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Mabelle O.

Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests
Alvarez v. Guingona Facts: HB 8817, entitled "An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago," was filed in the HoR, subsequently passed by the HoR, and transmitted to the Senate. A counterpart of HB 8817, SB 1243 was filed in the Senate, and was passed as well. The enrolled bill was submitted to and signed by the Chief Executive as RA 7720. When a plebiscite on the Act was held on July 13, 1994, a great majority of the registered voters of Santiago voted in favor of the conversion of Santiago into a city. Issue: Constitutionality of RA 7720. SC: YES, petition denied, presumption of constitutionality, no clear and unequivocal breach of the Consti. 1. WON Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) must be included in determining the average annual income for purposes of conversion.YES  For a municipality to be converted into an independent component city, its average annual income for the last two consecutive years (at that time, based on 1991 constant prices) must be at least 20M. Petitioners contend that the IRAs must be deducted from the municipality’s income because they are not income but transfers and/or budgetary aid from the NG and that they fluctuate depending on different factors.  The court in its discussion of what an LGU is said that: a. it is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted by law and possessed of substantial control over its own affairs. b. It is an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, but not intended, however, to be an imperium in imperio c. It is autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources.  Since the LGU is given broadened powers and increased responsibilities, it now operates on a much wider scale. More extensive operations, in turn, entail more expenses. The vesting of duty, responsibility and accountability in every LGU is accompanied with a provision for reasonably adequate resources to discharge its powers and effectively carry out its functions.  Availment of such resources is effectuated through the vesting in every LG unit of (1) the right to create and broaden its own source of revenue; (2) the right to be allocated a just share in national taxes, such share being in the form of internal revenue allotments (IRAs); and (3) the right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries.  The court held that the IRAs were properly included because they are items of income and form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the LGU. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of the LG unit. They thus constitute income which the LG can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds.  LGC, Sec 450 (c): "the average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income."  DOF Order 35-93: ANNUAL INCOME: revenues and receipts realized by provinces, cities and municipalities from regular sources of the Local General Fund including the internal revenue allotment and other shares provided for in Secs 284, 290 and 291 of the Code, but exclusive of non-recurring receipts, such as other national aids, grants, financial assistance, loan proceeds, sales of fixed assets, and similar others. 1. WON considering that the Senate passed SB 1243, its own version of HB 8817, RA 7720 can be said to have originated in the HoR. YES  Bills of local application are required to originate exclusively in the HoR. Petitioners contend that since a bill of the same import was passed in the Senate, it cannot be said to have originated in the HoR.  Such is untenable because it cannot be denied that the HB was filed first (18 Apr 1993). The SB was filed 19 May. The HB was approved on third reading 17 Dec, and was transmitted to the Senate 28 Jan 1994.  The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does not

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Mabelle O. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests
contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.  The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the HoR, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the HoR, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.  Tolentino v. SoF: “what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the HoR on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.” Basco v. PAGCOR Facts: PAGCOR was created under PD 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. To attain its objectives (centralize and integrate the right and authority to operate and conduct games of chance, generate additional revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-civic project, expand tourism, minimize evils prevalent in conduct and operation of gambling clubs) PAGCOR is given territorial jurisdiction all over the Philippines. Under its Charter's repealing clause, all laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, inconsistent therewith, are accordingly repealed, amended or modified. Issues: 1. WON PD 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees. NO  The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. Thus, "the Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it." Its "power to tax" therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the "inherent power to tax" The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that "municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress" which has the power to "create and abolish municipal corporations" due to its "general legislative powers." Congress, therefore, has the power of control over LGs. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power. The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked. As early as 1975, the power of LGs to regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise, licenses or permits" was withdrawn by PD 771 and was vested exclusively on the NG. Only the NG has the power to issue "licenses or permits" for the operation of gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees which is a consequence of the issuance of "licenses or permits" is no longer vested in the City of Manila. LGs have no power to tax instrumentalities of the NG. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the NG. In addition to its corporate powers (Sec. 3, Title II, PD 1869) it also exercises regulatory powers. PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere LG. The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in any manner control the operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress to

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Mabelle O. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests
carry into execution the powers vested in the federal government.--> "supremacy" of the NG over LGs.  Holmes: absence of power on the part of the States to touch, in that way (taxation) at least, the instrumentalities of the United States  mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru extermination of what local authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities or enterprise using the power to tax as "a tool for regulation" WON the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated by PD 1869. NO.  Art x Sec 5, Consti: Each LG unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the LG.  power of LG to "impose taxes and fees" is subject to "limitations" which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law until "amended, repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its "exemption clause" remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of LGs to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy.  principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization." It does not make LGs sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio."  LG: political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary system of government, such as the government under the Philippine Constitution, LGs can only be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be an imperium in imperio. LG in such a system can only mean a measure of decentralization of the function of government. Vilas v. City of Manila Facts: Vilas, Trigas, and aguado are creditors of Manila as it existed before the cession of the Philippine Islands (PI) to the US by the treaty of Paris. According to them, under its present charter from 1. the Government of the PI is the same juristic person and liable upon the obligations of the old city. PI SC: different entity. Issue: WON notwithstanding the cession of the PI to the US followed by a reincorporation of the city, present municipality liable for obligations of old city. YES  The city as now incorporated has succeeded to all of the property rights of the old city and to the right to enforce all its causes of action. There is identity of purpose between Sp and Am charters and substantial identity of municipal powers, area, and inhabitants.  Argument against liability: ayuntamiento of Manila was a corporation entity created by the Sp government . when the sovereignty of Sp ceased, municipality, ceased as well.--> analogy to doctrine of principal and agent, death of principal=death of agent  Dual Character of Municipal Corporations: 1. Governmental: exercises by delegation a part of the sovereignty of the state 2. Private/Business: mere legal entity or juristic person. Stands for the community in the administration of local affairs wholly beyond the sphere of the public purposes for which its governmental powers are conferred  In view of the dual character of municipal corporations, there is no public reason for presuming their total dissolution as a mere consequence of military occupation or territorial cession.  McKinley’s instruction: relinquishment or cession… cannot in any respect impair the property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds…  Property rights of municipal corporations and individuals were safeguarded. The cession did not operate as an extinction or dissolution of corporations. The legal entity survived both military occupation and cession. The corporate identity and liability of the city was not extinguished.  TVA: entitled to proceed to judgment. Lidasan v. COMELEC Facts: RA 4790 (An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur) was signed into law. Dianaton is composed of Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong,

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Mabelle O. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests
Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamakawan, Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain,Matimos and Magolatung. It was later found out that Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Katbo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamakawan were not within Lanao del Sur but within Cotabato. The COMELEC adopted a resolution recognizing the new municipality for purposes of election. Meanwhile, the Office of the President recommended that the COMELEC that the operation of the statute be suspended until clarified by correcting legislation. This triggered petitioner to file action. Issue: WON RA 4790 is unconstitutional. YES  The constitution requires that no bill must be enacted which shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. While the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein, the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.  Test of the sufficiency of a title: whether or not it is misleading; technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth.  In this case, not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.  Respondents: change in boundaries merely incidental. SC: NO! Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one province to another of necessity involves reduction of area, population and income of the first and the corresponding increase of those of the other. This is as important as the creation of a municipality. And yet, the title did not reflect this fact. Felwa case: cannot be considered by the court, in this case, while no reference to elective officials were made, such were incidental to the creation of B, MP,I, and K-A. Hume v. Village of Fruitport: An act to incorporate the village of Fruitport, in the County of Muskegon but statute included Ottawa. Declared unconstitutional for having more than one subject. Contention: “in the County of Muskegon” a mere surplusage. SC: the court cannot reject a part of the title for the purpose of saving the act. RA 4790 cannot be salvaged with reference to the nine remaining towns. While where a portion of a statute is rendered unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the parts will be separated, and the constitutional portion upheld, it is not so when the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with them. Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly. They serve as an instrumentality of the State in carrying out the functions of government. Secondly. They act as an agency of the community in the administration of local affairs. It is in the latter character that they are a separate entity acting for their own purposes and not a subdivision of the State. several factors come to the fore in the consideration of whether a group of barrios is capable of maintaining itself as an independent municipality. Amongst these are population, territory, and income Speaking of the original twenty-one barrios which comprise the new municipality, the explanatory note reads: the territory is now a progressive community; the

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Mabelle O. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests
aggregate population is large; and the collective income is sufficient to maintain an independent municipality. This bill, if enacted into law, will enable the inhabitants concerned to govern themselves and enjoy the blessings of municipal autonomy. Obviously, what was in the mind of the proponent was the 21 barrios, and not the nine remaining. Republic v. City of Davao Facts: Davao filed an application for a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) for its proposed project, the Davao City Artica Sports Dome, with the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB), Region XI. The EMB denied the application after finding that the proposed project was within an environmentally critical area and ruled that, pursuant to Sec 2, PD 1586 (Environmental Impact Statement System), in relation to Sec 4, PD 1151, (Philippine Environment Policy), Davao must undergo the environmental impact assessment (EIA) process to secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC), before it can proceed with the construction of its project. Davao filed a petition for mandamus and injunction with the RTC of Davao alleging that its proposed project was neither an environmentally critical project nor within an environmentally critical area; thus outside the scope of the EIS system. Hence, it was the ministerial duty of the DENR, through the EMB, to issue a CNC in favor of respondent upon submission of the required documents. RTC: for Davao. LGUs not required by PDs 1586 & 1511 to comply with the EIS law. Only agencies and instrumentalities of the NG, including GOCCs, as well as private corporations, firms and entities are mandated to go through the EIA process for their proposed projects which have significant effect on the quality of the environment. An LGU, not being an agency or instrumentality of the NG, is deemed excluded under the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius. MR: denied Issue: WON Davao is required to comply with the EIS law. YES. **Davao already expressed agreement that it must secure an ECC for proposed project, hence moot and academic, but the SC decided to still discuss issues to educate the bench and bar.  Davao cannot claim exemption from coverage of PD 1586.  LGU a body politic and corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it in conformity with law. It performs dual functions: (1) Governmental functions are those that concern the health, safety and the advancement of the public good or welfare as affecting the public generally.  LGU is an agency of the NG (2) Proprietary functions are those that seek to obtain special corporate benefits or earn pecuniary profit and intended for private advantage and benefit. LGU agent of the community in the administration of local affairs.  Sec 16 LGC: duty of the LGUs to promote the people’s right to a balanced ecology. As a body politic endowed with governmental functions, an LGU has the duty to ensure the quality of the environment, which is the very same objective of PD 1586.  Sec 4 of PD 1586 clearly states that “no person, partnership or corporation shall undertake or operate any such declared environmentally critical project or area without first securing an ECC issued by the President or his duly authorized representative.” The CC defines a person as either natural or juridical. The state and its political subdivisions, LGUs are juridical persons. Undoubtedly therefore, LGUs are not excluded from the coverage of PD 1586.  State policy: achieve a balance between socio-economic development and environmental protection, which are the twin goals of sustainable development. This can only be possible if we adopt a comprehensive and integrated environmental protection program where all the sectors of the community are involved, i.e., the government and the private sectors. The LGUs, as part of the machinery of the government, cannot therefore be deemed as outside the scope of the EIS system. *other issue: Davao must be granted ECC, it has duly proven that the dome will not be constructed in an environmentally critical area, hence, it becomes the ministerial duty of the DENR to issue the CNC. San Juan v. CSC Facts: When the Provinicial Board Officer position was left vacant, Rizal Governor San Juan informed Director Abella of the Department of Budget and Management that a certain Santos had assumed office as acting PBO and requested Abella to endorse Santos’ appointment. Abella, however recommended Almajose on

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Mabelle O. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests
the basis of a comparative study of all MBOs which included San Juan’s nominees. According to Abella, Almajose was the most qualified since she was the only CPA among the contenders. DMB Usec Cabuquit signed Almajose’s appointment papers upon Abella’s recommendation. Unaware of Almajose’s appointment, San Juan reiterated his request for Santos’ appointment in a letter to Sec. Carague. DBM Reg. Dir. Galvez wrote San Jose that Santos and his other recommendees did not meet the minimum requirements under Local Budget Circular 31 for the position of local budget officer and required San Jose to submit at least three other nominees. After finding out about Almajose’s appointment San Juan wrote Carague protesting against the said appointment on the grounds that Cabuquit is not legally authorized to appoint the PBO; that Almajose lacks the required three years work experience as provided in LBC 31; and that under EO 112, it is the Gov., not the RD or a Congressman, who has the power to recommend nominees for the position of PBO. DBM, through its Director of the Bureau of Legal & Legislative Affairs (BLLA) Afurung, issued a Memorandum ruling that the San Juan's letter-protest is not meritorious considering that DBM validly exercised its prerogative in filling-up the contested position since none of the his nominees met the prescribed requirements. San Juan then moved for a reconsideration of the BLLA ruling. Such was denied. He then wrote the CSC which issued resolutions upholding Almajose’s appointment. Issue: WON the DBM can appoint anyone in the event that the Governor recommends unqualified persons. NO.  issue is not merely about validity of appointment of PBO, but involves the application of a most important constitutional policy and principle, local autonomy.  Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.  McKinley's Instructions: establishment of municipal governments, natives afforded the opportunity to manage their own local officers to the fullest extent of which they are capable and subject to the least degree of supervision and control  1935 Constitution: limited the executive power over local governments to "general supervision . . . as may be provided by law."  Tecson v. Salas: presidential competence is not even supervision in general, but general supervision as may be provided by law. He could not thus go beyond the applicable statutory provisions, which bind and fetter his discretion on the matter. ○ Supervision goes no further than "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties." ○ Control "means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate had done in the performance of their duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."  RA 2264, "An Act Amending the Law Governing Local Governments by Increasing Their Autonomy and Reorganizing Local Governments" was passed. It was followed in 1967 when Republic Act No. 5185, the Decentralization Law was enacted, giving "further autonomous powers to local governments governments."  1973 Constitution: the state shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of LGUs, especially the barangay to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities.  article on Local Government was incorporated into the Constitution. It called for a LGC defining more responsive and accountable local government structures. The exercise of greater local autonomy is even more marked in the present Constitution. Article II, Section 25 on State Policies provides: Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments The 14 sections in Article X on Local Government not only reiterate earlier doctrines but give in greater detail the provisions making local autonomy more meaningful. Thus, Sections 2 and 3 of Article X provide:

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initiative. and referendum. nominations for judicial positions are made by the Judicial and Bar Council. She cannot apply the DBM procedure.Mabelle O. The public respondent's grave abuse of discretion is aggravated by the fact that Director Galvez required the Provincial Governor to submit at least three other names of nominees better qualified than his earlier recommendation. 2. . The complete disregard of the local government's prerogative and the smug belief that the DBM has absolute wisdom. 705-706). responsibilities. Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit of liberty upon which these provisions are based. It may not be amiss to give by way of analogy the procedure followed in the appointments of Justices and Judges. If none is qualified. and provide for the qualifications. reject all the Council nominees. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. The right given by Local Budget Circular No. is the proper administration of fiscal affairs at the local level. and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units. Citing Tocqueville. is ultra vires and is. accordingly. It is for this reason that the nomination and appointment process involves a sharing of power between the two levels of government. If the DBM Secretary jealously hoards the entirety of budgetary powers and ignores the right of local governments to develop self-reliance and resoluteness in the handling of their own funds.   Pimentel v. authority. 3. however. it cannot have the spirit of liberty. They are prepared by the local officials who must work within the constraints of those budgets. appointment and removal. the goal of meaningful local autonomy is frustrated and set back. The PBO is expected to synchronize his work with DBM. salaries. set aside. Provincial and municipal budgets are prepared at the local level and after completion are forwarded to the national officials for review. and appoint another person whom she feels is better qualified. term. . CSC 7 . It is for this reason that there should be a genuine interplay. COMELEC Facts: Ganzon v. When the Civil Service Commission interpreted the recommending power of the Provincial Governor as purely directory. Sinco stated that the value of local governments as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of autonomy that they enjoy. 6. . allocate among the different LGUs their powers. Sec. he must return the list of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets the legal requirements and ask for new recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities and qualifications." (Sinco. A people may establish a system of free government but without the spirit of municipal institutions. There can be no reservation of the right to fill up a position with a person of the appointing power's personal choice. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Sec. 31 which states: Sec. and a harmonization of proposals from both the local and national officials.0 — The DBM reserves the right to fill up any existing vacancy where none of the nominees of the local chief executive meet the prescribed requirements. Eleventh Edition. They are not formulated in the inner sanctums of an all-knowing DBM and unilaterally imposed on local governments whether or not they are relevant to local needs and resources. The President makes the appointments from the list of nominees submitted to her by the Council. More important. and discretion are manifest. it went against the letter and spirit of the constitutional provisions on local autonomy. pp. he stated that "local assemblies of citizens constitute the strength of free nations. The Congress shall enact a LGC which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall. powers and functions and duties of local officials. and resources. a balancing of viewpoints. election. Philippine Political Law. Under Article VIII of the Constitution. It was a meaningless exercise. The appointment of the private respondent was formalized before the Governor was extended the courtesy of being informed that his nominee had been rejected. The DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees nominated by the Governor. In his classic work "Philippine Political Law" Dean Vicente G. Aguirre Facts: Tan v.

Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Facts: Cordillera Broad Coalition v. Mangelin Facts: 8 . COA Facts: Limbona v.Mabelle O.

Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests 9 .Mabelle O.

cannot even create a barrio. from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said EOs and/or any disbursement by said municipalities. to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers.  Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution. Auditor General Facts: Pursuant to Sec 68 of the RAC. since barrios are units of municipalities? NO. each of which consists of several barrios. Pelaez instituted the present special civil action. barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated. for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction. as well as his representatives and agents. the President issued EOs 93121. carried out or implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the Pelaez v. can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios. Pelaez claims that RA 2370 had already impliedly repealed Sec 68. Sec 3:Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress. On delegation of legislative power:  While the power to fix such common boundary. 124. " Municipal corporations are purely the creatures of statutes. under this new law.Mabelle O. and 126-129 which created 33 provinces. the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities — the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. as it does. When RA 2370 became effective. RA 2370. All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall come under the provisions hereof." ISSUE: If the President. in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities.  The statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities. may partake of an administrative nature — involving. it is "strictly a legislative function" or "solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative power. against the Auditor General. enforcement or administration of a law. it is essential. that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests him. to restrain 10 . In the language of other courts.

in effect. Instead of prescribing rules of conduct. thereby. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law. the discretion of the President in approving or prescribing codes. Sec. and would bring about a total collapse of the democratic system established by our Constitution. may be required by public welfare or public interest. leads to the same result.  Schechter case: NIRA unconstitutional. consequently. Art. as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive. and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. We think that the code making authority thus conferred is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. it authorizes the making of codes to prescribe them. In fact. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A better proof of the fact that the issuance of said executive orders entails the exercise of purely legislative functions can hardly be given. in effect. and thus enacting laws for the government of trade and industry throughout the country. in his opinion. 11 . or offices of the national government. for his office would thereby become vacant. if the validity of the delegation of powers made in Section 68 were upheld. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. industry or activity. which it is the special duty and privilege of this Court to uphold. by creating a new municipality and including therein the barrio in which the official concerned resides. bureaus.  the executive orders in question were issued after the legislative bills for the creation of the municipalities involved in this case had failed to pass Congress. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. aside from the statement of the general aims of rehabilitation. It supplies no standards for any trade. bureaus. VII. correction and expansion described in Sec. insofar as local governments are concerned.  The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments.  If the term "unfair competition" is so broad as to vest in the President a discretion that is "virtually unfettered. so long as the same or its officers act Within the scope of their authority. he could compel local officials to submit to his dictation.Mabelle O. remove any of its officials. or offices. Consti: The President shall have control of all the executive departments." and.  Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality. he could. there would no longer be any legal impediment to a statutory grant of authority to the President to do anything which. The President cannot interfere with local governments. Such grant of authority would be a virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of the Executive. On the President’s power of control: Sec 10 (1). without actually creating it.6 Thus. tantamount to a delegation of legislative power.  LGUs: fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. it is obvious that "public welfare. 1. It does not undertake to prescribe rules of conduct to be applied to particular states of fact determined by appropriate administrative procedure. is virtually unfettered. by merely brandishing the power to create a new municipality (if he had it). and of the nature of the few restrictions that are imposed." which has even a broader connotation. 3 sets up no standards. For that legislative undertaking. In view of the scope of that broad declaration.

