for more than 20 soldiers without augmentation (13-15 personnel). •• The Detachment has no water hauling capability. •• The Detachment requires two hours to transition from NBC reconnaissance to decontamination missions.

b. Chemical Reconnaissance Detachment (LB Team). The Chemical Reconnaissance Detachment (CRD) of a SF Group is a five-man detachment capable of training or augmenting an SFODA for NBC special reconnaissance. Currently there are only two active duty CRDs. • Capabilities: •• Able to support NBC aspects of special reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, and direct action. •• Able to train SOF elements to perform NBC SR/DA missions and provide mission support. •• Can be employed as a whole or in a split team configuration. •• Capable of deploying on short notice with minimal preparation at any level of conflict. •• Capable of detecting and collecting NBC samples.

• Limitation. The CRD is designed as an augmentation team/training team, operationally limited requiring security, medical, language and communications support. c. Additional Duty Personnel. Varying in numbers within ARSOF, there are NBC trained (extra-duty) individuals at the team [SFODA], company, and battalion level.

3. Naval Special Warfare Forces (NAVSOF) Assets
a. Naval forces do not have separate units for NBC defense. Navy NBC defense duties are assigned as an additional duty to already established teams of personnel. b. NBC defense resources are coordinated through the unified combatant commands and provided by Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), and Naval Facilities Command (NAVFAC). For additional information on NAVSOF NBC support refer to Appendix M, “NBC Support Considerations and Requirements.”

4. Air Force Special Operations Forces (AFSOF) Assets
a. Air Force NBC defense resource organizations are similar to that of the Navy. NBC defense duties are assigned (as an additional duty) to existing readiness units. b. Air Force readiness units provide NBC defense support, as well as their usual support, to the command elements to which they are assigned.

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USSOCOM Pub 3-11

APPENDIX B
SOF COMPONENT AND SERVICE COMMON NBC DEFENSE EQUIPMENT 1. Component Common Equipment
a. Detection Equipment • Chemical Agent Detector Paper, M8. NSN: 6665-00-05-0829, TM 3-6665-205-1011. M8 is chemically treated, dye impregnated paper. It detects liquid V and G (nerve), and H (blister) CW agents. It does not detect vapors or agents in water. Exposure to liquid insecticides, antifreeze, and petroleum products may cause false readings. (Navy non-asset) • Chemical Agent Detector Paper, M9. NSN: 6665-01-049-8982, TM 3-4230-229-10. M9 detector paper detects the presence of liquid chemical agent (nerve & blister), but does not identify the specific agent or its type. M9 paper reacts to CW agents by turning a reddish color. Exposure to liquid insecticides, antifreeze, and petroleum products may cause false readings. The paper can be attached with an adhesive back. • Chemical Agent Automatic Alarm, M8A1. NSN: 6665-01-105-5623, TM 3-6665-312-12P. The M8A1 is a nerve agent alarm. The system consists of the M43A1 detector, as many as five M42 alarm units and various power supplies. • Remote Sensing Chemical Agent Alarm (RSCAAL), M21. NSN: 6665-01-302-1968, TM 09676A-1-101. The M21 is a two-man-portable, passive infrared sensor that detects nerve and blister agent vapor clouds from a distance of 3-5 kilometers. It can be used for reconnaissance and surveillance missions. It consists of a detector, tripod, M42 remote alarm unit, transit case, power cable assembly, and standard military power source. (AF non-asset) • Automatic Chemical Agent Detection Alarm (ACADA), M22. The M22 is an advanced, point-sampling, chemical agent alarm system. It detects standard nerve and vesicant agents. The system consists of the detector, as many as five alarm units, and various power supplies. This system replaces the M8A1 alarm in most SOF units. (NAVSOF non-asset) • NBC Reconnaissance System FOX, M93A1. NSN 6665-01-323-2582. FM 3-3. The FOX (M93A1) is a fully integrated NBC reconnaissance system with a dedicated system of NBC detection, warning, and sampling equipment integrated into a high speed, high mobility, armored carrier. Its components include a Mobile Mass Spectrometer. (NAVSOF & AF nonasset) • Chemical Agent Detector Kit, M256A1. NSN: 6665-01-016-8399, TM 3-6665-307-10. The M256A1 Chemical Agent Detection Kit is designed to detect and identify blood (AC & CK) blister (H, HN, HD, CX, L) and nerve (V & G series) agents and consists of a carrying case, 12 sampler-detectors, instruction cards, and M8 paper. • Water Testing Kit for Chemical Agents, M272. NSN 6665-01-134-0885, TM 3-6665-319-10. The M272 is a lightweight, portable kit that detects and identifies harmful amounts of CW agents present in raw and treated water. It detects AC, HD, L, and nerve agents. (Naval non-asset) • Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM). NSN: 6665-01-199-4153, TM 3-6665-327-13 P. The CAM is used to search and locate contamination, specifically nerve and blister agents. It is a battery operated, portable point monitoring system. It cannot realistically assess the vapor hazard over an area from one point. It weighs 8.6 pounds. (AF non-asset) • Individual Chemical Agent Detector (ICAD). NSN 6665-01-340-1693, TM 3-6665-340-12&P. ICAD is a miniature, chemical agent detector for nerve, blood, choking, and vesicant/blister agents. The ICAD has a slower detection response time for some agents and may not be suitable for individual force protection missions in certain roles. (Army and AF nonasset) • Improved Chemical Agent Monitor (ICAM). NSN 6665-01-357-8502, TM 3665-327-19. The ICAM merges two improvements to the CAM. These improvements are a modular design and an updated electronics board. The modular design significantly reduces repair time. (NAVSOF & AF non-asset)

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Appendix B
b. Protection Equipment • Protective Mask, M24. NSN 4240-00-808-8799, TM 3-4240-280-10. The M24 mask protects personnel in aircraft and on the ground against all known CB aerosols and vapors. It can be attached to the aircraft oxygen system using an M8 adapter kit. (AF & NAVSOF non-asset) • Protective Mask, M40A1. NSN 4240-01-258-0061, TM 3-4240-400-10. The M40 mask protects against CB agents, radioactive fallout particles, and battlefield contaminants. It has a silicone face piece, binocular lens system, voicemitter, drink tube, clear and tinted inserts, and standard thread filter canister. • Combat Vehicle Crewman Mask, M42. NSN 4240-01-258-0065, TM 3-4240-400-10. The M42 series mask has the same components as the M40 with an additional built-in microphone for wire communications. The filter canister is attached to the end of the hose with an adapter for CPFU connection. (AF & Naval non-asset) • Aircrew Protective Mask, M43. NSN 4240-01-208-6966. The M43A1 mask has a form-fitting butyl rubber face piece with lens mounted close to the eyes, an integrated hood with a skull-type suspension system, a portable battery or power operated blower/filter system, and an inhalation air distribution assembly. (AF & Naval non-asset) • General Aviator Protective Mask, M48. NSN 4240-01-386-4686, TM 3-4240-342-20. M49. NSN 4240-01-413-4096, TM 3-4240-344-20. The M48 and M49 masks are an upgrade of the M43 Type I mask. Its improved blower is chestmounted. The blower is lighter, less bulky, and battery-powered. (AF & Naval non-asset) • Protection Assessment Test System (PATS), M41. NSN 4240-01-0365-8241. FM 3-4. The M41 is used to check the face seal of protective masks. (NAVSOF non-asset) • Aircrew Uniform Integrated Battlefield (AUIB). The AUIB is a standard combat uniform for aircrews. It replaces both the BDO and the NOMEX flight suit and provides NBC and flame protection. (AF & NAVSOF non-asset) • Battle Dress Overgarment (BDO), Overgarment 84 (Marines). NSN 8415-01-137-1704. FM 3-4. The BDO is a camouflage, expendable, two-piece overgarment. It protects for 24 hours against chemical agent vapors, liquid droplets, biological agents, and radioactive particles. Max wear time is 30 days in an uncontaminated environment. (NAVSOF non-asset) • Chemical Protective Glove Set, NSN 8415-01-033-3518, TM 10-277. This protective glove set consists of an outer butyl rubber glove and an inner cotton insert. • Chemical Protective Footwear Cover (CPFC). NSN 8430-01-021-5978. FM 3-4. CPFCs are impermeable and have unsupported butyl rubber soles and uppers. Two variations are fielded; one with a single heel flap, and the other with the newer fishtail doubled heel flap. (NAVSOF non-asset) • Green/Black Vinyl Overboot (GVO/BVO). NSN 8430-01-048-6305. The GVO is a plain olive drab vinyl green overshoe with elastic fasteners. It protects against NBC agents, rain, mud, or snow. The BVO is very similar except it is black with enlarged tabs on each elastic fastener. • Joint Service Lightweight Suit (JSLIST). The JSLIST program, a four-Service effort to field a common chemical protective ensemble, has produced a new protective overgarment that is currently being fielded. Testing continues on the glove and boot. Program objectives include reduced heat stress, compatibility with all interfacing equipment, longer wear, and washability. • Simplified Collective Protective Equipment (SCPE). M20A1. NSN 4240-01-166-2254. FM 3-4. The SCPE consists of an expandable liner, blower/motor assembly, protective entrance, support kit, and replacement liners. It is lightweight and mobile allowing for the conversion of existing structures into protected command and control centers. (AF & Marine nonasset)

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SOF Component and Service Common NBC Defense Equipment
c. Decontamination Equipment • Portable Decontamination Apparatus, M11. NSN 4230-00-720-1618, TM 3-4230-204-12&p. The M11 decontaminates small areas that personnel must touch. It is a steel container with an aluminum spray-head assembly and a nitrogen gas cylinder that provides pressure. It’s filled with 1-1/3 quarts of DS2, enough to cover 135 square feet. (AF & NAVSOF non-asset) • Power Driven Decontamination Apparatus, M12A1. NSN 4230-00-926-9488, TM 3-4230-209-12. The M12A1 is power driven and includes a pump unit, heater unit, 500-gallon tank unit, and personal shower unit. (SOF & AF non-asset) • Portable Decontamination Apparatus, M13. NSN 4230-01-133-4124, TM 3-4230-214-12&P. The M13 is used to decontaminate vehicles and crew served weapons larger than .50 caliber. It is about the size of a 5-gallon gasoline can and comes pre-filled with 14 liters of DS2. Decon capability is 1200 square feet. (AF & NAVSOF non-asset) • Lightweight Decontamination System (LDS), M17. NSN 4230-01-251-8702, TM 3-4230-228-10. The M17 is portable, lightweight, and consists of a combined pump and heater unit, 1500 gallon or 3,000 gallon collapsible rubberized tank and personal shower unit. • Skin Decontamination Kit (SDK), M291. NSN 4230-01-101-3984, TM 3-4230-216-10. The M291 is used for skin and equipment decontamination. It is non-toxic, eliminating the need for inert trainers. • Decontamination Kit, Individual Equipment, M295. NSN 6850-01-357-8459. FM 3-4. The M295 uses sorptive resin unlike the liquid based kits. It is a pouch, designed to fit in the cargo pocket of the BDU, and contains four individually wrapped wipe-down mitts to decontaminate personal equipment. • Decontamination Solution (DS2). NSN 6850-00-753-4870. TB CML 113. DS2 is effective against all known chemical and biological agents except bacterial spores. It is issued in 1-1/3 quart cans (M11), 14-liter containers (M13), and 5-gallon containers. It is also extremely corrosive. (AF & NAVSOF non-asset) • Calcium Hypochlorite (HTH). NSN 6810-01-065-2410. FM 3-5. HTH is a decontaminant that is used only when STB is not available. It is effective against lewesite, V agents, and all biological materials including bacterial spores. HTH ignites on contact with liquid mustard agent or DS2 (or any organic compound such as JP8, diesel, any POL product). Observe same precaution as for STB. • STB - Super Tropical Bleach (STB). NSN 6850-00-297-6653. FM 3-5. STB is effective against lewesite, V & G agents, and biological agents. It ignites on contact with liquid mustard agent or DS2 (or any organic compound such as JP8, diesel, any POL product).

2. Army Specific Equipment
a. Detection • Biological Integrated Detection System (BIDS). NSN 6665-01392-6191, TM 3-666-F349-12PP. BIDS is a self-contained biological detection lab mounted on a HMMWV. It has sample detectors, identification equipment, navigation devices, weather sensors, and communication links. BIDS is an Army corps-level asset. (SOF non-asset) • Long Range Biological Standoff Detection System (LR-BSDS), M94. FM 3-101-6. The M94 mounts on an airborne platform and detects biological clouds at a distance of up to 50 km. It is equipped with an infrared laser, receiver, and detector.. The M94 also has an information processor for tracking and mapping functions. The M94 does not identify biological agents. It identifies a cloud of biological-type material, but cannot distinguish whether this is from biological warfare or natural background causes. Further analysis is required from other assets. (SOF non-asset) b. Protection Equipment • Apache Protective Mask, M45A1. TM3-4240-341-10. The M45A1 provides protection without the aid of forced ventilation air. It is compatible with aircraft sighting systems and night vision devices. It has close fitting eyepieces, a voicemitter, drink tube, and low profile filter canister.

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Appendix B
• Simplified Collective Protective Equipment (SCPE), M28. NSN 42400-01-331-2938. FM 3-4. M28 is a lightweight modular system. It has tent liners, hermetically sealed filter canisters, recirculation filters, protective and tunnel entrances for litter patients. Improvements are a medical air lock, tent interface, and liquid agent resistance.

3. Navy Specific Equipment
a. Detection • Chemical Warfare Directional Detector (CWDD), AN/KAS-1. NSN 25-5855-01-147-4362. NAVSEA SWO73-AAMMD010 Op Manual. CWDD is a passive sensor that detects the infrared signature of G and V nerve agent vapor clouds up to 10 nautical miles from a ship. CWDD detects cloud presence but not the distance to an agent cloud. • Chemical Agent Point Detection System (CAPDS). NSN 25-6665-01-294-2556. NAVSEA SWO-AB-MMO-010 Op Manual. CAPDS is a shipboard installed detector that continuously samples outside air and sounds an alarm when G or V nerve agents are detected. • Improved Chemical Agent Point Detection System (IPDS). IPDS is the improved version of CAPDS. In addition to G (nerve) and VX agents, IPDS detects vesicant/blister agent vapors. • Interim Biological Agent Detection System (IBADS). The IBADS can be employed on ships, shore facilities, and vehicles. It takes 20 minutes from detection to identification and alarm for biological agents. b. Protection Equipment • Protective Mask, MCU-2/P. NSN 4220-01-327-4149, TM 0910-LP-287-420. The MCU-2P uses standard NATO filter canisters. The original design came from the Air Force. It has two voicemitters and allows for a wide field of view. • Protective Mask, MCK-3A/P. NAVAIR 13-1-6.10. The MCK-3A/P is the current aviator protective mask. • Chemical Protective Overgarment (CPO). NSN 8415-01-214-8290. NSTM Chapter 470. The CPO is a lightweight, compact, chemical agent protective suit. It lasts for 100 hours of cumulative wear time within 30 days of opening the bag. It will protect up to six hours in a contaminated environment and has a 10-year shelflife. • Aircrew Individual Protective Ensemble (IPE). See NAVAIR 13-1-6.10. NSN Special Mission Equipment. The IPE is composed of the MCK-3A/P mask, tactical ventilator, and A/P37S-1 intercom set. It provides aircrewmen with necessary head, eye, and respiratory protection to guard against toxic effects of nuclear fallout and CW/BW agents. IPE includes: respirator assembly, helmet assembly, MK1 flyer’s chemical protective coverall, white cotton undershirt and drawers, plastic disposable footwear covers, plastic disposable cape, chemical protective gloves and cotton inserts, chemical protective socks and CMU-23A/P survival vest. • Selected Area Collective Protective System (SACPS). The SACPS provides total protection for a selected compartment or group of adjacent compartments on ships without CPS.

4. Air Force Specific Equipment
a. Detection Equipment • Automatic Liquid Agent Detector, AN/PSR-2. NSN 6665-01-314-2086. FM 3-4. The AN/PSR-2 ALAD detects liquid droplets of GD, VX, HD, L, and thickened agents within 60 seconds of exposure. It has a built in self-test function and a warning system with integral and auxiliary capability. • Automatic Agent Detector (AMAD), M90. M90 Handbook. The AMAD is an automatic nerve and mustard (HD) agent detector that detects agents in vapor form. This system is currently in use by the Air Force. It transmits an alarm by radio to a central alarm unit. b. Protection Equipment

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SOF Component and Service Common NBC Defense Equipment
• CB Protective Mask, MCU-2/AP. NSN 4220-01-327-4149, TM 0910-LP-287-420. The MCU-2P uses standard NATO filter canisters. It has two voicemitters and allows for a wide field of view. • Protective Mask, M17. A1 & A2. NSN 4240-01-143-1019, TM 3-4240-279-10. The M17 mask has been a standard armed forces issue since the 1960’s. It has a voicemitter, hard lens, and filter elements in the cheeks. The M17A1 version has a drinking tube and a resuscitation system. The M40 series mask is replacing it. • Survivable Collective Protection System 2 (SCPS-2). The SCPS-2 uses a pressurized, filtered environment to provide people with protection from nuclear fallout, bio agents, and chem. agents without the need to wear NBC individual protective equipment (IPE). It also provides blast protection. • Building Modification Kit, KMU-450F BLDG. NSN 4240-01-044-7659, TO 11D-3-7-1. The C/B modification kit is a collective protection system used to rapidly convert existing forward military structures to chemical/biological agent-proof shelters. When attached to a base field structure, it provides a pressurized clean air facility.

5. Marine Corps Specific Equipment (Protection Equipment)
• Saratoga Suit. NSN 8415-01-333-7574. FMFM 11-9. The Saratoga suit replaced the OG-84 in FY91. It is a camouflage patterned, reusable, two-piece suit with a coat, integrated hood, and trousers. It has a cotton rip stop outer layer with a carbon filter layer to absorb agents before inner layer breach. It protects against chemical agent vapors, liquid droplets, biological agents, radioactive alpha and gamma particles. In a non-NBC contaminated environment the suit may be laundered up to four times during its service life. It is not intended to be decontaminated or reimpregnated, and should be discarded after 24 hours of exposure to chemical agents. Protective capabilities extend to 30 days with active protection of 24 hours. • Armored Vehicle Protective Mask, M25. NSN 4240-00-994-8751, TM 3-4240-280-10. The M25 series mask is special for crews of armored vehicles. Inside an armored vehicle, the mask is coupled to a gas particulate filter and outside the M10A1 canister filters air. It protects against NBC contaminants and is being replaced by the M42. • Portable Collective Protection System (PCPS). NSN 4240-01-200-4340. FM 3-4. The PCPS consists of the protective shelter, support kit, and hermetically sealed filter canister. It provides an uncontaminated, positive pressure shelter for use as a command and control center or rest and relief for 12 to 14 Marines. When over pressure is applied the shelter protects against CB agent penetration. Shelter: tent and fly (saranaex composite material), aluminum support structure, airlock for decontamination. Support kit accessories: motor/blower assembly, flexible ducts and hermetically sealed filter canister: aluminum canister, gas filter, and particulate filter.

6. SOF Specific Equipment
• Chemical Protective Undergarment (CPU). FM 3-4. The CPU is an expendable, two-piece undergarment that is worn under a standard uniform. It protects for 12 hours against chemical agent vapors, liquid droplets, biological agents, and radioactive particles.

7. Equipment in Development
a. Joint • Joint Biological Remote Early Warning System (JBREWS). Designed to detect the actual on site presence or approach of biological agents, collect samples to analyze for selected agents, and utilizing a sensor network command provide early warning to take protective action. Consisting of several monitoring units it can be used in the defense of large sites, e.g. airfields etc. The system utilizes a HMMWV and trailer to transport its components. • Portal Shield, Sensor Network Command Post (SNCP). Designed to detect and identify biological agents. Consisting of several monitoring units it can be used in the defense of large sites, e.g. airfields etc. It is currently in the test phase of development. • Joint Service Light NBC Reconnaissance System (JSLNBCRS). NSN 6665-01-323-2582. JSLNBCRS will detect, mark, and warn of NBC hazards on the battlefield. The system will use the HMMWV and the Light Armored Vehicle as mobile platforms to move sophisticated sensors and analysis equipment on the battlefield. (NAVSOF & AF non-asset)

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Appendix B
• Modular Decontamination System (MDS). MDS consists of a decontamination pumper and two high-pressure washer modules. Each module may be transported on a ¾-ton trailer. MDS is supported by two 3000-gallon self-supporting fabric water tanks and one 125-gpm-water pump. (NAVSOF non-asset) • Multipurpose Integrated Chemical Agent Alarm (MICAD). MICAD is a near real-time integrated NBC detection, warning, and reporting system. Using existing detectors, it automates data gathering, formats sensor data, transmits alarms, and issues NBC1 and NBC4 reports. (NAVSOF non-asset) • Joint Chemical Agent Detector (JCAD). JCAD detects nerve and blister agents. It is lightweight, portable, and its interferant technology reduces false alarms. JCAD will allow detection of emerging threat agents. • Joint Service Lightweight Standoff Chemical Agent Detector (JSLSCAD). JSLSCAD is a passive, infrared detection unit that detects nerve and blister vapor clouds at a distance of up to 5 km while the detector is moving. • Joint Biological Point Detection System (JBPDS). JBPDS will provide common point detection for all services. It will detect BW agents at low threshold levels and identify them within 15 minutes. Currently three variants are planned including a vehicle mounted, man-portable, and handheld. • Sorbent Decontamination System (SDS). Sorbent decontaminate includes CB decontaminates that increase decon efficiency, are less caustic, and require no water. Development goals are: neutralization with less contact time, no scrubbing, less health risks, and improved storage stability. • Joint NBC Warning and Reporting System (JWARN). JWARN is a system of computers, printers, and software. This equipment is tied together with communications that will enable personnel to rapidly detect, identify, and disseminate data on CB threats. b. Army Equipment in Development • Soldier Hydration System (SHS). SHS is a civilian style camel back system compatible with the M40 mask c. Navy Equipment in Development • Shipboard Automatic Liquid Agent Detector (SALAD). SALAD will be an automated externally mounted liquid agent detector capable of detecting G (nerve), V (nerve), and H (vesicant/blister) series chemical agents. • Shipboard Chemical Agent Monitor, Portable (SCAMP). SCAMP is a portable detector that detects nerve and blister agent vapors. d. Marine Corps Equipment in Development • Joint CB Agent Water Monitor (JCBAWM). JCBAWM will be a man portable device to detect, identify, and quantify CB agents. It will allow the user to sample water and receive a digital readout of the contents. This detection system will be capable of warning personnel of CB agent presence. • Small Unit Biological Detector (SUBD). SUBD is a biological detector capable of operating on the move. It weighs less than 30 lbs. and can be carried by one soldier. It will identify both solid and airborne samples and provide an audible/visual alarm. • NBC Canteen Refilling System (NBC CRS). The Canteen Refilling System developmental goals are compatibility with common water distribution systems and the 5-gallon water container. Other objectives are capability to refill multiple canteens in a contaminated area.

8. Nonorganic Assets
• Quick Mask, Model Name: Chem./Bio Model Number: QM-7DT6VR-YE-M (yellow), QM-7DT6VR-BL-M (black). • DECCOFOGGER. Commercial manportable, chemical decontamination fogger.

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APPENDIX C
US ARMY THEATER NBC DEFENSE ASSETS 1. Theater Army
a. Chemical Battalion (Enhanced). A chemical battalion consists of up to seven chemical companies. The battalion provides command and control of these companies in the area of the theater army command. Battalions provide smoke, decon, biological detection, and/or recon support. b. Decon Company. A chemical decon company provides equipment decon support to units. The company is 100 percent mobile. Each decon platoon is organized with a platoon HQ and three decon squads. c. NBC Recon Company. NBC recon companies are employed to detect contaminated areas or confirm that the area is clear of contamination. Recon units can operate throughout the battlefield conducting search, survey, surveillance, marking, and sampling missions. d. BIO Defense Company. Biological detection companies are an operational level asset. Equipped with 35 BIDS, and M94 long range standoff detection systems the company is arrayed to provide coverage through out the supported units area of operations. e. JA/JB Teams. JA/JB Teams provide NBC operations support to units over one or two 12-hour shifts. These teams also augment a tactical operations center to provide NBC operations support to units over two 12-hour shifts.

2. Corps JTF
a. Chemical Brigade. The corps chemical brigade commands and controls two to six chemical battalions and separate units. The brigade provides NBC recon, decon, biological detection, and smoke support throughout the corps area. b. Chemical Battalion. The chemical battalion consists of three to seven chemical companies. The battalion provides command and control of these companies as part of a chemical brigade. Battalions provide smoke, decon, biological detection and/or recon support. c. Decon Company. A chemical decon company provides equipment decon support to units. The company is 100 percent mobile. Each decon platoon is organized with a platoon HQ and three decon squads. d. Smoke/Decon Company. The smoke/decon chemical company (corps/theater army) provides large area smoke and equipment decon support to divisions, units in the corps rear areas, and units in the COMMZ. The company consists of a company HQs and four smoke/decon platoons. e. Smoke/Decon Company (Light). The smoke/decon chemical company (corps/theater army) provides large area smoke and equipment decon support to divisions, units in the corps rear areas, and units in the COMMZ. f. BIO Defense Company. Biological detection companies are an operational level asset. Equipped with 35 BIDS and M94 long range standoff detection systems, the company is arrayed to provide coverage through out the supported units area of operations. g. NBC Recon Company. NBC recon companies are employed to detect contaminated areas or confirm that the area is clear of contamination. Recon units can operate throughout the battlefield conducting search, survey, surveillance, and sampling missions. h. JA/JB Teams. JA/JB Teams provide NBC operations support to units over one or two 12-hour shifts. These teams also augment a tactical operations center to provide NBC operations support to units over two 12-hour shifts.

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Appendix C 3. Division
a. Divisional Chemical Company (Active). Assigned to a heavy division, and under the operational control of the division chemical officer, this company provides smoke, decon, recon, and chemical staff support. b. Divisional Chemical Company (Reserve). Assigned to a heavy division, and under the operational control of the division chemical officer, this company provides smoke, decon, recon, and chemical staff support. c. Smoke/Decon Company (ABN and AA). The chemical company (airborne/air assault) provides equipment decon, large area smoke, and chemical staff support to the airborne and air assault divisions. The company is organized with a division chemical section, an NBC center, a company HQ, and three smoke/decon platoons. The smoke/decon platoons contain a platoon HQ, two smoke/decon squads, and a support squad. d. Mechanized Smoke Generator Company. The mechanized smoke company provides large-area smoke support for tactical operations in the forward combat area. The smoke company consists of a company headquarters and three smoke platoons. The company is 100 percent mobile.

4. Brigade
a. Smoke/Decon/Recon Chemical Company (ACR). This company provides equipment decon, NBC reconnaissance, large-area smoke, and chemical staff support to armored cavalry regiments (ACR). The company consists of a chemical staff section, a company HQ, one NBC recon platoon, and one smoke/decon platoon. b. Decon/Recon Chemical Company (LACR). This company provides equipment decon, NBC reconnaissance, large-area smoke, and chemical staff support to armored cavalry regiments (ACR). The company consists of a chemical staff section, a company HQ, one NBC recon platoon, and one smoke/decon platoon. c. Separate Brigade Chemical Platoon (Reserve). The platoon provides equipment decon, NBC recon, and large-area smoke support to separate brigades and attached units. The platoon consists of a headquarters, a recon squad, and two smoke/ decon squads.

5. Chemical Brigade
a. Mission: To provide command and control of two to six chemical battalions. Personnel: 17 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 47 enlisted. b. Major Equipment Systems • • • • • • • • • • • 5 2 3 3 1 1 2 1 1 1 3 HMMWVs, M998/1038 1HMMWVs, M1028 Trucks, 2 1/2-ton CUCVs, 3/4-ton, M1009 Trailers, 3/4-ton Trailer, 1 1/2-ton Radio, AN/GRC-106 (AN/GRC-193) Radios, AN/VRC-47 (AN/VRC-89) Generator, 3kw Generator, 5kw Generator, 5kw (PU-160) Chem alarms, M8A1

6. Chemical Battalion
a. Mission: To provide command and control of three to seven chemical companies (recon, decon, dual purpose (smoke/ decon), mechanized smoke, and/or motorized smoke). Personnel: 10 officers, 2 warrant officers, and 37 enlisted.

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b. Major Equipment Systems • • • • • • • • • • • • 4 3 7 4 3 1 1 7 1 1 2 3 HMMWVs, M998/1038 Trucks, 2 1/2-ton CUCVs, 3/4-ton, M1009 Trailers, 3/4-ton Trailers, 1 1/2-ton Water trailer, 400-gal Radio, AN/GRC-160, (AN/GRC-88) Radios, AN/VRC-46, (AN/VRC-90) Radio, AN/VRC-47, (AN/VRC-89) Generator, 3kw Generators, 5kw Chem alarms, M8A1

7. Chemical Battalion (Enhanced)
a. Mission: To provide command and control of three to seven chemical companies (recon, decon, dual purpose (smoke/ decon) mechanized smoke, and/or motorized smoke). Personnel: 12 officers, 2 warrant officers, and 43 enlisted. b. Major Equipment Systems • • • • • • • • • • • 4 3 7 3 3 7 1 1 1 1 3 HMMWVs, M998/1038 Trucks, 2 1/2-ton CUCVs, 3/4-ton, M1009 Trailers, 3/4-ton Trailers, 1 1/2-ton Radios, AN/GRC-160 (AN/GRC-88) Radio, AN/VRC-46 (AN/VRC-90) Generator, 3kw Generator, 5kw Generator, 5kw (PU-620) Chem alarms, M8A1

8. Chemical Company (Mechanized/Smoke)
a. Mission: To provide large-area smoke support for a heavy division from the main battle area forward. Personnel: 5 officers, 0 warrant officers, and 102 enlisted. b. Major Equipment Systems • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 7 1 4 5 2 9 1 7 7 3 5 1 21 1 Trucks, 5-ton Truck, wrecker, 5-ton Trucks, 2 1/2-ton HMMWVs, 5/4-ton Trailers, 1/4-ton Trailers, 1 1/2-ton Water trailer, 400-gal trailer-mounted TPU Tank and pump units Radios, AN/VRC-46 (AN/VRC-90) Radios, AN/VRC-47 (AN/VRC-89) Generator, 5kw 1059 smoke carriers M578 recovery vehicle

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Appendix C 9. Chemical Company (Decon)
a. Mission: To provide decontamination support for elements of corps/theater army. Personnel: 7 officers, 0 warrant officers, and 127 enlisted. b. Major Equipment Systems • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 31 1 18 2 6 6 47 1 15 15 1 16 45 15 3 6 21 15 Trucks, 5-ton Truck, wrecker, 5-ton Trucks, 2 1/2-ton Commo Trucks, 5/4-ton CUCVs, 3/4-ton, M1009 Trailers, 1/4-ton Trailers, 1 1/2-ton Water trailer, 400-gal 500-gal fabric tanks 3,000-gal fabric tanks Trailer-mounted TPU Tank and pump units 65gpm pumps Radios, AN/GRC-160&88 Radios, AN/VRC-46&90 Radios, AN/VRC-47&89 Chem Alarms, M8A1 M12A1 decon apps.

10. Chemical Company (Smoke/Decon)
a. Mission: To provide equipment decontamination and large-area smoke support for elements of a corps/theater army. Personnel: 6 officers, 0 warrant officers, and 135 enlisted. b. Major Equipment Systems • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 26 3 24 24 20 1 10 2 11 5 2 13 8 4 28 24 24 Trucks, 5-ton Trucks, 2 1/2-ton HMMWVs Trailers, 3/4-ton Trailers, 1 1/2-ton Water trailer, 400-gal Tank and pump units Trailer-mounted tank and pump units Radios, AN/VRC-46&90 Radios, AN/VRC-47&89 Generators, 3 kw Chem alarms M8A1 3,000-gal Tanks, fabric AN/VRC-98 Pumps, 65gpm LW decon apps M157 Smk Gens

11. Chemical Company (Smoke/Decon)
a. Mission: To provide equipment decontamination and large-area smoke support for a light division. Personnel: 6 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 149 enlisted.

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b. Major Equipment Systems • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 37 1 31 31 28 1 1 8 6 15 5 28 21 24 8 Trucks, 5-ton truck, wrecker, 5-ton HMMWVs, 5/4-ton Trailers, 3/4-ton Trailers, 1 1/2-ton Water trailer, 400-gal Trailer-mounted tank unit 3,000-gal fabric tanks Tank and pump units Radios, AN/VRC-46&90 Radios, AN/VRC-47&89 65gpm water pumps Chem alarms, M8A1 M157 smoke gens M12A1 PDDAs

12. Chemical Company (Recon)
a. Mission: To provide NBC reconnaissance support for elements of a corps/theater army. Personnel: 5 officers, 0 warrant officers, and 137 enlisted. b. Major Equipment Systems • • • • • • • • • • • • 1 4 40 1 4 1 1 1 38 4 2 4 Truck, 5-ton Trucks, 2 1/2-ton HMMWVs, 5/4-ton (armored) CUCVs, 5/4-ton, M1008 Trailers, 1 1/2-ton Water trailer, 400-gal Tank and pump unit Trailer-mounted tank and pump unit Radios, AN/VRC-46&90 Radios, AN/VRC-47&89 Generators, 3kw Chem alarms, M8A1

13. Chemical company (Heavy DIV)
a. Mission: To provide equipment decon, large-area smoke, NBC recon, NBC warning and reporting, and chemical staff support to a heavy/infantry division. Personnel: 12 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 154 enlisted. b. Major Equipment Systems • • • • • • • • • • • • • 27 6 7 2 1 12 1 15 1 36 6 12 26 5-ton, 15 2 1/2-ton, 1 2 1/2-ton shop van, and 1 5-ton wrecker Truck HMMWVs, 5/4-ton M1059 Smoke Systems CUCVs, 3/4-ton 3/4-ton, 41 1 1/2-ton and 1 400-gal water Tanker 500-gal and 12 3,000-gal fabric Tanks LD Trailer-mounted tank Tank and pump units Tracked recovery vehicle, M578 65gpm water pumps M93 NBCRS M12A1 PDDAs Chem alarms, XM22

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Appendix C 14. Chemical Company (Heavy DIV)
a. Mission: To provide equipment decon, large-area smoke, NBC recon, NBC warning and reporting, and chemical staff support to a heavy/infantry division. Personnel: 12 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 150 enlisted. b. Major Equipment Systems • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 25 6 1 1 1 12 1 13 1 36 6 12 12 6 5-ton and 16 2 1/2-ton Trucks HMMWVs, 5/4-ton 5/4-ton and 2 3/4-ton CUCVs HMMWV with commo 3/4-ton, 40 1 1/2-ton, and 1 400-gal water Trailers 500-gal and 12 3,000-gal fabric tanks Trailer mounted tank Tank and pump units M578 65gpm water pumps M113 APCs M12A1 PDDAs Chem alarms, M8A1 M1059 Smk Gens

15. Chemical Company (Smoke/Decon)
a. Mission: To provide equipment decon, large-area smoke, NBC recon, NBC warning and reporting, and chemical staff support for an airborne or air assault division. Personnel: 9 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 118 enlisted. b. Major Equipment Systems • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 32 25 1 2 18 2 22 6 6 1 5 21 6 17 30 18 Trucks, 5-ton HMMWVs, 5/4-ton Truck, wrecker, 5-ton CUCVs, 5/4-ton Trailers, 3/4-ton Trailers, 3/4-ton Trailers, 1 1/2-ton 500-gal fabric tanks 3,000-gal fabric tanks Trailer-mounted tank Tank and pump units 65gpm water pumps M12A1 PDDAs [18 M17 LDS] Chem alarms, M8A1 Drums, fabric, 500-gal M157 Smk Gens

16. Chemical Company (Smoke/Decon/Recon)
a. Mission: To provide equipment decon, large-area smoke, NBC recon, NBC warning and reporting, and chemical staff support for an armored cavalry regiment. Personnel: 6 officers, 0 warrant officers, and 67 enlisted.

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b. Major Equipment Systems • • • • • • • • • • • • • 4 3 4 4 6 2 1 3 6 6 7 1 11 Trucks, 5-ton Trucks, 2 1/2-ton HMMWVs, 5/4-ton Trailers, 3/4-ton Trailers, 1 1/2-ton 500-gal fabric tanks 3,000-gal fabric tank Tank and pump units 65gpm water pumps M93 NBCRS M1059 Smk Gens M12A1 PDDAs [3 - M17 PDDE] Chem alarms, M8A1

17. Chemical Company (Decon/Recon)
a. Mission: To provide equipment decon, NBC recon, NBC warning and reporting, and chemical staff support for a light armored cavalry regiment. Personnel: 7 officers, 0 warrant officers, and 65 enlisted. b. Major Equipment Systems • • • • • • • • 5 3 5 1 3 6 8 6 Trucks, 5-ton Trucks, 2 1/2-ton HMMWVs, 5/4-ton Recovery vehicle, tracked Tank and pump units 65gpm water pumps M93 NBCRSs M17 PDDEs

18. Chemical Platoon (SEP BDE)
a. Mission: To provide NBC staff services and smoke/decon support, radiation monitoring, chemical detection, and NBC recon support to brigade and attached units. Personnel: 4 officers, 0 warrant officers, and 33 enlisted. b. Major Equipment Systems • • • • • • • • • • 7 2 4 6 5 8 7 1 4 2 HMMWVs (hvy) HMMWVs Decon apparatuses, lightweight Trailers, 3/4-ton Trailers, cargo, LMTV Trailers, cargo, FMTV Alarms, chem agent, XM22 Water test kit, bacteriological Tank and pump units Tank assembly, fabric, 3,000-gal

19. JA/JB Teams
a. Mission: To provide NBC warning and reporting support. JA Team personnel: 1 officer, 0 warrant officers, and 4 enlisted. JB Team personnel: 2 officers, 0 warrant officers, and 8 enlisted.

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Appendix C
b. Major Equipment Systems JA: • 1 HMMWV • 1 Trailer, 3/4-ton JB: • 1 CUCV, 5/4-ton • 1 Trailer, 3/4-ton

20. LA/LB Teams
a. Mission: To provide NBC recon support. LA Team personnel: 1 officer, 0 warrant officers, and 5 enlisted. LB Team personnel: 1 officer, 0 warrant officers, and 4 enlisted. b. Major Equipment Systems LA: • 2 HMMWVs • 2 Trailers, 1/4-ton • 2 Radios, AN/VRC-46 (AN/VRC-90) LB: • 1 Radio, AN/PRC-70 • 1 Radio, AN/PRC-90 • 1 Camera set, KS-99

21. Chemical Company (Biodetection)
a. Mission: To provide biological detection across a joint task force or corps area of operations. Personnel: 10 officers, 0 warrant officers, and 204 enlisted. b. Major Equipment Systems • • • • • • • • • • 38 7 84 35 48 1 36 83 35 35 Generators Radios, AN/GRC-193A Radios, AN/VRC-90A M1097 HMMWVs MM998 HMMWVs TPU Trailers, 3/4-ton NAVSTAR GPS Shelters, S-788/G TACMET Meteorological Stations

For additional information on units and equipment refer to FM 3-101, Chemical Staffs and Units.

