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FM 3-05.



JULY 2003

Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only to protect technical or operational
information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program or by other
means. This determination was made on 30 May 2003. Other requests for this document must be
referred to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School,
ATTN: AOJK-DT-SFD, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28310-5000.

Destroy by any method that must prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.

Headquarters, Department of the Army

FM 3-05.230


Washington, DC, 30 July 2003




PREFACE .................................................................................................................. iii

Chapter 1 SPECIAL FORCES ROLE .......................................................................................1-1
Special Forces Organization ....................................................................................1-1
Host Nation Assistance ............................................................................................1-3
Counterpart Relationships........................................................................................1-3
Conversion and Demobilization................................................................................1-4

Chapter 2 PREDEPLOYMENT PLANNING .............................................................................2-1

Detachment Assignments ........................................................................................2-1
Support and Sustainment Planning Process............................................................2-1
Deliberate Mission Planning Process.......................................................................2-2
Time-Sensitive Mission Planning Process ...............................................................2-2
Base Camp Principles ..............................................................................................2-2
Base Camp Considerations......................................................................................2-3
Planning Considerations ..........................................................................................2-5
Security Equipment and Measures ..........................................................................2-8
Regional Analysis .....................................................................................................2-9
Terrain Analysis........................................................................................................2-9

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only to protect

technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange
Program or by other means. This determination was made on 30 May 2003. Other requests for this
document must be referred to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare
Center and School, ATTN: AOJK-DT-SFD, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28310-5000.

DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that must prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of
the document.

FM 3-05.230


Chapter 3 EMPLOYMENT........................................................................................................ 3-1

Section I - SFODA Staff Responsibilities ............................................................ 3-1
Section II - Base Camp Construction................................................................... 3-3
Description ............................................................................................................... 3-3
Miscellaneous Tips and Techniques...................................................................... 3-50
Section III - Base Camp Operations ................................................................... 3-57
SF Group/Battalion Staff Responsibilities.............................................................. 3-57
Base Camp Defense.............................................................................................. 3-58
Screening, Cordon, and Search Operations.......................................................... 3-58
Security Measures ................................................................................................. 3-64

Chapter 4 REDEPLOYMENT ................................................................................................... 4-1

Disposition of Base Camp........................................................................................ 4-1
Final Closeout .......................................................................................................... 4-2

Appendix A WEIGHTS, MEASURES, AND CONVERSION TABLES .......................................A-1

Appendix B LOGISTICAL SUSTAINMENT ................................................................................B-1
Appendix C FUNDING................................................................................................................ C-1
Appendix D LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS .................................................................................. D-1
Appendix E FIRE SUPPORT.......................................................................................................E-1
Appendix G BUILDING MATERIALS......................................................................................... G-1
Appendix H ELECTRICAL REQUIREMENTS ........................................................................... H-1
Appendix I BASE CAMP INDIVIDUAL BUILDING PLANS ....................................................... I-1
Appendix J VIETNAM-ERA BASE CAMP EXAMPLES ............................................................ J-1
Appendix K MEDIA SUPPORT ...................................................................................................K-1
GLOSSARY .................................................................................................Glossary-1
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................... Bibliography-1
INDEX ............................................................................................................... Index-1

Field Manual (FM) 3-05.230 is a “how to” guide for Special Forces (SF)
conducting joint and combined operations. It provides references and describes
tactics, techniques, and procedures for establishing base camp operations. It
supports the doctrinal concepts and principles of FM 3-05.20, Special Forces
Operations; FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces; and Joint
Publication (JP) 3-10.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Base
Defense, and should be used in conjunction with these manuals. This FM is a
focused collection of applications and practical information. It is not intended to
provide “the schoolhouse solution” to a particular problem or situation, but to
help detachments recognize, analyze, and resolve the problems they will
encounter throughout the full spectrum of operations.
This manual was designed and written for SF operating in an ambiguous
environment. The specific objective of FM 3-05.230 is to devise fabrication
techniques, recommend air-transportable equipment, and organize the camp
construction sequence, with a view toward increasing the efficiency of SF during
the initial phases of base camp establishment. The techniques and equipment
described in this manual include concepts tailored from the warning order to the
time of demobilization and disposition of the camp.
This manual is unclassified to ensure Armywide dissemination and facilitate the
integration of SF in the preparation and execution of campaigns and major
operations. It also provides guidance for SF commanders who determine the force
structure, budget, training, material, and operational requirements necessary to
prepare SF to conduct their missions and collateral activities.
The most common measurements that the soldier uses are expressed throughout
the text and in many cases are United States (U.S.) standard terms rather than
metric. Appendix A consists of conversion tables that may be used when mission
requirements or environments change.
This manual contains numerous acronyms, abbreviations, and terms. Users
should refer to the Glossary at the back of this manual for their meanings and
The proponent of this manual is the United States Army John F. Kennedy
Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS). Submit comments and
recommended changes to Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: AOJK-DT-SFD,
Fort Bragg, NC 28310-5000.
Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not
refer exclusively to men.

Chapter 1

Special Forces Role

The U.S. Army’s mission is to fight and win America’s wars. SF
operations encompass war, conflict, and peacetime engagements. SF
operations, although carried out at the tactical level, are characterized by
their strategic and operational implications. The unique SF skills,
consisting of language qualification, regional orientation, area studies,
and interpersonal relations, are keys to past successes experienced by SF
in the field. This chapter discusses SF organization, as well as SF and
host nation (HN) relationships from base camp establishment through
demobilization of the camp.


1-1. SF units, along with other Army special operations forces (ARSOF),
conduct special operations (SO) throughout the full spectrum of operations. The
basic element of SF is the Special Forces operational detachment A (SFODA), a
12-man detachment. SF companies and battalion headquarters (HQ) have
similar detachments, known as Special Forces operational detachments B
(SFODBs) and Special Forces operational detachments C (SFODCs),
respectively. Generically, these units are referred to as Special Forces
operational detachments (SFODs). When forward-deployed, SFODBs are
referred to as advanced operational bases (AOBs), SFODCs are forward
operational bases (FOBs), and SF groups are Special Forces operational bases


1-2. The Special Forces group (Airborne) (SFG[A]) is a multipurpose and
extremely flexible organization. Its mission is to plan, conduct, and support
SO activities in any operational environment whether it is permissive,
uncertain, or hostile. The SFG(A) consists of those elements described in the
following paragraphs; however, FM 3-05.20 includes further details. For the
purpose of this manual, only the SF battalion and its composition are
discussed in detail.


1-3. The group headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) provides
command and control (C2), staff planning, and staff supervision of group
operations and administration. The group HHC consists of the group HQ,
company HQ, and the chemical reconnaissance detachment—attached from
the United States Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) (USASFC[A]).

FM 3-05.230


1-4. The group support company (GSC) provides intelligence, signal, and
combat service support (CSS) to the SFOB. The GSC controls consolidated
facilities and activities when SFOBs and FOBs consolidate support
operations. The GSC is comprised of the following:
• Military intelligence detachment HQ.
• Company HQ.
• Service detachment HQ.
• Medical section.
• Signal detachment HQ.
• Personnel section.


1-5. The SF battalion of the SFG(A) plans, conducts, and supports SO
activities in any operational environment. The battalion is directly
responsible for isolating, deploying, controlling, sustaining, recovering, and
reconstituting SFOBs and SFODAs. The SF battalion consists of the
elements discussed in the following paragraphs.
Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment

1-6. The battalion headquarters and headquarters detachment (HHD)

commands and controls the battalion and attachments. The HHD performs
no operational mission separate from the battalion.

Battalion Headquarters and Support Company

1-7. The battalion headquarters and support company (HSC) provides
routine administrative and logistics support to all elements of the battalion.

Special Forces Company

1-8. The SF company plans and conducts SO activities in any operational

environment. The company HQ is the SFODB, a 10-man team. In garrison,
the SFODB commands and controls its own organic SFODAs. The SF
company commander, an experienced SF major, normally has more authority
and greater freedom of action than do conventional Army company
commanders. When deployed, the SFODB functions as a separate operational
detachment with its own assigned mission. The mission may require the
SFODB to operate separately or to exercise operational control (OPCON) of a
mix of organic and attached SFODAs. The SFODB is a multipurpose C2
element with many employment options. It can exercise C2 over one to six
SFODAs. The SFODB’s primary missions are to act as an AOB, a special
operations command and control element (SOCCE), or an isolation facility
(ISOFAC). The SFODB can also deploy to conduct SF operations in a
specified area of operations (AO) or joint special operations area (JSOA).
1-9. The basic building block of SF operations is the 12-man SFODA, also
known as an “A detachment,” “ODA,” or “A team.” All other SF organizations
are designed to command, control, and support the SFODA. The SFODA is

FM 3-05.230

designed to organize, equip, train, advise or direct, and support indigenous

military or paramilitary forces engaged in unconventional warfare (UW) or
foreign internal defense (FID) activities. The commander of an SFODA is a
captain. His two primary assistants are an assistant detachment commander
(an SF warrant officer) and an operations sergeant (a master sergeant). The
SFODA has one intelligence sergeant and two specialists in each of the four
primary SF functional areas (weapons, engineer, medical, and communica-
tions). By having two each of the specialties, the SFODA can conduct split-
team operations when the situation does not warrant the employment of the
full team or when the commander believes it is prudent to do so.


1-10. SF units are uniquely chartered to assist developing nations in
establishing and improving operational bases through SF’s collateral
activities of security assistance (SA), counterdrug (CD) activities, personnel
recovery (PR), humanitarian demining (HD) activities, and foreign
humanitarian assistance (HA). SF soldiers fulfill a niche in a geographic
combatant commander’s ability to assist a U.S. Ambassador’s initiatives and
a Country Team’s assigned tasks. FMs 100-25 and 3-05.20 include further
guidance on command relationships.
1-11. Broadly stated, the mission of SF is to advise, train, and assist HN
personnel; emphasis will depend upon the environment, rules of engagement
(ROE), and political and geographic characteristics of a particular area. This
assistance may vary from technical and medical advice to training and
equipping HN forces for offensive operations, and advising and assisting local
government officials.

1-12. Respect and camaraderie between SF and HN personnel is a
leadership issue. Showing reverence for legitimate HN culture, taboos, and
unwritten laws is a proven time-tested method of earning immediate respect
from the HN. This is not to imply that human rights, ethics, or other issues
deemed unacceptable by our government are tolerable.
1-13. SO imperatives are a fine guide for SF to follow in building productive
counterpart relationships (FM 3-05.20 discusses the SO imperatives in more
detail). Although not all imperatives apply all the time, mission planning and
execution concerning the following points increase the likelihood of success:
• Balance security and synchronization. Insufficient security may
compromise a mission. Excessive security and compartmentalization
almost always causes the mission to fail due to inadequate
• Understand the operational environment. SF units must understand
the theater and civilian influences, as well as enemy and friendly

FM 3-05.230

• Recognize political implications. SF units conduct operations to

advance political objectives. SF must understand the intent of the
ROE despite any military disadvantages that may result. The
advancement of the political objective may take precedence over the
military disadvantages.
• Consider long-term effects. SF units consider political, economic,
informational, and military effects when faced with dilemmas since the
solutions have broad, far-reaching effects. A single slip of the tongue
may result in massive loss of HN rapport.
• Ensure legitimacy and credibility. Significant legal and policy
considerations apply to many U.S. SF missions. Legitimacy is a crucial
factor in developing and maintaining indigenous and international
• Ensure long-term sustainment. Successful SF policy, strategy, and
programs are durable, consistent, and sustainable. SF units avoid
starting programs that are beyond the economic, technological, or
cultural capabilities of the HN to maintain without U.S. assistance.
1-14. The use of collective pronouns such as “we” and “our” in everyday
vocabulary along with interpersonal relationships enhance positive
counterpart relationships. Getting to know the HN families, traditions,
strengths, and weaknesses of diverse cultures greatly assist in arbitration
when conflict does occur. Conflict will arise—the SF elements’ decisive
management of the conflict determines credibility with the HN.


1-15. Conversions from a U.S.-sponsored operational base into an HN camp,
or the complete demobilization of a camp are well within SF doctrinal
capabilities. An example of a recent conversion is Santa Lucia Base Camp
(SLBC) in the rural Huallaga River Valley, Peru. Following 7 years of joint
interagency and multinational counterdrug operations known as SNOWCAP,
the United States turned over the SLBC facilities to the Peruvians in 1995
and transitioned into smaller, more dispersed urban sites that dot the river
valley. Though SF and the Country Team had invested years of labor and
millions of dollars, the productivity of the camp had outlived its usefulness.
Therefore, rather than completely demobilize the camp and cart the
equipment, facilities, and defensive barriers out of country, the Embassy
negotiated a mutual agreement and, with the assistance of SF, transitioned
the camp into a regional police HQ.
1-16. In short, SF units are well suited to convert or demobilize U.S.-
sponsored base camps. The inherent versatility and flexibility of SF allow
commanders to integrate and synchronize their capabilities with a Country
Team’s objectives. SF soldiers have superb collective skills and are adept in
negotiating and influencing dynamic complex situations to achieve desired
end states without jeopardizing future relations.

Chapter 2

Predeployment Planning
Like the commanders of other Army units, SF commanders task-organize
their elements into teams and task forces based on the mission, enemy,
terrain and weather, troops and support available—time available, and
civil considerations (METT-TC) in the battlespace. This chapter describes
the mission planning process that SF commanders and staff go through in
the predeployment phase.

2-1. In anticipation of various missions and to ensure functional coverage of
all premission activities, the SFOD commander organizes a detachment staff
using METT-TC. Detachment staff members perform those duties outlined in
FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, for their particular functional
area. Also, detachment members perform additional duties in the absence of
the primary individual or at the discretion of the detachment commander.
FM 3-05.20 contains more detailed information on staff organization and


2-2. Once an SF group commander receives the special operations command
(SOC) mission letter, his staff prepares a statement of requirement (SOR).
The SOR consolidates and prioritizes all group requirements that exceed its
organic capabilities. (Appendix B outlines the SOR format.) A complete SOR
addresses in detail all aspects of combat support (CS) and CSS, to include—
• Logistics, including supply, services, maintenance, and transportation.
• Funding resources (Appendix C).
• Soldier support, including personnel services, legal services
(Appendix D), finance services, postal services, and religious support.
• Health service support.
• Intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) support.
• Base defense, including nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)
defense; air defense coverage; and military police (MP) support.
• Signal support, including frequency and communications security
(COMSEC) requirements.
• General aviation support.
• Engineer support, including real estate, real property maintenance
activities, base development, and construction of training and
rehearsal sites.

FM 3-05.230

• Sustainment training of uncommitted SF teams.

• Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) support.


2-3. Based on the SOC commander’s mission tasking package (MTP) and
other mission guidance, SF commanders conduct their own mission planning
process. The objective of this process is to develop a comprehensive plan with
contingency options that provide flexible execution. SF commanders must not
tie themselves to a rigid plan. They must anticipate the unexpected and
remain agile enough to modify their plans as required to achieve their higher
commanders’ intent.
2-4. Deliberate SF targeting and mission planning requires days or weeks to
complete an adequate intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) and to
prepare for commitment of an SF team. Team members must understand the
political, social, economic, and military situation in the JSOA. They must know
the ethnic groups, customs, taboos, religions, and other essential data that
could affect mission execution. The SF team can best achieve this level of area
orientation through intensive area assessments and area studies before
commitment. FM 3-05.201, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations,
includes further information on the area assessment and area study.


2-5. When preparing for an SF mission, time may be a critical factor. A
time-sensitive mission may also impose time constraints on planning and
other mission preparation, particularly if no SOMPF exists for the mission.
Time is a significant factor because the success of the mission depends
largely on the quality of mission preparation. If there is not enough time for
normal preparation, the SF base commander determines minimum essential
preparation tasks. He then modifies the deliberate mission planning process
to do those tasks in the time available. The SF base commander must inform
the SOC or the joint special operations task force (JSOTF) commander when
these minimum essential tasks cannot be accomplished without an
unacceptable degree of risk of mission failure.


2-6. The base camp is comprised of independent, hardened, mutually
supported platoon positions surrounding a hardened central control facility.
Facilities are provided at the site for the SF team and HN personnel. The
overall defensive posture of this camp is enhanced by continual, aggressive
offensive operations conducted by camp personnel in their area of
responsibility (AOR). The base camp concept, as presently defined by SF,
embodies the following principles:
• Speed of building installations:
Should be defendable within 30 days.
Assisted by one engineer platoon.
Selected construction equipment used.

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• Desired size is such that the camp can be defended by one-fourth of the
assigned strength.
• Defense in depth:
Primary, alternate, and supplementary defense lines.
Alternate and secondary positions.
Ability to limit and seal off penetrations.
Internal camp changes.
Reserve forces.
Coordinated fire support plan.
• Variations in configurations.
• The interior should be compartmentalized in case a certain area of the
camp is penetrated.
• Resupply depends primarily on air unless the camp is situated near
• Airstrip requirements—if an airstrip is built, it must be near enough
that small arms fire can cover it.
• A plentiful water supply is necessary, preferably by wells.
• Prestocking of war materials, which can be banded and palletized
ready for delivery.
• Prestocking of a stock of two complete camps.
• Use of the containers in which war materials are transported to the
base campsite (containers express [CONEXs], military vans
[containers] [MILVANs], or sea-land containers).
• Generator use—it is best to use three-phase hook-up systems to avoid
power surges or blowing generators.
• Petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) storage sites separate from the
main camp area.
• On-hand excavation and earthmoving equipment for hasty repairs.
2-7. If the terrain dictates that the base camp be built in multiple sections,
personnel should build each section as though each is a separate camp. Also,
personnel must ensure defensive and protective measures support the other
camps. In an area where there are several camps and the opposition activity
is gaining strength, the camps are required to have—
• Immediate fire support (Appendix E).
• Immediate close air support.
• Reaction forces available within 30 minutes, upon request.


2-8. The single most important consideration for the camp is its security
(defense). One of the most important security considerations is camp location.
Proper location allows for better defense, infrastructure support, and a
myriad of other considerations based on METT-TC. Security concerns start
from the very moment that the order comes to construct a camp throughout

FM 3-05.230

construction to normal camp operations. Once construction begins, the camp

location will no longer be a secret. The camp will most likely require a large
security force to provide security in and around the surrounding area while
area development operations are being carried out. To be successful, the base
camp must have the support from the local populace.
2-9. Construction time must be kept to an absolute minimum. The camp
needs to become operational as soon as possible. A connecting airfield or
landing zone must also be constructed during the initial phase of
construction. The camp will depend on outside support that will most likely
come by air (fixed-wing and rotary-winged).
2-10. SFOD personnel must consider many factors when establishing a base
camp. These include—
• Fields of fire. This must be cleared first. The soldiers must be able
to see the enemy to engage them with direct fire weapons.
• Barriers. Sufficient time must be allowed for barrier construction.
Soldiers must be able to stop or slow the opposition’s advance to
prevent them from entering the area.
• Evasion plans. Evasion plans must be modified, if necessary. There
will be at least two evasion plans: one that is for the whole camp and
one that is just for the detachment.
• Patrolling. Active patrolling, listening posts (LPs), and observation
posts (OPs) should be initiated the moment operations begin. Soldiers
must know what is out in the surrounding area at all times.
• Construction priorities. The order of building or structure construction
must be prioritized. The communications bunker, tactical operations
center (TOC), and medical bunker should be among the first projects
completed. Along with these projects, provisions for sanitation,
cooking, sleeping, and water supply must be made. SFOD personnel
must have a plan and implement the plan.
• Pretraining. Pretraining must be conducted before deployment.
Commanders and operations sergeants must conduct training on a
regular basis to prepare the detachment for operations. Engineers must
maintain their skills and continue their education in areas required to
construct the camp.
• Camp operation standing operating procedure (SOP). A complete SOP
should be developed to allow for smooth operations and incoming
detachments to continue normal operations.
• Immediate action drills. These must be practiced until they become
second nature to all camp members. Drills should continue on a
regularly scheduled and unscheduled basis covering every possible
• Maintenance. SFOD personnel should develop a comprehensive plan,
to include blueprints, that covers all areas of the camp (barriers,
buildings, fields of fire, and equipment). Bunkers and support
structures will require daily maintenance in temperate climates, and
constant checks after engagements for structural damage due to near

FM 3-05.230

and direct hits, as well as wave concussions generated by crew-served

weapons and friendly artillery.
• Location. SFOD personnel should determine the type of design and
placement of the camp depending on location. If the camp is to be
located in a wet area or one that is prone to flooding, then care should
be taken in placing the camp on high ground and using construction
techniques that will either allow the camp to float or stay
waterproofed. If the camp is to be placed in cold or temperate climate
areas, then the structures will have to be insulated and heated. The
single most important thing to remember about any climate is that
most designs will remain the same, but there will have to be
modifications made to them to suit the environment.
• Drainage. The camp will require a drainage system throughout the
trench systems and under the bunker complexes. This drainage system
is accomplished by placing pipes with holes in the bottom of the
trenches or under the bunkers in a bed of gravel. The pipes must run
away from the camp to either a drainage field or natural creek or
runoff area. This work should be accomplished during the construction
phase of each system.
• External support. SFOD personnel should plan for the use of external
support, to include Army, Air Force, Navy, United States Marine Corps
(USMC), and HN engineers, as well as MP personnel.

2-11. Planning considerations fall into two types: general and logistical.
Both of these types are discussed in the following paragraphs.


2-12. The organization, training, and equipment of an SF team vary with
the actual mission. The FOB or SFOB/FOB commander must consider the
following factors during initial mission planning:
• Mode of employment (for example, low visibility or clandestine).
• Method of infiltration, resupply, and exfiltration.
• Scope and duration of operation.
• Operational environment (permissive, uncertain, or hostile).
• Availability of indigenous support mechanisms.
• Communications requirements based upon the electronic threat, time
sensitivity of transmission, and environmental conditions.
• Use of engineers to assist in construction of the base camp.
• Use of CI and MP personnel.
• Collection means (visual observation, photography, surreptitious entry,
and technical surveillance).
• ROE and other legal or policy considerations related to the mission.
• Cover (as required).

FM 3-05.230

2-13. The use of foreign or commercial materiel, tactics, and techniques may
permit the deployed SF team to pass a cursory visual inspection by a hostile
observer to avoid electronic identification, and to prevent identification by
weapons signature. SF missions may require procurement and use of foreign
or commercial—
• Weapons.
• Communications equipment.
• Clothing.
• Rations.
• Maps.
Other specialized materiel requirements may include—
• Satellite communications (SATCOM) and other specialized communi-
cations equipment.
• Suppressed weapons.
• Specialized equipment for collecting information, such as telescopes,
night vision devices, electronic surveillance and direction-finding
equipment, surreptitious entry devices, and remote sensor systems.
• Terminal guidance equipment, such as radar transponders and laser
target designators.
• NBC defensive clothing or equipment.
2-14. A sample communications plan has been developed to fulfill the
communications requirements for the base camp and the detachment
(Figure 2-1, page 2-7). Equipment listed provides for a synergistic operational
environment. Additional equipment will be required to outfit HN forces.
2-15. The group commander must identify his contingency requirements for
such equipment. He must coordinate with the special operations theater
support element (SOTSE) to procure sufficient quantities to properly train
each SFOD in the equipment’s use and repair before the SFOD is committed.
All equipment that could indicate the nature or operational area of the
mission receives the same security classification as the mission itself.


2-16. Sustainment operations are constantly in progress to maintain units
at a desired level. To maintain this level, planners must address the
following considerations:
• Maximizing the use of existing fixed facilities.
• Limiting CSS requirements to mission essentials.
• Minimizing the handling of supplies.
• Concentrating maintenance on returning major end items to service.
• Relying on airlines of communication for rapid resupply.
• Anticipating high attrition during resupply missions into denied areas.
• Identifying to the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) as early
as possible those items that require operational floats or other special
logistics arrangements.

FM 3-05.230

• Making maximum use of HN support, including local and third-country


Figure 2-1. SF Communications Connectivity

FM 3-05.230

2-17. Additional detailed logistics planning should include the following:

• Identification of time-phased material requirements, facilities, and
other resources necessary to support the current operation.
• Determination of logistics planning factors to be used for this operation
and development of logistical requirements. Additionally, the method
to determine sources for all classes of supply must be defined.
• Identification of support methods and procedures required to meet the
air, land, and sea lines of communication (LOCs).
• A description of the interrelationship between theater and strategic
LOCs, to include the need for airfields capable of supporting strategic
and theater airlift aircraft.
• Development of a country or theater concept of support.
• Development of a plan to provide food, equipment, and medical
supplies to relieve the suffering in the absence of nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) and information operations (IO).


2-18. United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) forces
operate in an international security environment dominated by the military
power of the United States and its friends and allies. This superiority has led
opposition groups to wage war systematically through terrorism. Terrorism is
a strategy of intimidation by exploiting and leveraging the real-time, global
dissemination of emotionally charged images produced by inflicting
casualties on the United States, its friends, and allies. The resulting
turbulence can provide to a terrorist group, or a rogue state, influence far out
of proportion to its size or legitimacy by driving a wedge between the United
States and friendly governments or weakening U.S. resolve to maintain
forward presence in critical places. USASOC Directive 525-13, Force
Protection, has additional information.
2-19. Commanders must plan for security of assets entrusted to them. Plans
must be affordable, effective, and attainable. Plans will tie security measures
together and integrate security efforts by assigning responsibility,
establishing procedures, and ensuring subordinate plans complement each
other. Planning must ensure that requirements at each threat condition
(THREATCON) have been addressed, to include responsibility assigned for
execution of measures, adequate local implementation guidance, and
assurance that adequate resources are available.
2-20. Physical security measures are physical security equipment,
procedures, or devices used to protect security interests from possible
threats. They include, but are not limited to—
• Security guards.
• Military working dogs.
• Physical barriers.
• Badge systems.
• Secure containers.

FM 3-05.230

• Locking devices.
• Intrusion detection systems.
• Security lighting.
• Assessment or surveillance systems (such as closed-circuit television).
• Access control devices.
• Facility hardening.
2-21. The security of the base camp depends on each individual there. By
integrating the above measures and the proper equipment, the lives and
equipment of the camp will be safer.

2-22. The military analyst must understand the nature of the complexity of
the situation and understand the opposition to determine effective courses of
action (COAs). His analysis must consider the following factors:
• The nature of the society.
• The nature of the opposition.
• The nature of the government.
2-23. The analyst must identify the principal factors for each of these broad
factors and study each in turn. Finally, he must weigh and compare the
factors in each area and reach conclusions. These conclusions lead to
development of COAs. The analyst can then predict the potential effects of
each possible COA and select the best one. The process is time-consuming
and may require additional expertise. FM 3-07, Stability Operations and
Support Operations, contains additional information.
2-24. The analyst considers the separate analyses of the society, the
opposition, and the government together. His conclusions must reflect the
interaction of all factors. He must determine the dynamic with which each
side attempts to mobilize human and materiel resources in its favor. This
dynamic affects specific groups of people. The analyst identifies issues that
concern key political, social, and economic groups. The government and
opposition may offer solutions to the people’s problems and attempt to deliver
on their promises within resource constraints. Measured combinations of
benefits, persuasion, and coercion motivate groups to conform their behavior
to the will of the government or the opposition.

2-25. Throughout history, the knowledge and physical effects of terrain
have played a dominant role in the development of society during both peace
and war. Terrain is a portion of the earth’s surface that includes man-made
and natural features. Terrain analysis is the process of analyzing and
interpreting these features and the influence of weather and climate on
them. Terrain data (or information) is raw data in any form about a segment
of terrain. Knowledge of the battlefield terrain is extremely important during
all phases and levels of military planning. JP 2-03, Joint Tactics, Techniques,
and Procedures for Geospatial Information and Services Support to Joint

FM 3-05.230

Operations; FM 5-33, Terrain Analysis; and FM 34-130, Intelligence

Preparation of the Battlefield, include additional information.
2-26. The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) is moving toward
digital maps. The foundation data concept provides for the creation of a
1:250,000-scale product in many areas where there are no mapping products.
This digital data may be enhanced using mission-specific data sets to produce
a larger scale product. All existing digital map and imagery data is available
online via NIMA’s Gateway Data Network on the SIPRNET and JDISS
systems. The SF terrain team will be able to assist the SF commander in
visualizing the terrain through access to various databases.
2-27. The process of extracting, reducing, and recording data is very time-
consuming. To make it faster and easier to manage, detachment members
should divide terrain databases into two areas: area-specific and general
data. Area-specific data is cataloged by geographic area and subject being
portrayed; examples are roads, soils, and vegetation. General data files
include books, scientific writings, technical literature, and other pertinent
data that does not fall into area-specific files.
2-28. These highly important databases support the IPB. IPB is a
systematic and continuous approach to analyzing the opposition,
environmental effects, and terrain in a specific geographic area. The process
plays a primary role in prebattle support. In providing terrain support to
friendly forces, the SFOD must ensure that IPB assesses the terrain for both
enemy and friendly operations.
2-29. Analysis of the influence of weather and climate on the natural and
man-made features of a geographic area is accomplished by organizing
various source materials into a single graphic manuscript. Information is
extracted from various sources (maps, imagery in various formats, and
literature). Data is then reduced to a uniform scale and format.
2-30. To determine the effect of terrain on the general COA available to
both friendly and opposition forces, analysts evaluate terrain in terms of
observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and
cover and concealment (OAKOC). Before analysts can analyze the military
aspects of terrain, they must first know—
• Nature of the operations.
• Types of units involved.
• Seasons the operations take place.
• Where the operations take place.
NOTE: During Vietnam, a number of base camps were built to pacify an
area. One camp in particular, named Pleiku, was built in an undesirable
location of low land. High water levels had stained surrounding trees.
Conventional commanders silenced the protests of U.S. SF advisors. During
the first monsoon season, the camp was flooded out and eventually relocated.
2-31. If time constraints are of concern, a modified combined obstacle
overlay (MCOO) should be used. An MCOO shows—
• Preferred movement routes.

FM 3-05.230

• What places to avoid (weather-dependent).

• What to expect for terrain, materials, and trafficability.
• Where to hide.
• Where the enemy is likely to hide and preferred enemy movement
• Where to site facilities, antennas, supplies, and so forth.
NOTE: Detachment members must be careful not to overlook extreme
changes in weather conditions.
2-32. Terrain analysis is essential to any operation. It provides the
commander with tailored and updated products that allow him to better
visualize the terrain in his AO. The detachment should also update
previously performed terrain analysis after base camps are completed.

Chapter 3

This chapter provides an overview of the different areas that are covered
throughout the employment phase: SFODA staff responsibilities, base
camp construction, and base camp operations. This chapter also provides
considerations and procedures that should be followed during the
planning, construction, and operation of a base camp. Concurrently with
base camp construction, military training is conducted and numerous
occasions arise that require the SF team and HN personnel to defend the
campsite from attack by the opposition. Due to a tremendous amount of
activity at or near the site, it sometimes takes several months to build an
SF base camp. The camp’s exact configuration and facilities will depend
upon the functional requirements and the METT-TC factors. After
infiltration, an effective area organization already in place may be found,
or it may be lacking or incomplete. Regardless of its development or
degree of success, constant improvements will be necessary.


3-1. During construction, the actual building of the camp begins and
responsibilities during this phase shift from the SFOB/FOB to the
detachment (FM 3-05.20 includes more information). The responsibilities of
the SFODA staff are explained below.
3-2. SFODA commander. He ensures that the buildup of logistics takes place
as scheduled. He has a weekly formal meeting with the HN forces to discuss
the plans for the coming week. The commander does not dominate the scene
with his counterparts if he can refrain from doing so. He considers his actions
as on-the-job training for his counterparts and places himself in the
instructor role. He also maintains frequent contact with the local officials on
the status of the camp and solicits their assistance. As the camp nears
completion, the SFODA commander shifts emphasis from camp construction
to expanding the operational capabilities of the detachment. He identifies
problem areas and seeks assistance, if necessary. He also establishes an SOP
for the operation of the base camp. The SFODA commander helps develop a
routine for nonoperational activities and divides responsibilities among
detachment members. He lays the groundwork for the next detachment.
3-3. Assistant detachment commander. He serves as second in command. He
ensures implementation of the detachment commander’s decisions and
concepts, and serves as the detachment commander in the commander’s

FM 3-05.230

absence. The assistant detachment commander provides technical and

tactical advice and assistance to the detachment commander on all matters
pertaining to the camp. He also provides technical and tactical experience
and guidance to detachment members.
3-4. Assistant operations sergeant/S-2. The S-2 follows up on all intelligence
matters initiated during the planning phase. He keeps the SFOB/FOB
informed of the intelligence situation, especially any increase in the
3-5. Operations sergeant/S-3. The S-3 continues to monitor the personnel
situation to ensure that the detachment remains at full strength. He also
ensures that immediate replacements are provided if a vacancy occurs. He
monitors the progress of the camp and maintains close coordination with the
S-4 to quickly identify any problem areas and resolve them. The S-3 keeps the
SFOB/FOB commander informed and develops the camp folder during this
period. The minimum essential components in the camp folder are—
• A map of the AOR.
• A map of the route to the camp from the SFOB/FOB.
• Imagery of the campsite.
• One copy of the area assessment.
• A status report on the critical items of equipment.
• The status of personnel.
• A defense plan (including a fire plan).
• An evasion and recovery (E&R) plan.
NOTE: The S-3 must ensure operations security (OPSEC), crime prevention,
and physical security programs are in place to protect these documents.
3-6. Engineer sergeant/S-4. The S-4 coordinates all requests for supplies
(including maps) and equipment. He develops a detailed air movement plan.
3-7. Medical sergeant/S-5. The S-5 follows through on CA and PSYOP
projects. He keeps the SFOB/FOB commander informed on progress. The S-5
continues to develop the team and camp medical plans and develops a
medical care plan for the locals. He coordinates with the S-4 on a detailed air
evacuation plan.
3-8. Weapons sergeant. The weapons sergeant develops a detailed defensive
and security plan of the base camp and all training areas. He coordinates
with the SFOB/FOB in the development and implementation of a reaction
force. The weapons sergeant coordinates with the engineer sergeant’s efforts
in base camp development. He also coordinates with the operations sergeant
in the development of training and training schedules.
3-9. Communications sergeant/assistant S-2. The communications sergeant
coordinates all S-2 efforts with the assistant operations sergeant. The
communications sergeant develops multiple communications methodologies
and coordinates with the weapons sergeant on all training plans. He also
assists the SFOD commander in the development of all communications
traffic to or through the SFOB/FOB or higher.