Issue: WON Santo Tomas legally exists. as it certainly does. In other words. even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers. or to create a new one. Municipality of Kapalong v. Cawaling. as certified by the National Statistics Office: Provided. (b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly- 12 . as certified by the Department of Finance. The COMELEC conducted a plebiscite in Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for ratification. and if it has either of the following requisites: (i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers.1) Cawaling v. NO. it can not be a party to any civil action. the President has no power to create a municipality.000. Alvarez v. must be deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution. Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted.  In short. Sto. Moya Facts: Pres. by conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that which he has over said executive departments. Requisites for Creation. or (ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150. Sto. such control does not include the authority either to abolish an executive department or bureau. it reverses the process and does the exact opposite.Mabelle O. said Section 68. which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory enactment. As a consequence. the power of control of the President over executive departments. Garcia created the Municipality of Santo Tomas from portions of the Municipality of Kapalong. invoking his rights as a taxpayer.  Criteria for the creation of a city: SECTION 450. in 1935. bureaus or offices implies no more than the authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere in the exercise of discretion by its officials. 1917. Issues: 1. And Appropriating Funds Therefor).00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices. the alleged power of the President to create municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority even greater than that of control which he has over the executive departments. That. Since private respondent has no legal personality. and as such. bureaus or offices. bureaus or offices.000) inhabitants. Judge Moya should have dismissed the case.  As ruled in the Pelaez case. since further proceedings would be pointless. bureaus or offices.  Then. the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area. — (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an average annual income. Tomas now asserts jurisdiction over eight barrios of Kapalong.000. see p. Article X of the Constitution) which requires that only "a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city" NO. also. of at least Twenty million (P20. as part of the Revised Administrative Code. Guingona (supra. WON the creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section 450(a) LGC (in relation to Section 10. approved on March 10. Manifestly. Tomas then filed a complaint against Kapalong for settlement of the municipal boundary dispute. as certified by the Lands Management Bureau. and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein. COMELEC Facts: President Estrada signed into law RA 8806 (Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon. The Plebiscite City Board of Canvassers (PCBC) then proclaimed the creation of the City of Sorsogon as having been ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite. population. The Rules of Court expressly provides that only "entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. filed a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of the plebiscite and challenging RA 8806. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests exercising over them the power of control denied to him by the Constitution. Instead of giving the President less power over local governments than that vested in him over the executive departments.

 The creation of an entirely new LGU through a division or a merger of existing LGUs is recognized under the Constitution. Article X of the Constitution. The COMELEC argues that since publication is indispensable for the effectivity of a law. the COMELEC concludes. "An Act Creating the City of Sorsogon by Merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in the Province of Sorsogon. and Appropriating Funds Therefor. 2000 issue of TODAY a newspaper of general circulation. Then on September 01. 2000. the title of the law. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands. could only mean "effectivity" as used and contemplated in Section 10 of the Code.A.  The law was first published in the August 25. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. WON the plebiscite was timely conducted. Tuvera. Otherwise put. 2000. 8806. The abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject separate and distinct from the creation of Sorsogon City. While the title of the Act sufficiently informs the public about the creation of Sorsogon City. still such date must be reckoned from the date of the effectivity of the law. NO. which should be read together with Section 65 (effectivity of the Act) thereof. petitioner claims that no such information has been provided on the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon. it was published in a newspaper of local circulation in the Province of Sorsogon. Hence. allows the merger of LGUs to create a province city. 2000) when the law had not yet been published. exclusive of specific funds. YES. should be the reckoning point in determining the 120-day period within which to conduct the plebiscite. (c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund. that is. the creation of the City of Sorsogon. While the same provision allows a law or ordinance to fix "another date" for conducting a plebiscite.A. 1. Section 10. there is only one subject embraced in the title of the law. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. and non-recurring income. it could only schedule the plebiscite after the Act took effect."  Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous. Thus. No. which date. according to the COMELEC. The phrase "A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city" is not a criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city may be created. citing the landmark case of Tañada vs. transfers. municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria established by the Code.Mabelle O.  Petitioner contends that R. it is the necessary means by which the City of Sorsogon was created. 2000  the plebiscite shall be conducted within 120 days from the date of the effectivity of the law. 2000 plebiscite was well within the 120-day period from the effectivity of the law on September 1." cannot be said to exclude the incidental effect of abolishing the two municipalities. not from the date of its approval (August 16. WON it violates the “one bill one subject” rule.  Contrary to petitioner's assertion.  Consequently. the publication of the law was completed on September 1. natural and inevitable consequence of the merger. 1. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical. 8806 actually embraces two principal subjects which are: (1) the creation of the City of Sorsogon. Thus. the December 16. not from its approval. provided that such merger or division shall comply with the requirements prescribed by the Code. the word "approval" in Section 54 of R. and (2) the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon. This construction is in accord with the fundamental rule that all provisions of the laws relating to the same subject should be 13 . No. quoted earlier and which petitioner cited in support of his posture. nor can it be considered to have deprived the public of fair information on this consequence.

X-Commissioner [exhibit for petitioner]." Candijay will not only engulf the entire barrio of Pagahat. Even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendant. Neither plan shows where Looc-Tabasan. courts have no choice but to dismiss the complaints/petitions." The respondent Court. the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of defendant's claim. because. Auditor General (supra. the court will find for the defendant. . Lomislis Island. that the challenged Decision "does not solve the problem of both towns but throws them back again to their controversy.Alicia’s purported lack of juridical personality. In such cases. after weighing and considering the import of certain official acts. neither side could establish its cause of action and prevail with the evidence it had. it included portions of Barrios Putlongcam and La Hacienda within the jurisdiction of Candijay when said barrios are undisputedly part of Alicia’s territory under EO265 creating the latter" 3. 3. as a result of having been created under a void executive order  Candijay commenced its collateral attack on the juridical personality of Alicia some thirty five years after it first came into existence in 1949. but also of the barrios of Putlongcam. Neither do they show that Barrio Pagahat forms part of plaintiff-appellant Municipality of Candijay. we find that the issues of fact in this case had been adequately passed upon by respondent Court in its Decision. Tagtang Canlirong. part of Barrio Cagongcagong and portions of Barrio Putlongcam and La Hacienda and all of Barrio Mahayag and Barrio del Monte within the territorial jurisdiction of Candijay. and a part of the Municipality of Mabini. including EO. Candijay will eat up a big chunk of territories far exceeding her territorial jurisdiction under the law creating her. 2. CA : 1. Del Monte. and Act 968 of the Philippine Commission dated October 31. 265 dated September 16. The determination of equiponderance of evidence by the respondent Court involves the appreciation of evidence by the latter tribunal. . in effect. . Trial court erred in relying on Exh.  Neither party was able to make out a case." 4. CA: there is an equiponderance of evidence When the scale shall stand upon an equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence which shall incline it to one side or the other. petitioner claims. As a consequence thereof. After an examination of the respective survey plans of petitioner and respondent submitted as exhibits. there has been no such showing.14) Municipality of Candijay v. Mahayag. WON the CA erred in its application of the principle of "equiponderance of evidence". mentioned in the aforequoted boundary line declared by the Provincial Board of Bohol. for having based its ruling against petitioner on documentary evidence which. It appears that."  With respect to the first and second grounds. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests read together and reconciled to avoid inconsistency or repugnancy to established jurisprudence Pelaez v. are void. Court rejected the boundary line being claimed by petitioner since it would in effect place "practically all of Barrio Pagahat . The RTC ruled in favor of Candijay. here. after presentation of its evidence. Under said principle. CA Facts: The Municipalities of Alicia and Candijay were in dispute over barrio/barangay Pagahat. concluded that "Barrio Bulawan from where barrio Pagahat originated is not mentioned as one of the barrios constituted as part of defendant-appellant Municipality of Alicia. 1949 (which created the municipality of Alicia from out of certain barrios of the municipality of Mabini). 2. are actually located. Candijay asked the trial court to bar Alicia from presenting its evidence on the ground that it had no juridical 14 . there is no preponderance of evidence on his side if such evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action Issues: 1.Mabelle O. which will not be reviewed by this Court unless shown to be whimsical or capricious. court: "both plans are inadequate insofar as identifying the monuments of the boundary line between Candijay and the Municipality of Mabini (which is not a party to this case) as declared by the Provincial Board of Bohol. the courts can only leave them as they are. 1903 (which set forth the respective component territories of the municipalities of Mabini and Candijay). Cagongcagong. which is well-supported by the evidence on record. see p.

per this Court's ruling in Pelaez vs. and was therefore declared unconstitutional. Created in 1959 by virtue of EO 353. even if made. on 24 December 1965. EO 174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after having surpassed the income requirement. and therefore had been in existence for all of sixteen years when Pelaez vs. if not in fact attaining. the Municipal district. that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the executive order. subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights.  Municipality of San Narciso. Candijay contended that EO 265 issued by is null and void ab initio. On the contrary. the Municipality of San Andres has been considered to be one of the twelve (12) municipalities composing the Third District of the province of Quezon.  Alicia's situation in the instant case is strikingly similar to that of the municipality of San Andres. And various governmental acts throughout the years all indicate the State's recognition and acknowledgment of the existence thereof. The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Quezon vs. Pelaez vs. 3. Mendez. inasmuch as Sec 68 of the RAC. or ten years ahead of the municipality of San Andres. the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for more than six years when."  No pretension of unconstitutionality per se of Section 442 (d) of the LGC is proffered." are validly accepted in this jurisdiction. It is doubtful whether such a pretext. All considered. Sr: EO 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years. Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986) apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives. as if existing laws have been complied with.Mabelle O. appended to the 1987 Constitution. the Municipality of Alicia was covered by the 7th 15 . Auditor General. constituted an undue delegation of legislative powers to the President of the Philippines. Congress did just that when it has incorporated Section 442 (d) in the Code. certain governmental acts all pointed to the State's recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality of San Andres: 1. which in essence are retrospective. 2. Alicia was created by virtue of EO 265 in 1949. Section 442 (d) of the LGC to the effect that municipal districts "organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. Under AO 33. or on 05 June 1989. the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon must now be conceded. Granting that EO 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. began and continued to exercise the powers and authority of a duly created LGU. In the meantime. that of a de facto municipal corporation. the Municipality of San Andres had been covered by the 10th Municipal Circuit Court of San Francisco-San Andres for the province of Quezon. would succeed. under AO 33 above-mentioned.  For instance. the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating. and aimed at giving "validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws. Auditor General was promulgated. Auditor General was promulgated. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests personality. The ruling could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of EO 353 but it was not to be the case. Curative laws. and later the Municipality of San Andres. on which said EO was based. 4. Conventional wisdom cannot allow it to be otherwise.

Mabelle O. changing the status of Santiago from an ICC to a component city. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 8528 because it does not provide for submitting the law for ratification by the people of Santiago City in a proper plebiscite. YES. for said breach of right  Case at bar=justiciable. Four years later. The Plebiscite Board of Canvassers declared the rejection and disapproval of the independent Municipality of TNL. hence reinstating the Paredes ruling is untenable. and should henceforth be considered as a regular. 2. WON petitioners have standing.e.. division. Old law: “political unit or units” New law: “political units” The deletion of the words “unit or” does not affect the Tan ruling. de jure municipality. WON the change involved any creation. YES. Padilla seeks to set aside the plebiscite and prays that a new plebiscite be undertaken because the previous one was a complete failure and the results obtained were invalid and illegal because the plebiscite should have been conducted only in the political units affected. Other petitioners are residents and voters of Santiago. under the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution. abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUs involve a common denominator — material change in the political and economic rights of the Vilas v.  Rule: constitutionality of law can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement  Miranda was mayor when he filed the petition. RA 8528 which amended RA 7720 was enacted. Gov. WON petition involves a political question. COMELEC (supra. not legality. it should likewise benefit from the effects of Sec 442 (d) of the LGC.  Political units directly affected: residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof = units which would participate in the plebiscite. to the exclusion of the remaining areas of the mother unit. and a remedy granted and sanctioned by law. WON laws passed by Congress comply with the requirements of the Consti pose questions that this court alone can decide. COMELEC Facts: A plebiscite in the matter of the creation of the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa was held in the municipality of Labo pursuant to RA 7155 and the Constitution.  Concom debates: Davide asked for deletion of “unit or” because the plebiscite is to be conducted in all units affected.  PQ: concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom. 1. RA 7720 converting the municipality of Santiago to an independent component city was signed into law and thereafter ratified in a plebiscite. see p. division. YES. an act or omission violative of such right. WON petitioners have right to a plebiscite is a legal question. Issues: 1. Aguirre Facts: In 1994. the Municipality of Alicia is one of twenty municipalities comprising the Third District of Bohol.  Padilla’s contention that the Tan ruling has been superseded by the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. the 12 barangays comprising TNL.8) Miranda v. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Municipal Circuit Court of Alicia-Mabini for the province of Bohol. Only 2890 favored its creation while 339 voted against it. his rights would have been greatly affected. Likewise. i.  A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal that the creation. merger. legally demandable and enforceable.3) Padilla v.  Justiciable issue: implies a given right. Issue: WON the plebiscite conducted is valid. 1. City of Manila (supra. Tan v. of a particular measure. WON a plebiscite is necessary considering the change was a mere reclassification from ICC to CC. 16 . see p. merger. NO.  Inasmuch as respondent municipality of Alicia is similarly situated as the municipality of San Andres. abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries. YES.

dividing. Art X addressed the undesirable practice in the past whereby LGUs were created. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests LGUs directly affected as well as the people therein. a plebiscite was held where the people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. Thus. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14. The plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the effectivity of the law or ordinance prescribing such action.  When RA 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago City from a municipality to an independent component city. the consent of the people of the LGU directly affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism to any exercise of legislative power creating. There is more reason to consult the people when a law substantially diminishes their right. It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires the approval of the people "in the political units directly affected. it required the approval of its people thru a plebiscite called for the purpose. abolished. abolishing." By virtue of these results. – Taxes that will be collected by the city will now have to be shared with the province. • The independence of the city as a political unit will be diminished: – The city mayor will be placed under the administrative supervision of the provincial governor. YES. abolition. Abalos Facts: Prior to the enactment of RA 7675 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong) the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. Art 6. merging or altering the boundaries of LGUs. conversion. so long as they result in a material change in the LGU directly affected. unless said law or ordinance fixes another date.  The rules cover all conversions. paragraph (f) (1) of the IRRs of the LGC is in accord with the Constitution when it provides that no creation. invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong. RA 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect. merged or divided on the basis of the vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the people. This plebiscite requirement is also in accord with the philosophy of the Constitution granting more autonomy to LGUs. merger. Consti: Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.  Sec.  Rule II. 1. whether upward or downward in character. RA 7675 contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule. Petitioners. 18. Tobias v. 26(1).  The changes that will result from the downgrading of the city of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city are many and cannot be characterized as insubstantial. Pursuant to the LGC. come before the court to assail the constitutionality of RA 7675. – The resolutions and ordinances of the city council of Santiago will have to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabela. There is neither rhyme nor reason why this plebiscite should not be called to determine the will of the people of Santiago City when RA 8528 downgrades the status of their city. or substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUS shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the LGU or LGUs affected. Issue: WON RA 7675 unconstitutional. division. It is one instance where the people in their sovereign capacity decide on a matter that affects them — direct democracy of the people as opposed to democracy thru people's representatives.41% of the voting population.  Petitioners: inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject law resulted in the latter embracing two principal subjects: (1) the conversion of 17 ."  Sec 10.911 voted "no.621 voted "yes" whereas 7. Nevertheless. especially a change in the political and economic rights of its people.Mabelle O.

 Such does not suffice to strike down the validity of RA 7675. unless otherwise fixed by law. 7675. The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members. who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces. WON the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law resulting in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI. including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative     18 . It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject. 5(1) of the Constitution.. or each province. The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators." The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be increased. and those who. The said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes. language of such precision as to mirror. the statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand indubitably ordains compliance with the "one city-one representative" proviso in the Constitution: Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand. Section 26(1) "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. Sec. the persons interested in the subject of the bill and the public. 5(1).  Limit of 250 members is not absolute. the increase in congressional representation mandated by RA 7675 is not unconstitutional. as provided by law. Sumulong v. and (2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts. "unless otherwise provided by law. cities. the title of R. WON the division was made pursuant to a census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements.A.A. shall be elected through a party list system of registered national. Comelec: the constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article VI. scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation" 1." Lidasan v. it is in compliance with the aforestated constitutional mandate that the creation of a separate congressional district for the City of Mandaluyong is decreed under Article VIII.000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative districts.  Sec.  Petitioners: there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250. No. and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein.Mabelle O. Therefore. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. Comelec: Of course. Section 49 of R. NO. regional and sectoral parties or organizations. Hence. "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong. Constitution). No. and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants. shall have at least one representative" (Article VI. 1. 7675. Verily. of the nature. if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members. Section 5(3).

consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation. certainly the assailed ordinance would 1. including Section 49 thereof.  Petitioners: Section 49 of RA 7675 preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts  argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong.  Sec. deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law. No. as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety."  US v. At any rate. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong. NO. improve the morals.  The contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof. WON a municipality may rely on its police power to justify the enactment of the assailed ordinance. It is a general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general welfare clause must be reasonable. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself. 5(4): Within three years following the return of every census. peace. 2.  Police power granted to municipal corporations: "General power of council to enact ordinances and make regulations. attaches itself to the main trunk of municipal authority. peace.A. against public policy.  As correctly observed by the Solicitor General. and for the protection of property therein. and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State. Thus. good order.The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations. NO. improve the morals. Rep. comfort. is the incumbent representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district. Petitioners are business owners who had been previously issued licenses by the Municipal Mayor of Bocaue Issues: 1.  If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited. WON the subject law has resulted in "gerrymandering. an act of the legislature. 1. the author of the assailed law. Dela 19 . 1. WON the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on R. Salaveria: The general welfare clause has two branches: 1.. Paras Facts: Ordinance 84 was passed by the Municipality of Bocaue. and relates to such ordinances and regulations as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law. partial. The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary thereto.  US v.It authorizes such ordinances as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety. NO. Zamora's constituency has in fact been diminished. good order. comfort. it should be noted that Rep. WON Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts. or is unreasonable. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests districts. promote the prosperity. which development could hardly be considered as favorable to him.Mabelle O. it is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws. the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section. having consistently won in both localities. and for the protection of property therein. not repugnant to law. promote the prosperity. Abendan: An ordinance enacted by virtue of police power is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law. discriminating or in derogation of a common right. Cruz v. Ronaldo Zamora. and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof." which is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party.

ordering the full cessation of the operation of its plant located at Guyong. MR: RTC issued an order (a) setting aside the order which granted a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. however. bars. . such competence extending to all "the great public needs. CA: certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction. Maria. occupation or calling. . or enterprise. RTC: action for certiorari. cockpits. saloons. it sent its representatives to the office of the mayor to secure the same but were not entertained. consonance with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations. In compliance with said undertaking. They may be regulated. the first section was amended to include not merely "the power to regulate. Technology Developers v. there was in this instance a clear invasion of personal or property rights. remained the same and the exact wording was followed. In due course the petition was denied for lack of merit. b) Mayor's permit. personal in the case of those individuals desirous of patronizing those night clubs and property in terms of the investments made and salaries to be earned by those therein employed." in the language of the Administrative Code. thus effectively causing the stoppage of its operation. respondent acting mayor ordered the Municipality's station commander to padlock the premises of petitioner's plant. Judge issued of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. 1. promote the prosperity. 1954. cabarets." and to interdict any calling. Closure order was issued in grave abuse of discretion. Sta." The title. maintenance and operation of night clubs. The letter likewise requested its plant manager to bring with him to the office of the mayor the following: a) Building permit. mandamus with preliminary injunction.  The authority of the local executive to protect the community from pollution is the center of this controversy. petitioner commenced to secure "Region III-Department of Environmental and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit. WON a municipality has no authority to prohibit a lawful business. **reasonableness. On April 6. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests pass the test of validity. Bulacan. occupation. pavilions. until further order. bowling alleys. The power granted remains that of regulation. . and other similar places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction: . dancing schools. without previous and reasonable notice upon petitioner. TD's attention having been called to its lack of mayor's permit. improve the morals.  It is clear that in the guise of a police regulation. Issue: WON the appellate court committed a grave abuse of discretion in rendering its question decision and resolution. . 1989. but likewise "prohibit . and (b) dissolving the writ consequently issued. NO. There is thus support for the view advanced by petitioners that to construe RA 938 as allowing the prohibition of the operation of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional question. CA Facts: TD received a letter from acting mayor Cruz. NO.  RA 938: the municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall have the power to regulate by ordinance the establishment.  There is a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory power "to provide for the health and safety. prohibition.Mabelle O." although among the permits previously secured prior to the operation of petitioner's plant was a "Temporary Permit to Operate Air Pollution Installation" issued by the then National Pollution Control Commission (now Environmental Management Bureau) and is now at a stage where the Environmental Management Bureau is trying to determine the correct kind of anti-pollution devise to be installed as part of petitioner's request for the renewal of its permit. Then on May 21. but not prevented from carrying on their business. billiard pools. MR: denied. c) Region IIIPollution of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit. consistency with the laws or policy of the State.  It is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of might clubs. not prohibition.  The following circumstances militate against the maintenance of the writ of preliminary injunction sought by petitioner: 20 .