22. Covers
a. The use of buildings and covers to protect supplies and equipment provide significant benefits to the fixed site commander. Limiting the exposure of these items to NBC agents reduces the hazard, and subsequently the need for decontamination. As a general rule anything that provides a barrier between the items of concern and the environment will provide some degree of protection. Currently there are NBC protective covers (NBC-PC) available as common table of allowances (CTA) items. These covers are specifically designed to provide a 24-hour barrier from liquid agent contamination. b. Covering can also be accomplished with items as basic as canvas tarpaulins and plastic sheeting, or as elaborate as large area maintenance and tactical aircraft shelters. The following table depicts some examples of material and equipment that may be

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US Army Theater NBC Defense Assets
available to the fixed site commander for this purpose. These items generally provide protection from liquid agent hazards, however those with integral overpressure/filtration systems additionally provide vapor hazard protection. In all cases a significant degree of protection will be afforded to the personnel, equipment, or material either covered or contained within. Any building provides partial cover. To maximize the cover supplies, equipment should be placed in rooms without external walls. All ventilation ducts, doors, windows, and electrical outlets should be covered with plastic sheeting. Note: Caution should be exercised when using commercially available protective covers/material in place of military issued covers. These items may not possess the multi-spectral camouflage qualities of their military counterpart and would subsequently be easier to detect by enemy acquisition systems. Figure C-1 depicts available NBC defense covers.

NBC Defense Covers Item
ROWPU Cover Large Area Maintenance Shelter (Clamshell) Tactical Aircraft Shelter (TAS)

Remarks
Lightweight flexible fabric for covering ROWPU. Puncture, crack, and tear resistant. Aluminum framed PVC coated fabric shelter, 192 feet x 75 feet x 31 feet Aluminum box frame PVC coated fabric shelter with clamshell opening at each end, 100 feet x 64 feet x 27 feet. Has air conditioning and heating ductwork. Modular aluminum framed fabric tentage system, (8 feet x 20 feet x 10 feet. Aluminum framed PVC coated fabric tent, 11 feet x 11 feet x 9' feet. (Effort is underway to develop a chemically hardened version as part of a pre-planned product improvement (P3I)). Replacement for current General Purpose Tents; Pole or frame support system fabric tent. Extendable to any length required by adding modules, 54 feet x 18 feet x 14 inches. Protective shelter system constructed of flouro-polymer/aramid laminate fabric that provides liquid and vapor protection and is readily decontaminable. Integrated with a Field Litter Ambulance (FLA), M1097 HMMWV, 300 square feet fully integrated. Also contains a 10 kW tactical quiet generator on a high mobility trailer. Multipurpose frame supported collective protection tent. Tent fabric is flouropolymer/aramid laminate. Features four interchangeable removable walls. Individual tent covers 121 square feet.
Figure C-1. NBC Defense Covers

Tent Extendable Modular Personnel (TEMPER) Modular Command Post System (MCPS)

Modular General Purpose Tent System

Chemically and Biologically Protective Shelter (CBPS)

Modular Chemically Hardened Tent

23. Government/Nongovernment Organization Assets
Government agencies or nongovernmental organizations may be capable of providing assets to the fixed site commander in either materials or assistance. Consult the Staff Judge Advocate for advice concerning the legal requirements for obtaining support from government and nongovernmental agencies. Examples of these agencies or organizations includes but is not limited to: a. United Nations Peacekeeping Forces. Source of trained personnel, equipment, and materials. b. World Health Organization. Source of medical assistance teams. c. International Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies. Source of materials, manpower, and equipment.

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Appendix C 24. Host Nation Assets
In addition to the resources available through military supply channels, assets may be available from the host nation. Consult the Staff Judge Advocate for advice concerning the legal requirements for obtaining host nation support. Use of these facilities will not only reduce turn around time, but will also alleviate some of the burden placed on military logistics channels. Examples of these include, but are not limited to: a. Local Police Departments. Source of trained personnel for refugee handling, maintenance of civil order, security operations, and traffic control. b. Local Retail Centers and Industries. Source of covers, expendable supplies, and decontaminants. c. Local Fire Departments. Source of high-pressure water dispensing equipment, hoses. Note: In some countries local fire departments are outfitted with equipment packages to support evacuation of the public from toxic areas. (e.g., French Fire Brigades) d. Local Water Department. Source of large quantities of water. e. Local Sanitation Department. Source of trained personnel to handle disposal of non-persistent materials and hazardous waste. f. Environmental Control Office or similar agency. Source of trained personnel to assist in monitoring, reduction, and disposal of hazardous material and waste. g. Civil Defense Agencies. Source of trained personnel, detection equipment, and materials. h. Water Treatment Plants. Source of decontaminants. i. Local Construction Companies. Sources of earth moving equipment, materiel-handling equipment, and construction materials. j. Multinational Corporations. Potential source of assets previously mentioned.

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APPENDIX D
US MARINE CORPS ORGANIC ASSET 1. Purpose
The Marine Corps has approximately 800 chemical/biological (CB) specialists spread across its force and assigned at the battalion level and higher. With the exception of the Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF), the Marine Corps does not use structured NBC defense units. Personnel intensive tasks such as unit decontamination and NBC reconnaissance operations are performed as an additional duty within Marine units.

2. Organization
a. The CBIRF was established to combat the growing chemical/biological, radiological-nuclear (CBR-N) threat. The force is a mission ready national asset that is manned, trained, and equipped to respond to CBR-N incidents worldwide, when directed by the National Command Authority. Self sufficient and capable of sustained operations, the force can assist local and military agencies in dealing with CBR-N terrorist acts by providing initial post incident consequence management. CBIRF is unique as it integrates all the elements needed for CBR-N consequence management in a single command. CBIRF also provides training to local, state, and federal agencies as well as to other DOD forces, and assists with the development of new equipment, techniques, and procedures for responding to the use of CBR-N weapons. b. The threat will dictate the force size requirement. This self-contained response force has five elements: 1) headquarters, 2) force protection, 3) medical, 4) security search and rescue, 5) service support. The mission focus of CBIRF is to quickly evacuate causalities of a WMD incident and provide time critical medical intervention in a contaminated environment. A unique feature of CBIRF is its electronic linkage to an advisory group (AG) of experts through the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The AG, composed of military and civilian experts in chemical/biological matters, advises the CBIRF in training, incident response, and effects modeling. Additionally, a deployable laboratory from the Naval Medical Research Institute will support CBIRF. This laboratory is capable of identifying biological agents.

3. Equipment
CBIRF is designed to deploy as a complete unit (375 Marines and Sailors) and is able to provide the best support if predeployed in the operational area. CBIRF’s Initial Response Force (IRF) is kept on a six-hour alert status and is capable of deploying in two C-5’s with all of its vehicles, personnel, and equipment. If required, the IRF can be rapidly configured to deploy in all types of military and commercial aircraft. The limited assets of the IRF are only intended to provide initial response capability as the IRF should be reinforced by the entire force within 24 hours.

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Appendix D
CBIRF NBC Defense Equipment Detection Equipment
Gas Chromatograph/Mass Spectrometer; Field and Portable. Detection Tubes; Chemical Agents. Monitor, Chemical Agent. Kit, Detector, Chemical Agent M256A1. Detector, Gas. Detector, Radiac DT236/PDR75. Radiac Set, AN/VDR-2. Advanced Chemical Agent Detector and Alarm System (ACADA), M22. Detector, Chemical Agent, M9 Paper. Meter, pH. Kit, Testing, Water, M272. NBC Reconnaissance System (FOX) M93. Alarm, Chemical Agent Remote Sensing (RSCAAL) M21.

Description
Detects, identifies and analyzes low level concentrations of chemical agents. Monitors a broad range of hazardous and toxi c gases and vapors. Detects and monitors various levels of nerve and blister agents on equipment surfaces and personnel. Portable kit used to detect chemical contamination. Hand-held device that detects, monitors and provides instant values on hazardous and toxic gases or vapors. Portable device used primarily by NBC and medi cal personnel to detect radiological exposure levels. Portable, hand-held device used to monitor and detect radiological contamination. An advanced point sampling, detection, and alarm system capable of detecting nerve and blister agents. Personal device used to detect chemical agent contamination on equipment and personnel. Hand-held device used in detecting liquid chemical agents and determining the decontamination solution concentration. Portable device used to detect chemical and biological agents in water. Armored vehicle mounted system designed to detect, identify, monitor, quantify, and mark chemical and radiological contamination. Detects nerve and blister agent clouds at a distance up to 5 kilometers.

Individual Protection Equipment
Coveralls, Level B. Suit, Protective, Chemical, Overgarment. Suit, Protective, Level A. Suit, Level A D urable. Level A training. Suit, Level B D urable. Gloves; Chemical Agent with insert, leather and improved. Cover, Footwear, Protector.

Description
Lightweight, disposable overgarment which provides protection against chemical and biological contamination. Provides protection against chemical agents. Provides protection from organic and inorganic chemical agents originating from a variety of sources and biological hazards. A front entry, encapsulating, positive pressure, vapor and liquid protective, one-piece overgarment. Provides Level A training. An encapsulating suit which protects against commercial liquid chemicals. Provides handwear protection against chemical agents. Provides protection against known chemical agents.

Figure D-1. CBIRF NBC Defense Equipment

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US Marine Corps Organic Asset
CBIRF NBC Defense Equipment (Cont.) Individual Protection Equipment
Mask, C/B Protective (M40).

Description
The improved mask provides improved facial and respiratory protection with cup, ballistic protective eyelense, redesigned drinking tube coupling. A compressed air breathing apparatus used to provide clean-air respiratory support in contaminated areas. A positive pressure closed circuit breathing apparatus, used for respiratory and eye protection in dangerously contaminated environments. Impermeable butyl rubber apron used to provide additional contamination protection.

Breathing Apparatus, Self-Contained. Rebreathers.

Apron, T oxicological Agents.

Decontamination Equipment
Decon System, M1731. Shelter, Decon. Decon Kit, M291. Trailer, Decon.

Description
Portable, lightweight, power driven decontaminating system. Provides facility to decontaminate personnel. Provides personnel, immediate decontamination capability. Supports decontamination operations.

Medical Equipment
Medical Support Equi pment.

Description
Includes aspirators, ventilators, pacemaker/defibrillators, breathsaver bags, heat stress monitors, surgical sets, and an armored, 4 litter ambulance. Includes laboratory, shock surgical, and aid station sets. Provides cardio/respiratory training support for all personnel.

AMALs. Manikins; Adult, Child, and Trauma.

Collective Protection
Portable Collective Protection System.

Description
Provides protective shelters for command and control, medical, and rest and relief operations.

General Support
Generator Set, 50kw, 3kw, 10kw, 30kw, and 8kw. Pump Module; Fuel and Water. Storage Tanks; Fuel and Water. Shower, Unit. Water Purification Units, Reverse Osmosis. Water Storage Tanks; vehicles, modules, and collapsible. Vehicle Fleet.

Description
Provides electrical power for required support. Provides support for required operations. Provides support for required operations. Portable system which provides personnel decontamination. Water purification system capable of treating water from any source. Used to support operations. Includes command and control, transport, cargo and utility, logistics, mobile operations, and troop carriers types of vehicles.
Figure D-1. CBIRF NBC Defense Equipment

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Appendix D

Intentionally Blank

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APPENDIX E
NBC RISK ASSESSMENT/VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS TOOL SECTION A. RISK ASSESSMENT 1. Purpose
A risk assessment allows the commander and his staff to identify vulnerabilities to an NBC hazard and mitigate those risks. The assessment is a series of questions that provides insight into mission areas that may be susceptible to an NBC attack. Conversely, shortcomings, and the need for improvement, may be identified in critical warfighting capabilities. The areas of interest generally relate to a defensive NBC posture within the purview of the primary staff and special staff. It should be noted that the result of any staff evaluation dealing with readiness requires a determination of security classification.

2. Risk Analysis Considerations
a. Identify and Disseminate Threat

Threat Analysis Checklist
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What is the threat? ! Are adversaries thought to have an NBC threat? ! By adversary, what NBC agents are known to be on-hand? ! By adversary, what NBC agents are thought to be available? ! By adversary, what and how many NBC delivery systems (e.g., SOF, missile, aircraft, ship, and artillery) are available and where are they located? ! By adversary, are NBC preventative measures such as inoculation and defensive training, being conducted and if so how extensive are the measures (e.g., inoculations of all military, or just SOF; for one biological agent or several) and how much vaccine do they have available? ! Is there a release other than attack (ROTA) threat? ! How have we considered the “collateral damage” threat posed by industrial compounds? ! Will coalition forces be subjected to environmental hazards that have aspects similar to deliberate chemical agent attacks and if so, what? ! What specific environmental hazards have been identified that might affect coalition proposed routes of advance of withdrawal? ! Where are NBC production facilities/stockpiles? ! By adversary, which individual(s) have NBC release authority and at what times (e.g., at all times, delegates to field commanders discretion during crisis, etc.)? ! By adversary, what is their NBC doctrine and strategy – including declaratory policy. How will the NBC threat be employed? ! When do we anticipate attack in terms of deployment? ! What is the most likely type of strike that might occur early in the deployment process? ! What is the anticipated priority of attack against ports, airfields, and similar locations? ! Is the enemy conducting noticeable recon of these ports, airfields and similar locations? ! What are the enemy agents of choice for specific scenarios? ! What is the stated national resolve and capability of the enemy regarding NBC employment in the region as well as in CONUS to prevent or disrupt deployment? ! What is/are the enemy’s anticipated concept(s) of operation with regard to employment of NBC weapons against an adversary either armed with WMD or allied with an adversary that is armed with WMD and capable of holding at risk strategic centers of gravity? For example, is the enemy expected to threaten use of NBC weapons to deter intervention operations against strategic centers of gravity? Is the enemy expected to use NBC weapons if deterrence fails, to preempt, retaliate, or withhold for use as a last resort, or use in a combination with any of the preceding concepts? ! Will adversarial use of NBC weapons increase their regional “prestige” and/or alter the psychological balance? ! Will adversaries be able to threaten US forces throughout the depth of their deployment?

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Appendix E
Threat Analysis Checklist (cont'd) In priority order, what kinds of information is the adversary seeking on its opponent that may be useful to it in planning NBC operations? ! Have friendly/neutral population centers been identified as potential targets? What friendly commercial NBC facilities are potential targets? ! What effect will threat employment have on our operations? ! Which pre-positioned storage areas are critical to the allied effort? ! What is the vulnerability of storage areas for pre-positioned assets? ! What is the enemy’s resolve and threat toward noncombatant US citizens in theater? ! What level of deployment degradation will the enemy seek to achieve using NBC weapons? ! What are the impacts of threat NBC usage with respect to psychological, medical, logistical, etc., implications? ! Will the use of WMD impact the cohesiveness of coalitions? If so, how? ! Which ports and airfields will be prime targets for enemy use of NBC agents under current operational plans? ! Will NBC weapon use produce a strategic, political, and/or psychological effect that overshadows its actual military utility? Have appropriate intelligence activities been tasked to develop the NBC threat? ! Which agencies are developing the NBC threat? ! What resources does the combatant command have for obtaining NBC threat data when deployed? ! What is the timeliness of NBC threat data? ! How are the above resources informed of specific information to be watching for? ! What system is in place to prioritize intelligence requests? Have we pieced together the various intelligence reports to identify and deconflict contradictory information? ! How is contradictory information deconflicted? ! Which staff sections or personnel contribute to deconflicting of NBC intelligence? ! What criteria are in place to determine if pieces of information should be incorporated into planning? Have we disseminated this information to the whole team (Services, planners, OJCS, and units)? ! When is data considered ready to be sent out to other team members? ! How is NBC threat data routed? ! How and when do we share information and conclusions with actual or potential allies (coalition partners)? ! What is the threat to host nation (HN) population/forces and how might this impact on coalition operations? ! What HN emergency response and reporting agencies are included in the dissemination of NBC data? When? What types of data? Do we have the capability to monitor for changes to the threat and rapidly disseminate major changes?
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b. Incorporate NBC Threat into Plans and Operations

NBC Plans and Operations Checklist
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Do combatant command OPLANS accurately identify the current NBC threat? ! What is the U.S. doctrinal operational response to a confirmed chem/bio use on US forces? ! What other operational responses are authorized to be made by the CINC? ! When is the CINC authorized to make these operational responses? ! How do friendly targeting plans consider the environmental aspects of industry and potential enemy weapons storage areas? ! What are the plans and priorities for distribution of force protection assets to combatants, noncombatants (i.e., US, HN, and others), and enemy prisoners of war? (1) Decontamination units and material? (2) NBC reconnaissance, detection and warning units and equipment? (3) Chemical/biological defense equipment and support (e.g., individual and collective protection, medical prophylaxes, etc.)? (4) Smoke and obscurants (i.e., units and munitions)? ! What plans are in place, tested and evaluated, regarding handling and evacuation of contaminated corpses? ! What passive avoidance measures are required by the combatant commander? ! In consideration of joint doctrine, how is HN support needs determined? ! How do the plans provide NBC protection guidance for the entire spectrum of operations, from operations other than war to general war?

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NBC Risk Assessment/Vulnerability Analysis Tool
NBC Plans and Operations Checklist (cont'd)
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Are planners addressing the NBC threat, in peacetime, to forward-deployed forces? ! How are changes in threat status in the unit’s AO sent quickly with a proper priority? ! What priority is used to ensure timely receipt of information? ! Are chemical and biological defense requirements being fulfilled? ! Are forward-deployed forces inoculated with safe and effective vaccines for high threat BW agents? ! How sufficient are the medical (e.g., vaccines, antibiotics, antidotes, etc.) and non-medical (e.g., protective equipment) stocks on hand? ! Are units trained to operate in a chemical and biological warfare environment? Is there a structured plan to reduce/mitigate the NBC threat? ! Do we understand which “smart” sensors, are available and how to use this information? ! Once “smart” sensors detect agents, how (using what communication system) is their information transmitted, especially across service and coalition lines? ! What is the (our) standard to confirm enemy use of NBC weapons? For example, is a Gold Seal biological laboratory required for BW confirmation? ! Which staging areas are most critical to our success? ! What alternate staging areas have been identified? ! What priority are enemy NBC weapons delivery and storage units being given in the targeting sequence? ! What military/nonmilitary steps are planned to negate or deter the use of NBC weapons? ! What friendly actions may create an NBC hazard for SOF? ! What steps are planned to eliminate enemy capability to target ports, airfields, etc.? ! What measures, related to countering NBC weapons, are being used throughout the coalition depth of deployment and beyond? ! Are we prepared to portray enemy use of NBC weapons in such a negative way as to rally world opinion against our enemy? ! What NBC defense units will be deployed early to provide protection against the enemy’s use of NBC weapons at points of entry? ! Which, if any, warning systems have digitization connectivity? ! What risk analysis methods are in place to determine if/and or when to decontaminate? ! How does the command know what units are trained and equipped to perform decontamination in the absence of chemical units? ! What can the command do about it if they are not? ! What steps have been taken to ascertain the NBC defense readiness of potential coalition partners? ! What means are available to alleviate shortcomings in coalition partners’ NBC defense posture/capability? ! If deployment is planned to be continuous over a relatively long period of time, what protective measures are planned for later deploying units? ! How frequently are field artillery and air defense artillery (ADA) units required to move? ! What is the theater guidance with regard to dispersion? ! What steps have been taken to mitigate the effect of NBC weapons employment on tempo? ! What awareness training have component forces received to negate the threat of covert positioned NBC weapons? Is the entire staff involved in the NBC defense process? Medical considerations ! What medical protection assets are in place in the form of vaccines, pretreatment, and/or skin protectants? ! What plans are in effect for using them? ! What is the immunization protocol? ! Providing medical assistance for enemy use presents significant implications. What plans have been made to address this? ! What levels of medical protection have been provided to the subordinate units to increase an individual’s resistance to an NBC attack, indigenous medical threat, and environmental hazards? Do they understand how to use this protection? ! What provisions for providing military supplied medical assistance to nonmilitary personnel are included in campaign plans? ! What plans are in place to alleviate shortfalls caused by providing medical support to nonmilitary personnel? ! What steps have been taken to ensure proper medical assistance is available for combat units, US and HN civilian workers, dependents, and EPWs? ! Are all hospitals (component, HN, and coalition) equipped to care for NBC casualties?

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Appendix E
NBC Plans and Operations Checklist (cont'd) What vaccines are available within the theater? If sufficient vaccines are not available to inoculate all personnel, what is the protocol for determining who receives vaccinations? ! What is the policy for decontaminating and evacuating the wounded? ! What steps have been taken to ensure that the decontamination and evacuation policy is known and understood? ! What steps have been taken to ensure that an adequate number of medical personnel have received specialized training in NBC casualty treatment and management? ! Have plans been made for combating the indigenous medical threat within the theater? ! What medical force structure, by sequence, is available to the theater? ! What is the policy for determining the priority of medical attention to non-military personnel: US, allies, EPWs, and HN? Logistics ! What NBC defensive procedures have logistical commanders initiated to limit exposure of their units and facilities to NBC attacks and to protect personnel and supplies from NBC contamination? ! What command and control procedures are established to ensure the effective NBC defense of multi-service, HN, coalition, and major logistics bases, including ports and airfields? ! What plans are in effect for ensuring that sufficient protective equipment is available for issue to US civilians, HN personnel, and allies? ! How much equipment for protecting EPWs has been ordered? What is a reasonable amount to plan for? Where is it stored? ! How do you determine if the required amount of individual protective gear and unit NBC defense equipment is on hand in each subordinate unit? ! What procedures are in place to ensure that sufficient water and other supplies are on-hand in the proper location to permit effective and efficient decon operations? ! What plans have been made to ensure that necessary medical supplies are kept at the level required to execute the mission? ! What steps have been taken to ensure that sufficient alternate supply routes exist for logistical operations? ! What plans are in place to address NBC defense equipment resupply? ! What training has been conducted with HN police, fire, and other emergency organizations regarding NBC defense? Civil-Military Operations ! What action plans are in place to depict an NBC defensively trained force? ! What provisions have been made to protect or replace the noncombatant workforce if evacuation is ordered? ! What cross training of military to perform civilian technician work has been conducted? ! What evacuation routes for noncombatants have been designated? ! How has this information been communicated to those affected? ! How has it been practiced, if at all? ! What plans have been made for controlling civilian evacuations? ! How has this been practiced? ! How has information concerning potential environmental hazards been communicated to the noncombatant population? ! What steps have been taken to protect the nonmilitary personnel from environmental hazards? ! When was the last NEO exercise? ! What was the percentage of participation? ! How do you ensure personnel with wartime missions are not simultaneously slotted for NEO? ! What steps have been taken to ensure that the guards have been trained in how to teach EPWs the proper use of protective equipment? ! What units have been designated to protect civilians, medical facilities, etc.? What steps have been taken to ensure that these units are not called for elsewhere in operations plans? ! What are the NBC defense-related duties and responsibilities of the various civil affairs units deployed in support of the OPLAN? ! Who is responsible for coordinating NBC defense matters with the various other US and HN government agencies in the theater? Is he/she prepared to do so? PAO ! What PAO plans are in place to deter NBC weapon use? ! What PAO plans are in place to rally world opinion before and after NBC weapon use?
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NBC Risk Assessment/Vulnerability Analysis Tool
NBC Plans and Operations Checklist (cont'd) What PAO plans are in place to deter further NBC weapon use? Legal ! What are NBC weapon rules of engagement? ! What are rules of engagement for employing riot control agents? ! What is the US policy for use of NBC weapons? Do we provide enough guidance to synchronize the component NBC defense plans? ! What decision support tools are available to assist the unit commander in determining proper protective posture? ! What decision support tools are available to assist the unit commander in determining when to decontaminate? Is the NBC threat adequately considered in the OPLAN? ! What alternate ports and airfields are available? ! What protective and defensive measures are in effect at ports and airfields? ! What is our policy on sending out NBC warning reports - affected units only? All units? If all units, how do we differentiate between affected and non-affected units? ! How do we transmit this information across service and coalition lines? ! What is the time-phased arrival of medical units in theater? ! What flexibility for changing arrival sequence exists? If NBC defense assets are needed more quickly, what is the mechanism for making it happen? ! What provisions are in place to ensure adequate NBC force protection units are sequenced for early entry operations? ! What is the deployment sequence for all components as applicable to— NBC reconnaissance units? Bio detection (BIDS and Gold Seal Lab) units? NBC decon units? Medical units and personnel? Smoke generation units? ! What NBC defense measures are integrated into the overall force protection plan? ! What measures are taken to protect deep strike capabilities? ! What methods of NBC warning and reporting have been established to ensure dissemination of information to subordinate components and coalition forces? ! What is the current method of determining the need for decontamination? ! What priorities of decontamination have been established in the theater? ! What provisions have been made to ensure knowledge of all joint force unit locations? ! What steps are being taken to ensure that subordinate commanders know where contaminated areas are during operations? ! What priority is placed on avoiding contamination? ! What is the plan for deploying NBC sensor suites in the theater of operations? Do supporting component OPLANS adequately address NBC defense? ! How are supporting component assets organized to perform dedicated NBC defense functions? ! How do supporting component commanders determine NBC readiness? ! What is the status of supporting component commanders’— Plans? Equipment? Training? Personnel? ! What NBC functions have the other components planned for conducting internally? ! For which NBC functions will a CJTF need to provide support to the other components? ! What methods are in place to monitor NBC defense readiness of component forces in the areas of training, equipment, and personnel? ! How are component NBC defense assets coordinated into a comprehensive theater NBC defense plan? Do the plans maximize joint service synergy, effectively utilize resources, and produce a seamless NBC defense posture across the operation? ! How has NBC warning and reporting been integrated into the joint force C2S systems? ! When was it last practiced? ! How have the services’ requests for NBC defense forces been incorporated into OPLANs? ! Where are the recon assets located? ! Where do plans call for NBC recon units to be located during offensive and defensive operations? Have NBC defense shortfalls been addressed? ! What actions are taken to alleviate shortfalls in the NBC defense readiness of supporting service commanders’ units?
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Appendix E
c. Ensure Adequacy of Guidance and Doctrine

NBC Guidance and Doctrine Checklist
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What enemy NBC/WMD employment concepts are being considered in plans? What JTF guidance is in place to synchronize component NBC defense plans? What are the procedures for decontaminating the wounded and quarantining contagious casualties? What are the shortcomings? What procedures have been written regarding handling and evacuation of contaminated corpses? How has the CJTF ensured that components are aware of this policy? How and when has knowledge of this policy been evaluated? What steps have been taken to ensure that this policy is known and understood? What is the stated national policy of massive response to enemy use of NBC? What plan exists to obscure high priority/high signature targets with smoke and obscurants from enemy acquisition assets (including smoke deception plan)? What is the policy of coalition partners on response to enemy use of NBC? Does the policy of coalition partners include acting independently if NBC is used on their troops/homeland? Has the issue of a coordinated response concerning coalition partners been coordinated in advance?

d. Train and Exercise the Joint Force in NBC Defense

Joint Force Training and Exercise Checklist
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Do combatant command staff and Service senior leaders understand the NBC threat and how they support the theater NBC defense strategy? (Suggestion: “Wargame” the plan with senior leaders and talk them through NBC attacks. Have them brief back how their units will respond. Discuss what key decisions have to be made; when and what the available options are.) ! What steps have been taken to negate the operational difficulties likely to be encountered if attacked by NBC weapons? ! What steps have been taken to prevent the occurrence of needless casualties if attacked by NBC weapons? ! What steps are being taken to improve leader awareness of the NBC threat and how to counter it? ! What steps are being taken for NBC defense of power projection operations? Do necessary models and simulations support the combatant command’s training and exercise needs? ! What computer models/simulations are currently used to train the combatant command’s staff and subordinate services? ! How often are models/simulations used to exercise the staff and services? ! How thoroughly is an NBC threat integrated into these models? ! What model(s) would the combatant commander or staff like to see an NBC threat thoroughly integrated into? Has the NBC threat been adequately addressed in joint exercises and training? ! What is the combatant commander’s stated goal for NBC defense in joint exercises? ! What universal joint task list (UJTL) tasks have been incorporated into joint exercises? Does this accommodate the government accounting office (GAO) findings? ! How are the modern computer based tools being used to exercise NBC defense tasks? ! How many times during the past year were each of the NBC defense tasks of the UJTL exercised? ! How were they evaluated? ! How is the staff being trained to ensure their understanding of their responsibilities with regard to the NBC defense tasks tested? ! What is the requirement to perform realistic missions for extended periods of time while fully encapsulated? What is the combatant commander’s expectation? ! What training objectives are mandatory for major joint task force and combatant command level exercises? ! What training has been provided for leaders to mitigate the demonstrated extra toll that encapsulation takes on leaders? ! What is the minimum required NBC defense training specified by command directives? ! How have unit leaders been trained in hazards and protective measures associated with depleted uranium on the battlefield? ! How have unit leaders been trained to distinguish between an environmental hazard and a chemical agent attack? ! What training has been given to both soldiers and leaders with regard to protecting themselves from an environmental hazard?

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NBC Risk Assessment/Vulnerability Analysis Tool
Joint Force Training and Exercise Checklist (cont'd) What training has been given to both soldiers and leaders with regard to avoiding an environmental hazard? What training has been given to both soldiers and leaders with regard to decontaminating an environmental hazard? ! What practice have personnel had in communicating while encapsulated? ! How has medical unit ability to perform their mission with contaminated casualties been assessed? ! What plans are in place for movement of contaminated patients within theater? ! What units are responsible for this mission? ! When did they last practice this mission? ! What evacuation routes have been designated? Have plans and responses against the NBC threat been adequately exercised? ! What action plans are in place to ensure quality NBC defense play is included in exercises? ! How does the command envision (written in specific planning documents) maintaining op tempo following enemy use of biological or chemical weapons? ! Do multinational/coalition force exercises include sufficient NBC defense play to determine coalition readiness? ! What are the coalition force political policies that discourage the inclusion of NBC defense events in major exercises? ! What is the combatant commander’s standard regarding practice of self-sustaining decontamination operations (without a chemical unit available)? ! How are exercises designed to ensure that NBC warnings are received across both service and coalition lines? ! How do exercises incorporate both active and passive measures to protect key ports of entry from NBC hazards? ! How do joint exercises measure the proper use of dispersion and movement as preventive measures against NBC attacks? How is targeting of enemy NBC weapons/capabilities played in exercises? ! How are NBC weapon effects on the civilian population played in exercises? ! How is the need for additional medical support in NBC war exercised? ! How do exercises test a unit’s ability to decontaminate wounded personnel and quarantine contagious casualties? ! How have military personnel slated to take the place of key civilian personnel been exercised to ensure that they can perform their wartime mission? ! How has exercising around massive evacuations been accomplished? ! When was the last NEO exercise? What percentage of noncombatants participated? ! How do exercises give leaders opportunities to make realistic NBC defense decisions? ! Do exercise scenarios anticipate the use of decision support tools? ! How often is using EPW guards to train EPWs in the use of US NBC defense equipment incorporated into exercises? ! How do exercises adequately account for the time-phased arrival of NBC defense and medical support? ! How often are decontamination priority decisions included in exercises?
! !

!

e. Assess Readiness and Identify Needs

NBC Readiness Checklist
!

! ! !

!

!

! !

!

Have combatant command issues identified in wargames and exercises (e.g. how to handle civilian/coalition requirements, logistics shortfalls gaps in command and control, NBC warning and reporting in developing theaters) been identified for resolution? What process is being used for resolution? What is the process to ensure plans have been updated to reflect exercise lessons learned? What mechanism(s) do the combatant commander and staff use to determine unit NBC defense readiness? How is NBC defense readiness incorporated into unit readiness reporting? Are ratings based on objective criteria or subjective criteria? Can the commander call his status anything he wants regardless of what the data indicates? How has the staff ensured that the process for resolving NBC defense readiness issues is known to all subordinate commands? What are the NBC defense standards that the combatant commander expects all deploying units to meet? What steps are being taken to ensure that these standards are being met? What is the combatant commands criteria for determining NBC defense readiness? How does the combatant commander and staff consider and encourage technological developments related to NBC defense individual protection? To what degree has the combatant command elevated the requirement for uniform and meaningful NBC readiness standards and reporting to OJCS?

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NBC Readiness Checklist (cont'd)
!

! !

! !

What are the measurement standards which the combatant commander and staff use to ensure uniform and meaningful standards and assessment of NBC defense readiness among the assigned forces? What combatant commander NBC guidance has been published? What is the system to ensure issues that cannot be resolved at Service, component, or combatant command staff level has been identified to appropriate organizations for resolution? What mechanisms exist for providing theater NBC defense readiness needs to service chiefs for their information/action? What is the process to ensure that NBC defense needs have been incorporated into the combatant commander’s integrated priority list (IPL) process?

SECTION B. VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS TOOL 3. Purpose
The Vulnerability Analysis (VA) is the commander’s tool to conduct continuous, systematic estimating of consequences to friendly forces resulting from NBC attacks. The overall methodology includes intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB), risk assessment, and VA with associated mitigation measures. The VA is a stand-alone document usually developed by a small group of subject matter experts from the staff.

4. Risk Assessment Charts
The charts (Figures E-1 to E-3) on the following pages describe the risk assessment process. They aid the commander and staff in determining force risk levels and the minimum recommended steps to reduce the NBC risk. Follow these basic steps when using the risk assessment charts:

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

Enter the chart at “Start Here.” Answer the main question in the shaded box by considering subordinate questions/answers underneath it. If the answer to any question below the shaded box is a “yes,” then the shaded box answer is “yes.” Go to the next lower box and repeat the process. If the answer to a shaded box question is “no,” read the risk assessment to the right. Read to the right to determine the minimum recommended procedures to reduce risk. Complete the assessment by assigning the assessed risk level in the risk assessment box at the bottom of the page.

Note: Sound judgement by commanders and staffs determine this subjective “Risk” rating. Charts should be modified with additional questions and mitigation measures based on mission specific situations.

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NUCLEAR RISK ASSESSMENT
Select YES if one or more boxes are checked
START HERE
Is the enemy Nuclear capable?

Operational Risk Assessment
NO

Minimum Acceptable Response By Category
1. Continue the IPB process. 2. Conduct psychological operations convincing the enemy of the futility of nuclear weapons use. 3. Know the threat/protective measures. 4. Ensure all defensive plans include NBC defense measures. 5. Maintain NBC training.

YES

Is there a production capability? Are there known nuclear stockpiles? Is there a national policy (other than non-use) governing the use of Nuclear weapons?

YES

NO Does the enemy reserve the right of “first use”? Does the enemy reserve the right to “retaliate in kind”?

LOW

RISK
6. Continue steps above. 7. Increase NBC defense training. 8. Be aware of Nuclear Weapons Risk Indicators - see Service references. 9. Continue to harden storage locations. 10. Implement dispersion plan for personnel/supplies. 11. Be aware of radiation effects to exposed personnel. 12. Create templates depicting radii of vulnerability (RV). NOTE: Use the appropriate classified manuals. 13. Reduce susceptibility to EMP effects.

Is the fixed site/unit within the range of likely delivery systems? YES NO Aerial bomb Artillery Missiles Mines Rockets Other Would the enemy target the unit doctrinally or as a possible COA?

YES

NO

MEDIUM

Is the enemy trained and equipped to conduct nuclear operations? YES NO Have nuclear munitions been delivered to nuclear capable units? Has probable use message traffic been intercepted? Has the enemy used nuclear weapons? Is the enemy exercising its nuclear delivery capabilities? Is the enemy threatening to use nuclear weapons?

RISK

HIGH

RISK

14. Continue all steps above. 15. Be prepared to transfer mission functions to secondary locations. 16. Use EMP susceptible equipment as little as possible.

Assessment = _______Risk

Figure E-1. Nuclear Risk Assessment

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BW RISK ASSESSMENT
Select YES if one or more boxes are checked
START HERE
Is the enemy BW capable?

Operational Risk Assessment
NO

Minimum Acceptable Response By Category
1. Ensure immunizations are current. 2. Maintain intel and passive data collection efforts. 3. Maintain good personal hygiene. 4. Maintain good area sanitation. 5. Ensure MOPP gear is readily available. 6. Maintain physical conditioning. 7. Cover all supplies and equipment. 8. Know the threat/protective measures. 9. Use approved food/water sources. 10. Ensure all defensive plans include NBC defense measures.

YES

Is there a production capability? Are there medical/pharmaceutical plants in country/theater? Are there any known agent stockages? Does the enemy have BIO munitions plants?

LOW

Is the fixed site/unit within the range of likely delivery systems? YES NO Aerial spray Aerial Bomb Artillery Missiles Rockets Mines Other Would the enemy target the unit doctrinally or as a possible COA? Are weather and terrain favorable for employment?

RISK

YES YES

NO MEDIUM NO

Is the enemy trained and equipped to conduct BW operations? YES NO Are protective masks and clothing readily available? Are immunizations, prophylaxis, and pretreatments available? Have BW munitions been delivered to units? Has probable use message traffic been intercepted? Has the enemy used BW weapons? Is the enemy exercising its biological delivery capabilities? Is the enemy threatening to use biological weapons?

RISK

HIGH

11. Continue steps above. 12. Actively employ biodetection capabilities. 13. Be alert to medical reports of an unusual nature. 14. Be aware of enemy activity regarding biological weapons. 15. Ensure prophylaxis, pretreatments, and immunizations are available for the known/suspected threat. 16. Implement dispersal plans for personnel/supplies. 17. Continually monitor weather conditions. 18. Assume designated MOPP level.

RISK

Assessment = _______Risk

19. Continue all steps above. 20. Be prepared to transfer mission functions to secondary locations. 21. Increase MOPP level for exposed personnel.

Figure E-2. Biological Risk Assessment

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CHEMICAL RISK ASSESSMENT
Select YES if one or more boxes are checked
START HERE
Is the enemy CW capable?

Operational Risk Assessment
NO

Minimum Acceptable Response By Category
1. Maintain intel and passive data collection efforts. 2. Ensure MOPP gear is readily available. 3. Cover all supplies and equipment. 4. Know the threat/protective measures. 5. Use approved food/water sources. 6. Ensure all defensive plans include NBC defense measures. 7. Maintain NBC defense training.

YES

Are there industrial chemical production facilities in country/theater? Are there any known agent stockpiles? Does the enemy have weaponization capabilities?

LOW

Is the fixed site/unit within the range of likely delivery systems? YES NO Aerial spray Aerial Bomb Artillery Missiles Rockets Mines Other Would the enemy target the unit doctrinally or as a possible COA? Are weather and terrain favorable for employment?

RISK

YES YES

NO MEDIUM NO

Is the enemy trained and equipped to conduct CW operations? YES NO Are the following items readily available? Protective masks? Chemical protective garments? Chemical defense equipment? Have CW munitions been delivered to units? Has probable use message traffic been intercepted? Has the enemy used CW weapons? Is the enemy exercising its chemical delivery capabilities? Is the enemy threatening to use chemical weapons?