FM 3-05.230


3-10. Section II is devoted to one particular design that was developed after
careful study and research. The design is a square-shaped outer barrier and
perimeter with a square-shaped inner barrier and perimeter. This design
affords the maximum use of all weapons systems, C2 elements, and protective
systems in and around the camp. Camps used during the Vietnam era did not
always employ inner barriers or perimeters. There was a common
denominator found within a majority of the camps: trench systems (zigzag),
command bunkers, and key weapons bunkers. The enemy always targeted
the command bunkers, medical bunkers, and team houses as priority targets
during attacks.
3-11. This new design was developed with the following in mind: security,
construction process, manning, maintenance, and operation. The design was
kept basic to allow a detachment to construct the camp with minimum
outside assistance and to allow for ease of modification or improvisation.
3-12. This is only one design and should not be considered the “best” design
for a camp. It can be modified to almost any shape to fit the situation.
Terrain, environmental factors, and situation will dictate the actual design
and requirements for all camps.

3-13. The base camp is established to facilitate the assigned SF mission. The
base camp not only serves as an operational base to carry the battle to the
enemy, but also serves as an administrative center that must maintain
constant contact and services with the population base of the local area.
Support from the local population is critical to the success of the mission.
3-14. The base camp is based on the concept of independent, hardened,
mutually supporting platoon and company positions surrounding a hardened
central control facility. Facilities must be provided within the camp for the SF
team, their HN counterparts, and for 200 to 800 soldiers with or without their
dependents as the situation dictates. Appendix F outlines construction
methods and requirements. Appendix G provides information on building
materials. Appendix H discusses electrical requirements and Appendix I
provides individual building plans.
3-15. There is no “set” geometric pattern. Squares, rectangles, circles, stars,
and triangles are among the most common shapes. Appendix J depicts base
camp examples.
3-16. The exact location of the camp in relation to the surrounding terrain
will dictate the initial shape and size of the camp. The shape can change as
improvements are made and changes to the situation occur.
3-17. The lack of a set geometric shape has necessitated the need for seven
common denominators, regardless of the shape or size. Each of these common
denominators is discussed in detail in the following paragraphs.

FM 3-05.230

3-18. The inner perimeter is the heart of the SF base camp (Figure 3-1,
page 3-5). All operational, administrative, and logistics activities are
controlled from this area. It also serves as the hardened core of the camp’s
defensive system. A protective wall or berm that is usually constructed of
earth and logs surrounds this perimeter. Bunkers for automatic weapons and
numerous individual fighting positions are integral parts of this berm.
3-19. The following paragraphs describe the positions that are usually
located within the inner perimeter. Helpful tips and techniques for
construction, operation, and security are also included.

Inner Protective Berm

3-20. The inner berm is built above ground (Figure 3-2, page 3-6). Positions
on the outer perimeter are constructed below ground. This allows the inner
positions to engage targets outside the camp without having their fires
masked by the outer perimeter positions.
3-21. The inner berm is usually constructed of earth and logs. Bunkers for
automatic weapons and numerous individual fighting positions are integral
parts of this wall. Soldiers manning these positions are protected from
incoming indirect fire impacting to their rear by a splinter wall. This wall also
forms an aboveground trench for movement of personnel and supplies.
(Figure 3-3, page 3-6, depicts the layout of the inner berm.)
3-22. A section of chain-link fence erected 10 feet in front of each bunker will
help defeat rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) rounds. This fence should be
angled to prevent oblique shots from hitting bunkers (Figure 3-4, page 3-6).
RPG screens or fences are excellent protection for all of the camp’s fighting
bunkers. If available stocks of chain-link fence are limited, then the outer
perimeter bunkers have priority over the inner perimeter bunkers.

FM 3-05.230

Figure 3-1. Inner Perimeter

FM 3-05.230

Figure 3-2. Inner Protective Berm

Figure 3-3. Inner Berm Layout

Figure 3-4. Protective Fence

FM 3-05.230

Fighting Bunkers
3-23. Two layers of logs (at least 6 inches in diameter) form the foundation
of the bunker’s roof. The second layer crisscrosses the first layer. These logs
extend over the sides of the bunkers at least 18 inches.
3-24. Sandbags are used to contain the blast layer of the bunker’s roof. A
burster layer of logs (at least 6 inches in diameter) is often added over the
blast layer. Construction of a second-layer tin roof above the existing
sandbagged one is an excellent addition to these bunkers (Figure 3-5).
3-25. Each bunker contains at least one automatic weapon. These weapons
are issued in addition to the defensive firepower of the reaction force when
the bunker’s occupants are out on operations.
3-26. Each bunker has ample stocks of small arms ammunition (ammo),
grenades, food, first-aid supplies, and water. Space in the sleeping section of
these bunkers is at a premium. Triple-decked bunks are constructed to allow
maximum utilization of space. Wooden floors are excellent additions to these
bunkers. Although used primarily as living quarters, this section also has
firing ports on the left and right sides. Chicken wire is used to screen firing
ports from grenades. (Figure 3-6, page 3-8, and Appendix I, Figures I-2
through I-6, pages I-4 through I-6, show the layout of a fighting bunker.)

Inner Perimeter Security

3-27. Inner perimeter security is the responsibility of the reaction force
company and augmented by reconnaissance platoon and support personnel.
Normally one platoon is assigned to each side, which includes one corner of
the inner protective berm. Remaining personnel take shelter in a protected
area near the communications and TOC bunkers to form a replacement and
reinforcement pool.

Figure 3-5. Fighting Bunker and Roof Layout

FM 3-05.230

Figure 3-6. Fighting Bunker Layout

3-28. SFOD members construct inner perimeter security force quarters

above ground with chest-high sandbagged walls protecting it. These buildings
should be constructed on each side of the inner berm.
3-29. The inner perimeter security force also serves as the reserve force
during camp defense with the mission of reinforcing the outer perimeter or
counterattacking any breach by the enemy of that defensive position. The
security force must counterattack immediately after losing a defensive
position on the outer perimeter. The enemy should be caught before he has
the opportunity to consolidate his gain—seconds count. Light automatic
weapons, shotguns, grenades, speed, and determination are the ingredients of
a successful counterattack.
3-30. All entrances to the inner perimeter are locked and guarded during
the hours of darkness. SFOD members must maintain 24-hour security and
adjust the security posture of the camp based on METT-TC.

U.S. Special Forces Team House

3-31. SFOD members construct this position above ground but chest-high
sandbagged walls protect it. This building serves as the administrative HQ

FM 3-05.230

for the U.S. SF detachment. It contains offices for the detachment

commander and for the operations sergeant. It also has sleeping quarters for
some (never all) SF personnel. SFOD members must be aware of the
following security concerns:
• Detachment members should never be allowed to sleep in a single
location. They should be spread out over several locations.
• Each team member must know where his alert position is located and
the fastest route to it.
• A portion of the U.S. team will always be out of the camp on operations,
rest and recuperation (R&R), and so on. The operations sergeant has
the responsibility of cross-leveling the alert position roster to ensure
total coverage.
• Visitors will be housed in either the U.S. or HN team houses. They
must be briefed in advance of camp procedures and their individual
actions in case of attack.
• All aboveground buildings will have chest-high sandbagged walls on
the inside of the building, which will prevent rapid deterioration of the
sandbags (Figure 3-7).

Figure 3-7. Example of Sandbag Reinforcement

Host Nation Team House

3-32. Construction is the same as the U.S. SF team house. This building
serves the same purpose as the U.S. SF team house except it is for the HN

Communications and TOC Bunkers

3-33. These positions are always underground (water table permitting) and
built with the best protective materials and techniques available. These
bunkers contain radio rooms (one for U.S. personnel and one for HN

FM 3-05.230

personnel) and the TOC. Entry to the TOC bunker is limited to U.S.
personnel and carefully selected HN counterparts only. There should not be
separate TOCs for SF and the HN—one TOC operates effectively and
efficiently without the problem of two TOCs issuing different and sometimes
conflicting instructions to its members. SFOD members should—
• Ensure an emergency power and lighting system is provided for this
bunker. Battery-powered lights are useful in this role. A small
generator located near the bunker will provide power to critical
equipment inside the bunker.
• Stock bunker with emergency food, water, medical supplies, batteries,
and small arms ammo and grenades.
• Ensure bunkers always have two entrances and exits.
• Bury all field lines to protect them from damage. (S-folding these lines
every 20 feet or so as they are buried will create enough slack to afford
protection from near-burst indirect fire rounds [Figure 3-8].) STP 31-
18E34-SM-TG, Soldier’s Manual and Trainer’s Guide, MOS 18E,
Special Forces Communications Sergeant, Skill Levels 3/4, includes
more information on the laying of communications wire.
• Construct an additional tin roof 2 to 3 feet above the bunker’s existing
sandbagged roof. This will waterproof the bunker, thus preventing the
sandbags from becoming too heavy from rainwater, and may cause
incoming mortar rounds to detonate before impacting the sandbagged
protective layer (Figure 3-9, page 3-11). This second roof is an excellent
addition to all of the larger bunkers within the inner perimeter.

Figure 3-8. Example of Incorrectly and Correctly Buried Field Lines

FM 3-05.230

Figure 3-9. Communications or TOC Bunker

Medical Bunker
3-34. This position is always underground (water table permitting). It is
large enough for a treatment and operating room, a ward area, and storage
for most of the camp’s medical supplies. Both U.S. and HN team medics sleep
here. This bunker serves as a field hospital only during camp defense
operations. Detachment members receive day-to-day treatment in the
dispensary located in the outer perimeter. They should—
• Ensure both entrances to this bunker are wide enough to accommodate
aid and litter teams.
• Stock bunker with emergency food, batteries, medical supplies, ammo,
and plenty of water for drinking and for use in treatment of casualties.
• Ensure an emergency lighting system is included for the bunker.
Battery-powered lights and a small generator near the bunker are
• Construct a second tin roof above the sandbagged protective layer—the
roof is an excellent addition to this bunker.
• Build racks in ward area that allow for the stacking of patients on
litters after treatment so that space will not become a problem during
camp defense (Figure 3-10, page 3-12).

FM 3-05.230

Figure 3-10. Building Racks in Ward Area

Generator Bunker
3-35. Detachment members normally construct this bunker above ground
and heavily sandbag it for maximum protection. It furnishes all electrical
power for the camp. The size and number of generators depend on the size of
the camp. These generators will be double-banked, which will allow one bank
to run while the other is shut down for servicing or repairs. Adequate fuel
supplies should be stored in the adjacent bunker below ground. SFOD
members must—
• Always allow 2 or 3 feet of space between the top of the sandbagged
walls and the start of the protective roof so that heat does not become a
problem (Figure 3-11, page 3-13).
• Ensure chemical fire extinguishers are placed in this bunker.
• Bury all power lines to protect them from damage. (S-folding these
lines every 20 feet or so as they are buried will create enough slack to
afford protection from near-burst indirect fire rounds.)

FM 3-05.230

Figure 3-11. Generator Bunker

Mortar Positions
3-36. Detachment members locate the camp’s heavy mortars within the
inner perimeter. Personnel select sites to give 360-degree fields of fire.
Positions built below ground house the weapons, ammo, and crew. The
following operational and security concerns require SFOD members to—
• Ensure the ready-ammo box contains just that—ready ammo. Rounds
stored here are out of the packing cases and stacked by type (high-
explosive [HE], white phosphorus [WP], illumination [ILLUM]) and in
the cardboard shipping tubes (Figure 3-12, page 3-14). SFOD members
remove the tape from these tubes. The objective is to have the rounds
in the air in seconds—not minutes.

FM 3-05.230

Figure 3-12. Ready-Ammo Box

FM 3-05.230

• Cover the muzzle of the weapon when not in use (Figure 3-13).
• Cover the entire weapon with a poncho or tarp when not in use
(Figure 3-13).

Figure 3-13. Weapon Protection

• Dispose of unused powder charges (increments) from expended mortar

rounds that accumulate quickly during camp defense. These charges
are dangerous. One spark can result in serious burns to the mortar
crew. Place unused charges in an empty ammo can in the walls of the
pit after removal from rounds (Figure 3-14). Move unused charges to a
safe storage area as soon as possible until they can be burned or
disposed of otherwise. FM 23-90, Mortars, includes further information
on destruction methods.

Failure to properly dispose of unused charges
could result in bodily injury.

Figure 3-14. Proper Disposal of Unused Charges

FM 3-05.230

• Keep a generous basic load of all types of mortar rounds in the bunker
to avoid running out of ammo during the middle of a camp defense.
• Remove most of the ammo from the packing cases and store by type
(HE, WP, ILLUM) in wooden racks in this bunker. These rounds
remain sealed in their cardboard tubes until needed.
• Store additional ammo by type in wooden shipping boxes (Figure 3-15).
Have the necessary tools ready in the bunker to open boxes when
• Rotate all ammo, when restocked, to use the oldest ammo first.
• Maintain communication with the TOC by both radio and field
telephones. A directed mortar is invaluable during camp defense.
Undirected fire is a waste of time and ammo.
• Stock the bunker with food, water, first-aid supplies, flashlights,
batteries, small arms ammo, grenades, and tools.
• Construct a second tin roof above the existing sandbagged one—the
roof is an excellent addition (Figure 3-16, page 3-17).
• Preplan mortar barrages to channelize an attacking enemy, deny him
access to the camp’s tactical wire, and to cover dead space within the wire.

Figure 3-15. Mortar Ammo Storage

FM 3-05.230

Figure 3-16. Mortar Pit and Ammo Bunker

Fire Arrow
3-37. Although the fire arrow is not current U.S. doctrine, it may be
necessary based on HN support and as a possible contingency. This device is
used to signal overhead aircraft the direction of attack, desired direction of
bombing runs, resupplies, and so on. Detachment members construct this
device in a location that allows for maximum aerial observation and
accessibility by ground troops. It should have a primary and alternate
marking system for both day and night operations.
3-38. Virtually any type of lighted or visual marking system is acceptable if
all participating units are briefed and concur. Day marking or visual
acquisition devices include, but are not limited to, colored smoke, mirrors,
road flares, and any reflective or contrasting marker panel (space blanket).
Night marking or acquisition aids may include a light gun, road flares, fire
pots, flashlights, chemlights, and infrared (IR) lighting systems. Electronic
navigational aid (NAVAID) markings (ZM, SST-181, GAR-1, tactical air
navigation [TACAN]) may be used for either day or night operations and
placed as directed by mission requirements. To construct a fire arrow, the
following instructions apply:
• The shaft of the arrow should be at least 10 feet long. Two sections
forming the arrowhead are 3 feet in length. The entire framework is
constructed from 2 x 4s (Figure 3-17, page 3-18).
• A wooden spool from an electrical cable reel makes an excellent
rotating base from the fire arrow.
• A device must be constructed to lock the arrow in place once it is
pointed in the right direction.

FM 3-05.230

Figure 3-17. Fire Arrow

S-4/Arms Room
3-39. Detachment members construct this building above ground with chest-
high sandbagged walls. It must be large enough to contain all supplies and
equipment that are required to sustain the camp during normal operations
and during camp defense operations. The arms room will be collocated within
this building and will have the capability to secure both small arms and crew-
served weapons not required to be on line in the camp. Sleeping quarters for
both the U.S. and HN team S-4 personnel will also be located in this building.
SFOD members should—
• Construct storage racks in the supply room to accommodate items to be
stored on them.
• Organize items by type, size, and frequency of use.

3-40. SFOD personnel construct adequate latrine facilities in the general
areas of all living and work areas. The number and size of these latrines will
vary depending upon the amount of personnel in the base camp. Generally,
the box (pit) or the burn-type latrines are constructed. The burn type is
preferred. Detachment members situate numerous urine tubes throughout
the camp and place the tubes in a pit or drum (with holes punched all
around) and fill with gravel. SFOD members should—
• Position latrines near living and work areas.

FM 3-05.230

• Ensure there are enough latrines to handle at least 8 percent

(4 percent U.S. and 4 percent HN) of the force at any given time.
• Be aware of the two types of latrines that are easily constructed: the
box (pit) and the burn type. The disadvantages of the pit type are the
possibility of contaminating the ground water, overflow during the
rainy season, and having to relocate it once it is full. The disadvantages
of the burn type are the signature, the fumes produced, and the
required duty assignment.
• Ensure there are numerous urine tubes located throughout the camp
that allow for the quick discharge of urine without having to walk very
far. Detachment members construct urine tubes as follows:
ƒDig a hole large enough to accommodate a 55-gallon drum with an
open top.
ƒExtend pipes or bamboo tubes (minimum 1-inch diameter) from the
drum at a slight angle to a height of approximately 24 to 28 inches.
ƒPlace either metal or plastic funnels in the ends of the tubes and
cover the top of the funnels with a piece of screen wire to prevent
foreign objects and insects from entering the pipe or tube.
ƒFill the drum with crushed stone or gravel in various layers of size
and ensure the drum has several holes punched all over it to allow
for drainage.
ƒEnsure that a ventilation tube with screen wire over the end of the
tube is present.
ƒBury the drum and cover the top with a layer of crushed rock or
FM 21-10, Field Hygiene and Sanitation, Appendix A, Task 9, includes
further information.

Ammunition Bunkers
3-41. These are always constructed underground (water table permitting).
Detachment members locate these bunkers in several areas within the inner
perimeter and construct them close to or in the berm. SFOD members should—
• Ensure each of the camp’s fighting bunkers contains a reserve stock of
ammo. All fighting bunkers should be stocked in advance.
• Construct ammo bunkers close to or in the berm (one bunker per side).
• Ensure doors are large enough to allow for ease of loading and
unloading operations.
• Construct a second tin roof above the existing sandbagged one. This
roof should slope away from the bunker entrance and the
communications trench.
• Always stack and store ammo by type.
• Always have necessary tools in the bunker to allow for rapid opening of

FM 3-05.230

Vehicle Revetments
3-42. SFOD members build these above ground and use them as protective bays
in which the camp’s organic vehicles park at night (Figure 3-18). Construction can
be of earth and logs or dirt-filled 55-gallon drums. These bays are located in
several areas within the inner perimeter. SFOD members should—
• Incorporate armored vehicles into the camp’s defensive system by
constructing their revetments as integral parts of the berm.
• Always back vehicles into their revetments.
• Always construct alternate revetments for armored vehicles.

Figure 3-18. Vehicle Revetments

FM 3-05.230

Fire-Fighting Posts
3-43. Fires are a constant danger in any camp. In fact, fire has destroyed
more camp facilities than enemy actions. Fire-fighting posts should be located
throughout the entire camp. These locations usually consist of 55-gallon
drums filled with water and a supply of buckets. Chemical fire extinguishers
are located in all vehicles, motor pool, generator and fuel bunkers, medical
bunker, ammo bunker, and communications and TOC bunkers. If the
situation permits, SFOD members should place a water truck with a pump
and hoses within the inner perimeter. Detachment personnel should—
• Fill drums with rainwater on most fire-fighting posts. The addition of
gutters on nearby buildings channels the rainwater directly into the
drums (Figure 3-19). During the dry season, the camp’s water truck
may be used to fill the drums on a regular basis.
• Paint fire buckets red to allow for easy recognition of “strays.”
• Hold regular fire-fighting drills.

Figure 3-19. Use of Gutter to Fill Drum With Rainwater

3-44. 55-gallon drums may be used for field-expedient fire-fighting drums.

One method is to open the top of the drum with a chisel; however, this is a
very time-consuming task. A faster and more efficient method would be to—
• Remove the filler cap and empty the drum.
• Transport the drum to a safe area.
• Stand the drum upright with the filler cap facing up.
• Place three wraps of detonating cord inside the inner rim at the top.
Leave a 12-inch pigtail hanging over edge of the rim.
• Prepare the firing assembly with a nonelectric cap crimped to a safe
length of time fuse or fuse igniter.
• Tape the firing system 6 inches from the end of the pigtail.
• Detonate.

FM 3-05.230

3-45. The inner barrier is the obstacle zone surrounding the inner perimeter
(Figure 3-20, page 3-23). As the word “zone” implies, this barrier has two or
more barbed wire entanglements in depth (two rows) with intervals between
them. These intervals contain additional obstacle belts. The entire zone is
covered by fire from positions on the inner perimeter. The inner barrier must
also be wide enough to prevent the enemy from getting within grenade-
throwing range. Detachment personnel leave two passages open in this
barrier. The first is for the access road, which allows vehicles to enter the
inner perimeter (a later section of this chapter discusses the access road in
greater detail). The second is a small personnel path that leads from the
inner to the outer perimeters. Both passages have guarded gates.
3-46. Detachment personnel must remember that obstacles covered by fire
are barriers. These cost an enemy time and casualties to overcome. Obstacles
not covered by fire are merely obstructions and can be breached or bypassed
at random. The barrier itself will not halt a determined attack or even
infiltrators, but it will slow them down, cause casualties, and channelize
them so that effective fires can be brought upon their attack.
3-47. Starting from the berm and working outward, the inner barrier
usually contains the following protective features. Helpful tips and
techniques for construction, operation, and security are also included.

Double-Apron, Barbed-Wire Fence

3-48. This fence is 1 meter high by 3 meters wide. Construction techniques
are covered in detail in FM 5-34, Engineer Field Data. This fence is often
reinforced with additional wire when erected in the camp defense role. An
attacking enemy will attempt to breach a double-apron fence by—
• Explosives (bangalore torpedoes). This method will usually breach the
fence but results in the loss of surprise and can have a high casualty
rate if effective fire is immediately placed on the breach.
• Using wire cutters to cut through the lower strands of wire in the
enemy apron, the center fence, and the friendly apron (Figure 3-21,
page 3-23). This is time-consuming but can result in effective breach of
the barrier.
• Placing improvised scaling ladders or mats on the fence and using
these as ramps to cross over this barrier (Figure 3-21). Detachment
members should reinforce the standard double-apron fence for its camp
defense role with the addition of concertina wire. These members place
two concertina rolls inside the aprons (one on the friendly side of the
center section and one on the enemy side). The two concertina rolls
increase the amount of wire that an enemy must cut to create an
effective breach and the amount of time spent to accomplish this task.
Detachment personnel defeat the effective use of scaling ladders by
using two additional rolls of concertina wire in corresponding positions
on the outside of both aprons. They use horizontal wires on all of these
additions and stake the rolls inside the apron to the ground at the
bottom. The bottoms of the rolls placed on the outside are secured every
5 feet or so to the aprons.

FM 3-05.230

Figure 3-20. Inner Barrier

Figure 3-21. Examples of Breaching a Double-Apron Fence

FM 3-05.230

Mine Belt
3-49. Mines have been employed in the defensive systems of camps in the
past. Because of the potential source of danger to friendly forces and civilians,
the practice of employing buried mines in the camp’s defensive systems must
be carefully planned if they are to be used. Detachment members use
controlled mines and defensive devices extensively throughout the entire
defensive system. The M-18 claymore mines are excellent defensive weapons
when properly employed. SFOD personnel place these mines in depth (two
rows) so that they can be used against more than one assault from a given
direction. The “Outer Barrier” section, later in this chapter, discusses other
controlled mines in more detail. The following are helpful tips for SFOD
• Select locations carefully for claymore mines before employing them in
the defensive system.
• Employ claymore mines in depth (at least two rows). Mines should be
at least 3 meters apart in each row to prevent sympathetic detonation.
• Ensure that placement of each claymore mine provides full coverage.
• Always fire the outer row first.
• Stagger each row to safeguard the claymore mines from the backblast
of the outer rows.
• Be aware that claymore mines are electrically command-detonated
from friendly positions (in this case, the berm). Identify which firing
wire leads to what row by simply tying a knot in the end of the wire.
One knot would indicate the first row (outer), two knots the second
row, and so on.
• Ensure alert training includes the locations of the mines controlled
from that position and the timing for their firing. Do not fire claymores
at a target that can be destroyed by other means.
• Avoid the centralized firing of banks of claymores (five or more) from a
master control position.
• Ensure claymores in the inner barrier face the rear of the outer
perimeter personnel. This arrangement is not a problem during an
attack as outer perimeter personnel should be in protected positions
and the inner barrier claymores will only be fired in the event of an
attempted breach of the inner barrier. A simple but time-consuming
solution is to disconnect the firing devices each day. An alternate
solution is to mount the mines to the inside lid of a used ammo crate or
box. The box is then buried in the ground and filled with enough dirt to
keep it in place and still allow the lid to close. The lid is then raised
each night (or when required) by a wire or rope. A stake is placed in the
ground behind the box to act as a stop and to prevent the lid from
coming back too far and allowing the mine to fire into the air
(Figure 3-22, page 3-25). Remove the metal latch to prevent infiltrators
from locking it down.
• Save the firing wires from expended claymore mines. SFOD members
can reuse them with the addition of a new blasting cap.

FM 3-05.230

• Check all claymore mines daily to ensure that they are ready to be fired
and that good circuits are present. Use the supplied test sets or a

Figure 3-22. Claymore Mine

3-50. Detachment members use this obstacle belt to disrupt the enemy
during an assault and as a counter sapper measure. The tanglefoot usually
has a minimum depth of 9 meters. SFOD personnel place stakes at irregular
intervals from 1 to 3 meters apart. They also string barbed wire from these
stakes in irregular crisscross patterns at varying heights of 6 to 8 inches. This
process causes a crawling enemy to have to rise over the wire, thus exposing
him to observation and fires. SFOD members should—
• Always use metal stakes.
• Incorporate trip flares in the tanglefoot.
• Always rig flares on the friendly (inner) side of the obstacle belt with
the trip wires running forward at an angle toward the enemy (outer)
side. Doing so places the obstacle belt between an enemy and the trip
flares and will prevent him from disarming them before an attack or

Triple Concertina Fence

3-51. This fence is 2 meters high by 2 meters wide. FM 5-34 covers detailed
construction. SFOD members should always follow these steps:
• Erect from right to left while facing the outside.
• Space pickets as follows:
ƒPlace long pickets 5 paces apart.
ƒPlace anchor pickets 2 paces from the end of long pickets.
ƒPlace enemy and friendly rows of pickets 3 feet apart.
ƒOffset the friendly picket row from the enemy row.
• Use horizontal wires on all three rows of a concertina wire fence to
prevent the enemy from depressing the wire coils.

FM 3-05.230

• Stake the bottoms of the concertina wire coils to the ground every 8 feet
or less in both the enemy and the friendly rows.
3-52. An attacking enemy will attempt to breach a triple concertina fence by—
• Using explosives (bangalore torpedoes).
• Using wire cutters. This is extremely time-consuming but not
• Placing improvised scaling ladders under the fence and lifting up the
wire in a particular section to create a tunnel under the wire
(Figure 3-23).
• Using scaling ladders or mats placed on the fence as platforms to
depress the concertina coils to create a passage over the fence.

Figure 3-23. Use of Improvised Scaling Ladders

Channelizing Fences
3-53. These are usually triple concertina fences that crisscross the various
barbed wire and obstacle belts of the inner barrier. Their purpose is to
channel an attacking enemy into the fields of fire of friendly automatic
weapons. Their construction is identical to the triple concertina fence
described above.

Communications Trenches
3-54. These trenches zigzag through the inner barrier from the inner to the
outer perimeters (Figure 3-24, page 3-27). These trenches allow the protected
movement (from both friendly and enemy fires) of personnel and equipment
between these two perimeters. There should be at least one trench per wall or
side. SFOD members should—
• Always excavate communications trenches in an irregular zigzag
• Ensure trenches are at least 6 feet deep and are wide enough to permit
foot traffic in both directions at once.
• Always construct and emplace retaining walls to prevent cave-ins and
normal erosion during the rainy season.

FM 3-05.230

• Use the strongest, most durable material available to act as the facing
walls. Support in place by using pickets not smaller than 3 1/2 inches in
diameter. Maximum spacing between pickets should not exceed 5 feet.
Drive these pickets into the floor of the trench at least 17 inches.
Anchor the pickets at the top by running wire out to stakes or to
another form of tie-down located outside the trench. Use the formula
and diagrams outlined in FM 5-34, Chapter 6, to determine the length
of these anchor wires.
• Ensure that turns at the zigzags will allow transport of a litter through
them. A simple solution is to cut off the inside corners.
• Lock all entrances to the inner perimeter during the hours of darkness.
Each trench entrance in this perimeter should have a trapdoor
arrangement constructed and kept locked except during actual alerts.

Figure 3-24. Underground Communications Trench

Trip Flares

3-55. Detachment personnel rig all barbed-wire fences in the inner barrier
with trip flares. These should be inspected daily. Properly employed, trip
flares will not only give early warning but also illuminate an attacking
enemy. SFOD members should heed the following instructions:
• Never attach trip flares to the metal pickets of any fence. This is the
first place that an enemy will look. Attach flares to a separate metal or
wooden stake located behind the fence and always on the friendly
(inner) side. Run trip wires forward at an angle toward the enemy
(outer) side. This method will prevent the enemy from disarming them
before he attacks.
• Place trip flares in channelizing fences (these fences are unique in that
they do not have a friendly or enemy side) by locating them on separate
stakes between the coils of concertina wire rows. Run the trip wires out
to the right and left in an irregular pattern to the outer coils
(Figure 3-25, page 3-28). This method will prevent the enemy from
disarming the flares before an attack.
• Inspect all fences and flares daily.

FM 3-05.230

Figure 3-25. Channelizing Fences

3-56. The outer perimeter is the central defensive position of the camp
(Figure 3-26, page 3-29). The majority of the camp’s reaction force and
weapons defend this position. Numerous bunkers containing automatic and
crew-served weapons surround it. Water table permitting, these bunkers are
constructed underground. This allows the bunkers on the inner perimeter to
engage targets outside the camp without having their fires masked by the
outer perimeter positions. A perimeter trench links together all fighting
bunkers, platoon and company command posts, mortar pits, and ammo
bunkers located in the outer perimeter. Numerous individual fighting
positions are integral parts of each trench section. Normally, one reaction
force company is responsible for each side, to include one corner of the inner
perimeter. They are connected by communications trenches, at least one per
wall. These trenches allow the protected movement of personnel and
equipment between the two perimeters.
3-57. The outer perimeter consists of various protective features and
facilities. These are described in the following paragraphs.

Fighting Bunkers
3-58. Water table permitting, detachment members construct these bunkers
underground. They should have a depth of at least 5 feet. Logs used in the
construction sides and the roof should be at least 6 inches in diameter. SFOD
members then add a blast layer of soil to the roof. This layer should be at
least 2 feet deep. Personnel often add a burster layer over this blast layer.
These bunkers have three firing ports: one to the front and one each on the
left and right sides. Each bunker contains at least one automatic weapon.
Personnel stock each bunker with ample supplies and small arms ammo,
grenades, food, water, and first-aid supplies.

FM 3-05.230

Guard Towers
3-59. When possible, guard towers should be positioned around the outer
perimeter so that the towers have interlocking visibility.

Figure 3-26. Outer Perimeter

FM 3-05.230

Sleeping Bunkers
3-60. Each of the fighting bunkers has an adjoining sleeping bunker. This
bunker serves as the living quarters for the reaction force personnel manning
that particular section of the perimeter (Figures 3-5, page 3-7, and 3-6, page
3-8). Though addressed as separate entities for the sake of clarity,
detachment members actually construct the fighting and sleeping bunkers as
one installation with the perimeter trench passing through the center
dividing the two sections. All other construction details are identical. An
L-shaped entrance with steps is located in the rear of each sleeping section.
These steps permit entry to both the bunker and the perimeter trench.

RPG Screens
3-61. SFOD members erect a section of chain-link fence 10 feet in front of
each fighting bunker to defeat RPG rounds. Angling this fence prevents
oblique shots from hitting the bunker (Figure 3-4, page 3-6).

Perimeter Trench
3-62. This trench connects all the defensive positions of the outer perimeter
(Figure 3-27). This trench is usually 6 feet deep and wide enough to permit two-
way traffic. Each section of this trench contains numerous individual fighting
positions (bays). These positions have firing ports that cover the outer barrier, a
firing step-up, and a grenade sump. The rear wall of this trench (side closest to
the inner barrier) is slightly higher than the front wall containing the
individual fighting positions. This arrangement protects the occupants of these
positions from fires of the inner perimeter. Detachment members must provide
adequate drainage for this trench system and bunkers. All other construction
details are identical to those of the communications trenches described in the
inner barrier section of this chapter.

Vehicle Revetments
3-63. These are identical in construction and use to those found in the inner
perimeter. On the outer perimeter, vehicle revetments are constructed
parallel to the perimeter trench. This location affords vehicles protection from
both friendly and enemy fire.

Figure 3-27. Perimeter Trench

FM 3-05.230

Mortar Positions
3-64. Usually, SFOD members locate the camp’s light mortars (60
millimeter [mm]) in the outer perimeter. These pits are identical to those
constructed in the inner perimeter. Built below ground, the pit contains the
weapon, ready-ammo box, and an increment disposal can. The only difference
in construction is that the mortar pits on the outer perimeter not only have
steps connecting them with ground level, but also have a small passageway
that connects them to the perimeter trench. An adjacent bunker (with
overhead cover) serves as a crew shelter and ammo area. This bunker may
also serve as living quarters for the mortar crew. Detachment members
construct a triple-decked bunk in the space normally occupied by the cased
mortar ammo. This arrangement not only positions the crew close to their
assigned weapon, but also allows more room in the sleeping bunkers.