Bulacan. 1988. directed to the Provincial Governor through channels. to condemn the dilapidated structures located at 1271 to 1277 Pedro Gil St. from the deleterious effect of the pollution of the environment. Notices of condemnation were issued. and by virture of his police power. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then National Pollution Control Commission on December 15. it must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution.  TD: huge investment. Maria. 1988 observed that the fumes emitted by the plant of petitioner goes directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air pollution device has been installed.. Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or validate its permit much less to install any device to control the pollution and prevent any hazard to the health of the residents of the community. the permit was good only up to May 25. 5. 3. Molas. Maria. 2. 1987. Inc. a private practitioner. Three months after the notices of condemnation were issued. Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the municipality of Sta.Mabelle O. 21 . Paco. Civil Engineer Romulo C. 4. Molas.. No mayor's permit had been secured. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was made by Marivic Guina who in her report of December 8. Manila. Sta. 6. now the Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. all occupied by petitioners. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests 1. Chua Huat v. he stated that although the buildings are old. he may deny the application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise close the same unless appropriate measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of the community from the emissions in the operation of the business. CA Facts: Manuel Uy and Sons. stating that the subject buildings were found to be in dangerous condition and therefore condemned. In his evaluation report. The Acting Mayor." so that petitioner was ordered to stop its operation until further orders and it was required to bring its permits (see facts) This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents of Barangay Guyong. The orders were based on the inspection reports made by Architect Oscar D. petitioners formally protested against said notices of condemnation on the ground that the buildings are still in good physical condition and are structurally sound based on the abovementioned certification of Civil Engineer Romulo C. inspected the abovementioned structures upon the request of petitioners herein. While it is true that the matter of determining whether there is a pollution of the environment that requires control if not prohibition of the operation of a business is essentially addressed to the then National Pollution Control Commission of the Ministry of Human Settlements. which all showed that the subject buildings suffer from structural deterioration by more than 50% and as much as 80%. 1989.1987. requested the City Engineer and Building Official of Manila. in a letter of February 16. Andres and the Memorandum-Reports made by the Evaluation Committee of the Office of the City Engineer. they are still structurally sound and have a remaining economic life of at least eight years. called the attention of petitioner to the pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant whose offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the locality but also affect the health of the residents in the area. SC: such is concomitant with the need to promote investment and contribute to the growth of the economy is the equally essential imperative of protecting the health. nay the very lives of the people. subject to the confirmation of the Mayor as required by Section 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila. and 1553 to 1557 Paz St. but instead presented a building permit issued by an official of Makati on March 6.

fraud or error of law. and (b) that there is no appeal. as estimated by the city engineer. It alleges that the condemnation orders were not immediately executory.D. he may condemn the same and shall immediately 22 . board or office exercising judicial function acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction. they shall be removed. was informed of the issuance by the City Engineer of the demolition order with respect to the building located at 1565 Paz St. who is at the same time the Building Official (Sec. whose decision is final.Mabelle O.D. They alleged a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and that there is no other plain.  SEC. and adequate remedy. and (e) administrative decisions falling within the executive jurisdiction cannot be set aside by courts of justice except on proof of grave abuse of discretion. 1096. speedy. NO. praying that a restraining order or preliminary injunction be issued enjoining respondents from proceeding with the announced demolition of the subject buildings. respondents be prohibited from demolishing said buildings. the finding or declaration of the Building Official and ask that a reinspection or re-investigation of the building or structure be made. under Section 5. against City Mayor Ramon Bagatsing. petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Petitioners failed to show the presence of both elements. Condemnation Proceedings. the owner of a building may appeal to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. 275. provide: "SEC. All buildings or parts of buildings which show defects in any essential parts shall be repaired and put in safe condition at once. (d) the power to condemn and remove buildings and structures is an exercise of the police power granted the City of Manila to promote public safety. City Mayor and City Engineer: petition should be dismissed on the following grounds: (a) that it involves questions of facts which should be ventilated before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. unreasonable and deserves no consideration as petitioners have not exhausted readily-available administrative remedies and that the validity of the questioned condemnation and demolition orders entails questions of facts not entertainable in this petition. The Mayor confirmed the rest of the condemnation orders issued by the respondent City Engineer. It is explicitly clear from Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court that for certiorari to be available: (a) a tribunal. Moreover. No... or with grave abuse of discretion. with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order. Deterioration and Defects. for not availing of this remedy. P. Inc: petition is premature. (c) the power to condemn buildings and structures in the City of Manila falls within the exclusive domain of the City Engineer pursuant to Sections 275 and 276 of its Compilation of Ordinances (also Revised Ordinances 1600). On 2 May 1983. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests On 26 April 1983. Manila. Issue: WON the mayor and city engineer committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the condemnation orders.  The power to condemn buildings and structures in the City of Manila falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the City Engineer. and was told to vacate the premises within 15 days from notice. and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Whenever in the judgment of the City Engineer any building or portion of building has been damaged by any cause to such an extent as to be dangerous for use. (b) the subject buildings were condemned and ordered removed after it was established that they had suffered from defects or deterioration thereby posing perils to the lives and limbs not only of petitioners but also to the public in general. Paco. petitioners filed the instant Petition for Prohibition. this petition be given due course. as the finding of the City Engineer/Building Official is still subject to the approval of the Mayor per Section 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila. Rule VII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P. nor any plain. Maria Gamboa. and after hearing. 276. 206.  It is patently obvious that petitioners have no valid grievance for the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to be available to them. one of the petitioners herein.  Sections 275 and 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila (also Revised Ordinances 1600). City Engineer and Building Officer Romulo del Rosario and Manuel Uy and Sons. speedy. Inc.3. 1096). Manuel Uy and Sons. or if the deterioration be greater than fifty per centum of the value of the building.

and it must be so patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. This is also true with the respondent Mayor who can approve or deny the condemnation orders as provided in Section 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila.  It is a settled doctrine that there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction "when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. the owner may. If the owner or his agent be not willing to abide by thus order of condemnation. Within the fifteen-day period. it is unquestionable that the Building Official has the authority to order the condemnation and demolition of buildings which are found to be in a dangerous or ruinous condition. deciding the case on the evidence presented. he may make formal objection within the period of seven days following such notification.  The Mayor's act of approving the condemnation orders was likewise done in accordance with law. Should the owner or his agent not comply with the decision of the Mayor the building shall be removed at his expense and the city will proceed to recover against him for the amount expended. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests notify the owner and the Mayor of his action.1. appeal to the Secretary the finding or declaration of the Building Official and ask that a re-inspection or re-investigation of the 23 . the Building official shall order its repair. vacation or demolition depending upon the degree of danger to life. . otherwise known as the National Building Code. appeal was likewise available to petitioners. to wit: "When any building or structure is found or declared to be dangerous or ruinous. Procedure for Demolition of Buildings. . It is also clear from the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila that the Mayor has the power to confirm or deny the action taken by the Building Official with respect to the dangerous or ruinous buildings. ruinous or dangerous . This is without prejudice to further action that may be taken under the provisions of Articles 482 and 694 to 707 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. or safety. No. sanitary. The Mayor shall hear the owner or his agent and his experts and also the city engineer. such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. The protest made by petitioners was submitted only on 22 February 1983.3. validly issue the questioned condemnation and demolition orders.D. The following steps shall be observed in the abatement/demolition of buildings under this Rule: 5. 1096."  From the abovementioned provisions.5. if he so desires. 1096.Mabelle O. under the title Abatement/Demolition of Buildings.D. health. plumbing and electrical defects of up to 80%. and clearly beyond the seven days prescribed under Section 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila. Romulo M. therefore. structural. del Rosario. The Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the then Ministry of Public Works to implement P."  We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent City Engineer because the orders were made only after thorough ocular inspections were conducted by the City's Building Inspectors. There must be a finding or declaration by the Building Official that the building or structure is a nuisance. The results of the inspections were set forth in a memorandum dated 16 November 1982 where it was shown that all the buildings had architectural. or three months after the notices of condemnation were issued. the owner or his agent shall immediately proceed to remove the building within fifteen days from the date on which he was notified of such final action.  Moreover. also states the authority of the Building Official with respect to dangerous buildings.  City Engineer and Building Official. provide: "5."  Section 215 of P. If the Mayor confirms the action of the city engineer. can.

and insure the protection of property therein. as well as powers necessary and proper for governance such as to promote health and safety. of course.Mabelle O. Under this program. A valid delegation of police power may arise from express delegation. maintain peace and order. bereaved families whose gross family income does not exceed 2k/month will receive a 500php cash relief to be taken out of unappropriated available funds existing in the municipal treasury. There are. The decision of the Secretary on the appeal shall be final. COA disapproved R 60 and disallowed in audit the disbursement of funds for the 24 . the municipal secretary certified a disbursement of P400. if given the chance to correct its/his mistake or error.6. Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power. improve public morals.000 for the implementation of the Burial Assistance Program. may amend its/his decision on a given matter. Issues: 1. Based on its preliminary findings. safety. will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum. This Court has long upheld the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies because it rests on the assumption that the administrative body. exceptions to this rule. or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation. promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof.  Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. and maintain peace and order in the LGU. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests building or structure be made . and as a general rule. The program was stayed by COA Decision No. 1159. enhance prosperity. R 60 was referred to the Commission on Audit for its expected allowance in audit. those necessarily implied therefrom. municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted." Binay v. improve morals. and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health. for reasons of law. Thereafter. implementation thereof. and preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein. . and provides a system of administrative appeal.  Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law."  Certiorari will not be then because petitioners failed to exhaust all the administrative remedies. or reconsideration. the courts. .5. WON R 60 is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause. Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review. comfort and convenience. Domingo Facts: Resolution 60 confirming the ongoing burial assistance program initiated by the mayor’s office. The Metro Manila Commission approved Resolution 60. and statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people. comity and convenience."  Sec 7 of BP 337: every LGU shall exercise the powers expressly granted. YES. but none is available to petitioners. board or officer.

and illimitable of powers. morals. and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health. and. Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. Ibid) social justice (Section 10."  Police power of a municipal corporation: broad. safety. Paupers may be reasonably classified. but not to exceed. morals. Constitution). and has been said to be commensurate with. II.Mabelle O. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good. It is the most essential. Ibid) as well as human dignity and respect for human rights. Thus. general welfare. (Section 11. Different groups may receive varying treatment. peace.  COA: there is no perceptible connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained under R 60 and the alleged public safety. and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. down to our local councilors. The municipal officials contend that petitioner's warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance 13. housing the urban poor. greatest and most powerful attribute of the government. and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death. but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity.  There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers as subject of legislation."  The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. of the inhabitants of Makati . etc. elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions. good order or safety and general welfare of the people. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests  Police power: power to prescribe regulations to promote the health. of the inhabitants of Makati  Apparently. insistent.  The resolution is a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards social justice. health. it is not limited thereto. etc. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life. security. general welfare. Elena against the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside Tatel’s warehouse. Ibid. Art. education. etc. emancipating the tenantfarmer from the bondage of the soil. the promotion of the general welfare (Section 5. Resolution No. though not complete. while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace. Precious to the hearts of our legislators." Tatel v. Tatel contends 25 . Resolution 291 was enacted by the Municipal Council of Virac declaring Tatel’s warehouse a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the Civil Code and directing the petitioner to remove and transfer said warehouse to a more suitable place within two months from receipt of the said resolution. it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power. and. prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism. The loss of a member of a family is a painful experience.  COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. It covers a wide scope of subjects. in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. and general welfare of the community. is the welfare of the paupers. Thus. It extends to all the great public needs. COA tries to re-define the scope of police power by circumscribing its exercise to "public safety. statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled. comfort. OSG: "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services (Section 9. should have more in law. Municipality of Virac Facts: Based on complaints received by the residents of barrio Sta.

Zamboanga del Sur with an area of 5. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests that said ordinance is unconstitutional. Tamin v. Sr. or in 1958. comfort and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof. there can be no better policy than what has been conceived by the municipal government. what is regulated by the ordinance is the construction of warehouses wherein inflammable materials are stored where such warehouses are located at a distance of 200 meters from a block of houses and not the construction per se of a warehouse. As far as public policy is concerned. the municipality leased an Area of 1. and for the protection of property therein. Issue: 1.  In spite of its fractured syntax. however refused to pay the rentals as well as vacate the area.  These principles require that a municipal ordinance (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with public policy. improve the morals.Mabelle O. as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety. peace. and (6) must not be unreasonable. NO  Ordinance 13. despite the national government’s allotment for the construction of a municipal gymnasium within the public plaza. the appropriation for the construction of the gymnasium might be reverted back to the national government which would result to "irreparable damage.  Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause under the Administrative Code. Dumingag. injury and prejudice" to the municipality and its people who are expected to derive benefit from the accomplishment of the project. Real.  The objections interposed by the petitioner to the validity of the ordinance have not been substantiated.894 square meters more or less. that the parcel of land was reserved for public plaza under PP 365 and that the incumbency of the late Mayor Isidoro E.350 square meters to M&R subject to the condition that they should vacate the place in case it is needed for public purposes. it is the owner of a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion. 13 is unconstitutional. good order. Its purpose is well within the objectives of sound government. it must not only be within the corporate powers of the municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law. WON Ordinance No. and instead of filing an answer. Ordinance 13 meets these criteria.  For an ordinance to be valid. CA Facts: The municipality of Dumingag file d a case for the ejectment of Medina and Rosellon. According to the municipality. The purpose is to avoid the loss of life and property in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligation of the government. not repugnant to law. the 26 . that the defendants religiously paid the rentals until 1967. was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. contrary to the due process and equal protection clause of the Constitution and null and void for not having been passed in accordance with law. It is a settled principle of law that municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with the police powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. RTC: Judge Tamin issued an order setting the preliminary hearing for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of possession. No undue restraint is placed upon the petitioner or for anybody to engage in trade but merely a prohibition from storing inflammable products in the warehouse because of the danger of fire to the lives and properties of the people residing in the vicinity. M&R. Hence. such construction which was already started could not continue because of the presence of the buildings constructed by the defendants. promote the prosperity. which reads: The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations. According to the municipality.

and. The municipality implemented the writ of possession and ancillary writ of demolition issued by the petitioner Judge resulting in the dispossession of the private respondents from the parcel of land and the demolition of structures and buildings thereon owned by the respondents." According to Tamin. since the complaint is for illegal detainer which is within the original jurisdiction of the municipal court and the pendency of a cadastral case between the parties over the ownership of the same parcel of land. The appellate court pointed out that under this rule: (i) There is clear statutory authority for the taking of possession by the government and (ii) The authority is premised on the government depositing the value of the land to be taken. CA: RTC committed an error when it applied by analogy the rule on eminent domain to justify the issuance of the writ of possession and writ of demolition. A public nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons. there is neither statutory authority for the trial court's action nor bond given to compensate the petitioners for the deprivation of their possession and the destruction of their houses if it turns out that the land belongs to them. This action is. the Statute of Fraud does not apply. CC A nuisance is any act. CC Nuisance is either public or private. the private respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the CA questioning the orders of the petitioner Judge. Issue: 1. omission. that a case is pending before the Cadastral court between respondent Medina and petitioner municipality as regards the ownership of the subject parcel of land. an accion de reivindicacion. In the case at bar. For this reason. the necessity of a writ of possession is greater in the instant case considering that the parcel of land is covered by a PP and the on-going construction thereon is being endangered to be left unfinished on account of the buildings standing on the parcel of land because the appropriation for the construction might be reverted back to the national treasury. 695. M&R filed an omnibus MR with motion to set aside order and to quash writ of possession and demolition but this was denied. condition of property or anything else which: (5) Hinders or impairs the use of property. that the other respondent Fortunata Rosellon leased from Medina a portion of the parcel of land. For the fact is that petitioners claim ownership of the land in question and until that question is resolved either in the case pending before the respondent judge or in the cadastral proceeding. 27 . 694. Tamin denied the MTD and granted the municipality's motion for a writ of possession "with the ancillary writ of demolition to place in possession the plaintiff on the land subject of this case. occupied and possess by respondent Vicente Medina since 1947 when he bought the subject parcel from a Subanan native. Tamin justified his granting the motion for a writ of possession with the ancillary writ of demolition by applying the rule an eminent domain in analogy in that under this Rule the complainant is given the right to the writ of possession in order that public construction and projects will not be delayed. Before the petitioner Judge could further act on the case.  Applying these criteria. 1968 recognized "private rights". therefore the Cadastral court has no jurisdiction over the land involved in this case. it would be unjust to deprive petitioners of its possession. Petition was given due course and a TRO was issued enjoining the petitioner Judge from proceeding with the hearing of the case and from enforcing the orders. withdrawing this land from sale of settlement and reserving the same for school site purposes under the administration of the Director of Public School and public plaza under the administration of the Municipality of Dumingag.Mabelle O. business. The land subject of this case is covered by PD 365. WON the allegations in the complaint constitute a cause of action for abatement of public nuisance under Article 694 of the Civil Code. establishment. As the complaint is for recovery of ownership of the land not to enforce the contract. we think the trial courts order is arbitrary and void. that the respondents were never lessees of the petitioner municipality. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests respondents filed an MTD alleging the lack of jurisdiction of the TC. a real action within the jurisdiction of this court. therefore.  Art. to the end that the public construction thereon will not be jeopardized. the municipality alleges that M&R are claiming ownership over the land which was previously rented to them.  Art. although the extent of the annoyance. M&R’s answer: The parcel of land has been owned. that Proclamation 365 issued on March 15. According to him. we agree with the petitioners that the complaint alleges factual circumstances of a complaint for abatement of public nuisance.

869-870) where the Supreme Court declared: There is absolutely no question that the town plaza cannot be used for the construction of market stalls. 2040 and the said resolution of the municipal council of San Fernando that respondent Macalino was seeking to enforce when he ordered the demolition of the stalls constructed in the disputed area. the municipal council of San Fernando had already adopted Resolution No.Mabelle O. Blg. (Sec. and that such structures constitute a nuisance subject to abatement according to law. conformably to the aforementioned orders from the court and the council. that the private respondents refused to vacate the premises despite demands. specially of residences. not correct to say that he had acted without authority or taken the law into his hands in issuing his order. to be devoted to public use and to be made available to the public in general. or (3) Abatement. They are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or even leased by the municipality to private parties.  A public plaza is outside the commerce of man and constructions thereon can be abated summarily by the municipality. As officer-in-charge of the office of the mayor. we rule that petitioners had no right in the first place to occupy the disputed premises and cannot insist in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease contracts. the complaint states: that petitioner municipality is the owner of a parcel of land covered by Presidential Proclamation No 365 which is reserved for a public plaza. considering that even before Civil Case No. WON the municipality is entitled to a writ of possession and a writ of demolition even before the trial of the case starts. without judicial proceedings. or(2) A civil action. declaring this area as the parking place and public plaza of the municipality. It chose to file a civil action for the recovery of possession of the parcel of land occupied by the private respondents. petitioner municipality was aware that under the then LGC (B. therefore. 2040 was decided. Town plazas are properties of public dominion. series of 1964. citing a case: Exactly in point is Espiritu v. 1. that the private respondents by virtue of a contract of lease entered into by the former mayor occupied a portion of the parcel of land constructing buildings thereon. the petitioners now contend that the Judge was justified in issuing the writ of possession and writ of demolition.  It is the decision in Civil Case No. They should have realized and accepted this earlier.  Article 699 of the Civil Code provides for the following remedies against a public nuisance: (1) A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance..  On the premise that the parcel of land forms part of a public plaza. he had the duty to clear the area and restore it to its intended use as a parking place and public plaza of the municipality of San Fernando. . 28 . It is. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio. 29. and that the appropriations are in danger of being reverted to the national treasury because the construction had to be stopped in view of the refusal of the private respondents to vacate the area. (102 Phil.  The petitioner municipality had three remedies from which to select its cause of action. 337) the Sangguniang Bayan has to first pass an ordinance before the municipality may summarily abate a public nuisance.  Thus.  Applying this well-settled doctrine.P. that the municipality is constructing a municipal gymnasium in the area financed by appropriations provided by the national government. Obviously. 149(z) (ee).

PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR. 365 dated March 15. Province of Zamboanga del Sur. to wit: BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES PROCLAMATION NO. do hereby withdraw from sale or settlement and under the administration of the Director of Public Schools administration of the Municipal Government of Dumingag. certain parcels of land of the public domain situated in the Municipality of Dumingag.  Under the cadastral system. therefore. subject to private rights. 22593] Government of the Philippine Islands v. Island of Mindanao. the government through the Director of Lands initiates the proceedings by filing a petition in court after which all owners or claimants are compelled to act and present their answers otherwise they lose their right to their own property. MARCOS.¦  It is to be noted that even before the Proclamation. One of the claimants in the cadastral proceedings is private respondent Vicente Medina who traced his ownership over the subject parcel of land as far back as 1947 when he allegedly bought the same from a Subanan native. not only did the municipality avoid the use of abatement without judicial proceedings. In fact.  However. the parcel of land was the subject of cadastral proceedings before another branch of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur. 1968 recognizes private rights which may have been vested on other persons. ISLAND OF MINDANAO. 365 were still pending. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests  The Court observes that even without such investigatiom and recommendation. but the status of the subject parcel of land has yet to be decided. PUBLIC PLAZA AND PLAYGROUND PURPOSES CERTAIN PARCELS OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF DUMINGAG. 120 [1920])  Considering therefore. 39 Phil.  We have to consider the fact that Proclamation No. to wit: The 29 . the respondent mayor was justified in ordering the area cleared on the strength alone of its status as a public plaza as declared by the judicial and legislative authorities. 365 RESERVING FOR SCHOOL SITE.  If. the allegations in the complaint are true and that the parcel of land being occupied by the private respondents is indeed a public plaza. the outcome of said proceedings becomes a prejudicial question which must be addressed in the resolution of the instant case. 41 Phil. . Abural. Osorio (158 SCRA 674 [1988]). under such circumstances. It is a proceeding in rem somewhat akin to a judicial inquiry and investigation leading to a judicial decree.Mabelle O. if any there be.  Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me by law. PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES. there would have been no need for a writ of possession in favor of the petitioner municipality since the private respondents' occupation over the subject parcel of land can not be recognized by any law. A writ of demolition would have been sufficient to eject the private respondents. 996 [1919]. the cadastral proceedings intended to settle the ownership over the questioned portion of the parcel of land under Proclamation No. (Director of Lands v." (Section 1 Cadastral Act [No. At the time of the filing of the instant case. We apply by analogy the ruling in the case of Quiambao v. Roman Archbishop of Manila. then the writ of possession and writ of demolition would have been justified. The purpose is to serve the public interests by requiring that the titles to any lands "be settled and adjudicated. I FERDINAND E. the nature and purpose of the Cadastral proceedings.

there is no prejudicial question to speak of. logic and pragmatism. however. and [b] the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. then private respondent's right of possession is lost and so would their right to eject petitioner from said portion.  A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.. Whether or not private respondents can continue to exercise their right of possession is but a necessary. suspended by the cancellation by the Land Authority of the Agreement to Sell executed in their favor.  The actions involved in the case at bar being respectively civil and administrative in character. Indeed. if not jurisprudence. for there is power inherent in every court to control the 30 . 4863) The doctrine of prejudicial question comes as in to play generally in a situation where civil and criminal actions are pending and the issues involved in bath cases are similar or so closely-related that an issue must be preemptively resolved in the civil case before the criminal action can proceed. Aragon. it is obvious that technically. 1 Am Jur 2d tells us: The court in which an action is pending may. Thus. 10. stemming from the fact that the right of private respondents to eject petitioner from the disputed portion depends primarily on the resolution of the pending administrative case. such right of possession had been terminated. effort in what may turn out to be a sheer exercise in futility.G. the existence it a prejudicial question in a civil case is alleged in the criminal case to cause the suspension of the latter pending final determination of the former. If the cancellation of the agreement.  Faced with these distinct possibilities. Thus. is the intimate correlation between said two [2] proceedings. hold the action in abeyance to abide the outcome of another pending in another court. People v. (Zapanta v. To allow the parties to undergo trial notwithstanding the possibility of petitioner's right of possession being upheld in the pending administrative case is to needlessly require not only the parties but the court as well to expend time. especially where the parties and the issues are the same. the more prudent course for the trial court to have taken is to hold the ejectment proceedings in abeyance until after a determination of the administrative case. 4 SCRA 510 [1962]. Equally apparent. Montesa. 50 O. to Sell and the subsequent award to petitioner are voided. dictate such move.Mabelle O. For while it may be true that private respondents had prior possession of the lot in question. Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court area: [a] the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal action. in the exercise of a sound discretion.  The essential elements of a prejudicial question as provided under Section 5. at the time of the institution of the ejectment case. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests instant controversy boils down to the sole question of whether or not the administrative case between the private parties involving the lot subject matter of the ejectment case constitutes a prejudicial question which would operate as a bar to said ejectment case. No. upon proper application for a stay of that action. logical consequence of the issue involved in the pending administrative case assailing the validity of the cancellation of the Agreement to Sell and the subsequent award of the disputed portion to petitioner. or at the very least.

we have to consider the fact that the cadastral proceedings will ultimately settle the real owner/s of the disputed parcel of land. private respondents filed on September 6. 1096) and provided that they shall be established not less than 50 meters from any residential structures. Upon prior approval and certification of zoning compliance by Zoning Administrator issued on February 10. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests disposition of causes an its dockets with economy of time and effort for itself. 22 of the Real 31 . the existence in the instant case of the same considerations of identity of parties and issues. churches and other institutional buildings. 1988 a case for the declaration of nullity of a building permit with preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction and/or restraining order with the trial court. WON the CA erred in concluding that the Tepoot building adjacent to petitioner's funeral parlor is residential simply because it was allegedly declared as such for taxation purposes.  A tax declaration is not conclusive of the nature of the property for zoning purposes. Not only that. . and for litigants. Agdao. Consequently. 870254 in favor of petitioner for the construction of a funeral parlor in the name and style of Metropolitan Funeral Parlor at Cabaguio Avenue. Davao City. . Issue: 1. YES. series of 1982 otherwise known as the "Expanded Zoning Ordinance of Davao City. justifies the rule's analogous application to the case at bar." Section 8 of which states: Sec.  Technically. Patalinhug v. 363.D. CA Facts: The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance 363.  While this rule is properly applicable to instances involving two [2] court actions. petitioner continued to construct his funeral parlor which was finished on November 3. for counsel. for under Sec. the counsels and the parties as well as the need to resolve the parties' right of possession before the ejectment case may be properly determined." Notwithstanding the findings of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. . economy of time and effort for the court. A property may have been declared by its owner as residential for real estate taxation purposes but it may well be within a commercial zone.Mabelle O. petitioner commenced the construction of his funeral parlor. owned by Wilfred G. in complete disregard of Ordinance 363 declaring the subject area as dominantly for commercial and compatible industrial uses. A discrepancy may thus exist in the determination of the nature of property for real estate taxation purposes vis-a-vis the determination of a property for zoning purposes. a tax declaration does not bind a provincial/city assessor. 8. Acting on the complaint of several residents of Barangay Agdao. a tax declaration only enables the assessor to identify the same for assessment levels. In fact. Davao City that the construction of petitioner's funeral parlor violated Ordinance No. . since it was allegedly situated within a 50-meter radius from the Iglesia ni Kristo Chapel and several residential structures. In case respondent Vicente Medina is adjudged the real owner of the parcel of land. 1987 Building Permit No. However. the Sangguniang Panlungsod conducted an investigation and found that "the nearest residential structure. a prejudicial question shall not rise in the instant case since the two actions involved are both civil in nature.  Even if we are to examine the evidentiary value of a tax declaration under the Real Property Tax Code. Where the rights of parties in the record action cannot be properly determined until the questions raised in the first action are settled the second action should be stayed. then the writ of possession and writ of demolition would necessarily be null and void. 1987. Thereafter.1 Funeral Parlors/Memorial Homes with adequate off street parking space (see parking standards of P. USE REGULATIONS IN C-2 DISTRICTS (Shaded light red in the Expanded Zoning Map) AC-2 District shall be dominantly for commercial and compatible industrial uses as provided hereunder: 3. The demolition of the constructions in the parcel of land would prove truly unjust to the private respondents. Tepoot is only 8 inches to the south.

32 . with property. s-88 of the Sangguniang Bayan.Mabelle O. 8 is inapplicable. was still a residential zone. which had "allowed/tolerated/abetted" the construction of shanties and market stalls while charging market fees and market entrance fees from the occupants and users of the area. s-88.  The declaration of the said area as a commercial zone thru a municipal ordinance is an exercise of police power to promote the good order and general welfare of the people in the locality. Tepoot's building is commercial and. even if Tepoot's building was declared for taxation purposes as residential. The Court did not issue the preliminary reliefs prayed for. as such.  Respondent: as the local chief executive. on March 7." which is based on a taxpayer's declaration. therefore. In 1987. GBDC is a domestic corporation owned and controlled by the Camacho family. deny or revoke municipal licenses and permits. They contended that Resolution No. 12. 1. the revocation of petitioner's permit was not tainted with any grave abuse of discretion. Banzon. appraisal and assessment are based on the actual use irrespective of "any previous assessment or taxpayer's valuation thereon. where the funeral parlor was constructed. Consequently. v. Corollary thereto. Issue: WON the Mayor may issue. While the commercial character of the questioned vicinity has been declared thru the ordinance. Mayor Melanio S. GBDC asserted that the executive order and the resolution in question were quasijudicial acts and not mere exercises of police power. private respondents have failed to present convincing arguments to substantiate their claim that Cabaguio Avenue. GBDC filed the instant petition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction or restraining order aimed at the reinstatement of the Mayor's permit and the curtailment of the municipality's collection of market fees and market entrance fees. which donated to the Municipality of Balanga the present site of the Balanga Public Market. Municipality of Balanga Facts: This case involves a parcel of land situated in Barrio San Jose. and with business and occupations." Pursuant to said Resolution. 1988. The lot in dispute lies behind the Balanga Public Market. issued Executive Order No. The ordinance which regulates the location of funeral homes has been adopted as part of comprehensive zoning plans for the orderly development of the area covered thereunder. the basis of Executive Order No. In fact. It is registered in the name of petitioner Greater Balanga Development Corporation. Unquestionably. the operation of a funeral parlor constitutes a "commercial purpose. It questioned respondents' failure to observe due process in revoking the permit and challenged the legality of the collection of the market and entrance fees by the municipality. s-88 revoking the permit insofar as it authorized the operation of a public market. once a local government has reclassified an area as commercial. Municipality of Balanga. in order to promote the general welfare. 1. was a legitimate exercise of local legislative authority and. On the same day. Sec. deny or revoke municipal licenses and permits. granting petitioner the privilege of a "real estate dealer/privately-owned public market operator" under the trade name of Balanga Public Market. issued Mayor's Permit No.  The trial court's determination that Mr. However. It discovered that certain portions of the property had been "unlawfully usurped and invaded" by the Municipality of Balanga. the rights of the individual may be subordinated. Mayor Banzon. is strengthened by the fact that the Sangguniang Panlungsod has declared the questioned area as commercial or C-2. GBDC then applied with the Office of the Mayor of Balanga for a business permit to engage in business in the said area. that determination for zoning purposes must prevail. may interfere with personal liberty. the Mayor may issue. Jr." as gleaned from Ordinance 363. Province of Bataan. 12. 2729. Greater Balanga Development Corp. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Estate Tax Code. the Sangguniang Bayan of Balanga passed Resolution No. s-88 annulling the Mayor's permit issued to petitioner and advising the Mayor to revoke the permit "to operate a public market.  Persons may be subjected to certain kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the state and to this fundamental aim of government. the state. a piece of land declared by a taxpayer as residential may be assessed by the provincial or city assessor as commercial because its actual use is commercial. GBDC conducted a relocation survey of the area.

petitioner appeared to be the true owner of Lot 261-B-6-A-3 when respondents revoked its permit to engaged in business on its own land. Good faith is always presumed. Entry of judgment was likewise. upon a violation of existing ordinance regulating business establishments or any provisions of this article. because of a false statement in the application form cannot be justified under the aforementioned provision. and (2) failed to apply for two separate permits for the two lines of business it proposed to engage in. he shall secure a separate permit for each business and pay the corresponding fee imposed in this article. residence and citizenship of (sic) the applicant's full description of the business.Mabelle O. the Municipal Mayor may revoke the permit and the applicant may be prosecuted and penalized in accordance with the pertinent provisions of penal laws. in effect close the establishment. 1984 (Rollo. Revoking the permit. in addition to the fine and imprisonment that they (sic) may be imposed by the court for violation of this article  Respondents claim that petitioner (1) deliberately made a false statement in the application form when it failed to provide the information that their place of business is the subject of adverse claims.  In case a person desires to conduct the same kind or line of business in another place within the Municipality. A close scrutiny of the records reveals that the Sangguniang Bayan did not establish or maintain any public market on the subject lot. the particular place where (sic) the same shall be conducted. one as real estate dealer and another as public market operator. 1988. Petitioner was able to survey the land and have the survey approved on March 21. 324). — The Municipal Mayor may revoke a permit. There must be proof of willful misrepresentation and deliberate intent to make a false statement. notwithstanding the fact that he may conduct or operate all distinct business (sic). p. When the Mayor's permit was revoked on February 19. the landowner cannot be deprived of its right over the land. and on January 11. The resolution merely mentioned the plan to acquire the lot for expansion of the public market adjacent thereto. It is only in the Mayor's permit itself that petitioner's lines of business appear. trades or occupation in one place only  (h) Revocation of Permit. profession. however. 1988. for all intents and purposes. five years had already elapsed since the case was decided. No. petitioner obtained in its name TCT No. and as it happened. Petitioner left this entry bank in its application form (Rollo. 33 . occupation and/or calling privileges" is being applied for. pp. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests  The authority of the Mayor to revoke a permit he issued is premised on a violation by the grantee of any of the conditions for which the permit had been granted.R. Neither was petitioner's applying for two businesses in one permit a ground for revocation. If the applicant deliberately makes a false statement in the application form. made in the same year. this still does not justify the revocation of the Mayor's permit.  The question of ownership over Lot 261-B had already been settled with finality by the Supreme Court in 1983 in G. which in this case are two separate types.  Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue Code reads: (b) The application for a Mayor's permit shall state the name.  The application for Mayor's permit in the case at bench requires the applicant to state what type of "business". 120152 "without any memorandum of encumbrance or encumbrances pertaining to any decision rendered in any civil case" Clearly. 3803 and the Transfer Certificate of Title of petitioner is spurious.  Assuming arguendo that Lot 261-B-6-A-3 was actually one of those awarded to the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. petitioner did not make any false statement in the pertinent entry. in addition to or aside from the establishment specified in his permit. Respondents claimed that petitioner had violated the provisions of Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue Code when it failed to inform the Mayor that the lot in controversy was the subject of adverse claims for which a civil case was filed.  The permit should not have been issued without the required information given in the application form itself. and such other pertinent information and date (sic) as any (sic) be required. Until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court. he shall pay the fee imposed on each separate business. 62223. 15-16). If a person desires to engage in more than one kind or line of business.

Third. While the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. buying. and Felipe Ongonion. buying. gathering. Further. possessing. Blg. gathering. 33 which prohibited the catching. and Section 468 (a) (1) (vi). selling and shipping of live marine coral dwelling organisms. without any distinction whether it was caught or gathered through lawful fishing method. They likewise maintained that there was no violation of due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Office Order No. Teocenes Midello. the Ordinances deprived them of due process of law. selling and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms was also enacted. Second. Section 458 (a) (1) (vi). within its territory remain healthy for the future generation. gathering. such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing under Section 447 (a) (1) (vi). As to the former. the Ordinance took away the right of petitioners-fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways. covered only live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms which were enumerated in the ordinance and excluded other kinds of live marine aquatic organisms not dwelling in coral reefs. Indeed. i. They claimed that in the exercise of such powers. a substantial distinction existed between a fisherman who catches live fish with the intention of selling it live. Socrates Facts: Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance No. After all. and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade. had a lawful purpose and employed reasonable means. 337. depriving all the fishermen of the whole province of Palawan and the City of Puerto Princesa of their only means of livelihood and the petitioners Airline Shippers Association of Palawan and other marine merchants from performing their lawful occupation and trade. Petitioners Alfredo Tano. uncertainty. where fish dwells [sic]. possession. possessing. the stallholders and traders were doing business on property not belonging to the Municipal government. the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue permit. Ordinance No. Angel de Mesa. as the Ordinance No. The petitioners filed this action claiming that first. Baldomero Tano. undoubtedly. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests  Of course.e. Eulogio Tremocha. and shipment of love marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for a period of 5 years in and coming from Palawan waters. 149 [1] [r]). 15-92 which banned the shimpment of live fisha and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from 01 Jan 1993-1998. Governor Socrates and Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan defended the validity of Ordinance No. of the LGC. The respondents implemented the said ordinances. the Province of Palawan had the right and responsibilty to insure that the remaining coral reefs.P. buying.2 as a valid exercise of the Provincial Government power under the general welfare clause (Section 16 of the LGC of 1991 [hereafter. besides the prohibition was for only five (5) years to protect and preserve the pristine coral and allow those damaged to regenerate. 143 SCRA 480 [1986]).. 23 contained no regulation nor condition under which the Mayor’s permit could be granted or denied. as Ordinance No. and a fisherman who catches live fish with no intention at all of selling it live. LGC]). the claim that the executive order and resolution were measures "designed to promote peace and order and protect the general welfare of the people of Balanga" is too amorphous and convenient an excuse to justify respondents' acts (Villacorta v. and its specific power to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment. public hearings were conducted before the enactment of the Ordinance which. in other words. Provincial Government of Palawan enacted Resolution No. 34 . in violation of Section 2. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is null and void. Sec. Tano v. were charged criminally on the basis of the ordinances. selling. 2 Ordinance Prohibiting the catching.Mabelle O. they further asserted. then there is no legal basis for it to impose and collect market fees and market entrance fees. the Sangguniang Bayan has the duty in the exercise of its police powers to regulate any business subject to municipal license fees and prescribe the conditions under which a municipal license already issued may be revoked (B. Bernardo. 2 altogether prohibited the catching. Jr. Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution. The Ordinance. their livelihood.  In view of the undisputed fact that the respondent Municipality is not the owner of Lot 261-B-6-A-3. the former uses sodium cyanide while the latter does not. But the "anxiety. Only the owner has the right to do so. the Ordinance applied equally to all those belonging to one class. Finally. while as to the latter. restiveness" among the stallholders and traders cannot be a valid ground for revoking the permit of petitioner. the criminal cases based thereon against petitioners Tano and the others have to be dismissed.

Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests There are actually two sets of petitioners in this case. pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2. Section 131(p) of the LGC (R. they should be construed in their general and ordinary sense.  Since the Constitution does not specifically provide a definition of the terms "subsistence" or "marginal" fishermen.A. fees or charges therefor. 7160) defines a marginal farmer or fisherman as "an individual engaged in subsistence farming or fishing which shall be limited to the sale." The LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters and impose rentals. No. but of their protection. by appropriate ordinances. development and utilization . Moreover. The so-called "preferential right" of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute. they would be adversely affected by the ordinances. marine resources belong to the State. to penalize. inter alia. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the LGU concerned. but also for the generations to come. Issue: their enjoyment may be guaranteed not only for the present generation.. . with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers. What the provision merely recognizes is that the State may allow. or of ecological imbalance. A marginal fisherman is an individual engaged in fishing whose margin of return or reward in his harvest of fish as measured by existing price levels is barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the cost of gathering the fish. .Mabelle O. development and conservation.  1." Devolution refers to the act by which the National Government confers  1. the use of explosives. by law. any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower LGU. barter or exchange of agricultural or marine products produced by himself and his immediate family. . and such other activities which result in pollution. lakes. Section 5(c) of the LGC explicitly mandates that the general welfare provisions of the LGC "shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to the LGUs in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people of the community. the sangguniang bayan. while a subsistence fisherman is one whose catch yields but the irreducible minimum for his livelihood. Article XII of the Constitution. noxious or poisonous substances. trial and determination of the criminal cases until the constitutionality or legality of the Ordinances they allegedly violated shall have been resolved. acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes. and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishery laws. Further. the sangguniang panlungsod and the sangguniang panlalawigan are directed to enact ordinances for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants. which shall include. As hereafter shown. muro-ami." Finally. they are entitled to the protection of the State as enshrined in Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution. The petitioners claim that as subsistence or marginal fishermen.  Anent Section 7 of Article XIII. and. Indispensable to decentralization is devolution and the LGC expressly provides that "[a]ny provision on a power of a LGU shall be liberally interpreted in its favor." Whether the ordinances in question are unconstitutional? NO. Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen." It bears repeating that nothing in the record supports a finding that any petitioner falls within these definitions. In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine. Whether petitioners are subsistence or marginal fishermen? NO. ordinances that "[p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing . . The primary interest of the first set of petitioners is to prevent the prosecution.  Besides. but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation's marine wealth. and other deleterious methods of fishing. electricity. the centerpiece of LGC is the system of decentralization as expressly mandated by the Constitution. and in case of doubt. the ordinances in question are meant precisely to protect and conserve our marine resources to the end that   35 . shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The second set of petitioners merely claim that they being fishermen or marine merchants. it speaks not only of the use of communal marine and fishing resources. their "exploration. cooperative fish farming. bays and lagoons.

fees or charges therefor.A. under the general welfare clause of the LGC. to enact ordinances to enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology. which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power. acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological imbalance. approved on 19 June 1992. It is clear to the Court that the Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes: (1) to establish a "closed season" for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five years. 458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi). and impose rentals. to penalize. it is incorrect to say that the challenged Ordinance of the City of Puerto Princesa is invalid or unenforceable because it was not approved by the Secretary of the DENR. LGUs have the power. ." The devolution of such power has been expressly confirmed in the Memorandum of Agreement of 5 April 1994 between the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Interior and Local Government. It likewise specifically vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters. 7611. the use of explosives. and the sangguniang panlalawigan the duty to enact ordinances to "[p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing . The realization of the second objective clearly falls within both the general welfare clause of the LGC and the express mandate to cities and provinces to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment. No. Parenthetically. inter alia. electricity.       36 . 1015. Finally. However. . the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests power and authority upon the various LGUs to perform specific functions and responsibilities. If at all. it imposes upon the sangguniang bayan.D. and under Sections 149.Mabelle O. the requirement of approval by the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture (not DENR) of municipal ordinances affecting fishing and fisheries in municipal waters has been dispensed with in view of the following reason: (1) As discussed earlier. The accomplishment of the first objective is well within the devolved power to enforce fishery laws in municipal waters. the sangguniang panlungsod. Therefore. otherwise known as the Strategic Environmental Plan (SEP) for Palawan Act. No. and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishery laws. the approval that should be sought would be that of the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture. and other deleterious methods of fishing. 447(a) (1) (vi). In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to LGUs under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause). and (2) to protect the coral in the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities. noxious or poisonous substances. such as P. and such other activities which result in pollution. This statute adopts a "comprehensive framework for the sustainable development of Palawan compatible with protecting and enhancing the natural resources and endangered environment of the province". muro-ami. by appropriate ordinances. we wish to add that these Ordinances find full support under R. which allows the establishment of "closed seasons.

Mabelle O. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests 37 .