RISK

8. Continue steps above. 9. Increase NBC defense training. 10. Actively employ chemical detection capabilities. 11. Be alert to medical reports of exposure to chemical agents. 12. Be aware of enemy activity regarding chemical weapons. 13. Ensure antidotes are available for the known/suspected threat. 14. Implement dispersal plans for personnel/supplies. 15. Continually monitor weather conditions. 16. Assume designated MOPP level.

HIGH

RISK

17. Continue all steps above. 18. Be prepared to transfer mission functions to secondary locations. 19. Implement pretreatment directives. 20. Be prepared to increase MOPP.

Assessment = _______Risk

Figure E-3. Chemical Risk Assessment

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Appendix E 5. Nuclear Vulnerability
a. To assess a unit’s vulnerability to a nuclear attack, a commander determines the likelihood of an adversary using a nuclear weapon, the unit’s NBC defense protection level, the type, and size of the weapon likely to be employed by the enemy (see Figure E-1). The commander then weighs various courses of action (COAs) to determine which COA allows for mission accomplishment at an acceptable risk. b. When addressing unit vulnerability to nuclear weapons employment, consider friendly force dispositions and capabilities. c. A nuclear explosion’s biological effects are measured according to the amount of radiation (centigrays) to which personnel are exposed. For the biological effects of radiation in man refer to FM 8-9/NAVMED P-5059/AFJMAN 44-151, NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC Defensive Operations. d. Two techniques to evaluate unit vulnerability to nuclear detonations are: • A technical approach in which unit dispositions are compared with the effects of an expected yield. • An operational approach in which unit dispositions are compared with targeting criteria used by the threat target analyst. e. In a nuclear environment, the more concentrated a unit is, the more lucrative a target it becomes. If the unit itself is not the target, but falls within the fallout pattern, unit monitors will be capable of providing the commander with essential information regarding the hazard. For additional information on nuclear hazard prediction refer to FM 3-7, NBC Field Handbook. f. The primary tool for analyzing friendly dispositions is the radius of vulnerability (RV). RV is the radius of a circle within which friendly troops will be exposed to a risk equal to, or greater than, the emergency risk criterion (five percent combat ineffectiveness) and/or within which material will be subjected to a five percent probability of the specified degree of damage. For additional RV information and tables refer to, JP 3-12.2 Secret Restricted Data (SRD), Nuclear Weapons Employment and Effects Data; and JP 3-12.3, Nuclear Weapons Employment and Effects Data (Notional) (unclassified for training purposes).

6. Biological Vulnerability
a. Prior to conducting vulnerability analysis, determine the risk of a biological agent attack or the enemy’s capability and probability of use (see Figure E-2) and presence of endemic diseases. Once it is determined that the enemy has the capability and the willingness to employ biological weapons, the next step is to determine the unit’s vulnerability to an attack (Figure E-2). Even if an enemy lacks the capability to employ biological weapons, the unit is still vulnerable to endemic diseases. Possible sources include contaminated water sources and local food. Commanders need to ensure units practice good hygiene. Ensure personnel wash hands frequently, particularly prior to eating to prevent ingestion of harmful biological material (either indigenous or BW agents found on various surfaces). b. To determine vulnerability to biological agents: • Determine immunization levels in relationship to threat/theater endemic agents and availability of prophylaxis. • Determine unit’s protective posture. Is the unit protected by forward deployed, prompt response, all weather, precisionstrike conventional or nuclear capabilities to deter the adversary; and if deterrence fails, to preempt or respond to the adversary’s use of NBC weapons? Furthermore, is the unit protected by active defenses or force protection against NBC weapons before detonation/release of agent(s)? • Determine unit’s biological detection posture – does it have early warning systems? Does it have biological integrated detection system (BIDS), Portal Shield, Interim Biological Agent Detection System (IBADS), long range biological stand off detection system (LRBSDS), or Joint Biological Point Detection System (JBPDS)? Point detectors such as the BIDS or IBADS will determine if a biological attack has occurred, provide information on the BW agent, and provide a sample for

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confirmation purposes. A biological detector generally consists of a trigger, collector, detector, and identifier. The trigger will monitor the background, determine if significant changes occur in the ambient background, and initiate the collection, detection/identification process. It is important to note that due to the state of technology and the nature of the background, triggers may react to the background changes that are not due to a BW attack. This is normal and generally protection actions should not be taken upon trigger events alone. The detector, if present, will determine if the aerosol is biological or non-biological (i.e. smoke, dust). The identifier specifically identifies the BW agent allowing the commander to initiate force protection and contamination avoidance measures. Other point detectors such as Portal Shield provide point detection and alarm of a BW attack through the use of multiple networked sensors. Unlike other biological detection systems it uses networking and smart logic to reduce false alarms due to man made events and certain natural aerosols. Generally, the system triggers when a predetermined threshold concentration is reached. This activity is communicated to the command post. Agent identification occurs within 15 minutes and alarms are transmitted to command post. A sample for confirmatory analysis is also automatically stored in the system and can be delivered to a supporting medical unit for analysis. • Determine unit’s hygienic practices. For example, are troops provided means to bath/cleanse regularly? • Determine current or projected maneuver (or mobility) disposition. • Consider time of day and weather conditions – the time most conducive for BW attack is during a clear night or during early morning hours with light winds (less than 10 knots or 12 miles per hour (mph)).

7. Chemical Vulnerability
Prior to conducting a vulnerability analysis, first determine the risk of a chemical attack or the threat’s capability and probability of use (see Figure E-3). If the possibility exists for the threat to employ chemical agents, conduct a vulnerability analysis in two parts: First, make an estimate of the threat’s capability to employ chemical munitions in the unit’s AO/ area of interest (AI) (see Figure E-3. Chemical Risk Assessment) within a specific time period. Second, use this information to generate simplified effects information. a. Estimate Delivery Capability • Step 1. Determine time periods of interest. Time periods of interest are based on the commander’s operational concept and situation variables, such as mission, enemy, terrain, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations or METT-TC. The time period is coordinated with the intelligence and operations officers. They will normally conform to phases or the expected duration of an operation; however, it may be desirable to use other criteria. For example, a maintenance unit may want to use the expected time lag between an anticipated threat chemical attack and the time required to retrieve and don their protective gear (as in “MOPP READY” protective posture) as the time period of interest. A time period may also be based on factors relating to enemy tactics, such as the expected arrival time of a second echelon force. Further, significant weather changes could also influence the selection of time periods. The time period of interest can range from 6 hours to 48 hours. While some planning factors are based on a 12-hour to 48-hour cycle. Fixed site operations may be based on a significantly higher time frame (i.e., 12 hours to 96 hours), with time periods of 24 hours or greater used when IPB allows. Time periods of less than 6 hours are generally not used. For short-term actions, shorter time periods could be used to estimate the effects of initial enemy preparation fires or to estimate the effect of a single chemical agent attack. • Step 2. Associate weather data with each time period. Associate each time period with a temperature (ambient or ground); wind speed, and stability category. (Note: the M93 NBCRS can also report ground temperature.) The temperature will impact primarily on agent persistency. For each time period, temperature should be expressed as one of the following (in degrees Celsius): 55o, 50o, 40o, 30o, 20o, 10o, 0o, -10o, -20o, or -30o. Determine temperature by taking the average of the temperatures from each Chemical Downwind Message (CDM) line applicable to the time period of interest. Use this average temperature for all calculations. When estimating persistency for agents expected to last beyond the time period of interest, use the average daily temperature of the day in which the attack may occur. Wind speed will impact on casualty production, persistency, and downwind agent travel. It should be expressed as one of the following: 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, or 18 kilometers per hour (kmph). As a rule of thumb, for any wind speed above 18 kmph, use 18 kmph. Calculate wind speed in the same manner used above for temperature. In some situations it may be necessary to modify this number for casualty estimate purposes. For example if a 24-hour period contains six hours of expected high wind speeds (unstable conditions), a calculator would probably elect to disregard those figures and develop a separate (lower) average for casualty estimation. The staff estimates an enemy would not employ chemicals for casualty effects during that 6-hour period of high

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winds. Base this decision on the magnitude and duration of the wind change and the expected enemy COA. Stability categories (stable, neutral, or unstable) also affect casualty production and downwind agent travel. Stability has a major impact on casualty production down wind since it affects the vertical dispersion of the agent. During inversion (stable atmosphere) the agent is trapped in a shallow layer near the ground and the concentration remains high. When the atmosphere stability category is either neutral or unstable the agent’s concentration near the ground is lower. Inversions occur at night with clear skies and light winds. Determine the stability category in the same way as temperature and wind speed. Other environmental factors exist that could impact the analysis. Terrain and vegetation could affect the estimate. These factors can effect the dispersion of the agent, its concentration down wind, and the estimated casualties. However, these factors have been incorporated in the persistency estimate process. • Step 3. Estimate delivery capability. Estimate the number of chemical munitions likely to be employed in the AO for each required time period. Coordinate with the intelligence officer to produce this estimate. Provide the intelligence officer with the time periods of interest. Request information concerning the threat capability to deliver chemical munitions in your AO. •• The estimate should indicate the number of delivery units, by type, and the number of rounds, by agent, if available. The intelligence officer also provides estimates on when, where, and what type of agent the enemy might use in the AO. If the situation or event template does not yield needed information, assume the enemy can optimize the agent mix. For example, to determine the threat’s capability to create a contamination obstacle, assume they will fire only persistent agents. Likewise, to predict casualty effects, assume the enemy will fire agents that have the greatest casualty producing effects. •• When the primary threat is covert or unconventional, express enemy delivery capability in terms of agent weight or as agent weight times some expected delivery means. For example, ten kilograms of nerve agent delivered by an agricultural sprayer. If estimates indicate limited agent supply, it will be difficult to estimate how much of that supply will be used each day. As an option for this situation, conduct the analysis for a single enemy attack based on the threat’s maximum employment capability during the selected time period. •• The intelligence officer considers a number of factors in making his estimate such as the number of employment assets within range of the AO and other AOs the enemy force must service. NOTE: Do not assume every delivery system within range will be firing into the AO being considered. Enemy locations of chemical munitions. Weather effects on probable agents. Threat capability to deliver chemical munitions to delivery systems. Impact of threat attacks on civilians. •• The intelligence estimate should provide a range of numbers based on estimated COA for each time period. The estimate should provide the enemy’s maximum capability and his likely delivery capability. Alternatively, different estimates can support various enemy COAs. Estimates should not be based on a friendly COA unless they would significantly impact on the enemy delivery capability. •• It is not necessary to assess every possible situation and enemy option. To do so would result in inefficient use of available time. The goal is to provide estimates to the commander/staff, which can be later refined. Continuously assess the situation and look for events and options with the potential of changing the outcome of the battle. b. Generate Effects Information. Effect information will provide the following estimates: casualty effects and downwind agent effects. • Determine Casualty Estimate •• Step 1. Determine probable friendly targeted size. Based on the chemical staff and S2/G2 IPB, select an area/activity the enemy would probably target then determine the target size. For example, determine the area occupied by a fixed site activity, in this case 400m x 600m. Calculate the number of hectares (ha) in the selected target area. One hectare is 10,000 square meters; therefore, an area that is 400m x 600m = 240,000 square meters or 24 hectares. •• Step 2. Determine probable agent. Unless it is known which agents the threat will employ, assume the most effective casualty-producing agent available.

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•• Step 3. Estimate casualties based on intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB). The number of rounds the threat may use to engage the specific target. Predicted temperatures (from CDM or other sources). For additional information refer to FM 3-3, Nuclear Contamination Avoidance; FM 3-7, NBC Field Handbook; FM 3-14, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Vulnerability Analysis; AFMAN 32-4017, Civil Engineer Readiness Technician Manual for NBC Defense; and AFMAN 32-4019, Chemical-Biological Commanders Guide.

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APPENDIX F
NBC WARNING MESSAGE AND THREAT CONDITION SYSTEM 1. General
The NBC Warning and Reporting System (NBCWRS) is developed to provide critical data on enemy NBC attacks and resulting hazard areas to the various levels of command within NATO. This system provides for reporting the following: nuclear detonations, radioactive contamination, enemy biological or chemical attacks and resulting contamination, predicting and warning of fallout areas, and predicting/warning of chemical hazard areas. This information contributes to the declared “Threat Condition.”

SECTION A. STANDARD MESSAGE SYSTEM 2. NATO NBC Reporting and Warning Categories
a. Source Level. Observation Posts (OPs) or any agency below NBC collection or NBC sub-collection centers fall into this category. The responsibilities of the source level are: • Report the initial enemy use of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons by the most expeditious means available (FLASH precedence). (NBC 1) • Report immediately any further NBC attacks and subsequent data to the NBC sub-collection or NBC collection center. (NBC 1) • Disseminate timely warnings of predicted hazard areas to enable forces to increase their NBC state or readiness, to conduct monitoring and to prepare for survey and decontamination. (NBC 3) • Report monitoring and survey results to the NBC sub-collection or NBC collection center. (NBC 4) • Submit detailed information on chemical or biological attacks on request. (NBC 6) b. NBC Sub-Collection Centers and NBC Collection Centers (NBCCC). This is the NBCCC on air bases. Corps or lower formation, headquarters, air division headquarters, sector operation centers fall into this category. Their responsibilities include: • Report the initial enemy use of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons by the most expeditious means available in accordance with directives and standard operating procedures (SOPs). (NBC 1) • Clarify, consolidate, and evaluate NBC attack data reported from the source level or other NBC centers or agencies. (NBC 1 and NBC 2) • Compute fallout predictions and chemical downwind hazard areas based upon processed NBC attack data and pass the appropriate warnings to units likely to be affected. (NBC 3) • Direct survey efforts within its zone of observation. • Analyze survey and monitoring results and pass actual contaminated areas to units likely to be affected. (NBC 4 and NBC 5) • Request and provide detailed information on chemical and biological attacks as directed. (NBC 6) • Exchange NBC information with appropriate national military and civilian reporting agencies. c. NBC Control Center Level. Major NATO commands, major subordinate commands, and forward-deployed headquarters such as in Southwest Asia fall into this category. Their responsibilities include: • Report the initial enemy use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons by the most expeditious means available in accordance with directives and SOPs. (NBC 1)

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• Clarify, consolidate, and evaluate NBC attack data reported from the source level or other NBC centers or agencies. (NBC 1 and NBC 2) • Transmit promptly NBC warnings to adjacent HQ or agencies when predicted hazard areas extend beyond their own area of observation. (NBC 3) • Exchange NBC information with appropriate national military and civilian authorities as arranged by directives and SOPs. • Organize and coordinate the NBC warning system within its area of observation by contributing to the war plans and issuing a comprehensive directive and/or SOP. • Submit reports to higher headquarters and adjacent agencies as required. (NBC Summary Report)

3. Standard NBC Message Purpose
Organizations within the NBCWRS should use the standard NBC message formats for reporting nuclear, biological, and chemical attacks and predicted or actual hazard areas following attacks. a. NBC 1 through NBC 6 Report Application • NBC 1 Observers initial report. • NBC 2 Used for passing evaluated data. • NBC 3 Used for immediate warning of predicted contamination and hazard areas. • NBC 4 Used for passing monitoring and survey results. • NBC 5 Used for passing information on areas of actual contamination. • NBC 6 Used for passing detailed information on chemical or biological attacks. b. NBC SITUATION Report is used for passing information on the NBC situation. The NBC SITREP is a free text message; any rules for content are given by the local national authority or command. c. NBC Summary Report is used for passing information on the NBC situation. d. STRIKWARN is used to warn of impending nuclear attack. e. CHEMWARN is used to warn of impending chemical attack. f. NBC Weather and Wind Messages are used to pass pertinent information (e.g. direction, speed, and conditions). g. Signal/Audio/Visual Services Supplement (SAV SER SUP) provides general information on communication matters. The SAV SER SUP also supplements and amplifies, signal operating instructions (SOIs), signal extracts instructions (SEIs), and SOPs issued by the United States Army Special Forces Command (USASFC) for Special Operations communications.

4. JWARN
JWARN is a joint warning system of detectors, computers, printers, and software tied together with communications that will rapidly detect, identify, and disseminate data on CB threats. For detailed information on NBCWRS message formats refer to FM 3-7, NBC Field Handbook. For convenient reference see Graphic Training Aid (GTA) 3-6-8, NBC Warning and Reporting System.

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NBC Warning Message and Threat Condition System SECTION B. THREAT CONDITIONS 5. General
The NBC Threat Warning System provides commanders with information to establish appropriate unit defense measures. This system consolidates the most current intelligence estimates, intent and activities, and recommends measures to be employed to combat a threat.

6. THREATCON White
a. Probability of attack: Negligible/Low b. Definition: The opposing force does not posses NBC defense equipment, is not trained in NBC defense or employment and does not posses the capability to employ NBC agents or systems nor will they most probably gain access to NBC agents. c. Enemy indicators: None d. Recommended actions: • A deploying force would not necessarily have to carry their full complement of chemical defense equipment (CDE). However, ground forces should carry protective masks and components should have a contingency plan to deploy and distribute their full complement of CDE if the situation warrants. • Chemical personnel should concentrate effort in smoke and herbicide employment planning and constantly monitor threat indicators for any change in the enemy NBC status.

7. THREATCON Green
a. Probability of attack: Possible/Low b. Definition: The opposing force has an offensive CB capability, has received training in defense and employment techniques, but there are no indications of the use of CB weapons in the immediate future. c. Indicators: There has been no overt NBC activity. The enemy has a CB capability but weapons have not been dispersed or deployed. d. Recommended unit actions: • Personnel carry their IPE and commanders have additional contingency IPE stockpiles identified and readily available for distribution, if the threat status should increase. • Conduct refresher NBC defense training to include individual common survival skills training, team training, and unmasking procedures. • Activate the NBCWRS. • Activate passive NBC defense measures. • Identify decontamination sites, water sources, and civilian nuclear, biological and chemical hazards. • Analyze CDE logistics requirements. Submit requests for Host Nation Support if required.

8. THREATCON Amber
a. Probability of attack: Probable/Medium

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b. Definition: The enemy is equipped and trained in NBC defense and employment techniques. NBC weapons and employment systems are readily available. There are indicators the enemy will employ weapons in the immediate future in the JTF AOR. c. Indicators: • The enemy is exercising with NBC delivery systems. • NBC munitions have been deployed to either field storage sites or firing sites. • Enemy troops are wearing or carrying protective equipment. • Enemy NBC reconnaissance elements observed with conventional units. • Enemy decontamination units observed with front line units. • The opposing force use of meteorological radars associated with surface to surface missiles (SSMs) has been detected. d. Recommended unit actions: • Deploy NBC detection device and alarms; initiate selective, periodic or continuous monitoring. • Integrate routine NBC reconnaissance assets (if assigned) into conventional reconnaissance plan. • Rehearse decontamination procedures. • Analyze MOPP level and consider change based on current situation and mission. • Intensify training; rehearse IPE exchange and automatic masking procedures. • Cover vehicles, supplies, and equipment to the fullest extent possible. • Fill portable decontamination apparatuses and mount on vehicles (if applicable). • Issue Class VIII medical supplies. Begin prophylaxis with command approval.

9. THREATCON Red
a. Probability of attack: High b. Definition: There is a strong indication of imminent use of NBC weapons. The opposing force has threatened to use NBC weapons. In addition to those listed for THREATCON Amber, indicators may include: • NBC weapons have been used within the AOR. • Enemy observed providing NBC warning to its forces. • Munitions delivered to firing units within range of friendly forces. • In addition to those listed for THREATCON Amber, recommended unit actions include: •• Initiate continuous NBC monitoring. •• Begin operation of collective protective shelters and other systems.

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NBC Warning Message and Threat Condition System SECTION C. THREAT CONDITION ACTIONS 10. PRE-ATTACK ACTIONS — Alarm Amber
a. Assess Likelihood of NBC Attack and Inform Unit. The NBC assessment team should advise the commander on the current NBC threat. The commander should initiate unit notification of the possibility of NBC attack by declaring Alarm Amber, at the appropriate time. This tells unit personnel to be observant for signs of an NBC attack and to take appropriate precautionary measures. b. Suspend Noncritical Activities and Shelter All Non-mission Essential Personnel. The Commander should initiate sheltering of all non-mission essential personnel in designated shelters, available collective protection systems, or inner rooms of buildings (improvised shelters) which offer the best available degree of protection from contamination when the possibility of attack is imminent. Personnel should remain in these areas when not performing mission essential tasks. c. Monitor Health Status/Disease Situation. Preventive medicine personnel should continuously evaluate and assess the unit’s health status and environmental situation for indications of an NBC attack. They should look for agent symptoms, unusual disease patterns or indications of environmental contamination. Information sources include medical intelligence reports, disease and injury rates, laboratory analysis results, and epidemiological studies. d. Watch for Attack Indications. All personnel should be alert for signs of attack. Personnel specifically monitoring air and land approaches to the base, such as active air defense units, security forces, and air traffic control personnel, should be particularly alert for indications of attack e. Activate/Monitor Detectors and Detection Systems. Commanders should direct activation and monitoring of available detectors by shelter teams and readiness personnel and initiate periodic sampling/analysis performed by the preventive medicine staffs. f. Cover Unprotected Mission Essential Equipment. Commanders should direct units to cover mission essential equipment to prevent deposition of contamination on the equipment. This will reduce the need for decontamination and minimize the possibility of personnel contaminating themselves if they have to handle the equipment at a later time.

11. TRANS-ATTACK ACTIONS — Alarm Red
a. Attack Warning. Trans-attack procedures begin when the attack against the base begins. Detection and warning of the attack are critical to the implementation of protective measures. The attack warning signal, Alarm Red, directs personnel to take cover and use protective measures. b. Take Cover. Taking cover protects personnel against blast, shrapnel, heat, and liquid and particulate contamination. After taking cover, personnel don their masks and remaining protective gear as appropriate. All but the most mission essential functions cease. Personnel able to safely observe the attack in progress should watch for any unique signs of an NBC attack. c. Use MOPP 4. All personnel should assume MOPP 4 (full IPE) in the absence of any other information, and remain in IPE until directed to reduce the MOPP level. Commanders should consider going with full MOPP until they can gain more information on the type and extent of contamination. MOPP levels may then be reduced accordingly. The ultimate goal is to balance mission continuation with force survivability in order to maximize mission effectiveness. Towards this end, the concept of risk assessment (what risk a commander is willing to take in relation to the importance of the mission) is an integral part of the equation. d. Keep Shelters Closed. Shelter teams or senior personnel in each shelter should ensure shelter doors remain closed as much as possible to limit infiltration of contamination, and control personnel entering and exiting the shelter.

12. POST-ATTACK ACTIONS — Alarm Black
a. Maximize Shelter Use and Restrict Nonessential Movement. Commanders should ensure personnel continue to use shelters as long as there is residual contamination.

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Appendix F
b. Employ Contamination Control Measures for Shelter Entry. Shelter teams should employ contamination control measures to limit the infiltration of contamination. They should continue to do so until it has been determined there is no longer a contamination hazard. c. Avoid Potentially Contaminated Surfaces/Areas. All personnel should minimize contact with potentially contaminated surfaces until there are indications that surface contamination is no longer a hazard. d. Obtain and Report Observations or Evidence of NBC Attack. Base personnel and designated specialized team members (i.e., security, shelter, reconnaissance, ordnance, and damage assessment) provide reconnaissance and assessment information for all types of damage and hazards. During initial reconnaissance, personnel should be observant for activated detectors, operating or spent NBC delivery systems or devices, such as spray tanks, aerosol generators, and submunitions or bomblets. This information should flow up to the survival recovery center where readiness personnel will report any indications of NBC attacks to higher headquarters through established NBC Warning and Reporting systems. e. Survey, Control, and Mitigate NBC Health Hazards. The preventive medicine staffs should continue to take patient and environmental samples to analyze them or send them to DOD labs for analysis. They should review medical intelligence reports, monitor patient diagnoses and symptoms, and conduct epidemiological studies to find and inform commanders of the indications of an NBC attack. If there are indications of an NBC attack, the medical staff should administer antidotes, vaccines and antibiotics and prepare to quarantine casualties as dictated by the agent and previous medical protective countermeasures. They should provide treatment for NBC casualties according to established medical protocols. Such treatment includes supportive measures, isolation procedures, and antibiotic, antiviral, or antitoxin therapy. f. Adjust MOPP. Commanders should adjust the MOPP to the lowest possible level consistent with identified hazards. g. Handle and Dispose of Contaminated Remains. Commanders should ensure mortuary affairs and medical personnel, including augmentees, identify and place suspected NBC contaminated remains in double human remains pouches (one inside the other) and mark them with “CHEMICAL” or “CHEM”, “BIOLOGICAL” or “BIO”, prior to evacuation to theater mortuary affairs decontamination collection points or local temporary mass burial. Nuclear contaminated remains require additional special handling.

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APPENDIX G
NBC HAZARD PREDICTION 1. General
SOF elements confronted with an NBC hazard will utilize the NBC message warning system to submit critical information. Once received in the NBC Collection Center (NBCCC), it is critical to quickly interpret and prepare NBC reports. These reports are vital during any wartime contingencies in which the enemy has the ability to employ NBC weapons. Information must be current and accurate to allow for mission critical decisions. The impact of NBC agents can influence operational tempo and sustainment of forces.

SECTION A. CHEMICAL CONSIDERATIONS 2. Chemical Warfare Agents
a. Chemical warfare agents are classified according to physical state, physiological action, and use. Threat forces classify chemical agents according to their physiological effect on the body, such as nerve, blood, blister, and choking. The terms persistent and nonpersistent describe the time an agent stays in an area. Persistent chemical agents affect the battlefield for an extended period of time. Conversely, nonpersistent agents affect the battlefield for relatively short periods of time. b. The hazards from a chemical strike may last for less than an hour or for several weeks. The effects on personnel may be immediate. For units forced into high levels of protection, missions will take longer to perform. Figure G-1 is a summary of chemical weapon, RCA, and TIM characteristics that commanders, staffs, and personnel need to consider when planning operations in a chemical environment.

CHEMICAL OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Chemical Agent Target of Choice Conditions for Employment Method of Employment/ Portal of Entry (PoE) Duration of Hazard Effect/Rate of Action (RoA) Prevention Treatment

Tabun (GA)
(colorless to brown liquid; odorless to fruity)

Personnel

Night/Early Morning; Artillery, Bomb, Inversion; Wind 6-16 km Missile, Bomblet

1 to 2 Days

Untreated - visual disturbance, secretions, nausea, diarrhea, twitching, seizures, paralysis, death: RoA: Vapor - seconds to minutes Liquid - minutes

PoE: Respiratory, Skin, Digestive Personnel Night/Early Morning; Artillery, Bomb, Inversion; Wind 6-16 km Missile, Bomblet <1 Day

Individual Protective Equipment (IPE); Pyridostigmine Bromide (PB)

Atropine/2-Pam Chloride; Diazepam Benzodiazepines Ventilate as required.

Sarin (GB)
(colorless liquid/gas; odorless)

Same as T abun

IPE

Same as T abun

RoA: Vapor - seconds PoE: Respiratory Personnel Night/Early Morning; Artillery, Bomb, Inversion; Wind 6-16 km Missile PoE: Skin, Digestive Inversion; Wind 6-16 km Spray tank; Artillery; B omb; Missile; Mine PoE: Respiratory, Skin, Digestive Days to months, temperature dependent Same as T abun IPE Same as T abun 1 to 2 Days Same as T abun IP E; PB Same as T abun

Soman (GD)
(colorless liquid/gas; fruity/camphor)

Personnel, Equipment, T errain, (amber, oily liquid; odorless) Buildings VX

RoA: rapid, death in fifteen minutes IP E; PB Same as T abun (Treat as severe nerve agent explosure) Recommend 30 mg diazapam (suboptimal)

Personnel, Equipment, T errain, (amber, oily liquid; odorless) Buildings Novichok

Inversion; Wind 6-16 km Spray tank; Artillery; B omb; Missile; Mine

>1 Day Same as T abun Cold - months RoA: Vapor - seconds to minutes Liquid - minutes

PoE: Skin, Digestive

Figure G-1. Chemical Operational Planning Considerations

G-1

Appendix G
CHEMICAL OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS (Cont.)
Chemical Agent Target of Choice Conditions for Employment Method of Employment/ Portal of Entry (PoE)
Spray tank; Artillery; B omb; Missile; Mine

Duration of Hazard

Effect/Rate of Action (RoA)

Prevention

Treatment

Mustard (H, HD, HN-1, HN-2, HN-3
(colorless to pale yellow to dark, oily liquid; garlic/fishy/fruity to odorless)

Personnel, Equipment, T errain

Above 56F

Days to Year Temperature Dependent

Blisters; Respiratory Tract, immune suppression; death

Individual Protective Equipment (IPE)

Supportive Therapy; Calamine; Antibiotics; Major exposure topical antibacterial cream; Eyes neomycin ophthalmic ointment

PoE: Respiratory, Skin Personnel Night/Early Morning; Inversion; Wind 6-16 km Night/Early Morning; Inversion; Wind 6-16 km Artillery; B omb; Missile PoE: Respiratory Personnel Portable Cylinder Minutes Minutes

RoA: 2 to 48 hours Severe respiratory, headache, nausea, vomitting RoA: 2 hours to days Deep breathing, convulsions, death IPE Oxygen Amyl or Sodium Nitrite and Sodium Thiosulfate IPE Supportive Therapy

Arsine (AS)
(colorless gas; mild garlic)

Hydrogen Cyanide (AC)
(colorless liquid/vapor; bitter almond)

PoE: Respiratory Personnel Night/Early Morning; Inversion; Wind 6-16 km Night/Early Morning; Inversion; Wind 6-16 km Artillery, Bomblet PoE: Respiratory, Digestive Artillery, Bomblet PoE: Skin, Respiratory Personnel Night/Early Morning; Inversion; Wind 6-16 km Portable Cylinder <1 Day; Persistent in soil, water, and surfaces

RoA: Exposure to onset - 15 seconds - minutes; Lethal dose - inhalation- seconds Disorientation IPE Supportive Therapy

BZ
(white powder; odorless)

RoA: 30 minutes to 36 hours IPE Same as Mustard. Treat with British Anitlewisite

Lewisite (L)
(colorless to brown; geranium/floral)

Personnel

Environmental Immediate pain, blisters, airway damage persistent. More Volatile than mustard RoA: 30 minutes to 13 hours, inhalation - fatal in 10 minutes Minutes to Hours Shortness of breath, fluid on lungs, Death RoA: Immediate (high concentration) - 24 hours >1 Day Immediate pain, skin welts, sores, fluid on lungs RoA: 30 seconds

Phosgene (CG)
(colorless gas; ne w cut hay)

IPE

Oxygen; Supportive Therapy; Avoid exertion

PoE: Respiratory Personnel Night/Early Morning; Inversion; Wind 6-16 km Artillery, Bomblet PoE: Skin, Respiratory

Phosgene Oxime

IPE

Supportive Therapy

Riot Control Agents (RCAs)
CS/CN
(white powder; apple blossom/ pepper)

Personnel, T errain

Wind - Light

Spray tank; Bomblet; Bulk; Grenade PoE: Respiratory

<1 Day

T earing; difficulty breathing, burning and pain

IPE

Supportive Therapy

RoA: Immediate <1 Day T earing, coughing, sneezing, vomitting IPE Supportive Therapy

Adamsite (DM)
(light yellow to green crystals; odorless/ irritating)

Personnel

Wind - Light

Spray tank; Bomblet; Bulk; Grenade

PoE: Respiratory

RoA: Immediate

Toxic Industrial Materials (TIMs)
Chlorine (CL2)
(green/yellow gas, bleaching powder)

Personnel

Wind - Light

T ank, Tanker Minutes Truck, Containers, Railcar

Irritant, respiratory tract

IPE

Supportive Therapy

RoA: Rapid Personnel Night/Early Morning; Inversion; Wind 6-16 km Minutes to T ank, Tanker Truck, Containers, hours Railcar Shortness of breath, fluid on lungs, Death RoA: Immediate (high concentration) - 24 hours Eye and skin burn, Irritant RoA: Immediate Special clothing; respirator Supportive Therapy; Flush eyes and skin with water IPE Oxygen; Supportive Therapy; Avoid exertion

Phosgene (CG)

Ammonia

Personnel

Wind - Light

T ank, Tanker Truck, Railcar

Minutes

Figure G-1. Chemical Operational Planning Considerations

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NBC Hazard Prediction
CHEMICAL OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS (Cont.)
Chemical Agent Target of Choice Conditions for Employment Method of Employment/ Portal of Entry (PoE) Duration of Hazard Effect/Rate of Action (RoA) Prevention Treatment

Toxic Industrial Materials (Cont.)
Formaldehyde Personnel Wind - Light T ank, Tanker Truck, Railcar Short Period Burn - eyes and skin ; Respiratory RoA: Immediate Ethylene oxide Personnel Wind - Light Pressure T ank Short Period Irritant - eyes and skin RoA: Immediate Sulfur dioxide (converts to H2SO4 with water) Hydrogen Fluoride (HF) Hydrogen Chloride (HCL) Ammonium Bromide Personnel Wind - Light T ank, Tanker Truck, Railcar Minutes as gas; as Sulfuric Acid hours Minutes as gas; hours as acid Short Gas - irritant; Acid - burns; Corrosive RoA: Delayed Personnel Wind - Light T ank, Tanker Truck, Railcar Gas - irritant; Acid - burns; Corrosive RoA: Immediate Personnel Wind - Light T ank, Tanker Truck, Railcar PoE: Respiratory Personnel Wind - Light T ank, Tanker Truck, Railcar PoE: Respiratory Hydrogen Sulfide Personnel Wind - Light T ank, Tanker Truck, Railcar, Cold Storage PoE: Respiratory Methyl Isocyanate Personnel Wind - Light T ank, Tanker Truck, Railcar, Cold Storage PoE: Respiratory Acrylonitrile Personnel Wind - Light T ank, Tanker Truck, Railcar PoE: Respiratory Sulfur Trioxide (to H2SO4) Nitrogen Tetroxide (emits NO2) Personnel; Equipment as acid H2SO4 Personnel Wind - Light (good in T ank, Tanker rain) Truck, Railcar PoE: Respiratory Wind - Light T ank, Tanker Truck, Railcar PoE: Respiratory, Skin Liquid/gas short at 70 oF Gas - short; Acid variable Short Short Short Short Irritant - eyes, throat, skin; Burns RoA: Immediate Irritant - eyes RoA: Immediate Irritant; Frostbite; Asphyxiant SCBA, special protective clothing SCBA, special protective clothing SCBA, special protective clothing Special protective clothing, respirator Special protective clothing, respirator Supportive therapy; Flush eyes and skin with water; Supportive Therapy Flush eyes and skin with water; Supportive Therapy Special protective clothing Flush eyes and skin with water; Supportive Therapy Special protective clothing, respirator Special protective clothing Special protective clothing, respirator Special protective clothing, respirator Vapor protective clothing, respirator Flush skin and eyes with water; Supportive Therapy Flush skin and eyes with water; Supportive Therapy Flush skin and eyes with water - 20 minutes; Supportive Therapy Flush skin and eyes with water; Supportive Therapy; Inject MgSO4 at affected location Flush eyes and skin with water; Supportive Therapy

RoA: Immediate Irritant to skin; Pulmonary Edema RoA: Immediate Irritant to skin and eyes, blood and CNS damage RoA: Immediate Irritant - eyes and skin; Acid - burn RoA: Immediate Irritant - eyes and skin (burns); Respiratory; Death RoA: Immediate Flush eyes and skin with water; Supportive Therapy Flush eyes and skin with water; Supportive Therapy Flush eyes and skin with water; Supportive Therapy

Figure G-1. Chemical Operational Planning Considerations

For additional details on hazards, refer to JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments.

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Appendix G
c. Adversaries will seek to employ chemical agents under favorable weather conditions, if possible, to increase their effectiveness. Weather factors considered are wind, air stability, temperature, humidity, and precipitation. Favorable, moderately favorable, and unfavorable weather conditions for tactical employment of a chemical aerosol or vapor cloud are summarized in the figure G-2 below. The best weather for direct placement on an occupied area is calm winds with a strong, stable temperature gradient. Low winds and stable or neutral conditions are most favorable for spreading an agent cloud evenly over a larger target area.

WEATHER EFFECTS ON CHEMICAL AGENTS FACTORS Wind FAVORABLE Steady < 5 kph MODERATELY FAVORABLE Steady < 5 kph UNFAVORABLE > 13 kph (artillery) > 19 kph (aerial bombs Unstable < 4 degrees C < 40% Any

Air Stability Temperature Humidy Precipitation

Stable > 21 degrees C > 60% None

Neutral 4 - 41 degrees C 40 - 60% Light

Figure G-2. Weather Effects on Chemical Agents

d. Adversaries may choose to deliver agents upwind of targets, in which case, stable or neutral conditions with low to medium winds of 5-13 kph are the most favorable conditions. Marked turbulence, winds above 19kph, moderate to heavy rain, and an air stability category of “unstable” result in unfavorable conditions for chemical clouds. Figure G-3 depicts the visible indications of atmospheric conditions that are favorable or unfavorable to a successful biological/chemical attack.

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NBC Hazard Prediction

ATMOSPHERIC INDICATIONS OF BIOLOGICAL/CHEMICAL ATTACK

a.

Smoke, Neither Rising or Falling. An indication of a normal temperature gradient-neutral atmospheric stability prevails-BW/CW attack prospects are generally favorable.

b.

Smoke Rising. An indication of a high temperature gradient-atmosphere is thermally unstable-BW/CW attack prospects are poor.

c.

Smoke Falling/Inversion Condition. An indication of a low temperature gradient-atmosphere is thermally stable-BW/CW attack prospects are generally excellent.
Figure G-3. Atmospheric Indication of Biological/Chemical Attack Prospects

e. Most weather conditions do not affect the quantity of munitions needed for effective, initial liquid contamination.