Ammunition Bunkers
3-65. SFOD members construct these bunkers underground (water table
permitting) on the outer perimeter and facing the communications trench.
They are located close to where this trench joins the outer perimeter trench.
This arrangement places an ammo bunker close to the center of each reaction
force company’s defensive position. There is one ammo bunker per section
(side) of outer perimeter. These bunkers have a double-wide door for ease in
loading and unloading operations. Detachment personnel organize and stack
(by type) the ammo stored in these bunkers. The construction of a second tin
roof above the existing one is an excellent addition to this bunker. This roof
should slope away from the bunker entrance and the communications trench.

Company Command Post

3-66. SFOD members also construct these bunkers underground. They
locate these bunkers on the rear wall of the perimeter trench, close to the
center of each company’s defensive position. There is one command post per
section (side) of outer perimeter. Radio and field telephones link company
command posts to the TOC. SFOD personnel post maps of the camp and the
surrounding area in these locations. The command post houses the company
medical personnel.

3-67. On the outer perimeter, SFOD members construct burnout-type
latrines above ground. These latrines are identical to those found in the inner
perimeter. Usually, detachment members construct at least three latrines per
section (side) of the outer perimeter. SFOD members must ensure they
account for the dead space created by these structures.

Well, Water Tanks, and Troop Showers

3-68. A plentiful water supply, preferably a well that is located within the
camp’s perimeter, is essential for the survival of camp inhabitants. SFOD
members will dig wells, if possible. Cisterns to catch rainwater during the
rainy season and direct it to underground storage may be required. Streams
and cisterns are inferior alternatives to a well as a source of water, but may
have to be used if the situation dictates. When initially constructing the

FM 3-05.230

camp, detachment members must consider water storage for a camp under
siege conditions. SFOD members should plan for this contingency in advance.
Two 10-foot water towers should supply all the camp’s needs. Detachment
personnel use pump and purification systems. Aboveground buildings serve
as the shower points for reaction force personnel. SFOD members must
ensure they account for the dead space created by these structures.

Dining Facility
3-69. SFOD personnel construct this building above ground. In addition to
the dining area, there is also a serving line, kitchen, food storage area, and a
butcher shop. Food must be sufficient in both quality and quantity. The
butcher shop is a necessity. Detachment members slaughter live animals on a
regular basis. This practice greatly reduces the camp’s refrigeration
requirements. U.S. and HN team medical personnel must constantly monitor
all sanitation procedures at the dining facility. From the standpoint of
morale, food problems are major problems. U.S. personnel should attempt to
eat what the HN personnel are eating.

Perimeter Road
3-70. This road allows camp personnel in vehicles to service the various
installations of the outer perimeter. Detachment members construct small,
single-lane trench bridges to allow vehicle passage over the communications
trenches. These bridges must be sturdy enough to support the largest vehicle
in camp when it is fully loaded.

Fire-Fighting Posts
3-71. Fire-fighting posts are located throughout the entire camp. These
posts are identical in design to those located in the inner perimeter.

3-72. The outer barrier is the main obstacle zone that surrounds the camp
(Figure 3-28, page 3-33). This barrier is two or more barbed-wire entangle-
ments in depth with intervals containing additional obstacle belts between
them. Fires from positions on both the outer and inner perimeters cover this
entire zone. This barrier must be wide enough to prevent the enemy from
getting within grenade-throwing range. Detachment members leave one
passage open through this barrier. This passage is for the access road that
allows vehicles to enter the inner perimeter.

FM 3-05.230

Figure 3-28. Outer Barrier

3-73. Starting from the bunkers and trenches and working out, the outer
barrier usually contains the protective features discussed in the following
paragraphs. Helpful tips and techniques for construction, operation, and
security are also included. Some of these protective measures may be
improvised; however, all mines should be command-detonated
whenever possible.

FM 3-05.230

Claymore Belt
3-74. This belt contains two rows of claymore mines, allowing the mines to
be used against assaults from two directions. Detachment members must
check claymores daily.

Punji Moat
3-75. The moat is one of the oldest forms of field fortifications. Properly
constructed, it still remains a very formidable barrier against enemy attacks
(Figure 3-29). SFOD members excavate a ditch (at least 8 feet deep and 8 feet
wide) around the entire outer perimeter. They embed punji stakes (15 to 18
inches long) at 1-foot intervals in both the sides and floor of this moat. These
sharpened stakes of bamboo or wood are excellent expedient antipersonnel
devices. Several thousand stakes are required for each section (side).

Figure 3-29. Punji Stake and Moat

Punji Field
3-76. An attacking enemy will attempt to cross the moat by using
improvised scaling ladders. With this fact in mind, detachment members
extend a punji field from the forward edge of the moat outward for 5 meters.
Detachment members embed these punjis in the ground to a depth of 3 to 4
inches at an angle of 45 degrees. The punjis will impale an attacking enemy
between the knee and the ankle. For increased effectiveness, detachment
members often emplace punjis in clusters of three stakes. One stake runs
forward and the other two are angled out 30 degrees to the right and left.

Double-Apron Fence
3-77. A reinforced double-apron, barbed-wire fence is erected forward of the
punji field. This fence is identical to the one constructed in the inner barrier.

3-78. Detachment members use this obstacle belt to disrupt the enemy
during an assault and as a counter sapper measure. Tanglefoot usually has a
minimum depth of 9 meters. All other construction details are identical to the
inner barrier.

FM 3-05.230

Triple Concertina Fence

3-79. This fence is identical in construction to the fence erected in the inner

Controlled Mine Belt

3-80. The M-18 claymore mine is an excellent example of a controlled mine.
Detachment members carefully select the locations of controlled mines before
employing them in the defensive system. SFOD members place these mines
in depth (at least two rows). This placement allows use of the mines against
more than one assault from a given direction. Detachment members always
fire the outer row first. Mines used in the controlled mine belt of the outer
barrier are electrically detonated from the bunkers and individual fighting
positions of the outer perimeter. The basis of the firing system uses the M-57
firing device, firing wire, and blasting cap from the claymore. (SFOD
members should recover these items, if possible, after firing a mine. The used
electric blasting cap can be replaced and the firing system used again.) The
30 meters of firing wire is sufficient to cover the distance from the outer
perimeter firing position, across the moat, to a location just outside the
leading edge of the punji field. At this point, detachment members tape the
blasting cap 6 inches from the end of a length of detonating cord. Then they
run the detonating cord to the controlled mine’s location, cut it, and crimp a
nonelectric blasting cap to the end. SFOD personnel seal both ends of the
detonating cord with a waterproofing compound. Then they connect the firing
system to the controlled mine.
3-81. The method used varies from mine to mine and depends on the type of
device employed: priming adapters, M-10 universal destructors, and
improvised connections are used in this role. If a destructor is not available,
the detonating cord and nonelectric blasting cap are inserted after the fuse
well of the projectile has been firmly packed with C-4 explosive. Detachment
members then bury the entire firing system, minus the portion that crosses
the moat, to protect it from tampering or damage. Several other extremely
effective devices may also be used in the controlled mine belt role. Grenades,
detonating cord, bangalore torpedoes, shaped charges, mortar and artillery
rounds, and 55-gallon drums of gasoline have a wide application as improved
controlled mines.
3-82. Grenades. SFOD members should follow these instructions:
• Select the location for the device and dig a small hole (5 inches deep).
• Remove the fuse assembly from the body of a fragmentation WP
• Wire the grenade upside down to a short V-shaped picket. (Attach the
grenade approximately 10 inches up from the pointed end of the
• Place picket into the ground and drive it into the ground until the
grenade’s fuse well is approximately 3 inches above the hole’s surface.
(The grenade should face the enemy’s approach.)
• Crimp a nonelectric cap onto a short length (branch line) of detonating
cord. Use waterproofing compound to seal the area where the cap joins

FM 3-05.230

the detonating cord. Install a plastic priming adapter onto the branch
line near the blasting cap.
• Carefully insert the blasting cap into the fuse well of the grenade and
screw the priming adapter to hold this assembly in place. Refill the
hole surrounding the grenade with soil to protect the blasting cap from
fragments or tampering.
3-83. Detachment members employ grenades in clusters of three to five
devices when used as controlled mines. The pattern of installation can be in
meters. The installation process for each device is identical to the one
described above. When the cluster has been completed, a ring main of
detonating cord is laid behind the devices. The branch line from each device is
then joined to the ring main using a girth hitch with one extra turn. The free
ends of the branch lines are sealed with waterproofing compound. The free
end of the ring main is run to a location just outside the leading edge of the
punji field. At this point, it joins the claymore firing wire leading out from the
bunker or individual fighting positions on the outer perimeter. The electric
blasting cap on the claymore line is taped 6 inches from the end of the ring
main and is sealed with waterproofing compound to protect it from moisture.
The entire firing system (from firing point to the explosive devices) is then
buried to protect it from damage. Only the portion of the firing system that
crosses the moat is left exposed. (Figure 3-30, page 3-37, shows a layout of
firing systems.)
3-84. Detonating cord. SFOD members should follow these instructions:
• Select the location for the device. (This should be an area
approximately 10 meters square.)
• Enclose this entire area with a ring main of detonating cord.
• Prepare four branch lines of detonating cord. In this application, the
detonating cord is doubled and has overhand knots tied every 6 feet.
Branch lines are approximately 9 meters long. Branch lines run
lengthwise with the ring main and are spaced 2 meters apart.
• Secure the branch line to the ring main using a girth hitch with one
extra turn. Branch lines join the ring main at an angle of 90 degrees,
and at least 6 inches of this line should be left free beyond the tie. Use
waterproofing compound to seal the free end of the branch line.
• Cover the loop of the ring main and the branch lines with a thin layer
of soil.
• Bury the remainder of the ring main and the claymore firing wire to a
depth of at least 6 inches for maximum protection from damage. (When
detonated during an attack, the detonating cord will cause any enemy
soldier in contact with it to become a casualty. Those in close proximity
to this detonation will probably become victims of shock.)

FM 3-05.230

Figure 3-30. Side View of Firing Systems Layout

3-85. Bangalore torpedoes. Bangalore torpedoes are steel tubes 5 feet

long and 2 1/8 inches in diameter. They are grooved and capped at both ends.
Each tube is filled with explosives and has a 4-inch booster at each end.
SFOD members prepare bangalore torpedoes for use as controlled mines
(Figure 3-31, page 3-38) in the following manner:
• Select the location for the device and dig a small hole approximately
5 inches deep.
• Place a 5-foot U-shaped picket into the hole and drive it into the ground
12 to 14 inches.
• Wire a bangalore torpedo to the picket. The lower end of the torpedo
should be approximately 3 inches above the surface of the hole. (The
torpedo should face the enemy’s approach.)
• Crimp a nonelectric blasting cap onto a short length of detonating cord
(branch line). Use waterproofing compound to seal the area where the
cap joins the detonating cord. Install a plastic priming adapter onto the
branch line near the blasting cap.
• Carefully insert the blasting cap into the lower fuse well of the torpedo
and screw the priming adapter to hold the assembly in place. Refill the
hole surrounding the torpedo with soil to protect the blasting cap from
3-86. When used as controlled mines, bangalore torpedoes are employed in
clusters of three to five devices. The pattern of installation can be in straight
or staggered lines. The distance between devices is 30 meters. The
installation process for each device is identical to the one described above.
When the cluster has been completed, a ring main of detonating cord is laid
behind the devices. The branch line from each device is then joined to the
ring main using a girth hitch with one extra turn. The free end of each of the
branch lines is sealed with waterproofing compound. The previously
described steps are followed to complete the installation process. The
approximate bursting radius of a bangalore torpedo is from 15 to 20 meters.

FM 3-05.230

Figure 3-31. Bangalore Torpedo Used as a Controlled Mine

3-87. Shaped charges. The M2A3 shaped charge is a moisture-resistant,

molded fiber container approximately 15 inches long by 7 inches wide. This
charge is 15 pounds and contains 9 1/2 pounds of composition B explosives
with a 50-50 pentolite booster weighing approximately 2 pounds. A
cylindrical fiber base slips onto the end of the charge to provide a standoff
distance. A cone of glass is used as a cavity liner. When using shaped charges
as controlled mines (Figure 3-32, page 3-39), SFOD members—
• Select the location for the device and lay the charge on its side with the
cavity facing the enemy’s approach. They discard the fiber base.
• Apply sandbags to each side to ensure that the charge remains pointing
in the proper direction.
• Place a wooden box (filled with rocks, brass casings, or machine gun
links) in front of the charge as shrapnel. An entire reel of barbed wire
is an excellent substitute.
• Run a branch line of detonating cord from the device to a location on
the leading edge of the punji field where it will eventually join the
claymore firing wire. (These must not be connected at this time.)

FM 3-05.230

• Crimp a nonelectric blasting cap to the device end of the branch line.
• Use waterproofing compound to seal the area where the cap joins the
detonating cord.
• Install a plastic priming adapter onto the branch line near the blasting cap.
• Carefully insert the blasting cap into the threaded cap well of the
shaped charge. Using the plastic priming adapter to hold this assembly
in place, they sandbag the sides, rear, and top of the charge to protect it
from damage and to prevent it from moving.
• Connect the free end of the branch line to the claymore firing wire. The
electric blasting cap on the claymore wire is taped 6 inches from the
end of the branch line. The end of the branch line is sealed and
waterproofed. The entire system is buried to protect it from damage.
Only the portion that crosses the moat is left exposed. Shaped charges
are powerful weapons. Only single charges, not clusters, are used as
controlled mines.

Figure 3-32. Shaped Charges Used as Controlled Mines

3-88. Mortar and artillery rounds. SFOD members prepare HE or WP

projectiles for use in the following manner:
• Select the location for the device and dig a small hole approximately 8
inches deep.
• Place a medium U-shaped picket into the hole and drive it into the
ground with the “U” facing the enemy’s approach approximately 12
• Remove the fuse assembly from the projectile.
• Install a properly assembled universal destructor into the fuse well. If
destructors are not available, they pack the well with C-4 and make a
blasting cap cavity.
• Wire the projectile upside down to the U-shaped picket facing the
enemy’s approach. The end of the projectile should be 3 inches from the
• Crimp a nonelectric blasting cap onto a short branch line of detonating
• Waterproof the area where the cap joins the branch line.

FM 3-05.230

• Carefully insert the blasting cap into the destructor or C-4. (If C-4 is
used then the adapter is not required.)
• Waterproof the area where the cap joins the projectile.
3-89. When used as controlled mines, projectiles are employed in clusters of
three to five devices. The pattern of installation can be in straight or
staggered lines. The distance between devices depends on the type of
projectile used. The installation process for each device is identical to those
listed above. When the cluster has been completed, a ring main of detonating
cord is laid behind the devices. The branch line from each device is then
joined to the ring main using a girth hitch with one extra turn. The free ends
of the branch lines are sealed with waterproofing compound. From this point,
the installation of the remainder of the firing system is identical to the
process described above for controlled mines. One advantage of using
projectiles as controlled mines is, in effect, it gives SFOD members what
equates to a mortar or artillery barrage exactly where they want it and when
they need it.
3-90. 55-gallon drums of gasoline. To prepare gasoline drums for use as
controlled mines, SFOD members—
• Select the location for the device and place two sandbags on the ground
end to end, parallel to the outer perimeter.
• Lay a 55-gallon drum of gasoline on its side with the top of the drum
(filler cap end) resting on the sandbags.
• Rotate the drum so that the filler cap is in the twelve o’clock position.
• Attach a 1-pound block of TNT centered in rear of the drum with
adhesive paste.
• Dig a small hole approximately 5 inches deep in front of the drum.
• Run a branch line of detonating cord from the device to a location on
the leading edge of the punji field where it will eventually join the
claymore firing wire. (These are not connected at this time.)
• Crimp a nonelectric blasting cap to the device end of the branch line.
• Waterproof the area where the cap joins the branch line.
• Install a plastic priming adapter near the blasting cap.
• Prepare a second branch line approximately 8 feet long in the manner
described above.
• Remove the fuse assembly from a WP grenade.
• Carefully insert the blasting cap on the end of the 8-foot branch line
into the threaded cap well of the grenade, using the plastic priming
adapter to hold this assembly in place.
• Place the grenade into the hole with the free end of the branch line
running toward the rear of the drum; refill the hole with soil.
• Carefully insert the blasting cap on the long branch line into the
threaded cap well of the TNT charge on the rear of the drum, using the
plastic priming adapter to hold this assembly in place.

FM 3-05.230

• Sandbag the sides, rear, and top of the drum to protect it from damage
and movement.
• Waterproof the free end and then join the branch line to the main
branch using a girth hitch with one extra turn.
3-91. From this point, the installation of the firing system is identical to the
process described above for controlled mines. When used as controlled mines,
gasoline drums are employed as single devices, not clusters. They are
effective out to approximately 85 meters. A WP grenade should always be
included to ensure positive ignition of the gasoline. Either plastic explosive or
TNT alone will not always positively ignite fuel. In the device described
above, only gasoline was used. Gasoline is adequate for an antipersonnel
device. However, M4 thickener can be added to the gasoline as an enhancer.
Thickened fuel burns longer and clings to anything in its path. The one major
drawback is that over prolonged periods of time, thickened fuel deteriorates
and must be disposed of in a time-consuming process. On the other hand,
gasoline stores extremely well. Some may be lost to evaporation over a
prolonged period of time, but this is easily replaced. Drums should always be
emplaced with filler cap facing up.

Double-Apron Fence
3-92. This is identical in construction to the reinforced fence erected around
the punji field.

Outer Punji Field

3-93. This field is identical in construction to the one that surrounds the
moat. This field is 10 meters wide.

Triple Concertina Fence

3-94. This is identical in construction to the fence erected around the
tanglefoot belt.

Access Road
3-95. This road allows vehicle passage to the inner perimeter. Detachment
members construct a trench bridge at the point where it crosses the punji

Channelizing Fences
3-96. These are triple concertina fences that crisscross the various barbed
wire and obstacle belts of the outer barrier. Their purpose is to channel an
attacking enemy into the fields of fire of friendly automatic weapons.

Trip Flares
3-97. All barbed-wire fences in the outer barrier are rigged with trip flares.
Barrier fences are inspected daily.

FM 3-05.230

3-98. Detachment members use detection systems, if available, on the outer
perimeter to provide real-time information on enemy movement and
intention. Special emphasis is placed on monitoring dead space. Two
examples of detection systems are the Eagle Intrusion Detection System
(EIDS) and the Observation Post Kit (OP-KIT).
3-99. The EIDS is used as a force multiplier in supplementing manpower
with technology to increase security and provide real-time notification of
surreptitious entries into prohibited areas. The EIDS incorporates three basic
detectors: seismic, magnetic, and passive infrared to detect, classify, and
report unauthorized intrusions. Camera-monitoring devices are used as a
primary or alternate detection system, if feasible. Perimeter detection
systems provide minimal benefit unless continuously monitored.
3-100. The OP-KIT was developed to provide a remote long-range day- or
night-capable camera with remote control and transmission capability to
meet a variety of operational scenarios. As stated earlier, these systems
provide minimal benefit unless continuously monitored.

3-102. Positions on the outer perimeter serve as firing points for both the
claymore mine belt and the controlled mine belt, which can lead to confusion
as to which firing wire detonates what mine. The knot system can be used to
determine the individual rows in a belt. All the wires leading to the controlled
mine belt are placed on the left side of the firing point. All wires leading to
the claymore belt are placed on the right side.
3-103. Alert training should include the location of the mines controlled from
that position and the timing for their firing. Controlled mines should not be
fired at a target that can be destroyed by some other means. SFOD members
must check all mines daily.

3-104. The camp not only serves as an operational base to carry the battle to
the enemy, but also as an administrative center that must maintain constant
contact with the surrounding population. To accomplish this successfully,
each camp should have an administrative area (Figure 3-33, page 3-43). This
area is usually located between the outer barrier and the airfield. A triple
concertina fence and bunkers protect the area. This area permits the camp to
offer medical and administrative services to the local population while at the
same time not allowing them access to the camp.
3-105. The administrative area usually contains the following facilities.
Helpful tips and techniques for construction, operation, and security are also

FM 3-05.230

Figure 3-33. Administrative Area

FM 3-05.230

Main Gate
3-106. This gate is the only entrance to the camp and the first of several
gates on the access road. It is constructed of wood and laced with barbed wire.
The gate is wide enough to cover the single-lane access road and is guarded
24 hours a day. A sign is usually hung over this gate that gives the name of
the camp (the camp is no longer a secret by now). A smaller gate is usually
constructed on one side to allow personnel (patrols) passage at night when
the main vehicle gate is blocked. This gate is guarded 24 hours a day. At
night, there are at least two guards on duty at all times. During daylight
hours, three or more guards are required to screen all civilians seeking entry
to the dispensary or the government administrative buildings. Detachment
members lock the gate during the hours of darkness. They use knife-rest
devices (defined in paragraph 3-119, page 3-46) during this period to reinforce
this gate. SFOD members emplace these devices in front of and behind the
gate. They then chain these devices in position and lock them from the inside.
The guards at this gate have the key and pass it on to their relief. These
procedures also apply to the smaller personnel gate. Claymore mines and trip
flares are also used to reinforce this gate. They are installed at dusk and
removed at dawn.

3-107. SFOD members construct this building above ground, but chest-high
sandbags on the inside of the building protect it. For convenience, the
dispensary is located just inside the main gate. Both the camp’s reaction force
personnel and the local population receive normal day-to-day medical
treatment here. This building usually contains a waiting room, an office, at
least one treatment room, and a ward area. Some patients may be required to
remain in the ward overnight. For this reason, the dispensary is staffed for
24-hours-a-day operation. Usually, medical aides and nurses handle the night
shift with U.S. and HN medical personnel on call. Patients who require
prolonged treatment are evacuated to the rear area.

Guard Towers
3-108. When possible, guard towers should be positioned around the outer
perimeter. Guard towers should have interlocking visibility.

Government Administration Buildings

3-109. SFOD members construct these buildings above ground, but chest-
high sandbagged walls on the inside of the building protect it. These
buildings are located next to the dispensary building. Their primary function
is to provide office space in a protected environment for HN administrative
services. These services form the vital link between the HN government and
the local civilian population around the surrounding area. If the area is fairly
stable, these services are located in a separate compound in one of the larger
villages in the area. In this case, their protection is the responsibility of the
regional forces under the command of the district chief. If there is not a viable
military force in the area, then this protection will fall on the camp and its
organic reaction force personnel. These buildings are only open to the public
during daylight. Employees of the various government services are prime

FM 3-05.230

targets and must be protected. They are usually quartered inside the camp at
night. A PSYOP and CA officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO) can
provide valuable training and monitoring of these personnel and services.

Motor Pool
3-110. The motor pool is usually a large covered shed with several rooms at
one end that are used for office space and storage. Detachment members use
this area to service and repair the camp’s vehicles. Vehicles are parked inside
the camp at night in protected revetments. Only those vehicles under repair
remain in the motor pool overnight. Spare parts and tools are controlled
items and must be kept locked. SFOD members keep fire extinguishers
handy—the right type for each kind of fire.

Fuel Dump
3-111. This is a large revetment that serves as the central storage area for
most of the camp’s fuel supplies. Detachment members construct the
revetment out of earth and logs (similar to the berm) or out of dirt-filled
55-gallon drums. Revetment construction is necessary to protect fuel supplies
from both enemy and friendly fires. This dump serves as the central storage
area for some (never all) of the camp’s fuel supplies. Small reserve fuel
supplies are located in other areas of the camp (generator bunker). Fuel
supplies are normally shipped to the camp in 55-gallon sealed drums. If
available, self-sealing bladders should be installed in these revetment or
underground storage tanks for safer long-term storage. The fuel dump must
have chemical-type fire extinguishers readily available.

Helicopter Pad
3-112. The helicopter pad allows helicopters to land inside the camp. Usually
this pad is only large enough to accommodate a single utility-type helicopter
at a time. Heavy-lift and multiship formations must land at the airfield. The
pad can be circular or rectangular in shape. The surface of the pad must be
solid enough to support the aircraft in all types of weather. The surface is
marked with a large white and orange “H.” A windsock is placed near the pad
to assist aviators in determining pad location, as well as wind speed and
3-113. Automatic weapons bunkers at each of the corners, the main gate,
and the outer barrier gate protect the administrative area. These bunkers are
identical in construction to those on the outer perimeter. Detachment
members erect a section of chain-link fence 10 feet in front of each of these
bunkers to defeat RPG rounds. Angling this fence prevents oblique shots from
hitting the bunker. Detachment members rig the fence with trip flares and
claymore mines. They install the claymore mines each night and remove
them each morning.
3-114. These bunkers are manned 24 hours a day. Two of these bunkers are
used as traffic control points. The main gate bunker controls the flow of local
civilians seeking medical aid and administration buildings. The outer barrier
gate bunker prevents these same civilians from entering the motor pool and
fuel dump area or the remainder of the camp.

FM 3-05.230

Triple Concertina Fence

3-115. This fence surrounds the entire administrative area. A small section
runs from the main gate bunker toward the outer barrier gate bunker. This
fence prevents civilians from entering the motor pool and fuel dump area.

Additional Facilities
3-116. The following facilities are also included in the administrative area:
• Outer barrier gate. This entrance is identical in construction and size to
the main gate.
• Latrines. At least two burn-type latrines are required to service the
administrative area.
• Fire-fighting post. The fire-fighting post has the same requirements as
for the inner and outer perimeters.
• Water supply. The dispensary will require a good water supply.

3-117. This single-lane road is the only quick passage into the camp. It runs
from a point outside the main gate to the inner perimeter. Special
consideration must be given to both the construction and fortification of this
road because it breaches all barriers and perimeters of the camp.
3-118. SFOD members construct gates at each barrier and perimeter entry
point. At night, the personnel lock all gates and reinforce them with knife-
rest devices, flares, and claymore mines. Spike boards are also emplaced
across the road in front of each gate. These boards prevent the enemy from
using a vehicle as a battering ram to attack the gate. The access road has
three curves in its construction:
• Where it joins the main road outside the camp.
• At a point inside the barrier.
• At a point inside the outer perimeter.
Should the enemy attempt to use a vehicle to attack a gate, these curves not
only force a reduction of speed but also will position the vehicle broadside to
the camp’s defensive fires.
3-119. During daylight hours when the road is in use, detachment members
remove all defensive obstacles. Traffic on this road is then controlled from
two bunkers: one located just inside the main gate and the other at the
entrance to the outer barrier. There are several types of defensive obstacles:
• Knife-rest devices. These are portable wooden or metal frames strung
with barbed wire. They are used to reinforce all access road gates
during the hours of darkness. These devices are emplaced in front of
and behind each access road gate. They are then chained in position
and locked from the inside. The guard at each gate has the key and
passes it on to his relief.
• Claymore mines and trip flares. These are emplaced forward of the
knife-rest devices each night. They are removed during daylight hours.

FM 3-05.230

• Spike boards. These devices are 10-foot sections of 2 x 8s with

numerous 30d nails driven through them. Their purpose is to deflate
the tires of a vehicle that may attempt to breach the gate by ramming
it. Two spike boards should be emplaced forward of each gate at night.
These boards are portable and are removed during daylight hours.

3-120. The surrounding area usually contains the following facilities and
locations that are critical to the camp’s survivability (Figure 3-34, page 3-48).
Helpful tips and techniques for construction, operation, and security are also

Cleared Fields of Fire

3-121. A camp is unique from all other forms of field fortifications. The size
of the camp alone makes it impossible to conceal. The enemy knows its exact
location. Subsequently, when clearing fields of fire for the camp, SFOD
members remove all vegetation. The logs obtained from the largest trees are
used in camp construction. Limbs, brush, weeds, and tall grass are removed
and burned. An area at least 300 meters wide is cleared around both the
camp and the airfield. Camp security patrols should follow these instructions:
• Physically walk the ground and identify all dead space. All dead space
in this area must be covered by the camp’s indirect fire weapons.
• Start registering mortars to cover these areas after they are identified.
• Physically walk this entire area every day. Patrols should not depend
on visual checks of this area conducted from inside the camp. The
enemy may construct jump-off positions for an attack on the camp
within this area during the hours of darkness. Such construction by the
enemy ceases before dawn, the work site is carefully camouflaged, and
the enemy withdraws before daylight. The process is then repeated on
successive nights until the project is complete. Moonless nights during
the rainy season are the usual time for such activities.
• Ensure that fields of fire are kept clear.

3-122. Air is the primary means of resupplying the camp. The larger the camp,
the greater the demand for logistics to support its operation. The volume of
supplies needed for a single camp alone exceeds the lift capacity of all the
helicopters usually assigned to a given operational area. Usually, helicopters
are in great demand for operational—not administrative—missions. Hence, an
airfield becomes a necessity to allow the use of fixed-wing aircraft to maintain
the camp’s logistical demands. The airfield must be large enough to accept the
largest aircraft operating in the camp’s area. SFOD members should always
place the airfield as close to the camp as possible. The enemy will quickly
recognize the airfield’s importance to the survival of the camp. The SFOD must
be prepared to provide protection of the airfield from the time construction

FM 3-05.230

Figure 3-34. Surrounding Area

3-123. Construction of an airfield is a major effort that requires the use of

heavy earthmoving equipment. The camp must call on outside assistance to
accomplish this task. The camp’s reaction force can be expected to provide the
following during the construction of the airfield:
• Convoy security to move the equipment into the area.

FM 3-05.230

• Security of both the site and the equipment during construction of the
• Convoy security to move the equipment out of the area after
construction is completed.
• Perforated steel planking (PSP) (an excellent addition to the surface of
the airfield). PSP will ensure a fairly reliable all-weather airstrip.
Installation of a windsock near the airfield will aid the aircrews. If the
airfield will be used at night, then it must have improvised lighting
installed to assist the pilots in landing and takeoffs. Firepots work
great for this purpose.
• A fire arrow installed on the edge of the runway to assist the pilot in
determining wind direction at night. The arrow should always be
pointed into the wind. (Figure 3-35 shows an example of an airfield

Figure 3-35. Airfield Layout

Perimeter Road
3-124. This is a utility road that encircles the entire camp. It is primarily
used to transport personnel and equipment to camp construction and
maintenance projects in the outer barrier of the camp’s defensive system. It is
often easier to approach maintenance problems in this barrier from outside
the camp. The opposition uses two methods to interdict roads: mines and
ambushes. Of these, the use of mines is the most common form of attack.
Mining operations by the opposition usually occur during the hours of
darkness. These operations require a minimum number of personnel, require
a very brief period of time to accomplish, and are virtually impossible to
totally prevent. Roads must be swept daily by road-clearing patrols equipped
with mine detectors. Since this is a very exacting task, no individual should
be permitted to operate a detector for more than 20 minutes at a time. Once

FM 3-05.230

detected, mines are neutralized by using one of the following methods:

explosives, rope and hooks, or mechanical methods. Of these, explosives are
the safest.

Main Road
3-125. This road serves as the primary link between the actual camp and
other locations that are within the camp’s area of influence. This road
services any outpost or friendly villages.


3-126. This section consists of additional tips and techniques that SFOD
members should consider in base camp development. The following
paragraphs explain each of these aspects.

3-127. All vehicles should have their windshields removed and their
floorboards sandbagged as protection against mines. During convoy
operations, SFOD members should always follow strict convoy distance and
security procedures. All vehicles must carry extra fuel, spare tires, tools, and
towing chains. Vehicles must be kept in a high state of repair (they may be
the only way out as a last resort). A highly qualified mechanic is required for
the vehicles and generators. He will need to cross-train local soldiers and
civilians to assist him.

3-128. A camp is in many respects like a small town: both need a wide
variety of skilled workers to keep it running. Drivers, mechanics, carpenters,
cooks, plumbers, barbers, tailors, nurses, and clerks are but a few of the many
specialties that will be required to keep the camp running. Reaction force
personnel and their dependents should be canvassed for assistance in locating
the personnel required. A thorough background investigation should be
conducted on all “trusted” personnel.

3-129. In most cases, married reaction force personnel will have their
families with them. This poses several problems—first and foremost, where to
put them. The easy solution would be to put them in separate quarters
outside the camp. However, doing so would allow the enemy to capitalize on
this and use them to overthrow the camp. It would also cause the reaction
force personnel to worry about their families each night. The best solution is
to put them inside the camp in underground bunkers between the outer
perimeter and the start of the inner barrier. Wherever they end up living,
they will have to be protected and cared for; therefore, it is important to have
a plan.

FM 3-05.230

3-130. The SF team’s approach to civic action will prove highly successful
• It improves the capabilities of counterparts by requiring them to
participate in planning and carrying out the programs. Participation
improves efficiency and makes the people realize that the HN officials
are concerned with their welfare.
• It improves the HN system by working with the counterparts to ensure
that they are aware of the support available through the HN, and
encouraging or persuading them to use the government organization.
• SF personnel and their counterparts encourage the local civilians to
carry out self-help projects with reaction force troops providing some
assistance. Experience has shown that civilians have more personal
interest in projects in which they participate.
• The use of reaction force troops on civic action projects helps develop
good relations between troops and civilians. Civic action projects will do
more for the cause of defeating the enemy in the long term than most
military operations that are undertaken.
3-131. Commanders must establish a viable plan from the very beginning of
establishing the camp to ensure mission success in the end. FM 41-10, Civil
Affairs Operations, contains further information on civic actions. The
functional areas of civic action are—
• Health and sanitation.
• Education and training.
• Agriculture.
• Welfare and refugees.
• Transportation.
• Commercial development.
• Resources control.