Mabelle O. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests 38 .

it was deemed necessary. Neptune. NO. According to Bel-Air they own the streets and as such. IAC Facts: Studies were made by Mayor Yabut et al. on the feasibility of opening streets in Bel-Air calculated to alleviate traffic congestion along the public streets adjacent to Bel-Air. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Sangalang v. 39 . Zodia. Based on the studies.Mabelle O. Mercedes. Jupiter. should not be deprived of them without just compensation. Issue: WON the mayor acted arbitrarily in opening up Jupiter and Orbit streets. and Paseo de Roxas streets. Orbit. in the interest of the general public to open to traffic Amapola.

In order to foster the common good The police power of the state is a power coextensive with self-protection and it is not inaptly termed the law of overwhelming necessity. An imposition of restraint upon liberty or property 2. Fredeswindo F. thoroughfares under Section 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code. the petitioner filed on December 29. is not unrestricted license to act accordingly to one’s will. He contended that Resolution No. 158 under existing law.  Art. It declared: Pursuant to Republic Act No. is valid since it was ordered by the approving authority itself. nevertheless. could not be the subject of a barter.. Jr. Judge Graciano P. 1978. Elena S. 2 which found that the road was a public road and not a trail but just the same also upheld Resolution 158. 158 closing the old road leading to the new Capitol Building of this province to traffic and giving the owners of the properties traversed by the new road equal area as per survey by the Highway District Engineer's office from the old road adjacent to the respective remaining portion of their properties.  PASEI v. 5185. Although in this case the road was not closed by the municipality of Catanduanes but by the provincial board of Catanduanes. also in the same part of the road. the petitioner insists that Sec. a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Catanduanes for "Restoration of Public Road and/or Abatement of Nuisance. and welfare of society. BAVA has failed to show that the opening was unjustified or that the mayor acted unreasonably. Angeles S. Vargas. 158 and the deeds of exchange were invalid. the greatest of all rights.Mabelle O. Anselmo Peña. municipal authorities can close. Reyes portions of the closed road in exchange for their own respective properties. Eulogia T. Consists of: 1. Alcala." nevertheless sustained the authority of the provincial board to enact Resolution No. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests  The opening of Jupiter was warranted by the demands of the common good. Pursuant thereto. 1980. Alejandro. In 1978. 158 is not an order for the closure of the road in question but an authority to barter or exchange it with private properties.  Bill of rights: even liberty itself. as so too was the closure of the northern portion of the said road. It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort. Section 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code being very explicit on this. The act of the mayor is in the concept of police power. is with Congress and not with the provincial board. without a prior order of closure. on which was subsequently laid a new concrete road leading to the Capitol Building. while it could do so. in terms of traffic decongestion and public convenience. 40 . 2246 is not applicable because Resolution No. while holding that the land in question was not a declared public road but a mere "passageway" or "short-cut. CA Facts: The Provincial Board of Catanduanes adopted Resolution No. In the case at bar. converted it into a piggery farm. 701: summary abatement may be carried out by the mayor himself Cabrera v. the provincial government of Catanduanes could close the road only if the persons prejudiced thereby were indemnified. the closure. In a decision dated November 21. Drilon: Police Power: state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. 1 Appeal was taken to the respondent court. subject to the approval or direction of the Provincial Board. Control over public roads. Latorre. He maintains that the public road was owned by the province in its governmental capacity and. part of the northern end of the old road fronting the petitioner's house was planted to vegetables in 1977 by Eulogia Alejandro.  There is not merit in BAVA’s claims that the demolition of the gates at Orbit and Jupiter amounts to deprivation of property without due process of law or expropriation without just compensation. it may not be done arbitrarily or unreasonably." He alleged that the land fronting his house was a public road owned by the Province of Catanduanes in its governmental capacity and therefore beyond the commerce of man. It is subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number. The same is upheld in the case of Orbit street.  However. who had bought Angeles Vargas's share. Burden of showing that it is unjustified lies on aggrieved party. Learning about Resolution 158. There is no taking involved in this case. Bagadiong. he insists. Gayapa. Baldomero Tolentino. Annulment of Resolutions and Documents with Damages. and Juan S. However. Deeds of Exchange were executed under which the Province of Catanduanes conveyed to Remedios R. safety. Before us now.

it would seem to us. v. Issue: WON the provincial board can order the closure of a road and use/ convey it for other purposes. 5185." Favis: The general rule is that one whose property does not abut on the closed section of a street has no right to compensation for the closing or vacation of the street."  Favis vs. or square. which provides: "Property of public dominion. The circumstances in some cases may be such as to give a right to damages to a property owner. shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State. absent a plain case of abuse or fraud or collusion. — With the prior authorization of the Department Head. Authority to close thoroughfare. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests The petitioner alleges that the closure of the road has especially injured him and his family as they can no longer use it in going to the national road leading to the old capitol building but must instead pass through a small passageway. reaching beyond plaintiff's house. the CA ruled that the he "was prejudiced by the closure of the road which formerly fronted his house. It sustained the subsequent sale of the land as being in accordance not only with the charter but also with Article 422 of the Civil Code. Faithfulness to the public trust will be presumed.  Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the municipality might be lawfully used or conveyed. City of Hinton : The Constitution does not undertake to guarantee to a property owner the public     41 . The provincial board has. 2246. The city council. when no longer intended for public use or for public service. These are acts well within the ambit of the power to close a city street. Inc. YES. Such power to vacate a street or alley is discretionary. shall be closed without indemnifying any person prejudiced thereby. from those sustained by the public generally. The lower court found the petitioner's allegation of injury and prejudice to be without basis because he had "easy access anyway to the national road. So the fact that some private interests may be served incidentally will not invalidate the vacation ordinance. alley. but no such way or place aforesaid or any part thereof. if he still has reasonable access to the general system of streets. street. he is entitled to damages in accordance with law. City of Baguio: appellant may not challenge the city council's act of withdrawing a strip of Lapu-Lapu Street at its dead end from public use and converting the remainder thereof into an alley. is the authority competent to determine whether or not a certain property is still necessary for public use. for in fact the vehicles used by the Court and the parties during the ocular inspection easily passed and used it. Bercilles: closure of a city street is within the powers of the city council under the Revised Charter of Cebu City. That such actions shall be subject to approval or direction by the Provincial Board: (a) Authority to close thoroughfare under Section 2246. The following actions by municipal officials or municipal councils.Mabelle O. While it is true that the above cases dealt with city councils and not the provincial board. and not merely in degree.  Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. the duty of maintaining such roads for the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants of the province. No. But to warrant recovery in any such case the property owner must show that the situation is such that he has sustained special damages differing in kind. Sec.A. Richmond v. as provided for in the pertinent sections of the Revised Administrative Code shall take effect without the need of approval or direction from any official of the national government: Provided. And the discretion will not ordinarily be controlled or interfered with by the courts. 5185 in relation to Section 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code: R.." However. even though his property does not abut on the closed section. a municipal council may close any municipal road.  The authority of the provincial board to close that road and use or convey it for other purposes is derived from the following provisions of Republic Act No. For such inconvenience. park. Moreover. after all. He and his family were undoubtedly inconvenienced by the loss of access to their place of residence for which we believe they should be compensated. there is no reason for not applying the doctrine announced therein to the provincial board in connection with the closure of provincial roads. Section 11 (II) (a): II. this authority is inferable from the grant by the national legislature of the funds to the Province of Catanduanes for the construction of provincial roads.

thereto. is the price he and others like him must pay for the welfare of the entire community. Jr. Asistio Facts: MMC Ordinance No. plus the fact that the new road adds beauty and color not only to the town of Virac but also to the whole province of Catanduanes. as found by the trial court in Civil Case No. This principle was supported by City of Manila vs. 79-02 was enacted by the Metropolitan Manila Commission. (2) Found that Heroes del '96. Followed up but to no avail. Upon application of vendors. stallowners filed an action for prohibition against the City of Caloocan. written or oral. This is not a case where his property has been expropriated and he is entitled to just compensation. the Caloocan City mayor opened up seven (7) flea markets in that city. the Manila Mayors did not have the authority to give permits. including the petitioner. Hence. outside the commerce of man. Jr. is null and void. the city authorities abandon a portion of the street to which his property is not immediately adjacent. but he must content himself with such route for outlet as the regularly constituted public authority may deem most compatible with the public welfare. if ever. 79-02 expressly provides that the use of certain streets as flee markets are subject to the approval of the Metropolitan Manila Commission. LC: PI Granted. (3) Opined that the officials have the right to demolish the subject stalls of the plaintiffs. straight to the veterans fountain and down to the pier. However. such as it is. subsequent to his acquisition. the City Government. this case. it may not be the subject of lease or other contract. he does so in tacit recognition of these principles. Such case is damnum absque injuria. If. One of those streets was the "Heroes del '96" where the petitioner lives. C-12921. 337. Invoking the trial court's decision in Civil Case No. has been leasing portions of the streets to them. This means that they cannot be alienated or leased or otherwise be the subject matter of contracts (Municipality of Cavite vs. The construction of the new road was undertaken under the general welfare clause. the respondents city mayor and city engineer.  There is no doubt that the disputed areas from which the private respondents' market stalls are sought to be evicted are public streets.. hence. the OIC City Mayor and the City Engineer and/or their deputies. The right of the public to use the city streets may not be bargained away through 42 .. A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of man. caused the demolition of the market stalls on Heroes del '96. The law will not permit him to be cut off from the public thoroughfares. did not pursue the latter's policy of clearing and cleaning up the city streets. as OIC city mayor of Caloocan City. Dacanay wrote a letter to Mayor Asistio. par.  As the stallholders pay fees to the City Government for the right to occupy portions of the public street. has been giving to the public. As the trial judge acutely observed. Rojas). Antonio Martinez.Mabelle O. otherwise known as the LGC. Such lease. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. designating certain city and municipal streets.  petitioner is not entitled to damages because the injury he has incurred. which is wide and concrete. and that the permits granted are therefore considered null and void. Pursuant. to the squatters. (1) Observed that MMC Ordinance No. Issue: WON public streets or thoroughfares may be leased or licensed to market stallholders by virtue of a city ordinance or resolution of the Metro Manila Commission. the city administration in Caloocan City changed hands. but the public treasury cannot be required to recompense him." For the enjoyment of those benefits. which stated that: œThe property being a public one. When he acquires city property. Such leases or licenses are null and void for being contrary to law. must be prepared to give his share Dacanay v. calling his attention to the illegally-constructed stalls on Heroes del '96 Street and asked for their demolition. To stop Mayor Martinez' efforts. City Mayor Asistio. he may suffer loss because of the inconvenience imposed. issued them licenses to conduct vending activities on said street. shortly after the LC decision came out. NO. But petition was later dismissed. Gerardo Garcia. V. Gozon and Gonzales streets are of public dominion. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests maintenance of the most convenient route to his door. Being outside the commerce of man. roads and open spaces as sites for flea markets. praying the court to issue a writ of preliminary injunction ordering these city officials to discontinue the demolition of their stalls during the pendency of the action. Gozon and Gonzales streets. contrary to law. whatever inconvenience the petitioner has suffered "pales in significance compared to the greater convenience the new road. every individual in the province. more so due to Section 185.. as successor of Mayor Martinez. C-12921.

The said ordinance was approved by the municipal council pursuant to MMC Ordinance No. On October 16. respondents municipality and Palanyag filed with the trial court a joint petition for prohibition and mandamus with damages and prayer for preliminary injunction. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets located at Baclaran. 1990. to which the petitioner filed his memorandum/opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. entered into an agreement whereby the latter shall operate. and public works for public service paid for by said provinces. the market stalls shall be dismantled. authorizing and regulating the use of certain city and/or municipal streets. Cruz and J. As to what consists of property for public use. Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea market thereon. Macasiano from enforcing his letter-order against respondent Palanyag. Issue: WON the ordinance authorizing the flea markets on public streets is valid NO. All other property possessed by any 43 . 1990. promenades. Property for public use. ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls along G. otherwise. Macasiano v. the respondent city officials are under legal obligation to protect.Mabelle O. public waters. That the use of the vending areas shall be temporary and shall be closed once the reclaimed areas are developed and donated by the Public Estate Authority. Civil Code). as arteries of travel for vehicles and pedestrians. 1990. Diokno Facts: Paranaque passed Ordinance No. under certain terms and conditions. 424. The interests of a few should not prevail over the good of the greater number in the community whose health. on October 23. 1990. Gabriel St. safety. Series of 1990 which authorized the closure of J. 86. 1990. city streets. good order and general welfare. consists of the provincial roads. General Macasiano wrote a letter to respondent Palanyag giving the latter ten (10) days to discontinue the flea market. 1990 of the municipal council of respondent municipality subject to the following conditions: 1. the trial court issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin petitioner from enforcing his letter-order of October 16. 3. That the time during which the vending area is to be used shall be clearly designated. cities or municipalities. peace. Gabriel. a service cooperative. petitioner Brig. On September 13. On October 24. market stalls were put up by respondent Palanyag on the said streets. 1990 pending the hearing on the motion for writ of preliminary injunction. the Metropolitan Manila Authority approved Ordinance No. 1990. Macasiano.G. Parañaque. cities and municipalities. in the provinces. 2. Consequently. G. On June 20. 1990. the municipal council of Parañaque issued a resolution authorizing Parañaque Mayor Walfrido N. That the aforenamed streets are not used for vehicular traffic. Cruz. Gen.. Series of 1979. petitioner Brig. Lt. Mayor Robles' Executive Order may not infringe upon the vested right of the public to use city streets for the purpose they were intended to serve: i. respondent municipality and respondent Palanyag.G. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests contract. On July 20. 1990 of the Municipality' of Parañaque and enjoining petitioner Brig. operation. 86. Gen. 423. the trial court issued an order upholding the validity of Ordinance No. roads and open spaces within Metropolitan Manila as sites for flea market and/or vending areas.  The Executive Order issued by Acting Mayor Robles authorizing the use of Heroes del '96 Street as a vending area for stallholders who were granted licenses by the city government contravenes the general law that reserves city streets and roads for public use. Article 424 of Civil Code states: Art. That the 2-meter middle road to be used as flea market/vending area shall be marked distinctly.e. and that the 2 meters on both sides of the road shall be used by pedestrians. Hence. These stalls were later returned to respondent Palanyag. On December 17. 4. maintain and manage the flea market in the aforementioned streets with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal government of Parañaque. 2. 1990. Ferrer to enter into contract with any service cooperative for the establishment. cities and municipalities is divided into property for public use and patrimonial property (Art. PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command.  The property of provinces. On August 8. and that the majority of the residents do not oppose the establishment of the flea market/vending areas thereon. fountains. maintenance and management of flea markets and/or vending areas. s. 86 s. in Baclaran. Bayanihan. the squares.

Article 424 of the Civil Code lays down the basic principle that properties of public dominion devoted to public use and made available to the public in general are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or leased by the LGU to private persons. without prejudice to the provisions of special laws. Aside from the requirement of due process. close any barangay. et al.  Respondent municipality has not shown any iota of proof that it has complied with the foregoing conditions precedent to the approval of the ordinance. in gratia argumenti. Bercilles. Cebu Oxygen.R. alley. the property then becomes patrimonial property of the LGU concerned (Article 422.  Even assuming. 44 . However. the City Council of Cebu. the City Council passes another resolution authorizing the sale of the said abandoned road through public bidding. Garcia Extension and Opena streets are local roads used for public service and are therefore considered public properties of respondent municipality. through a resolution. Closure of roads.  J. . v. The allegations of respondent municipality that the closed streets were not used for vehicular traffic and that the majority of the residents do not oppose the establishment of a flea market on said streets are unsupported by any evidence that will show that this first condition has been met. 1975. When it is already withdrawn from public use. Chapter II of Blg. park or square. which states: Sec. municipal. August 29. Bercilles. the aforestated legal provision which gives authority to LGUs to close roads and other similar public places should be read and interpreted in accordance with basic principles already established by law. et al. These basic principles have the effect of limiting such authority of the province. Gabriel G. Mabolo. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code. Such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. the same not being included in the City Development Plan. Inc. Cruz. No. We held therein that the City of Cebu is empowered to close a city street and to vacate or withdraw the same from public use. Cebu City as an abandoned road. the designation by respondents of a time schedule during which the flea market shall operate is absent. In one case. Bayanihan. 1975. street. etc.R. L--40474. G..  However. known as LGC. 337. city or provincial road. 66 SCRA 481).G. declared the terminal road of M. Chapter II of the LGC. 10..A LGU may likewise. the local government has no power to use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private persons. through its head acting pursuant to a resolution of its sangguniang and in accordance with existing law and the provisions of this Code. that respondent municipality has the authority to pass the disputed ordinance. G. Thereafter. street or park. the same cannot be validly implemented because it cannot be considered approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority due to non-compliance by respondent municipality of the conditions imposed by the former for the approval of the ordinance. A property thus withdrawn from public use may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed. those roads and streets which are available to the public in general and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are still considered public property devoted to public use. No. v. et al.Mabelle O. local governments have no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress. 66 SCRA 481). It is only then that the respondent municipality can "use or convey them for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed" in accordance with the last sentence of Section 10. which should be complied with before closing a road. No such way or place or any part of thereof shall be close without indemnifying any person prejudiced thereby.L-40474. Borces Street. the closure should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property from public use when circumstances show that such property is no longer intended or necessary for public use or public service. One such example of this authority given by Congress to the local governments is the power to close roads as provided in Section 10. city or municipality to close a public street or thoroughfare. In such case. Civil Code. Lt.. Likewise. August 29. Hence. Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress.

public waters.Mabelle O. cities and municipalities is divided into property for public use and patrimonial property. 7160 known as LGC of 1991 which took effect on January 1. the camino does not traverse. Gabriel. known as Local Government Lode. Thus. It is thus pointless to concentrate on the testimonies of both witnesses since the same have. 43 had the power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations subject to the provisions of existing laws. sidewalks.  It is beyond dispute that the establishment. 337 (The LGC).  The property of provinces. Bayanihan. involves an ordinance which is void and illegal for lack of basis and authority in laws applicable during its time. In trial. According to the Colomidas. and public works for public service paid for by the said provinces. Lt. However. Batas Pambansa Blg. become irrelevant. has already been repealed by Republic Act No. the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator of Liloan testified that according to the zoning map of Liloan. it is of public notice that the streets along Baclaran area are congested with people. but runs along the side of the Pilapils’ property Issue: WON the Municipality of Liloan has authority to close or abandon the camino vecinal. even if We are to agree with both the trial court and public respondent that Longakit and Pepito were telling the truth. We find it worthy to note that Batas Pambansa Blg. the exercise of such powers should be subservient to paramount considerations of health and well-being of the members of the community. safety and convenience. 337. cities or municipalities. 1992. repair and maintenance of municipal streets.G. The Colomidas tried to improve the camino for the public’s convenience but such was met with threats from the Pilapils. Pilapil v.  The powers of a LGU are not absolute.  Dacanay case: the general public have a legal right to demand the demolition of the illegally constructed stalls in public roads and streets and the officials of respondent municipality have the corresponding duty arising from public office to clear the city streets and restore them to their specific public purpose. CA Facts: The Colomidas own a parcel of land which has a road right of way leading to the national highway. the legislative body of the municipality. the local government should refrain from acting towards that which might prejudice or adversely affect the general welfare. The instant case as well as the Dacanay case. They are subject to limitations laid down by toe Constitution and the laws such as our Civil Code. Based on this objective. To license and allow the establishment of a flea market along J. They are governed by the same principles as property of public dominion of the same character. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests  Further. The first consists of the provincial roads. a camino vecinal leading to the national highway exists while the Pilapils deny such fact. fountains. and to provide for the construction. Moreover. bridges. 42 Under the applicable law in this case. regulate the use thereof and prohibit the construction or placing of obstacles or encroachments on 45 . The Pilapils also threatened to fence off the camino vecinal. Such road ends at the Pilapils’ land. G. the decision of the Municipality of Liloan with respect to the said camino vecinal in sitio Bahak must prevail. promenades. No private party can interfere with such a right. houses and traffic brought about by the proliferation of vendors occupying the streets. The Colomidas then filed a petition for injunction and damages with a prayer for a writ of PM or prohibitory injunction which sought to prevent the Pilapils from harassing them as well as fencing off the camino vecinal. Every LGU has the sworn obligation to enact measures that will enhance the public health. avenues. improvement. and promote the general prosperity of the inhabitants of the local units. Cruz. alleys. city streets. closure or abandonment of the camino vecinal is the sole prerogative of the Municipality of Liloan. for all intents and purposes. Section 5(d) of the new Code provides that rights and obligations existing on the date of effectivity of the new Code and arising out of contracts or any other source of prestation involving a LGU shall be governed by the original terms and conditions of the said contracts or the law in force at the time such rights were vested. The Pilapils also filed a case against the Colomidas alleging that no such camino exists on their land. parks and other public places. squares. municipal streets. YES. the Sangguniang Bayan. maintain peace and order. at this point. Garcia Extension and Opena streets in Baclaran would not help in solving the problem of congestion.