G-5

Appendix G SECTION B. CHEMICAL PLOTTING 3. Simplified Chemical Plots
Chemical plotting is one of the critical tasks performed in the NBCCC. Raw data from NBC 1 reports and current weather information is necessary to construct a chemical plot. Chemical plots are divided into two categories: Type A (air contamination) and Type B (ground contamination) attacks. The sole source document for chemical plotting is Allied Tactical Publication (ATP) 45A and should always be referenced when constructing a plot. a. Chemical Downwind Message (CDM). A key element in constructing any type of plot is current surface weather conditions. CDMs are valid for six hours. The CDM contains downwind direction and speed, air stability, temperature, humidity, any significant weather, and cloud cover. Anytime a CDM is used you must insure that it is valid at the time of use and that it was developed for your location. b. Type A Chemical Plots. Type A chemical plots are constructed after each air contamination attack. There are two distinct plots under Type A, which are referred to as “cases” (1 and 2). Determining which case to use is based on wind speed. If the wind speed is 10 kmph or less, then you use case one and if the wind speed is >10 kmph or greater then case two is used. In determining the case always use a current CDM. • Case one plots are always a circle plot with a one km radius circle around the center of the attack location and a 10 km radius circle around the attack location. • A case two plot is always constructed with wind speeds >10 kmph or greater. The case two plot has a specific wind direction and 30 degree angles forming on each side of the centerline. The downwind distance of a case two plot is determined by the air stability and delivery method c. Type B Chemical Plots. Type B chemical plots are constructed after a confirmed ground contaminating attack. There are six distinct plots that are also referred to as cases. Without exception all Type B plots have a maximum downwind distance of 10 km. Determining which case to use will be based on the wind speed and the size of the attack area. • Cases 1, 3, and 5 are constructed when the wind speed is 10 kmph or less. Case 1 is a one km radius circle around the attack area and a 10 km radius circle around the attack area. Case 3 is a 2 km radius circle around the center of the attack area and a 10 km radius circle around center the center of the attack area. Case 5 is spray attack with a 1 km radius circle around the start and finish locations of the attack and a 10 km radius circle around these same two points. • Cases 2, 4, and 6 are constructed when the wind speed is >10 km or greater. Case two is constructed with a one km radius attack area and a 10 downwind hazard. Case four is constructed with a 2 km radius circle attack area and a 10 km downwind hazard. Case 6 is a spray attack with two 1 km radius circles and two 10 km down-wind hazard areas. • Recalculation: It may necessary to recalculate an existing plot because of changes in weather conditions. The weather conditions that could cause you to recalculate a plot are: •• Wind direction changes of 30 degrees or more. •• A change in air stability category that extends the downwind hazard or a change in wind speed. Note: a new NBC 3 report has to be forwarded. •• There is a change in representative downwind speed of 10 kmph or more or if the wind increases from < 10 kmph to > 10 kmph or the reverse. For additional information on chemical attacks see FM 3-3, Chemical and Biological Contamination Avoidance.

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NBC Hazard Prediction SECTION C. BIOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 4. General
Significant characteristics for biological warfare environments include: vulnerable target population, infectious or toxic agent properties, agent availability or adaptability for scaled-up production, agent stability, and agent suitability for aerosol dispersion. Limiting factors include biological properties, environmental factors, and dissemination methods.

5. Technical Aspects
Biological agents can be classified as pathogens or toxins. Human pathogens are defined as organisms that cause disease in man. Pathogens include bacteria, rickettsia, chlamydia, fungi, and viruses. Naturally occurring toxins are non-living, byproducts of cellular processes that can be lethal or highly incapacitating. Figure G-4 is a summary of biological weapon characteristics that commanders, staffs, and personnel need to consider when planning operations in a biological environment. For additional details on hazards refer to JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments.

BIOLOGICAL OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Biological Agent Target of Choice Conditions for Employment Method of Employment Portal of Entry (PoE)
Point, multipoint, line

Duration of Hazard

Effect/Rate of Action (RoA)

Prevention

Treatment

Personnel Anthrax (B.anthracis)

Darkness ,Temp <10C Humid < 85% Wind 5-15 km

Years

Infection: skin, lungs, gastrointestinal tract Death: skin (25%) , intestinal and pulmonary (100%)

Individual Protective Equipment (IPE); Vaccine

PoE: broken skin, digestive, respiratory

RoA: 1 - 7 days

Immediate postexposure: ciprofloxacin, tetracycline, doxycycline. C ontinued treatment: penicillin, tetracycline, erythromycin, chloromycetin, sufadiazine Antibiotics, tetracycline

Cholera

Personnel

Darkness , Temp <10C Humid < 85% Wind 5-15 km

Point, multipoint, line PoE: digestive

1 - 42 days; Stable - salt water; Unstable fresh water <1 Day

Vomiting, headache, indigestion, severe diarrhea Death 15 - 90% RoA: 12 to 72 hours Fever, joint pain, rash, photophobia, death 20% RoA: 3 to 10 days

IPE; Vaccine

Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever Yellow Fever

Personnel

Darkness , Temp <10C Humid < 85% Wind 5-15 km

Point, multipoint, line PoE: respiratory, broken skin

IPE; Antibiotics

Antibiotics, tetracycline, doxycline, chloroamphenicol Supportive Therapy

Personnel

Darkness , Temp <10C Humid < 85% Wind 5-15 km

Point, multipoint, line PoE: respiratory

Variable

Death - <5% untreated fever, hypotension, bleeding RoA: 3 to 6 days

IPE; Vaccine

Tularemia

Personnel

Darkness , Temp <10C Humid < 85% Wind 5-15 km

Point, multipoint, line

Week to years; Temperature Dependent

Death 30% ulcers, enlarged glands, pneumonia,

IPE; Vaccine

PoE: breaks in skin, mucous membranes, digestive, respiratory, vector Brucellosis Personnel Darkness , Temp <10C Humid < 85% Wind 5-15 km Point, multipoint, line PoE: Respiratory, digestive Weeks

RoA: 1 - 21 days, (average 3 - 5 days)

Immediate postexposure: ciprofloxacin, tetracycline, doxycycline. C ontinued treatment: ciprofloxacin, streptomycine, gentamycin, tobramycin Antibiotics doxycycline, rifampin

Death - < 2% ; Untreated - IPE chronic illness, acute febrile illness, localized infection, RoA: 5 - 21 days

Figure G-4. Biological Operational Planning Considerations

G-7

Appendix G
BIOLOGICAL OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS (Cont.)
Biological Agent Target of Choice Conditions for Employment Method of Employment Portal of Entry (PoE)
Point, multipoint

Duration of Hazard

Effect/Rate of Action (RoA)

Prevention

Treatment

Botulism
(white powder to colorless crystals)

Personnel

Darkness , Temp <10C Humid < 85% Wind 5-15 km

Air (1 day), food/water (weeks)

Blurred vision, nausea, dry Vaccine mouth, paralysis, respiratory arrest, death (65%) RoA: 1 to 5 days; inhalation - hours to days

Antioxin from CDC, intubution, ventilatory support

PoE: Digestive and respiratory Saxitoxin
(white powder)

Personnel

Darkness , Temp <10C Humid < 85% Wind 5-15 km

Point PoE: Respiratory, digestive, open skin

Unknown

Numbness, muscle Individual Protective weakness, respiratory Equipment (IPE) failure, death - 15 minutes RoA: 10 minutes to 4 hours Malaise, fever, death IPE; Quarantine (Bubonic) 60%, cutaneous (pneumonic) 100% fatal RoA: 2 to 10 days Death < 1% IPE; Vaccine untreated - nonspecific febrile illness, occasionally pheumonia RoA: 2 - 3 weeks

Induce vomitting; Supportive Therapy (oxygen) DO NOT USE ATROPINE Post-exposure ciprofloxacin, doxycycline

Plague (Yersinia pestis)

Personnel

Darkness , Temp <10C Humid < 85% Wind 5-15 km

Point

2 - 30 days; Years below freezing; 1 PoE: Respiratory, year in soil; 270 days in vector (skin body bites) Point, multipoint 60 or more days

Q Fever (Coxiella burnetii)

Personnel

Darkness ,Temp <10C Humid < 85% Wind 5-15 km

Within 8 to 12 days, tetracycline doxycycline

PoE: Respiratory, vector Ricin Personnel Darkness , Temp <10C Humid < 85% Wind 5-15 km Point, multipoint, line PoE: Digestive, respiratory Trichothenc- Personnel ene (T-2) Darkness , Temp <10C Humid < 85% Wind 5-15 km Point, multipoint, line Stable

Weakness, fever, cough, pulmonary endema inhalation - Death Rate high (36 to 72 hours) RoA: 12 - 24 hours

IPE

Supportive Therapy

(colorless crysta l to clear/ yellowish oil)

5 - 7 Days; Untreated - nausea, Years at room vomiting, diarrhea, temperature immune suppression, hypotention, shock, dermal burning skin and eye damage, damage to airway. Death - Moderate PoE: Respiratory, skin, and RoA: 1 - 24 hours digestive Point PoE: Digestive and respiratory Point, multipoint Cold or dry years Malaise, fever, vomiting Death 30 - 35%; 14 - 90 days Death - 1 - 2%

IPE

Supportive Therapy (oral charcoal, clinical toxicological practices)

Salmonella

Personnel

Darkness , Temp <10C Humid < 85% Wind 5-15 km Darkness , Temp <10C Humid < 85% Wind 5-15 km

Sanitation and proper cooking

Supportive Therapy

Smallpox

Personnel

IPE; Vaccine

PoE: Respiratory RoA: 2 - 17 days Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis (VEE) Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers (VHF) Staphylococcal Enterotoxon B (SEB)
(white, fluffy material)

Supportive Therapy (quarantine); Vaccine up to 3 days from exposure; Vaccine immune globulin (VIG) Supportive Therapy

Personnel

Darkness , Temp <10C Humid < 85% Wind 5-15 km

Point, multipoint, line PoE: Respiratory, vector

Relatively unstable

Malaise, fever, rigors, headache, vomiting, diarrhea ;death - < 1% RoA: 1 - 6 days

IPE; Vaccine

Personnel

Darkness , Temp <10C Humid < 85% Wind 5-15 km

Point, multipoint PoE: Digestive, broken skin, respiratory, vector

Relatively unstable

Fever, hypotention, bleeding, death (1% to 90%) RoA: 2 - 7 days

IPE

Supportive Therapy

Personnel

Darkness , Temp <10C Humid < 85% Wind 5-15 km

Point, multipoint

Persistent, resistent to freezing

Untreated - distress, vomiting, shock, fever, severe respiratory distress, death RoA: 3 - 12 hours

IPE

Supportive Therapy (ventilation)

PoE: Digestive, respiratory

Figure G-4. Biological Operational Planning Considerations

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NBC Hazard Prediction 6. Operational Considerations
a. Dissemination. Biological agents may be dispersed or deposited as aerosols, liquid droplets, or dry powders. In some instances, agents can be dispersed using vectors (e.g. mosquitoes). Live microorganisms usually grow in a moist environment; therefore, these agents may be disseminated in a liquid medium as wet aerosols. However, microbiological materials may also be stored and released in more stable, powder mediums. In general, agents dispersed as dry powder will survive longer than those dispersed as wet aerosols. b. Persistency. Persistency of biological agents varies greatly and depends on specific agent characteristics and the environmental conditions. These conditions include solar (ultraviolet) radiation, relative humidity, wind speed, and temperature gradient. Ultraviolet light affects most biological agents. However, encapsulation or genetic engineering may protect agents from natural decay and increase their persistency. Figure G-5 provides a general overview of weather effects of BW agent clouds.

Weather Effects on Biological Agent Dissemination
Weather Conditions Cloud Performances
Agent clouds travel downwind for long distances before they spread laterally. High humidity and light rains generally favor wet agent dissemination.

Operational Considerations
Agent clouds tend to dissipate uniformly and remain cohesive as they travel downwind. Cloud lies low to the ground and may not rise high enough to cover the tops of tall buildings and/or other tall objects. More agent required for same results as under stable conditions. Desired results may not be achieved. Agent clouds tend to break up and become diffused. Little operational benefit from off-target dissemination.

Favorable

Stable/Inversion Conditions. Wind Speeds: 15-32kph

Marginal

Neutral Conditions. Wind Speeds: 9-15kph

Agent clouds tend to dissipate quickly.

Unfavorable

Unstable/Lapse conditions. Agent cloud rises rapidly and does not Wind Speeds: <9 or travel downwind any appreciable >32kph distance. Cold temperatures affect wet agent dissemination.

Figure G-5. Weather Effects on Biological Agent Dissemination

SECTION D. BIOLOGICAL PLOTTING 7. Plotting Biological Agent Attacks
Presently, there is not a standard method for manually plotting biological agent attacks that all Services and/or allied countries agree upon. This shortfall exists partially because of the extreme complexity of the subject and the different characteristics associated with pathogens as opposed to toxins, although both are considered biological agents. For example, computer-generated biological agent plotting models use the following factors to develop hazard predictions for a line spray attack: specific type of agent decay rate, agent density, air stability code, time of attack, wind speed, volume of spray tank, line source strength, dissemination efficiency, release height respiratory dose, purity of agent and concentration, and target population breathing rate. NBC reconnaissance personnel probably won’t see evidence of biological contamination unless toxins such as Trichothecene Mycotoxin (T2) are used in a manner consistent with chemical dissemination. This complicating factor occurs because the desired particle size for biological agents is in the 1 - 5 micron range (1000 microns are equal to one millimeter).

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Appendix G
a. Biological plots are broken into two contamination zones: • Zone 1. The cloud is expected to produce a casualty rate of at least 20% for exposed, unprotected personnel in Zone 1. • Zone 2. The cloud is expected to produce a casualty rate of between 3% and 20% for exposed, unprotected personnel in Zone 2. b. The hazard distances associated with biological plotting far exceed those associated with chemical plotting. Similar to the concept used with nuclear plotting, there is a relationship between Zone 1 and Zone 2 of a biological agent plot. The Zone 2 distance will always be four times larger than Zone 1. For example, if the Zone 1 distance (as measured from the attack location) is 40 kilometers, the Zone 2 distance (as measured from the attack location) will be 160 kilometers. c. Biological plotting techniques are not standardized; therefore, units should make every effort to verify agent travel downwind by contacting sister Service or joint/coalition forces who possess biological agent samples. d. Point Source Attack (Air Contaminating). • Use the procedure associated with Type A, Case 2 chemical plotting to produce the shape of the hazard plot. Note: If the attack area radius is known to more than one kilometer, plot a circle with a radius equal to the radius of the known attack area. At this point, use the concepts imbedded in Type A, Case 2 chemical plotting for the remainder of the plotting procedure. For example, establish the tangent reference point opposite the wind direction line at a spot twice the radius of the circle as measured from the center of the attack area. • The downwind distance of Zone 1 in kilometers is eight times the effective wind speed in kilometers per hour. For example, if the wind speed is 15 km/h, the down-wind distance of Zone 1 will be 120 kilometers (as measured from the attack location). • The downwind distance of Zone 2 in kilometers is 32 times the effective wind speed in kilometers per hour. As previously mentioned, this equates to four times the Zone 1 distance. In our example, the Zone 2 distance would be 480 kilometers. e. Line Spray Attack (Air Contaminating). • Use the procedure associated with Type B, Case 6 chemical plotting to produce the shape of the hazard plot. • The downwind distance of Zone 1 in kilometers is eight times the effective wind speed in kilometers per hour. For example, if the wind speed is 12 km/h, the down-wind distance of Zone 1 will be 96 kilometers (as measured along the downwind direction line from each end of the spray line). • The downwind distance of Zone 2 in kilometers is 32 times the effective wind speed in kilometers per hour. As previously mentioned, this equates to four times the Zone 1 distance. In the example, the Zone 2 distance would be 384 kilometers (as measured along the downwind direction line from each end of the spray line). f. Large Liquid Drop Attack (Ground Contaminating). Draw a circle with a five kilometer radius around the center of the attack area. If the radius of the attack area is known to be larger than five kilometers, draw a circle with a radius equal to the radius of the known attack area. g. The following apply to biological agent plotting. • Movement of the Cloud. After a biological agent release occurs, the cloud will gradually widen and lengthen as it moves downwind. Ultimately, the cloud will obtain a length of approximately one-third the total distance traveled. For example, if the leading edge of the cloud has traveled 30 kilometers, the trailing edge of the cloud will be approximately 10 kilometers behind (at the 20 kilometer point of the downwind hazard line). •• As the cloud increases in width and length, the actual exposure hazard will increase. This occurs because, although the concentration of the cloud has decreased, the exposure time will be greater due to the increased size of the cloud. Therefore, personnel will be exposed to a lower concentration of agent, but for a longer period of time.

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•• Unlike Type A, Case 2 chemical attacks, the cloud arrival time associated with biological agent attacks is determined by dividing the distance the unit is from the attack area by the wind speed (in km/h). For example, if the leading edge of a unit is located 60 kilometers from the attack location, and the wind is moving at 20 km/h toward the unit, the leading edge of the cloud should arrive at the unit three hours after the time of attack. In this example, if the attack took place at 1200 hours, the expected cloud arrival time would be 1500 hours. •• The length of time personnel can expect to be exposed to the cloud can be determined by dividing the unit’s distance from the attack area by three times the wind speed (in km/h). This will provide an answer in hours and fractions of an hour. In the above example where the people are located 60 kilometers from the attack location and the wind speed is 20 km/h, the “cloud exposure time” would be one hour (60 km divided by [30 x 20]). Therefore, we would expect the cloud arrival time for this location to be 1500 hours and the cloud departure time to be 1600 hours. • Time allotted for cloud deposition. There are several factors that affect the time it takes for a biological agent cloud to settle to earth, with its limited contact or resuspension hazard, or be destroyed by weathering effects. However, the default factor for cloud deposition is eight hours. • Impact of structures on cloud travel. The distances associated with biological hazard plots are based on cloud travel across clear, open land. Heavy forest structure, cities, etc., will limit cloud spread because of increased cloud dispersion and particle contact with surfaces. Installations surrounded by an urban infrastructure are less likely to receive the full power of a remote biological agent release. For additional information on biological attacks see FM 3-3, Chemical and Biological Contamination Avoidance.

SECTION E. NUCLEAR CONSIDERATIONS 8. Nuclear Weapon Effects
An air burst at sea level can be expected to dissipate its energy as blast (55%); thermal radiation (heat - 30%); initial nuclear radiation (5%); and residual nuclear radiation (fallout and neutron induced radiation – 10%). Figure G-6 is a summary of nuclear weapon characteristics that commanders, staffs, and personnel need to consider when planning operations in a nuclear environment.

NUCLEAR HAZARDS OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Nuclear Hazards Target of Choice Conditions for Employment Method of Employment Portal of Entry (PoE) Duration of Hazard Effect/Rate of Action (RoA) Prevention Treatment

Nuclear
Nuclear Cities, Personnel, Ports, Airfields, Equipment None Point, Artillery, Missile, Bomb Half Life of radio-active elements Burns, radiation sickness, trauma, death Shielding, sheltering Supportive care, cytokines, platelets, tranfusions, nuclides, dependent chelation

RoA: Immediate to days

Radiological
Depleted Uranium Personnel, Equipment None Artillery, Missile, Bomb, Individual Half Life Kidney damage, burns, radiation sickness, death RoA: delayed Radioactive Compounds Personnel, Buildings, T errain Equipment Night/Early Morning; Artillery, Bomb, Inversion; Wind 6-16 km Missile Half Life D eath, burns, radiation sickness RoA: delayed Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Clear Artillery, Bomb, Missile Short Renders electronics inoperable RoA: immediate Shielding, sheltering Shielding, sheltering Shielding, sheltering Supportive care, cytokines, platelets, tranfusions, nuclides, dependent chelation Supportive care, cytokines, platelets, tranfusions, nuclides, dependent chelation None. Equipment must be replaced.

Figure G-6. Nuclear Operational Planning Considerations

For additional details on hazards refer to JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments.

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Appendix G
a. Blast. Blast produces casualties through crushing, extreme static over-pressures (primary), falling or flying debris (secondary), and by impact (tertiary) after objects are lifted and thrown through the air. Personnel suffering critical injuries from blast effects would likely suffer lethal nuclear and thermal radiation exposure as well. b. Thermal (Heat). Heat released at detonation travels at the speed of light and can cause burns beyond 30 miles. Depending on proximity and shielding, clothing and other flammable items may ignite. One or two layers of loose, light-colored clothing can reduce burns. Secondary fires from blast and heat are an additional hazard. Thermal effects can also disrupt operational plans as fire, melting snow, or ice may make movement routes impassable. c. Radiation. Initial ionizing radiation includes gamma and neutron energy bursts (electromagnetic pulse) that may interfere with electrical equipment operation and can disrupt communications over wide areas. The primary delayed radiation hazards are fallout, produced when the fireball contacts the surface of the earth, and neutron-induced radiation around ground zero. A secondary hazard produced by early fallout is beta emitters, which can result in severe skin burns if allowed to remain on exposed skin. Radiation injuries can be classified as penetrating radiation injuries from gamma radiation; superficial, external skin injuries from beta emitters; and internal injuries from inhaled or ingested beta and alpha particles. Fallout considerations include: • Predicting and identifying the hazard. • Shielding and sheltering personnel and equipment. • Radiation decay rates. • Radiation intensity. • Radiation effects on individuals and units.

9. Protective Actions
Protective actions taken before attack are most critical to individual survivability and unit effectiveness and may include the need for terrain selection (use of reverse slopes), dispersion (unit remains effective), and sheltering (depressions, culverts, caves, bunkers and obstructions). Training and education of staffs, leaders, and individuals to the effects of blast in all terrain environments is paramount to successful operations under these conditions. Figure G-7 provides military radiation exposure status (RES) and mission-exposure risk guidelines.

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Nuclear Radiation Exposure Status Guidelines
Radiation Exposure Status Total Past Cumulative Dose No Exposure None to slight evidence of transient headache and 6 - 12 nausea, vomiting in Hours • • 5% of personnel in upper range. Transient, mild nausea and vomiting 2 - 20 in 5% -30% of Hours personnel Transient, mild to moderate nausea and vomiting in20% - 70% of personnel. Mild to moderate fatigue and weakness in 25%60% of personnel. Initial Symtoms Time of Initial Single Mission Exposure Risks Symptoms Negligible Moderate Emergency Risk (cGy) Risk (cGy) Risk (cGy) • • 50 • • 70 • • 150

RES 0 Units

RES 1 Units

• • 0• • 70

• • 10

• • 30

• • 110

RES 2 Units

• • 70• • 150

• • 40 Any exposure exceeds Negligible Risk Any exposure exceeds Negligible Risk

RES 3 Units

• • 150

2 hours 2 days

Any exposure exceeds Negligible Risk

NOTES 1 Radiation status categories are based on previous exposure to radiation. 2 The commander, upon advice of the surgeon, makes reclassification of units from one radiation status category to a less serious one after observation of actual health of exposed personnel. 3 All exposures to radiation are additive, total body doses. No allowance is made for body recovery from radiation injury. 4 None of these symptoms alone are a reliable indicator of the amount of radiation exposure a person may have received. 5 Possible exposure criteria for a single operation that will not exceed the dose criteria for the stated degree of risk. Risk levels are graduated within each status category to provide more stringent criteria, as the total dose accumulated becomes more serious. The exposure criteria given for RES-1 and RES-2 units should be used only when the numerical value of a unit's total past cumulative dose is unknown.

Figure G-7. Nuclear Radiation Exposure Status Guidelines

10. Additional Radiation Hazards
a. In an operational environment, many highly technical items of equipment have high-energy or radiological sources that may accidentally or deliberately become radiation hazards. For example, communications and surveillance sites may have known hazard areas around their equipment that result from high-energy transmissions. These transmissions can injure personnel, damage equipment, and cause avionics malfunctions. Additionally, medical radiation sources require precautions to avoid accidental or deliberate exposures. The possible terrorist use of radiological materials threatens personnel safety as well as terrain or facility denial. b. Services should address considerations for the use of depleted uranium munitions and the resultant precautions against alpha particle inhalation or ingestion. Commanders should also be cognizant that significantly high levels of radiation can result from damaged, industrial radiation hazard areas. Due to limited downwind hazards, avoidance is the easiest protective measure against industrial radiation hazards.

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Appendix G SECTION F. NUCLEAR PLOTTING 11. Simplified Nuclear Plotting
Simplified nuclear plotting requires nuclear detonation (NUDET) information NBC 1 Reports for estimated yield of the weapons, type of burst, attack location/ ground zero (GZ), current Effective Downwind Message (EDM), ATP 45(A) (sole reference for NBC plotting), and an 1/250,000 Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) map of the operational area. a. Effective Downwind Message (EDM) is valid for six-hour time periods. EDM consists of seven numbers. The first three numbers are wind direction in degrees, the second set of three numbers are wind speed in knots per hour, and the last digit is the angle of expansion for the plot. b. Types of Burst. There are four types of nuclear burst. They are the high altitude, air, surface, and sub-surface burst. The high altitude burst takes place at an altitude equal or above 100,000 feet and produces electromagnetic pulse (takes out all power). The air burst is below 100,000 feet and is designed for maximum blast and radiation. The surface burst is where any portion of the fireball touches the surface of the earth, designed for maximum radioactive fallout. Sub-surface bursts were designed for extremely heavy local residual radiation and short-range surface shock. c. To develop a simplified fallout plot, the following steps are required: • Find and plot ground zero. Gather information from NBC 1 Report(s). (Use lines J, L, and M, from the NBC 1 Report(s) to construct ground zero). Draw/plot ground zero. • Estimate the yield of the NUDET. This may be estimated by using NBC 1 Reports lines J, L, and M). Note: Use the nomograms listed in ATP 45(A). • Determine type of burst. Determine this from NBC 1 reports. Note: High altitude bursts are not plotted. • Develop simplified plot: plot/draw downwind direction; determine downwind direction for Zone 1, draw Zone II, and plot yield groups “Alpha” through “Golf”. • Estimate arrival times (EAT) of radioactive fallout. • Label simplified nuclear plot. • Special Case Note: Use this case if the Effective Downwind Speed (EDS) is < 8 km/h or if the weapon yield is < 4.4 KTs)

Nuclear Yield Groups. •• Alpha is 2KT or less •• Bravo is more than 2KT to 5 KT •• Charlie is more than 5KT to 30KT •• Delta is more than 30KT to 100KT •• Echo is more than 100KT to 300KT •• Foxtrot is more than 300KT to 1000KT (1 MT) •• Golf is more than 1000KT to 3000KT (3 MT)

For additional details refer to AFMAN 32-4017, Civil Engineer Readiness Technician’s Manual for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense, and FM 3-7, NBC Field Handbook.

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APPENDIX H
NBC RECONNAISSANCE (SURVEY TECHNIQUES) 1. General
Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain information by visual observation or other detection methods, about the activities and resources of an enemy, or about the meteorologic, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. NBC reconnaissance (recon) is a specific type of reconnaissance. The purpose of NBC recon is the detection and identification of NBC hazards, which includes finding gaps and detours around NBC contaminated areas.

SECTION A. PRINCIPLES OF NBC RECONNAISSANCE 2. Purpose
The goal of NBC reconnaissance is to produce combat information to allow friendly forces to avoid contaminated areas. NBC reconnaissance also can produce technical intelligence concerning the enemy’s offensive NBC capability. NBC recon is part of the overall intelligence collection effort. It is performed in advance of and during combat operations to provide information used by the commander to confirm or modify his concept of operation. NBC recon also is conducted throughout the framework of the battlefield from the forward combat area to deep in the theater’s rear area. NBC recon missions are conducted wherever the enemy has the capability of employing NBC weapons. NBC recon operations are planned and performed with six fundamentals (see Figure H-1) in mind:

FUNDAMENTALS OF NBC RECONNAISSANCE
Retain freedom of maneuver. Orient on the threat. Report all information rapidly and accurately. Develop the situation rapidly. Avoid contact with enemy forces. Maximize the capabilities of NBC recon units.
Figure H-1. Fundamentals of NBC Reconnaissance

a. Retain Freedom of Maneuver. By avoiding contaminated areas, the commander maintains freedom of maneuver. Knowing the location of contaminated areas allows all units to practice the first principle of NBC defense—contamination avoidance. This also reduces the degradation effects of high MOPP levels on personnel. b. Orient on the Threat. NBC recon operations are limited to those areas where the enemy can employ NBC weapons. Enemy use of persistent chemical agents is the primary threat that the majority of NBC recon operations will be directed against. The intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) identifies where, when, how, and why the enemy will employ NBC weapons. It is impossible to conduct NBC recon continuously at all points on the battlefield, therefore the IPB assists in focusing the NBC recon effort at the most critical places and times on the battlefield.

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Appendix H
c. Report All Information Rapidly and Accurately. NBC recon is performed to obtain information. Higher commanders need this information to confirm or make decisions. Combat information loses value quickly. Negative reports tell as much as positive reports. Accurate reporting of locations is essential to avoiding NBC hazards. d. Develop the Situation Rapidly. Once contamination is encountered, the unit performing the mission rapidly identifies its type and intensity. Possible bypass routes or gaps are also quickly identified. e. Avoid Contact with Enemy Forces. Detecting and identifying NBC agents is extremely difficult on the battlefield. Many of the detection procedures are time consuming. Contact with enemy forces has a degrading effect on NBC recon operations. It is seldom possible to accurately detect and identify NBC agents while in close combat. The loss of a single recon element to enemy direct fire severely degrades the ability of the entire force to conduct future NBC recon operations. f. Maximize the Capability of NBC Recon Units. When selecting a unit to conduct NBC recon the commander considers the various capabilities and limitations of the unit. The mobility, survivability, and detection capabilities of each type of unit must be considered when assigning tasks and missions.

3. Actions on NBC Contact
When the unit performing NBC recon encounters NBC contamination, the unit uses a series of actions to develop the situation: a. Stop and Report. Upon encountering contamination, the recon unit halts and reports the presence of contamination. A simple contact or spot report can be used or an NBC 4 report If enemy contact is likely or expected, the unit should avoid areas of limited cover and concealment, and minimize its exposure to the contamination. b. Determine Agent Type and Intensity. The unit develops the situation by determining the exact type and intensity of the contamination, if possible. Depending on the type of contamination and the unit’s detection/identification capability, the time required can be rather short, or take as long as 20 minutes. If the unit has limited detection and identification capability, one element should remain at the contaminated area to determine the agent type while other elements should move to covered and concealed positions to provide overwatch. c. Choose a Course of Action. Once the leader has gathered enough information to make a decision, he selects a course of action. The course of action should adhere to the intent of the commander, be within the capability of the unit, and allow the unit to resume its mission as soon as possible. Courses of action include: • Bypass. Routes around the contaminated area are located and marked allowing follow-on forces to avoid the contaminated area. • Cross. Bypassing the contaminated area may not be possible. The shortest, safest route across the contaminated area is located allowing follow-on forces to minimize their exposure while crossing the contaminated area. • Survey. An NBC survey determines the exact boundaries of the contaminated area. This provides the maximum information concerning the contaminated area. d. Recommend a Course of Action. Once the recon leader has selected a course of action, it is reported it to the commander. The commander approves or disapproves the course of action based upon its impact on the overall mission. To avoid unnecessary delay the SOP or OPORD may provide automatic approval of certain actions. Once the recon unit has reported the presence of NBC contamination, the commander acts on this information. The impact of the reported contamination is analyzed against current and future operations. The commander may consider altering the scheme of maneuver to avoid the contamination area or to increase the protective posture.

SECTION B. RECONNAISSANCE TECHNIQUES 4. General
Units performing NBC recon use specialized “NBC recon techniques” to accomplish their missions. These techniques fall into the two categories - search and survey. Search techniques are used initially to find contamination. Once contamination is detected, survey techniques determine the size of the contamination. These techniques can be used while mounted or dismounted

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NBC Reconnaissance (Survey Techniques)
or in combination to meet the needs of the situation. It may be necessary to dismount to conduct a detailed survey of an area or to obtain readings in areas not accessible to vehicles. Also, aerial operations may be required to locate large nuclear contaminated areas typical of nuclear events.

5. NBC Route Recon
An NBC route reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtain information on a specific route. (A route is the prescribed course to be traveled from a specific point of origin to a specific destination.) A route may encompass a single road or could be an axis of advance. Units performing a route recon typically conduct an NBC route recon as part of the overall operation. A unit, particularly an NBC recon unit, could be given the specific mission of conducting an NBC route reconnaissance. This mission is appropriate when the commander determines there is a high likelihood of contamination along the route. An NBC route recon proceeds faster than an NBC zone recon. The size of the route and the time available dictate the size of the recon element. a. Once contamination is detected, the recon element has the following options: • Conduct an NBC survey to define the boundaries of the contamination. • Locate and mark clear bypass routes. • Terminate the mission and move to a coordinated decon point. • Continue the mission. b. Critical Tasks. Certain tasks must be accomplished during a route recon. The IPB indicates possible locations for contamination along with previous NBC reports. Critical tasks are:

Route Recon Critical Tasks Checklist
! ! !

Reconnoiter the route, and determine the location of any contamination. Locate and mark bypass routes if contamination is encountered. Report and mark all NBC hazards along the route.

6. NBC Zone Recon
An NBC zone reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtain detailed information on NBC hazards within a specified zone. An NBC zone recon is appropriate when previous knowledge of the area is limited and there are indications or reports of NBC hazards. Typically, a zone NBC recon is performed to determine the suitability for large unit (brigade or higher) assembly areas or logistic bases. Previous reports or intelligence may indicate a high probability of past NBC attacks within the zone. A zone recon is a deliberate, time-consuming process that requires a substantial expenditure of resources. a. Once contamination is detected, the recon element has the following options: • Conduct an NBC survey to define the boundaries of the contamination. • Terminate the mission and move to a coordinated decon point. • Continue the mission. b. Critical Tasks. Certain tasks are accomplished during a zone recon unless specifically directed otherwise by the commander. Based on time and operational requirements the commander may direct the reconnaissance towards specific information only. Critical tasks are:

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Appendix H
Zone Recon Critical Tasks Checklist
! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

Reconnoiter all terrain within the zone for contamination. Locate all previously reported NBC attack areas and determine if there is still a hazard. Locate all possible contamination within the zone. Check all water sources for contamination. Locate all commercial chemical, nuclear facilities, storage areas, and waste sites. Report all information. Mark contaminated areas. Locate routes to bypass contamination.

7. NBC Area Recon
An NBC area reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtain detailed information concerning a specific area. An area recon is a specialized form of zone recon that proceeds faster since the effort is focused on a specific piece of terrain. This mission typically is assigned when employing a unit to reconnoiter a reported/suspected NBC attack/hazard area. a. Once contamination has been detected, the recon element usually performs a survey to define the boundaries of the contamination. b. Critical Tasks. During an NBC area reconnaissance, the critical tasks are:

Area Recon Critical Tasks Checklist
! ! ! !

Reconnoiter all terrain within the area. Locate and mark all NBC hazards within the hazard. Locate bypass routes around identified contaminated areas. Report all information.

8. NBC Survey
An NBC survey is a directed effort to obtain detailed information concerning a contaminated area. The extent of the contamination is then determined and marked. a. This is a resource intensive operation typically conducted in rear areas to prevent units from unknowingly entering the contaminated area. b. Critical Tasks. During an NBC survey, the critical tasks are:

Survey Critical Tasks Checklist
! ! ! !

Locate the general boundaries of the contaminated area. Place warning markers at specified intervals around the contaminated area and at all entry points. Determine the intensity of the contamination. Report information via NBC 5 report.

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NBC Reconnaissance (Survey Techniques) 9. NBC Surveillance
NBC surveillance is the systematic observation of surface areas to detect NBC attacks and hazards. All units perform a type of NBC surveillance-monitoring. Units monitor their areas using automatic chemical agent alarms to provide early warning. Units can be given the mission to perform NBC surveillance by observing specified areas for indications of a chemical attack. a. After observing the indications of an NBC attack, the recon element has the following options: • Conduct an NBC survey to define the boundaries of the contamination. • Locate and mark clear bypass routes. • Terminate the mission and move to the coordinated decon point. • Continue the mission. b. Critical Tasks. During surveillance, the critical tasks are:

Surveillance Critical Tasks Checklist
! ! !

Identify reporting criteria. Occupy observation posts to overwatch the designated area. Report all indications of an NBC attack.

For additional NBC reconnaissance information see FM 3-19, NBC Reconnaissance.

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Appendix H

Intentionally Blank

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APPENDIX J
SAMPLING TECHNIQUES 1. General
a. JTF/JSOTF commanders may receive the mission to collect materiel and environmental samples as evidence to support intelligence and operational requirements to substantiate that an NBC attack has occurred, provide field identification of agents used, survey the degradation of such products, or identify delivery systems and their nation of origin. Sampling operations are particularly important if a potential adversary uses previously unknown agents or if an adversary allegedly uses an NBC agent first. Therefore, the collection of samples and background information must be as detailed and comprehensive as possible. b. An adversary may use radiological agents (RAs) to restrict the use of terrain and/or to cause delayed casualties. Further, residual radiation from RAs can potentially result in high dosages for those who operate in the RA contaminated area. A SOF element may collect samples to verify the use of RAs and to identify the radionuclides of the RAs. c. SO may involve nuclear, biological and chemical sampling (NBCS) elements that higher echelons control, often with involvement of an intermediate headquarters. Samples taken by SOF elements can be used as key input for critical decisions. For example, the National Command Authority may use the intelligence derived from the samples as verification of first use of NBC agents. If the sample is critical, international observers may accompany a SOF element. d. Special NBC reconnaissance tasks include sampling operations, NBC-related technical evaluation and observation, and providing advice and training on special NBC reconnaissance skills.

SECTION A. SAMPLING OPERATIONS 2. Purpose
a. The data from sampling operations supports the intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) process and directly relates to ongoing and future operations. Sampling operations may be done for four reasons. Samplers: • Collect baseline bioenvironmental samples for background levels of indigenous biological material in a given area. • Collect and identify suspected NBC samples such as chemical, biological, environmental (soil, air, liquids, vegetation), and anatomical samples (tissue) from animals or suspected contaminated animal specimens. • Collect radiological agent samples such as radiological agents spread throughout an area as radioactive dust particles, pellets, or industrial waste. • Provide preliminary identification of chemically/biologically contaminated samples. b. An LB team(s) may augment a SOF element(s) conducting a unilateral collection mission, such as technical observations to support surveillance of known or suspected NBC facilities in hostile areas where the threat precludes the use of other human intelligence (HUMINT) means. The LB team may provide NBC technical training to SOF elements if the mission requirements prevent the LB team from augmenting the element. Also, the team may provide NBC defensive skills training to HN personnel if the HN personnel speak English, or if language support is provided, and if HN support agreements allow such training.

3. NBC Sampling Techniques and Procedures
The collection of environmental and background (control) samples are an integral part of the investigation of allegations of NBC use. As a routine technique, collect a minimum of four samples, three of suspected contamination and one in an unaffected area for control. Keep samples cool, cold if possible. The types of samples taken and the collection methods depend upon the circumstances encountered by the collector. Field collectors and analysis centers define techniques and collection requirements. The protection and sampling equipment used by a SOF element is tailored to fit specific situational requirements. Collection techniques vary according to the circumstances under which an element must work (e.g., dead animals may be a sample source - triple bag). A neat sample is an ideal sample medium for collection and laboratory analysis. Additionally, the return and recovery of any sample identification or test equipment previously used to identify the agents (such as M256 kits, M8 and M9

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Appendix J
paper) are of great value to a laboratory conducting analysis. These items should be recovered, packaged, and shipped for analysis. Different information may be derived from each type of sample.

Sampling Guidance Checklist
! ! ! ! ! ! !

! !

! ! ! ! !