3-132. The following information discusses relationship concerns between
the United States and its counterparts. U.S. advisors—
• Do not command their counterparts’ units.
• Must establish long-standing relationships and rapport with
• Should recommend corrections to their counterparts as required.
• Should support their counterparts in disputes with U.S. agencies if this
support is warranted.
• Should not present too many subjects at once to their counterparts.
• Should ensure through testing that the counterparts understand what
they have been taught.

FM 3-05.230

• Should allow counterparts to exercise their own prerogatives when

appropriate, teaching them to make sound, independent decisions.
• Should ask for and seek the advice of their counterparts; they will
always have a technique or solution to the problem and it may be
better than that of U.S. personnel.
• Do not make promises that cannot be fulfilled.
• Use the native language as much as possible, but offer to teach English
to the counterpart and his troops.

3-133. The best defense is a good offense. The following paragraphs discuss
important information for the SFOD to take into consideration.
3-134. SFOD members should establish a series of outpost and ambush sites
around the camp’s surrounding area each night. They should also employ
outpost and saturation patrolling during daylight hours.
3-135. SFOD members must develop a base defense plan from the beginning.
It should include final protective fires and sectors of fire for machine guns,
the principal direction of fire for automatic rifles, and barrages and
concentration for mortars and artillery. Indirect fires should be preplanned
and, if possible, preregistered. Consideration should be given to possible
request for tactical air support. Range cards must be prepared for all crew-
served weapons. Fires must be controlled so that preliminary enemy probes
do not give away automatic weapons positions and fire plans. Normally,
mortars and shoulder-fired weapons should be used against small-scale
actions that do not severely threaten the camp. Night firing devices are used
for indirect fire weapons. Aiming stakes and other similar devices should be
used for direct fire weapons to assist in control of fire. A countermortar plan
must be developed, and firing units capable of supporting this plan should be
assigned specific areas of fire.
3-136. Other defensive considerations include the following:
• A good barrier plan is essential; however, local security should never
depend on physical barriers alone. A well-coordinated illumination plan
must be developed and rehearsed.
• Multiple means of communication should be established between both
perimeters and the TOC.
• The chain of command within all units must be well defined to preclude
• Emergency plans to restore communications and provide medical aid to
ensure uninterrupted defense of the area must be developed and

3-137. A paramilitary organization does not have the hold on the individual
soldier in regards to absences without leave (AWOLs) and deserters that a
regular army unit has. Excessive AWOLs and desertions decrease combat
effectiveness, and lead to less successful operations. Good food, living

FM 3-05.230

conditions, care of dependents, and athletic programs will add to the overall
morale of the camp and its personnel.

3-138. Standard military water supply procedures should be used whenever
possible. Water blivets, reverse osmosis water purification units (ROWPUs),
and standard-issue water cans are a few examples of what may be available.

3-139. Springs often make an excellent source of water. They should be dug
deep, and sealed, fenced, and piped to the camp. Proper development of a
spring will increase the flow of ground water and lower the chance of
contamination from surface water. Springs are usually of two types: gravity-
seepage, where the water-bearing soil comes to the surface over hard,
underlying soil; and artesian, where the water under pressure and trapped by
the hard layer of soil finds an opening and wells to the surface. Detachment
members should dig a small hole near the spring to determine the depth of
the hard soil and whether the spring is gravity-seepage or artesian.
Personnel then check uphill and nearby for sources of contamination. They
have the water tested to determine purification requirements before
drinking. A final point to check is to determine if the spring runs water
during long, dry spells. Usually the soil is dug to the hard, underlying part,
and a tank of reinforced, watertight concrete is made on all but the uphill
side. The opening on the uphill side should be lined with porous concrete or
stone without mortar to admit the gravity-seepage water. The uphill side can
be backfilled with gravel and sand, which helps keep fine materials in the
water-bearing soil from entering the spring. If the hard soil cannot be
reached easily, a concrete cistern is built. A pipe containing holes that is
placed in the water-bearing layer of soil can feed this cistern. With an
artesian type of spring, all sides of the tank are made of watertight,
reinforced concrete, but the bottom is left open. The water then enters
through the bottom.

3-140. These are used to store rainwater and other caught or gathered
water. The cistern must be watertight to prevent surface contamination from
polluting the supply. Reinforced concrete is the best material since it is
strong, has a long life, and can be made quite watertight. A manhole and
drain must be provided so that it can be cleaned. A vent and a place to add
chlorine for disinfectant are also necessary. The cistern should be able to hold
at least 3,000 gallons (7 1/2 x 7 1/2 x 7 1/2 feet). To ensure that the cistern is
watertight, approximately 5 1/2 U.S. gallons of water to 100 pounds of cement
is used. When the concrete is mixed, it should be tamped thoroughly and the
surface kept damp for at least 10 days. If possible, the walls and floor should
be poured at the same time. The manhole entrance must be at least 4 inches
above the cistern surface and the cover must overlap by 2 inches. The bottom
of the cistern should be sloped so that one part can be more easily siphoned or
bailed out when cleaning. If an overflow is installed, it should be covered with
a copper screen.

FM 3-05.230

3-141. The cistern should be properly cleaned and disinfected before use and
at regular intervals, as required. Downspouts from aboveground structures
can be used to fill the cistern. A catchment screen and sand filter should
always be installed between the cistern and incoming water source. A sand
filter will prepare water for either boiling or chlorinating. The sand filter
should be at least one-tenth the size of the catchment area. A typical filter
will be 4 x 4 feet for a 3,000-gallon cistern. The filter will be layered from the
bottom up with coarse gravel (1 inch), fine gravel (1 inch), coarse sand (1
inch), and fine, clean sand (18 inches). About every 6 months, the manhole
cover to the filter must be removed and the filter cleaned. All matter from the
splash plate should be removed, and the top 1/2 inch of sand should be
scraped off and removed. When the depth of the sand becomes only 12 inches,
it should be rebuilt with clean sand to the original 18 inches.

Water Purification Plant

3-142. A crude water purification plant can be constructed to provide safe
drinking water (Figure 3-36, page 3-56). The tools and materials required are—
• Three barrels (concrete tank or 55-gallon drums).
• One 8-inch funnel.
• Two smaller tanks (5 gallons with float valves).
• Four shutoff valves.
• One throttle or needle valve (if hose is used, clamps may be used
instead of valves).
• Pipe or hose with fittings.
• Hypochlorite of lime or sodium hypochlorite (laundry bleach).
3-143. The two large barrels on the top of the structure are used to weaken
the bleach. The two smaller tanks on the shelf below are for holding equal
amounts of weakened bleach solution and water at a constant pressure. This
arrangement makes a constant flow of the solution and water, at the same
speed, into the hoses leading to the mixing points. The mix is further
controlled by the valves and may be seen through the open funnel. If a
throttle valve is not available, a shutoff valve may be used and a throttle
action obtained by this valve and valve number 4 in series. Placing two of the
barrels at a height of 10 feet causes a pressure of only about 5 pounds per
square inch. Thus, plumbing does not have to be high quality except for valve
number 1 and the float valve of the water holdup tank, if the rainwater
supply is under higher pressure. SFOD members should follow these steps for
• Mix concentrated bleach with water in the concentrated barrel with all
valves closed.
• Fill the pipe from the mixing barrel to the solution tank with water
after propping the float valve in a closed position.
• Allow a trace amount of concentrate to flow into the mixing barrel by
opening valve number 2.
• Use a measuring stick to see how much concentrate was used.

FM 3-05.230

• Close valve number 2 and open valve number 1 so that untreated water
enters the mixing barrel.
• Close valve number 1 and mix solution in the mixing barrel with a
• Remove the prop from the float valve of the solution tank so that it will
operate properly.
• Open wide the metering valve and valve number 4 to clean the system;
allow a gallon to drain through the system.
• Close down the metering valve until only a stream of drops enters the
• Open valve number 3.
3-144. Detachment members must use trial-and-error methods to learn how
much concentrate should be put in the concentrate barrel and the amount of
solution to allow past the funnel. The result should be water with a noticeable
chlorine taste in the distribution system. The flow into the funnel and the
taste of the water in the distribution system should be checked regularly to
ensure proper treatment and operation.

FM 3-05.230

Figure 3-36. Water Purification Plant

FM 3-05.230


3-145. Units select base campsites that most effectively use available
terrain, water supplies, and HN personnel to accomplish their mission. The
base camp is established to facilitate the SF missions. A base camp is
established in the JSOA when the HN requests assistance and HN personnel
are trained in FID. The base camps are sometimes built in an austere and
hostile environment. In many places, the United States must consider the
implications of their presence. The populace tends to be suspicious of the
unfamiliar; the use of CA and PSYOP should be underscored to minimize any
negative effects caused by the construction of the camp.
3-146. Opening up the base camp and conducting operations and training
should last no more than 60 days. Then the camp is considered capable of
accomplishing its assigned mission with no supplementary forces or
assistance. By this date, all nonorganic troops will be withdrawn and all
logistical support will be provided through normal channels on a request
basis. The average life of an operational base camp is approximately 18
months. This time is based on the fact that the opposition would either
comply or move operations following the realization that the base camp could
not be eliminated by various means, and that joint operations were winning
the full trust of the HN people.
3-147. Consideration must be given to media reporting during the period
that the base camp is operational. Appendix K provides information on media


3-148. The most common roles, functions, and responsibilities of the group
and battalion staff are discussed below. They are not all-inclusive and they
may vary due to the situation. These responsibilities include the following:
• Group/Battalion S-1. The group/battalion S-1 continues to monitor the
personnel situation and provides replacements as needed.
• Group/Battalion S-2. The group/battalion S-2 monitors the intelligence
collection capability of the detachment. He maintains close
coordination with the S-2s from other HQ to quickly identify and
resolve any problem areas that develop. He also follows up on all
special intelligence collection requests, such as imagery, and ensures
rapid dissemination down to the detachment level.
• Group/Battalion S-3. The group/battalion S-3 initiates an operations
and intelligence analysis during this phase and informs the SFODC S-3
of the results. He also coordinates with S-4 to ensure that the phased
logistical buildup is satisfactorily completed. The group/battalion S-3
also monitors reports to ensure that any problem areas that impede
operational capability are resolved. He continues to update the
detachment as more information becomes available. The
group/battalion S-3 also works closely with the S-2 during this phase to

FM 3-05.230

determine the effectiveness of the operations conducted by the

• Group/Battalion S-4. The group/battalion S-4 continues to monitor the
logistical situation. He reviews supply requests for suitability or items
requested. He also coordinates with the S-3 to determine problem areas
and to assist in their resolution.
• Group/Battalion S-5. The group/battalion S-5 monitors the CA
programs currently in effect and those being planned. He also provides
guidance to the detachment to improve their procedures. The
group/battalion S-5 follows up on requests of CA materials to ensure
adequate and timely response to the detachment’s needs.
• Group/Battalion S-6. The group/battalion S-6 ensures that necessary
communications equipment has been provided. He also coordinates
with signal officers from other HQ and renders technical assistance
should a problem develop.


3-149. The overall defense posture of a base camp is enhanced by continuous
aggressive operations conducted by the base camp personnel. These are—
• Patrolling.
• Ambushes.
• Observation.
• Area intelligence nets.
• CA and PSYOP campaign plans.
• Use of ground surveillance radar and night observation devices.


3-150. Screening, cordon, and search operations are used to gain intelligence
information. Screening operations identify individuals for further
interrogation by CI and human intelligence collectors (HICs). These
operations also obtain security information for force protection (FP) and
obtain information to conduct background checks for suitability or hire, or to
further assess an individual. Cordon and search operations identify and
apprehend persons hostile to friendly operations. HN forces assisted by CI,
interrogation, and other friendly forces should do the actual controlling of the
areas. In some instances, the operation may only consist of U.S. intelligence
personnel to screen for intelligence information. FM 3-05.102, Army Special
Operations Forces Intelligence; FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation; and
FM 34-60, Counterintelligence, include additional information.
3-151. In a conventional combat environment, screening operations are
conducted to collect information from refugees, enemy prisoners of war
(EPWs), and civilian internees at mobile and static locations. These
operations are conducted with other elements, such as MP units, HICs,
combat troops, CA, and PSYOP teams. These trained personnel assist with
coordination and planning, which may include joint or combined planning

FM 3-05.230

and operation. Trained personnel also exploit cordon and search operations
for individuals and information of intelligence interest.
3-152. In stability operations and support operations, cordon and search
operations are used to search out the opposition infrastructure as well as
individual unit elements; these cordon and search operations may use a
community or area as cover for their activities or as a support base. CI agents
conduct these operations, whenever possible, with HN forces and
3-153. Ideally, U.S. forces, including CI personnel, provide support while HN
officials direct the entire operation. HN personnel, as a minimum, should be
part of the screening and sweep elements on any cordon and search
operation. In situations where there is no viable HN government, these
operations may be conducted unilaterally or as part of a combined force.

3-154. The purpose of CI screening operations is to identify persons of CI
interest or verify persons referred by HICs who are of CI interest, and gather
information of immediate CI interest. Based on priority intelligence
requirements (PIR) and information requirements (IRs), screening can be
focused in any direction to meet the commander’s requirements.

Subjects of Intelligence Interest

3-155. HICs normally conduct refugee and EPW screening at the EPW
compound or refugee screening point. CI personnel conduct interrogations
with the view to intercepting hostile intelligence agents, saboteurs, and
subversives trying to infiltrate friendly lines. The following are examples of
categories of persons of CI interest:
• Persons suspected of attempting to infiltrate through refugee flow.
• Line-crossers.
• Deserters from opposition groups.
• Persons without identification (ID) papers or forged papers
(inconsistent with the norm).
• Repatriated prisoners of war (PWs) and escapees.
• Members of underground resistance organizations who are seeking to
join friendly forces.
• Collaborators with the opposition.
• Target personalities, such as those on the personality list (also known
as the black, gray, or white lists).
• Volunteer informants.
• Persons who must be questioned because they are under consideration
for employment with U.S. forces or for appointment as civil officials by
CA units.

FM 3-05.230

Planning and Coordination

3-156. CI personnel plan these screening operations, as much as possible, in
conjunction with several elements. These elements include—
• Commanders. The commanders, at all levels (to include HN), are concerned
with channeling refugees and EPWs through the AO, particularly in the
attack, to prevent any hindrance to unit movement or any adverse effect on
unit mission.
• Human intelligence collectors. HICs must understand what CI
personnel are looking for and have the commander’s current PIR and
IRs. Close coordination with HICs is essential for successful CI
• Military police. MP elements are responsible for collecting EPWs and
civilian internees from capturing units as far forward as possible in the
AO. MP units guard the convoys transporting EPWs and civilian
internees to EPW camps, and command and operate the EPW camps.
• Civil Affairs. CA elements, under the G-5, are responsible for the
proper disposition of refugees.
• Psychological Operations. PSYOP elements, under the G-3, contribute
to screening operations by informing the populace of the need for their
• Civil authorities. Civil authorities in hostile areas are included in
planning only if control has been returned to them.

3-157. CI personnel use the following indicators in an attempt to identify
hostile infiltrators. CI personnel look for persons—
• Of military age.
• Traveling alone or in pairs.
• Without ID.
• With unusual documents.
• With suspicious wounds or apparent combat wounds.
• Possessing large amounts of money, precious metals, or gems.
• Displaying any peculiar activity.
• Trying to avoid detection or questioning.
• Using enemy methods of operating.
• Having a pro-enemy background.
• With a suspicious story.
• With a family in enemy areas.
• With a technical skill or knowledge.
• Who have collaborated.
• Who violate regulations in enemy areas.

FM 3-05.230

3-158. In addition to interrogation, other methods of screening EPWs and

refugees are used. These include—
• Apprehension lists.
• Low-level informants infiltrated into EPW compounds or camps,
civilian internee screens or camps, or refugee screens or centers.
• Sound equipment placed in suspect holding areas or cages.
• Polygraph examinations.
• Specialized identification equipment; for example, metal-trace detection

3-159. This type of screening requires personnel to prepare apprehension
lists and indicators to be used by screening teams. Specialized equipment,
such as metal detection kits, would significantly enhance the screening
process. These teams will provide the initial screening and will detain and
refer suspects to the military intelligence (MI) control element for detailed CI
interrogation and possible exploitation.
3-160. Checkpoints are placed in strategic locations where there is sufficient
space for assembling people under guard and for parking vehicles for search
and investigation (Figure 3-37, page 3-62). These checkpoints are set up as
either mobile or static missions. Local security is posted to protect the
checkpoint, and a sufficient amount of personnel are posted to the front and
rear to catch anyone attempting to avoid the checkpoint. The preparation
needed for static and mobile checkpoints is identical to other screening
operations and the indicators will remain the same.
3-161. Mobile checkpoint. A mobile checkpoint is used as a moving system
by which the team, either mounted or on foot, briefly selects individuals at
random. These checkpoints are located at various points for periods not to
exceed one day.
3-162. Static checkpoint. Static checkpoints are those manned perma-
nently by MP units or troops at the entrance to a bridge, town gates, river
crossing, or similar strategic point.


3-163. The basic operation is the community cordon and search operation. As
the screening element sets up the collection or screening station, the sweep
element escorts the residents toward the station, leaving behind one resident
to care for family belongings, if required by law.
3-164. The search element follows behind the sweep element searching
houses, storage areas, cemeteries, and so forth, with dogs and metal detection
equipment. CI personnel search for evidence of intelligence collection
operations, to include communications codes or other such paraphernalia.
Each search element should include a CI team with a human intelligence
collection team, as required, which will have a list of persons of CI interest.

FM 3-05.230

Figure 3-37. Example of a Checkpoint

3-165. CI personnel move suspected persons on for photographing, further

interrogation, or relocation to the screening area detention point to be taken
back to a base area or area coordination center interrogation facility for
detailed interrogation upon completion of the operation.
3-166. CI team members pass innocent residents through to the post-
screening area where they are provided medical assistance and other civic
assistance, as well as entertainment and friendly propaganda. CI personnel
return immediately to the detention area any persons caught attempting to
escape or break through the cordon.
3-167. When the operation is terminated, CI team members allow all
innocent individuals to return to their homes, and remove the suspects under
guard for further interrogation. The CI team then photographs all members
of the community for compilation of a village packet, which will be used in
future operations.

FM 3-05.230

3-168. In the collection or screening station, the CI team personnel bring the
residents to the collection area (or holding area) and then systematically lead
them to specific screening stations (Figure 3-38). En route to the screening
station, CI team personnel search each individual for weapons. Then they
lead the residents past the mayor or community leaders (opposition defectors
or cooperating prisoners who will be hidden from view so that they can
uncompromisingly identify any recognizable opposition). These informants
will be provided with the means to notify a nearby guard or a screener if they
spot an enemy member. Once spotted, CI personnel will immediately
segregate this individual and appropriate personnel will interrogate him.

Figure 3-38. Example of a Collection or Screening Station

FM 3-05.230

3-169. Army Regulation (AR) 190-16, Physical Security, paragraph 1-5,
outlines the physical security programs that will provide the means to
counter threat entities during peacetime, mobilization, and wartime. These
• Hostile intelligence services.
• Paramilitary forces.
• Terrorists or saboteurs.
• Criminal elements.
• Protest groups.
• Disaffected persons.
Physical security procedures include, but are not limited to—
• Using physical security equipment or measures to reduce vulnerability
to a threat.
• Integrating physical security into contingency, mobilization, and
wartime plans, and testing physical security procedures and measures
during the exercise of these plans.
• Coordinating base camp OPSEC, crime prevention, and physical
security programs to protect against the total criminal element.
• Training guards at sensitive or other storage sites in tactical defense
against, and in response to, attempted penetrations.
• Creating physical security awareness.
3-170. AR 190-16, paragraph 1-7, states that threat assessments are
comprised of the following resources:
• Monitoring. Due to diverse missions, the dispersal of forces, and
various states of readiness, base camps must constantly monitor
current and potential threats. Threat information is normally passed
through intelligence summaries, serious incident reports, law
enforcement, and security incident reports.
• Analysis. Base camps will develop a local threat statement based on
local area analysis and information provided by service intelligence and
investigative organizations.
• Security resources. The threat statement is an essential tool for the
commander to use to determine the commitment of physical security
resources. It is an integral part of the installation physical security or
resource protection plan.
3-171. The security of the base camp depends on each individual there. By
integrating the above measures and the proper equipment, the lives and
equipment of the camp will be safer.

Chapter 4

Closing out a base camp is a critical part of mission planning throughout
all phases of operation. Initial plans for the disposition of the base camp
must begin as soon as the mission is received. Based on U.S. Government
(USG) goals and the situation on the ground, the disposition of the camp
can take any of the forms discussed below. STP 31-18-SM-TG, Soldier’s
Manual and Trainer’s Guide, CMF 18, Special Forces Basic Tasks, Skill
Levels 3/4, and FM 3-05.20 contain additional information.


4-1. Depending on the circumstances, there are many options available for
closing out a base camp. Among these are the following:
• Abandon or destroy the base camp. This can take one of two forms: an
emergency evacuation, in which case the disposition of the camp
should be included in the overall escape and evasion plan, or in a
controlled manner when the facility has outlived its usefulness. In
either case, sensitive items must be accounted for and either removed
or destroyed to prevent their use by hostile forces. Prior and
continuous planning of this phase is critical to ensure each person
assigned to the base camp knows and understands his role during an
• Hand over the base camp to HN military or government. Turning over a
facility to the HN will require specific instructions on the disposition of
equipment within the compound from the State Department and U.S.
military chain of command. If the intent when building the facility is to
turn it over to the HN at some point, clear guidance on how this
turnover is to be accomplished should be given ahead of time. Also, it
should be determined whether or not the United States will be
reimbursed for construction costs.
• Hand over the base camp to United Nations (UN) or other international
organization. As with the above option, turning over a U.S. military
facility to the UN or other international organization is a political
decision and must be done only with clear guidance from the State
• Hand over the base camp to U.S. NGO. Depending on the function of
the facility, it can be turned over to a U.S. NGO. Although the camp is
being handed over to another group of Americans, the transition to any
NGO is a political decision and requires clear guidance from the State
• Hand over the base camp to U.S. military or Government. As the
situation in the region develops, it may be necessary to hand over the

FM 3-05.230

base camp to another U.S. military or Government agency. For

example, a base camp set up to train and maintain CD operations may
eventually be transferred to the control of the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA).
• Hand over the base camp to other U.S. SF. Long-term operations will
require the transition of the base camp from one SF detachment to
another at some point.
• Combination of any of the above. Based on changing requirements, the
final status of the base camp can be any combination of the above or
something else entirely. Whatever the final disposition of the facility,
planning for this phase must be accomplished as soon as possible.
4-2. The completion of the detachment’s involvement with the base camp
does not necessarily mean the end of the life of the facility. When the mission
for construction of a base camp is first received, it should contain at least
basic instructions for the disposition of the base camp once the detachment is
ready to leave the area. If not, it is incumbent on the commander and his
staff to find out what the ultimate goals are for the base camp so that
operations can be planned around them.
4-3. Planning is continuous and revised concurrently with operations to
reflect the existing political and military conditions in the theater. For
example, the emergency evacuation plan for a base camp may initially
include vehicles and other support from the HN, but can be revised when an
American carrier task force shows up in the region.
4-4. CA teams may be provided to assist in closeout or handing over the
facility, particularly when no suitable provisional government exists to
assume control and the facility is to be turned over to other than USG
4-5. PSYOP units can be used to assist in closeout by establishing programs
to explain to the local populace the steps and rationale for disposition of the
base camp and to condition them for the change.
NOTE: A fully functioning active base camp that is employing the local
populace for its support can create a large gap in the local economy with the
departure of U.S. forces. Plans for this transition should be incorporated in
the final disposition of the camp to reduce its effect on the area.

4-6. Final closeout of a base camp can be expected to include logistical and
financial considerations. Some of these are—
• Assembly of HN forces, to include employees of the facility, into
assembly areas.
• Completion of administrative records of all personnel at the facility, to
include inventorying and accounting for arms, equipment, and
sensitive items.
• Settlement of pay, allowances, and benefits to any HN personnel
employed at the facility.

FM 3-05.230

• Settlement of all claims against the HN or the United States in a fair

and prompt manner.
• Recommendations for awards and decorations submitted for deserving
HN personnel supporting the base camp.
• Rehabilitation and employment of HN personnel supporting the base
4-7. The commander in charge of the final disposition of the facility is
responsible for direction, advice, and final guidance to all U.S. and HN
personnel. Additionally, he must coordinate and supervise any
demobilization operations that fall under his jurisdiction during this phase of
the operation.

Appendix A

Weights, Measures,
and Conversion Tables
Tables A-1 through A-5, pages A-1 and A-2, show metric units and their
U.S. equivalents. Tables A-6 through A-15, pages A-2 through A-5, are
conversion tables.
Table A-1. Linear Measure
Unit Other Metric Equivalent U.S. Equivalent
1 centimeter 10 millimeters 0.39 inch
1 decimeter 10 centimeters 3.94 inches
1 meter 10 decimeters 39.37 inches
1 decameter 10 meters 32.8 feet
1 hectometer 10 decameters 328.08 feet
1 kilometer 10 hectometers 3,280.8 feet

Table A-2. Liquid Measure

Unit Other Metric Equivalent U.S. Equivalent
1 centiliter 10 milliliters 0.34 fluid ounce
1 deciliter 10 centiliters 3.38 fluid ounces
1 liter 10 deciliters 33.81 fluid ounces
1 decaliter 10 liters 2.64 gallons
1 hectoliter 10 deciliters 26.42 gallons
1 kiloliter 10 hectoliters 264.18 gallons

Table A-3. Weight

Unit Other Metric Equivalent U.S. Equivalent
1 centigram 10 milligrams 0.15 grain
1 decigram 10 centigrams 1.54 grains
1 gram 10 decigrams 0.035 ounce
1 decagram 10 grams 0.35 ounce
1 hectogram 10 decigrams 3.52 ounces
1 kilogram 10 hectograms 2.2 pounds
1 quintal 100 kilograms 220.46 pounds
1 metric ton 10 quintals 1.1 short tons

FM 3-05.230

Table A-4. Square Measure

Unit Other Metric Equivalent U.S. Equivalent
1 square centimeter 100 square millimeters 0.155 square inch
1 square decimeter 100 square centimeters 15.5 square inches
1 square meter (centaur) 100 square decimeters 10.76 square feet
1 square decameter (are) 100 square meters 1,076.4 square feet
1 square hectometer (hectare) 100 square decameters 2.47 acres
1 square kilometer 100 square hectometers 0.386 square mile

Table A-5. Cubic Measure

Unit Other Metric Equivalent U.S. Equivalent
1 cubic centimeter 1,000 cubic millimeters 0.06 cubic inch
1 cubic decimeter 1,000 cubic centimeters 61.02 cubic inches
1 cubic meter 1,000 cubic decimeters 35.31 cubic feet

Table A-6. Temperature

Convert From Convert To
Fahrenheit Celsius
Subtract 32, multiply by 5, and divide by 9
Celsius Fahrenheit
Multiply by 9, divide by 5, and add 32

Table A-7. Approximate Conversion Factors

To Change To Multiply By To Change To Multiply By
Inches Centimeters 2.540 Ounce-inches Newton- 0.007062
Feet Meters 0.305 Centimeters Inches 3.94
Yards Meters 0.914 Meters Feet 3.280
Miles Kilometers 1.609 Meters Yards 1.094
Square inches Square 6.451 Kilometers Miles 0.621
Square feet Square 0.093 Square Square inches 0.155
meters centimeters
Square yards Square 0.836 Square Square feet 10.76
meters meters
Square miles Square 2.590 Square Square yards 1.196
kilometers meters
Acres Square 0.405 Square Square miles 0.386
hectometers kilometers

FM 3-05.230

Table A-7. Approximate Conversion Factors (Continued)

To Change To Multiply By To Change To Multiply By
Cubic feet Cubic meters 0.028 Square Acres 2.471
Cubic yards Cubic meters 0.765 Cubic meters Cubic feet 35.315
Fluid ounces Millimeters 29.573 Cubic meters Cubic yards 1.308
Pints Liters 0.473 Millimeters Fluid ounces 0.034
Quarts Liters 0.946 Liters Pints 2.113
Gallons Liters 3.785 Liters Quarts 1.057
Ounces Grams 28.349 Liters Gallons 0.264
Pounds Kilograms 0.454 Grams Ounces 0.035
Short tons Metric tons 0.907 Kilograms Pounds 2.205
Pounds-feet Newton- 1.356 Metric tons Short tons 1.102
Pounds- Newton- 0.11296 Nautical Miles Kilometers 1.852
inches meters

Table A-8. Area

To Change To Multiply By To Change To Multiply By
Square Square inches 0.00155 Square inches Square 645.16
millimeters millimeters
Square Square inches 9.155 Square inches Square 6.452
centimeters centimeters
Square Square inches 1,550 Square inches Square 0.00065
meters meters
Square Square feet 10.764 Square feet Square 0.093
meters meters
Square Square yards 1.196 Square yards Square 0.836
meters meters
Square Square miles 0.386 Square miles Square 2.59
kilometers kilometers

Table A-9. Volume

To Change To Multiply By To Change To Multiply By
Cubic Cubic inches 0.061 Cubic inches Cubic 16.39
centimeters centimeters
Cubic meters Cubic feet 35.31 Cubic feet Cubic meters 0.028
Cubic meters Cubic yards 1.308 Cubic yards Cubic meters 0.765
Liters Cubic inches 61.02 Cubic inches Liters 0.016
Liters Cubic feet 0.035 Cubic feet Liters 28.32

FM 3-05.230

Table A-10. Capacity

To Change To Multiply By To Change To Multiply By
Milliliters Fluid drams 0.271 Fluid drams Milliliters 3.697
Milliliters Fluid ounces 0.034 Fluid ounces Milliliters 29.57
Liters Fluid ounces 33.81 Fluid ounces Liters 0.030
Liters Pints 2.113 Pints Liters 0.473
Liters Quarts 1.057 Quarts Liters 0.946
Liters Gallons 0.264 Liters Gallons 3.785

Table A-11. Statute Miles to Kilometers and Nautical Miles

Statute Miles Kilometers Nautical Miles Statute Miles Kilometers Nautical Miles
1 1.61 0.86 60 96.60 52.14
2 3.22 1.74 70 112.70 60.83
3 4.83 2.61 80 128.80 69.52
4 6.44 3.48 90 144.90 78.21
5 8.05 4.35 100 161.00 86.92
6 9.66 5.21 200 322.00 173.80
7 11.27 6.08 300 483.00 260.70
8 12.88 6.95 400 644.00 347.60
9 14.49 7.82 500 805.00 434.50
10 16.10 8.69 600 966.00 521.40
20 32.20 17.38 700 1127.00 608.30
30 48.30 26.07 800 1288.00 695.20
40 64.40 34.76 900 1449.00 782.10
50 80.50 43.45 1000 1610.00 869.00

Table A-12. Nautical Miles to Kilometers and Statute Miles

Nautical Miles Kilometers Statute Miles Nautical Miles Kilometers Statute Miles
1 1.85 1.15 60 111.00 69.00
2 3.70 2.30 70 129.50 80.50
3 5.55 3.45 80 148.00 92.00
4 7.40 4.60 90 166.50 103.50
5 9.25 5.75 100 185.00 115.00
6 11.10 6.90 200 370.00 230.00
7 12.95 8.05 300 555.00 345.00
8 14.80 9.20 400 740.00 460.00
9 16.65 10.35 500 925.00 575.00
10 18.50 11.50 600 1110.00 690.00
20 37.00 23.00 700 1295.00 805.00
30 55.50 34.50 800 1480.00 920.00
40 74.00 46.00 900 1665.00 1033.00
50 92.50 57.50 1000 1850.00 1150.00

FM 3-05.230

Table A-13. Kilometers to Statute and Nautical Miles

Kilometers Statute Miles Nautical Kilometers Statute Miles Nautical
Miles Miles
1 0.62 0.54 60 37.28 32.38
2 1.24 1.08 70 43.50 37.77
3 1.86 1.62 80 49.71 43.17
4 2.49 2.16 90 55.93 48.56
5 3.11 2.70 100 62.14 53.96
6 3.73 3.24 200 124.28 107.92
7 4.35 3.78 300 186.42 161.88
8 4.97 4.32 400 248.56 215.84
9 5.59 4.86 500 310.70 269.80
10 6.21 5.40 600 372.84 323.76
20 12.43 10.79 700 434.98 377.72
30 18.64 16.19 800 497.12 431.68
40 24.86 21.58 900 559.26 485.64
50 31.07 26.98 1000 621.40 539.60

Table A-14. Yards to Meters

Yards Meters Yards Meters Yards Meters
100 91 1000 914 1900 1737
200 183 1100 1006 2000 1828
300 274 1200 1097 3000 2742
400 366 1300 1189 4000 3656
500 457 1400 1280 5000 4570
600 549 1500 1372 6000 5484
700 640 1600 1463 7000 6398
800 732 1700 1554 8000 7212
900 823 1800 1646 9000 8226

Table A-15. Meters to Yards

Meters Yards Meters Yards Meters Yards
100 109 1000 1094 1900 2078
200 219 1100 1203 2000 2188
300 328 1200 1312 3000 3282
400 437 1300 1422 4000 4376
500 547 1400 1531 5000 5470
600 656 1500 1640 6000 6564
700 766 1600 1750 7000 7658
800 875 1700 1860 8000 8752
900 984 1800 1969 9000 9846

Appendix B

Logistical Sustainment
The U.S. Army strategy for conducting operations has changed from air-
land to force projection using tailored packages. Commands have aligned
their unit sustainment organizations and activities with the U.S. Army’s
concept of force projection. This change allows units to integrate organic
CS and CSS elements within the theater Army support structure for
continuous and responsive sustainment to deployed units. FM 100-25
contains additional information.