This is the proposed road leading to the national highway. and prepare municipal comprehensive plans and other development planning document. through its head acting pursuant to a resolution of its Sangguniang and in accordance with existing law and the provisions of this Code. R-20732. 5. In the first place. he could nevertheless. they were effectively deprived of access to the national highway from their property. with or without the order of the Mayor or Sangguniang Bayan. as the then Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator. therefore." The Colomidas presented no rebuttal witness to show that by the approval of the zoning map by the Sangguniang Bayan. street. Book I of said Code provided: 45 Sec. Of course.  As further declared by Engineer Jordan. 50 Thus. even after judgment. Rule 10 of the Rules of Court allows it. improved or repaired and (c) close any municipal road. The reluctance of the trial court and public respondent to give due weight to the testimony of Engineer Jordan stemmed from a doubt as to his authority to prepare the plan. Among his functions under the governing law at the time was to formulate an integrated economic. to the above powers of a LGU. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. he testified that the Sangguniang Bayan instructed him to prepare the zoning map. introduced in evidence without objection on the part of the Colomidas and evaluated by the trial court.  In the instant case. what invested the zoning map with legal effect was neither the authority of the person who ordered its preparation nor the authority of the person who actually prepared it. park or square. but failure to amend does not affect the 46 . close any barangay. but its approval by the Sangguniang Bayan. No such way or place or any part thereof shall be closed without indemnifying any person prejudiced thereby. Be that as it may. through the Sangguniang Bayan. A property thus withdrawn from public use may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed. — A LGU may likewise. the municipal roads to be constructed. Closure of roads. Secondly. (b) promulgate a zoning ordinance which may consider. — When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties. Said section reads: Sec. as if they had been raised in the pleadings. the said legislative body determined. among other things. There was nothing procedurally objectionable to this. maintained. It is also property for public use. Both courts observed that while on direct examination. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests them 44 Section 10. municipal. The unrebutted testimony of Engineer Epifanio Jordan shows that the same was approved by the Sangguniang Bayan. was relied upon. the Municipality of Liloan. approved the Urban Land Use Plan. even if he had not been instructed by anyone to prepare the map. There is also some confusion regarding the party who directed him to do so. on the contrary. Furthermore. on his own initiative and by virtue of his functions. they may argue that the zoning map was prepared for and approved by the Sangguniang Bayan after the filing of their petition in Civil Case No. the location of the camino vecinal in sitio Bahak.  A camino vecinal is a municipal road. he stated that he prepared it upon the Mayor's oral order. among others. under the applicable law. clearly a supervening event. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time. this camino vecinal in sitio Bahak "passes the side of the land of Socrates Pilapil. In short. the Municipality of Liloan had the unassailable authority to (a) prepare and adopt a land use map. they shall be treated in all respects. city or provincial road. did not affect the preparation and subsequent approval of the zoning map. physical and other development objectives and policies for the consideration and approval of the sangguniang bayan and the municipal mayor. Chapter 2. this plan was duly signed by the Municipal Mayor (Exhibit "1"). Section 5. By doing so. 48 Such inconsistency is quite trivial and hence. Title One. make one. Pursuant. had the authority to prepare the plan and admit it to the Sangguniang Bayan for approval. this preparation and approval. Engineer Jordan. 47 during crossexamination. alley. 10.Mabelle O. the latter allowed the issue raised by the supervening event to be tried. social. the mayor was both a member and the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan. The trial court and public respondent then failed to appreciate the role and function of a Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator.

public morals. ordain. not repugnant to the Constitution. The National Legislature. binds not only the Pilapils and the Colomidas. after due hearing. The solemn declarations of old people like Sesenando Longakit and Florentino Pepito cannot overturn the decision of the Municipality of Liloan. Dividing the two (2) streets is a concrete perimeter wall approximately fifteen (15) feet high.  MMDA: it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. MMDA v. Makati City. respondent was apprised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished. through its Chairman." The LGC of 1991 defines a LGU as a "body politic and corporate". CA: MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street. the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. may delegate this power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or LGUs. a national road open to the general public. Both ends of Neptune Street are guarded by iron gates. the trial court denied issuance of a preliminary injunction. 96001 for injunction. respondent received from petitioner. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. One of these basic services is traffic management which involves the regulation of the use of thoroughfares to insure the safety. From the premise that it has police power. Bel-Air Facts: BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street. 47 . public safety. Civil Case No. Respondent prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. but also the general public. reaching and justifying measures for public health. formerly Reposo Street. On January 2. The court may grant a continuance to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests result of the trial of these issues. and the general welfare. Once delegated. a private subdivision road and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. however. a national road.  A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. Issue: WON the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its regulator and police powers. a road inside Bel-Air Village. to be amended and shall do so freely when the presentation on the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth. duly proved to be an official act of the Municipality of Liloan. while its eastern end intersects Makati Avenue. On the same day. the court may allow the pleading.  It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. RTC: issued TRO. Neptune runs parallel to Kalayaan Avenue. 1995 requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2. and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws.Mabelle O. respondent instituted against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court. The western end of Neptune Street intersects Nicanor Garcia. it is now urged that there is no need for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune street to the public.  Such supervening fact. statutes and ordinances. Branch 136. Intermediate Appellate Court. and for the subjects of the same. a subdivision road open to public vehicular traffic. either with penalties or without. 1996. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance. It is alleged that the police power of MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the consolidated cases of Sangalang v. convenience and welfare of the general public. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive. 1995.  Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. 1996. It has been defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make. On December 30. a notice dated December 22. one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory.

Makati. LGUs exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies. preparation. A. the MMDA is expressly authorized "to set the policies concerning traffic" and "coordinate and regulate the implementation of all traffic management programs. city or municipality. standards and projects to rationalize the existing transport operations. programs and projects to rationalize the existing transport operations. including the institution of a single ticketing system in Metropolitan Manila. 7924 [24] in 1995. the cities of Caloocan. infrastructure requirements. traffic engineering services and traffic education programs.) No. . Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. twelve (12) cities and five (5) municipalities. Under this service. and the municipalities of Malabon. (6) health and sanitation. The LGC of 1991 empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan. coordination. and monitoring of policies. regulation. (2) transport and traffic management.."  The scope of the MMDA’s function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7) basic services." fix."  Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several LGUs ." In addition. A. the MMDA may "install and administer a single ticketing system. There is no syllable in R. urban protection and pollution control. and shelter services. It also covers the mass transport system and the institution of a system of road regulation. (4) flood control and sewerage management. the use of thoroughfares and promotion of the safe movement of persons and goods. Pasay. impose and collect fines and penalties for all traffic violations. municipalities and barangays. zoning and land use planning. infrastructure requirements. Marikina. cities. that of the municipal government is the sangguniang bayan. as the case may be]. Paranaque and Valenzuela. and promotion of safe and convenient movement of persons and goods. (3) solid waste disposal and management. Muntinlupa. 48 . With the passage of Republic Act (R." There are seven (7) basic metrowide services and the scope of these services cover the following: (1) development planning. Quezon. Las Pinas. the use of thoroughfares. standards. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power. No. management. including the institution of a single ticketing system in Metro Manila for traffic violations.e. San Juan and Taguig. One of these is transport and traffic management which includes the formulation and monitoring of policies. let alone legislative power. the administration of all traffic enforcement operations. Pateros. city municipality] provided under the Code. implementation. administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement operations. (5) urban renewal. The same Code gives the sangguniang barangay the power to "enact ordinances as may be necessary to discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law or ordinance and to promote the general welfare of the inhabitants thereon. Pasig.  "Metro-wide services" are those "services which have metrowide impact and transcend local political boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that it would not be viable for said services to be provided by the individual LGUs comprising Metro Manila. coordination. sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang bayan to "enact ordinances. and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the [province. approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the [province.i. and that of the barangay is the sangguniang barangay. Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and administrative region" and the Administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed under "a development authority" referred to as the MMDA. Mandaluyong.  Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the LGC of 1991. namely. provision for the mass transport system and the institution of a system to regulate road users. setting of policies. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests LGUs are the provinces. traffic engineering services and traffic education programs. and (7) public safety. installation of a system and administration. . monitoring.  It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation. They are also the territorial and political subdivisions of the state. Navotas. The legislative body of the provincial government is the sangguniang panlalawigan. Manila. that of the city government is the sangguniang panlungsod.Mabelle O. The basic service of transport and traffic management includes the following: "(b) Transport and traffic management which include the formulation. Unlike the legislative bodies of the LGUs.

the power to appropriate money for its operation. It was the MMC itself that possessed legislative powers. the power to impose taxes and other levies. much less police power. and the power to pass ordinances or resolutions with penal sanctions were vested exclusively in the MMC. approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. 824. Although the MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA. Under the 1987 Constitution. the two Sangalang cases do not apply to the case at bar.Mabelle O. Its power was merely to provide the LGUs technical assistance in the preparation of local development plans. It did not have legislative power." i. the MMDA is not a political unit of government. both involved zoning ordinances passed by the municipal council of Makati and the MMC. 7924 took effect. Firstly. can this be interpreted as an express or implied grant of ordinance-making power. the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA."It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies. No. 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent BAVA. people’s organizations. an examination of Presidential Decree (P. a "development authority. It also had the power to review. shows that the latter possessed greater powers which were not bestowed on the present MMDA.     49 . Any semblance of legislative power it had was confined to a "review [of] legislation proposed by the local legislative assemblies to ensure consistency among local governments and with the comprehensive development plan of Metro Manila. The MMDA is. resolutions and measures recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan were subject to the MMC’s approval. D. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances. the LGUs became primarily responsible for the governance of their respective political subdivisions. No. the charter of the MMC." Rationalizing the use of roads and thoroughfares is one of the acts that fall within the scope of transport and traffic management. however.  The MMC was the "central government" of Metro Manila for the purpose of establishing and administering programs providing services common to the area. Clearly. Moreover. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. revise or repeal all ordinances. The notice does not cite any ordinance or law. A. Petitioner MMDA simply relied on its authority under its charter "to rationalize the use of roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and convenient movement of persons.) No.A.e. and at the same time." When R. Secondly.  Contrary to petitioner’s claim. the basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street is contained in the notice of December 22." The character of the MMDA was clearly defined in the legislative debates enacting its charter. resolutions and fix penalties for violation of such ordinances and resolutions. The MMA’s jurisdiction was limited to addressing common problems involving basic services that transcended local boundaries. Whatever legislative powers the component cities and municipalities had were all subject to review and approval by the MMC. the MMC which fully possessed legislative and police powers. Metropolitan Manila became a "special development and administrative region" and the MMDA a "special development authority" whose functions were "without prejudice to the autonomy of the affected LGUs. All ordinances. through its president. the power to charge and collect fees. All its functions are administrative in nature. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests there is no provision in R. the power to appropriate money. It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a LGU or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. Metropolitan Manila had a "central government. The power delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of the MMDA’s functions. non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. amend. In the instant case. As a "central government" it had the power to levy and collect taxes and special assessments. as the legal basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street. review appropriations for the city and municipal units within its jurisdiction. resolutions and acts of any of the four (4) cities and thirteen (13) municipalities comprising Metro Manila. Thus. By no stretch of the imagination. as termed in the charter itself.. It was bestowed the power to enact or approve ordinances." and to "advise the local governments accordingly.

the MMC under P. 7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. but appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. CA: the public purpose for the expropriation is clear from R 43-89 and that since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur did not declare R 43-89 invalid. Bustillo for contempt. This emphasizes the administrative character of the MMDA. Bustillo paid the fine and manifested that he lost in the election. The incumbent Mayor Leonardo Barrios. old LGC and that the exercise of eminent domain is not one of the two acts enumerated in Section 19 thereof requiring the approval of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. It added that the duty of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is merely to review the ordinances and resolutions passed by the Sangguniang Bayan under Section 208 (1) of B. its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent CA did not err in so ruling. CA Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed R 43-89. Bustillo and transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its approval. Pet: seeks the reversal of the decision and resolution of the CA and a declaration that R 43-89 of the Municipality of Bunawan is null and void. No. Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court and that it would be in the government's best interest for public respondent to be allowed to take possession of the property. No. 1996 for the Municipality of Bunawan." Bunawan filed a petition for Eminent Domain against petitioner Percival Moday. It is the LGUs. Acting on petitioners' Omnibus Motion for Enforcement of Restraining Order and for Contempt. Court issued TRO enjoining and restraining public respondent Judge from enforcing her order and respondent municipality from using and occupying all the buildings constructed and from further constructing any building on the land subject of this petition. ordering him to pay the fine and to demolish the "blocktiendas" which were built in violation of the restraining order. RTC: granted respondent municipality's motion to take possession of the land. A. which is made of concrete. expropriation of petitioners' property could proceed. filed a Manifestation. Blg. RTC at Prosperidad. the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. A. Motion to Resolve "Urgent Motion for Immediate Dissolution of the Temporary Restraining Order" and Memorandum on June 11. the Municipality of Bunawan had erected three buildings on the subject property: the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) Hall. Unlike the MMC. acting through their respective legislative councils. the President merely exercises supervisory authority. 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA under R. part of his function is to perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by the President. 6138-Pls-4 Along the National Highway Owned by Percival Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Government Sports Facilities.P. Agusan del Sur. "Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. held that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's failure to declare the resolution invalid leaves it effective. Moday v. 7924. In the case at bar. The municipality filed a Motion to Take or Enter Upon the Possession of Subject Matter of This Case stating that it had already deposited with the municipal treasurer the necessary amount in accordance with Section 2. Article X of the Constitution. Meanwhile. the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said Resolution and returned it with the comment that "expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in Bunawan for the establishment of the government center. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests It is not even a "special metropolitan political subdivision" as contemplated in Section 11. as well as his parents before the 50 . 337.  Clearly then. The Chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected by the people." R 43-89 was approved by then Municipal Mayor Anuncio C. No. that possess legislative power and police power. the Court issued a Resolution citing incumbent municipal mayor Anuncio C. R. In fact. whereas in LGUs. both wooden structures. and the Bunawan Municipal Gymnasium. The creation of a "special metropolitan political subdivision" requires the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. D.Mabelle O. the Municipal Motorpool. MR: denied. hence. MR: denied.

the LGC 18 in force at the time expropriation proceedings were initiated. to the provincial fiscal. ordinance.Mabelle O. Blg. other public entities and public utilities. there being other municipal properties available for the purpose. or order is "beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president making the same. The action of the sangguniang panlalawigan shall be final. or order must be premised specifically upon the fact that such resolution.  The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of Municipal R 43-89 is an infirm action which does not render said resolution null and void. The effect of such an action shall be to annul the ordinance. ordinance.'" Respondent court also concluded that since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan did not declare the municipal board's resolution as invalid. Inherently possessed by the national legislature. Blg. The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution. who shall examine them promptly and inform the sangguniang panlalawigan in writing of any defect or impropriety which he may discover therein and make such comments or recommendations as shall appear to him proper. For the taking of private property by the government to be valid. or order is outside the 51 . the Court's pronouncements in Velazco v.  Section 153 of B. exercise the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose. Although pertaining to a similar provision of law but different factual milieu then obtaining. The provincial (board's) disapproval of any resolution. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Pet: contend that the CA erred in upholding the legality of the condemnation proceedings initiated by the municipality. 337. or order invalid is when such resolution. A strictly legal question is before the provincial board in its consideration of a municipal resolution. or if there be none.P. through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian. or order. the expropriation was politically motivated and R 4389 was correctly disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. resolution or executive order in question in whole or in part. grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue. resolution or executive order is beyond the power conferred upon the sangguniang bayan or the mayor. is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. ordinance. ordinance. NO. According to petitioners. because it failed to point out which and where are those available lots. CA: declared that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's reason for disapproving the resolution "could be baseless. expropriation of petitioners' property could proceed. the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments. entering its actions upon the minutes and advising the proper municipal authorities thereof. Issue: WON a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.P. Blas. ordinance. are applicable to the case at bar. the sangguniang panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit them to the provincial attorney. as expressed in Section 153 of B. (1) Within thirty days after receiving copies of approved ordinances.  Eminent domain." Absolutely no other ground is recognized by the law.  The Municipality of Bunawan's power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not disputed as it is expressly provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 337: Sangguniang Panlalawigan Review. It is government's right to appropriate. in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State. resolutions and executive orders promulgated by the municipal mayor.  What petitioners question is the lack of authority of the municipality to exercise this right since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved R 43-89. The law. 337. (2) If the sangguniang panlalawigan shall find that any municipal ordinance. resolution or executive order invalid in whole or in part. private property for public use or purpose. the taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation. the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case. where we cited significant early jurisprudence. Petitioners also pray that the former Mayor Bustillo be ordered to pay damages for insisting on the enforcement of a void municipal resolution. it shall declare such ordinance. Section 9 of said law states: A LGU may.

we find no evidentiary support for petitioners' allegations. If a provincial board passes these limits. Blg.  The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the use must be public. 23 has ruled that the necessity of exercising eminent domain must be genuine and of a public character. taking cognizance of such issues as the adequacy of compensation.  Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove Municipal R 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise the right of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate said resolution. CA Facts: The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camsur passed Resolution No. SG: under Section 9 of the LGC (B. The uncertified photocopy of the sketch plan does not conclusively prove that the municipality does own vacant land adjacent to petitioners' property suited to the purpose of the expropriation. RTC: denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Camsur to take possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court of the amount of P5. be declared null and void. Both motions were denied. pursuant to the earlier-quoted Section 9 of B. The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order and a motion to admit an amended motion to dismiss. there was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain." The accusations of political reprisal are likewise unsupported by competent evidence. They also asked that an order be issued to restrain the trial court from enforcing the writ of possession.P. 337). Perforce. 43-89 is valid and binding and could be used as lawful authority to petition for the condemnation of petitioners' property. Camarines Sur v. they allege that the municipality owns a vacant seven-hectare property adjacent to petitioners' land. however. Expressed the view that the Province of Camsur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian 52 . Issued a writ of possession.Mabelle O. the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that private respondents may suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper. Bustillo used the expropriation to retaliate by expropriating their land even if there were other properties belonging to the municipality and available for the purpose. In the questioned decision.P. The SJs failed to appear at the hearing of the motion. necessity of the taking and the public use character or the purpose of the taking. compensation must be made and due process of law must be observed. and (c) that the order denying the motion to dismiss and allowing Camsur to take possession of the property subject of the expropriation and the order denying the motion to admit the amended motion to dismiss. Camsur: claimed that it has the authority to initiate the expropriation proceedings under Sections 4 and 7 of LGC (B. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests scope of the legal powers conferred by law. Series of 1988. and thereafter to issue a writ of injunction. be set aside. the Court holds that petitioners' demand that the former municipal mayor be personally liable for damages is without basis. Camsur filed expropriation cases against the San Joaquins as well as a motion for the issuance of writ of possession. Petitioners claim that then incumbent Mayor C. 129. After a careful study of the records of the case. Specifically. respondent appellate court similarly held that the pleadings and documents on record have not pointed out any of respondent municipality's "other available properties available for the same purpose. Such has been the consistent course of executive authority. evidenced by a sketch plan. Consequently. They moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property.  Accusation of political oppression: it is alleged that Percival Moday incurred the ire of then Mayor Bustillo when he refused to support the latter's candidacy for mayor in previous elections. in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees. it follows that Resolution No.00. Blg. it usurps the legislative function of the municipal council or president. The Supreme Court. 337) and that the expropriations are for a public purpose. Government may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken.P.714. Blg. (b) that the complaints for expropriation be dismissed. CA: SJs asked: (a) that the Res. 337. authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site.

) before the taking thereof could satisfy the constitutional requirement of "public use". Reyes: Court said that there was "no need under the facts of this petition to rule on whether the public purpose is superior or inferior to another purpose or engage in a balancing of competing public interest. Ultimately. like a resort complex for tourists or housing project (Heirs of Juancho Ardano v." The Solicitor General denigrated the power to expropriate by the Province of Camsur by stressing the fact that LGUs exercise such power only by delegation. to the prior approval of the Secretary of the Agrarian Reform. It also ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after Camsur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the property of the private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land. The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a public purpose.Mabelle O.g.     53 . Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health. "Housing is a basic human need. Guerrero. Rollo. the environment and in sum the general welfare. held that the Province of Camsur must comply with the provision of Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of the SJs Issue: WON the expropriation of agricultural lands by LGUs is subject. convenience or benefit. it assumed that the resolution is valid and that the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use. as the implementator of the agrarian reform program. As held in Sumulong v. "public use" means public advantage. the livelihood of the farmers. public plazas. The housing project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of the Constitution. pp. 154 SC. particularly Section 65 thereof. fishery and the cottage industry.  Modernly. The establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the Province of Camsur. It is also true that in delegating the power to expropriate. following the recommendation of the Solicitor General.. 154 SCRA 461. Moreover. 6657). The old concept was that the condemned property must actually be used by the general public (e. which requires the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform before a parcel of land can be reclassified from an agricultural to a non-agricultural land. Guerrero. Sumulong v. CA.A. bridges. either in the law conferring the power or in other legislations. 1415. there has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of "public purpose" or "public use" for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised. 125 SCRA 220 [1983]. allowing the Province of Camsur to take possession of private respondents' lands and the order denying the admission of the amended motion to dismiss. While such delegated power may be a limited authority. fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. Camsur: its exercise of the power of eminent domain cannot be restricted by the provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R. Under the new concept. the center would make available to the community invaluable information and technology on agriculture. 128-129) Heirs of Juancho Ardana v.RA 461 [1987]). Reyes. It is true that LGUs have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature.  When the CA ordered the suspension of the proceedings until the Province of Camsur shall have obtained the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to change the classification of the lands sought to be expropriated from agricultural to non-agricultural use." it upheld the expropriation after noting that petitioners had failed to overcome the showing that the taking of 8. which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community. CA: set aside the order of the trial court. it is complete within its limits.970 square meters formed part of the resort complex. safety. pp. A fair and reasonable reading of the decision is that this Court viewed the power of expropriation as superior to the power to distribute lands under the land reform program. the legislature may retain certain control or impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof by the local governments. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project. Once operational. etc. No. (Comment. roads. the limitations on the exercise of the delegated power must be clearly expressed.