Use glass or polypropylene bottles. Use gloves made of nitrile, avoid Latex gloves. If local containers must be used, two identical unused containers should be included along with sample. Do not use paper bags, as this sample will be of no value. Generally, try to sample from point sources. Sample as close to the discharge (point) source as possible. Always collect samples from control sites as well as target sites, provide at least one control sample. Try and collect multiple control samples at one or more nearby control sites; control samples should be the same type as the target sample. Duplicate samples can be used to confirm chemical presence at a sampling spot. Only one opportunity may exist to take a sample therefore selecting a sampling spot that has the highest probability of finding target compounds is imperative. Use maps, imagery, geological info, and weather data. Collect target samples first, then find areas to collect control samples. Sample during the coolest part of the day in summer and the warmest part of the day in winter. Light rainfall may increase the probability of finding target compounds while heavy rainfall will decrease the probability. Prevalent wind speed and direction will determine where surface contamination is located. High winds in arid areas will dilute target compounds to undetectable levels.

a. Chemical and Biological Sampling (Environment). Environmental samples include air, water, soil, and vegetation samples of suspected contamination. Background or control samples may be air, water, soil, or vegetation. In addition, they represent the normal condition of the air, water, soil, and vegetation around the suspected contaminated area. The collection of environmental samples requires the collection of control samples. Control samples allow the analysis center to compare an uncontaminated sample with a contaminated sample and determine whether a compound is naturally occurring in the environment. Collectors take samples of soil, water, and vegetation from areas that are approximately 500 meters upwind of an alleged attack area to ensure that an accurate comparison can be made. Control samples must be generically the same as those collected in an alleged attack area. For example, if a SOF element collects leaves from an apple tree in an attack area, it should collect sample leaves from an apple tree outside the contaminated area. If the team collects water from a pond in the attack area, it should collect samples of water from a pond (not a moving stream) in a nearby clean area. The size of an environmental control sample should be about the same as those taken from an attack area. • Air/Vapor Samples. Air/vapor is a good sample matrix since it is well-mixed. Air/vapor from a sample site contains a static concentration of contaminants. The concentration of contaminants depends upon the flow rate of the contaminant into the environment, the wind speed, the physical state of the contaminant, the terrain contours, and temperature as a variable. •• When to Sample. Perform sampling as soon as possible after alleged use of agent. •• Where to Sample. When a facility emits chemicals into the atmosphere, the best places to obtain samples are as close to the emission source as possible (the chemical’s concentration is maximal at that point). Natural and man-made terrain features such as hills, rows of buildings, and valleys sometimes aid the collector by channeling emissions. When these features are close to a particular facility, use the downwind side, if possible, for sample collections, as emissions remain concentrated due to the channelizing effect. Determine where downwind typically is for the site, and collect environmental samples from that point. For collection in a possibly contaminated location (if the situation permits), use a detector kit such as the M18A2 initially to determine if a possible vapor hazard exists from known chemical agents. Also, use the kit to test possible toxic agent munitions. Take air samples with the white strip tubes and save them for laboratory analysis. Small air samplers also enable the collector to obtain vapor samples from alleged toxic agent munitions at a safe distance while explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel: render the munitions safe. If EOD personnel are not on the scene, the air sampler can be started, but the collector should stand at a safe distance while the sampler is operating. •• How to Sample. Contaminants are sampled for later identification by using devices that draw air through filter material. Note: Persons sampling air should not use cologne, perfume, insect repellent, medical creams, or strong soaps before taking a sample. The fragrances of these products are volatile organic compounds that can be absorbed on the

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Sampling Techniques
filter and skew analytical results. Smoke also severely interferes with the air sampling; therefore, avoid cigarette, vehicle exhaust, and campfire smoke. Note: shipboard sampling operations must consider the products (e.g., fuels, solvents, gases etc…) that are present and can cause false readings. The primary method for collecting air samples is with the PAS-1000 Automatic Air Sampler with Tenax tube for a total of three to four minutes, when possible. Place the Tenax tube in a 2-1/4-inch piglette after taking the sample. (A pig or piglette is a heavy-duty metal container designed to contain small sample containers for transport to the laboratory.) Seal the piglette around the cap either with pressure-sensitive or Teflon tape. Once sealed, place the piglette into a Mylar or Ziplock plastic bag. Fold the bag around piglette in a circular motion. Insert first bag into a second bag and fold again. Use any type tape to secure the plastic around the piglette after the collector makes the fold. Then place the piglette into a cooler/refrigerator during transport and transfer. • Water Samples. Water sampling involves collecting enough water to obtain good information about the contaminants. •• When to Sample. Sample water from a facility when intelligence or local reports suggest that a process of possible interest is ongoing. Reports indicating higher than normal amounts of security or an increased flow of effluents from facility chimneys or water discharge pipes may be potential signals that samples should be taken. Collect water samples from allegedly contaminated field areas just after the start of a rainstorm when runoff is beginning. Natural surface drainage will concentrate any remnants of toxic compounds in depressions, streams, or ditches. When possible, perform sampling as soon as possible after alleged use of an agent. •• Where to Sample. Drains are ideal sites since contamination and dilution from other sources are minimized. Multiple samples should be taken at different depths. Sample stream water in the slower moving parts of the stream. The turbulence and speed of rapidly flowing water often dilutes chemical concentration and affects contamination. If an oil stainlike fan, globules of organic materials, or an unnatural-looking powder is visible on surface water, take surface samples of the material. Otherwise, take a sample from near the bottom of the stream. Most chemicals of interest are denser than water and usually sink to lower levels. However, high water temperatures promote decomposition and may cause the upper layers of water to harbor contaminants. For example, blister agent (mustard) may float on the surface of water due to surface tension, even though it is heavier than water. •• How to Sample. Collect sample by immersing a capped or stoppered container to the desired depth, removing the cap or stopper, letting the container fill, and then capping the container. An alternate method for deep-water sampling is to use a plastic, pump-operated siphon to pump water from a specific depth. Use the M272 chemical agent water test kit for initial screening if the collector believes that the use of standard chemical warfare agents has occurred. The collector should provide the analysis center four C-18 cartridges when using the Sep-Pak technique. For additional Sep-Pak usage refer to FM 3-18, Special NBC Reconnaissance (LB Team). • Soil Samples. Soil is a good place to sample for toxic organic compounds. Soil may contain large amounts of compounds of interest. For best results, it is essential that the collector sample at the precise site of compound deposition. •• When to Sample. Sample as soon as possible after the alleged incident. •• Where to Sample. Recognize contamination by discoloration or apparent deposition of material on the soil’s surface. If discoloration or deposition of material is evident, use a garden trowel or wooden tongue depressor to scrape up the soil. Collect only discolored soil or deposited materials, if possible. Multiple samples should be taken at different depths. •• How to Sample. Avoid direct contact with the sample. Collectors take soil samples by scraping into a collection container the top two to five centimeters of soil from areas that appear to be contaminated. If the collector samples chunks or clods of earth, select those that are no larger than 10 by 5 by 1 centimeters. Also, collect a control sample of the same soil type or texture. Scrape the top two to five centimeters of suspected soil into a collection container using a knife, spoon, spatula, or similar item. Use a glass bottle, jar, or Teflon jar as a container when available. Mylar bags may also be used. When using glass bottles, jars, or Teflon jars, seal the cap with either pressure-sensitive or Teflon tape and mark for identification. Place sample in one bag, push excess air out, and seal by folding over open end two to three times and wrap with any tape when using Mylar bags. Insert first bag into a second bag, seal, tape, and mark for identification. If possible, place samples in a piglette. It is important to seal well so volatiles don’t escape. Also, place a tamper-resistant seal across storage bags.

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Appendix J
• Vegetation Samples. Vegetation as it exists provides an excellent means for collecting samples. •• When to Sample. Sample as soon as possible after the alleged incident. •• Where to Sample. When it is possible to figure out a probable center of attack in an area, take vegetation samples near the center of the area, about 100 meters upwind of the area. Also, take samples at several 100-meter increments downwind of the area. If the collector can discern a contamination pattern in the area, this should be reported. •• How to Sample. Make a visual survey of the area and don protective equipment before collecting vegetation. Enter the area from an upwind direction. Collect vegetation samples that are different from normal. Select leaves that have wilted or appear to have been chemically burned. Collect vegetation that appears to have liquid or solid substances deposited on its surfaces. This may appear as a shiny or moist area. Collect vegetation at several locations within the suspected contaminated area. Use a cutting tool or any sharp object and cut several affected leaves or a handful of grass whenever possible. Do not crush the sample. Place sample into a Mylar or ziplock bag. Squeeze excess air out of the bag and seal. Fold over open end of the bag two to three times and wrap with any type tape. The minimum size sample of value is three leaves or three handfuls of grass. One leaf is of little value, but should be collected. Bark is acceptable but not preferred. Mark the bag for identification. Take a control sample of similar material from an unaffected area. Seal, tape, and mark the control sample. b. Radiological Agent Sampling. Radiological sampling operations are important to determine if and where a threat uses a radiological agent. The collection of samples and background information must be as detailed and comprehensive as possible. Each sample is processed and analyzed to provide data for analysis. Sample processing includes the collection of the sample, handling and transfer, and the associated administrative procedures. The administrative procedures ensure a documented chain of custody and a detailed description of the collection procedure. After laboratory analysis of the sample, intelligence personnel analyze the data to produce the intelligence to support operational requirements. An adversary may scatter radiological agents as radionuclide dust or as pellets of radioactive materials. The RA dust will cover vegetation, soil, and water surfaces. RA pellets do not cover vegetation surfaces like a dust, but remain on the surface of the soil. Also, RA pellets sink to the bottom of bodies of water. A SOF element can take samples of vegetation, soil, or water to collect the RA pellets or dust. The SOF element does a ground radiological reconnaissance (GRR) to locate the RA. Since the purpose of a RA sampling mission is to collect RA samples, terminate the GRR after the RA is found. The radiological safety of the SOF element is a constant concern. RA contaminated areas emit high doses of radioactivity therefore; the element monitors the radiation throughout the radiological agent sampling mission. Note: The SOF element must not exceed the commander’s operational exposure guidance (OEG). The team chooses the environmental samples based on measurements the collector makes with the team’s radiac meters. • Water Samples. Collect enough water to obtain information about the radiological agents. •• When to Sample. Intelligence assets will provide information on the presence of indicators that may indicate the need for sample collection (such as higher than normal amounts of security or increased flow of smoke from a facility chimney or water from a water discharge pipes). The best time to collect water samples from allegedly contaminated field areas is just after the start of a rainstorm when runoff is beginning. Natural surface drainage will concentrate any remnants of radionuclides in depressions, streams, or ditches. •• Where to Sample. Collect water from the slow-moving areas of the stream or body of water. •• How to Sample. If the collector believes that the use of radiological agents has occurred, use the AN/PDR 27, the AN/ VDR 2, or any radiac instrument that measures dose rate to confirm that a sample is contaminated (hot). The collector immerses a capped or stoppered container to the desired depth, he removes the cap or stopper, allows the container to fill, then caps the container. An alternate method for deeper water is to use a plastic, pump-operated siphon to pump water from a specific depth. The following minimum quantities for a sample are necessary for analysis: surface or water discharge sources, two liters; drinking water sources, one liter. NOTE: Collect a minimum of four samples, three of suspected contamination and one in an unaffected area for control. • Soil Samples. Soil is a good place to collect radiological agents (dust or pellets). It’s essential that the collector monitors the sample prior to collection to ensure the sample is contaminated (hot). •• When to Sample. Sample as soon as possible after the alleged incident or report of activity.

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•• Where to Sample. Collect RA samples from any place where radiacmeters indicate contamination (hot). If RA deposits material is evident, use a garden trowel or the scoop provided in the M34 soil sampling kit to scrape up the soil. Collect only contaminated (hot) soil, if possible. •• How to Sample. Avoid direct contact with the sample. Collect soil samples by scraping the material into a collection container from contaminated areas. Collect a control (uncontaminated) sample of soil of the same type or texture. Scrape the soil into a collection container using a knife, spoon, spatula, or similar item. When using glass bottles, jars, or Teflon jars, seal the cap either with pressure sensitive or Teflon tape and mark for identification. Place sample in one bag, push excess air out, and seal by folding over open end two to three times and wrap with any tape when using Mylar bags. Insert first bag into a second bag, seal, tape, and mark for identification. If possible, place samples in a piglette. Place a tamper-resistant seal across storage bags. •• Minimum quantities necessary for analysis: Gamma spectrometry plus gross alpha or gross beta, two kilograms of soil (approximately one square foot area, three inches deep). Gross alpha or gross beta only, 100 grams. • Contaminated Vegetation Samples. Collect samples of vegetation that appear to be different from normal. Select leaves that have wilted or appear to have been chemically burned. Collect samples of vegetation that appear to have liquid or solid substances deposited on their surfaces (this may appear as a shiny or moist area). •• When to Sample. Collect samples as soon as possible after the alleged incident or report of activity. •• Where to Sample. When it is possible to calculate a probable center of attack in an area, collect vegetation samples near the center of the area, about 100 meters upwind of the area, and in several 100-meter increments downwind of the area. If the collector can discern a contamination pattern in the area, it should be reported. •• How to Sample. Make a visual survey of the area and don protective equipment before collecting vegetation. Enter the area from an upwind direction. Collect vegetation samples that the radiacmeters indicate are contaminated (hot). Collect vegetation at several locations within the suspected contaminated area. Use a cutting tool or any sharp object and cut affected leaves or grass whenever possible. Place at least three liters of densely packed sample in Mylar bags or in a one-gallon wide-mouth plastic jar. Double-pack the Mylar bag or place the one-gallon wide-mouthed plastic jar in a Mylar bag. Mark the bag for identification. Collect a control sample of similar material from an unaffected area. Seal, tape, and mark the control samples. The minimum quantity of a vegetation sample necessary for analysis is at least three liters per sample. c. Biomedical Samples. The purpose in collecting samples is to determine if a toxic substance is present in the natural environment or if it has been artificially introduced. • Biomedical samples collected during an investigation include blood, urine, and tissue samples from living victims and blood and urine samples from unexposed control sample persons. •• When to Sample. Collect samples as soon as possible after the alleged incident or report of activity. •• Where to Sample. The selection of human sampling controls must be carefully considered due to potentially large deviations introduced by ethnic diets, racial/cultural differences, physiological makeup, and living conditions. Animal controls also warrant careful consideration. •• How to Sample. Trained medical personnel should collect biomedical samples (human or animal). Collectors must have express authorization to collect biomedical samples from the dead to preclude any state or religious complications that could jeopardize a mission. For additional “Biomedical Samples” details refer to FM 3-19, NBC Reconnaissance.

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Appendix J SECTION B. SAMPLE INFORMATION REPORTING, PACKAGING, AND SHIPMENT 4. General
Although a sample collected from an alleged attack area can be significant, it can become useless if the collector (SOF element) doesn’t record essential information about its collection. Also, the sample can become useless if the collector improperly packs the sample and it breaks during shipment to an analysis center. The following paragraphs discuss information required when acquiring samples and the preferred methods for handling and packing samples for shipment. a. Sample Background Information. A complete history of the circumstances about each sample’s acquisition is provided to the agency exploiting the sample. Critical information includes:

Critical Background Information Checklist
! ! ! !

!

!

!

!

Meteorological conditions at time of sampling and alleged attack. Length of time after alleged attack when sample was taken. Circumstances of acquisition, how collector obtained the sample, and where the collector found the sample. Physical description. The physical state (solid, liquid, powder, apparent viscosity), color, approximate size, identity of the specimen (military nomenclature, dirt, leaves, etc.), and dose rate, (if radiologically contaminated). Circumstances of agent deposition. The type of delivery system, a description of how the weapon functioned, how the agent acted on release, sounds heard during dissemination, a description of any craters or shrapnel found associated with a burst, and colors of smoke, flames, or mist that may be associated with the attack. Agent effects on vegetation. A description of the general area (jungle, mountain, grassland) and changes in the vegetation after agent deposition (color changes, wilting, drying, dead) in the main attack and fringe areas. Agent effects on humans. How the agent affected personnel in the main attack area versus fringe areas; the duration of agent effects; peculiar odors that may have been noticed in the area before, during, or after an attack; measures taken that alleviated or worsened the effects; and the approximate number of victims and survivors (include age and gender). Agent effects on animals. The types of animals that were or were not affected by an attack and a description of how they were affected.

b. Sample Identification and Control. To prevent confusion, use the sample identification number when referring to the sample or to information concerning its acquisition. A sample identification number contains the following information: • Country of acquisition -- a two-digit alphabetic code for the country (established by DIAM 58-13) from which the collector took the sample. A complete listing of country codes can be found in FM 3-18, Special NBC Reconnaissance (LB Team), Appendix K. • Date acquired -- a six-digit numerical code for the year, month, and day that the collector took the sample. • Sample sequence number -- a three-digit numerical code assigned by the LB team. It begins each collection day. The first sample collected is 001, the second 002, and so forth. • Sampler identification -- a two- or three-digit alphabetic abbreviation of the sampler’s first and last name. When the sampler’s identity must be protected, code the identity using XA through XZ and then XXA through XXZ, if necessary. Maintain an index of codes and identities separately within the classified files so that the sampler can be recontacted. Example of sample identification number: 850115-002-JD LA -Collector took sample in LAOS. 850115 -- Sample obtained on 15 January 1985 002 -- This is the second sample obtained on 15 January 1985 JD -- John Doe took the sample. Samples must be carefully controlled to be of greatest value. A chain of custody must be recorded on the DD Form 1911. The collecting element assigns an identification number and affixes it to the sample or its container to aid in the identification of samples. c. Acquisition and Shipment of Samples. The collecting element provides a formatted message for transmission when possible. During special operations in a theater in which a SOF headquarters is deployed, the collecting element transmits the

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message via the fastest means through the fewest channels to the radiological, chemical, and biological sampling control element (R-CBSCE). If a R-CBSCE has not been deployed to the area of operations, sometimes in a low sample volume peacetime operation, the collecting elements transmit the message via the fastest means through the fewest channels to the message addressees shown in the example. In addition, a written report accompanies each sample or batch of samples. The collecting element properly classifies the acquisition message. • An acquisition message contains the following information: •• The sample identification number is a part of the subject line if only a single sample is in the text. Otherwise, refer to the sample number within the message body with its background information. If the LB team ships the sample immediately, then it must include the shipment date, the mode of transportation, courier identification, air bill of lading number, flight number, destination, and estimated time of arrival in the message (see Appendix F, NBC Warning Message and Threat Condition System). In addition, the Material Courier Receipt (DD Form 1911) should be used to maintain chain of custody. •• Background information surrounding the sample. •• Questionable circumstances surrounding acquisition of a sample. •• The name of another country or agency that got a sample from the same event or area and is not shown on the message address. •• A recommended priority and rationale for analysis to guide the analysis center on the operational element’s assessment of the potential value of the sample. •• All details that relate to the acquisition of the sample despite how insignificant they may seem to the collector. •• Disposition of samples is according to their physical category. • Ship all samples via the fastest, safest means (preferably via technical escort unit (TEU)) to the theater R-CBSCE or to a location that the R-CBSCE designates. If there is no R-CBSCE in theater, send the samples IAW preplanned instructions from the Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Analysis and Technical Evaluation Board (R-CBATEB) established at the Chemical Research, Development, and Engineering Center (CRDEC), Aberdeen, Maryland. • The R-CBATEB should be involved during the mission planning process for technical and specialized support. The R-CBATEB will direct, in advance, that the collectors send the samples to the following locations, dependent on the category of the sample. The R-CBATEB uses these considerations to decide the final destination of the sample: Is the sample chemical or biological in content? Is the sample content completely unknown? Is the sample a possible combination of chemical and biological material? • Regardless, the R-CBATEB must be notified earlier than receipt of the sample so additional instructions or deviations from standard instructions can be given. Ship RA samples via the fastest, safest means (preferably via TEU) to the radiological laboratory at the US Army Hygiene Agency, Edgewood, Maryland. • Before shipment, contact: Commander Technical Escort Unit ATTN: SMCTE-OPE Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21010 • The TEU controls the transport of samples to their final destination. Do not ship suspected toxic samples or munition systems to the continental United States (CONUS) technical centers or intelligence agencies without coordination prior approval by the recipient. For additional information refer to FM 3-19, NBC Reconnaissance.

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Appendix J SECTION C. WITNESS INTERVIEWS 5. General
Interviewing an alleged victim or witness is the most critical phase of an investigation. Generally, if the mission requires interviews with alleged victims or interrogation of threat forces, then trained interrogation teams should accompany the SOF element. Although sample collection is important in defining allegations of agent use, the interview process remains the most important phase of an investigation. Only through it can background information, attack data, and agent dissemination be discerned about an alleged attack. Each collector must constantly be aware of how he or she may unconsciously influence a witness’ testimony. Vocal tones, facial expressions, body language, and the manner in which a collector poses questions can affect testimony. Therefore, SOF elements must constantly monitor themselves, interpreters, and the interviewee. The types of questions used are monitored to ensure that they do not lead the witness toward a foregone conclusion. The following material covers, in detail, the rationale and techniques used for successful interviews. It is to be used as a guideline. a. Elements of Proper Interviewing • Each interview should be conducted in a way that is as psychologically comfortable for the witness as possible. Collectors using an interpreter should position themselves so that they can monitor the witness and the interpreter. By doing this, the collector maintains control of the interviewer’s direction and speed. A tape recorder may preserve actual conversation that could be reviewed later. • A key element when interviewing more than one person in a group of people is to ensure that each person is questioned alone. This prevents any cross-pollination of ideas. • Questions should not lead to a yes or no type answer. If the witness does not understand the question, he or she may respond with yes to avoid displeasing the collector. This could result in a rapid but inaccurate interview. • Do not become emotionally involved with the state of affairs or surroundings of a witness during an interview. These actions may mislead the collector and skew the results. The collector must remain hardened to the given task. • Be aware that disinformation and propaganda may be presented. Testimony should describe scientific reality and not a social or political “truth.” • Understand that many people have neither the education nor the means to establish the scientific causality of an event. Because of this, the witnesses may identify a wrong factor as the cause of the event. While accounts are totally sincere, they also may be inaccurate. • Do not assume anything about information received surrounding an investigation. Misinformation operations of varying intensity and sophistication can come from any group of people. Political webs are complex and collectors must not allow themselves to be manipulated. b. Background Information • The interviewer uses information about a witness’ social and environmental background to help establish his credibility and relationship to an alleged attack. It also helps calm a witness and sets the tone of the interview. • The most important part of the background is establishing the correct names and all aliases of the witness. This is critical. In multicultural societies individuals often use different names that correspond to each society in which they exist. Without all names, recontacting a witness may be impossible. Because of the confusion that surrounds combat areas, a photograph of the witness can often aid in recontacting the witness. • Establish the witness’ military training and service. This often helps in detecting a witness’ possible political motives. Understanding a witness’ degree of training also helps in building credibility.

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c. Attack Data and Agent Characteristics • The description of how an alleged NBC attack occurred is critical in determining whether or not an attack occurred. A collector’s questioning is most difficult during this part of an interview. A collector should ensure that the witness is not led toward any conclusion. Often, the best way to proceed is by asking questions such as “What happened next?” or “What was it like?” This way, the witness can describe events in his words without being influenced by the collector. • Always ask questions that require the witness to describe or explain a situation. During questioning, the collector should not assume that any specific event occurred. For example, instead of asking “What color was the agent?” the collector should instead ask, “Was there a color associated with the event?” • If the event involved a weapon, the collector should ensure that his questioning derives information on how the weapon functioned. Information that shows the witness’ awareness of a difference between high explosive and toxic agent weapon functioning is also important. For additional “Sampling” considerations refer to FM 31-20-5, Special Reconnaissance, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures; FM 3-18, Special NBC Reconnaissance (LB Team); and FM 3-19, NBC Reconnaissance.

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Appendix J

Intentionally Blank

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APPENDIX K
DECONTAMINATION OPERATIONS 1. General
A SOF element uses decontamination procedures modified to fit the peculiar situation of the element. SOF elements may be in denied or hostile territory and therefore, require a high degree of stealth in all phases of a mission. The modified decontamination procedures described herein do not compromise the critical survival principles of stealth, contamination avoidance, or preventing the spread of contamination throughout the battlefield. These procedures may be modified to accommodate the addition of site entry and security personnel who might be added to the mission profile. Figures K-1, 2, 3, & 4 depict considerations for the conduct of decontamination operations.

PRINCIPLES FOR PLANNING DECONTAMINATION OPERATIONS
1. Decon as soon as possible 2. Decon only what is necessary 3. Decon as far forward as possible 4. Decon by priority
Figure K-1. Principles for Planning Decontamination Operations

K-1

Appendix K

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR COORDINATING DECONTAMINATION OPERATIONS
Type of decontamination to be performed Type of agent the unit is contaminated with Prime movers and trailers needing decontamination Largest vehicle to decontaminate Dirty entry/clean exit Enough room to conduct decontamination Wind direction Augmentees from contaminated unit Logistics, security, fire support availability Weather and terrain effects Current combat situation Direction of enemy forces Frequencies, call signs, brevity codes Action on enemy contact in the decontamination site Supported unit tactical operation center/command post grid Challenge and password Fuel resupply (diesel/gas) Water resupply Maintenance support CASEVAC Link-up point and direction of movement Near/far recognition Designate supply/access routes Designate fuel/water pre-stock points Communications positions Disposition of contaminated clothing and equipment Collateral damage of DECON operation (e.g. water supply, local populace, other troops in area)
Figure K-2. Planning Considerations for Coordinating Decontamination Operations

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Decontamination Operations

PLANNING DECONTAMINATION OPERATIONS

Actions on the DECON site

DECON SITE

Security Final PCI Rehearsals

ORP
TLPs PCIS Rehearsal WARNORD OPORD

Alternate Route

SECURITY HALT

AA
CONCEPT OF DECONTAMINATION OPERATION
Unit leader conducts Troop Leading Procedures (TLP) in assembly area (AA) Decon unit moves on primary route to a security halt Unit leader conducts reconnaissance of ORP Decon unit occupies ORP, maintains security, conducts final pre-combat inspections (PCIs), and rehearsals Unit leader conducts recon of DECON site for security, contamination, and site layout Unit leader orders decon unit to move to the DECON site and conduct actions on the DECON site Decon unit moves out on an alternate route and returns to AA after actions on the DECON site are complete
Figure K-3. Planning Decontamination Operations

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Appendix K

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR DECONTAMINATION SITE RECONNAISSANCE
Look for good overhead cover, drainage, access, water source, size Mark detailed equipment decontamination (DED), detailed troop decontamination (DTD), and link-up point Identify routes, holding areas, water source and resupply, fire and logistic support Set security and medical plan Check prevailing and current winds Draw a sketch of the site Note any special considerations
Figure K-4. Considerations for Planning Decontamination Site Reconnaissance

2. Immediate Decontamination
The purpose of immediate chemical or biological decontamination is to allow a force to sustain its mission and improve survivability of personnel while in a contaminated area. Individual actions as shown in Figure K-5 include; Skin Decon, Personal Wipedown, and Operator’s Spraydown. Immediate decon techniques are initiated individually, without command, once aware of contamination on bare skin. Skin Decon is started within one minute of being contaminated and Operator’s Spraydown is most effective when done within 15 minutes after Personal Wipedown. Radiological contamination hazards have different affects but the same decontamination principles. Remove radiological contamination from equipment and personnel by brushing and/or using soap and water.

IMMEDIATE DECONTAMINATION
SKIN DECON

PERSONAL WIPEDOWN

OPERATOR SPRAYDOWN

Figure K-5. Immediate Decontamination Actions

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a. Commander’s Responsibilities

Commander’s Inherent Responsibilities Checklist
! ! !

Ensure all personnel are trained on procedures to conduct immediate decon. Ensure personnel are proficient on the use of chemical defense equipment (CDE). Ensure appropriate security and force protection measures are taken during skin decon procedures executed away from base.

b. Individual Responsibilities

Individual Decon Responsibilities Checklist
!

!

!

Skin Decontamination ! Start self-decontamination within one minute of becoming contaminated. Personal Wipedown ! Every soldier wipes down his mask, hood, gloves, and other essential gear. ! Do not attempt to remove chemical contamination from your protective overgarment, unless the agent is thickened and globbed on the overgarment. ! Brush off radiological contamination from your overgarment. Operator’s Spraydown ! After decontaminating yourself and your personal equipment, you may need to decon other mission essential portions of your equipment before continuing your mission. ! To ensure you do not pick up contamination from these items, decontaminate those surfaces you or your soldiers must touch while operating the equipment.

3. Operational Decontamination
Operational decon generally follows immediate personnel skills decon. The objective is to reduce the level of contamination to regenerate needed combat power. Operational decon will further reduce the risk of contamination transfer, the spread of contamination, and speed the weathering process by removing much of the gross contamination. It can include IPE Exchange and Vehicle Washdown as depicted in Figure K-6. Both operations are conducted with or without support of an external chemical unit. Operational Decontamination is normally conducted within one to six hours following an attack.

UNSUPPORTED ONE-LANE WASHDOWN
WIND

STEP 1 BUTTON UP VEHICLE AND EQUIPMENT

STEP 1 WASHDOWN VEHICLE AND EQUIPMENT STEP 3 ASSEMBLY AREA IPE EXCHANGE

Figure K-6. Operational Decontamination Concept of Operation (with vehicles)

K-5

Appendix K
a. Operational Decontamination Considerations

SOF DECON Element Actions at the DECON Site Checklist
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

!

Element leader conducts leaders recon with one person. Do not leave anything at ORP. SOF decon element occupies site and unloads decontamination apparatus (M17LDS). Washdown team sets up decontamination apparatus (M17LDS). IPE exchange team sets up IPE exchange area and begins to dig sump. Maintain security at all times. When decontamination apparatus is set-up, washdown team begins second sump at IPE exchange area. Maintain 50% security at all times while digging. Element leader mans contact point, conducts near/far recognition. Gives arm signal to go to MOPP 4 upon arrival of contaminated unit. Element leader controls all vehicle movement. Drivers maintain visual contact with element leader. Assistant leader runs IPE exchange. Element leader conducts IPE exchange. SOF decon element personnel spray vehicles for two-three min. Driver moves vehicle, then IPE exchange. Close site: - Detection team checks for contamination - Decon team spot decontaminates contamination - Pack team loads equipment, avoiding contamination, buries refuse - Marking team marks contaminated areas - SOF decon element leader sends NBC 5 higher Return to ORP.

Critical Tasks Checklist
! ! ! ! ! !

Set-up site within 30 min of arrival. Maintain security until arrival of contaminated unit. IPE exchange. Vehicle washdown. Check contamination. Close and mark site.

b. IPE Exchange/Vehicle Washdown

Commander’s Responsibilities Checklist
! ! !

Ensure all personnel are trained on procedures to conduct IPE exchange. Ensure personnel are proficient on the use of chemical defense equipment (CDE). Ensure appropriate security and force protection measures are taken for decontamination/IPE exchange executed away from base.

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Equipment/Logistical Requirements Checklist
! ! ! ! ! !

Decontamination apparatus (M17 LDS and 65 GPM pump). Adequate fuel for water heaters and pump units. Adequate water supply (approximately 100 to 150 gallons per wash point per vehicle). Liquid detergent. Engineer tape (one roll). Replacement IPE.

Site Operation Checklist
! ! !

Both the vehicle washdown and IPE exchange operations should operate concurrently. Ensure decontamination apparatuses are positioned properly and ready to dispense hot, soapy water. Ensure that the contaminated unit operates the IPE exchange.

Site Closure Checklist
! !

Decon NCOIC ensures proper disposal of contaminated IPE. Decon NCOIC has his team properly mark the decon site and send NBC 5 report forward.

4. Thorough Decontamination
The purpose of thorough decon is to reduce contamination to a negligible level to allow contaminated units to reduce their protective posture from MOPP level 4 to MOPP level 0. As depicted in Figures K-7 and K-8, thorough decontamination includes detailed equipment decontamination (DED) and detailed troop decontamination (DTD). Thorough decontamination requires the support of a chemical unit and should be completed as soon as tactically feasible after contamination.

K-7

K-8
Link-up NonContaminated Vehicle Route Recycle Route

Appendix K

THOROUGH DECONTAMINATION
Detailed Equipment Decontamination
Pre-Decon Staging Area Station 1 Prim Wash Station 2 Apply Decon Solution Drivers Station 3 Wait Interior Decon Station 4 Rinse Hotline Station 5 Check CAM Op To Tactical Assembly Area

STATION

Personnel 1 Operator 2 sprayers 4 scrubbers

Equipment 2 M17LDS (1 back-up) 1 1,500gal tank 4 Long-handle brushes 7 TAP approns Liquid detergent

wind TCs and

1 2 3

1 Operator 8 appliers 1 Operator 2 decon asst

8 M13 DAPs w/ DS2 9 TAP approns 3 TAP approns 2 30gal containers 10 M8 books 30 sponges 50 trashbages 1 paper, pen, st.watch (2 AN/VDR2)

D T D

4 5 DTD

1 Operator 2 sprayers 1 Operator

2 M17LDS (1 back-up) 1 1,500gal tank 3 TAP approns 1 CAM (AN/VDR2) 10 M256 kits 20 M8 books

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Clean Drivers

1 Element Leader

2 M22 ACADAs See DTD Logistics

Figure K-7. Thorough Decontamination—Detailed Equipment Decontamination

Decontamination Operations

THOROUGH DECONTAMINATION
DETAILED TROOP DECONTAMINATION
Station 1 Equipment Decon

(1)

Equip Check

(1)

Station 2 Hood/Boot Decon Station 3 BDO Removal Station 4 Glove/Boot Removal Station 5 (2*) Monitor 1st Aid Station 6 Mask Removal (2)

(1)
Path ment Equip

(1) (1)
Liquid Control Station 7 (3) Mask Decon

(1)
Path ment Equip

DTD LOGISTICS St1- 3x 30gal, CAM, 10xM256, tarp, 6 long- hand brush, 100 trash bags, 5xM8 books, 50xM295 St2- STB, cutting tool, 50xM295 St3- 2x30gal, 100 trash bags, 50xM295 St4- 2x30gal, 50 trash bags, cutting tool St5- CAM, CLS Bag St6- M22 ACADA St7- 4x3gal, tarp, 2xsponge, case paper towels, im hea t St8- tarp, mask PLL, 1 roll engr tape (for whole site

SH so H H C ap 20 20
Vapor Control Station 8 Reissue

M22

Figure K-8. Thorough Decontamination—Detailed Troop Decontamination

a. Thorough DECON Specific Planning Considerations

Thorough Decon Considerations Checklist
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Leaders reconnaissance of the DECON Site. Equipment stored at the ORP. Security of the ORP. Link-up procedures with contaminated unit (frequencies, call signs, recognition signals, etc.). Briefing of key personnel from the contaminated element. Segregation of contaminated/non-contaminated vehicles. Security of DECON site (contaminated unit responsibility). Traffic control at DECON site. Sustainment of DECON site (water, decontaminants, rotation of personnel). Augmentation of DECON site (18 for DED, 13 for DTD). Medical requirements.

K-9

Appendix K
b. Thorough Decontamination Close-out Procedures

Close –Out Procedures Checklist
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Equipment stored at the ORP. SOF decon element leader designates one or more individuals to check for and decontaminate along the DED line beginning at station 1 and moving in order to station 5. SOF decon element leader designates four or more individuals to load equipment and bury refuse, avoiding contaminated areas. SOF decon element leader designates one or more individuals to mark contaminated areas. All decon element personnel process through the DTD when above steps are completed. Utilize same process to close the DED as used with DTD. SOF decon element leader sends NBC 5 to higher headquarters.

5. SOF Element Decontamination
A SOF element entering a contaminated environment to conduct a mission or becoming contaminated while operational has three options for decontamination as depicted in Figure K-9. Commanders must evaluate the threat, tactical situation, and decontamination system availability when deciding how to decontaminate.

SOF ELEMENT DECONTAMINATION OPTIONS
Unsupported SOF Element Decontamination Expedient Personnel Decontamination System (EPDS) Dirty Exfiltration Decontamination
Figure K-9. SOF Element Decontamination Options

a. Unsupported SOF Element Decontamination. When conducting unsupported SOF element decon the initial action to be taken is to locate and secure an upwind decontamination site (also serves as an objective rally point (ORP)). The same personnel tasked to set up the ORP secure the site. The remaining members of the element move to the contaminated area to conduct the mission. The personnel at the decontamination site go to MOPP 4 as the operational element returns from the contaminated area. The ORP security personnel prepare to decon the returning element. The element members are checked for contamination at a liquid/vapor contamination control line or hot line with available detection equipment. If decontamination is necessary, the following operational element decontamination procedures should be applied.

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USSOCOM Pub 3-11

Decontamination Operations
Unsupported SOF Element Decontamination Steps • Step 1. While the operational element moves to the objective, the remaining element members at the ORP set up a modified hasty decontamination site that includes a hot line and a sump for disposal of contaminated equipment and clothing. As the element members return from their mission, one member in the ORP acts as station operator/monitor while the other members provide security for the ORP/decon site. • Step 2. The operational element halts at the hot line. • Step 3. If a sample or equipment has been recovered it is checked for contamination and decontaminated if necessary. • Step 4. Samples or recovered equipment are then placed into a Mylar bag (or acceptable substitute) held by the clean ORP member. Bag is sealed and placed on the clean side of the hot line. • Step 5. SOF personnel and their personal equipment are now checked with the appropriate detectors. Equipment is either disposed of in the sump or decontaminated and checked again before declaring it clean. • Step 6. After Step 5 is completed on the second soldier, using the buddy system, decontaminate the buddy’s protective mask hood using personnel and equipment decontamination kits, then roll protective mask hood. The risk during this step is the transfer of contamination to the neck and the accidental breaking of the mask seal during rolling. • Step 7. The first and second personnel use the buddy system to remove the first soldier’s chemical protective overgarment/ battledress overgarment (CPOG/BDO) and discards it into the sump. Use of a knife, surgical scissor, or other cutting tool is appropriate during this step; however, the instrument used must be decontaminated after each cut. The first person moves to the next station 10 – 15 meters away. • Step 8. At the second station the first person removes overboots and gloves. A contamination control line (CCL) is established and clearly marked. It is on the upwind side and delineates the dirty side from the clean side. Standing on the dirty side, individuals will remove one boot, leaving it on the dirty side, and stepping, with the same foot over, the CCL to the clean side. Likewise the individual will perform the same procedure with the other boot. Once completely standing on the clean side, individuals will remove their gloves ensuring they fall on the dirty side of the CCL. The risk during this procedure is the transfer of contamination across the CCL and the potential of personnel falling during boot removal. • Step 9. The second person moves to the second station and removes his boots and gloves. • Step 10. Each person’s protective mask is rechecked for contamination, decontaminated if necessary. Then each person moves upwind and removes his mask after the air is checked for contamination. If a replacement mask is available, the mask will also be discarded. • Step 11. The next personnel continue in sequence from the beginning. • Step 12. Continue in sequence. • Step 13. When all personnel have been cleared, the station monitor polices all contaminated clothing left in the dirty area, places them in the sump, closes the sump, decontaminates gloves, and removes protective clothing. • Step 14. Record/report the grid coordinates of the decon site and continue the mission.

K-11

Appendix K
b. Expedient Personnel Decontamination System (EPDS). EPDS is designed to address SOF equipment shortfalls in personnel decontamination procedures and equipment. The system is a one-man portable, lightweight system that does not displace an undue amount on an individual’s combat load. The EPDS is a validated system that provides rapid effective decontamination procedures that are easily integrated into existing SO tactics. This system weighs less than 20 lbs., can be set up within 10 minutes, and can decontaminate up to 20 personnel at a rate of less than five minutes per individual.