B-1. When the theater support system is in place, it can meet most unit
requirements except dedicated direct support (DS), which unit CS and CSS
must provide. Logistic planners then must concentrate on the following
• Initial entry. Planners must determine the type of sustainment
required: the number of days of accompanying supplies based on the
time-phased force and deployment list (TPFDL) and the unit basing
• Buildup and integration. Planners must coordinate and integrate
logistics with the theater support system before TPFDL closure and as
it continues to mature (FM 100-25, Chapter 7).


B-2. Each operation is unique and requires mission-specific analysis that
develops a tailored sustainment force. Joint, international, and interagency
activities add complexity to the sustainment system. ARSOF may find
themselves conducting operations outside a theater support system because
of geographic location. Preparing and submitting a SOR during these types of
exercises can enhance the unit’s requirement determination process and also
add a final coordination check to the theater operation plan (OPLAN).

B-3. Deliberate planning and crisis-action planning are the two
methodologies of planning. In deliberate planning and preparation, ARSOF
and the ASCC can fully identify support requirements in OPLANs and
concept plans (CONPLANs) from a bare-based SOR down to the user level
based on an established set of planning assumptions. In this way, the ASCC
coordinates how to fulfill requirements from the support structure in the
theater Army. In crisis-action planning and preparation, the requirements
anticipated at the combatant commander’s level dictate the amount of

FM 3-05.230

responsiveness and improvisation required to provide reactive, no-notice

support and sustainment. Actual circumstances may dictate that preplanned
requirements are modified, or they may generate new requirements that
were unanticipated during the deliberate planning process.
B-4. During deliberate planning for a mission, the theater SOC may use
ARSOF (either in the theater or requested from United States Special
Operations Command [USSOCOM]) to assist the planning process by
conducting assessments or site surveys. These missions can also serve ASCC
preparations. When feasible, planners integrate these assessments into the
theater campaign plan to provide intelligence, operational, and logistics
information for logistics preparation of the theater.
B-5. The use of assessment teams may not be practical during crisis-action
planning. When crisis-action planning occurs, the theater SOC staff, with the
ASCC, must anticipate the unified command’s ARSOF support requirements.
USASOC can deploy advance party personnel to assist the ASCC in receiving
ARSOF and to establish access to the theater support structure.


B-6. The geographic combatant commander establishes the command
relationship involving ARSOF in his theater. However, the theater ASCC has
the Title 10, United States Code (USC), responsibility, regardless of OPCON
arrangements within the unified command, to provide administration and
support to deployed ARSOF. Also, when directed by the geographic
combatant commander, the ASCC will support and sustain designated
special operations forces (SOF) of other U.S. Services and other multinational
B-7. Special operations support command (SOSCOM) HQ provides C2 to its
organic elements to accomplish its mission of planning and coordinating CSS,
health service support, and signal support to ARSOF units supporting the
war-fighting combatant commanders. When directed, SOSCOM deploys its
CS and CSS battalions in DS of deployed ARSOF.


B-8. The SOTSE is a staff planning, coordinating, and facilitating element.
It serves as the ARSOF liaison to the ASCC for matters pertaining to
logistics and medical needs, and provides ARSOF advocacy within the ASCC.
The SOTSE coordinates requirements identified by ARSOF and facilitates
the interface of ARSOF organizational logistics functions with the services
provided by the ASCC. USASOC attaches the SOTSE to the ASCC HQ for
duty within the ASCC G-4 staff. The SOTSE coordinates closely with the
supported theater SOC and ARSOF during the deliberate planning process.
The SOTSE identifies support requirements, integrates ARSOF sustainment
requirements into the ASCC support plan, and ensures timely provision of
that support.
B-9. A critical source of information that the ASCC needs in its coordination
and facilitation functions is the SOR provided by the ARSOF units. The SOC
J-4 and other logistics staffs have to be proactive and must be included in the
mission planning process. The logistics planners must anticipate operational

FM 3-05.230

unit requirements at all stages of the mission. Ideally, the J-4 uses the ASCC
OPLAN in preparing his CONPLAN for inclusion in the mission order. This
approach allows theater support elements time to review required support
before the SOF mission unit submits its mission-tailored SOR. This review is
especially critical in crisis-action planning and short-notice mission changes.
The SOR is a living document that requires periodic reevaluation and
updating as requirements change. Determination of requirements begins
with the receipt of the mission. Time and accuracy are critical factors.
B-10. Although deliberate planning is the preferred method, crisis-action
planning is within the framework. The key is to anticipate requirements
based on emerging operations and then to use approved OPLANs.


B-11. Conventional CSS organizations and procedures are adequate for
ARSOF requirements. Standard procedures are in place to handle the few
ARSOF-peculiar requirements. The ASCC provides reception, staging,
onward movement, and integration (RSOI), and follow-on support and
sustainment of Army forces in the theater, including ARSOF. The ASCC also
provides support to Army forces in intermediate staging bases. ARSOF have
some key differences that affect the type of support required for RSOI and
sustainment. The following conditions occur often enough that they must
receive special consideration during logistics planning:
• Forward-deployed ARSOF units are usually in isolated and austere
locations. Distribution is the key consideration.
• Some special equipment exists; however, most equipment is Army-
common and organic ARSOF assets can maintain it.

B-12. Responsibilities for planning and executing theater support do not
align with the levels of war or with the HQ normally associated with them.
The ASCC provides the necessary capability for the Army forces assigned to
a unified command.
B-13. The geographic combatant commander supports SOF in his AOR. The
ARSOF logistics planners identify the support requirements in the planning
phase. The ASCC must also identify the logistics shortfalls for inclusion in
the combatant commander’s risk assessment in his AOR. If the ASCC cannot
support ARSOF, the ASCC must raise the shortfall to the supported
combatant commander for resolution.
B-14. The theater SOC tasks missions to ARSOF. The theater SOC works
closely with the unified command staff and the theater ASCC to articulate
the ARSOF requirements. The geographic combatant commander establishes
priorities and allocates the available resources to ARSOF to accomplish each
mission. The ASCC develops the theater support plan, which includes
sustainment of ARSOF by the theater logistics organizations. The theater
SOC then monitors ARSOF sustainment in the theater.
B-15. The SOC and ARSOF logisticians coordinate with the ASCC to develop
plans and subsequent orders to implement directives the ASCC will issue to

FM 3-05.230

support the ARSOF assigned to the unified command. The SOC advises the
ASCC commander on the appropriate command and support relationships for
each ARSOF mission. The SOTSE keeps USASOC informed of the status of
ASCC’s supporting plans.


B-16. The SOR identifies and consolidates in priority all unit requirements
that exceed organic capabilities. As shown in the following outline format
(Figure B-1, pages B-5 through B-11), a complete SOR addresses in detail all
aspects of CS and CSS.

FM 3-05.230


a. Unit to Be Supported.
b. When Support Is Required.
c. Location of Supported Unit When Support Is Required.
d. Unit Points of Contact.
e. Number of Personnel to Be Supported.
f. Unit Identification Code.
g. Force Activity Designator.
h. Funding. Special funding for the operation and how to access, if applicable. Fund flow
for obtaining supplies, including project code.
a. Mission. State the general mission of the unit, command, or operation.
b. Desired Results. Provide a concise statement of the desired results of the support
being requested.
4. ASSUMPTIONS. Give the conditions that are likely or must exist for this support to be
required. Relate the assumptions to specific requirements, as required or appropriate.
5. CONSTRAINTS. Define situation that, if experienced, will degrade operations. Give
conditions to specific requirements identified, as required or appropriate.
6. COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COORDINATION. Describe functional command and
control of the unit.
a. Class I.
(1) Dining facility requirements.
(2) Augmentation.
(3) Food storage facilities. Determine which of the following food storage facilities are
required to contain a 30-day supply of rations.
(a) Dry space in cubic feet.
(b) Chill space in cubic feet.
(c) Freezer space in cubic feet.
(4) Mermites. Determine requirements for mermites. List how many and how often
they are required.
(5) Meal payment. Determine how individuals will pay for their meals.


Figure B-1. Statement of Requirements Format

FM 3-05.230


(a) Cash collection.

(b) Payroll deduction.
(c) Meal cards.
(6) Dining facility hours. Determine if a 24-hour dining facility will be required.
(7) Equipment augmentation. Determine requirements for equipment augmentation
to dining facility. List the equipment by nomenclature, National Stock Number
(NSN), and quantity.
(8) Combat rations. Estimate the number of combat rations required by the number
of meals required for 30-day sustainment.
(a) Meal, combat, individual.
(b) Meal, ready-to-eat (MRE).
(c) Long-range reconnaissance patrol rations.
(d) Other (specify).
(9) Water requirements.
b. Class II.
(1) Self-service. List essential self-service supply center items required for 30-day
(2) NBC equipment. List requirements for NBC consumables and nonconsumables
needed to provide two complete issues of NBC equipment following an NBC attack.
(3) Sustainment. List other Class II items required for sustainment, such as common
table of allowance (CTA) 50-900 items.
(4) Reproduction equipment. Determine what reproduction equipment is required.
List the equipment and the number of copies needed for 30-day sustainment.
(5) Special equipment. List any special Class II equipment required over and above
that already authorized and on hand. List by nomenclature, NSN, and quantity.
(6) Clothing sales. Determine requirements for clothing sales facility.
(7) Geospatial products (maps, digital data). State the requirement for each product
type by quantity and area coverage.
c. Class III.
(1) Petroleum, oils, and lubricants. Determine POL, including base support functions,
for a 30-day sustainment. List item by type and quantity.
(a) Motor gasoline (specify regular or super).
(b) Diesel fuel (specify DF1 or DF2).
(c) Aviation gasoline (specify JP4 or JP5).


Figure B-1. Statement of Requirements Format (Continued)

FM 3-05.230

(d) Oil (bulk).
(e) Grease.
(f) Coolants.
(g) Packaged POL or other lubricants.
(2) Tankers and dispensers. Identify requirements for tankers or dispensers in
addition to organic capabilities. List by type, capacity, and quantity.
(3) Planning factors. Determine if the planning factors used to identify POL
requirements were factors other than those in the Combined Arms Support
Command (CASCOM) database or operational log (OPLOG) planner. If so,
d. Class IV. Determine requirements for building and barrier materials.
e. Class V.
(1) Additional Class V requirements. Determine Class V requirements over and
above those in the unit basic load. List by Department of Defense (DOD)
identification code, nomenclature, and quantity.
(2) Planning factors. Determine which planning factor was used to forecast Class V
consumption rates.
f. Class VI.
g. Class VII.
(1) Additional equipment. Determine requirements for additional items of equipment,
such as trucks and generators. List by nomenclature, NSN, and quantity.
(2) Maintenance augmentation. Determine the requirement for maintenance
augmentation to support the equipment listed above.
h. Class VIII.
(1) Determine requirements for Class VIII supplies by nomenclature, NSN, quantities,
and special requirements associated with a particular item, such as refrigeration.
(2) Determine schedule of resupplies required.
(3) Determine whether resupply will be prepackaged standard line items.
(4) Identify Class VIII supplies peculiar to the AO—whether they are readily available
or must be specifically acquired (for example, antivenins).
(5) Determine availability and reliability of HN Class VIII for emergency purposes.
i. Class IX (Repair Parts).
(1) Mandatory parts list. Determine if there is a mandatory parts list to support the


Figure B-1. Statement of Requirements Format (Continued)

FM 3-05.230


(2) Prescribed load list (PLL). Determine if the PLL includes repair parts to support all
assigned equipment.
(3) Equipment density list. Develop an equipment density list to provide to HN or
other supporting agency, as required.
(4) Leased vehicles and equipment. Determine Class IX requirements for leased
vehicles and equipment, if necessary.
j. Class X. Determine Class X requirements. List by type and quantity.
k. Other.
(1) Emergency resupply. Identify requirements for emergency resupply push
packages. (Specify by NSN, nomenclature, and quantity. Attach as separate
enclosure for each type of push package.)
(2) Maps and photographs. Identify requirements for maps and imagery.
a. Field Services.
b. Engineering Services.
(1) Equipment power compatibility. Determine the following if supplied with
commercial power at the wartime site.
(a) Equipment is compatible.
(b) Plug adapters are required. List what voltage and how many are needed.
(c) Transformers are required. List what voltage and how many are needed.
(2) Water requirements. Identify daily requirements for potable water.
(3) Pest control requirements. Determine requirements for rodent and insect control
(4) Heavy-equipment requirements.
c. Other Services.
(1) Linen requirements. List by type and quantity.
(2) Laundry services requirements.
(3) Other services identification. Determine if other services are needed.
a. DS and General Support (GS) Maintenance. Identify requirements for DS and GS
b. Other Maintenance Equipment. List commercial and nonstandard equipment that
must be maintained.


Figure B-1. Statement of Requirements Format (Continued)

FM 3-05.230


a. Air Transportation.
(1) Unit load plans. Enclose unit load plans.
(2) Administrative aircraft. Determine requirements. Specify type and number of
hours per week.
(3) Equipment and personnel requirements. Determine requirements for additional
materiel handling equipment and personnel.
(4) Cargo storage facilities. Determine requirements for cargo storage facilities.
Specify by the number of square feet required for the following:
(a) Covered secure storage.
(b) Outdoor secure storage.
(5) Airfield requirements.
(a) C-130s.
(b) C-141s.
(c) C-5As.
(d) Other (specify).
b. Water Transportation. Determine water transportation needs (specify).
c. Ground Transportation. Determine requirements for supplemental military vehicles.
(1) Tactical vehicles. With or without communications equipment.
(2) Other special purpose vehicles.
a. Maintenance Facilities. Identify vehicle communication, weapons, and aviation
maintenance area (covered) requirements (list in square feet).
b. Billeting Facilities.
(1) Billet number and size requirements.
(a) Officers.
(b) Senior enlisted.
(c) Enlisted.
(d) Females.
(2) Tentage.
c. Medical Facilities. Determine requirements for physical facilities.
(1) Hospital beds.


Figure B-1. Statement of Requirements Format (Continued)

FM 3-05.230


(2) Treatment rooms.

(3) Dental treatment rooms.
(4) Laboratory.
(5) X-ray room.
(6) Pharmacy.
(7) Other (specify).
d. Other Facilities (list by function and square feet).
(1) Operations center.
(2) Logistics center.
(3) Signal center.
(4) Reception and palletizing.
(5) Dining facility.
(6) Dispensary.
(7) Isolation facility.
(8) Parachute rigging and drying.
(9) Ammunition storage.
(10) Clubs.
(11) Gym.
(12) Antenna fields.
(13) Ranges (list type weapons requiring ranges).
(14) Drop zones.
(15) Secure facilities (for storing, receiving, and transmitting classified messages and
(16) Other (specify).
a. Casualty Reporting. Determine how casualty-reporting system works.
b. Administrative Services.
(1) Reproduction and word processing. Determine reproduction and word processing
(2) Postal. Identify postal requirements.


Figure B-1. Statement of Requirements Format (Continued)

FM 3-05.230

c. Finance. Determine finance support requirements. Identify what is required (pay and
d. Religious Support. Identify religious support requirements.
e. Legal. Determine requirements for staff judge advocate support.
a. Patient Care. Determine legal and policy constraints on providing medical care to
indigenous personnel.
b. Medical Evacuation. Determine aeromedical and overland evacuation requirements.
c. Medical Logistics.
d. Medical Intelligence.
e. Preventive Medicine Services. Vaccination and prophylactic medication requirements.
f. Veterinary Services.
g. Dental Services.
h. Laboratory Services.
a. Terminal Equipment and Access. Determine requirements for the following:
(1) Supplemental terminal equipment. Specify by type and quantity.
(2) Access to HN communication telephone system. Specify need, such as number
of lines.
(3) Access to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) telegraph network.
(4) Access to HN military teletype system.
(5) Access to automatic secure voice communications.
(6) Access to NATO secure voice network.
(7) Access to Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN).
b. Transmit and Receive Sites. Determine the number of transmit and receive sites to be
set up and how much area will be needed.
c. Signal Maintenance Support.
d. Frequency Requirements.
a. Military Police. Determine MP requirements.
b. Counterintelligence. Determine if CI is required.
c. Base Defense. Determine if base defense capabilities are required.


Figure B-1. Statement of Requirements Format (Continued)

Appendix C

The purpose of this appendix is to provide information as to the proper
legal use and expenditure of government monies. This section is only a
guide. If there is any doubt as to the proper use of funds, a judge advocate
should be consulted. The National Defense Authorization Act dated 1994
contains additional information.
All leaders should be aware that Title 10, USC, is the document that
provides the guidance and restrictions on all monies spent by the USG.
The phrase Title 10 money refers to all funds associated with the U.S.
military and is further subdivided into various funding lines to be spent
in specific ways. The principal source of money for any particular unit is
operation and maintenance (O&M) funding, which is budgeted on an
annual basis to provide for all unit-initiated activities. Units may also
have access to other types of monies, such as Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS)-directed exercises funding, DA funding for operational exercises, SA
funding, and humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) funding.


C-1. SA is an umbrella term for all statutory programs and authorities
under which the United States may provide and regulate forms of assistance
and sales to foreign governments (and international organizations) for the
purpose of enhancing U.S. and mutual security.
C-2. CA leaders advising a supported commander should first determine
whether the mission is funded as an SA mission. Unless the activity,
property, service, or training in question is specifically part of the SA
mission, the transfer of funds and equipment or conduct of the training is not
authorized. The mission scope should be frequently reviewed to ensure that
operations are not exceeding mission authority.
C-3. Congress carefully scrutinizes and constantly reviews SA programs;
therefore, these activities naturally have more visibility than routine
deployments. Because of the many restrictions on standards of eligibility,
type of materials and services to be provided, and the constantly changing
nature of SA programs and activities, the advice of a judge advocate is
essential. A Judge Advocate General (JAG) officer through legal channels up
to the unified command level should coordinate all questions on SA
C-4. If not deployed on an SA mission, any requests for HN support or
assistance should be coordinated through JAG channels, or the U.S. Embassy
military representative (military group [MILGP] or military advisory

FM 3-05.230

assistance group [MAAG]). If deployed on an SA mission, unit members must

understand up front specifically what kinds of support and assistance can
and cannot be provided to the HN.


C-5. HCA serves as a vital component of the nation assistance effort of the
U.S. Congress, and only Congressionally approved funding may be used for
these types of activities. Through Title 10, USC Section 401, Congress
specifically authorizes funds for the following activities:
• Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided to rural areas of a
• Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.
• Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.
• Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.
C-6. HCA activities must meet the following three requirements to be
considered legal for funding under Title 10, USC:
• Promote the security interests of the United States and the HN.
• Promote the specific operational readiness skills of the members of the
armed forces who participate in the activity.
• Serve the basic economic and social needs of the local people.
C-7. HCA funds are distributed to the geographic combatant commanders
who are responsible for identification of HCA projects and assignment of
particular missions to designated units. The unit then purchases materiel
used for the HCA project. Congress has barred the use of HCA funds for
projects that will benefit (directly or indirectly) individuals, groups, or
organizations engaged in military or paramilitary operations.
C-8. One exception to the Congressional prohibitions on the use of O&M
funds for HCA is the authority to perform minor HCA activities incidental to
the unit mission (under the provision of “minimal expenditures” of general
O&M funds for projects in conjunction with a military exercise or operation,
which must be reported to Congress by the end of the fiscal year). This
exception requires a legal review before implementation to ensure
compliance with U.S. law.
C-9. HCA activities can be part of a larger combat exercise (for example,
Cobra Gold) or may be the focal point of a smaller engineer or medical
exercise (for example, Nuevos Horizontes). There is no dollar limit on the cost
of the project as long as it is financed from specifically designated HCA
C-10. Only HCA projects identified at the combatant command level or
approved by a JAG officer should be performed. Unit members should not
attempt to interpret U.S. law in cases where there is any question of legality.
U.S. statutes are subject to change and supplementation by local authorities.
Only Title 10, USC, Section 401, funding authority may be used for HCA
projects. The Stevens Amendment has been eliminated.

FM 3-05.230


C-11. This action is a General Accounting Office (GAO) holding that was
approved in 1992. It approves the funding of outside the continental United
States (OCONUS) training missions and payment of specific HN expenses
with O&M funds in certain limited circumstances.
C-12. The SF Exception applies to SF, CA, and PSYOP forces. It states that
the USSOCOM commander, any unified commander, or a specified
combatant commander may pay or authorize payment for the following
• Expense of SOF training with armed forces and other security forces of
a friendly foreign country.
• Expenses of deploying SOF for the training.
• Where SOF is training with a friendly developing country, the
incremental expenses incurred by that country as a direct result of
such training. Incremental expenses include the reasonable and proper
costs of—
Training ammo.
Other goods and services consumed by HN forces as a result of the
Incremental expenses do not include the pay allowances or other normal
costs incurred by HN personnel.
C-13. The decision to use the SF Exception rests with the combatant
commander. The primary purpose of the training mission must still be the
training of U.S. SOF. Attempting to use the SF Exception for the primary
purpose of training friendly foreign country forces is prohibited. If this
primary test is not met, then O&M funds cannot be used to pay the expenses
listed above.
C-14. In most circumstances, deployments for training (DFTs) or joint
combined exercises for training (JCETs) will be paid for with O&M funds
from the unit which initiated the deployment. An SF group DFT will be paid
for with SF group O&M funds. Commanders must report data for all DFTs
that rely upon Section 2011.
C-15. The SF Exception allows SOF to use O&M funds in certain limited
circumstances to pay for specific expenses of the HN incurred in training
exercises conducted with U.S. SOF. Normally, O&M funds cannot be used to
pay for any HN expenses unless they fit the parameter of the SF Exception,
and then only after review and approval (Figure C-1, pages C-4 and C-5).

FM 3-05.230

CLASS I (Subsistence Items and Water)

• Primary: Troop Issue Subsistence Activity (TISA) at present station for MREs and B
rations (also for bulk bottled water).
• Alternate: In-country local procurement coordinated through higher contracting for
amounts over $2,500.
• Contingency: Utilization of portable filtration systems available through the joint
operational stocks (JOS) warehouse normally requires a 2-week lead time and is
subject to availability.
• Emergency: Use operational fund (OPFUND) for in-country local purchase.
CLASS II (Organizational Clothing and Individual Equipment [OCIE], Tools, Tents)
• Primary: Requisition through supply system or locally purchase available items with
International Merchants Purchase Authorization Card (IMPAC).
• Alternate: JOS warehouse has limited availability of force protection items, tents, and
the like; normally requires a 2-week minimum lead time; and items are subject to
• Contingency: Arrange for higher contracting of in-country assets.
• Emergency: Use OPFUND for in-country local purchase.
CLASS III (Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants)
• Primary: Contracted in-country local procurement if readily available; Class III
through normal supply channels or local purchase.
• Alternate: OPFUND for small amounts.
CLASS IV (Construction and Barrier Materials)
• Primary: Contracted local procurement or requisition and shipping through normal
supply channels depending on availability and amounts needed.
• Alternate: Local procurement at present station with contracting or IMPAC.
• Contingency: OPFUND for in-country procurement of limited amounts.
CLASS V (Ammunition)
• Primary: Unit basic load (UBL) and combat-configured loads (CCLs) shipped through
normal channels.
CLASS VI (Personal Demand Items)
• Primary: Sundry packs are available through the TISA at present station; normally
require a 2- to 3-week advance notice.
• Alternate: Locally purchase required items at present station.
• Contingency: Use contracting support from USASOC for large purchases of Class VI.
• Emergency: Use OPFUND for small purchases of required items in-country.

Figure C-1. Prospectus

FM 3-05.230

CLASS VII (Major End Items)

• Primary: Ship organic unit and augmentee assets as required by METT-TC.
• Alternate: Use USASOC contracting or in-country MILGP to set up rental vehicles
and truck/heavy-equipment support.
CLASS VIII (Medical Supplies)
• Primary: Battalion medical section and general services officer (GSO)
procurement through normal medical channels.
• Contingency: In-country procurement of needed Class VIII by higher contracting
or the MILGP.
• Emergency: Use OPFUND to purchase in-country resupply of Class VIII.
CLASS IX (Repair Parts)
• Primary: Bring PLL and CCL of parts to support all deployed equipment,
weapons, and night observation devices (NODs). Resupply through normal
message traffic/logistical status (LOGSTAT) as required.
• Alternate: In-country procurement of repair parts with the OPFUND.
CLASS X (Materials Supporting Nonmilitary Programs)
• Primary: Fortifications or barrier materials.
• Alternate: CA projects (agriculture, economic development program materials).

Figure C-1. Prospectus (Continued)

Appendix D

Legal Considerations
This appendix describes basic policies, guidance, procedures, and
responsibilities regarding legal services provided during times of
deployment. The matters outlined here may be augmented by specific
guidance contained in the OPLAN to the various missions and

D-1. Mission. The Group Judge Advocate (GJA) is the primary legal advisor
to the group commander and members of the group staff. The GJA also
advises subordinate commanders and staff officers on all legal matters and
coordinates all legal activities within the AO.
D-2. Task organization. The manner in which the group legal section
deploys will depend greatly upon the composition of the SFOB. In all major
deployment situations, the GJA should deploy with the group battle staff,
and the battalion legal NCOs must deploy with their FOBs. The remaining
members of the group legal section should deploy with the group’s main body.
GJA deployment information follows:
• An SFOB may deploy only the GJA and the group senior legal NCO.
An SFOB may add the group administrative specialist, and in some
cases, the GJA will request a flyaway package from HQ, USASFC(A).
The flyaway package will consist of an additional judge advocate and
an additional legal NCO. The group legal office can also request a
flyaway package to support split missions or to support garrison
operations while the GJA deploys.
• Individual mobilization augmentees are attorneys who fill a specific group
legal billet. These individuals will fill positions vacated by the GJA when
he deploys.

D-3. Upon receiving a warning order, the GJA will immediately join the
battle staff and begin conducting a mission analysis. The GJA will coordinate
with the particular theater combatant commander’s judge advocate to
determine ROE in effect. Afterwards, the GJA will assist the S-3 in drafting the
ROE annex. The GJA will also—
• Draft the legal annex.
• Conduct briefings and train all deploying personnel on the law of
armed conflict (LOAC), ROE, and human rights.

FM 3-05.230

• Coordinate with group budget officer and the S-4 to ensure that
ordering officers and Class A agents with appropriate level of
purchasing authority are appointed as needed.
D-4. The GJA and the S-4 will also coordinate with higher HQ to obtain
support of a contracting officer in the theater of operations.

D-5. The GJA will be located in the group operations center (OPCEN) and
will provide legal advice as discussed in the following paragraphs.
D-6. International law/operational law. The GJA will function as the
operational law advisor to the group commander, staff, and subordinate
commanders. The duties of GJA include, but are not limited to—
• Advising the command on the LOAC during wartime and LOAC
concepts during stability operations and support operations, reviewing
mission concepts for compliance with the LOAC, and providing a staff
estimate to the commander for his decision.
• Participating in planning cells and reviewing OPLANs, CONPLANs, and
operation orders (OPORDs) for LOAC implications of attacking or
destroying specific targets.
• Reviewing target folders and advising on the LOAC implications of
attacking or destroying specific targets.
• Briefing the group commander at scheduled command and staff briefings
concerning legal aspects of the operation.
• Briefing the deploying team while they are in isolation concerning legal
considerations specific to their operation, the ROE, and the laws of the
country to which they are being deployed.
• Attending briefbacks given by the teams and ensuring that each team
member has an understanding of the legal aspects of his mission.
• Attending debriefing of the teams after completion of mission, as
• Coordinating with the S-1 and S-3 to ensure that all EPWs and detainees
are properly processed and cared for. Where the status of any person in
U.S. custody is uncertain, the GJA will arrange for, or assist in, the
conduct of Article 5 tribunals pursuant to the Geneva Conventions.
• Advising the command and briefing the group on the effects and
requirements of any status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs) in effect in
the AO. If no treaty or other international agreement has been concluded
by the time of deployment, the GJA will contact the higher HQ Staff
Judge Advocate (SJA) or the Defense Attaché Office of the U.S. Mission to
the country concerned to ensure some type of SOFA is negotiated. In the
absence of an international agreement, U.S. forces may be subject to the
jurisdiction of the friendly HN.

FM 3-05.230

D-7. Military justice. The following paragraphs describe duties related to

military justice:
• The GJA will determine jurisdictional chains of command in effect
within the AOR prior to deployment. The GJA will advise the
command on all matters involving military justice, represent the
command in courts-martial, prepare Article 15s (Commanding Officer’s
Non-Judicial Punishment), and coordinate trial defense service
support for soldiers in the group.
• Commanders are responsible to ensure that any misconduct by their
subordinates is fully investigated. Commanders will forward sworn
statements and any other results of their investigation through
command channels to the GJA for evaluation for possible Uniform
Code of Military Justice action. If further investigative assistance is
needed, the GJA will coordinate with MP investigations or criminal
investigation division assets through the applicable General Courts-
Martial Convening Authority’s SJA.
• U.S. personnel detained by foreign governments will be reported to the
GJA using a serious incident report format. The GJA will coordinate with
the component or supporting command responsible for coordination with
that country and request assistance from any available CA assets in
obtaining release of these personnel in accordance with (IAW) existing
SOFAs or other treaties or agreements.
D-8. Intelligence oversight. The GJA will advise the group commander on
intelligence oversight matters, ensuring that special intelligence-gathering
equipment is maintained properly, reporting requirements are met, and that all
concerned are aware of the legal implications of noncompliance.

D-9. Legal assistance. The GJA will provide basic legal assistance to the
group (such as power of attorney, wills, and advice) as long as it will not
conflict with other GJA responsibilities.

D-10. Claims administration. The GJA will coordinate the appointment of

claims officers who will conduct initial investigations and reporting
responsibilities. The GJA will advise the claims officer on the proper
procedures to follow in investigating claims.

D-11. Administrative law. The GJA will advise and represent the
command on administrative law issues (such as initiating investigations IAW
AR 15-6, Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers, and
administrative separations).

D-12. Fiscal law. The GJA will advise the S-3 on all foreign training and SA
matters to ensure that legal limitations on the use of funds, with particular
regard to the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act, have
been complied with.

D-13. Contract and procurement law. If the component or supporting

commands cannot provide contract review, the GJA will review all contracts for
legal sufficiency before any contracting officer binds the Government.

Appendix E

Fire Support
Fire support planning is the continuous process of acquiring and
analyzing targets, allocating fire support to targets, scheduling the attack
of targets, and synchronizing all available fire support to achieve the
commander’s intent and to support the scheme of maneuver.
Fire support coordination is the process of executing the fire support
plan. It, too, is continuous and runs concurrently with the planning
process during combat operations. JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques,
and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS), and FM 3-09.32, J-Fire
Multiservice Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower, include
additional information.


E-1. Effectiveness of the fire support effort is measured by achieving desired
effects on the enemy, setting conditions for decisive operations, and
supporting joint force operations. Effective fire support depends on planning
for the successful performance of the following four basic fire support tasks:
• Support forces in contact. The commander must provide responsive fire
support that protects and ensures freedom of maneuver to forces in
contact with the enemy throughout the AO.
• Support the concept of operation. Commanders set the conditions for
decisive operations by successfully attacking high-payoff targets, the
loss of which prevents the enemy from interfering with friendly
operations or developing their own operations.
• Synchronize fire support. Fire support is synchronized through fire
support coordination, beginning with the commander’s estimate and
concept of operations. Fire support must be planned for continuously
and concurrently with the development of the scheme of maneuver.
Further, operations providing fire support must be synchronized with
other joint force operations (such as air operations, intelligence
operations, and SO) to optimize the application of limited resources,
achieve synergy, and avoid fratricide.
• Sustain fire support operations. Fire support planners must formulate
fire support plans to reflect logistic limitations and to exploit logistic
capabilities. Ammo, fuel, food, water, maintenance, transportation, and
medical support are all critical to sustaining fire support operations.


E-2. The fire support coordinator (FSCOORD) and fire support officer (FSO)
are responsible for fire support planning and coordination. Due to the lack of

FM 3-05.230

an internal FSCOORD/FSO, this position is usually manned by the Air Force

SOF tactical air control party (TACP). Duties include the following:
• Plan, coordinate, and execute fire support.
• Advise the commander on fire support matters.
• Request, adjust, and direct all types of fire support.
• Develop the fire support plan and execution matrix and disseminate to
key personnel.
• Process all lower-echelon fire support plans.
• Coordinate all fire support coordination measures, target numbers and
lists, location of final protective fires, and priority of fires with higher HQ.
• Obtain from higher HQ—
ƒStatus and location of fire support delivery systems available to the
ƒExisting targets, scheduled fires, known points, high-payoff targets,
and priority of target attack.
ƒCurrent and planned fire support coordinating measures.
ƒVerified frequencies and call signs.
ƒArmy aviation available.
ƒStatus of tactical air (TACAIR) missions and CAS control
ƒNaval gunfire (NGF) available.


E-3. Many SO missions provide the joint force commander (JFC) with
unconventional attack options. SOF are not a substitute for conventional
forces, but a necessary adjunct to existing conventional capabilities.
Typically, air, naval, and long-range ground-based fire support systems are
called to deliver additional joint fire support to SOF. Figure E-1, page E-3,
depicts C2 request and tasking channels.


E-4. The joint fires element (JFE) is part of the JFC J-3. The JFE—
• Is responsible for all fire support within the theater.
• Disseminates fire support guidance.
• Disseminates the pulse repetition frequency (PRF) codes for laser
• Tasks services to provide fire support.
E-5. The special operations liaison element (SOLE) coordinates SOF issues
for the joint special operations component command (JSOCC).
E-6. The FSCOORD is responsible for coordination measures with the JFE.
The joint special operations air component (JSOAC) assigns organic SOF
aviation assets to fill requests.