65. The closest provision of law that the CA could cite to justify the intervention of the Department of Agrarian Reform in expropriation matters is Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. which reads: Sec. through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian exercise the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government. or its political subdivisions. The fencing of said property was allegedly to enable the storage of the respondent's heavy equipment and various finished products such as large diameter steel pipes. which provides: A LGU may. Series of 1988. After the lapse of five (5) years from its award. before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. 337. manifesting the intention to expropriate the respondent's 54 . Series of 1975. such authority is limited to the  applications for reclassification submitted by the land owners or tenant beneficiaries. large diameter concrete pipes.P. Series of 1987.    Meycauayan v. headed by then Mayor Celso R. it is the legislative branch of the LGU that shall determine whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated shall be public.  The opening. upon application of the beneficiary or the landowner. units must first secure the approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use. bridge components. The Republic of the Philippines. agricultural purposes. commercial or industrial uses. In the same year. Blg. cannot be the source of the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to determine the suitability of a parcel of agricultural land for the purpose to which it would be devoted by the expropriating authority. Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by implication. passed Resolution No. There is also an ancient rule that restrictive statutes. and parts for low cost housing. Bulacan. hospitals. there is no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by LGUs to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform. bridges. Conversion of Lands. as sovereign. Legaspi. cannot be bound by provisions of law couched in general term. and harbors.Mabelle O. wharves. adverbial phrase of the provision sends signals that it applies to lands previously placed under the agrarian reform program as it speaks of "the lapse of five (5) years from its award.P. the same being an expression of legislative policy. While those rules vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural lands for residential." The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of Executive Order No. Section 9 of B. commercial or industrial purposes. pre-stressed girders and piles. when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for. do not embrace the sovereign unless the sovereign is specially mentioned as subject thereto. because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. no matter how broad their terms are. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests  Resolution No. or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential. the LGC. the Municipal Council of Meycauayan. was promulgated pursuant to Section 9 of B. In effect. 258. it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use. Likewise. as holders of delegated sovereign powers. The courts defer to such legislative determination and will intervene only when a particular undertaking has no real or substantial relation to the public use. 129-A. etc. Ordinarily. That the beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation. IAC Facts: The Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation filed with the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan. without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform. the DAR. with due notice to the affected parties. To sustain the CA would mean that the LGUs can no longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads. 129. may authorize the reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition: Provided. schools. and subject to existing laws. Blg. an application for a permit to fence a parcel of land. pontoon pipes for ports.

The petitioner itself admits that there are four such cross roads in existence. However. The appellate court held that there is no genuine necessity to expropriate the land for use as a public road as there were several other roads for the same purpose and another more appropriate lot for the proposed public road. On the basis of this report. for the purpose of expropriating anew the respondent's land. Issue: WON there is a genuine necessity to expropriate this strip of land for use as a public road. reiterated to the Office of the Mayor its petition for the approval of the permit to fence the aforesaid parcels of land. then. unlike the lot sought to be expropriated which was found by the Committee to be badly needed by the company as a site for its heavy equipment after it is fenced together with the adjoining vacant lot. Series of 1983. the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision. on February 14. The Sketch Plan clearly shows that petitioner's factory site is adjacent to Bulac Road which has a width of about seven meters.  The petitioner's purpose in expropriating the respondent's property is to convert the same into a public road which would provide a connecting link between Malhacan Road and Bulac Road in Valenzuela. Branch VI. disapproving and annulling Resolution No. which is the market value of the land. This is the very reason why petitioner filed an application with the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan. The Special Committee recommended that the Provincial Board of Bulacan disapprove or annul the resolution in question because there was no genuine necessity for the Municipality of Meycauayan to expropriate the respondent's property for use as a public road. Series of 1976. The Provincial Board of Bulacan approved the aforesaid resolution on January 25. On January 10. the trial court issued an order declaring the taking of the property as lawful and appointing the Provincial Assessor of Bulacan as court commissioner who shall hold the hearing to ascertain the just compensation for the property.025. Hence.  The records. with the Philippine National Bank. now headed by Mayor Adriano D. reveals that there are other connecting links between the aforementioned roads. it appears obvious to this Special Committee that there is no genuine necessity for the Municipality of' Meycauayan to expropriate the aforesaid property of the Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation for use as a public road. the Provincial Board of Bulacan passed Resolution No. a special civil action for expropriation. 21.  The Sketch Plan clearly and conclusively shows that petitioner does not need this strip of land as a private road. Petitioner can use Bulac Road in reaching McArthur Highway on the west or in reaching the Manila North Expressway on the east for the purpose of transporting its products. Petitioner does not need to go to Malhacan Road via this so-called private road before going to McArthur Highway or to the Manila North Expressway. 1984. there would be seven. 238. Thereafter. taking into consideration the location and size of the land. Considering that in the vicinity there are other available road and vacant lot offered for sale situated similarly as the lot in question and lying Idle. more or less. the trial court on March 1. NO. also opined that the land is more Ideal for use as storage area for respondent's heavy equipment and finished products. 1984. Bulacan and thereby ease the traffic in the area of vehicles coming from MacArthur Highway. filed with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos.  From the foregoing facts. The Municipal Council of Meycauayan. the justification to condemn the same does not appear to be very imperative and necessary and would only cause unjustified damage to 55 . The respondent court stated that with the proposed road. 1984 issued a writ of possession in favor of the petitioner. nearer and more advantageous. Bulacan. 1985. MR: denied. it is beyond doubt that petitioner acquired this strip of land for the storage of its heavy equipments and various finished products and for growth and expansion and never to use it as a private road. passed Resolution No.Mabelle O. On August 27. Upon deposit of the amount of P24. PPMC.00. 258. Why should petitioner go first to Malhacan Road via this so called "private road" before going to McArthur Highway or to the Manila North Expressway when taking the Bulac Road in going to McArthur Highway or to the Manila North Expressway is more direct. of the Municipal Council of Meycauayan. the petitioner. the decision was re-examined and reversed. upon motion for reconsideration by the respondent. The court. 1984. The respondent went to the Intermediate Appellate Court on petition for review. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests parcel of land. Daez. Bulacan to fence with hollow blocks this strip of land. Series of 1975. however.

This allegation does not merit consideration absent a showing of concrete evidence attesting to it. This lot for sale and lying Idle is most Ideal for use as a public road because it is more than three (3) times wider that the said strip of land. Condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the public good and there is a genuine necessity of a public character.     Napocor v. the Court held: With due recognition then of the power of Congress to designate the particular property to be taken and how much thereof may be condemned in the exercise of the power of expropriation. however.. Or. There is no question here as to the right of the State to take private property for public use upon payment of just compensation.  It must be noted that this strip of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos. the municipality may seek to expropriate a portion of the vacant lot also in the vicinity offered for sale for a wider public road to attain decongest (sic) of traffic because as observed by the Committee. That the equal protection clause will not allow. Citing the case of J. will not suffice to improve and decongest the flow of traffic and pedestrians in the Malhacan area.. There is absolutely no showing in the petition why the more appropriate lot for the proposed road which was offered for sale has not been the subject of the petitioner's attempt to expropriate assuming there is a real need for another connecting road. the party adversely affected is the victim of partiality and prejudice.M. Respondents sought a re-evaluation. Inc. and extending also from Malhacan Road to Bulac Road and most Ideal for a public road because it is very much wider than the lot sought to be expropriated. the courts have the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine whether there is a genuine necessity therfor. it seems that it is more just. it is still a judicial question whether in the exercise of such competence. . the lot of the Corporation sought to be taken will only accommodate a one-way traffic lane and therefore.  Since there is another lot ready for sale and lying Idle. Judge increased value without hearing and directing the defendants to manifest within twenty-four (24) hours whether or not they are accepting 56 .Mabelle O.071 square meter which is adjacent and on the western side of the aforesaid strip of land and extends likewise from Bulac Road to Malhacan Road belongs also to Dr. Tuason & Co. this court further ruled that the government may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken. Bautista. There is no showing that some of the six other available cross roads have been closed or that the private roads in the subdivision may not be used for municipal purposes.. that there is no evidence on record which shows a change in the factual circumstances of the case. and reasonable if this lot is the one to be expropriated. The petitioner alleges that surely the environmental progress during the span of seven years between the first and second attempts to expropriate has brought about a change in the facts of the case. What is questioned is the existence of a genuine necessity therefor. Chinese Community of Manila: this Court held that the foundation of the right to exercise the power of eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character. De Knecht v. Land Tenure Administration (supra). The lot for sale and lying Idle with an area of 16. What is more likely is that these roads have already been turned over to the government. The desire of the Municipality of Meycauayan to build a public road to decongest the volume of traffic can be fully and better attained by acquiring the other available roads in the vicinity maybe at lesser costs without causing harm to an establishment doing legitimate business therein. Villacorta. adjacent and on the western side of the strip of land. We note.  The petitioner objects to the appellate court's findings contending that they were based on facts obtaining long before the present action to expropriate took place. Jocson Facts: The NPC filed for the acquisition of a right-of-way easement over portions of the parcels of land described in the complaints for its Negros-Panay Interconnection Project. Consequently. City of Manila v. particularly the BacolodTomonton Transmission Line. fair. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests the firm. 215165 and 37879 were acquired by petitioner from Dr. Villacorta. Provisional values were fixed on the basis of the market value and the daily opportunity profit petitioner may derive. v.

After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper officer to forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the property involved. for thereafter as the Rules expressly state. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests and withdrawing the amounts." It is very clear that it was not the intention of the 57 . No. if this be ordained. "no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard. since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. would an order of condemnation be a final one. as the case may be. et al: there are two (2) stages in every action of expropriation: The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit." This assessed value is that indicated in the tax declaration. the commissioners would be final. to be held by such treasurer subject to the orders and final disposition of the court. 45 held: The statute directs that. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before. vs. in the 1915 case of Manila Railroad Company. upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. the court has the discretion to determine the provisional value which must be deposited by the plaintiff to enable it "to take or enter upon the possession of the property. Said section reads in full as follows: Sec. in the proceedings before the Trial Court. 42 repealed the "provisions of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court and of any other existing law contrary to or inconsistent" with it. — Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real or personal property involved if he deposits with the National or Provincial Treasurer its value. Issue: WON Judge Jocson committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. this Court. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit.D. deposited by the plaintiff for each of them as "final and full satisfaction of the value of their respective property (sic). unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a depository of the Republic of the Philippines payable on demand to the National or Provincial Treasurer. " Judge declared the provisional values as the final values and directing the release of the amounts deposited. 2. are concerned. Paredes. 1592. ." The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of the "just compensation for the property sought to be taken. et al. 42 which requires the petitioner.. "an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with National or Provisional Treasurer. would be a final one." Notice to the parties is not indispensable. to the defendants even if not all of them made the manifestation. as provisionally and promptly ascertained and fixed by the court having jurisdiction of the proceedings.  However. if not of dismissal of the action. So. upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter. YES. and findings of. in the amount directed by the court to be deposited. at the very outset. for the public use or purpose described in the complaint.D. "when condemnation proceedings are brought by any railway corporation" the amount of the deposit is to be "provisionally and promptly ascertained and fixed by the court. It ends with an order. too. it repealed Section 2 of Rule 67 insofar as the determination of the provisional value. et al. representing the provisional values.Mabelle O. the form of payment and the agency with which the deposit shall be made. in full satisfaction thereof. .  It will be noted that under the aforequoted section. too. Such deposit shall be in money. after due notice to the defendant. Jose Mar Garcia. Hon. and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. and suspended the issuance of the writ of possession until after the suspending the amounts shall have been released to and received by defendants. .  Municipality of Biñan vs. No. Accordingly. "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned.  P. the petitioner has the right to take or enter upon the possession of the property involved upon compliance with P." An order of dismissal. of course. In interpreting a similar provision of Act No. to deposit with the Philippine National Bank in its main office or any of its branches or agencies." This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners.

albeit erroneously. . a much stronger reason why the respondent Court should not have issued the 12 July 1990 Order increasing the provisional values of the Gonzaga lots in Civil Cases Nos. respondent Judge either deliberately disregarded P. in Civil Case No. 42.D. The motion for reconsideration in Civil Case No. and courts should ordinarily give all such persons an opportunity to be heard if that be practicable. it was entitled to be placed in possession of the property involved in the complaints at once. he issued a new Order increasing the provisional values of the properties involved therein. As a matter of fact.  Clearly. which should not be permitted to delay the progress of the work. effectively removes the discretion of the court in determining the provisional value."  Compounding the above error and the capriciousness with which it was committed is respondent Judge's refusal to place the petitioner in possession of the property or issue the writ of possession despite the fact that the latter had likewise deposited the additional amount called for by the 12 July 1990 Order. Paredes. however. The above Order has absolutely no legal basis even as it also unjustly. After having fixed these provisional values. and will cause no delay in the prompt and provisional ascertainment of the value of the land. In effect. the Clerk of Court then had no right to receive it. and has no power to annul. 5938 is dated 11 July 1990 while the Order granting both motions was issued the next day. Instead of complying with the clear mandate of the law. petitioner deposited the provisional value fixed by the court. 42 or was totally unaware of its existence and the cases applying the same. moreover.  In any event. pursuant to both Section 2 of Rule 67 and P. 5938 and 5939. All that is needed is notice to the owner of the property sought to be condemned. Of course. oppressively and 58 . more particularly Sections 4 and 5. the motion for reconsideration filed by defendants Jesus Gonzaga. . 42. it presents no question which merits the attention and consideration of the court. therefore. What is to be deposited is an amount equivalent to the assessed value for taxation purpose. No. and after doing so. and assess the true value of the land accordingly. No. No. respondent Judge chose to ignore and overlook it. But the scope and extent of the inquiry is left wholly in the discretion of the court. "plenary control over the order fixing the amount of the deposit. As a matter of right. as was held in Manila Railroad Company vs. No hearing is required for that purpose. respondent Judge issued the 16 July 1990 Order directing the defendants to state in writing within twenty-four (24) hours whether or not they would accept and withdraw the amounts deposited by the petitioner for each of them " as final and full satisfaction of the value of their respective property (sic) affected by the expropriation" and stating at the same time that the writ will be issued after such manifestation and acceptance and receipt of the amounts. Moreover. It is not even a mere motion for it does not comply with the rules. Respondent Court had the corresponding duty to order the sheriff or any other proper officer to forthwith place the petitioner in such possession. No hearing was held on the motions. Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. there is nothing in the statute which denies the right of the judge to hear all persons claiming an interest in the land. when there would no need for the filing of the deposit. upon separate motions for reconsideration filed by the defendants in Civil Cases Nos. 5938 does not even contain a notice of hearing. that would amount to a denial of the right of possession of the lands involved until the conclusion of the proceedings.  P. who may or may not be known at the time of the entry of the order. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests legislator that before the order fixing the amount of the deposit could lawfully be entered the court should finally and definitely determine who are the true owners of the land. as the records show. 12 July 1990." The reason for this is that a contrary ruling would defeat the very purpose of the law which is to provide a speedy and summary procedure whereby the peaceable possession of the property subject of the expropriation proceedings "may be secured without the delays incident to prolonged and vexatious litigation touching the ownership and value of such lands. amend or modify it in matters of substance pending the course of the condemnation proceedings. Instead. 5938 and 5939. It is then a mere scrap of paper. give them a hearing as to its value.Mabelle O. and upon deposit by petitioner of the said amounts.D. 50  There was. et al. . in no wise effects the validity of the order. respondent Judge lost.D. and a failure to hear the owners and claimants of the land.

in the last mentioned decree. The court may also set aside the report and appoint new commissioners. pursuant to the Real Property Tax Code. This Court ruled in Export Processing Zone Authority vs. 5938. for being. et al. 5940. yet. 5941 and 5944 filed any manifestation. We declared as unconstitutional and void. after a period of ten (10) days which it must grant to the parties in order that the latter may file their objections to such report. respondent Judge declared in his Order of 18 July 1990 that the provisional amounts he fixed. whichever is lower. He thus subordinated his own judgment to that of the defendants' because he made the latter the final authority to determine such just compensation. or it may accept the report in part and reject it in part. Nos. he also ruled that the writ of possession will be issued only after the latter shall have received the said amounts. If the legislature or the executive department cannot even impose upon the court how just compensation should be determined. respondent Judge was duty bound to set in motion Section 5 of Rule 67. Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. considering that the parties submitted neither a compromise agreement as to the just compensation nor a stipulation to dispense with the appointment of commissioners and to leave the determination of just compensation to the court on the basis of certain criteria. 5939. shall be considered as the full payment of the value of the properties after the defendants in Civil Cases Nos. in the Order. it would be far more objectionable and impermissible for respondent Judge to grant the defendants in an eminent domain case such power and authority. prior to the recommendation or decision of the appropriate Government office to acquire the property. 5942 and 5943 shall have filed their manifestations.Mabelle O. when any party fails to present a defense as required in Section 3. accordingly. said section directs the court to appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to it regarding the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. 794 and 1533. It must be recalled that three (3) sets of defendants filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Section 3. and the value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property or the value as determined by the assessor. and it may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the petitioner the property essential to the exercise of its right of condemnation.  As may be gleaned from the 25 June 1990 Order. Such commissioners shall perform their duties in the manner provided for in Section 6. Section 4 of the same rule provides that the court must rule on them and in the event that it overrules the motions or. the method of ascertaining just compensation prescribed in P. respondent Judge whimsically and arbitrarily considered the so-called provisional values fixed therein as 59 . for cause shown. Dulay. and to the defendant just compensation for the property so taken. under the Constitution. impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives which tends to render the Court inutile in a matter which.  Without perhaps intending it to be so. is reserved to it for final determination. This Order and the records before this Court do not disclose that the defendants in Civil Cases Nos. and after hearing pursuant to Section 8. whichever is lower in the first three (3) decrees. the respondent Judge found that the petitioner has that right and that "there will be a (sic) paramount public interest to be served by the expropriation of the defendants' properties. but also a complete disregard by respondent Judge of the provisions of Rule 67 as to the procedure to be followed after the petitioner has deposited the provisional value of the property. later increased with respect to the properties of the Gonzagas. the court may. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests capriciously compels the petitioner to accept the respondent Judge's determination of the provisional value as the just compensation after the defendants shall have manifested their conformity thereto. inter alia.D. upon the filing of their report. 76 464." Accordingly. recommit the same to the commissioners for further report of facts. to wit: the market value as declared by the owner or administrator or such market value as determined by the assessor. 52 that the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function.  Not satisfied with the foregoing violations of law and insisting upon his own procedure. accept and render judgment in accordance therewith or. it should enter an order of condemnation declaring that the petitioner has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned. there is not only a clear case of abdication of judicial prerogative.