Expedient Personnel Decontamination System Tactical Planning Guidelines
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Decontamination of the force will occur at the closest permissive site to the target permitted by the tactical situation. In some missions, such as maritime interdiction operations (MIO), decontamination will likely occur directly on the objective after it is secure. Timely and effective decontamination is critical to prevent NBC casualties. SOF contamination challenges may be considerably higher than the standard 10/m2 that JSLIST Approved Material (JAM) is designed to protect against. Chemical Warfare (CW) break-through times on SOF personnel protective equipment (PPE) dictates the need to conduct decontamination at the soonest opportunity consistent with the tactical situation. CW break-through times are significantly reduced in the case of salt water exposed PPE, further heightening the importance of rapid decontamination. The nature of SOF operations in the NBC environment dictates the use of a supporting force to conduct decontamination is often tactically infeasible. The SOF decontamination capability must reside completely within the force and be effective post mission for both the healthy personnel and casualties. Contamination control is paramount. The reduction or elimination of the spreading of liquid or solid contamination off target and back to friendly forces, mission critical mobility platforms, or forward staging bases is critical. The procedure and equipment should not produce undue logistical burdens in terms of training, acquisition, or maintenance.

• The following is a generic sequence of events for a mission requiring EPDS in a potentially contaminated area. Figure K-10 depicts a basic layout for an EPDS decontamination site.

Generic EPDS Mission Sequence
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Determine presence of contamination or possibility of contamination. Establish contamination control area (CCA). Ensure all personnel that are contaminated remain in that area. Call for EPDS. Designate operating and security personnel for EPDS. Establish Hot Line (HL), Mark HL, and Contamination Control Line (CCL). Set up DECON line considering environmental factors; wind rain, poor ventilation. Breakout equipment and set up according to space availability. Upon completion of set up direct contaminated personnel to begin equipment drop. (All personnel working EPDS should DECON boots and gloves first.) Place all sensitive equipment that requires DECON into equipment bags. WORK IN PAIRS WHEN POSSIBLE. Establish Litter DECON line if indicated. Include Emergency Medical Treatment (EMT) station in “Hot Zone.” Establish the Triage Area as the Casualty Control Point (CCP) and locate it on the clean side of the CCL. Begin DECON process.

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USSOCOM Pub 3-11

Decontamination Operations

EXPEDIENT PERSONNEL DECONTAMINATION SYSTEM (EPDS)
Wind Direction Check out with doctor EMT Area

SDS

SDS

SDS
CCP Triage Area

Med Kits Remove Gross Contamination Drop Sensitive Equipment Here Shuffle Pit

SDS MATT

SDS
Trash Trash Trash

Puff Pad for DECON of Hands

Co nta mi na tio nC on tro

Drop Non-sensitive Equipment Here

Deflation Pump Hot Line

lL ine

Contamination Control Area

Figure K-10. Expedient Personnel Decontamination System (EPDS)

• The EPDS Decontamination Process. The following procedures are specific to the EPDS.

One Piece Cut Out
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Direct breakout of Mk 1 medical kits. Take out M291s and M295s. Place kits in a pile at the “Hot Line.” Decon each other’s hoods with the M295. If time permits, decon as much area as possible to reduce any gross contamination and off gassing. Direct into first shuffle pit. Decon feet (shuffle feet in pit). Direct to the next shuffle pit, cutters begin cut out procedures. Cut both straps off hood (required), loosen neck cord. Contaminated person bends forward at the waist. Cutter - roll hood up from the “Rear Bottom” as far as possible, gather bottom into neck cord. Cut tails of cord if needed. (Cutter decon hands) Cut wrist, waist, and ankle closures as appropriate for the ensemble worn. (Cutter decon hands) Release/cut boot closures. (Cutter decon hands) Contaminated person steps out of boots. (Cutter decon hands) Unzip zipper across back (if FREIS). (Cutter decon hands) Start at the lower side of zipper center (if dry suit cut from center rear neckline) down one leg as far as possible. (Cutter decon hands)

K-13

Appendix K
One Piece Cut Out (cont'd)
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Cut down other leg from area of buttocks down as far as possible. (Cutter decon hands) Cut up from top edge of zipper through neck dam (If FREIS). (Cutter decon hands) Remove suit forward, stripping down, have contaminated person step, put one foot at a time. Gloves should be removed with garment, if not strip gloves prior to chemical protective undergarment (CPU) removal. (Cutter decon hands)

CPU REMOVAL ! Start at top rear center, cut down middle of back. (Cutter decon hands) ! Contaminated person extends arms forward/down, cutter pull forward and down. (Folding it inside out as best as possible to contain external contamination.) (Cutter decon hands) ! Cut down one side of CPU trouser leg, have contaminated person step out of CPU trouser. (Cutter decon hands) ! Strip off one Gore-Tex sock, then second, then one CPU sock, and then the second, having the contaminated person step onto safety pad. (Cutter decon hands) ! Contaminated person proceeds to mask drop area, decon hands, use breath hold technique with assisted mask removal from decon line. ! Move to redress area/redress…move to exfil area. ! Monitor and administer buddy aid if necessary. Personnel developing symptoms of exposure should be taken to the triage area for treatment.

Two Piece Cut Out
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Direct breakout of Mk 1 medical kits. Take out M291s and M295s. Place kits in a pile at the “Hot Line.” Decon each other’s hoods with the M295. If time permits, decon as much area as possible to reduce any gross contamination and off gassing. Direct into first shuffle pit. Decon feet (shuffle feet in pit). Direct to the next shuffle pit, cutters begin cut out procedures. Cut both straps off hood (required), loosen neck cord. (Cutter decon hands) Contaminated person bends forward at the waist. Cutter - roll hood up from the “Rear Bottom” as far as possible, gather bottom into neck cord. Cut tails of cord if needed. (Cutter decon hands) Cut wrist, waist, and ankle closures as appropriate for the ensemble worn. (Cutter decon hands) Start at the top rear center and cut down the back. (Cutter decon hands) Contaminated person extend arm forward/down, cutter pull top forward and down. (Folding in on itself as best as possible to contain or isolate.) Gloves should come off with the top. (If not, remove gloves.) (Cutter decon hands) Cut down each side of legs (Cutter decon hands), grasp rear center of trouser, cut straps (above X if indicated), and allow to fall having contaminated person step forward and away. (Fold trouser in on itself and contain as best as possible, contain in bag or isolate.) (Cutter decon hands) Cut boot closures, cutter secure boot and have contaminated person step forward out of boots. (Cutter decon hands)

CPU REMOVAL ! Start at top rear center, cut down middle of back. (Cutter decon hands) ! Contaminated person extends arms forward/down, cutter pull forward and down. (Folding it inside out as best as possible to contain external contamination.) (Cutter decon hands) ! Cut down one side of CPU trouser leg, have contaminated person step out of CPU trouser. (Cutter decon hands) ! Strip off one Gore-Tex sock, then second, then one CPU sock, and then the second, having the contaminated person step onto safety pad. (Cutter decon hands) ! Contaminated personnel proceed to mask drop area, decon hands, use breath hold technique with assisted mask removal from decon line. ! Move to redress area/redress…move to exfil area. ! Monitor and administer buddy aid if necessary. Personnel developing symptoms of exposure should be taken to the triage area for treatment.

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USSOCOM Pub 3-11

Decontamination Operations
• Basic Operating Principles of Litter Decontamination. •• Management of life saving “ABCs” (check airway, check for breathing, and check for circulation) always comes first. •• Spot decon and cut away of protective garment or mask removal to facilitate care of ABCs. •• Patient triage is an important and dynamic part of litter decon, if a casualty has a compromised airway, is not breathing, or has uncontrolled bleeding, they should not be in the litter decon area. •• Current decon media is .5% hypochlorite solution, M-291, M-295, SDS. •• Appropriate litter is the “Raven” decon litter. •• Litter decon will be a “cut out” procedure similar to the “onion peel” procedure. •• The exact cut template will be determined by the ensemble worn (currently JSLIST VII, FRIES, DUI). •• To control the spread of contamination, every opportunity to decon the hand of the cutter must be used. Decon of hands and cutting tool must be accomplished prior to each cut. •• Decon of the patients boots and gloves should be the first step for successful decon. • The following procedures are specific to the EPDS - Litter Casualty. •• Set up parallel to standard EPDS line. •• All considerations to wind, environmental factors and casualty flow are unchanged. •• Casualty should be brought from the EMT station to litter decon on a Raven stretcher. •• ALTHOUGH NOT STATED AFTER EACH STEP, CUTTER SHOULD DECON HANDS AND TOOLS BETWEEN EVERY STEP OR TOUCH! Additional information for contaminated patient handling is found in Appendix L, “NBC Casualty Processing and Handling Techniques.” Information on how to request a video of the EPDS is found in Appendix R, "References."

K-15

Appendix K

Initial Step Decon any gross contaminated areas, decon exterior of mask and hood. Decon patients gloves. Decon patients boots. Liberal use of SDS and D-295 on the members. PPE prior to cut out is encouraged and will reduce the potential spread of contamination. Mask Hood Cut Out Cut arm Straps. Cut center through elastic. Roll hood back. Cut lines. ------------Fold lines. Remove Boots/Gloves & Wound Management Cut or unlace boots, remove boots. Do not remove sock. Remove gloves from fingers. Dressings should be removed and wounds irrigated as needed after removal of PPE. Clean dressings should be reapplied by non-contaminated personnel. FRIES or DRY (one piece cut out) Cut from neck line down each arm. Cut from neck line down one leg. Cut from crotch down other leg. Fold down upper chest. Roll from center out. Roll sleeves out. Cut Roll Fold Undergarment Removal (BDU/CPU/OTHER) Cut procedure is basically the same as two piece protective over garment. Cut away top. Cut away trousers. Remove Gore-Tex sock if worn, remove CPU sock. When casualty is basically nude, skin may be decontaminated using .5% hypochlorite or M-291. Cutter should continue to decon own hands and cutting instrument prior to each cut. Casualty Moves Across CCL Two man cutter team repeats self decon. Using three man lift picks up casualty and carries over CCL through dry shuffle pit and places on clean Raven litter. Casualty may be placed into Chemical Protective Patient Wrap for transport. Casualty Care Past the CCL The patient should be managed at the CCP for injuries and any symptoms from contamination or other injuries.

One Piece Cut Out Procedure Checklist

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Decontamination Operations

Two Piece Cut Out Procedure Checklist
Initial Step Decon any gross contaminated areas, decon exterior of mask and hood. Decon patient's gloves. Decon patient's boots. Liberal use of SDS and D-295 on the members PPE prior to cut out is encouraged and will reduce the potential spread of contamination. Mask Hood Cut Out Cut arm Straps. Cut center through elastic. Roll hood back. Cut lines. ------------Fold Lines. Top Cut (Two Piece) Cut from neckline down each arm. Unzip, fold down upper chest. Roll from center out. Roll sleeves out. Trouser Cut (Two Piece) Cut shoulder straps away. Cut from top center of bib down leg. Cut from crotch apex down leg. Roll out each side. Boot and Glove Removal Cut closures of overboots, slide over boot off. Remove over sock (Gore-Tex), remove CPU sock. Roll cuff of glove, pull off from fingers. Undergarment Removal (BDU/CPU/OTHER) Cut procedure is basically the same as protective over garment. Cut away top. Cut away trousers. Cut boot laces, slip off boots. When casualty is basically nude skin may be decontaminated using, 5% hypochlorite. Cutter should continue to decon his hands and cutting instrument prior to each cut. Casualty Moves Across CCL Two man cutter team repeats self decon. Using three man lift picks up casualty and carries over CCL through dry shuffle pit and places on clean Raven litter. Casualty may be placed into Chemical Protective Patient Wrap for transport. Casualty Care Past the CCL The patient should be managed at the CCP for injuries and any symptoms from contamination.

K-17

Appendix K
EPDS Key Decontamination Considerations Checklist
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Site Selection ! Security and good overhead concealment. ! Wind direction, environmental factors. Plan for litter casualties/ambulatory/non-injured contaminate. Management of ABCs always comes first. Take action to spot decon, cut away of PPE, and remove mask to support ABCs. Decon media for equipment and clothing is the sorbent decon system (SDS). Never remove any PPE or gear over the head. Appropriate litter is the “Raven.” Cutters should take every opportunity to decon hands. Always cut from top to bottom. Unmask station may require removal from immediate decon area due to off gassing of agent(s) from removed PPE. Contain removed PPE to reduce off gassing of agents in area of decon and move decon stations away from immediate area of off gassing hazard.

• Personnel Required at Site •• (1) Hot Line Director •• (2) Scrubber /Cutters •• (2+) Medical Personnel – driven by number of medical/chemical casualties.

• EPDS Equipment/Purchase/Order Data. See Figure K-11.

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USSOCOM Pub 3-11

Decontamination Operations

EPDS RUCKSACK

Components

Component Data
a. boundary bag x 3 ($31.00 each) Purchase Cascade Design 1-800-527-1527 (2 cut down and used for shuffle pit, 1 for container) b. baja bag x 5 ($9.40 each) Purchase Cascade Design c. large hook knife x 3 ($28.95 each) 51210-00-524-6925 d. scissors x 4 ($4.28 each) 6515-00-935-7138 e. blue chemlite x 1 ($6.45) 6260-01-178-5560 red chemlite x 1 ($5.14) 6260-01-178-5559 green chemlite x 1 ($5.14) 6260-01-074-4229 f. Electric scissors x 2 ($549.00) Purchase Bosch cordless cutter MOD 1925A, South Star Supply Co. 1-800-288-6739 g. 7 mil poly bag x 6 ($1.24) 9930-00-927-4569 h. SDS x 5 ($100.00) Purchase Guild Associates 614-798-8215 I. SDS Pad x 1 ($50.00) Part Number 864-100-0200 Purchase Guild Associates j. Calcium Hypoclorite 68% 6oz. x 2 ($1.44) 6810-00-255-0471 k. Head Lamps x 6 ($48.00) Open Purchase Water is carried in a 5 gallon collapsible bladder inside vector pack. If sea water is available, it may be used. Calcium Hypochlorite is carried for Bio agents. Red chemlites are used for marking Hot Line (HL). Green chemlites are used for Contamination Control Line (CCL) marking. Blue chemlites are used to mark the bottom of decon bags or shuffle pits. Additional water proof gas mask bags with equipment belts for carrying decon media and cutters (to avoid bending over). 7 mil poly bags for containment of removed PPE to reduce off gassing in the decon area. SDS 20 x 20 impregnated pads to step onto as a protective barrier after protective socks are removed.
Figure K-11. EPDS Rucksack and System Components

K-19

Appendix K
c. Dirty Exfiltration Decontamination. The purpose of dirty exfiltration is to remove a contaminated SOF element from its tactical environment so that decontamination can take place in a permissive environment. Dirty exfiltration decon activities include decontamination for personnel using either a DTD or EPDS, and may or may not include spot decontamination of the exfiltration platform. Dirty exfiltration decontamination should occur as soon as tactically feasible after contamination.

Decontamination of Exfiltration Platform Considerations
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Aircrews remain in place in aircraft. SOF decontamination element removes any additional protective lining/cover/equipment from exfil platform after contaminated SOF element has exited the platform. SOF decon element checks exfil platform for any residual contamination. SOF decon element decontaminates the exfil platform to the maximum extent possible with available equipment.

For additional decontamination details see FM 3-5, NBC Decontamination.

6. Basic Aircrew Decontamination Actions
The following list of decontamination actions identifies a standard set of instructions to doff aircrew equipment and clothing after actual or suspected NBC contamination. Figures K-12, 13 and 14 depict how decontamination stations can be systematically arranged to utilize equipment and allow aircrew redress.

STATION 1
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ATTENDANT: TRI Wipe (bleach, water and paper towel) crewmember above shoulders. CREWMEMBER: Stow personnel items. *DUST HANDS* ATTENDANT: Dust from knees to boots. ATTENDANT: Carefully dust blower and hang on rack. *DUST HANDS* ATTENDANT: Unsnap suspension assemblies on manifold from one side and reattach to other. Dust manifold/hang on rack. *DUST HANDS* ATTENDANT: Remove harness, vest, life preserver unit (LPU), exposure suit, etc. *DUST HANDS AFTER EACH ITEM* ATTENDANT: Undo flightsuit leg zipper and cut boot laces. *DUST HANDS* CREWMEMBER: Remove boot using the boot remover. DO NOT PLACE YOUR FOOT ON THE GROUND. ATTENDANT: Tube sock foot. Discard boot. Repeat step. *DUST HANDS AFTER EACH BOOT* CREWMEMBER: Loosen suit cuffs and reattach velcro. *DUST HANDS* CREWMEMBER/ATTENDANT: Remove and discard nomex gloves. *DUST HANDS* CREWMEMBER: Ensure next station is clear. Keep equipment away from body and proceed to next station. CREWMEMBER: Remove equipment from rack.

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USSOCOM Pub 3-11

Decontamination Operations
STATION 2
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ATTENDANT: Hang equipment on rack. Crewmember and attendant dust hands. Crewmember step into shuffle box and face rack. LHA ATTENDANT (liquid hazard area): Lower zipper on flightsuit. *DUST HANDS* CREWMEMBER: Face VHA (vapor hazard area). Assume race dive position. MAINTAIN EYE CONTACT WITH ATTENDANT LHA ATTENDANT Remove flightsuit to knees. Remove Butyl Gloves. Tube sock hands. DO NOT TOUCH CREWMEMBERS SKIN. *DUST HANDS* LHA ATTENDANT: Remove suit from legs. Ensure tube socks are retained on crewmember’s feet or replace them. Discard suit. *DUST HANDS* CREWMEMBER: Lift foot back for tube sock removal by LHA. Extend foot forward for tube sock replacement by VHA. Step out of the shuffle box. Repeat with other foot. Note: LHA remove shuffle box *ATTENDANTS DUST HANDS* LHA ATTENDANT: Tighten hood adjustment straps. *DUST HANDS* CREWMEMBER: Face LHA. LHA ATTENDANT: Release and stow chinstrap & communications connection. *DUST HANDS* LHA ATTENDANT: Remove tube socks from crewmember’s hands. *DUST HANDS* VHA ATTENDANT: Place new tube socks on crewmember’s hands. *DUST HANDS* CREWMEMBER: Grasp AERP mask with hand closest to rack. STATION 2A LHA ATTENDANT: Disconnect bayonets/snaps. *DUST HANDS* CREWMEMBER: Face decon rack & lean head toward LHA . LHA ATTENDANT: Remove helmet & stow. *DUST HANDS* LHA ATTENDANT: CAMS crewmember. VHA ATTENDANT: Brief crewmember on mask removal. (Crewmember turn 1/8 toward VHA) LHA ATTENDANT: Loosen hood adjustment straps. *DUST HANDS* LHA ATTENDANT: Prior to removing mask, take tube sock off hand that will remove mask and place hand on stomach. LHA ATTENDANT: Raise hood apron off shoulders. NOTE: Crewmember take several deep breaths, hold breath, close eyes tightly. CREWMEMBER: Place R/L hand under the neck dam and lift AERP (aircrew eye and respiratory protection) mask off head passing over shoulder to LHA ATTENDANT. DO NOT TOUCH OUTSIDE OF HOOD. Hands back. LHA ATTENDANT: Discard mask & tube socks. *DUST HANDS* CREWMEMBER: Hands forward. VHA ATTENDANT: Guide crewmember to the VHA.

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STATION 3 UNDRESS AREA CREWMEMBER: Remove any remaining clothing. CREWMEMBER: Redress and proceed to collection point and contact ground mission commander.

K-21

Appendix K
EXPEDIENT UNDRESS
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CREWMEMBER: Remove AERP and flight equipment as required. Redress. Proceed to collection point and contact ground mission commander.

STATION ONE (SIDE VIEW)
Dispenser Tri-wipe Tube socks SIGN Cleaning barrel Gunbox Tools Trash bin Walk cane Bungie Cords Foot Stool Ground light Boot remover Ammo boxes Stomp Grate Ground light Equipment clips

Figure K-12. Aircrew Decontamination Station #1

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USSOCOM Pub 3-11

Decontamination Operations

STATION TWO (SIDE VIEW)
Sign tied off to 550 cord Dispenser Dispenser

Tube socks

Sign

Sign

Tube socks

Tools Bleach bucket

Trash bin

Bungie Cords Ground light Walk cane

Shuffle box Ground light

Figure K-13. Aircrew Decontamination Station #2

K-23

Appendix K

STATION THREE TOXIC FREE AREA RACK
Weapons Clearing Fan Light Stand Redress Sign Redress Clothes Toxic Free Area Rope Trash Expedient Line Sign

Figure K-14. Aircrew Decontamination Station #3

For additional aircrew decontamination details refer to Air Force Manual 11-303, Aircrew Life Support (ALS) Combat Operations.

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USSOCOM Pub 3-11

APPENDIX L
NBC CASUALTY PROCESSING AND HANDLING TECHNIQUES 1. General
a. The priority to evacuate casualties and prevent loss of life and limb in an NBC environment requires commanders to consider to what extent they will commit evacuation assets to actually enter the contaminated area. If it is possible to keep evacuation assets free from contamination, every effort should be made to do so. b. On the modern battlefield there are three basic modes of evacuating casualties: personnel, ground vehicles, and aircraft. Using personnel to physically carry the casualties incurs a great deal of inherent stress. Cumbersome IPE, climate, increased workloads, and battle fatigue will greatly reduce the effectiveness of unit personnel. c. If evacuation personnel are to be sent into a radiologically contaminated area, operational exposure guidance (OEG) must be established. Radiation exposure records are maintained by unit chemical NCOs and made available to the commander and staff. d. Evacuation considerations should include: • Evacuation resources will become contaminated. Optimize the use of resources, medical or nonmedical, which are already contaminated before employing uncontaminated resources. • Once a vehicle has entered a contaminated area, it is highly unlikely that it will be able to be spared long enough to undergo a complete decon. This will depend upon the contaminant, the operations tempo, and the resources available to the evacuation unit. Normally, contaminated vehicles both air and ground are confined to dirty environments. • Use ground evacuation instead of air evacuation in a contaminated area. Vehicles are easier to decontaminate and can be replaced more easily. However, this does not preclude the use of aircraft in a contaminated environment or in the evacuation of contaminated patients. • The location of a contaminated area, forward line of own troops (FLOT), threat air defense systems, and patient’s medical condition will determine if and where air evacuation may be used in the evacuation process. One or more air evacuation resources may be restricted to contaminated areas. To the greatest extent possible, use ground vehicles to cross the line separating contaminated and clean areas. Ground ambulances can proceed to a medical treatment facility with a patient decon station and decontaminate and treat the patient. Patients are then transferred to a clean ground or air resource, if further evacuation is required. The routes used by ground vehicles to cross between contaminated and clean areas should be considered dirty routes and should not be crossed by clean vehicles. The effects of wind and time upon the contaminants must also be considered. • Always keep rotorwash of helicopters in mind when evacuating patients, especially in a contaminated environment. Intense winds will undoubtedly disturb the contaminants causing increased vapor hazards. • Ideally, aircraft must be allowed to land and reduce to flat pitch before patients are brought near. This allows some reduction in the effects of the downwash. Additionally, a helicopter should not land too close to a decon station (especially upwind) because any trace of contaminants in the rotorwash will compromise the decon procedure. • Operational decon of aircraft and ground vehicles should be accomplished to minimize crew exposure. Patient evacuation must continue, even under NBC conditions.

SECTION A. CASUALTY DECONTAMINATION CONSIDERATIONS 2. Casualty Decontamination
a. Casualty decon presents special problems for SOF service support personnel. In an NBC environment, contaminated wounded soldiers create increased hazards to rescuers and health service support personnel.

L-1

Appendix L
b. On the NBC battlefield, two classifications of casualties will be encountered—contaminated and uncontaminated. Those contaminated may suffer from the effects of an NBC agent, a conventional wound, or both. Some may suffer battle fatigue or heat casualties, induced by the stress of NBC conditions and extended time spent in MOPP 4. It is important to follow proper decon procedures to limit the spread of contamination to others and equipment. c. Casualty decon begins with the individual – self-care.

3. Patient Decontamination at a Medical Facility
a. Patient decontamination at a designated aid station. • When conditions prevent decon procedures forward, the casualty may have to be evacuated to an aid station before decon. Upon arrival at the aid station, patients are monitored with a CAM, or other detection equipment, or material to determine if they are contaminated. Contaminated patients arriving at the aid station must be decontaminated before admission into the clean treatment area. • Patient decon is the systematic removal of clothing and contaminants from patients who are unable to decon themselves. Patient decon is performed by a patient decon team consisting of eight nonmedical personnel from the supported unit to support the aid station. The patient decon team operates under the supervision of medical personnel to ensure that no further injury is caused to the patient by the decon process. b. Patient decontamination at a clearing station. A clearing station may receive patients from the aid station or directly from other areas which have not been decontaminated. The clearing station, as well as the aid station, must have a patient decon area. c. Patient decontamination at a hospital. • To the maximum extent possible, hospitals are located away from tactical or logistical targets. Patients evacuated from forward areas should have been decontaminated; however, patients may arrive from units located within the geographical area of the hospital that are contaminated and require decon. Patient decon at Army medical facilities can be performed by medical or trained non-medical personnel from units located in the geographical area/base cluster of the hospital. Patient decon at Air Force medical facilities is conducted by medical personnel (i.e. wartime medical decontamination team). • If the hospital does not have collective protective shelters (CPS) and becomes contaminated with a persistent agent, patients would be re-routed to other hospitals. If possible, all inpatients would be evacuated and the hospital decontaminated. • Upon completion of decon, the hospital will return to normal operations. Hospitals with CPS capabilities will decontaminate areas around the entry to these facilities, then continue receiving and caring for patients. Patient decon procedures used in forward medical facilities also apply to hospital operations. However, several patient decon stations can be operated at this site. All patients arriving at a hospital are monitored for contamination before being admitted into the clean areas of the hospital, if possible. Decon is performed, as required.

SECTION B. AGENT DECONTAMINATION PROCEDURES 4. Chemical Patient Decontamination Procedures
Before most patients receive medical treatment, they must be decontaminated. Standard procedures include: placing bandage scissors/cutting device used in this procedure in a container of Sorbent Decontamination System (SDS) and/or five percent chlorine solution between each use, decontaminating decon team member’s gloves and aprons, decontaminating the patient’s skin, bandages, mask, and splints, and using the detector paper (M8) or a CAM to determine the extent of contamination on each patient before beginning decon procedures. Patients’ wounds are then irrigated with sterile saline solution. (Validated at Dugway Proving Grounds)

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NBC Casualty Processing and Handling Techniques
NOTE: If possible, wear of a mask by the patient is always desirable. However, patients with compromised airways, damaged masks, or injuries to the head and/or face may not be capable of wearing a mask throughout the decontamination process. Medical personnel either conducting or supervising the patient decontamination process must decide, based on their judgement, to either remove or retain a mask in place. The Resuscitative Device, Individual Chemical (RDIC) is designed to ventilate a patient in a contaminated environment and may be used when required. For additional information on treatment procedures, refer to FM 3-5, NBC Decontamination; FM 8-9, NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC Defensive Operations; and FM 8-285, Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries. a. The litter patient (Raven NBC Litter) is decontaminated and the two-piece suit of the IPE is undressed as follows: • Step 1. Decontaminate any grossly contaminated areas. • Step 2. Decontaminate exterior of mask and hood. • Step 3. Decontaminate casualty’s gloves. • Step 4. Decontaminate casualty’s boots. • Step 5. Liberally decontaminate the front of the casualty’s IPE including the extremities, transfer the patient to a decon litter. NOTE: Before receiving another patient, decon team members drink approximately half a quart of water each. The amount consumed is increased or decreased according to the work level and the temperature. • Step 6. Logroll the casualty toward either side and liberally decontaminate his backside and the underlying litter. DO NOT remove splints. Splints are decontaminated by applying a 0.5 percent chlorine solution (include the padding and cravats). Splints are not removed until the patient has been evacuated to an appropriate echelon of care. This may include a corpslevel Combat Support Hospital or Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (CASH or MASH), Air Force Expeditionary Medical Support/Air Force Theater Hospital (EMEDS/AFTH) medical treatment facility, or Navy Fleet Hospital. The patient is checked with detector paper (M8) or a CAM for completeness of decon. Dispose of contaminated bandages and coverings by placing them in a contaminated waste bag. Seal the bag and place it in the contaminated waste dump. Warning - DO NOT use the M291 pads or wipes from the M258A1 kit around the wounds. NOTE: Other monitoring devices may be used when available. • Step 7. Logroll the casualty toward the opposite side and liberally decontaminate his backside and the underlying litter • Step 8. Roll casualty back to supine position and cut arm straps of mask hood. • Step 9. Cut hood and roll hood back. • Step 10. Cut, fold, and roll the upper half of the casualty’s IPE. •• Cut from the neckline down each arm. •• Fold down upper chest. •• Roll from center out. •• Roll sleeves out. • Step 11. Cut shoulder straps away from casualty’s trousers. • Step 12. Cut and roll casualty’s trousers.

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Appendix L
•• Cut from top center down leg. •• Cut from crotch apex down leg. •• Roll out to each side. • Step 13. Cut closures of over-boots and slide over-boots off. • Step 14. Remove Gore-Tex over-socks and chemical protective uniform (CPU socks). • Step 15. Roll cuffs of gloves and pull gloves off from fingers. • Step 16. Use same cutout procedures for undergarments as for IPE. • Step 17. Decontaminate skin with 0.5% hypochlorite solution as required. • Step 18. Irrigate wounds with sterile saline. • Step 19. Decon team performs self decon and then picks up casualty using three-man lift. • Step 20. Carry casualty through shuffle pit and place on clean Raven litter for turnover to clean disposition team. b. One-Piece Suit of the IPE is undressed as follows: • Step 1. Decontaminate casualty as described in two-piece procedure. • Step 2. Cut and roll hood as previously described. • Step 3. Cut, fold, and roll IPE. •• Cut from neckline down each arm. •• Cut from neckline down one leg. •• Cut from crotch down other leg. •• Fold down upper chest. •• Roll from center out. •• Roll sleeves out. • Step 4. Remove undergarments and perform remaining procedures as previously described. NOTE: Before decontaminating another patient, each decon team member drinks approximately half a quart of water. The exact amount of water consumed is increased or decreased according to the work level and temperature (See FM 3-4). c. The ambulatory chemical patient is decontaminated and undressed as follows: • Step 1. Remove load-carrying equipment. Remove load-carrying equipment (LCE) by unfastening/unbuttoning all connectors or tie straps; then place the equipment in a plastic bag. Place the plastic bag in the designated storage area for later decon. • Step 2. Decontaminate the patient’s mask and hood. Send patient to clothing removal station. After the patient has been triaged and treated (if necessary) by the senior medic in the patient decon station, he walks to the clothing removal station. Decontaminate and remove mask hood. Sponge down the front, sides, and top of the hood with a five percent chlorine

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NBC Casualty Processing and Handling Techniques
solution. Remove the hood by cutting or, with the quick-doff hood or other hoods, by loosening the hood from the mask attachment points. Before cutting the hood, dip the scissors in the five percent chlorine solution. Begin by cutting the neck cord, zipper cord, and the small string under the voicemitter. Next, release or cut the hood shoulder straps and unzip the hood zipper. Proceed by cutting the hood upward, close to the filter inlet cover and eyelens outserts, to the top of the eyelens outsert, across the forehead to the outer edge of the other eyelens outsert. Proceed downward toward the patient’s shoulder, staying close to the eyelens and filter inlet. Cut across the lower part of the voicemitter to the zipper. After dipping the scissors in the five percent chlorine solution again, cut the hood from the center of the forehead over the top of the head and fold the right and left sides of the hood away from the patient’s head, removing the hood. Decontaminate mask and patient’s face by using the M291/M258A1 kit or a 0.5 percent chlorine solution. NOTE: This solution is a 0.5 percent solution, considerably weaker than the five percent used for scissors. Wipe the external parts of the mask; cover both mask air inlets with gauze or your hands to keep the mask filters dry. Continue by wiping the exposed areas of the patient’s face, to include the neck and behind the ears. • Step 3. Remove field medical card (FMC). Cut the card tie wire, allowing the card to fall into a plastic bag. Seal the plastic bag and rinse it with the five percent chlorine solution. Place the plastic bag under the back of the protective mask head straps. • Step 4. Remove all gross contamination from the patients. Remove all visible contamination spots by using the M291/ M258A1 kit or a sponge dipped in a 0.5 percent chlorine solution. • Step 5. Remove overgarments. Remove overgarment jacket. Have the patient stand with his feet spread apart at shoulder width. Unsnap the jacket front flap and unzip the jacket. If the patient can extend his/her arms, make a fist and extend both arms backward at about a 30-degree angle. Move behind the patient, grasping the jacket collar at the sides of the neck; peel the jacket off the shoulders at a 30-degree angle down and away from the patient. Avoid any rapid or sharp jerks that spread contamination. Gently pull the inside sleeves over the patient’s wrists and hands. If the patient cannot extend his/her arms, cut the jacket to aid in its removal. Dip the scissors in the five percent chlorine solution between each cut. As with a litter patient, cut both sleeves from the inside, starting at the wrist, up to the armpit. Continue cutting across the shoulder to the collar. Cut around bandages or splints, leaving them in place. Next, peel the jacket back and downward to avoid spreading contamination. Ensure that the outside of the jacket does not touch the patient or any inner clothing. Remove the patient’s butyl rubber gloves by grasping the heel of the glove, peel the glove off with a smooth downward motion. Place the contaminated gloves in a plastic bag with the overgarment jacket. Do not allow the patient to touch his/ her trousers or other contaminated objects with exposed hands. Remove the patient’s overboots by cutting the laces with scissors dipped in the five percent chlorine solution. Fold the lacing eyelets flat on the ground. Step on the toe and heel eyelets to hold the overboot on the ground and have the patient step out of it. Repeat this procedure for the other overboot. If the green vinyl overboot (GVO) is worn, first try to remove the overboots without cutting; if necessary cut the overboot along the front. If the overboots are in good condition, they can be decontaminated and reissued. Remove overgarment trousers. Unfasten or cut all ties, buttons, or zippers before grasping the trousers at the waist and peeling them down over the patient’s combat boots. Again, the trousers are cut to aid in removal. If necessary cut both trouser legs starting at the ankle, keeping the cuts near the inside of the legs, along the inseam, to the crotch. Cut around all bandages, tourniquets, or splints. Continue to cut up both sides of the zipper to the waist and allow the narrow strip with the zipper to drop between the legs. Place the scissors in the decon solution. Peel or allow the trouser halves to drop to the ground. Have the patient step out of the trouser legs one at a time. Place the trousers in the marked and contaminated disposal bag. Have the patient remove cotton glove liners to reduce the possibility of spreading contamination. Have the patient grasp the heel of one glove liner with the other gloved hand, peeling the glove off. Hold the removed glove by the inside and grasp the heel of the other glove, peeling it off. Place both gloves in the contaminated waste bag. Place the patient’s personal effects in a clean bag and label with the patient’s identification. If they are not contaminated, return them. If personal effects are contaminated, place the bagged items in the contaminated storage area until they can be decontaminated, then return to patient. • Step 6. Check patient for contamination. After the patient’s overgarments have been removed, check BDUs by using detector paper (M8) or a CAM. Carefully survey all areas of the patient’s clothing, paying particular attention to discolored areas on the uniform, damp spots, tears, areas around the neck, wrist, ears, and dressings, splints, or tourniquets. Remove spots by using the 0.5 percent chlorine solution, using the M291/M258A1 kit or cutting away the contaminated area. Always dip the scissors in the five percent chlorine solution after each cut. Recheck the area with the detection equipment. • Step 7. Decontaminate the patient’s skin. Use the M291/M258A1 kit, or the 0.5 percent chlorine solution to spot decontaminate exposed neck and wrist areas, other areas where the protective overgarment was damaged, dressings, bandages, or splints. Have patient hold breath and close eyes. Have patient or assist patient in lifting mask at the chin. Wipe face with

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Appendix L
M291/M258A1 or the 0.5 percent chlorine solution. Wipe quickly from below the top of one ear, being careful to wipe all folds of the skin, top of the upper lip, chin, dimples, ear lobes, and nose. Continue up the other side of the face to the top of the other ear. Wipe the inside of the mask where it touches the face. Have the patient reseal and check mask. Caution - Keep the decon solution out of the patient’s eyes and mouth. • Step 8. Remove bandages and tourniquets. During the clothing removal, the clothing around bandages, tourniquets, and splints was cut and left in place. The aidman will replace the old tourniquet by placing a new one 1/2 to one inch above the old tourniquet. When the old tourniquet is removed, the skin is decontaminated with the M291/M258A1 kit or the 0.5 percent chlorine solution. Do not remove splints. Decontaminate them by thoroughly rinsing the splint, padding, and cravats with the 0.5 percent chlorine solution. The aidman gently cuts away bandages. The area around the wound is rinsed with the 0.5 percent chlorine solution, and the aidman irrigates the wound with the 0.5 percent chlorine solution. The aidman covers massive wounds with plastic secured with tape. Mark the wound as contaminated. The aidman also replaces bandages that are needed to control massive bleeding. Dispose of contaminated bandages and coverings by placing them in a plastic bag and sealing the bag with tape. Place the plastic bags in the contaminated waste dump. • Step 9. Proceed through the shuffle pit to the clean treatment area. Have the decontaminated patient proceed through the shuffle pit to the clean treatment area. Make sure that the patient’s boots are well decontaminated by stirring the contents of the shuffle pit as the patient crosses it. Patient’s combat boots and protective mask will be removed in the entrance of the CPS.

5. Biological Agent Patient Decontamination Procedures
The decon station as established for chemical agent patients can also be used for biologically contaminated patients. The eight-man patient decon team is required for biologically contaminated patient decon procedures. a. Decon a litter biological agent patient. • Remove the field medical card (FMC) by cutting the tie wire and allowing the FMC to drop into a plastic bag. Keep the FMC with the patient. • Patient decon team members first apply a liquid disinfectant, such as chlorine dioxide solution, to the patient’s clothing and the litter. NOTE: Disinfectant solution for use during patient decon procedures is prepared in accordance with the label instructions on the container. The solution strength for skin can also be used to irrigate the wound. • Patient decon team members remove the patient’s clothing as in decon of chemical agent patients. Do not remove bandages, tourniquets, and splints. Move patient to a clean litter as described for a chemical agent patient. Place patient’s personal effects in a clean plastic bag; label the bag. If uncontaminated, give to patient. If contaminated, place in contaminated storage, decontaminate when possible, and then return to patient. Place patient’s clothing in a plastic bag and dispose in a contaminated waste dump. • Bathe patient with soap and warm water, followed by reapplication of a liquid disinfectant. The medic places a new tourniquet 1/2 to one inch above the old tourniquet, then he removes the old one. The medic removes bandages and decontaminates the skin and wound with the disinfectant solution or the 0.5 percent chlorine solution; he replaces the bandage, if needed, to control bleeding. Splints are disinfected by soaking the splint, cravats, and straps with the disinfectant solution. NOTE: Use a 0.5 percent chlorine solution to decontaminate patients suspected of being contaminated with mycotoxins. • Two decon team members move patient to the hotline and transfer him/her to a clean litter as described for chemical agent patients. Keep the FMC in the plastic bag on the clean litter with the patient. Two medics from the clean side of the hotline move the patient from the hotline to the clean treatment/holding area. b. Decontaminate an ambulatory biological agent patient.