FM 3-05.230

Figure E-1. C2 Request and Tasking Channels


E-7. At the lowest level, the FSO nominates targets in his sector, records this
target information on the target list work sheet, and forwards it to the next-
higher echelon of command. The next-higher echelon of command considers
the target information, consolidates it (for example, eliminates duplications),
adds targets, and forwards a copy of the target list work sheet up the chain of
command. This process is repeated until the request is forwarded to the JFE
and is either approved, modified, or disapproved. The JFE informs all units of
any subsequent changes to the plans. Once targets are received at the SFOB,
FOB, or SFODA, they prepare their fire plans and schedules to support the
maneuver and allocate targets to the appropriate fire support agency or asset.
Preplanned targets for organic mortars may be planned without approval by
the higher HQ or JFC; however, higher HQ should be notified whenever
possible of all fires planned for organic weapons. Tables E-1 and E-2, pages
E-4 and E-5, discuss offensive and defensive fire planning.

FM 3-05.230

Table E-1. Offensive Fire Planning

Phase Actions to Be Taken
Short of the Consider planning fire—
Line of • To support the unit movement to the LD or LC.
Departure • To support the unit if the attack fails and the enemy counterattacks.
(LD) or Line • To impede enemy patrols and early warning systems.
of Contact
Provide priority of fires to lead elements.
Consider planning—
• Fires to suppress enemy direct-fire weapons.
• Smoke to restrict enemy observation of friendly maneuver elements.
• Smoke to screen friendly obstacle-breaching operations.
• Fires on exposed flanks.
Consider placing an observer with over watch elements.
Consider recommending a preparation fire if the advantages outweigh the
LD or LC disadvantages:
to the • Will the enemy be forewarned of an attack if a preparation is fired?
Objective • Will the loss of surprise significantly affect the chance for success?
• Are there enough significant targets to justify the preparation?
• Is there enough fire support ammunition to fire an effective preparation?
• Can the enemy recover before the effects can be exploited?
Determine when and how you will shift fires. Use one of the following methods:
• Time: At a predetermined time, fires will shift.
• Location: Fires shift when the maneuver unit reaches a certain location,
such as a phase line.
• On call: The maneuver commander directs when the fires shift.
• Event: A predetermined event signals shifting of fires.
Consider planning—
• Fires to block enemy reinforcements and resupply by ground or air.
On the • Fires to suppress enemy direct-fire weapons.
Objective • Obscurants to screen friendly forces or obscure hostile ground
observation when consolidating on the objective.
• A signal for lifting and shifting fires.
• Fires for the defense when consolidating on the objective.
Consider planning fires—
Beyond the • To impede enemy reinforcements.
Objective • To block avenues of approach for counterattacking enemy forces.
• To slow or block enemy retreat.

FM 3-05.230

Table E-2. Defensive Fire Planning

Focus Actions to Be Taken

On avenues of approach—
• Target enemy avenues of approach.
• Integrate fire support with direct-fire weapons.
• Plan trigger points for possible moving targets.
On key terrain—
• Place an observer on terrain where he can provide early warning, target
location, and laser designation and over watch of the battle.
• Plan to obscure enemy observation of friendly movements.
In Front
of the On obstacles—
Position • Coordinate coverage of obstacles with the engineers.
• Consider the use of smoke or riot control agents to hinder breaching
• If available and in conjunction with the engineer, plan family of scatterable
mines (FASCAM) to reseed minefields that the enemy has breached.
• Plan fires to close gaps and lanes in barriers or obstacle plans.
• Plan fires to help canalize the enemy.
• Integrate fire support with obstacles to complement direct-fire weapons.
• Accurately locate obstacles and preplanned targets.
• Using groups or series to assist in withdrawal.
• Using smoke to facilitate disengagement.
• Planning fires on top of your battle position to help in the disengagement, to
deny the enemy access to the position, and to support a counterattack.
Plan final protective fires (FPFs) (a prearranged barrier of fire designed to protect
friendly troops). Use the following sequence in planning FPFs, but remember the
maneuver commander selects FPF locations.
• Select the fire support asset to fire the FPF. This selection is based on
On the allocation.
Position • Adjust fire onto the FPF to determine actual firing data to be used in firing
the FPF. (The tactical situation, time, or ammo supply may not allow the
FPF to be adjusted.)
• Determine the FPF time of flight.
• Select the FPF tripper point (a permanent, visible point on terrain to the
front that is used to determine when the FPF will be fired). Consider time of
flight and the estimated enemy rate of movement.
• Integrate the FPF into the final protective lines of the company direct-fire
• Determine how the FPF call for fire will be initiated.


E-8. The purpose of quick fire planning is to quickly prepare and execute fire
support in anticipation of an impending operation. Quick fire planning
techniques constitute an informal fire plan. Quick fire planning differs from

FM 3-05.230

deliberate fire planning in that bottom-up, rather than top-down, fire

planning is conducted. In the quick fire plan, the FSO is responsible for—
• Identifying targets to be engaged in the target list.
• Allocating all fire support assets available to engage the targets in the plan.
• Preparing the schedule of fires.
• Disseminating the schedule to all appropriate fire support agencies for


E-9. CAS is defined by JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military
and Associated Terms, as “air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft
against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and
which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and
movement of those forces.” Joint CAS is CAS conducted through joint air
operations. The following conditions are required to employ CAS:
• Air superiority.
• Suppression of enemy air defenses.
• Target marking.
• Favorable weather.
• Prompt response.
• Aircrews and terminal controller skill.
• Appropriate ordnance.
• Communications.
• C2.
E-10. Preplanned requests for CAS include those CAS requirements
foreseeable early enough to be included in the joint air tasking order (ATO) or
mission orders. The requesting agency sends CAS requests through the S-3 or
fire support channels to the JSOTF FSCOORD. After requests are approved,
they (if sent to the JSOAC) are—
• Filled by SO aircraft.
• Forwarded to the joint air operations center (JAOC) (via the SOLE) to
be filled using conventional aircraft.
E-11. Preplanned CAS requests should be received in sufficient time to staff
and coordinate at all levels and should be received by the JSOAC 36 hours
before the ATO execution. Conventional preplanned CAS request channels
are identified in Figure E-2, page E-7.
E-12. Immediate requests for CAS are processed—
• The same as a preplanned request.
• Immediately via the Air Force air request net (AFARN) to the Air
Support Operations Center.
Immediate requests for CAS include the following:
• Requirements that were identified too late to be included in the ATO.

FM 3-05.230

• The format for requesting CAS is theater-dependent. Requests can be

sent by using—
ƒUnited States message text format (USMTF) close air support
request (CASREQ).
ƒDD Form 1972, Joint Tactical Air Strike Request.
ƒCASREQ found in JP 3-09.3.

Figure E-2. Conventional Preplanned CAS Request Channels

NOTE: This diagram does not show the SOF TACP elements. They will be
located with SF from detachment to SFOB.
E-13. Special operations CAS connectivity is shown in Figure E-3, page E-8.
Execution of CAS requests includes the following:
• Fighter check-in (provides the controllers with all pertinent
information regarding the aircraft and weapons).
• CAS 9-line briefing, which includes the following:
ƒEstablished standards for use with fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft.
ƒThreat condition information that does not dictate the CAS
aircraft’s tactics.
ƒThe mission brief that follows the numbered sequence (1–9) of the
CAS Briefing Form.
ƒUse of a standardized briefing sequence that improves mission
direction and control by allowing terminal controllers to pass
information rapidly.
ƒMission information and sequence that may be modified to fit the
tactical situation.

FM 3-05.230

Figure E-3. Special Operations CAS Connectivity

FM 3-05.230

E-14. NGF ships are very mobile, which allows them to be positioned to take
advantage of their limited deflection pattern. Very close supporting fire can
be delivered when the gun-target line is parallel to friendly front lines. The
relatively flat trajectory of NGF results in the probable error being long or
short as opposed to left or right.
E-15. The general mission of NGF support is to assist the ground force by
destroying, neutralizing, or suppressing targets that oppose that force.
Requests for NGF are processed through the S-3/G-3/J-3 channels.
Communications operate on the division NGF support net (HF).


E-16. Attack aviation assets perform the following fire support tasks:
• Provide limited aerial fire support to ground maneuver units.
• Coordinate and adjust indirect fires when tactical air and artillery are
• Conduct joint air attack team operations.
E-17. Attack aviation assets have the following capabilities:
• 4-kilometer (km) standoff capability.
• Rapid movement to the engagement area.
• Delivery accuracy.
• Air-ground communications.
• Quick maneuver and massed fires regardless of battlefield dispersion.
Tables E-3 through E-9, pages E-10 through E-13, outline aircraft and
weapons capabilities. Tables E-3 and E-4 also address two types of laser
capabilities: laser spot tracker (LST) and laser target designator (LTD).
E-18. The limitations of these aviation assets include—
• Having limited time on station and delayed response.
• Being affected by weather and visibility.
• Being affected by the air defense threat.

FM 3-05.230

Table E-3. Fixed-Wing Aircraft and Weapons Capabilities

Using Marking Beacon Other
Aircraft Ordnance Capability
Service Capability Capability Systems
Laser-Guided Bombs
(LGBs), AGM-65
Maverick, General
(TV), Night
Purpose (GP)
Bombs, Napalm,
AV-8B Aerial Mines, 2.75 
USMC Yes No Rockets None (NVG),
Harrier Rockets, 5.0 
Rockets, Cluster
Bomb Units (CBUs),
LUV-2 Flares, 25-mm
Cannon, AGM 122
USMC As Above No No Rockets None Infrared

Maverick, GP Bombs, Rockets,
CBUs, Aerial Mines, 30-mm High
A/OA-10A 2.75 5RFNHWV/89 Yes No Explosive None NVG
and 2 Flares, LUV 5 Incendiary
and 6 Flares, 30-mm (HEI), LUV
Cannon 1, 5, 6

Gated Laser SST-181,
FLIR, Low-
United Intensifier Single
Light Level
States 106-mm Howitzer, (GLINT), Sideband
AC-130H Air Force 40-mm Cannon, No Yes 106-mm (SSB),
(USAF) 20-mm Cannon WP, Personnel
(SOF) 106-mm HE, Locator
40-mm LTD System

106-mm Howitzer, 106-mm PPN-19,
AC-130U 40-mm Cannon, No Yes WP, SST-181,
(SOF) Radar,
20-mm Cannon 106-mm HE, SSB, PLS
40-mm LTD

B-1B USAF GP Bombs No No None PPN-19 Radar

United LGBs, GP Bombs,

F-14 States 20-mm Cannon, Laser
Yes Yes None FLIR, NVG
Tomcat Navy CBUs, LUV 2 Flares, Rockets
(USN) Aerial Mines

FM 3-05.230

Table E-3. Fixed-Wing Aircraft and Weapons Capabilities (Continued)

Using Marking Beacon Other
Aircraft Ordnance Capability
Service Capability Capability Systems

F-15E LGBs, GP Bombs, PPN-19, FLIR,

USAF No Yes Laser
Eagle 20-mm Cannon, CBUs PPN-20 Radar

F-16 LGBs, AGM-65 FLIR,

Fighting USAF Maverick, GP Bombs, No No None Radar,
Falcon 20-mm Cannon, CBUs GPS

F-16C/D LGBs, AGM-65 Radar,
Fighting USAF Maverick, GP Bombs, No Yes Laser None
Falcon 20-mm Cannon, CBUs NVG
LGBs, AGM-65
Maverick, GP Bombs,
20-mm Cannon, CBUs,
Aerial Mines, 2.75 
Rockets, LUV 1 and 2 FLIR,
USN Laser, WP
F/A-18 Flares, Napalm/Fuel Air Radar,
and Yes Yes Rockets, None
Hornet Explosive (FAE), AGM- GPS,
USMC HE Rockets
82 Walleye, 84 Stand- NVG
Off Land Attack Missile
(SLAM), 88 High-Speed
Antiradiation Missile
GP Bombs, Aerial
WP Radar,
S-3B USN Mines, 2.75 5RFNHWV No No None
Rockets FLIR
LUV 2 Flares

Table E-4. Rotary-Wing Aircraft and Weapons Capabilities

Using Marking Other
Aircraft Ordnance Capability
Service Capability Systems
FLIR, Light
7.62 Machine Gun (MG),
UH-1N USMC .50-Caliber (Cal) MG, 2.75  No No Rockets
Filters (LAF),
BGM-71 TOW, 2.75 5RFNHWV
AH-1F USA No No Rockets NVG
20-mm Cannon
BGM-71 TOW, AGM-114 Hellfire,
LUV 2 Flares, AGM-122, Rockets GPS
20-mm Cannon

FM 3-05.230

Table E-4. Rotary-Wing Aircraft and Weapons Capabilities (Continued)

Using Marking Other
Aircraft Ordnance Capability
Service Capability Systems
FLIR 39.8x,
NVG, Radar
AGM-114 Hellfire, 2.75 5RFNHWV Laser,
AH-64A USA No Yes Digital
30-mm Cannon Rockets
(DTV) 127x
FLIR 39.8x,
NVG, Radar
DTV 127x,
AGM-114 Hellfire, 2.75 5RFNHWV Laser, Air/Ground
With USA Yes Yes
30-mm Cannon Rockets Modes,
Data Modem
FLIR 66, 2/3x
OH-58D Thermal
AGM-114 Hellfire, 2.75 5RFNHWV Laser,
Kiowa USA Yes Yes Vision Sight
.50-Cal MG Rockets
Warrior (TVS), 50x

Table E-5. Weapons Capabilities

Effective Maximum Range
Weapons Maximum Rounds
(meters [m])
2.75 RX, 10 pound (lb) 7,500 76
2.75 RX, 17 lb 6,000 76
2.75 MX 66/M151 22.95 lb 6,900 38
7.62-mm Mini Gun 1,000 5,000
.50-Cal MG 1,830 500
20-mm Cannon 1,500 750
30-mm Cannon 3,000 1,200
40-mm Grenade 1,600 265
TOW 3,750 8
Hellfire 8,000 16
5.00 RX 2 7,200 8
CBU-55 FAE 2 Not Applicable (NA) 4
NOTE: Reflects maximum rounds aircraft can carry; however, mission may dictate less ammo being carried.

Table E-6. Mortars

Gun Maximum Minimum Sustainment
Rate of Fire Ammo Fuze
Mortar Range (m) Range (m) Rate (RPM)
60 mm 3,500 70 30 20
5,800/ HE, WP, PD, VT, TI,
M262/ 80/70 30/25 15/8
4,790 ILLUM Delay
107-mm HE, WP, PD, VT, TI,
6,840 770 18 3
M329A2 ILLUM Delay
120 mm 7,200 200 15 4

FM 3-05.230

Table E-7. Artillery

Basic Range Extended DPICM Rate RAP Sustainment
(m) Range (m) of Fire (m) Range (m) Rate (RPM)
and Ammo
M102 11,400 NA 10,500 15,300 3
Applicable Ammo HC, APICM, SMK FY99
RAP (M549)

M119A1 11,500 14,000 14,100 19,500 3

Applicable Ammo HC, APICM, SMK
HE (M700)
RAP (M913)

M109A5/A6 18,200 17,900 28,100 30,000 1

Applicable Ammo BBDPICM (M825), HE (M700) BBDPICM RAP

SMK, FASCAM (M864) (M549A1)
M198 18,300 18,000 28,200 30,100
Applicable Ammo SMK, FASCAM
HE (M700)
(M864) (M549A1)

Table E-8. Rocket Artillery

M270 Launcher Ammunition Range (m) Payload
M26 32,000 DPICM
ER MLRS, FY99 45,000 DPICM
M39 165,000 APAM
BLK 1A, FY98 300,000 APAM
BLK 2, FY01 140,000 BAT
BLK 2A, FY04 300,000 BAT2

Table E-9. Minimum Safe Distances for Aircraft-Delivered Ordnance

Distance (m)
Description 10% 0.1%
From PI From PI
MK-82 (LD) 500-lb Bomb 250 425
MK-82 AIR (HD) 500-lb Bomb (Retarded) 100 375
MK-82 LGB 500-lb Bomb (GBU-12) 250 425
MK-83 (HD/LD) 1,000-lb Bomb 275 475
MK-83 LGB 1,000-lb Bomb (GBU-16) 275 475
MK-84 (HD/LD) 2,000-lb Bomb 325 500
MK-84 LGB 2,000-lb Bomb (GBU-10/24) 225 500
MK-20-2 Rockeye (Antiarm or CBU) 150 225
MK-77 500 lb (Napalm FAE) 100 150
CBU-55/77-2 Fuel-Air Explosive (FAE) Note 1 Note 1
CBU-52-2 CBUs (All Types) 275 450
CBU-58/71-2,3 CBUs (All Types) 350 525
CBU-87-2 CBUs (All Types) 175 275
CBU-89-3 CBUs (All Types) 175 275
2.75 FFAR Rocket With Various Warheads 160 200

FM 3-05.230

Table E-9. Minimum Safe Distances for Aircraft-Delivered Ordnance (Continued)

Distance (m)
Description 10% 0.1%
From PI From PI
5.00 FFAR Zuni With Various Warheads 150 200
SUU-11 7.62-mm Mini Gun Note 1 Note 1
M-4, M-12, SUU-23, M-61 20-mm Gattling Gun 100 150
GAU-12 25-mm Gun 100 150
GPU-5A GAU-8 30-mm Gattling Gun 100 150
AGM-65 Maverick (EO, IR, Laser-Guided) 25 100
MK-1/MK-21 Walleye II (1,000-lb EO-Guided Bomb) 275 500
MK-5/MK-23 Walleye II (2,400-lb EO-Guided Bomb) Note 1 Note 1
AGM-123A Skipper (1,000-lb Laser-Guided Rocket-Bomb) 275 500
20 mm, 25 mm, 40 mm 35 125
105-mm Cannon 80 200
1. Risk-estimate distances are to be determined; for LGBs, the values shown are for weapons that do not
guide and that follow a ballistic trajectory similar to GP bombs.
2. Not recommended for use near troops in contact.
3. CBU-71/CBU-84 bombs contain time-delay fuzes that detonate at random times after impact. CBU-89
bombs are antitank and antipersonnel mines and are not recommended for use near troops in contact.
4. The data listed applies only to AGM-65A, B, C, and D models. AGM-65E and G models contain a
larger warhead and risk-estimate distances are not currently available.
5. This distance is used for all AC-130 engagements as it has the largest fragmentation pattern for the
largest weapon system on board.

Risk-estimate distances are for combat use and are not
minimum safe distances for peacetime training use.

E-19. Figures E-4 through E-7, pages E-15 through E-18, provide examples
of different methods for calling for fire.

FM 3-05.230

Fire Mission

“________________________ this is _______________________ Fire for Effect, Over”

(FDC’s Call Sign) (Observer’s Call Sign)
“Grid _____________________________________________________________, Over”
(6 Digit UTM)
Target Description (Size and Activity) “________________________”
Method of Engagement (Optional) “___________________________”
(Danger Close, Mark, High Angle, Ammunition/Fuze Type)
Method of Fire and Control (Optional) “___________________________________________”
(“At My Command, Time on Target, Request Splash,
Request Time of Flight, Over”)
FDC may challenge after they read back the above.
The observer should be prepared to authenticate.

Message to Observer
(Mandatory Call)

Units to Fire
Changes to Call for Fire (If Any)
Number of Rounds (Per Tube)
Target Number
Time of Flight (Seconds)

“Direction __________________________________________, Over”
(Prior to 1st Adjustment) (Mils or Degrees, Magnetic)
“Left/Right _________________” (Meters From Impact to Observer Target Line)
“Add/Drop _________________” (Meters, Distance From Impact to Target)
“Fire for Effect, Over”
“Repeat, Over”
Mission Completion

“End of Mission _____________________________, Over”

(BDA and Target Activity)

Figure E-4. Call for Fire Example

FM 3-05.230


“________________________ this is _______________________ Fire for Effect, Over”

(FDC’s Call Sign) (Observer’s Call Sign)
“Grid _____________________________________________________________, Over”
(6 Digit UTM)
“Mark, WP, At My Command, Request Time of Flight, Over.”
Method of Engagement (Optional) “______________________”
(Danger Close, Mark, High Angle, Ammunition/Fuze Type)
Method of Fire and Control (Optional) “_____________________________________”
(“At My Command, Time on Target, Request Splash,
Request Time of Flight, Over”)
FDC may challenge after they read back the above.
The observer should be prepared to authenticate.

Message to Observer
(Mandatory Call)

Units to Fire
Changes to Call for Fire (If Any)
Number of Rounds (Per Tube)
Target Number
Time of Flight (Seconds)

Mission Completion
“End of Mission, Over”

Figure E-5. Marking Mission Example

FM 3-05.230

Observer/Warning Order: “______________, this is ______________, Fire Mission, Over”

(AC-130) (Observer)
Friendly Location/Mark: “My Position ________________Marked by ________________”
(TRP, Grid) (Beacon, IR Strobe)
“Target Location: _____________________________________________.”
(Bearing [magnetic] and Range [meters], TRP, Grid)
Target Description/Mark: “_________________, Marked by____________________, Over”
(Target Description) (IR Pointer, Tracer)
Remarks: ____________________________________________________
(Threats, Danger Close Clearance, Restrictions, At My Command)

As Required
ƒ Clearance: Transmission of the fire mission is clearance to fire. Danger close is 200 m
with the 105 mm, and 125 m with the 40 mm, 25 mm, and 20 mm. For closer fire, the
observer must accept responsibility for increased risk. State “Cleared Danger Close”
on line fire. This clearance may be preplanned.
ƒ At my command: State “At My Command” on line fire. The gun ship will call
“Ready to Fire” when ready.
ƒ Adjust Fire: Only adjust for marking rounds or incorrect target. Adjust from impact by
giving range (meters) and cardinal (North, South, East, West) direction.
Do Not
ƒ Do not ask the gun ship to identify colors.
ƒ Do not reference clock positions.
ƒ Do not pass run-in headings/no-fire headings.
ƒ Do not correct left/right or short/long.

Figure E-6. Example of AC-130 Call for Fire

FM 3-05.230

Grid Method
(Given in Two Transmissions)

“____________, this is _______________, Fire Mission. Target at ____________, Over”

(Ship Call Sign) (Observer’s Call Sign) (Assigned by Observer)
“Grid ___________, Altitude ___________, Direction ________________, Over”
(6 Digit UTM) (Meters MSL) (Mils/Grid)
Target Description __________________________________
(Target Description Size, Activity, Cover)
Method of Engagement ______________________________________________________
(Danger Close, Ammo/Fuze, Type, No. Salvo, No. Guns, Reduced Charge, TOT)
Method of Control __________________________________________________________
(Fire for Effect, Ship Adjust, Spotter Adjust, Cancel Observer, At My Command)

Message To Observer

Gun Target Line (From Gun to Target)

Ready/Time of Flight/Line of Fire
(If Firing ILLUM) (Time of Flight in Seconds)
First Salvo at Offset (Danger Close Missions Only)
Summit (Max Ordnance in Feet for Air Spotter, Meters for Ground Spotter)

Changes to Call for Fire

Figure E-7. Naval Gunfire Call for Fire Example

Appendix F

Base Camp Construction, Methods,

and Requirements
Prior to 1965, SF had little or no authority to choose the site of a
proposed camp in South Vietnam. As a result of this policy, many camps
were inconveniently situated relative to terrain and available indigenous
personnel. Uprooting and relocation of indigenous people to establish a
camp were found to be ineffective due to general discontent of the HN
and subsequent high rate of desertion back to the areas from which they
had originally come. Many of these camps were located upon the
abandoned remains of old French forts. French foundations, usable
buildings, and trenches were incorporated into the base camps, resulting
in a considerable saving of construction time, particularly if a clearing
was available for an airstrip. In principle, these camps were similar to
those of their French predecessors, relying on heavy walls, moats, and
trenches to thwart attacks. No geometric pattern was standard, although
stars, rectangles, and triangles were among the more common shapes.
Reliance upon a surrounding boundary for camp defense had a severe
disadvantage. Once this boundary was breached, further defense of the
camp was practically impossible and defeat was highly probable. In 1965,
two significant changes occurred to facilitate the effectiveness of the SF
team: 1) SF soldiers were permitted to select sites that most effectively
used terrain, available water supply, and indigenous personnel to
accomplish the mission; and 2) the “base camp” concept emerged,
considering those factors upon which a potential base camp should be
evaluated to maximize the effectiveness of an SF operation.


F-1. The base camp concept has been categorized into three basic operational
designs based on the ground water table (GWT): subsurface, surface, and
F-2. Ideally, all base camps would be subsurface to provide maximum
security and protection from offensive weapons. However, due to high water
table or flooding conditions in certain areas, surface camps and floating
camps are also required. All structures are currently provided by either
prefabricated containers or prefabricated wood frame construction. To further
increase speed of construction, the erection and design of all buildings have
been standardized. Camps are authorized certain specific structures, the
basic design of which is the same for all camps. In the past, a great deal of
time was spent in the procurement of materials, both before and during
construction. Prestocking and pre-positioning materials have corrected this

FM 3-05.230

deficiency. All construction materials required for a camp are precut and
stored on a building-by-building basis. The building materials are then
banded and palletized so they can be delivered. If only certain buildings are
required (for example, rehabilitation of the existing camp), buildings are
ordered by name and shipped to the site. A stock level of two complete camps
is maintained.
F-3. The prefabricated container is the basic element for all underground
facilities and for those surface facilities required to be hardened. The machine
gun bunker, communications bunker, emergency medical bunker, power
generator facility, tactical operations bunker, POL storage, and ammunition
bunker are typical of the facilities provided by the prefabricated container.
The container is “hardened” by burying, sandbagging, or a combination of
the two.

Using large caliber or crew-served weapon systems in
an enclosed emplacement will require proper hearing
protection and adequate ventilation of gases. Also, if
using a prefabricated bunker with open-air area in the
rear, a blast wall/revetment approximately 4 feet from
rear and at least as high as the bunker should be built.
This will help protect occupants from possible enemy
indirect fires and fratricide.

F-4. The “floating” camp permits continued operation of the base camp in
areas subject to periodic flooding. Surrounding the camp is an earthen wall or
dyke, which permits operation of the camp during the initial stages of the
rainy season. In addition, the earthen wall creates protection and an obscure
view of the inside of the camp from the opposition. When the water level
exceeds the capacity of the dyke to prevent flooding of the camp, two
additional concepts are used for the floating camp. One concept provides a
floating platform or raft constructed of empty 55-gallon drums banded to a
wooden frame and floor members upon which facilities are constructed. The
second concept uses an adjustable platform permitting a convenient elevation
above the water level to be maintained. Rafts are used to support crew-served
weapons, buildings, and airboat docking facilities. A helicopter landing pad is
provided, consisting of a wooden platform supported by four containers. This
configuration does not float but does manage to keep the pad above water in
most cases.

F-5. An intrusion barrier consisting of tanglefoot wire, concertina wire, and
various anti-intrusion devices integrated with claymore mines surrounds the
camp. This barrier is currently “packaged” by placing the above items in
containers in sufficient quantity to provide approximately 300 meters of
hasty perimeter.

FM 3-05.230

F-6. Resupply of the base camp should not depend almost exclusively on
aircraft. However, each base camp should have an airstrip. An airstrip
capable of landing a C-130 is desirable in addition to the helicopter pad,
although the construction effort is somewhat extensive and in certain adverse
terrain conditions, practically unattainable. Construction of an airstrip
generally requires the greatest single camp construction effort and usually
dictates the use of heavy moving equipment. Soil stabilization or landing-mat
material is usually required for a pad or airstrip to reduce the severe dust
conditions prevalent during the dry season and extreme mud during the
rainy season.

F-7. A plentiful water supply, preferably multiple wells located within the
perimeter of the base camp, is essential for survival of camp inhabitants.
Streams and cisterns are inferior alternatives to the well as a source of water.

F-8. Electric power is provided by diesel or gasoline-driven generator sets,
usually 30 to 50 kilowatt (kW) capacity each, obtained through the military
supply system. The number of generator sets required depends upon the size
of that particular camp.


F-9. The following facilities are common to all base camps described above
and are considered standards for camp construction by SF:
• ARSOF billets. ARSOF personnel are authorized a minimum of 48
square feet per person for sleeping quarters. Where possible, personnel
of the same military occupational specialty (for example, 18Cs) should
not be billeted together. Ideally, the sleeping quarters will be divided
among the various buildings so that individuals will be billeted in or
near the building in which they work.
• Cover of sufficient height. To protect a person sleeping in bed from an
81-mm mortar burst 15 meters away, cover is required around all
ARSOF sleeping areas. Overhead cover for sleeping areas is also
recommended, but not required.
• ARSOF sanitary facilities. One bathhouse and one latrine are
authorized per SFODA.
• ARSOF dining, dayroom, and office facilities. A minimum of 1,000
square feet of floor space is authorized for these facilities.
• Supply and joint operations facilities. A minimum of 1,300 square feet
of floor space is authorized for these facilities.
• Communications bunker. The communications bunker is authorized 56
square feet of floor space and must be designed to withstand a hit from
small arms or an 81-mm mortar burst 5 meters away.
• Dispensary. The dispensary is authorized 1,300 square feet of floor
space. This building should have a waiting area, a records control area,
examination area, minor surgery room with water supply and area for

FM 3-05.230

sterilization, secured drugs, equipment room, and bed space for a

minimum of eight patients.
• Emergency medical bunker. This bunker is authorized 112 square feet
of floor space and will be designed using the same criteria as the
communications bunker.
• Generator building. A minimum of 10 x 10 feet open-sided or
adequately ventilated is required. The sides will be sandbagged or
properly protected with a blast wall to a minimum height of 4 feet.
• Water tower. Two 10-foot water towers are authorized. Wells will be
dug, if possible.
• Crew-served weapons pits. Mortar pits will be of standard design
(FM 5-34). For every two mortars, a minimum of three pits will be
• HN billeting. HN personnel are authorized 35 square feet of floor space
per individual. These structures need to be constructed with a low
• HN latrine. Adequate facilities (20 seats per 400 men).
• HN dining facility. This area is authorized 2,000 square feet of floor
NOTE: All of the above facilities are addressed using minimum square
footage. Storage, ammo, POL, water purification, and aircraft facilities
have to be provided and approved. FM 5-103, Survivability, includes
further information on thickness or sandbag-depth dimensions to be
added to bunkers.


F-10. Excavation and earthmoving operations are of exceptional importance
in the construction of a base camp. A brief discussion of various earthmoving
methods is summarized below.
F-11. One of the major requirements in the construction of an SF base camp
is to rapidly develop the defensive facilities so as to minimize the length of
time that the personnel preparing the camp are vulnerable to attack. During
the construction period, large forces of guard personnel are needed for
security of the site. One of the most time-consuming tasks is that of
excavating earth fortifications.
F-12. The volume of earth removed for major internal camp facilities has
been found to be relatively independent of the number of personnel in a camp
and dependent upon the type of camp under construction. With the exception
of the HN billets, major camp facilities (such as the TOC and the
communications bunkers) are of a standard size, independent of the total
number of people in the camp. Other facilities are estimated as to size and
excavation requirements. The volume of earth to be removed to accommodate
necessary structures and facilities is shown in Table F-1, page F-5. The use of
explosives can also help expedite the excavation of earth for the emplacement
of buildings, trenches, and so on.

FM 3-05.230

Table F-1. Estimated Excavation Requirements for Base Camps

Size, Total
Dimensions/ Excavated in Number Cubic
Facility Square Feet Cubic Yards Required Yards
Office, Dining, Dayroom, Billets 20 x 65 417 1 417
Communications Bunker 10 x 10 35.2 1 35.2
TOC 10 x 10 56 1 56
Supply Building 20 x 100 611 1 611
Dispensary 20 x 60 622 1 622
Mortar Pits 5x6 3.3 3 10
Generator Shed 10 x 10 18.6 2 37.2
Ammo Storage 20 x 20 74 2 148
5x6 5.5 5 27.5
Machine Guns 10 x 10 35.2 8 282
Road (Drainage Ditches) 6,000 222 2 444
Roads 3,000 3,333 1 3,333
Helipad 20 x 20 15 1 15
Runway (Drainage Ditches) 3,500 130 2 260
Runway 3,500 23,333 1 23,333
Trenches 14 20 280
POL Storage 267 1 267
Subtotal 30,178
Add 25% Backfill 7,545
Total 37,723

F-13. Tables F-2 and F-3 can help in determining the amount of time
required for excavating a site.

Table F-2. In Average Soil (Clayey Silt or Loam)

Size of
Machine Pull Shovel
(Cubic Yards) Dipper Shovel or Hoe Dragline Clamshell
38 42 27 32 23
0.5 63 41 48 34
0.75 92 60 69 50
1 122 79 92 67

Table F-3. In Hardpan (Not Broken Up): Dipper Shovel and Clamshell Comparison
Size of Machine Dipper Shovel Clamshell
(Cubic Yards) Cubic Yards/Hour Cubic Yards/Hour
0.38 3 5
0.5 6 9
0.75 10 16
1 17 22

FM 3-05.230


F-14. A possible construction sequence for a hypothetical base camp is
outlined below. In the case of an actual base camp, the sequence followed may
have to be varied, added to, or shortened to suit the particular circumstances
of the case.
• Initial Setup:
ƒSet up warning outposts.
ƒDig temporary pit latrines.
ƒSet up defensive perimeter; clear fields of fire as necessary.
ƒSet up armed points.
ƒSet up communications with FOB/AOB.
ƒSet up first-aid facilities.
ƒLay out base camp.
ƒSet up water supply.
ƒSet up waste disposal.
ƒSet up electric power supply.
ƒSet up dining facilities.
ƒSet up fuel storage site.
• Refinement and Strengthening:
ƒEstablish drainage patterns.
ƒStrengthen defenses.
ƒClear vegetation, move earth, make earthen dykes and
ƒImprove air supply facilities.
ƒBuild secured storage spaces.
ƒBuild dispensary facilities.
ƒBuild living facilities.
F-15. On arrival, the immediate requirement is to set up defense measures
and establish communications with FOB/AOB and air facilities. Sanitary and
waste-disposal facilities and water supply are next in order of urgency. In
some areas where SF operates, digestive and other illnesses are endemic.
Much of the trouble stems from the unsanitary practices of the HN
population. Maintenance of a healthy environment can contribute
significantly to the vitality and military effectiveness of the personnel
involved, both HN and SF. In the case of a camp set up in a previously
uninhabited location, sanitary practices must be followed from the beginning
since it is difficult to sanitize an area once it has been fouled.
F-16. Other essential functions are established next. Once the camp is in an
operating condition, the facilities may be refined and strengthened.

FM 3-05.230

F-17. Based upon the SF base camp requirements as set forth by SF
personnel and upon the tentative camp construction sequence outlined, the
following listing of equipment is applicable to certain construction tasks.
• Set up warning outposts:
ƒOrganic field telephone systems (wire).
ƒHigh-powered optics, binoculars, listening devices, and communi-
cations (wireless).
ƒExplosives and earthmovers.
ƒChain saws and brush cutters.
• Dig temporary sanitation sites:
ƒSpades and shovels.
ƒPower spades.
• Set up defensive perimeter and armed points:
ƒEarthen dykes and barriers.
ƒStrengthened prefabricated bunkers.
ƒSandbags filled.
ƒCorrugated galvanized steel sheets.
ƒPower spades.
ƒDrain pipes.
ƒPower saws.
• Set up communications with FOB/AOB:
ƒCommunications equipment in strengthened prefabricated
ƒBatteries charged.
ƒAntennas erected.
• Set up dispensary facilities:
ƒPrefabricated bunker used.
ƒBunker strengthened.
• Lay out base camp:
ƒTransit or level.
ƒStakes and string.
ƒTape or other measuring device.
• Set up water supply:
ƒStorage tanks.
ƒPurification equipment.

FM 3-05.230

• Set up waste disposal (burial):

ƒPower spades.
ƒContainers and drums for garbage.
• Set up electrical power supply:
ƒPower spades, shovels, and explosives.
ƒShelter, drainage; fuel supply (drain).
• Set up dining facilities:
ƒStorage facilities (prefabricated).
ƒTables and cutting blocks.
ƒSinks and water supply tools.
ƒCooking facilities.
ƒFire and fuel supplies.
ƒGarbage and rubbish handling.
ƒClean-up facilities (dishwashing facilities).
ƒPreventive medicine measures (defense against insects and
• Set up fuel storage:
ƒHand pumps and meters.
ƒRacks or scaffolding.
ƒBladder storage.
ƒDigging equipment.
• Establish drainage:
ƒTrencher or other digging device.
• Strengthen defenses:
ƒDigging devices.
ƒPrefabricated buildings.
ƒPower spade.
ƒPosthole digger.
ƒAnti-intrusion devices.
ƒCombat control center.
ƒOffice supplies.

FM 3-05.230

ƒBackup power supply.
• Improve field landing strip:
ƒGrader, scraper, or bulldozer.
ƒVS-17 panels.
ƒConcrete and asphalt (surfacing materials).
ƒMatting material.
• Build dispensary.
• Build repair shops.
• Build living quarters.

Appendix G

Building Materials
This section provides the necessary materials to construct a generic base
camp. Any other design or size would require a modified list of building
materials for construction. AR 71-32, Force Development and
Documentation – Consolidated Policies; AR 415-16; AR 710-1, Centralized
Inventory Management of the Army Supply System; and AR 725-50,
Requisition, Receipt, and Issue System, include additional information.

G-1. The amounts of materials listed are based on normal construction waste
residue and unforeseen construction needs. Each area of the camp has been
listed separately to aid in the ordering and procuring of materials needed
during any project phase.
G-2. All wood should be protected against wet conditions and termites. To
prevent insect, rot, and pilferage problems, materials should not be stockpiled
too far in advance of utilization.
G-3. Security of materials will be of primary importance during the
construction process. Detachment members must ensure that all materials
are stored inside a guarded perimeter at all times.
G-4. All materials are ordered for a specific position or location; detachment
members should not use materials that are not intended for that project.
G-5. All listed materials are the minimum required amounts to construct a
generic building, which can be adapted for use as any building and any
specialty buildings if significantly different from the generic team house. The
charts include the following (corresponding figures and tables in Appendixes
H and I are shown in parentheses):
• Generic team house, Table G-1, page G-2. (Figures H-1a through H-2b
and Table H-1 [pages H-2 through H-4], and Figures I-1 [page I-3] and
I-15 [page I-12].)
• Generic bunker, Table G-2, page G-3. (Figures I-17 through I-20
[medical or communications bunker], pages I-13 and I-14; Figures I-42
through I-44 [generator bunker], pages I-25 and I-26; and Figures I-45
and I-46 [fuel bunker], page I-27.)
• Guard tower, Table G-3, page G-3. (Figures I-47 through I-49, pages
I-28 through I-30.)
• Barriers, Table G-4, page G-4.
• Vehicle revetment, Table G-5, page G-4.

FM 3-05.230

• Communications trench – open, Table G-6, page G-4. (Figure I-12, page
• Fighting bunker – inner and outer, Table G-7, page G-5. (Figures I-2
through I-6, pages I-4 through I-6.)
• 81-mm mortar position, Table G-8, page G-5.


G-6. Table G-1 is a list of materials required to construct two team houses
(20 feet by 50 feet) that will house six personnel each. The remainder of the
personnel will be dispersed throughout the camp in various other buildings
and bunkers (communications, medical, and others).

Table G-1. Team House Materials List

Items Unit of Measure One Building Total
LP22, pressure-treated, 1 [ [ each (ea) 136 272
LP22, pressure-treated, 1 [ [ ea 24 48
LP22, pressure-treated, 1 [ [ ea 10 20
LP22, pressure-treated, 2 [ [ ea 168 336
LP22, pressure-treated, 2 [ [ ea 26 52
LP22, pressure-treated, 2 [ [ ea 4 8
LP22, pressure-treated, 2 [ [ ea 13 26
LP22, pressure-treated, 1/2 x 4 [ SO\ZRRG sheet 72 144
Plywood clip, 1/2 ea 180 360
Asphalt/fiberglass shingle (Tabs) sq 20 40
Nail, galvanized, common, 12d lb 100 200
Nail, galvanized, common, 8d lb 100 200
Nail, galvanized, common, 6d lb 100 200
Galvanized roof nail, 1 1/4 lb 60 120
Masonry nail, 2 1/2 lb 6 12
Lag bolt, 2 1/2 [ ea 40 80
Expansion shield, 1 [ ea 40 80
Washer, 3/8 GLDPHWHU ea 40 80
Screen, black, nylon, 4 wide linear ft 325 650
Wood door, screen, 3 [  ULJKW-hand ea 2 4
Hinge, door, galvanized ea 4 8
Door pull (handle), galvanized ea 4 8
Door closure, galvanized ea 4 8
Door, flush, prehung, split jamb with casing, with
ea 5 10
passage set, right-hand
Door, flush, prehung, split jamb with casing, with
ea 4 8
passage set, left-hand
Galvanized staples, 5/16 box 11 22
Gutter, plastic, 10 section ea 11 22
Gutter, plastic, end cap ea 4 8
Gutter, plastic, hangers ea 44 88
Gutter, plastic, coupling for joining pieces ea 8 16
Concrete, 80# premix bag cubic yards (cu yd) 17 34
Anchor bolt, with nut and washer, 1/2 GLDPHWHU[ ea 22 44
Sandbag ea 3,000 6,000
Gravel cu yd 13 26

FM 3-05.230

G-7. Table G-2 is a list of materials required to construct two generic

Table G-2. Bunker Materials List

Unit of
Items Measure One Building Total
LP22, pressure-treated, 2 [ [ ea 5 10
LP22, pressure-treated, 2 [ [ ea 40 80
LP22, pressure-treated, 2 [ [ ea 30 60
LP22, pressure-treated, 4 [ [ ea 4 8
LP22, pressure-treated, 8 [ [ ea 10 20
LP22, pressure-treated, 6 [ [ ea 2 4
LP22, pressure-treated, 3/4 [ [ SO\ZRRG sheet 24 48
Nail, galvanized, common, 6d lb 10 20
Nail, galvanized, common, 8d lb 12 24
Driftpin, 3/8 [ ea 20 40
Membrane, servicing 4-ply nylon fabric
ea 1 2
synthetic rubber, 53 [ )61-00-533-2732
Concrete, 80# premix bag cu yd 12 24
Anchor bolt, with nut and washer, 1/2 GLDPHWHU[ ea 26 52
Sandbag ea 6,000 12,000
Gravel cu yd 8 16

G-8. Table G-3 is a list of materials required to construct three guard towers.

Table G-3. Guard Tower Materials List

Unit of
Items Measure One Building Total
LP22, pressure-treated, 2 [ [ ea 124 372
LP22, pressure-treated, 2 [ [ ea 32 96
LP22, pressure-treated, 2 [ [ ea 3 9
LP22, pressure-treated, 2 [ [ ea 16 48
LP22, pressure-treated, 2 [ [ ea 9 27
LP22, pressure-treated, 2 [ [ ea 20 60
LP22, pressure-treated, 2 [ [ ea 4 12
LP22, pressure-treated, 4 [ [ ea 2 6
LP22, pressure-treated, 4 [ [ ea 2 6
LP22, pressure-treated, 4 [ [ ea 2 6
LP22, pressure-treated, 8 [ [ ea 4 12
LP22, pressure-treated, 3/4 [ [ SO\ZRRG sheet 37 111
Nail, galvanized, common, 20d lb 20 60
Nail, galvanized, common, 16d lb 50 150
Nail, galvanized, common, 8d lb 17 51
#8 tie wire, galvanized linear ft 480 1,440
Membrane, servicing 4-ply nylon fabric
ea 1 3
synthetic rubber, 53 [ )61-00-533-2732
Concrete, 80# premix bag cu yd 1 3
Anchor bolt, with nut and washer, 1/2 GLDPHWHU[ ea 26 78
Bolt, with nut and washer, 3/4 [ ea 13 39
Sandbag ea 1,000 3,000
Gravel cu yd 1 3

FM 3-05.230

G-9. Table G-4 is a list of materials that depicts the total amount required to
construct both the inner and outer barriers.

Table G-4. Barrier Materials List

Items Wall, Inner (150 m) Wall, Outer (600 m) Total
Picket, U-shaped, long 2,250 11,400 13,650
Picket, U-shaped, medium 700 2,000 2,700
Picket, U-shaped, short 1,725 8,000 9,725
Barbed wire (reel) 80 490 570
Concertina wire (roll) 570 2,540 3,110
Staple, wire 2,070 7,630 9,700
Stake, metal, 15 1,850 7,200 9,050

G-10. Table G-5 is a list of materials required to construct three vehicle

Table G-5. Vehicle Revetment Materials List

Items Unit of Measure One Building Total
LP22, pressure-treated, 2 [ [ ea 22 66
LP22, pressure-treated, 4 [ [ ea 44 132
LP22, pressure-treated, 4 [ [ ea 20 60
LP22, pressure-treated, 6 [ [ ea 22 66
Bolt, with nut and washer, 1/2 GLDPHWHU[ ea 370 1,110
Sandbag ea 100 300
Corrugated metal sheet, 26 gauge, 26 [ sheet 90 270


G-11. Table G-6 is a list of materials required to construct 8,000 feet of open
communications trenches in both the inner and outer perimeter and timber
trestle bridges for vehicles to cross five places.

Table G-6. Communications Trench (Open) Materials List

Items Unit of Measure Total
Gravel cu yd 1,200
Picket, U-shaped, long ea 3,200
Picket, U-shaped, short ea 3,200
Barbed wire, reel ea 32
Sandbag ea 300
Corrugated metal sheet, 26 gauge, 26 [ sheet 4,002
LP22, pressure-treated, 2 [ [ ea 20
LP22, pressure-treated, 4 [ [ ea 125
LP22, pressure-treated, 4 [ [ ea 45
LP22, pressure-treated, 6 [ [ ea 20
LP22, pressure-treated, 6 [ [ ea 20
LP22, pressure-treated, 6 [ [ ea 10
LP22, pressure-treated, 6 [ [ ea 25
LP22, pressure-treated, 6 [ [ ea 10
Spike, 8 lb 500
Driftpin, 3/4 [ ea 50
Driftpin, 3/4 [ ea 150

FM 3-05.230


G-12. Table G-7 is a list of materials required to construct twelve fighting

Table G-7. Fighting Bunker Materials List

Unit of
Items Measure One Building Total
LP22, pressure-treated, 2 [ [ ea 16 192
LP22, pressure-treated, 2 [ [ ea 32 384
LP22, pressure-treated, 2 [ [ ea 10 120
LP22, pressure-treated, 2 [ [ ea 10 120
LP22, pressure-treated, 2 [ [ ea 8 96
LP22, pressure-treated, 4 [ [ ea 6 72
LP22, pressure-treated, 6 [ [ ea 2 24
LP22, pressure-treated, 6 [ [4 ea 2 24
Nail, galvanized, common, 60d lb 2 24
Nail, galvanized, common, 16d lb 27 324
Nail, galvanized, common, 12d lb 2 24
Driftpin, 3/8 [ ea 8 96
Membrane, servicing 4-ply nylon fabric
ea 8 96
Synthetic rubber, 53 [ )61-00-533-2732
Drain pipe, plastic, perforated, 6 linear ft 12 144
Fence, chain link, 10 KLJK linear ft 60 720
Fence post, metal, galvanized, 12 KLJK ea 8 96
Sandbag ea 2,200 26,400
Gravel cu yd 3 36


G-13. Table G-8 is a list of materials required to construct three mortar
positions located in the inner perimeter.

Table G-8. 81-mm Mortar Position Materials List

Unit of
Items Measure One Position Total
LP22, pressure-treated, 2 [ [ ea 16 48
LP22, pressure-treated, 4 [ [  ea 7 21
LP22, pressure-treated, 6 [ [ ea 2 6
Nail, galvanized, common, 60d lb 2 6
Nail, galvanized, common, 12d lb 2 6
Membrane, servicing 4-ply nylon fabric
ea 1 3
synthetic rubber, 53 [ )61-00-533-2732
Sandbag ea 1,000 3,000
Gravel cu yd 2 6

FM 3-05.230


G-14. Table G-9, pages G-6 and G-7, is a list that depicts the essential items
that are required to construct, furnish, and maintain the camp (recommended

Table G-9. Base Camp MTOE

Medical Bunker/Dispensary Motor Pool

Item Amount Item Amount
Locker, metal 4 Tool set, complete 1
Litter 36 Desk, field 1
Litter stand 36 Chair 2
Pole, intravenous 36 Truck, 2 1/2-ton 3
Desk, field 5 HMMWV 1
Chair 11 Truck, 1 1/4-ton 3
Table, field 6 Generator, 100 kW 2
Table, examination 2 Generator, 5 kW 6
Table, surgical 2 Maritime Operations Building
Refrigerator, 12 cu ft 4 Item Amount
Light, surgical 2 Desk, field 1
Frame, bed 4 Chair 2
Spring, bed 4 Tool set, complete 1
Mattress, bed 4 Zodiac 3
Light, floor 2 Outboard motor, 35 horsepower 3
Stand, basin 4 Klepper 6
Sterilizer, surgical instrument 2 Open circuit set, complete 12
Table, anesthetist 2 Compressor, air (portable) 1
Cabinet, surgical instruments 4 Team House
Kitchen (Inner/Outer) Item Amount
Item Amount Refrigerator, 10 cu ft 2
Range outfit 7 Frame, bed 12
Burner, gas 3 Spring, bed 12
Heater, emersion 6 Mattress, bed 12
Jug, vacuum, 10 gallon (gal) 7 Locker, wall 24
Mermite can 10 Desk, field 6
Ice chest, storage 3 Cabinet, filing 4
Accessory outfit, gasoline, field 1 Chair 30
Range accommodations with Table, field 6
bake rack Safe, 5-drawer 5
Freezer, truck 1 S-4/Arms Room
Refrigeration, truck 1 Item Amount
Administration Building Desk, field 2
Item Amount Cabinet, filing 2
Desk 8 Locker, wall 4
Chair 25 Chair 4
Cabinet, filing 3 Frame, bed 4
Table, field 3 Spring, bed 4
Mattress, bed 4

FM 3-05.230

Table G-9. Base Camp MTOE (Continued)

Security Force Quarters Weapons (Camp Defense)

Item Amount Item Amount
Desk, field 7 Mortar, 60 mm 9
Chair 42 Mortar, 81 mm 3
Cabinet, filing 3 Mortar, 4.2 inch 1
Refrigerator, 10 cu ft 7 Machine gun, M60 9
Frame, bed 150 MK-19, 40 mm 3
Spring, bed 150 M203 6
Mattress, bed 150 Machine gun, .50 cal 3
Communications Bunker SAW, M249 12
Item Amount Engineer Equipment
Frame, bed 4 Item Amount
Spring, bed 4 Tractor, backhoe 1
Mattress, bed 4 Concrete mixer, gas, 16 cu ft 1
Desk, field 4 Internal vibrator 1
Table, field 4 Wood float with long handle 6
Chair 8 Steel trowel 8
Refrigerator, 10 cu ft 2 Steel edge 4
Cabinet, filing 2 Machete with sheath 15
Safe, 5-drawer 1 Posthole digger 6
Radio set, complete 3 Pick, mattock 10
Generator, hand 2 Shovel, D-handle 15
Power supply 2 Shovel, long handle 10
Security equipment 3 Hammer, sledge, 10 lb 10
Battery, rechargeable 8 Hammer, claw 30
Antenna group 4 Saw, chain, 36 ZLWKUHSDLUNLW 2
Antenna support system 4 Gloves, heavy duty work 50 pairs
Switchboard systems 4 Saw, crosscut 10
Operator’s pack 5 Saw, hand 10
Multiplexer 1 Pounder, picket 10
Telephone set 34 Miscellaneous Equipment/Supplies
Terminal box 6 Item Amount
Wire dispenser 10 Tent, Arfab, GP 5
Radio set (various) 32 Bucket, metal, 3 gal 50
Cabinet, map 1 Drum, 55-gal (empty) 300
Public address system 1 Bucket, dip, plastic 50
Tape recorder 1 Rope, manila, 1/2 [ 50
Copy machine 1 Rope, manila, 3/4 [ 50
Water Storage/Collection Cover, mattress 180
Item Amount Pillow, foam, with pillow case 180
Bag, water, 35 gal 22 Broom, push and straw 25 each
Water purification unit 2 Can, plastic, 5 gal 50
Water tank, 1500-gal collapsible 10 Heavy Equipment
Water tank, 3000-gal collapsible 2 Item Amount
Water quality control unit 1 Bulldozer 1
Surface pump, centrifugal type, Well-drilling rig 1
3 Dump truck 2
gas, 2
Box, calcium hypochlorite 1 Water truck 2

Appendix H

Electrical Requirements
This section provides all electrical and air conditioning requirements for a
base camp. All fixtures, circuit loads, and specifications are included in
the wiring diagram, and a panel board diagram is provided for each
structure within the camp.

H-1. The electrical requirements for this camp have been calculated based on
the projected electrical needs of the camp at the average daily load. Power
source will be from fuel-driven generators as both the primary and alternate
methods. The primary will be from two 100-kW diesel generators that will
run for 12 hours each. This method allows one generator to cool and have
operator’s maintenance performed, which will greatly extend the generator’s
life between overhauls. The additional emergency power for the critical areas
of the camp will come from separate 5-kW gasoline generators placed near
the location to be serviced (medical bunker, dispensary, communications and
TOC bunkers). A grid system will be incorporated to direct power to all areas
of the camp, as required.

H-2. The 100-kW generators will be located in separate bunkers to prevent
destruction of both generators at once during an attack. In addition, the noise
and emissions levels should be considered when installing the equipment so
as not to interfere with sleep and operations.
H-3. The communications and TOC bunkers will have battery backup power
available in case of total power failure.


H-4. The following paragraphs contain wiring and panel board diagrams.
These diagrams include the following (corresponding figures and tables in
Appendixes G and I are shown in parentheses):
• Generic team house, Figures H-1a through H-2b and Table H-1, pages
H-2 through H-4. (Table G-1, page G-2; Figure I-1, page I-3; and Figure
I-15, page I-12.)
• Generator bunker, Figures H-3a through H-4b and Table H-2, pages
H-5 through H-7. (Table G-2, page G-3, and Figures I-42 through I-44,
pages I-25 and I-26.)
• Perimeter lights, Figure H-5 and Table H-3, pages H-7 and H-8.
• Air conditioning, Figures H-6a, H-6b, and Table H-4, pages H-9 and
H-10, and Figure H-10, page H-12.

FM 3-05.230


H-5. Figure H-1a shows the wiring diagram for the team house. Figure H-1b,
page H-3, outlines the wiring specifications. Figure H-2a, page H-3, depicts
the panel board diagram. Figure H-2b, page H-4, outlines the electrical bill of
materials for the panel board. Table H-1, page H-4, outlines the electrical
materials required for the generic team house.

Figure H-1a. Generic Team House Wiring Diagram

FM 3-05.230

Fluorescent light fixture Junction box, 15″

Lighting panel board 4 - #40 AWG in 2 1/2″ C
Receptacle, duplex 4 - #2 AWG in 1 1/2″ C
Wall switch, single-pole Grounding rod
Safety switch, 100 amp Fan
Estimated load (all circuits in use):
Receptacle: 14 ea x 180 VA = 2,740 VA
Lamp: 24 ea x 100 VA = 2,400 VA
Fan: 3 ea x 180 VA = 540 VA
Total = 5,760 VA
Estimated load (actual daily use) = 3,800 VA
Watts = 3,800 x .85 = 3,230 VA = 3.2 kW
Any wire without further designation indicates 2 - #12 (AWG) wire in 1/2″ conduit. A greater number
of wires indicates as follows:
3 wires in 1/2″ C 4 wires in 1/2″ C
5 wires in 3/4″ C 6 wires in 3/4″ C
Figure H-1b. Generic Team House Wiring Specifications

Figure H-2a. Team House Panel Board

FM 3-05.230

Receptacle circuit conduit

Lamp circuit conduit
Fan circuit conduit
Grounding rod
Junction box, 15″
Safety switch, 100 amp
Phase (A, B, C)
Circuit breaker, 1P-50 AF-20 AT
Panel board – 3-phase, 4-wire 120/208 V, 100 amp, main lugs
1P-50 AF-20 AT circuit breaker – 12 ea
Figure H-2b. Panel Board Electrical Bill of Materials

Table H-1. Generic Team House Electrical Bill of Materials

Items One Building Total
Receptacle, duplex, 2P-3W-15 amp, 125 V 14 28
Fluorescent lighting fixture, 2/40 watt 24 48
Safety switch, 3P-100 amp, 100-amp fuse outdoor type, 240 V 1 2
Wall switch, 1-way, 1P-15 amp, 120 AC 12 24
Grounding rod, 3/4″ diameter, 10′, copper 1 2
Insulated conductor wire, type “THW,” #2 100′ 200′
Insulated conductor wire, type “THW,” #8 30′ 60′
Insulated conductor wire, type “THW,” #12 2,200′ 4,400′
Insulated conductor wire, type “THW,” #20 80′ 160′
Conduit, electrical metallic tubing (EMT), 1/2″ diameter 500′ 1,000′
Conduit, EMT, 1 1/2″ diameter 20′ 40′
Conduit, EMT, 2 1/2″ diameter 20′ 40′
Splice connector 320 640
Junction box, 15″ x 15″ 1 2
Junction box, 2″ x 4″ 50 100
Junction box, 4″ x 4″ 3 6
Lighting panel board, 3-phase, 4-wire 120/208 V, 100 amp, main lugs 1 2
1P-50 AF-20 AT circuit breaker 12 24
Ceiling fan, 1/10 horsepower 3 6

H-6. Figure H-3a, page H-5, shows the wiring diagram for the generator
bunker. Figure H-3b, page H-5, shows the wiring specifications. Figure H-4a,
page H-6, is the panel board diagram and Figure H-4b, page H-6, outlines the
panel board electrical bill of materials. Table H-2, pages H-6 and H-7,
outlines the electrical materials required for the generator bunker.

FM 3-05.230

Figure H-3a. Generator Bunker Wiring Diagram

Fluorescent light fixture Junction box, 15″

Lighting panel board 4 - #40 AWG in 2 1/2″ C
Receptacle, duplex 4 - #2 AWG in 1 1/2″ C
Wall switch, single-pole Grounding rod
Safety switch, 100 amp
Estimated load (all circuits in use):
Receptacle: 1 ea x 180 VA = 180 VA
Lamp: 3 ea x 100 VA = 300 VA
Total = 480 VA
Estimated load (actual daily use) = 480 VA
Watts = 480 x 0.85 = 408 VA = 0.4 kW
Any wire without further designation indicates 2 - #12 (AWG) wire in 1/2″ conduit. A greater number
of wires indicates as follows:
3 wires in 1/2″ C 4 wires in 1/2″ C
5 wires in 3/4″ C 6 wires in 3/4″ C
Figure H-3b. Generator Bunker Wiring Specifications

FM 3-05.230

Figure H-4a. Generator Bunker Panel Board

Receptacle circuit conduit

Lamp circuit conduit
Grounding rod
Junction box, 15″
Safety switch, 100 amp
Phase (A,B,C)
Circuit breaker, 1P-50 AF-20 AT
Panel board – 3-phase, 4-wire 120/208 V, 100 amp, main lugs
1P-50 AF-20 AT circuit breaker – 12 ea
Figure H-4b. Panel Board Electrical Bill of Materials

Table H-2. Generator Bunker Electrical Bill of Materials

Items One Building Total
Receptacle, duplex, 2P-3W-15 amp, 125 V 1 2
Fluorescent lighting fixture, 2/40 watt 3 6
Safety switch, 3P-100 amp, 100-amp fuse, outdoor type, 240 V 1 2
Safety switch, 3P-400 amp, 230-amp fuse, outdoor type, 240 V 4 8
Safety switch, double-throw, 4P-400 amp, outdoor type, 240 V 1 2
Wall switch, 1-way, 1P-15 amp, 120 AC 1 2
Grounding rod, 3/4″ diameter, 10′, copper 1 2
Insulated conductor wire, type “THW,” #2 100′ 200′
Insulated conductor wire, type “THW,” #8 30′ 60′
Insulated conductor wire, type “THW,” #12 300′ 600′

FM 3-05.230

Table H-2. Generator Bunker Electrical Bill of Materials (Continued)

Item One Building Total
Insulated conductor wire, type “THW,” #20 80′ 160′
Conduit, EMT, 1/2″ diameter 50′ 100′
Conduit, EMT, 1 1/2″ diameter 20′ 40′
Conduit, EMT, 2 1/2″ diameter 100′ 200′
Splice connector 30 60
Junction box, 15″ x 15″ 1 2
Junction box, 2″ x 4″ 5 10
Lighting panel board, 3-phase, 4-wire 120/208 V, 100 amp, main lugs 1 2
1P-50 AF-20 AT circuit breaker 12 24
Generator, 100 kW, 326 amp 1 2
Insulated conductor cable, D-B cable #4/0 25,000′ 50,000′
Insulated conductor cable, #500 MCM 200′ 400′
Conduit, steel galvanized, 4″ diameter 50′ 100′

H-7. Figure H-5 shows the wiring diagram for the perimeter lights.
Table H-3, page H-8, outlines the electrical bill of materials.

Figure H-5. Perimeter Lights Wiring Diagram

FM 3-05.230

Table H-3. Perimeter Lights Electrical Bill of Materials

Item Amount
Floodlight, 150-watt, high-pressure sodium-type, 208 V 140
Safety switch, 2P-30 amp, nonfusible outdoor-type, 240 V 70
Grounding rod, 3/4″ diameter, 10′ copper 70
Insulated conductor wire, type “THW,” #8 6,000′
Insulated conductor wire, type “THW,” D-B cable #2/0 10,000′
Conduit, rigid steel, galvanized, 1″ diameter 2,000′
Conduit, rigid steel, galvanized, 3″ diameter 1,600′
Splice connector 1,000
Junction box, 18″ x 18″ 70
Junction box, 4″ x 4″ 70
Pole, 30′ high 70

H-8. Figure H-6a, page H-9, shows the air conditioning diagram;
Figure H-6b, page H-10, outlines the bill of materials and output
requirements; and Table H-4, page H-10, depicts the total power load.

FM 3-05.230

Figure H-6a. Air Conditioning Diagram

FM 3-05.230

Outdoor unit carrier, 38BQ008, 7 1/2-ton, 38 amp, 208 V, 30, 60 Hz, 3′ 5 3/8″ x 3′ 8 1/2″
x 2′ 9″
Heat pump system, indoor unit carrier, 40BA009, 7 1/2-ton, 4300 CFM, 8.3 kW, 208 V, 30, 60 Hz,
3′ 4″ x 2′ 8″ x 2′ 5″
Building type: Underground, 50′ x 20′ x 9′
Cooling capacity required: 50′ x 20′ x 54 BTU/hr; square feet = 54,000 BTU/hr
Heating capacity required: 50′ x 20′ x 86 BTU/hr; square feet = 86,000 BTU/hr

Figure H-6b. Air Conditioning Bill of Materials and Output Requirements

Table H-4. Total Power Load

Building Type # One (1) Building Total
Maximum (kW) Daily Use (kW) Maximum (kW) Daily Use (kW)
1 21.9 17.0 21.9 17.0
Administration 1 6.0 2.5 6.0 2.5
Team house 2 5.8 3.2 11.6 6.4
Security quarters 7 5.3 3.0 37.1 21.0
Medical bunker 1 22.6 15.3 22.6 15.3
Dispensary 1 11.7 7.6 11.7 7.6
S-4/Arms room 1 6.1 2.4 6.1 2.4
Water operations 1 4.1 1.9 4.1 1.9
Washroom 5 1.5 1.0 7.5 5.0
Latrine 10 0.4 0.4 4.0 4.0
Kitchen, outer 2 3.4 2.3 6.8 4.6
Kitchen, inner 1 4.5 2.9 4.5 2.9
Motor pool 1 1.3 0.8 1.3 0.8
Perimeter lights 140 0.15 0.15 21.0 21.0
Total Power Load 166.2 112.4

H-9. Figures H-7 through H-9, pages H-11 and H-12, depict switch
connections in a circuit. Figure H-10, page H-12, is a diagram of an air
conditioning wall unit. The following contains various electrical notes to be
used for the electrical wiring of the base camp:
• To determine number of lights required in a building: room square
footage divided by 28 = number of lights.
• To determine wattage required from amps: amps x 0.85 = watts.
• Junction boxes:
2 inches x 4 inches used for lights, receptacles, and wall switches.
4 inches x 4 inches used for ceiling fans and perimeter lights.
15 inches x 15 inches used for wire connection between building
safety switch and main bus line.
18 inches x 18 inches used for wire connection between perimeter
light safety switch and main bus line.

FM 3-05.230

• Electrical circuits:
Lighting circuit should contain no more than nine lights per
Receptacle circuit should contain no more than six receptacles per
No more than three circuits may be placed in the same conduit. If
this is done, the circuit cannot share a common neutral.
• Wiring:
Unless otherwise indicated on diagrams, #12 wire will be used.
Only the size wire indicated between each connection should be
• Power loads: Between fixtures that are only used during daylight and
ones only used during darkness, the total power draw should not
exceed 100 kW at any one time.

Figure H-7. Connecting Multiple Switches in the Same Circuit

Figure H-8. Connecting Switch Before the Light (Fan) in a Circuit

FM 3-05.230

Figure H-9. Connecting Switch After the Light (Fan) in a Circuit

Figure H-10. Air Conditioning Wall Unit

Appendix I

Base Camp Individual Building Plans

This appendix provides the necessary plans to construct the buildings and
structures used in the various configurations of base camps.

I-1. These designs are based on U.S. doctrine and techniques used in
building construction. The list of materials in Appendix G corresponds with
these plans. Any deviation from these plans will cause the list of materials to
I-2. The amount of materials has been calculated to near-exact proportions
for these plans. Individual building techniques may require an additional
“overage” of materials to allow for waste or other things associated with
construction operations.
I-3. The Generic Building Framework diagram (Figure I-1) may be used for
the Administration, Team House, and Security Force buildings.
I-4. All dimensions given in the provided graphics are approximate and are
not to scale.
I-5. The following is a listing of enclosed graphics (corresponding figures
and tables in Appendixes G and H are shown in parentheses):
• Generic Building Framework, Figure I-1, page I-3. (Table G-1, page
G-2, Figures H-1a through H-2b and Table H-1, pages H-2 through
• Fighting Bunker (Inner and Outer) (Front Elevation), Figure I-2, page I-4.
• Fighting Bunker (Inner and Outer) (Rear Elevation), Figure I-3,
page I-4.
• Fighting Bunker (Inner and Outer) (Side Elevation), Figure I-4,
page I-5.
• Fighting Bunker (Inner and Outer) (Plan View), Figure I-5, page I-5.
(Table G-7, page G-5.)
• Fighting Bunker (Firing Platform and Firing Port Details), Figure I-6,
page I-6.
• Splinter Wall (Side Elevation), Figure I-7, page I-6.
• Splinter Wall (Details), Figure I-8, page I-7.
• Timber Trestle Bridge (Side View), Figure I-9, page I-8.
• Timber Trestle Bridge (Support), Figure I-10, page I-8.
• Timber Trestle Bridge (Sill and Footing), Figure I-11, page I-9.