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• Remove the patient’s FMC by cutting the tie wire and allowing it to drop into a plastic bag. Keep the bagged FMC with the patient. • Apply a liquid disinfectant solution, such as chlorine solution, over the patient’s clothing. • Remove the patient’s clothing as described for a chemical agent patient. Do not remove bandages, tourniquets, or splints. Place patient’s clothing in a plastic bag and move the plastic bag to the contaminated waste dump. • Have the patient bathe with soap and warm water. If the patient is unable to bathe, a member of the decon team must bathe the patient. Reapply the disinfectant solution. A medic places a new tourniquet 1/2 to one inch above the old one and removes the old one. A medic removes bandages and decontaminates the wound and surrounding skin area with the disinfectant solution or the 0.5 percent chlorine solution. The medic replaces the bandage, if required, to control bleeding. Splints are decontaminated in place by applying the disinfectant solution or the 0.5 percent chlorine solution to the splint, cravats, and straps. NOTE: Use a 0.5 percent chlorine solution to decontaminate ambulatory patients suspected of being contaminated with mycotoxins. • Direct the patient to cross the hotline to the clean treatment area. Boots must be decontaminated at the hotline before entering the clean treatment area. • Now this patient becomes a litter patient and must be placed in a patient protective wrap before evacuation.

6. Nuclear Patient Decontamination Procedures
The practical decon of nuclear contaminated patients is easily accomplished without interfering with the required medical care. NOTE: Patients must be monitored by using a radiac meter before, during, and after each step of the decon procedure. a. Decontaminate a litter nuclear-contaminated patient. • Patient decon team members remove the patient’s outer clothing as described for chemical agent patients. Do not remove bandages, tourniquets, or splints. Move the patient to a clean litter. Place the patient’s contaminated clothing in a plastic bag and move the bagged clothing to the contaminated waste dump. • Wash exposed skin surfaces with soap and warm water. Wash the hair with soap and warm water, or clip the hair and wash the scalp with soap and warm water. • Move the patient to the hotline. Two medics from the clean side of the hotline move the patient into the clean treatment area. b. Decontaminate an ambulatory nuclear-contaminated patient. • Have the patient remove his outer clothing (or have a decon team member assist him). Place his contaminated clothing in a plastic bag and move the bagged clothing to the contaminated waste dump. • Wash exposed skin surfaces with soap and warm water. Wash hair with soap and water, or clip the hair and wash the scalp with soap and water. • Direct the patient to move to the hotline. Decontaminate boots before crossing into the clean treatment area. • Now the patient becomes a litter patient. Patients are protected by using a blanket or other protective material during evacuation. Aid station operations under NBC conditions is described in FM 8-10-7, Health Service Support in a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environment. Treatment of chemical agent casualties is described in FM 8-285, Treatment of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries; and FM 8-9, Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC Defense Operations.

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Appendix L

Intentionally Blank

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APPENDIX M
FORCE PROTECTION ASSESSMENT 1. General
Fundamentally, protecting the force consists of those actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against personnel, resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the unit’s ability to sustain operations in NBC environments. Force protection consists of the equipment and procedures necessary to enable personnel to survive and continue to operate in a contaminated environment. SOF unit commanders must ensure that units and personnel are ready to accomplish their missions in an NBC environment. To provide adequate protection a commander and staff must assess the following components of force protection.

SECTION A. PHYSICAL PROTECTION 2. Adequate Support Measures
a. Individual Protection. Individual protective equipment (IPE) consisting of: • Respiratory protection afforded by a mask and filter canister that provides protection against inhaling or ingesting: •• Alpha or beta particles. •• Biological and chemical agents. • Whole body protection from a coverall, boots, and gloves that provide: •• A removal layer to keep alpha or beta particles off the skin. •• Limited protection against biological spores. •• Protection against liquid, aerosol, or concentrated vapor chemical hazards. b. Collective Protection. Collective protection (COLPRO) is provided in three categories, fixed (integral to a structure), mobile (integral to a ship or vehicle), or transportable (able to be erected, torn down, and moved to a new location). COLPRO provides protection for groups, which permits relaxation of individual NBC protection c. Medical Countermeasures. Medical countermeasures provide prophylactic (before exposure) and therapeutic (post exposure) treatments to mitigate or counter the effects of NBC agents. • Prophylactic Treatments. The most common prophylactic treatments are anti-emetic drugs to counter radiation sickness; vaccines to counter biological agents and nerve agent pre-treatment to counter nerve agents. • Therapeutic Treatments. Therapeutic treatments range from self-administered nerve agent and anti-convulsant auto-injectors to antibiotics and antidotes administered by medical staffs. d. Hazard Management. For known hazards, measures must be taken to avoid the hazard, protect equipment, and remove (decon) the hazard.

SECTION B. OPERATIONAL PROTECTION 3. Adequate Information and Intelligence
a. Detect and Identify. To avoid exposure to NBC hazards, intelligence sources must be able to detect and identify a hazard in a timely manner.

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Appendix M
b. Warning and Reporting. Upon detection of an NBC hazard, necessary information must be collected, analyzed, and disseminated utilizing existing warning and reporting formats. See Appendix F, NBC Warning Message and Threat Condition System.

SECTION C. READINESS 4. Individual NBC Defense Readiness Considerations
Individuals must be able to:

Individual NBC Defense Readiness Checklist
! ! ! !

!

!

! ! ! ! ! !

!

! ! !

! !

!

!

Recognize attacks with NBC weapons and take protective action. Recognize NBC alarms and signals. Recognize the existence of biological, chemical, and radiological hazards and take protective action. Properly don, seat, clear, and check his/her protective mask within nine (9) seconds and complete the adjustment/attachment of the hood, if available, within six (6) seconds for a total of fifteen (15) seconds following an alarm or recognition of a chemical or biological attack. Properly don protective clothing. In addition, the individual must be able to relate the use of protective clothing to the graduated levels of NBC threat described in Appendix E, NBC Risk Assessment/Vulnerability Analysis Tools and properly perform assigned missions. Take protective measures against thermal radiation (light, flash, and heat), blast wave, and nuclear radiation effects of nuclear explosions. Carry out immediate individual decontamination. Follow the procedures for the removal of NBC individual protective equipment (IPE). Recognize if casualties are contaminated and perform first aid (self aid and buddy aid). Practice good personal health and hygiene as a protective measure against the spread of disease. Maintain his/her NBC individual protective equipment in a high state of serviceability at all times. Be proficient in taking specific actions required of him/her for maintaining operating efficiency before, during, and after NBC attacks to reduce the effects of NBC weapons. Recognize or detect NBC agent contamination and perform immediate decontamination of his/her person, clothing, personal equipment, individual weapon and position, vehicle, and crew-served weapon. Recognize all standard-marking signs that indicate chemical, biological, or radiological contaminated areas. Cross or by-pass marked NBC contaminated areas with minimum danger to himself/herself. Demonstrate proficiency in performing his/her primary military duty, to include the use of crew/personal weapon(s), while wearing individual protective equipment (IPE) for extended periods. These periods are to be determined by the commander, based on such factors as weather conditions and equipment specifications. Be familiar with the procedures to be followed at the decontamination facilities of his/her military service. Be familiar with the principles of collective protection, including entry and exit from contamination control areas (CCAs) and shelter organization and operation, where applicable. Demonstrate familiarity with the use of dosimetry devices and chemical and biological detection and monitoring equipment where applicable. Demonstrate the ability to perform the duties of an NBC observer.

5. Commander NBC Defense Readiness Considerations
Commanders are required to have knowledge and competence in NBC defense beyond the scope of that demonstrated by each individual, but not to the degree required by NBC defense specialists. Commanders must be able to:

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Force Protection Assessment
Commander’s NBC Defense Readiness Checklist
! ! ! ! ! ! !

! !

Understand the principles of NBC defense. Know the defense organization and the NBC defense equipment available. Assess the capabilities of the NBC defense forces of the command. Assess the effects of NBC munitions on the unit/formation, especially on operations to be conducted. Issue orders and take measures depending on situation and mission. Plan operations taking into account the NBC threat and the readiness of units for operations in an NBC environment. Estimate the effects of wearing NBC IPE for an extended period of time and understand what measures can be taken to mitigate those effects on the combat effectiveness and well being of the forces. Be familiar with the available medical prophylactic countermeasures. Be familiar with integration of NBC training in exercises. All commanders should also consider:

! ! !

Risks of Low Level Radiation (LLR). Risks of Release other Than Attack (ROTA). Risks of Toxic Industrial Materials (TIMs).

6. Officer/NCO NBC Defense Primary Duty Personnel Readiness Considerations
Officers and enlisted personnel whose primary duties are concerned with unit NBC defense activities are required to receive formal training beyond the scope outlined in Survival Standards, Basic Standards of Proficiency for Individual Service Personnel, and Basic Standards for Selected Personnel Requiring Additional Training. NBC defense specialists are; command NBC defense officers and enlisted personnel, and unit NBC defense officers and enlisted personnel. Command NBC defense officers and enlisted personnel are those who are assigned full time duties for NBC defense. Unit NBC defense officers and enlisted personnel are those who are assigned an additional duty to form the NBC control party. These personnel can be at the level of company (or equivalent) but may be at a higher level, depending on a Service’s organizational structure. These personnel must be able to:

NBC Primary Duty Personnel NBC Defense Readiness Checklist
!

! ! ! !

! !

!

Assist the commander in providing policy and guidance to lower echelons in all matters pertaining to the development of an NBC defense capability. Plan, conduct, and monitor NBC defense training within the command. Evaluate the capability of lower echelons to survive an NBC attack and to continue operations in an NBC environment. Keep abreast of new tactics, techniques, and procedures in NBC defense. When planning an operation, act in the capacity of adviser to the commander on all matters pertaining to the NBC defense of subordinate units/formations. In addition, augmented as necessary, be responsible for the NBC reporting and warning system. Recommend employment of special NBC defense elements/units, if available. Where appropriate, operate and use automated systems for calculations and data processing. If an automated system is not available, personnel in NBC centers must be able to perform the same tasks manually. Act as adviser to the commander on all matters pertaining to cooperation in NBC defense with units/agencies of other nations. Additionally, all NBC Defense Officers must be able to:

!

! !

Identify the hazards related to risks of Low Level Radiation (LLR), risks of Release Other Than Attack (ROTA), and risks of Toxic Industrial Materials (TIMs). Make contingency plans for units facing LLR, ROTA, and TIM hazards. Act as adviser to the commander on all matters pertaining to LLR, ROTA and TIM hazards.

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Appendix M 7. Selected Personnel NBC Defense Readiness Considerations
To accomplish operational tasks beyond the scope of mere survival, certain selected personnel require additional training beyond the scope of individual standards but not to the degree required by NBC specialists. Such tasks are NBC monitoring, survey, reconnaissance, and contamination control. Selected personnel must be able to:

NBC Additional Duty Personnel NBC Defense Readiness Checklist
! !

! !

! ! ! ! !

!

Operate and maintain NBC equipment, applicable to the task. Recognize attacks with NBC munitions and fully understand unit procedures for implementing warnings and providing protection. Detect and identify contamination and organize and conduct NBC monitoring and survey operations. Monitor personnel, food, drinking water, and equipment for NBC contamination and effectiveness of decontamination measures. Collect samples of suspected biological contamination and forward them as directed. Collect samples of liquid or solid chemical agents. Mark NBC contaminated areas, equipment, supplies, and stores with standard marking signs. Provide data for compilation of NBC reports. Operate detection and survey equipment for recognizing and detecting hazards from radiological, biological, and chemical releases. Aircrews, rescue and survival personnel, as well as ground personnel must be able to: ! Use their NBC ensemble. ! Don and doff their IPE. All officers and noncommissioned officers, in addition to the basic standards of proficiency for individual Service personnel, should have knowledge (appropriate to their rank and operational role) of:

! ! ! ! ! ! !

Deployment of NBC observers and detection devices. NBC monitoring, survey, and reconnaissance. Survival procedures before, during and after an NBC attack and friendly nuclear strike. Radiological, biological, and chemical downwind hazards. Radiation dose control, exposure rules, and record keeping. General protective values of material against radiation, including the selection of buildings and the construction of shelters. Contamination control (procedures for the permanent or temporary prevention, reduction, or neutralization of contamination for maintaining or strengthening an efficient conduct of operations).

8. Medical Personnel NBC Defense Readiness Considerations
Medical personnel should be able to protect themselves, patients and the respective medical facilities against exposure to NBC agents (NBC Defense) and to carry out all measures necessary to maintain and restore the health of personnel exposed to NBC environments (NBC Medical Defense). Medical personnel must:

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Force Protection Assessment
NBC Medical Personnel NBC Defense Readiness Checklist
!

! ! ! ! !

!

! !

Be able to effectively protect casualties in an NBC situation during first aid, triage, resuscitative and emergency treatment, holding, evacuation, and hospital treatment. Be able to act in a way that medical materiel, vehicles, and medical facilities are provided protection against NBC hazards. Be familiar with fielded collective protection systems for facilities and vehicles, if appropriate. Know acute symptoms of NBC injuries, specific countermeasures as well as their potential side effects. Know decontamination procedures for NBC contaminated patients. Have selected medical personnel with specialized knowledge in contamination control procedures for NBC contaminated patients and associated equipment (e.g., radiac monitor and chemical agent monitor). Have medical personnel assigned to perform special NBC medical defense tasks during missions (e.g., anesthesiologists, surgeons, internists, microbiologists, and food chemists). Have medical personnel task-oriented with specialized knowledge of diagnosis and treatment of NBC injuries. Have medical personnel assigned to perform detection and identification of CB agents and radiation. Staff and command surgeons provide assessments to the commander on:

!

!

!

!

Scientific background involving the acute and long-term health effects of NBC/TIM hazards in the operational area and the risk/benefit balance from wearing IPE and the use of prophylactic medical NBC countermeasures. Preparation for an operation to include establishment of an inventory of NBC/TIM hazards and infectious endemic diseases in the deployment area and the resulting medical support requirements in relation to countermeasures. During an operation, coordinate the investigations of unusual sickness and fatalities in situations involving NBC/TIM hazards and endemic diseases directed at the verification and outbreak management in the case of occurrence of highly contagious diseases in a biological scenario. After operation advice on post-conflict surveillance for illness and follow-up in exposed or potentially exposed forces.

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Intentionally Blank

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APPENDIX N
COMPONENT NBC SUPPORT STRUCTURE 1. General
a. The principles of logistics complement the principles of war. Based on requirements and established priorities, logistics are the processes of planning and executing the movement and sustainment of operating forces in the execution of military strategy and operations. Logistics provide the foundation of combat power. b. Each component is responsible for its own support. In a JTF, joint logistics should use existing individual component policies and procedures whenever possible. If this is not possible, the differences should be identified to supported combatant commanders as early as possible for resolution. c. Interoperability activities between NSW Combat Service Support Team, USSOCOM Deployment Cell, 528th Special Operations Support Battalion, USAF Red Horse units, Seabees, and other selected DOD units can assist in providing seamless support.

2. Component NBC Support Structure
a. Naval Special Warfare Command. NAVSOC NBC defense assets are assigned at Group level. One Combat Service Support Team (CSST) is assigned to each NSW Group to provide full-spectrum logistic support for designated SEAL Teams, Special Boat Units, NSW Task Groups/Task Units and/or special mission units. The CSST mission contains three primary elements: • OPLAN/CONPLAN and crisis action logistic planning and coordination through the Theater SOC and Navy Component Commander, the CSST arranges for logistic support services that are not organic to the NSW Task Group or Task Unit. • In-theater contracting, small purchase and lease actions as authorized by the Theater Executive Agent and in conjunction with the JSOTF J-4. The CSST contingency contractors will provide the theater supply representative with its supply reissue requirements, requisitions, procurement, storage, distribution, security, and transportation issues. • Comprehensive forward operational base support is provided by the CSST to deliver all the services required for the deployed Task Group or Task Unit to live and fight. Mission elements include: force embarkation, load-planning, multimodal transport coordination, combat cargo handling, in-theater logistic coordination, Military Liaison Officer/Defense Attaché Officer liaison, construction, infrastructure support, contingency engineering, expeditionary camp siting and development, camp maintenance, messing, utilities, resupply, and local transportation. In addition, the CSST provides defensive combat planning and execution including force protection, perimeter defense, and NBC decontamination. The CSST provides decontamination services to the personnel, equipment, and facilities located at the Task Group or Task Unit Forward Operational Base (FOB) and can provide a safe working environment so that some operations may continue during the decontamination process. The CSST will attempt to arrange mutual assistance from other nearby commands capable of providing NBC decontamination. The CSST deploys with sufficient organic assets including equipment and decontamination chemicals to decontaminate the NSW forces at the FOB. When augmented with their reserve detachment the CSST has sufficient personnel and command and control to perform its mission. The CSST also acts as the NBC decontamination resupply source for platoons in the field and may be called upon to move forward in support of platoon decontamination and resupply. b. Air Force Special Operations Command. AFSOC NBC defense assets are part of a fully integrated base support program. • Group, Squadron, and Other Unit Commanders have the responsibility to implement NBC defense programs. To implement successful NBC defense programs, commanders must integrate all facets of NBC defense into their existing combat organizations. They must ensure all unit personnel have the necessary training, equipment and continuous logistic support to protect themselves and carry out the mission. They should designate appropriate individuals to perform special duties such as managing shelters and leading Contamination Control Teams (CCT). Unit commanders should recognize that when the number of casualties exceeds the capabilities of the medical unit, manpower assistance from non-medical units may be required. Unit personnel trained in buddy care and self aid are a source for this assistance.

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Appendix N
• Base Civil Engineer. The Base Civil Engineer and Readiness Flight personnel will provide NBC training for specialized teams as well as individual training for all deployed, or deployable personnel. Additionally, they will advise units on equipment acquisition, maintenance, and use of specialized NBC defense equipment. They will also advise the Commander on sustained (30-day supply in war readiness and support packages) operations in a contaminated environment. Finally, they will manage airbase detection systems, to include operating a control center and a network (manual or automated) of detectors for warning purposes. • Medical. The medical staffs will ensure medical measures are responsive to NBC defense and integrated with non-medical NBC defense measures. Medical personnel provide appropriate medical treatment, assist in patient transport, decontaminate patients, and provide preventive medicine services to the SOF community. Preventive measures fall into four phases. •• Preselection and health maintenance. •• Health threat and risk assessment. •• Health hazard monitoring, sampling, and analysis. •• Health hazard control and mitigation. Medical personnel will advise the commander on medical aspects of NBC defense; provide guidance on health and hygiene matters; provide self-aid and buddy care training to unit representatives; collect, analyze, or ship for analysis clinical samples for indicators of NBC agent exposure; administer vaccines, antibiotics, and other drugs or procedures necessary to prevent or treat NBC casualties; conduct medical record keeping as directed by higher headquarters. • Aircrew Life Support (ALS). Supply is critically important to effective and efficient ALS combat operations. ALS personnel must ensure supplies and equipment are ready, adequate, and available for immediate operations and sustainment. A welldefined resupply plan based on worst case (bare-base) contingencies must be coordinated with all agencies. For additional information on logistic requirements refer to AFM 11-303, Aircrew Life Support (ALS) Combat Operations. c. Army Special Operations Command • Special Operations Support Command (SOSCOM). SOSCOM mission is to plan and coordinate with Theater Army (TA) and ARSOF to assure combat service support (CSS), health service support (HSS), and signal support to ARSOF supporting combatant commands. • Special Operations Theater Support Elements (SOTSE). The SOTSE is the staff coordinator for ARSOF support requirements at the Army Service Component Command (ASCC). Embedded in the ASCC, the SOTSE staff has knowledge of the resources available to all other Army forces apportioned to the theater. Working with theater logisticians, the SOTSE can thereby identify requirements and plan for and coordinate ARSOF sustainment. • 528th Support Battalion. The 528th Support Battalion’s mission is to provide rapid deployable combat service support and health service support to ARSOF as directed.

3. Common Support Considerations
Any component conducting NBC defensive operations must know what equipment, material, and resupply is needed. Sufficient supply must be on hand to support each of the seven decon techniques; skin decon, personal wipedown, operator’s spraydown, IPE exchange, vehicle washdown, detailed troop decon, and detailed equipment decon. For additional detailed logistic information refer to FM 3-5, NBC Decontamination.

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APPENDIX O
TECHNIQUES TO LIMIT AND REDUCE CONTAMINATION 1. General
The purpose of field expedient NBC defense techniques is to mitigate the NBC environment effects when standard issued IPE or equipment protection is not available. These techniques are designed for emergency use only.

2. Detection
Animals, especially birds, are very vulnerable to the effects of chemical agents. Birds, monkeys, dogs, or other farm animals may be used to determine if an area is contaminated. Animals may not provide warning early enough to prevent casualties, but may be useful to determine if an area is safe to enter or if it is safe to unmask. Team members must be constantly alert for the other indicators of chemical attack and contamination to include active employment of chemical agent on your position and observing for signs of contamination such as dead insects, animals, and reptiles while patrolling. Chemical agents may be seen on the ground, in the water, or clinging to vegetation.

3. Contamination
Contaminated areas must be marked to prevent personnel from entering. It is important that whichever type of marking system is used, it is understood by all local civilians. The marking system may include distinctive colored cloth, wooden signs, paint, or marks cut on trees in a certain pattern.

4. NBC Warning
The standard NBC reports used in the NBC Warning and Reporting System should be sufficient for use with indigenous personnel. Visual and sonic signals must be developed for the use of the local civilian populace, based on the situation and what is available. Whistle blasts, horns, bells, and various visual signals must be developed and rehearsed.

5. Field Expedient Equipment
SOF detachments will not always have standard NBC defensive equipment available. In the UW environment, indigenous personnel and their families may be totally unprotected. In many cases, a SOF element may elect to adopt the same level of protection as the forces they are working with. Although there are no ideal substitutes for issue chemical protective equipment, there are several techniques that may offer some level of protection. a. Protective garments. The objective of using expedient protective garments is to prolong the time it takes for chemical agent liquid or vapor to absorb into the skin. Ordinary clothing provides limited protection, and layered clothing offers even better protection. Use whatever clothing is available to cover all exposed skin. Expedient covers to supplement the clothing greatly prolong the time it takes for agents to absorb. Vegetation, leaves, straw, grass, paper, etc. stuffed under the clothing will provide additional protection. Expedient covers, listed in order of effectiveness are: • Survival or space blanket, Mylar plastic • Polyvinyl chloride sheeting • Butyl rubber • Cortex plastic trash bags (up to 10 minutes) • Wet-weather gear (issue) or heavy poncho • Lightweight poncho • BDU uniform

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Appendix O
b. Equipment Covers. The expedient covers listed above will provide good temporary protection form liquid droplet contamination. Use tarpaulins, pallet packing materials, dunnage, plastic, canvas, and cardboard to cover supplies and equipment. Canvas will keep out more than 95% of liquid contamination if it is removed within one hour after the attack.

6. Decontamination
Decon is a means to avoid becoming a casualty and remaining mission effective. Expedient protection will start to lose its protective qualities rapidly be deteriorating after contamination with chemical agents. With expedient protection, the longer you remain contaminated, the less your chance for survival. a. To conserve resources, manpower, time, and materiel, follow these four decon principles of speed, need, limit, and priority. • Speed. Chemical agents can kill in minutes. Once contaminated, immediately remove contamination that is on your skin. This principle stresses that you decontaminate as the mission permits. • Need. Decontaminate only what is needed to continue the mission and stay alive. Use operational decon when the situation does not permit thorough decon. • Limit. Limit the spread of contamination. Conduct all decontamination operations with the smallest amount of movement possible to prevent recontamination. This is especially important with large groups of civilians. • Priority. Decontaminate only what you need immediately. Skin, clothing, and operational equipment are the first priority. b. Natural decontaminates include weathering, earth, fire, and water (boiling water-best). These are available in almost any environment and should be used to supplement standard and expedient decontaminates. Expedient decontaminates will have to be used when standard issue decontaminates such as DS2, STB, and M258 kits are not available. A detailed mission risk assessment will identify those chemicals that are expected to be available in the operational area. Some common chemicals that provide moderate to excellent decontaminating ability are: • Household bleach (sodium hypochlorite solution). Effective against blister and V-series nerve agents and all biological agents. Reacts rapidly (less than 5 minutes) with blister and V-series nerve agents. Use the common 5 to 15 percent solution. • Household ammonia (ammonia or ammonium chloride). Effective against G-series nerve agents. Use the solution as commonly available. • Caustic soda or lye (sodium hydroxide). Effective against G-series nerve agents, lewisite, and all biological agents. Neutralizes G-series nerve agents on contact. Use a ten percent solution, and observe cautions consistent with the handling of a caustic, damaging chemical. • HTH (calcium hypochlorite) or HTB (high-test bleach) - swimming pool chlorine powder. Effective against lewisite, mustard, V-series nerve agents, and all biological agents. Reacts rapidly (less than 5 minutes) with mustard and lewisite. Use a ten-percent solution or use as a dry mix. WARNING – DO NOT MIX BLEACH AND AMMONIA - WARNING

7. C4 Systems
C4 systems present a unique decontamination challenge. Normal decontaminates are corrosive and will destroy most C4 systems. C4 systems should be sealed in plastic or some other barrier to avoid contamination. The barrier can be decontaminated and removed in the event of an NBC attack. Most C4 systems can be operated normally while sealed in plastic.

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APPENDIX P
FOREIGN NBC EQUIPMENT RECOGNITION AND CAPABILITY/LIMITATION SUMMARY
NBC Defense Equipment: CAN ADA
Individual Protection Equipment Protective Coverall ACTON NBC lightweight overboots NBC overboots, Mark 5 Collective Protection Equipment ARO Aircrew Respirator System ARO Ventilated Respirator System (VRS) Detection Equipment DRES Chemical Agent Detection System Detector Kit, Chemical Agent (C-2) Chemical Agent Liquid Detector Paper - 3way M-8 and M-9 Detector, Chemical Agent, Nerve Vapor Detector Kit, Chemical Agent, M256A1 RADIAC Set, Remote Monitoring, and Alarm, AN/FDR-502(V) Radiacmeter, IM-5016/PD Radiacmeter, IM-108S/PD Radiation Monitor and Automatic Alarm, AN/GDQ-3 Gamma Survey Meter, Model 189 Decontamination Equipment NBC-DEWDECON-2L Decontamination Device NBC-DEWDECON-3L Decontamination Device NBC-DEWDECON-20L Decontamination Device NBC-DEWDECON-M Decontaminant Mixer/ Dispenser NBC-DEWDECON-PERS Emergency Response Personnel Decontamination Kit Skin Decontaminant Lotion In production. Vehicle-mounted, variable-speed filtration system. Description CAM network (up to eight) with central control station and monitoring stations remote to 4 km. Detects/Identifies G and V series nerve agents, blood agents, and choking agents. Kit contains M8 detector paper. Similar to US M256A1 Detects/Identifies G and V series nerve, and H series blister agents. Nerve agent vapor detector. Same as US M256A1 Sensor networked gamma detector for fixed or semi-fixed installations. Detects gamma at 1 - 5000 rad/hour. In service with Canadian Armed Forces. Detects and measures gamma radiation. Displays readings in rad/hour on analog dial from (1 to 10 rad/hour). Gamma radiation detector measuring gamma at 0 -500 rad/hour. Gamma radiation detector network for fixed or semi-fixed sites. Measures gamma at 1 - 5000 rad/hour. Measures X-ray and gamma radiation. Description 2-liter DS2 application device. Similar to US M11. In service with Australia, Canada, Saudi Arabia, and other nations. 3-liter DS2 application device pressurized by hand or air compressor. Australia, Saudi Arabia, and other nations. 20-liter pressurized device for C8-C decontaminant or optional DS2 decontaminant application. Decontaminant mixer/dispenser with high-pressure water system. Civilian police, fire fighters, ambulance crews, and civil defense teams. For general decontamination of nerve and blister agents. Neutralizes mustard, nerve agents, and lewisite on contact. Description One piece garment with attached hood worn in place of combat uniform Used in Australia, UK. Lightweight CP overboots. Used in Australia, UK. CP overboots. Description

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Appendix P
Miscellaneous Carleton NBC belt-mounted respiratory system Zenon Advanced Double Pass Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit (ADROWPU) NBC-DEWPRO-TEK Protective Material Description Battery-powered positive-pressure system designed for use with the C4 protective mask. Self-contained large volume water purification unit capable of processing NBC contaminated water. Relies on integral 40 kW diesel power generator. NBC protective material for covering supplies and equipment.

NBC Defense Equipment: FRANCE
Individual Protection Equipment Giat NBC Hood for Civilians NBC Protective Suit, Model S3P Protective Coverall, Model T3P NBC/F Protective Coverall Paul Boy'e Tropical NBC Combat Suit Paul Boy'e Lightweight Decontamination Suit Bachmann, Model 63, Disposable NBC Suit Bachmann, Heavy Duty NBC Decontamination Suit Collective Protection Equipment AMF 80 Modular NBC Shelters Description Protects face and respiratory tract from chemical agent vapors. Used in Swiss Army also. Two piece CP over-garment system. French Air Force air and ground crews. One piece CP coverall system with integral hood. Tank and helicopter crews. Similar to T3P w/o hood. In production for the French Army. Two-piece lightweight CP overgarment system with integral hood. Lightweight one- or two-piece suit. Reusable after up to 4 to 5 decons. Full-length outer garment, gloves, head cowl, overboots, and spare gloves. Designed for short-term emergency use. Heavy-duty butyl-based fabric.

Description
Canadian Forces Europe. Prefabricated shelter capable of housing up to 60 occupants. Comprised of 2 and 2.5 meter diameter modules connected by neoprene joints. Usually constructed in a trench and covered by a layer of earth. Self-supporting for 7days. Similar to AMF 80 but self-supporting for 48-hours. NBC shelters typically for field repair facilities. Capable of accommodating vehicles or aircraft. Personnel shelter, impermeable for up to 24-hours, positive overpressure and filtration system. Filtration unit for collective protective shelters. NBC Filter unit. Filtration/Pressurization unit for soft skin structures and mobile shelters. Kit designed for evacuation of the public from an area with a known toxic atmosphere. Contains I000 protective respiratory hoods for adults and children as well as 7 infant protection systems. Description Similar to US Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM) Point detector for G, V and H series agents.

AP 60 Modular Semi-hardened Shelter Bachmann NBC Shelters TMB Collective NBC Protection Tent FMGC High Capacity, Composite Filter Sofiltra-Poelman NBC Filters Giat NBC Filtering and Pressurization Unit for Soft-Skin Structures Giat NBC EVATOX emergency evacuation kit. Detection Equipment PROENGIN Portable Contamination Monitor, AP2C Chemical Detection Unit for Fixed Installations (ADLIF)

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Foreign NBC Equipment Recognition and Capability/Limitation Summary
Giat NBC Chemical Detection Control Kit (TDCC) Giat NBC Toxic Agent Detection and Identification Kit Giat NBC Detalac male F1 and male F2 Giat NBC DET INDIV male F1 Individual Nerve Agent Detector Gait NBC Adhesive Detector Paper, PDF1 Can detect most nerve, blood, and choking agents. In production. Detects toxic agents in atmosphere or n materials. Male-Model. Point nerve agent detection system. Similar to US M8A1. Individual nerve agent detection system for G series agents. Similar to M8 paper with adhesive backing.

Decontamination Equipment
Chemical Decontamination Glove male F1 Giat NBC Decontamination Appliance, Emergency, 2.5-liters ACMAT UMTH 1000 Vehicle-Mounted Decontamination System

Description
Personal decontamination device for skin, clothing, and equipment. Similar to US M11. Vehicle-mounted decontamination system, with equipment platform, fixed hydraulic equipment, motorized pump, 3000-liter water tank, and a removable hot water/steam generator. Air-transportable by C-130 aircraft.

Miscellaneous
NBC Casualty Bag Giat NBC ventilated casualty hood. Giat NBC individual survival kit.

Description
NBC protective bag with air filter generator. Provides casualty protection for up to 8-hours. Transparent NBC protective hood for casualties. Fabric wallet containing various detector papers, nerve agent vapor detectors, decontamination gloves, pyridostigmine pre-treatment tablets, and two to three MultiPen or ComboPen, autoinjectors

NBC Defense Equipment: GERMANY
Individual Protection Equipment
Helsa-Werke NBC Facelet Helsa-Werke NBC Protective Clothing Karcher Combat Suit with Integrated NBC Protection System, Safeguard 3002 Karcher Flying Suit with Integrated NBC Protection System, Safeguard 3002/A Karcher Impermeable NBC Suit, Safeguard 6004

Description
Used during rest or stand-by periods when full protection is not necessary. Used by Norway, Sweden, Germany and some Middle East Forces. Integral hood, jacket, overtrouser, overboots, and gloves. Used by Saudi Arabia and several other Middle East countries. Integral hood, jacket, and trousers. Worn in place of combat uniform. Fire resistant NBC protective garment. One-piece, gas-tight, full protective suit with integrated boots and mask.

Collective Protection Equipment
Karcher SPS 2000 long-term conservation system

Description
Used in Saudi Arabia. Dual tent storage system consisting of an inner and outer tent and a dehumidifier. Designed for storing equipment in a humiditycontrolled environment.

Detection Equipment
Honeywell-ELAC Chemical Agent Detection System, A2 Honeywell-ELAC Mustard Module MM-1, Mobile Mass Spectrometer

Description
Personal and point detection/alarm unit for nerve, blood, blister, and choking agents. Adaptable for fixed site networks. Used by Austrian Armed forces. Used with US M43A1 detector to detect blister, blood, and choking agents. Used by Israel, Thailand, Turkey, and the US. Detects chemical agent vapors and liquids. Incorporated in US Army and Marine Corps M93A1 NBC Reconnaissance Systems (FOX).

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Appendix P
Transportpanzer-1 'Fuchs' NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle US, British, and Israeli forces. See US M93A1 NBC Reconnaissance System (FOX).

Decontamination Equipment
Mobile NBC Decontamination Semi-trailer

Description
Mobile decontamination facility for equipment and clothing. Items are processed on conveyor belt through a series of heat, steam, decontaminant application, and rinsing processes. All contaminated run off is contained in integral tanks. Water is supplied by internal 800-liter tank and for long-term operations, by a water tanker vehicle via hoses. Used by Austrian forces. Two truck system. One for decontamination of material and terrain. One for decontamination of personnel and personal equipment. Each vehicle has its own integral 2000-liter water tank. Used by French, Middle East, and Portuguese forces. Mobile, self-contained, vehicle-carried, frame-mounted decontamination system with integral 200- and 435-liter water tanks. Capable of decontaminating personal, equipment, material, and clothing. Used by Australia, Austria, Portugal, Middle East, and some countries in North Africa. Mobile decontamination system mounted on a 4-ton trailer. Provides personal, equipment, material, clothing, terrain, and building decontamination capability. Used by Portuguese Air Force. Self-contained, complete decontamination system for vehicles, aircraft, personnel, terrain, clothing and equipment. Also capable of processing water contaminated by NBC agents into drinking quality water. Double-walled tent comprised of inflatable tubular frame with integral air compressor. Decontamination tent with inflatable frame. Used by Australia, Austria, Egypt, France, Taiwan, Thailand, NATO Headquarters. DADS- Capable of mixing and applying decontaminant solution. Used in terrain, vehicle, and aircraft decontamination operations. Similar to US M17 LDS. Used by Austria, Australia, NATO Headquarters, Portugal, and countries in the Middle East and North Africa. High pressure steam cleaning system in a light metal frame. Similar to US M17 LDS. Used by Austria, Belgium, Norway, Sweden and countries in the Middle East. Ten-liter pressurized decontaminant mixer/applicator. Similar to US M13 DAP. In use by 40 Armed Forces worldwide. Steam cleaner. Used in Africa, Europe, and US. Frame-mounted steam cleaner modified for military use. Used to decontaminate vehicles, equipment, aircraft and personnel. Similar to US M17 LDS. Used in Europe. High performance, self-contained, decontamination module. Used for mixing and applying decontaminant solutions. MPS 3200 - NATO Headquarters, Australia, Austria, Portugal, and some North Africa and Middle East countries. Filed Shower Unit and Collapsible Water Tank - several countries. Showerjet 15 - UK and New Zealand. MPS 3200 - Motor Pump Set. Used for water application, seawater resistant. Field Shower Unit - Two-stage shower unit for personnel decontamination. Showerjet 15 - Capable of decontaminating 15 personnel simultaneously when attached to Karcher MPDS, HDS 1500D or HDS 1200 hot water high-pressure modules. Collapsible Water Tank - 2500liter capacity.

Karcher Material, Terrain, Personnel Decontamination System (2 Trucks) Karcher Decojet Decontamination System

Karcher Decojet-trailer Decontamination System

Karcher DECONTAIN Decontamination System

Karcher DT60 Decontamination Tent Karcher Decontamination Tent Karcher C8- Direct Application Decontamination System (DADS)

Karcher MPDS Multipurpose Decontamination System Karcher Portable Lightweight Decontamination System DS 10 Karcher HDS 1200 EK Pressure Steam Jet Cleaner Unit Karcher SCS 1200 DE Lightweight Decontamination System Karcher SCS 1800 DE Decontamination System Karcher Decontamination Accessories: MPS 3200 Motor Pump Set; field Shower Unit; Showerjet 15 Collapsible Water Tank 2500-Liters

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Foreign NBC Equipment Recognition and Capability/Limitation Summary
Karcher Decontamination and Cleaning Agents: RM 21 RM 31 RM 32 RM 35 RM 54 Calcium Hypochlorite-C8 C8 emulsion component TDE 202 Karcher Hot Air Generator FB 60 E OWR DEKON Decontamination System In use worldwide. RM 21- Liquid personnel decontamination solution. RM 31- Liquid alkaline agent for cleaning unpainted surfaces. RM 32- Liquid alkaline cleaner for industrial applications. RM 35- Disinfecting cleaner for industrial applications. RM 54- Foam cleaner for sensitive weapon systems. Calcium Hypochlorite-C8 - Decontaminant powder with 64% available chlorine. C8 emulsion component - A mixture of tetrachloroethylene and emulsifier PTC 2000. A component of Munster emulsion. TDE 202 - Decontaminant emulsion that is effective on all known chemical warfare agents and mixtures of agents Used by Australian and US forces. Hot air decontamination device. Mobile decontamination system consisting of the following five basic components: DETECT 1000 - Air-conditioned, over-pressurized, compartmentalized shelter containing NBC detection, communications, and decontamination equipment. DEKON 2000 - Decontamination disaster protection vehicle capable of operating independently. Used for personal and equipment decontamination as well as providing contamination-free drinking water. SHOWER 3000 - Capable of providing personnel showers for up to 3500 individuals in 24-hours. Associated equipment is a collapsible 5000-liter water tank. WASH 4000 - Field laundry unit. MOBILE WORKSHOP 5000 - Van with spare parts for maintenance of the complete system. OWR DEKON Trailer 6000 Trailer-mounted decontamination device for personnel, equipment, and terrain decontamination. Integral 1000-liter water tank and portable 1000-liter water tanks. Can mix and apply decontaminant solutions. Portable decontamination system, which dispenses decontaminant solutions in a fine mist. Normally used with GD 5 decontaminant. GD 5 has same decontamination efficiency as DS2 but not as corrosive. High-pressure cleaner/steam jet device. High-pressure cleaner/steam jet device with decontamination module. DEDAS - Decontaminating Emulsion Direct Application System. Device used for the continuous production of decontaminate solutions and emulsions. Mobile disinfectant and drying unit for NBC protective suits. Used for decontamination of personnel, equipment, vehicles, aircraft, and terrain. Incorporates a shower unit, steam jet cleaner, 1400-liter aluminum water tank, and 1000-liter flexible tanks. Normally carried as a container on a vehicle but can be transported by helicopter. An integrated, containerized decontamination system. Used for decontamination of vehicles, equipment, personnel, and structures. Standard NBC decontamination truck. Used for terrain and equipment decon. Comprised of a pump, heater, and decontaminant mixer units as well as two 1500-liter water tanks. Similar to US M12A1 PDDA.