FM 3-05.230

• Open Communications Trench, Figure I-12, page I-10. (Table G-6, page
• Covered Communications Trench, Figure I-13, page I-11.
• Administration Building (Plan View), Figure I-14, page I-11.
• Generic Team House (Plan View), Figure I-15, page I-12. (Table G-1,
page G-2, Figures H-1a through H-2b and Table H-1, pages H-2
through H-4.)
• Security Force Quarters (Plan View), Figure I-16, page I-12.
• Medical or Communications Bunker (Foundation Plan View), Figure
I-17, page I-13.
• Medical or Communications Bunker (Section View), Figure I-18, page
• Medical or Communications Bunker (Stairwell Floor Plan), Figure I-
19, page I-14.
• Medical or Communications Bunker (Stairwell End Plan), Figure I-20,
page I-14.
• Dispensary (Plan View), Figure I-21, page I-15.
• Dispensary (Front and Rear View), Figure I-22, page I-15.
• S-4/Arms Room (Plan View), Figure I-23, page I-16.
• S-4/Arms Room (Section View), Figure I-24, page I-16.
• Water Operations Building (Plan View), Figure I-25, page I-17.
• Water Operations Building (Front View), Figure I-26, page I-17.
• Water Operations Building (Rear View), Figure I-27, page I-18.
• Washroom (Plan View), Figure I-28, page I-18.
• Washroom (Front View), Figure I-29, page I-19.
• Washroom (Rear View), Figure I-30, page I-19.
• Latrine (Plan View), Figure I-31, page I-20.
• Latrine (Side View), Figure I-32, page I-20.
• Latrine (Toilet Section View), Figure I-33, page I-21.
• Latrine (Urinal Section View), Figure I-34, page I-21.
• Kitchen (Inner and Outer) (Plan View), Figure I-35, page I-22.
• Kitchen (Inner and Outer) (Front View), Figure I-36, page I-22.
• Kitchen (Inner and Outer) (Rear View), Figure I-37, page I-23.
• Motor Pool (Plan View), Figure I-38, page I-23.
• Motor Pool (Front View), Figure I-39, page I-24.
• Motor Pool (Side View), Figure I-40, page I-24.
• Motor Pool (Diagonal Bracing), Figure I-41, page I-25.
• Generator Bunker (Plan View), Figure I-42, page I-25. (Figures H-3a
through H-4b and Table H-2, pages H-5 through H-7.)
• Generator Bunker (Front View), Figure I-43, page I-26.

FM 3-05.230

• Generator Bunker (Side View), Figure I-44, page I-26.

• Fuel Bunker (Front View), Figure I-45, page I-27.
• Fuel Bunker (Side View), Figure I-46, page I-27.
• Guard Tower (Front View), Figure I-47, page I-28. (Table G-3, page
• Guard Tower (Side View), Figure I-48, page I-29.
• Guard Tower (Wall Section), Figure I-49, page I-30.
• Vehicle Revetment (Side View), Figure I-50, page I-31. (Table G-5,
page G-4.)

Figure I-1. Generic Building Framework

FM 3-05.230

Figure I-2. Fighting Bunker (Inner and Outer) (Front Elevation)

Figure I-3. Fighting Bunker (Inner and Outer) (Rear Elevation)

FM 3-05.230

Figure I-4. Fighting Bunker (Inner and Outer) (Side Elevation)

Figure I-5. Fighting Bunker (Inner and Outer) (Plan View)

FM 3-05.230

Figure I-6. Fighting Bunker (Firing Platform and Firing Port Details)

Figure I-7. Splinter Wall (Side Elevation)

FM 3-05.230

Figure I-8. Splinter Wall (Details)

FM 3-05.230

Figure I-9. Timber Trestle Bridge (Side View)

Figure I-10. Timber Trestle Bridge (Support)

FM 3-05.230

Figure I-11. Timber Trestle Bridge (Sill and Footing)

FM 3-05.230

Figure I-12. Open Communications Trench

FM 3-05.230

Figure I-13. Covered Communications Trench

Figure I-14. Administration Building (Plan View)

FM 3-05.230

Figure I-15. Generic Team House (Plan View)

Figure I-16. Security Force Quarters (Plan View)

FM 3-05.230

Figure I-17. Medical or Communications Bunker (Foundation Plan View)

Figure I-18. Medical or Communications Bunker (Section View)

FM 3-05.230

Figure I-19. Medical or Communications Bunker (Stairwell Floor Plan)

Figure I-20. Medical or Communications Bunker (Stairwell End Plan)

FM 3-05.230

Figure I-21. Dispensary (Plan View)

Figure I-22. Dispensary (Front and Rear View)

FM 3-05.230

Figure I-23. S-4/Arms Room (Plan View)

Figure I-24. S-4/Arms Room (Section View)

FM 3-05.230

Figure I-25. Water Operations Building (Plan View)

Figure I-26. Water Operations Building (Front View)

FM 3-05.230

Figure I-27. Water Operations Building (Rear View)

Figure I-28. Washroom (Plan View)

FM 3-05.230

Figure I-29. Washroom (Front View)

Figure I-30. Washroom (Rear View)

FM 3-05.230

Figure I-31. Latrine (Plan View)

Figure I-32. Latrine (Side View)

FM 3-05.230

Figure I-33. Latrine (Toilet Section View)

Figure I-34. Latrine (Urinal Section View)

FM 3-05.230

Figure I-35. Kitchen (Inner and Outer) (Plan View)

Figure I-36. Kitchen (Inner and Outer) (Front View)

FM 3-05.230

Figure I-37. Kitchen (Inner and Outer) (Rear View)

Figure I-38. Motor Pool (Plan View)

FM 3-05.230

Figure I-39. Motor Pool (Front View)

Figure I-40. Motor Pool (Side View)

FM 3-05.230

Figure I-41. Motor Pool (Diagonal Bracing)

Figure I-42. Generator Bunker (Plan View)

FM 3-05.230

Figure I-43. Generator Bunker (Front View)

Figure I-44. Generator Bunker (Side View)

FM 3-05.230

Figure I-45. Fuel Bunker (Front View)

Figure I-46. Fuel Bunker (Side View)

FM 3-05.230

Figure I-47. Guard Tower (Front View)

FM 3-05.230

Figure I-48. Guard Tower (Side View)

FM 3-05.230

Figure I-49. Guard Tower (Wall Section)

FM 3-05.230

Figure I-50. Vehicle Revetment (Side View)

Appendix J

Vietnam-Era Base Camp Examples

This appendix provides examples of different shapes and sizes of base
camps. During the Vietnam era, base camps were established in both
rural and urban areas. These camps did not always employ inner barriers
or perimeters. There was, however, a common denominator found within
a majority of the camps: trench systems (zigzag), obstacles, command
bunkers, and key weapons bunkers. Regardless of the shape, size, or
location, care should be taken to make maximum use of all weapons
systems, C2 elements, and protective systems in and around the camp.

J-1. Base camps can be modified to almost any shape or size to fit the
situation. Functional requirements and the METT-TC factors will dictate the
actual design and requirements for all camps.
J-2. Below are Vietnam-era base camp examples (Figure J-1, pages J-1 and
J-2). The photos show the various geometric shapes that were used to form
base camps.

Figure J-1. Vietnam-Era Base Camp Examples

FM 3-05.230

Figure J-1. Vietnam-Era Base Camp Examples (Continued)

Appendix K

Media Support
Media reporting influences public opinion, which may affect the perceived
legitimacy of an operation, and ultimately influences the success or
failure of the operation. The speed with which the media can collect and
convey information to the public makes it possible for the world’s
populace to become aware of an incident as quickly as, or even before,
JFCs and USG decision makers.
Public affairs (PA) plans should provide open and independent reporting,
respond to media queries that provide the maximum disclosure with
minimum delay, and create an environment between commander and
reporters that encourages balanced coverage of operations. Additional
information may be found in JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military
Operations Other Than War; FM 100-6, Information Operations, Chapter
5; FM 46-1, Public Affairs Operations, Chapter 7; and The Judge Advocate
General’s School, United States Army (TJAGSA) publication, Operational
Law Handbook, Chapter 30.


K-1. The Public Affairs Operations Center (PAOC) forms the nucleus of a
media support center, and is responsible to the gaining command public
affairs officer (PAO) and his commander for facilitating media coverage of
operations. Facilitating media coverage includes guarding OPSEC, providing
briefings and escorts, registering media, coordinating media visits to units,
assisting in deploying media pools when required, and coordinating logistical
support for the media center, such as communications, billeting, dining, and
K-2. PA operations require additional dedicated transportation assets and
rely on transportation provided by supported units. Additional ground
transportation requirements may be met by using leased commercial
equipment; however, PA elements will commonly require access to additional
tactical vehicles. Additionally, critical time-sensitive events requiring a rapid
PA response, especially when they occur in remote locations, will require air
transportation assets.
K-3. PA operations will frequently involve transporting journalists and their
equipment. Although media representatives may have their own
transportation assets, unit commanders may authorize travel in Army
vehicles. The Army goal of providing access to operations, units, and
personnel is best accomplished by providing representatives with
transportation or travel support.

FM 3-05.230


K-4. Information battlespace requires beginning-to-end, protected, seamless,
electronic transfer and processing capability for the warfighter to conduct IO
virtually anywhere at any time. This capability must be a multimedia
network of systems that transports video, imagery, data, and voice
information to create an information sphere that the battle commander can
plug in and pull what he needs to visualize the battle from the current state
to a successful end state. The signal support mission-essential tasks to
protect and construct the information sphere are to—
• Link the force to the information sphere to achieve seamless global
• Transport information with broadband, high-capability systems
optimizing satellites and terrestrial signal support to connect
continental United States (CONUS), intermediate staging bases
(ISBs), and joint operational areas (JOAs).
• Reach back through strategic entry points to power-projection
platforms and information fusion centers.
• Extend the communication range of battle command operations centers
and fighting platforms by providing command, control, communi-
cations, and computers for mobile operations.
Future technology plans include the following:
• Direct broadcast satellites to enable wide access to information at
various echelons in real time or near-real time. This in turn will enable
a new level of empowerment and self-initiative for lower echelons.
• Multimedia technology will enable three-dimensional presentation of
imagery and graphics to help commanders visualize their battlespace
for more effective training, planning, rehearsal, and execution.


K-5. Open and independent reporting will be the principal means of coverage
of U.S. military operations. Journalists in a combat zone will receive
credentials from the U.S. military and will be required to abide by a clear set
of military security ground rules that protect U.S. forces and their
operations. Violation of the ground rules can result in suspension of
credentials and expulsion from the combat zone of the journalists involved.
News organizations will make them familiar with U.S. military operations.
K-6. Journalists will be provided access to all major military units. Special
operations restriction may limit access in some cases. Military PAOs should
act as liaisons but should not interfere with the reporting process.


K-7. Soldiers should follow this guide for those times when they must talk
with the press. Soldiers must always work through the PAO, as well as notify
and get approval from their chain of command before talking to the press.

FM 3-05.230


K-8. News organizations work a long time to achieve a reputation for a reliable
product, good service, and stability. They do this by delivering the same quality
news products over and over again. That reputation is a fragile commodity for
it can be destroyed by a single mishap. One bad news item is remembered
forever, while one hundred good news items seem to be forgotten.
K-9. If only one side of the story is available, the person being interviewed
can ensure that his will be printed. The “no comment” gambit will not sit well
with the viewing public (though it may be appropriate in limited cases).
K-10. A senior uniformed leader in the Army is responsible for the
management of resources and, more importantly, of American lives.
Americans pay for the military, so they own the military and are entitled to
know the “how” and “why” of the military.
K-11. The men and women of the media are competent professionals as
dedicated to their profession as soldiers are to theirs. Media personnel should
be treated with the same respect that soldiers expect, and their capability to
gather information should never be underrated. They can be tenacious and
may have sources of information not available to the soldier.
K-12. The command or agency has an important story to tell to the
American people who support military activities. In some cases, the
interviewed soldier will be the most believable spokesperson to represent


K-13. The following suggestions are for the soldier who is preparing for an
interview. He should—
• Find out who the reporter is.
• Find out why he was involved in the interview.
• Establish ground rules on what will be covered.
• Set how much time will be allowed for the interview.
• Anticipate questions and think through his responses.
• Do his homework.
• Know the key points he wants to make.
• Not memorize a statement (he will appear stilted or pompous).
• Read the newspaper and listen to the radio.

The “Five and Five” Rule

K-14. Soldiers should know the five worst and best things about their
organization and be able to discuss them in detail any time. They also need
to stay current and ensure that the detachment stays current.

FM 3-05.230

Self-Check Before an Interview

K-15. The following information is important for the soldier who is
preparing for an interview. He should—
• Check his appearance.
• Not wear sunglasses outdoors or tinted glasses indoors.
• Dress appropriately when wearing civilian clothes.
• Keep jewelry simple.
• Stand straight, when standing.
• Keep hands relaxed.
• Sit well into the chair, when seated, with hands resting on chair arms
or on legs.
• Be warm and friendly.
• Be careful not to adopt the interviewer’s attitude.
• Concentrate on the interviewer.
K-16. The unit PAO or country team PAO (United States Information
Service [USIS]) can give the best advice before, during, and after the
interview. As soon as someone has been asked for an interview, the PAO
should be brought into the action. PAOs know the media and the news
business and can give sound advice on what should and should not be done. If
a soldier goes into an interview or speaking engagement with a positive
attitude and really cares about his points, everything will be fine. When a
soldier has a story to tell, it should be done right and professionally.

AC alternating current
ACSA acquisition cross-Service agreement
AFARN Air Force air request net
AFFOR Air Force forces
ALCE airlift control element
ALO air liaison officer
ammo ammunition
amp ampere
AO area of operations; air officer (USMC)
AOB advanced operational base
AOC air operations center (USAF)
AOR area of responsibility
APAM antipersonnel/antimateriel
APICM all-purpose improved conventional munitions
AR Army regulation
ARFOR Army forces
ARSOA Army special operations aviation
ARSOC Army special operations component
ARSOF Army special operations forces
ASCC Army Service Component Command
ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System
ATO air tasking order
AUTODIN Automatic Digital Network
AVIM aviation intermediate maintenance
AVUM aviation unit maintenance
AWG American wire gauge
AWOL absent without leave
BBDPICM base-burning dual-purpose improved conventional munitions
BDA battle damage assessment
bn battalion

FM 3-05.230

BTU British thermal unit

C conduit
C2 command and control
CA Civil Affairs—Designated Active and Reserve component forces
and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct
civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations.
(JP 1-02)
cal caliber
CAS close air support
CASCOM Combined Arms Support Command
CASREQ close air support request
CBT combatting terrorism—Actions, including antiterrorism
(defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist
acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent,
deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism
throughout the entire threat spectrum. (JP 1-02)
CBU cluster bomb unit
CCL combat-configured load
CD counterdrug
CHS combat health support—Health support services required on
the battlefield to maintain the health of the soldier and to both
treat and evacuate casualties in an expedient manner to preserve
CI counterintelligence—Information gathered and activities
conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence
activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of
foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or
foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. (JP 1-02)
COA course of action
COM chief of mission
COMSEC communications security
CONEX container express
CONPLAN concept plan; operation plan in concept format
CONUS continental United States
CP-WMD counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction
CS combat support
CSS combat service support
CST coalition support team
CTA common table of allowance

FM 3-05.230

cu cubic
DA direct action; Department of the Army
DCSOPS Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
DEA Drug Enforcement Administration
DFT deployment for training
DOD Department of Defense
DOS Department of State
DPICM dual purpose improved conventional munitions
DS direct support—A mission requiring a force to support another
specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the
supported force’s request for assistance. (JP 1-02)
DSN Defense Switched Network
DTV digital television
E&R evasion and recovery—The full spectrum of coordinated
actions carried out by evaders, recovery forces, and operational
recovery planners to effect the successful return of personnel
isolated in hostile territory to friendly control. (JP 1-02)
ea each
EAP emergency action plan
ECC evacuation control center
EIDS Eagle Intrusion Detection System
EMT electrical metallic tubing
EO electro-optical
EOD explosive ordnance disposal
EPW enemy prisoner of war
ER electronic reconnaissance
FAC forward air controller
FAE fuel air explosive
FASCAM family of scatterable mines
FAX facsimile
FC foundation construction
FDC fire direction center
FFAR folding-fin aerial rocket
FID foreign internal defense—Participation by civilian and
military agencies of a government in any of the action programs
taken by another government to free and protect its society from
subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. (JP 1-02)

FM 3-05.230

FLIR forward-looking infrared

FM field manual
FOB forward operational base
FP force protection—Security program designed to protect Service
members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and
equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through
planned and integrated application of combatting terrorism,
physical security, operations security, and personal protective
services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and
other security programs. (JP 1-02)
FPF final protective fire
FSC fire support coordinator (USMC)
FSCOORD fire support coordinator (USA)
FSN federal stock number
FSO fire support officer
ft foot (feet)
FY fiscal year
G-3 Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations and Plans
G-4 Assistant Chief of Staff, Logistics
G-5 Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs
gal gallon
GAO General Accounting Office
GBU guided bomb unit
GJA Group Judge Advocate
GLINT gated laser intensifier
GP general purpose
GPS global positioning system
GS general support—That support which is given to the supported
force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof.
(JP 1-02)
GSC group support company
GSO general services officer
GWT ground water table
HA humanitarian assistance
HARM high-speed antiradiation missile
HC chemical smoke

FM 3-05.230

HCA humanitarian and civic assistance—Assistance to the local

populace provided by predominantly US forces in conjunction
with military operations and exercises. This assistance is
specifically authorized by title 10, United State Code, section 401,
and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided
under these provisions is limited to (1) medical, dental, and
veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; (2)
construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3)
well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4)
rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.
Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that
incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace.
(JP 1-02)
HD humanitarian demining; high drag
HE high explosive
HEI high explosive incendiary
HF high frequency
HHC headquarters and headquarters company
HHD headquarters and headquarters detachment
HIC human intelligence collector
HMMWV high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle
HN host nation
HQ headquarters
HQDA Headquarters, Department of the Army
hr hour
HSC headquarters and support company
Hz hertz
IAW in accordance with
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
ID identification
IDM improved data modem
ILLUM illumination
IMPAC International Merchants Purchase Authorization Card
IO information operations—Actions taken to affect adversary
information and information systems while defending one’s own
information and information systems. (JP 1-02)
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlespace
IR information requirement; infrared
ISB intermediate staging base

FM 3-05.230

ISOFAC isolation facility

J junction box
J-1 Manpower and Personnel Directorate
J-2 Intelligence Directorate
J-3 Operations Directorate
J-4 Logistics Directorate
J-5 Plans Directorate of a joint staff
J-6 Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems
JAG Judge Advocate General
JAOC joint air operations center
JCET joint combined exercise for training
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDISS joint deployable intelligence support system
JFACC joint force air component commander
JFC joint force commander
JFE joint fires element
JFSOCC joint force special operations component commander
JOA joint operations area
JOC joint operations center
JOS joint operational stocks
JP joint publication
JSOA joint special operations area—A restricted area of land, sea,
and airspace assigned by a joint force commander to the
commander of a joint special operations force to conduct special
operations activities. The commander of joint special operations
forces may further assign a specific area or sector within the joint
special operations area to a subordinate commander for mission
execution. The scope and duration of the special operations forces’
mission, friendly and hostile situation, and politico-military
considerations all influence the number, composition, and
sequencing of special operations forces deployed into a joint
special operations area. It may be limited in size to accommodate
a discrete direct action mission or may be extensive enough to
allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare
operations. (JP 1-02)
JSOAC joint special operations air component
JSOCC joint special operations component command
JSOTF joint special operations task force

FM 3-05.230

JTF joint task force—A joint force that is constituted and so

designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander,
a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force
commander. (JP 1-02)
JWICS Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System
km kilometer(s)
kW kilowatt(s)
LAF light attenuating filters
lb pound(s)
LC line of contact
LD line of departure; low drag
LGB laser-guided bomb
LIC low intensity conflict
LLLTV low-light level television
LOAC law of armed conflict
LOC line of communications
LOGSTAT logistical status
LP listening post
LST laser spot tracker
LTD laser target designator
m meter(s)
MAAG military assistance advisory group
MACOM major Army command
MAGTF Marine air-ground task force
MARFOR Marine Corps forces
MARLO Marine liaison officer
MASCAL mass casualty
MCOO modified combined obstacle overlay
MEDEVAC medical evacuation
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support
available—time available and civil considerations
MG machine gun
MI military intelligence
MILGP military group (assigned to American Embassy in host nation)
MILVAN military van (container)

FM 3-05.230

MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System

mm millimeter(s)
MOA memorandum of agreement
MOU memorandum of understanding
MP military police
MRE meal, ready to eat
MSL mean sea level
MTOE modified table of organization and equipment
MTP mission tasking package
NA not applicable
NALE naval and amphibious liaison element
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVAID navigational aid
NAVFOR Navy forces
NAVSOC naval special operations command
NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCO noncommissioned officer
NEO noncombatant evacuation operation
NGF naval gunfire
NGO nongovernmental organization—Transnational organizations
of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Nongovern-
mental organizations may be professional associations,
foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a
common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (develop-
ment and relief). “Nongovernmental organizations” is a term
normally used by non-United States organizations. (JP 1-02)
NIMA National Imagery and Mapping Agency
NIPRNET Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network
NOD night observation device
NSN National Stock Number
NSWTU naval special warfare task unit
NVG night vision goggle
O&M operation and maintenance
OAKOC observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain,
obstacles, and cover and concealment
OCIE organizational clothing and individual equipment

FM 3-05.230

OCONUS outside the continental United States

OP observation post
OPCEN operations center
OPCON operational control—Transferable command authority that
may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the
level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in
combatant command (command authority). Operational control
may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions
of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and
employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating
objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to
accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authori-
tative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint
training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the
command. Operational control should be exercised through the
commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this
authority is exercised through subordinate joint force comman-
ders and Service and/or functional component commands.
Operational control normally provides full authority to organize
commands and forces and to employ those forces as the
commander in operational control considers necessary to
accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in
and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or
matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or
unit training. (JP 1-02)
OPFUND operational fund
OP-KIT Observation Post Kit
OPLAN operation plan
OPLOG operational log
OPORD operation order
OPSEC operations security—A process of identifying critical informa-
tion and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to
military operations and other activities to: a. identify those
actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b.
determine indicators that hostile intelligence systems might
obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive
critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c.
select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an
acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to
adversary exploitation. (JP 1-02)
PA public affairs
PAO public affairs officer
PAOC Public Affairs Operations Center
PD point detonating

FM 3-05.230

PI point of impact
PIR priority intelligence requirements—Those intelligence
requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and
stated priority in the task of planning and decisionmaking.
(JP 1-02)
PLL prescribed load list
PLS personnel locator system
POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants
POM preparation for overseas movement
PR personnel recovery
PRF pulse repetition frequency
psi pounds per square inch
PSP perforated steel planking
PSYOP Psychological Operations—Planned operations to convey
selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to
influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and
ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations,
groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations
is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable
to the originator’s objectives. (JP 1-02)
PTADB planning terrain analysis database
PW prisoner of war
R&R rest and recuperation
RAP rocket-assisted projectile
ROE rules of engagement
ROWPU reverse osmosis water purification unit
RPG rocket-propelled grenade
RPM rounds per minute
RSOI reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
S-1 battalion or brigade personnel staff officer
S-2 battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer
S-3 battalion or brigade operations staff officer
S-4 battalion or brigade logistics staff officer
S-5 civil-military operations officer
S-6 battalion or brigade signal staff officer
SA security assistance
SACC supporting arms coordination center

FM 3-05.230

SATCOM satellite communications

SAW squad automatic weapon
SF Special Forces
SFG(A) Special Forces group (Airborne)
SFLE Special Forces liaison element
SFOB Special Forces operational base
SFOD Special Forces operational detachment
SFODA Special Forces operational detachment A
SFODB Special Forces operational detachment B
SFODC Special Forces operational detachment C
SIPRNET SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
SJA Staff Judge Advocate
SLAM stand-off land attack missile
SLBC Santa Lucia Base Camp
SMK smoke
SO special operations
SOC special operations command
SOCA special operations communications assembly
SOCCE special operations command and control element
SOF special operations forces
SOFA status-of-forces agreement
SOI signal operating instructions
SOLE special operations liaison element
SOMA status of mission agreement
SOMPF special operations mission planning folder
SOP standing operating procedure
SOR statement of requirement
SOSCOM special operations support command
SOT-A special operations team A
SOTAC special operations terminal attack controller
SOTSE special operations theater support element
SR special reconnaissance
SSB single sideband
STP soldier training publication

FM 3-05.230

STU-III secure telephone unit III

TACAIR tactical air
TACAN tactical air navigation
TACC tactical air control center (USN)
TACP tactical air control party
TACSAT tactical satellite
THREATCON terrorist threat condition
TI time-initiated
TISA Troop Issue Subsistence Activity
TJAGSA The Judge Advocate General’s School, United States Army
TM technical manual
TOC tactical operations center
TOT time on target
TOW tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided (missile)
TPFDL time-phased force and deployment list
TRP target reference point
TTADB tactical terrain analysis database
TV television
TVS thermal vision sight
UBL unit basic load
UHF ultrahigh frequency
U.S. United States
USA United States Army
USAF United States Air Force
USAJFKSWCS United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center
and School
USASFC(A) United States Army Special Forces Command (Airborne)
USASOC United States Army Special Operations Command
UN United Nations
USC United States Code
USG United States Government
USIS United States Information Service
USMC United States Marine Corps
USMTF United States message text format

FM 3-05.230

USN United States Navy

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command
UTM universal transverse mercator
UW unconventional warfare—A broad spectrum of military and
paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predomi-
nantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are
organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying
degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and
other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine
operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion,
sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. (JP 1-02)
V volt(s)
VA volt-ampere
VAC volts, alternating current
VHF very high frequency
VIP very important person
VT variable time
VTC video teleconferencing
WP white phosphorus
yd yard(s)

AR 15-6. Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers. 30 September 1996.
AR 71-32. Force Development and Documentation – Consolidated Policies. 3 March 1997.
AR 190-16. Physical Security. 31 May 1991.
AR 415-16. Army Facilities Components System. 17 March 1989.
AR 710-1. Centralized Inventory Management of the Army Supply System. 15 April 2003.
AR 725-50. Requisition, Receipt, and Issue System. 15 November 1995.
DD Form 1972. Joint Tactical Air Strike Request. July 2001.
FM 3-05.20. Special Forces Operations. 26 June 2001.
FM 3-05.102. Army Special Operations Forces Intelligence. 31 August 2001.
FM 3-05.201. Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations. 30 April 2003.
FM 3-07. Stability Operations and Support Operations. 20 February 2003.
FM 3-09.32. J-Fire Multiservice Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower.
15 November 2002.
FM 5-33. Terrain Analysis. 11 July 1990 (Change 1, 8 September 1992).
FM 5-34. Engineer Field Data. 30 August 1999 (Change 3, 10 April 2003).
FM 5-103. Survivability. 10 June 1985.
FM 5-424. Theater of Operations Electrical Systems. 25 June 1997.
FM 8-42. Combat Health Support in Stability Operations and Support Operations.
27 October 1997.
FM 21-10. Field Hygiene and Sanitation. 21 June 2000.
FM 23-90. Mortars. 1 March 2000 (Change 1, 9 December 2002).
FM 27-10. The Law of Land Warfare. 18 July 1956 (Change 1, 15 July 1976).
FM 34-52. Intelligence Interrogation. 28 September 1992.
FM 34-60. Counterintelligence. 3 October 1995.
FM 34-130. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. 8 July 1994.
FM 41-10. Civil Affairs Operations. 14 February 2000.
FM 46-1. Public Affairs Operations. 30 May 1997.
FM 63-3. Corps Support Command. 30 September 1993.
FM 100-6. Information Operations. 27 August 1996.

FM 3-05.230

FM 100-25. Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces. 1 August 1999.

FM 101-5. Staff Organization and Operations. 31 May 1997.
JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 12 April 2001.
JP 2-03. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Geospatial Information and Services
Support to Joint Operations. 31 March 1999.
JP 3-07. Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War. 16 June 1995.
JP 3-09. Doctrine for Joint Fire Support. 12 May 1998.
JP 3-09.3. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS).
1 December 1995.
JP 3-10.1. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Base Defense. 23 July 1996.
JP 4-02.2. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Patient Movement in Joint
Operations. 30 December 1996.
STP 5-51B12-SM-TG. Soldier’s Manual and Trainer’s Guide, MOS 51B, Carpentry and
Masonry Specialist, Skill Levels 1/2. 23 September 2002.
STP 5-51H34-SM-TG. Soldier’s Manual and Trainer’s Guide, MOS 51H, Construction
Engineering Supervisor, Skill Levels 3/4. 28 March 2003.
STP 5-51K12-SM-TG. Soldier’s Manual and Trainer’s Guide, MOS 51K, Plumber, Skill
Levels 1/2. 18 September 2002.
STP 5-51R12-SM-TG. Soldier’s Manual and Trainer’s Guide, MOS 51R, Interior
Electrician, Skill Levels 1/2. 18 September 2002.
STP 31-18-SM-TG. Soldier’s Manual and Trainer’s Guide, CMF 18, Special Forces Basic
Tasks, Skill Levels 3/4. 25 September 1997.
STP 31-18E34-SM-TG. Soldier’s Manual and Trainer’s Guide, MOS 18E, Special Forces
Communications Sergeant, Skill Levels 3/4. 28 April 2003.
TJAGSA Publication. Operational Law Handbook (2002).
TM 5-301-1. Army Facilities Components System – Planning (Temperate). 27 June 1986.
TM 5-301-2. Army Facilities Components System – Planning (Tropical). 27 June 1986.
TM 5-301-3. Army Facilities Components System – Planning (Frigid). 27 June 1986.
TM 5-301-4. Army Facilities Components System – Planning (Desert). 27 June 1986.
TM 5-304. Army Facilities Components System User Guide. 1 October 1990.
USASOC Directive 525-13. Plans and Operations – Force Protection (FOUO).
1 October 1997.

A motor pool, I-23 through
I-25 G
access road, 3-46, 3-47
open communications group support company (GSC),
administrative area, 3-42
trench, I-10 1-2
through 3-46
S-4/arms room, I-16
attack aviation assets, E-9
security force quarters, H
B headquarters and
splinter wall, I-6, I-7 headquarters company
base camp considerations, 2-3
timber trestle bridge, I-8, (HHC), 1-1
through 2-5
I-9 host nation assistance, 1-3
base camp conversion, 1-4
vehicle revetment, I-31
base camp defense, 3-58
washroom, I-18, I-19 I
base camp demobilization, 1-4
water operations building, inner barrier, 3-22 through 3-27
base camp principles, 2-2, 2-3 I-17, I-18
inner berm, 3-4 through 3-6
base camp shapes and sizes,
3-3, J-1, J-2 inner perimeter, 3-4 through
C 3-21
battalion headquarters and
call for fire, E-15
headquarters detachment
(HHD), 1-2 civic action, 3-51 L
battalion headquarters and close air support, E-6 through legal considerations, D-1
support company (HSC), 1-2 E-8 through D-3
building materials, G-1 through construction, 3-3 through 3-50, logistical sustainment, B-1
G-5 F-1 through F-9 through B-11
building plans, I-1 through I-31 cordon and search operations,
3-58, 3-59, 3-61 through
administration building, M
I-11 media support, K-1 through K-4
counterpart relationships, 1-3,
covered communications modified table of organization
1-4, 3-51, 3-52
trench I-11 and equipment (MTOE),
dispensary, I-15 G-6, G-7
fighting bunker, I-4 through mortar pit, 3-17
I-6 defensive considerations, 3-52
fuel bunker, I-27 dependents, 3-50
generator bunker, I-25, direct support (DS), B-1
naval gunfire, E-9
I-26 E
generic building, I-3 electrical requirements, H-1 O
generic team house, I-12 through H-12
outer barrier, 3-32 through 3-42
guard tower, I-28 through equipment requirements, F-7
I-30 through F-9 outer perimeter, 3-28 through
kitchen, I-22, I-23 F
latrine, I-20, I-21 fire arrow, 3-17, 3-18
medical or communi- fire support, E-1 through E-18
cations bunker, I-13,
funding, C-1 through C-5

FM 3-05.230

Special Forces battalion, 1-2

P Special Forces V
perimeter trench, 3-30 communications, 2-7 vehicle revetments, 3-20
planning considerations, 2-5 Special Forces company, 1-2,
through 2-7 1-3
general, 2-5, 2-6 Special Forces group
water supply, 3-53 through
(Airborne), 1-1
logistical, 2-6 through 3-56
2-8 stability operations, B-1
weights, measures, and
public affairs operations, K-1 staff responsibilities, 3-1, 3-2, conversion tables, A-1
3-57, 3-58 through A-5
SF group/battalion,
3-57, 3-58
redeployment, 4-1 through 4-3
SFODA, 3-1, 3-2
regional analysis, 2-9
support and sustainment, 2-1,
S support operations, B-1
surrounding area, 3-47 through
screening operations, 3-58 3-50
through 3-61
security equipment, 2-8, 2-9 T
security measures, 2-8, 2-9, terrain analysis, 2-9 through
3-64 2-11

FM 3-05.230
30 JULY 2003

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

General, United States Army
Acting Chief of Staff


Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army


Active Army, Army National Guard, and U. S. Army Reserve: To be distributed

in accordance with the initial distribution number 115905, requirements for
FM 3-05.230.
PIN: 080972-000