OWR DECOFOG III Decontamination System

OWR CLEAN 6000 G Decontamination Unit OWR CLEAN 7000 G Decontamination Unit OWR DEDAS 100 Decontamination Unit

OWR DRESS DEKONT 8000 OWR Multipurpose Decontamination System, MPD 12 and PD 12

INDECON Integrated Decontamination System NBC Decontamination Truck

Miscellaneous
Marking Set, Contamination, Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) Helsa-Werke casualty bags

Description
Used by the US Army. Same as US NBC Marking Set. CB protective bag for casualties with integral air blower and filter canisters.

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Appendix P
Karcher Mediclean units Atropine Aerosol Spray (AAS) Device designed to pre-clean wounds or areas of body contaminated with NBC agents. Alternative to atropine injection. Allows user to administer via nose or mouth.

NBC Defense Equipment: ITALY
Decontamination Equipment
Cristanini SANIJET C 921 Decontamination System

Description
Also used by French, Spanish, US, and Korea. Self-contained decontamination device powered by air-cooled diesel engine. Similar to US M17 LDS.

Cristanini SANIJET 3000/3 Containerized Decontamination System

Compartmentalized container designed to provide personnel and garment decontamination within the structure and vehicle decontamination outside via external hose reels. Used by some NATO forces. Trailer-mounted decontamination system for vehicle, equipment, personnel and terrain decontamination. Tubular frame, PVC, fabric decontamination tent.

Cristanini Trailer C 90-120/2 MIL Decontamination System Cristanini Decontamination and Shower Tent

Cristanini SANIJET Gun Cristanini BX 24 SPECIAL Decontamination Product Tirrena Small Decontamination Set, SDS T 155

Specialized gun assembly that allows descaling, decontaminant application, and rinsing to be accomplished from a single hose. Decontaminant packaged in cartridges for use with the SANIJET Gun.

Small fire extinguisher-type device used to dispense DS2 decontaminant. Similar to US M11.

NBC Defense Equipment: UNITED KINGDOM
Individual Protection Equipment
NBC Poncho Defender CB Mark 1 Civilian Suit

Description
CP protective poncho with charcoal kilt and integral hood. Civilian Chemical Protective (CP) suit available in five sizes. Designed to be worn over clothing and footwear. Configured as a one-piece coverall with integral hood. Civilian version of British NBC suit. Supplied as a two-piece ensemble comprised of hood, smock, and trousers or one-piece coverall. Lightweight three-piece CP suit with integral respirator. Lightweight two-piece CP suit without integral respirator. Civilian lightweight CP kit consisting of garments and equipment in a suitcase. Comprised of oversuit, inner two-piece protective garment, full-face respirator with filter canister, industrial rubber boots, inner cotton and outer rubber garments, mask demisting pack, decontamination powder, and an instruction handbook. Civilian Heavy Duty CP kit consisting of garments and equipment in a suitcase. Comprised of oversuit, inner two piece protective garment, full-face respirator with filter canister, industrial rubber boots, inner cotton and outer rubber garments, mask demisting pack, decontamination powder, and an instruction handbook. One-piece heavyweight chemical resistant and flame retardant oversuit designed primarily for civilian use.

Bondina Civilian NBC Protective Suit Wescare Lightweight NBC Survival Suit, Model No 100 Wescare Lightweight NBC Survival Suit, Model No 101 Complete NBC Kit, Civilian, Lightweight

Complete NBC Kit, Civilian, Heavy Duty

Heavy Duty Outer Suit

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Foreign NBC Equipment Recognition and Capability/Limitation Summary
Collective Protection Equipment
NBC Liners Models GP120/GP240

Description
Chemical resistant tent liners constructed of butyl coated nylon fabric. Portable NBC filtration unit provides pressurized filtered air.

Detection Equipment
Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM) GID-2 Fixed Chemical Agent Detection System GID-3 Graseby Ionic Detector Same as US CAM.

Description

Some NATO navies. Fixed detection system for vehicles, ships and buildings. Capable of detecting nerve and blister simultaneously. Designed to detect nerve and blister agents as well as monitor the effectiveness of vehicle collective protection systems. Detectors can be networked to form a perimeter defense. Used by Portugal and Spain. Automatic alarm system comprised of a detector and alarm unit. Responds to nerve and blood agents. Similar to US M8A1. Squad level detection kit for nerve and blister agents. Similar to US M256A1.

Nerve Agent Immobilized Alarm and Detector (NAIAD) Detector Kit Chemical Agent Residual Vapor No 1, Mark 1

Decontamination Equipment
Decontamination Kit, Personal No 1, Mark 1 Decontamination Kit, Personal No 2, Mark 1 Decontamination, NBC, Apparatus, Portable, No 2 (DAP 2) Decontaminant Chemical Agent XL1E1 WDL Dual-Purpose Decontamination and Large Area Screening System Portaflex 300 Decontamination Shower Unit

Description
Personal decontamination kit comprised of pads containing Fullers earth. Similar to US M13 individual decontamination kit. Personal decontamination kit consisting of a 113-gram dispenser of Fullers earth. Designed for decontamination of vehicles and equipment. Consists of pump, hoses, and brushing wand. Similar to US M13 DAP. Issued in a kit that contains specific reagents for persistent chemical agents. Dual-purpose decontaminant application and smoke screening system. Capable of dispensing hot air and water as well as mixing decontaminates. Designed for personnel decontamination.

Miscellaneous
Pearson Pathfinder Marking Device

Description
In service with the British Army. Automatically marks boundaries of areas such as minefields, and NBC contaminated terrain. Can be attached to any vehicle. Fires aluminum rods via compressed air. A two-layer chemically resistant polyethylene material used to protect personnel, supplies, and equipment from liquid agent contamination.

Chemical Agent Resistant Material (CARM)

NBC Defense Equipment: ISRAEL
Individual Protection Equipment
NBC Mask No 10A1 (Children 8-12 years) NBC Mask No 30 (General Use) NBC Mask No 33 (General Use) Civil Defense Hood

Description
Protective mask for children. Has drinking system and voicemitter. General use protective mask with voicemitter. General use protective mask with drinking system, voicemitter and right-handed canister option. Hood with transparent face panel and battery-powered forced ventilation system.

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Appendix P
NBC Disposable Protective Clothing SUPERGUM NBC Protective Clothing Clear disposable three-layer transparent protective clothing. Consists of trousers and jacket with hood. Emergency protective clothing for military and civilian applications. Available in sizes for adults and children. Comprised of jacket, trousers, gloves, footwear covers. CP overgarment system with nylon outer shell. CP overgarment system with cotton outer shell.

NBC Protective Garments, Lightweight, Type EC-UF-222 NBC Protective Garments, Standard, Type EC-GF-231

Collective Protection Equipment
SHALON collective NBC filtration systems

Description
NBC filtration systems built to Israeli civil defense specifications. Each unit is comprised of a washable synthetic foam pre-filter, NBC gas particulate filter, fan unit, flowmeter, and overpressure valve. Units are available for 12, 25, 50, and 100 person shelters.

Detection Equipment
Elbit Multipoint Gas Monitor (MGM)

Description
Continuous air quality monitoring system capable of analyzing air from up to 24 remote sampling points. Can be upgraded to incorporate meteorological and hazard assessment software. In service with the Israeli Defense Forces. Chemical agent detection device capable of detecting G and V nerve and H series blister agents. Can be configured for either vehicle or manpack operation. Hand-held detector unit capable of detecting nerve, blood, and blister agents. Simplified reliable chemical detection kit designed for use by non-specifically trained personnel. Detects nerve and blister agents displaying positive results as a color change. Device that interfaces the M43A1 alarm with communication systems providing audible and visible alarms.

CHASE Chemical Agents Sensor

RAFAEL CHAMP Chemical Agent Detector CDK chemical detection kit

Elbit Alarm and Power Remote - Control Unit (APCU) for M43A1.

Decontamination Equipment
DP-2 decontamination powder

Description
Homogeneous, finely ground powder decontaminant for skin and personal equipment.

NBC Defense Equipment: SWEDEN (Neutral)
Individual Protection Equipment
New Pac Lightweight Disposable C - Cover Dress S/91 New Pac Disposable C - Cover Dress S/89 New Pac C - Cover Poncho, N/60 New Pac C - Cover Poncho, N/90 Combat Suit 90

Description
Used in Austria, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland. Lightweight CP ensemble consisting of jacket with integral hood, trousers with integral footwear covers and gloves. Used in Sweden. Transparent, disposable full-body CP cover with footwear covers. Used in Norway. CP poncho. Used in Norway. CP poncho. Used in Sweden. CP suit consisting of jacket with integral hood, trousers and overboots. Worn in place of combat uniform.

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Foreign NBC Equipment Recognition and Capability/Limitation Summary
Collective Protection Equipment
Trellsystem chemically hardened hospital tent system.

Description
Inflatable, chemically hardened hospital tent with over-pressurization, filtration, and air conditioning.

Detection Equipment
CW Detection Device

Description
Small enzyme based detection device produced in two variations. One for nerve agents and one for mustard.

Decontamination Equipment
Hot Air Unit, VA-8 Cargo mobile decontamination station

Description
Decontamination device that generates super heated air for uniform/equipment decontamination. Mobile decontamination station built on a trailer chassis. Comprised of an extending tent with three sections, 500-liter water tank, pump unit, heating unit and wastewater collection system. Used for personnel decontamination.

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Appendix P

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APPENDIX Q
INTERNET/ONLINE REFERENCES 1. Country NBC Capabilities
National Ground Intelligence Center http://www.ngic.army.smil.mil/products http://www.ngic.army.smil.mil/archive

2. Hazardous Materials Guidance Sources
North American Emergency Response Guidebook http://hazmat.dot.gov/gydebook.htm. Federal Emergency Management Administration http:www.usfa.fema.gov/hazmat/

3. Health Effects
Safety and Health’s Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/npg/pgdstart.html#english.

4. Medical Care
US Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) http://aepo-xdv-www.epo.cdc.gov/wonder/prevguid/p0000018/p0000018.htm.

5. Industry News
National Defense Industrial Association http://www.ndia.org/

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Appendix Q

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APPENDIX R
REFERENCES
The development of USSOCOM Pub 3-05.11 is based upon the following primary references.

1. Department of Defense
a. DOD Directive 32025.14, Protection and Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Certain Designated Aliens in Danger Areas Abroad, 5 Nov 90 w/Change 2, 13 Jul 92. b. DOD Manual 5210.41, Nuclear Weapons Security Manual (U), Apr 94.

2. Joint
a. JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). b. JP 1-01, Joint Doctrine Development System. c. JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, as amended 1 September 2000. d. JP 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations. e. JP 2-01.2, Joint Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Counterintelligence Support to Operations. f. JP 2-01.3, JTTP for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace. g. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations. h. JP 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations. i. JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. j. JP 3-05.1, JTTP for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations. k. JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War. l. JP 3-07.2, JTTP for Antiterrorism. m. JP 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support. n. JP 3-10, Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations. o. JP 3-10.1, JTTP for Base Defense. p. JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments. q. JP 3-13.1, Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W). r. JP 3-33, Joint Force Capabilities. s. JP 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue. t. JP 3-50.21, Joint Tactics Techniques and Procedures for Combat Search and Rescue. u. JP 3-52, Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone.

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Appendix R
v. JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations. w. JP 3-54, Joint Doctrine for Operations Security. x. JP 3-56.1, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations. y. JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil–Military Operations. z. JP 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception. aa. JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations. bb. JP 4-01.3, JTTP for Movement Control. cc. JP 4-02, Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations. dd. JP 4-04, Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support. ee. JP 6-0, Doctrine for C4 Systems Support to Joint Operations.

3. Multi-Service
a. AFJMAN 24-204, Preparing Hazardous Materials For Military Air Shipments. b. FM 3-3/MCWP 3-37.2A, Chemical and Biological Contamination Avoidance. c. FM 3-3-1/MCWP 3-37.2B, Nuclear Contamination Avoidance. d. FM 3-4/FMFM 11-9, NBC Protection. e. FM 3-5/MCWP 3-37.3, NBC Decontamination. f. FM 3-6/FMFM 7-11-H/AFM 105-7, Field Behavior of NBC Agents (Including Smoke and Incendiaries). g. FM 3-7, NBC Field Handbook. h. FM 3-9/NAVFAC P-467/AFR 355-7, Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds. i. FM 3-14, NBC Vulnerability Analysis. j. FM 3-19/FMFM 11-20, NBC Reconnaissance. k. FM 8-9/NAVMED P-5059/AFJMAN 44-51, NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC Defensive Operations. l. FM 8-10-7, Health Service Support In a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environment, 22 April 1993 W/C 1. m. FM 8-285/NAVMED p-5041/AFJMAN 44-149/Marine Corps FMFM11, Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries. n. FM 34-81/AFM 105-4, Weather Support for Army Tactical Operations. o. FM 100-19/FMFM 7-10, Domestic Support Operations. p. FM 101-5-1/MCRP 5-2A, Operational Terms and Graphics.

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References 4. Army
a. AR 385-61, The Army Chemical Agent Safety Program. b. DA Pamphlet 385-61, Toxic Chemical Agent Safety Standards. c. FM 1-111, Aviation Brigades. d. FM 3-7, NBC Field Handbook. e. FM 3-18, Special NBC Reconnaissance (LBTeam). f. FM 5-116, Engineer Operations: Echelons Above Corps. g. FM 9-6, Munitions Support in Theater of Operations. h. FM 9-207, Operation and Maintenance of Ordnance Materiel in Cold Weather. i. FM 19-1, Military Police Support for the AirLand Battle. j. FM 21-10, Field Hygiene and Sanitation. k. FM 21-11, First Aid For Soldiers. l. FM 33-1, Psychological Operations. m. FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations. n. FM 34-37, Echelons Above Corps Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations. o. FM 34-60, Counterintelligence. p. FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace. q. FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations. r. FM 55-10, Movement Control in a Theater of Operations. s. FM 63-3, Corps Support Command. t. FM 63-4, Combat Service Support Operations: Theater Army Area Command. u. FM 100-5, Operations. v. FM 100-7, Decisive Force, the Army in Theater. w. FM 100-16, Army Operational Support. x. FM 100-22, Installation Management. y. FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations. z. FM 5-116, Engineer Operations: Echelons Above Corps.

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Appendix R 5. Air Force
a. AFI 11-301, Aircrew Life Support (ALS) Program. b. AFI 31-101, Air Force Installation Security Program. c. AFI 32-4001, Disaster Preparedness Planning and Operations. d. AFI 41-106, Medical Readiness, Planning and Training. e. AFMAN 11-303, Aircrew Life Support (ALS) Combat Operations. f. AFMAN 32-4004, Emergency Response Operations. g. AFMAN 32-4005, Personal Protection and Attack Actions. h. AFI 32-4007, Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception. i. AFMAN 32-4013, Hazardous Material Emergency Planning and Response Guide. j. AFH 32-4014, Volume 1, USAF Operations in a Chemical and Biological (CB) Warfare Environment, Planning and Analysis. k. AFH 32-4014, Volume 2, USAF Operations in a Chemical and Biological (CB) Warfare Environment, CB Hazards. l. AFH 32-4014, Volume 3, USAF Operations in a Chemical and Biological (CB) Warfare Environment, Defense Equipment. m. AFH 32-4014, Volume 4, USAF Ability to Survive and Operate Procedures in a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environment. n. AFMAN 32-4017, Civil Engineer Readiness Technician’s Manual for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense. o. AFPAM 32-4019, Chemical-Biological Warfare Commander’s Guide. p. AFI 10-212, Air Base Operability Program. q. AF Technical Order 14P3-1-151, Decontamination Procedures and Donning/Doffing of Chemical Defense Ensembles. r. AFSOC Medical Concept of Operations.

6. Marine Corps
a. FMFM 2-6, MAGTF Rear Area Security. b. OH 6-1, Ground Combat Operations. c. FMFM 3-5, Employment of Military Police in Combat. d. MCWP 3-37, MAGTF NBC Defense.

7. Navy
a. NWP 3-20.31, Surface Ship Survivability. b. NWP 4-02.4A, Fleet Hospitals.

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References
c. OPNAVINST 3400.10 series, Chemical, Biological and Radiological Defense (CBR) Defense Requirements Supporting Operational Fleet Readiness. d. OPNAVINST 3440.16 series, Naval Civil Emergency Management Program. e. NAVFACINST 3440.17 series, Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Warfare Defense (CBR-D) Material and Equipment Allowance for Naval Shore Activities. f. NAVMED P-5041, Medical Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties.

8. NATO Standardization Agreements (STANAG) and Publications
a. STANAG 2002 Edition 8, Warning Signs for the Marking of Contaminated or Dangerous Land Areas, Complete Equipment and Supplies. b. STANAG 2047 Edition 7, Emergency Alarms of Hazards or Attack. c. STANAG 2083 Edition 5, Amendment 4, Commander’s Guide on Nuclear Radiation Exposure of Groups. d. STANAG 2103 Edition 7, Amendment 4, Reporting Nuclear Detonations, Radioactive Fallout, and Biological and Chemical Attacks and Predicting Associated Hazards—ATP-45. e. STANAG 2104 Edition 7, Amendment 1, Friendly Nuclear Strikewarn. f. STANAG 2111 Edition 4, Target Analysis—Nuclear Weapons. g. STANAG 2133 Edition 1, Amendment 5, Vulnerability Assessment of Chemical and Biological Hazards. h. STANAG 2150 Edition 5, NATO Standards of Proficiency for NBC Defense. i. STANAG 2352 Edition 4, NBC Equipment Operational Guidelines. j. STANAG 2426 Edition 1, Contamination Control Policy. k. STANAG 2451 Edition 2, Doctrine for the NBC Defence of NATO Forces. l. STANAG 2500 Edition 4, NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC Operations. m. STANAG 2984 Edition 4, Graduated Levels of NBC Threat and Minimum Protection. o. STANAG 3946 Edition 1, Amendment 4, Maximum Dosage of Nerve Agent Vapor to the Eyes Acceptable for Aircrew. p. STANAG 4192 Edition 2, Amendment 1, Design Criteria and Construction Parameters for CCAs Associated with COCs and PBFs on Air Force Installations. q. NATO Amed P-6 (B), NATO Handbook on Medical Aspects of NBC Defensive Operations.

9. Other Sources
a. 29 CFR 1910.119 series (OSHA) b. Applying Collective Protection to Existing Buildings at Osan Air Base and Kunsan Air Base, Korea: A Report of the Joint Service Collective Protection Assessment Team, W. K. Blewett, et al. c. Jane’s NBC Protection Equipment, Tenth Edition.

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Appendix R
d. Inviting Disaster, “How Weapons of Mass Destruction Undermine U.S. Strategy for Projecting Military Power” by Greg Weaver and J. David Glaes USACMLS, Material Systems Division, DCD Briefing. e. North American Emergency Response Guidebook (NAERG). f. Expedient Personnel Decontamination System Video, SOFSP1-01-GVID-000365-00. Request copies from: US Army Soldier Center Attn: AMSSB-RIP-SP(N) Bldg 4, Rm D-218 Natick, MA 01760

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APPENDIX S
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS 1. User Comments
Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to the United States Special Operations Command, 7701 Tampa Point Blvd, MacDill AFB, FL 33621-5323 or E-mail at brushj@socom.mil. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship
The lead agent for this publication is the United States Special Operations Command.

3. Change Recommendations
Recommendations for changes to this publication should be submitted: a. Message b. E-Mail TO: USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL//SOOP-JP-D// brushj@socom.mil

c. Routine/written changes should be submitted to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command, ATTN: SOOPPJ-D (Mr. Brush), 7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill AFB, FL 33621-5323 d. Record of Changes: CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Distribution
a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publication centers. b. Only approved joint publications are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified or restricted handling joint publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, Room 1A674, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400. c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned administrative support responsibilities by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988, “Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.” Army: US Army AG Publication Center SL 1655 Woodson Road Attn: Joint Publications St. Louis, MO 63114-6181 Air Force Publications Distribution Center 2800 Eastern Boulevard Baltimore, MD 21220-2896 CO, Naval Inventory Control Point 700 Robbins Avenue Bldg. 1, Customer Service Philadelphia, PA 19111-5099

Air Force:

Navy

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Appendix S
Marine Corps: Commander (Attn: Publications) 814 Radford Blvd., Suite 20321 Albany, GA 31704-0321 Commandant (G-OPD) US Coast Guard 2100 2nd Street, SW Washington, DC 20593-0001 Commander USJFCOM JWFC Code JW2102 Doctrine Division (Publications Distribution) 116 Lake View Parkway Suffolk, VA 23435-2697 d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R.

Coast Guard:

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GLOSSARY
PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AFSOF AO AOB AOR ARSOF AT ATP BC BW C2 C4 C4I CA CAM C/B CBIRF CBT CCIR CCL CCP CCT CDE CDM CM CMA CMO CMOC COA CONPLAN CP CPS CPU CRD CRRC CSAR CSST CST CT CW D4 DA DAD DDS DECON DOD DTD ECS EDM Air Force special operations forces area of operation advanced operational base area of responsibility Army special operations forces antiterrorism allied tactical publication biological/chemical biological warfare command and control command, control, communications, and computers command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence civil affairs chemical agent monitor chemical/biological chemical/biological incident response force combating terrorism commander's critical information requirements contamination control line casualty collection point contamination control team chemical defense equipment chemical downwind message consequence management civil military affairs civil-military operations civil-military operations center course of action concept plan counterproliferation collective protective shelter chemical protective undergarment chemical reconnaissance detachment combat rubber raiding craft combat search and rescue combat service support team (Navy) coalition support team counterterrorism chemical warfare deny, degrade, disrupt or destroy direct action detailed aircraft decontamination dry deck shelter decontamination Department of Defense detailed troop decontamination environmental control systems effective downwind message

GL-1

Glossary
EMP EO EPDS EPW ERO EXFIL FARP FHA FID FM FMC FOB GRR GZ HDO HLZ HMMWV HN HNS IEDK INFIL INTSUM IO IPB IPE IR JCSAR JFC JFSOCC JIPB JP JSLIST JSOTF JTF JUO Km LA/LB Teams LD LHA LLR LNO LPU LZ MA METOC METT-TC MICON MOOTW electromagnetic pulse Executive Order expedient personnel decontamination system enemy prisoners of war engine running on/offload exfiltration forward arming and refueling point foreign humanitarian assistance foreign internal defense field manual field medical card forward operational base ground radiological reconnaissance ground zero humanitarian demining operations helicopter landing zone “Humm-V” high mobility multi-wheeled vehicle host nation host-nation support individual equipment decontamination kit infiltration intelligence summary information operations; international organizations intelligence preparation of the battlespace individual protective equipment intelligence requirements joint combat search and rescue joint force commander joint force special operations component commander joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace joint publication joint service lightweight suit joint special operations task force joint task force joint urban operations kilometer NBC support to Special Forces Groups lethal dose liquid hazard area low level radiation liasion officer life preserver unit landing zone mortuary affairs meteorological and oceanographic mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available and civil considerations mission concept military operations other than war

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Glossary
MOPP MOST MSR MTT NAI NATO NAVAIR NAVFAC NAVSEA NAVSOF NBC NBCCC NBCS NBCWRS NCA NEO NGO NSW NUDET ODA OEG OPLAN OPSEC mission-oriented protective posture mobile over snow transport main supply route mobile training team named area of interest North Atlantic Treaty Organization naval air systems command naval facilities command naval sea systems command naval special warfare forces nuclear, biological, and chemical nuclear, biological, chemical, collection center nuclear, biological, and chemical sampling NBC warning and reporting system National Command Authorities noncombatant evacuation operation non-governmental organization naval special warfare nuclear detonation operational detachment-A operational exposure guide operation plan operations security

PA PEO PIR PKO PO PPE PSYOP RA RCA R-CBATEB R-CBSCE RES RHIB ROE ROTA RSOV SA SDS SDV SEAL SF SFOB SFODA SHS SII SME SO

public affairs peace enforcement operations priority intelligence requirements peacekeeping operations peace operations personnel protective equipment psychological operations radiological agent riot control agents radiological chemical biological analysis and technical evaluation board radiological chemical biological sampling control element radiation exposure status rigid hull inflatable boat rules of engagement risks of release other than attack ranger special operations vehicle security assistance sorbent decontamination system seal delivery vehicle sea- air- land team special forces special forces operational base special forces operational detachment - A sodium hypochlorite solution statement of intelligence interest subject matter expert special operation(s)

GL-3

Glossary
SOC SOF SOP SOTSE SR TBM TEU TFA TIC TIM TIP TTP UN USCINCSOC USG USSOCOM UW VHA VX WMD special operations command special operations force(s) standing operating procedure special operations theater support element special reconnaissance theater ballistic missile technical escort unit toxic free area toxic industrial chemicals toxic industrial material target intelligence package tactics, techniques, and procedures United Nations Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command United States Government United States Special Operations Command unconventional warfare vapor hazard area ethyl-S-dimethylaminoethyl methylphosphonothiolate weapons of mass destruction

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Glossary PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
aerosol. A liquid or solid composed of finely divided particles suspended in a gaseous medium. Examples of common aerosols are mist, fog, and smoke. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.) agent. See biological or chemical agent. (This term and its definition are applicable only in the context of this publication and cannot be referenced outside this publication) antiterrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. (JP1-02) avoidance. Individual and/or unit measures taken to avoid or minimize nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) attacks and reduce the effects of NBC hazards. (JP1-02) biological agent. A microorganism that causes disease in personnel, plants, or animals or causes the deterioration of materiel. (JP 1-02) biological defense. The methods, plans, and procedures involved in establishing and executing defensive measures against attacks using biological agents. (JP 1-02) biological environment. Conditions found in an area resulting from direct or persisting effects of biological weapons. (JP 1-02) biological threat. A threat that consists of biological material planned to be deployed in order to produce casualties in personnel or animals or damage plants. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.) biological weapon. An item of materiel which projects, disperses, or disseminates a biological agent including arthropod vectors. (JP 1-02) blister agent. A chemical agent which injures the eyes and lungs, and burns or blisters the skin. Also called vesicant agent. (JP1-02) blood agent. A chemical compound, including the cyanide group, that affects bodily functions by preventing the normal utilization of oxygen by body tissues. (JP1-02) center of gravity. Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. (JP 1-02) chemical agent. Any toxic chemical intended for use in military operations. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.) chemical contamination. See contamination. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.) chemical defense. The methods, plans and procedures involved in establishing and executing defensive measures against attack utilizing chemical agents. See also NBC defense. (JP 1-02) chemical environment. Conditions found in an area resulting from direct or persisting effects of chemical weapons. (JP 1-02) chemical operations. Employment of chemical agents to kill, injure, or incapacitate for a significant period of time, personnel or animals, and deny or hinder the use of areas, facilities, or material; or defense against such employment. (JP1-02) chemical warfare. All aspects of military operations involving the employment of lethal and incapacitating munitions/agents and the warning and protective measures associated with such offensive operations. Since riot control agents and herbicides are not considered to be chemical warfare agents, those two items will be referred to separately or under the broader term

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Glossary
“chemical,” which will be used to include all types of chemical munitions/agents collectively. Also called CW. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.) chemical warfare convention (cwc). The CWC, which entered into force for states parties on 26 April 1997, bans the acquisition, development, production, transfer, and use of chemical weapons. It prohibits the use of riot control agents as a method of warfare. It provides for the destruction of all chemical weapons stocks and production facilities within 10 years after entry into force. It contains a vigorous challenge regime to ensure compliance. The United States ratified the CWC on 25 April 1997. chemical weapon. Together or separately, (a) a toxic chemical and its precursors, except when intended for a purpose not prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention; (b) a munition or device, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through toxic properties of those chemicals specified in (a), above, which would be released as a result of the employment of such munition or device; (c) any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions or devices specified in (b), above. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.) circle william. Ventilation fitting onboard ship that can be set to limit contamination in the event of an NBC attack. coalition. An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JP 1-02) combatant command. A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 1-02) contaminate. See contamination. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.) contaminated remains. Remains of personnel which have absorbed or upon which have been deposited radioactive material, or biological or chemical agents. (JP 1-02) contamination. 1. The deposit, absorption, or adsorption of radioactive material, or of biological or chemical agents on or by structures, areas, personnel, or objects. See also fallout; induced radiation; residual radiation. (DOD) 2. Food and/or water made unfit for consumption by humans or animals because of the presence of environmental chemicals, radioactive elements, bacteria or organisms, the byproduct of the growth of bacteria or organisms, the decomposing material (to include the food substance itself), or waste in the food or water. (JP 1-02) contamination control. Procedures to avoid, reduce, remove, or render harmless, temporarily or permanently, nuclear, biological, and chemical contamination for the purpose of maintaining or enhancing he efficient conduct of military operations. (JP 1-02) counterterrorism. Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. (JP 1-02) decontamination. The process of making any person, object, or area safe by absorbing, destroying, neutralizing, making harmless, or removing chemical or biological agents, or by removing radioactive material clinging to or around it. (JP 1-02) deliberate planning. A planning process for the deployment and employment of apportioned forces and resources that occurs in response to a hypothetical situation. Deliberate planners rely heavily on assumptions regarding the circumstances that will exist when the plan is executed. (JP 1-02) detection. In nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) environments, the act of locating NBC hazards by use of NBC detectors or monitoring and/or survey teams. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.) dirty. NBC contaminated. dispersion. 1. A scattered pattern of hits around the mean point of impact of bombs and projectiles dropped or fired under identical conditions. 2. In antiaircraft gunnery, the scattering of shots in range and deflection about the mean point of explosion. 3. The spreading or separating of troops, materiel, establishments, or activities which are usually concentrated in limited areas to reduce vulnerability. 4. In chemical and biological operations, the dissemination of agents in liquid or aerosol form. 5. In airdrop operations, the scatter of personnel and/or cargo on the drop zone. 6. In naval control of shipping, the berthing of a ship

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Glossary
in the periphery of the port area or in the vicinity of the port for its own protection in order to minimize the risk of damage from attack. (JP 1-02) doctrine. Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative, but requires judgement in applications. (JP 1-02) electromagnetic pulse. The electromagnetic radiation from a nuclear explosion caused by Compton-recoil electrons and photoelectrons from photons scattered in the materials of the nuclear device or in a surrounding medium. The resulting electric and magnetic fields may couple with electrical/electronic systems to produce damaging current and voltage surges. May also be caused by nonnuclear means. Also called EMP. (JP 1-02) Executive Order 11850. The executive order dated, 8 April 1975, Renunciation of Certain Uses in War of Chemical Herbicides and Riot Control Agents, renounced first use of herbicides in war (except for specified defensive uses) and first use of RCA in war except for defensive military modes to save lives. ground zero. The point on the surface of the earth at, or vertically below or above, the center of a planned or actual nuclear detonation. (JP 1-02) host-nation support. Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crisis or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Also called HNS. (JP 1-02) hot spot. Region in a contaminated area in which the level of radioactive contamination is considerably greater than in neighboring regions in the area. (JP 1-02) immediate decontamination. Decontamination carried out by individuals immediately upon becoming contaminated. It is performed in an effort to minimize casualties, save lives, and limit the spread of contamination. Also called emergency decontamination. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.) individual protection. Actions taken by individuals to survive and continue the mission under nuclear, biological, and chemical conditions. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.) individual protective equipment. In nuclear, biological and chemical warfare, the personal clothing and equipment required to protect an individual from biological and chemical hazards and some nuclear effects. (JP 1-02) industrial chemicals. Chemicals developed or manufactured for use in industrial operations or research by industry, government, or academia. These chemicals are not primarily manufactured for the specific purpose of producing human casualties or rendering equipment, facilities, or areas dangerous for human use. Hydrogen cyanide, cyanogen chloride, phosgene, and chloropicrin are industrial chemicals that also can be military chemical agents. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.) joint. Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. (JP 1-02) joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (JP 1-02) joint force special operations component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of special operations forces and assets, planning and coordinating special operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force special operations component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The joint force special operations component commander will normally be the commander with the preponderance of special operations forces and the requisite command and control capabilities. Also called JFSOCC. (JP 1-02)

GL-7

Glossary
joint special operations task force. A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The joint special operations task force may have conventional nonspecial operation units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. Also called JSOTF. (JP 1-02) joint task force. A joint task force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called JTF. (JP 1-02) mission-oriented protective posture. A flexible system of protection against nuclear, biological, and chemical contamination. This posture requires personnel to wear only that protective clothing and equipment (mission-oriented protective posture gear) appropriate to the threat level, work rate imposed by the mission, temperature, and humidity. Also called MOPP. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.) mission-oriented protective posture gear. Military term for individual protective equipment including suit, boots, gloves, mask with hood, first aid treatments, and decontamination kits issued to soldiers. Also called MOPP gear. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.) mobile training team. A team consisting of one or more US military or civilian personnel sent on temporary duty, often to a foreign nation, to give instruction. The mission of the team is to train indigenous personnel to operate, maintain, and employ weapons and support systems, or to develop a self-training capability in a particular skill. The National Command Authorities may direct a team to train either military or civilian indigenous personnel, depending upon host nation requests. Also called MTT. (JP 1-02) multinational force. A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed a temporary alliance for some specific purpose. (JP1-02) mylar. A trademark used for a thin strong polyester material. neat chemical agent. A non-diluted, full-strength (as manufactured) chemical agent. A chemical agent manufactured by the a binary synthesis route will also be considered a neat agent regardless of purity. nerve agent. A potentially lethal chemical agent which interferes with the transmission of nerve impulses. (JP 1-02) nonpersistent agent. A chemical agent that when released dissipates and/or loses its ability to cause casualties after 10 to 15 minutes. (JP 1-02) nuclear, biological, and chemical conditions. See nuclear, biological, and chemical environment. nuclear, biological, and chemical defense. Defensive measures that enable friendly forces to survive, fight, and win against enemy use of nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons and agents. US forces apply NBC defensive measures before and during integrated warfare. In integrated warfare, opposing forces employ nonconventional weapons along with conventional weapons (NBC weapons are nonconventional). (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.) nuclear, biological, and chemical environment. Environments in which there is deliberate or accidental employment, or threat of employment, of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons; deliberate or accidental attacks or contamination with toxic industrial materials, including toxic industrial chemicals; or deliberate or accidental attacks or contamination with radiological (radioactive) materials. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.) nuclear defense. The methods, plans, and procedures involved in establishing and exercising defensive measures against the effects of an attack by nuclear weapons or radiological warfare agents. It encompasses both the training for, and the implementation of, these methods, plans, and procedures. See also NBC defense. (JP 1-02) off-gassing. Term used to denote vapor release of biological or chemical agent. pathogen. A disease-producing microorganism. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

GL-8

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

USSOCOM Pub 3-11

Glossary
persistency. In biological or chemical warfare, the characteristic of an agent which pertains to the duration of its effectiveness under determined conditions after its dispersal. (JP 1-02) persistent agent. A chemical agent that when released remains able to cause casualties for more than 24 hours to several days or weeks. (JP 1-02) protection. Measures that are taken to keep nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards from having an adverse effect on personnel, equipment, or critical assets and facilities. Protection consists of five groups of activities: hardening of positions; protecting personnel; assuming mission-oriented protective posture; using physical defense measures; and reacting to attack. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.) protective mask. A protective ensemble designed to protect the wearer’s face and eyes and prevent the breathing of air contaminated with chemical and/or biological agents. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.) radionuclide. A nuclide (type of atom specified by its atomic number, atomic mass, and energy state, such as Carbon 14) that exhibits radioactivity. riot control agent. Any chemical, that is not listed in the Chemical Weapons Convention, which can produce rapidly in humans sensory irritate or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time following termination of exposure. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.) special operations command. A subordinate unified or other joint command established by a joint force commander to plan, coordinate, conduct, and support joint special operations within the joint force commander’s assigned operational area. Also called SOC. (JP1-02) sterilize. To remove from material to be used in covert and clandestine operations, marks or devices which can identify it as emanating from the sponsoring nation or organization. (JP1-02) subordinate command. A command consisting of the commander and all those individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or installations that have been placed under the command by the authority establishing the subordinate command. (JP 1-02) survey. The directed effort to determine the location and the nature of a chemical, biological, and radiological hazard in an area. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.) time-sensitive (special operations) planning. The planning for the deployment and employment of assigned, attached, and allocated forces and resources that occurs in response to an actual situation. Time-sensitive planners base their plan on the actual circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. (JP1-02) toxic chemical. Any chemical which, through its chemical action on life processes, can cause death, temporary incapacitation, or permanent harm to humans or animals. This includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin or of their method of production, and regard less of whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.) toxin. See toxin agent. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.) toxin agent. A poison formed as a specific secretion product in the metabolism of a vegetable or animal organism as distinguished from inorganic poisons. Such poisons can also be manufactured by synthetic processes. (JP 1-02) Tri-Wipe. Three step procedure to decontaminate. Step 1-wipe down with bleach solution. Step 2-wipe down with water. Step 3-wipe down with paper towel. weapons of mass destruction. In arms control usage, weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Can be nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, but excludes the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon. Also called WMD. (JP 1-02)

GL-9

Glossary

Intentionally Blank

GL-10

USSOCOM Pub 3-11

FM 3-05.105 NTTP 3-11.30 AFTTP(I) 3-2.35 15 February 2001

By Order of theSecretary of the Air Force:

LANCE L. SMITH
Major General, USAF Commander Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center

Air Force Distribution: F

FM 3-05.105 NTTP 3-11.30 AFTTP(I) 3-2.35 USSOCOM Pub 3-11 28 SEPTEMBER 2001

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: ERIC K. SHINSEKI General, United States Army Chief of Staff

Official: JOEL B. HUDSON Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army 0131902

DISTRIBUTION: Active Army, Army National Guard, and U. S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with the initial distribution number 115859, requirements for FM 305.105.

PIN: 079417-000

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