Mabelle O. the owner does not recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence thereof (12 C.  Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property' (Quoted in Political Law by Tanada and Carreon. the proceedings were still at that state where the provisional value was yet to be determined.  City Government of Toledo City vs. therefore.D. it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. 10 PhiL 104). maintenance and operation of private memorial type cemetery or burial ground within the jurisdiction of QC. that the Ordinance would be enforced. 1. the petitioner submitted to the discretion of the court as to the correct valuation. Section 9 of the Ordinance provides that at least 6% of the total area of a memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers & have been residents of QC for at least 5 years prior to their death. Seven years after the enactment of the Ordinance. The parties presented their documentary exhibits. Provincial Board. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. Quezon City v. just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all embracing and have transcended human 60 . Ericta Facts: QC passed an Ordinance regulating the establishment. Linsuya Fan. 623). 1957).00 per square meter as reasonable compensation for their land and the City Assessor informed the court of the current market and appraisal values of the properties in the area and the factors to be considered in the determination of such. Ill. Ichong vs. The Supreme Court has said that police power is so far-reaching in scope that it has almost become impossible to limit its sweep. It has been said that police power is the most essential of government powers. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests the final values. namely-. (2) eminent domain. liberty or property without due process of law' (Art. the parties themselves agreed to submit to a judicial determination on the matter of just compensation and that judgment be rendered based thereon. These are said to exist independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty. Hernandez. 50). The field and scope of police power have become almost boundless. 39 PhiL 660. private respondents stated that they have no objections and are in conformity with the price of P30. the most essential insistent and illimitable Especially it is so under the modern democratic framework where the demands of society and nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions. On the other hand. vs. 42 was totally negated despite compliance with the deposit requirement under the latter law. CFI declared Sec 9 null and void. Inc. This power embraces the whole system of public regulation (U.J. Fernandos. Constitution). As it derives its existence from the very existence of the state itself. V-11. et al: does not apply to the instant petition because at the pre-trial conference held therein. there are three inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the property rights. at times the most insistent. May 31. the QC Council passed a resolution requesting the City Engineer to stop any further selling of memorial parks in QC where the owners have failed to donate the required 6% cemetery space. it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope. NO. p. and the parties made no agreement on just compensation. it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes.  Restatement of certain basic principles: Occupying the forefront in the bill of rights is the provision which states that 'no person shall be deprived of life. In the instant case. In police power. If he is deprived of his property outright. no pre-trial was conducted. MR: denied Issue: WON the ordinance is authorized under QC Charter and a valid exercise of police power. so Himlayan filed a petition with the CFI seeking to annul Sec 9 of the Ordinance. the case was in fact terminated and the writ of execution then became a mere incident of an execution of a judgment. Section 1 subparagraph 1. Being coextensive with self-preservation and survival itself. By such Order. and always one of the least limitable of the powers of government (Ruby vs.7995. The City Engineer notified Himlayang Pilipino. (1) police power. In effect. The right of the petitioner to take or enter into possession of the property upon the filing of the complaint granted by Section 2 of Rule 67 and P. No.S. (3) taxation.

good order. the questioned ordinance was passed after Himlayang Pilipino. Expropriation. however.  As a matter of fact. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose. Since the Courts cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare. 1957). The sequestration of six percent of the cemetery cannot even be considered as having been impliedly acknowledged by the private respondent when it accepted the permits to commence operations. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as for instance. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health. The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537. The police power being the most active power of the government and the due process clause being the broadest station on governmental power.Mabelle O. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets. It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to homeowners. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law. requires payment of just compensation. parks. The clause has always received broad and liberal interpretation but we cannot stretch it to cover this particular taking. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests foresight. It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. they cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of the police power by which and through which the state seeks to attain or achieve public interest and welfare. and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. When the LGC. Hernandez. playgrounds. had incorporated. the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. and/or other entity or person at the rate of interest not exceeding eight per cent annum for the purpose of purchasing or expropriating homesites within their respective territorial jurisdiction and reselling them at cost to      61 . the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. (Ichong vs. not on any express provision of law as statutory basis of their exercise of power. the confiscation of an illegally possessed article. Arellano College Facts: Section 1 of Republic Act No. May 31. Moreover. in turn. City of Manila v. The necessities of public safety. or the general welfare of the people. The beneficiaries of the regulation. the conflict between this power of government and the due process clause of the Constitution is oftentimes inevitable. health. It continues to the present. Inc. the Philippine National Bank. nay. even without compensation. received necessary licenses and permits and commenced operating. such as opium and firearms. the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on implied powers of the municipal corporation. Batas Pambansa Blg. This has been the law and practise in the past. 6118. 267 authorizes cities and municipalities to contract loans from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. morals. Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. L-7995. safety.

and the extent of social and economic reform secured by the condemnation.  Guido vs. some go so far in the direction of a liberal construction as to hold that public use is synonymous with public benefit. we see no reason why a 10-. The highest court of New York State has ruled that slum clearance and erection of houses for lowincome families were public purpose for which New York City Housing authorities could exercise the power of condemnation. which seeks to condemn. No fixed line of demarcation between what taking is for public use and what is not can made. and sold to those who want to own a portion of it. 20 or 50 persons and their families does not insure to the benefit of the public to a degree sufficient to give the use public character. and this decision was followed by similar ones in other states. clothes the expropriation with public interest and public use. feudalistic practices. Rural Progress Administration: extent of the Philippine Government's power to condemn private property for resale: It has been truly said that the assertion of the right on the part of the legislature to take the property of one citizen and transfer it to another. several parcels of land having a combined area of 7. In some instances..270 square meters and situated on Legarda Street. even for a full compensation. YES. or 25-hectare farm land might not be expropriated and subdivided. and land that embraces a whole town. slumsites have been acquired by condemnation. expropriation of large estates.000 or 2. The expropriation in such cases tends to abolish economic slavery. (See below.  Although courts are not in agreement as to the tests to applied in determining whether the use is public or not. public utility. The court below ruled that this provision empowers cities to purchase but not to expropriate lands for the purpose of subdivision and resale. etc. or large section of a town or city. bears direct relation to the public welfare. and one inconsistent with every just principle and fundamental maxim of a free government. or other public advantage. If this expropriation be constitutional.  In a broad sense. we find no reason why the Rural Progress Administration could not take by condemnation an urban lot containing and area of 1. is susceptible of only meaning. to make the analogy closer. crime and waste. In     62 .Mabelle O. especially where the interest involved are of considerable magnitude. and other evils inimical to community prosperity and contentment and public peace and order. the land that is the subject of the present expropriation is only one-third of the land sought to be taken in the Guido case. for the purpose just stated. is claiming a despotic power. Issue: WON Act 267 empowers cities to expropriate as well as to purchase lands for homesites. and to authorize the exercise of the power of eminent domain to promote such public benefit. when the public interest is not promoted thereby. this case would open the gates to more oppressive expropriations. 15-. and about two-thirds of that involved in the Borja condemnation proceeding. or public advantage. the case at bar is weaker for the condemnor. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests residents of the said cities and municipalities. and so dismissed the present action.  The word "expropriating. The condemnation of a small property in behalf of 10.) The National Government may not confer its instrumentalities authority which itself may not exercise.000 square meters for subdivision into tiny lots for resale to its occupations or those who want to build thereon." taken singly or with the text. Viewed from another angle. It suffices to say for the purpose of this decision that the case under consideration is far wanting in those elements which make for public convenience or public use. trusts in perpetuity. But this power to expropriate is necessarily subject to the limitations and conditions noted in the decisions above cited. If upheld. endless conflicts between landlords and tenants. each case has to be judged according to its peculiar circumstances. enhances the physical and moral value of the surrounding communities. City of Manila. In the first place. The underlying reasons for these decisions are that the destruction of congested areas and unsanitary dwellings diminished the potentialities of epidemics. prevents the spread of crime and diseases to unaffected areas. The expropriation proceedings at bar have been instituted for the economic relief of a few families devoid of any consideration of public peace and order. the large number of people benefited. The size of the land expropriated. and promote the safety and welfare of the public in general.

a necessity must exist for the taking thereof for the proposed uses and purposes. are plenty elsewhere. even for the public good." The Mayor of the City of Manila himself confessed that he believes the plaintiff is entitled to keep this land." Necessity within the rule that the particular property to be expropriated must be necessary. the Arellano Colleges' land is situated in a highly commercial section of the city and is occupied by persons who are not bona fide tenants. The land in question has cost the owner P140. if really they only want to own their own homes. this Court. and forgetting for a moment the private character of the intended use. unless they intend to borrow the money with a view to disposing of the property later for a profits. In City of Manila vs. does not mean an absolute but only a reasonable or practical necessity.  But measured even by this standard. The people for whose benefit the condemnation is being undertaken are so poor they could ill afford to meet this high price. while a handful of people stand to profits by the expropriation. the defendant not only has invested a considerable amount for its property but had the plans for construction ready and would have completed the project a long time ago had it not been stopped by the city authorities. but it would likewise be taking a property intended already for public benefit. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests the second place. and not follow. a task which the government alone is not in a position to undertake. Cheaper lands not dedicated to a purpose so worthy as a school and more suited to the occupants' needs and means.  To authorize the condemnation of any particular land by a grantee of the power of eminent domain. As the Rural Progress Administration. citing American decision.Mabelle O.000. and that necessity must be of a public character. "So great is the regard of the law for private property that it will not authorize the least violation of it. turning down the occupants request after proper investigation. 63 . the national agency lands for resale as homesites and to which the petition to purchase the land in question on behalf of the occupants was referred by the President. the taking of the land. And again. Lastly. such as would combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and property owner consistent with such benefits. Any good that would accrue to the public from providing homes to a few families fades into insignificance in comparison with the preparation of a young men and young women for useful citizenship and for service to the government and the community. Manila Chinese Community. The ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany. this land was brought by the defendant for a university site to take the place of rented buildings that are unsuitable for schools of higher learning. laid done this rule: The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity. commented that "the necessity of the Arellano Law College to acquire a permanent site of its own is imperative not only because denial of the same would hamper the objectives of that educational institution. On the other hand. unless there exist a very great necessity thereof.000 students would be sacrificed. necessity for the condemnation has not been shown. the development of a university that has a present enrollment of 9.

would require the expenditure of a large sum of money in the transfer or removal of the bodies to some other place or site and in the purchase of such new sites. and would create irreparable loss and injury to the defendant and to all those persons owning and interested in the graves and monuments which would have to be destroyed.Mabelle O. that if the construction of the street or road should be considered a public necessity. The theory of the plaintiff is. which would fully satisfy the plaintiff's purposes. it may expropriate any land it may desire. that it had a Torrens title for the lands in question. that neither the court nor the owners of the land can inquire into the advisible purpose of purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions concerning the necessities therefor. that a great number of Chinese were buried in said cemetery. that the courts are mere appraisers of the land involved in expropriation 64 . Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests City of Manila v. in fact. that the lands in question had been used by the defendant for cemetery purposes. that the only function of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in question. would involve the destruction of existing monuments and the erection of new monuments in their stead. The Chinese Community of Manila denied that it was necessary or expedient that the said parcels be expropriated for street purposes. it is necessary for it to acquire ownership of certain parcels of land situated in Binondo. and that the expropriation. Manila . that once it has established the fact. under the law. that the plaintiff was without right or authority to expropriate said cemetery or any part or portion thereof for street purposes. that if said expropriation be carried into effect. other routes were available. that it has authority to expropriate land. some of which were owned and used by the Chinese Community of Manila for cemetery purposes. it would disturb the resting places of the dead. at much less expense and without disturbing the resting places of the dead. was not necessary as a public improvement. Chinese Community of Manila Facts: The City of Manila alleged that for the purpose of constructing the extension of Rizal Avenue.

the land must be private. like in the present case.  The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation. If. and. as long as there is a constitutional or statutory provision denying the right to take land for any use other than a public use. in effect declare certain uses to be public. For if the use be not public or no necessity for the taking exists. to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its value. to make inquiry and to hear proof. upon the other hand. public. for some purpose of proven public utility. Article 349 of the Civil Code provides that: "No one may be deprived of his property unless it be by competent authority. upon an issue properly presented.  The legislative department of the government was rarely undertakes to designate the precise property which should be taken for public use. and that necessity must be of a public character. it is a public use and no part of the ground can be taken for other public uses under a general authority. The ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany. The cemetery in  Issue: WON the courts may inquire into. that the courts would be without jurisdiction to inquire into the purpose of that legislation. and hear proof upon. and after payment of the proper compensation. When the courts come to determine the question. under such statute. while the latter is used only by a family. the courts will certainly sustain the action of the legislature unless it appears that the particular use is clearly not of a public nature. In the present case there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila : First. We believe that it can be confidently asserted that. or comparatively free. from doubt. as the case may be. the legislature should grant general authority to a municipal corporation to expropriate private land for public purposes. under the operation of the well-known rule that a statute will not be declared to be unconstitutional except in a case free. in fact. the necessity of the expropriation? YES. and before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it.Mabelle O. Unless this requisite (proven public utility and payment) has been complied with.  It cannot be denied. or church. it occurs to us that the question whether any particular use is a public one or not is ultimately. the courts have ample authority in this jurisdiction. The City of Manila can only expropriate private property. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority. a judicial question. but (b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. or neighborhood. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. Where a cemetery is open to public. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests proceedings. cannot authorize the taking of private property against the will of the owner. the legislature     65 . is a question which the courts have the right to inquire into. at least. when the value of the land is fixed by the method adopted by the law." But. The former is a cemetery used by the general community. however. they must not only find (a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain.  "It is erroneous to suppose that the legislature is beyond the control of the courts in exercising the power of eminent domain. and not follow. the taking of the land. the allegation of the necessity for the appropriation is an issuable allegation which it is competent for the courts to decide. notwithstanding compensation may be required. It is a well known fact that cemeteries may be public or private. concerning whether or not the lands were private and whether the purpose was." The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity. and. either as to the nature of the use or the necessity to the use of any particular property. the purpose must be public. It has generally. The legislative may. or a small portion of the community or neighborhood. if the legislature under proper authority should grant the expropriation of a certain or particular parcel of land for some specified public purpose. it shall be the duty of the courts to protect the owner of such property in its possession or to restore its possession to him. merely conferred general authority to take land for public use when a necessity exists therefor. under the provisions above quoted. it is true. and. second.

That. in the general acceptation of the definition of a public cemetery. The record shows that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge. which fact. VM alleged that (a) the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by the LGC and (b) the cause of action. MR denied. further. the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court. of course. Realty Corporation Facts: Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. previously made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the property with private respondent. if any. however. the Municipality of Parañaque filed a Complaint for expropriation against V. the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same through the cemetery. for the reason that the city of Manila has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public property. exercise the power of eminent domain for public use."  The Court disagrees. see p. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests question seems to have been established under governmental authority by the Spanish Governor-General. It provides as follows: Sec. based on 66 ." In this case. NO  Pque: a resolution approved by the municipal council for the purpose of initiating an expropriation case "substantially complies with the requirements of the law" because the terms "ordinance" and "resolution" are synonymous for "the purpose of bestowing authority [on] the LGU through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings in court in the exercise of the power of eminent domain." Article 36. which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain. Rule VI of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC: "If the LGU fails to acquire a private property for public use.M. Section 19 of RA 7160. finally. upon payment of just compensation. WON a resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force and effect of an ordinance. which the latter did not accept. Eminent Domain. was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. V. or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless. RTC: gave due course to petition and authorized petitioner to take possession of the subject property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value based on its current tax declaration. Series of 1991." Parenthetically. 93-95. the petition of the plaintiff must be denied. other public entities and public utilities. Allegedly. That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner. or welfare through purchase. pursuant to its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. Series of 1993. CA (supra. If that is true. 19. through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance.M. A LGU may.Mabelle O. and such offer was not accepted: Provided. imposed "through the law conferring the power or in other legislations. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government. That the LGU may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided. The cemetery in question may be used by the general community of Chinese. purpose. the complaint was filed "for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project. the LGU may expropriate said property through a resolution of the Sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to initiate expropriation proceedings. would make the cemetery in question public property. or purpose. it was also for this stated purpose that petitioner. Issues: 1. also lays down the parameters for its exercise. which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs. Camarines Sur v.  Even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in question. which will answer every purpose of the plaintiff. CA: affirmed. pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided. 51) Municipality of Paranaque v. An LGU may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter's control and restraints. 577. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land. then. Case dismissed.

If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution. because Section 19 of RA 7160. Rule VI of the Implementing Rules. or unjust. purpose or welfare."  Pque relies on Article 36. which provides that "territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. which requires only a resolution to authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. surely prevails over said rule which merely seeks to implement it. for greater public purposes. but said offer was not accepted.  Moreover. than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. Article III of the Constitution. In the case at bar. Essential requisites for the exercise the power of eminent domain: (1) An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive. In a clear divergence from the previous LGC. Thus. the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. This case. Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that the local chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance. Pque cites Camarines Sur vs. or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. RA 7160. absurd. since the law requiring an ordinance is not at all impossible. the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation. which had provided that a mere resolution would enable an LGU to exercise eminent domain. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property. and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice. and is guarded by the Constitution and laws more sedulously." In the instant case. as required under Section 9. 31 the present LGC which was already in force when the Complaint for expropriation was filed. This is clearly misplaced. (4) A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated. Article X of the Constitution. Besides. Strictly speaking. Rule VI thereof. In contrast. When the legislature interferes with that right and. Indeed. the Court does not diminish the policy embodied in Section 2. to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property. Accordingly. in behalf of the LGU. But Congress did not. the law is applied according to its express terms. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character. the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a fundamental or private right of the people." It merely upholds the law as worded in RA 7160. however. explicitly required an ordinance for this purpose. the manifest change in the legislative language — from "resolution" under BP 337 to "ordinance" under RA 7160 — demands a strict construction. the chief executive of the LGU act pursuant to an ordinance. the two are enacted differently — a third reading is necessary for an ordinance. (3) There is payment of just compensation.  In this ruling. but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. "No species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity. (2) The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use. but not for a resolution. what the discrepancy seems to indicate is a mere oversight in the wording of the implementing rules. unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members. Additionally. but a resolution is temporary in nature. it would have simply adopted the language of the previous LGC. appropriates the land of an individual without his consent. also requires that. the     67 . since Article 32. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous. there is no reason to depart from this rule. It has therefore no power to amend or act beyond the authority given and the limitations imposed on it by law. there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance. and other pertinent laws. is not in point because the applicable law at that time was BP 337. "[l]egislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation. the law itself. the previous LGC. An ordinance is a law.Mabelle O. CA to show that a resolution may suffice to support the exercise of eminent domain by an LGU. in exercising the power of eminent domain. We stress that an LGU is created by law and all its powers and rights are sourced therefrom.

subject matter and cause of action. the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in affirming the trial court's Decision which dismissed the expropriation suit. all others are properly complied with. YES. it does apply to specific issues decided in a previous case. 1994 which reiterated its Resolution No. and subsequently exercising its power of eminent domain over the same property. it was mentioned by private respondent. "the national legislature is still the principal of the LGUs. petitioner did not raise this point before this Court. and they have the right to resume the possession of the property whenever the public interest requires it. Whether those allegations are true or not is beside the point. and thus partakes only of a share in eminent domain.  However. dictates that the right to exercise the power be absolute and unfettered even by a prior judgment or res judicata. This argument is bereft of merit. WON the principle of res judicata as a ground for dismissal of case is not applicable when public interest is primarily involved. as an inherent power of the State. however. In fact. NO. petitioner merely alleged the existence of such an ordinance. The issue rather is: admitting them to be true. 38 Indeed. which has been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over it. It is hornbook doctrine that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action. In the second place. and ratified all the acts of its mayor regarding the subject expropriation. petitioner argues that its Sangguniang Bayan passed an ordinance on October 11. our ruling that petitioner cannot exercise its delegated power of eminent domain through a mere resolution will not bar it from reinstituting similar proceedings. all the requisites for the application of res judicata are present in this case. remains in the government. can "reach every form of property which the State might need for public use. The scope of eminent domain is plenary and. the eminent domain. for that matter. which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it. 1993. 93-35." Thus. this allegation does not cure the inherent defect of petitioner's Complaint for expropriation filed on September 23." "All separate interests of individuals in property are held of the government under this tacit agreement or implied reservation. the State or its authorized agent cannot be forever barred from exercising said right by reason alone of previous non-compliance with any legal requirement. For example. In any event. De Knecht. and only in passing. as prescribed by law. In its Brief filed before Respondent Court. bar the State or its agent from thereafter complying with this requirement. a final judgment dismissing an expropriation suit on the ground that there was no prior offer precludes another suit raising the same issue. The very nature of eminent domain." In Republic vs. There is a previous final judgment on the merits in a prior expropriation case involving identical interests. cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property. RJ which finds application in generally all cases and proceedings. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals and the trial court. In the first place. the highest and most exact idea of property. Series of 1993. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is in reality not eminent but "inferior" domain. since it must conform to the limits imposed by the delegation. Consequently.Mabelle O. the same is also true of the principle of "law of the case. The absence of an ordinance authorizing the same is equivalent to lack of cause of action.  While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State to exercise eminent domain.  68 . but it did not present any certified true copy thereof. Notwithstanding the grant to individuals. Parenthetically and by parity of reasoning. or in the aggregate body of the people in their sovereign capacity. Eminent Domain Not Barred by Res Judicata. By the same token. for their truth is hypothetically admitted by the motion. it cannot." WON the complaint states a cause of action. the question submitted before the court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint itself. may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the complaint? The fact that there is no cause of action is evident from the face of the Complaint for expropriation which was based on a mere resolution. like police power. once the said legal requirement and. the Court ruled that the power of the State or its agent to exercise eminent domain is not diminished by the mere fact that a prior final judgment over the property to be expropriated has become the law of the case as to the 2.    2.

but also clearly defeat social justice.156 representing 15% of the fair market value of the property to enable the petitioner to take immediate possession of the property pursuant to Section 19 of R. 3.400. 1528 contains 793 square meters but the actual area to be expropriated 69 . which petitioner paid to the neighboring lots. who was nominated by respondents. No. i. it contended that Lot No. Lugo. and Herbert E. who was nominated by petitioner and who was designated as Chairman. City of Cebu v. The lots are the most suitable site for the purpose. 1994 issued by the Honorable Court. the price offered was very low in light of the consideration of P20. That the SECOND PARTY agrees to part with the ownership of the subject parcels of land in favor of the FIRST PARTY provided the latter will pay just compensation for the same in the amount determined by the court after due notice and hearing. The commissioners were Palermo M. That the judgment sought to be rendered under this agreement shall be followed by a supplemental judgment fixing the just compensation for the property of the SECOND PARTY after the Commissioners appointed by this Honorable Court to determine the same shall have rendered their report and approved by the court. No. More specifically.000 per square meter. 7. 7160. The parties agreed to their appointment. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests parties. The parties executed and submitted to the trial court an Agreement wherein they declared that they have partially settled the case and in consideration thereof they agreed: 1.930. once all legal requirements are complied with.786. That the FIRST PARTY and the SECOND PARTY jointly petition the Honorable Court to render judgment in said Civil Case No. who was designated by the trial court. The motion was granted by the trial court. the trial court rendered its decision ordering Cebu to pay the Dedamos P24. CEB-14632 in accordance with this AGREEMENT.400. without prejudice to the final valuation as maybe determined by the court. The total area sought to be expropriated is 1. agreed to take possession over that portion of the lot sought to be expropriated where the house of the SECOND PARTY was located only after fifteen (15) days upon the receipt of the SECOND PARTY of the amount of P1.624 square meters with an assessed value of P1. Cebu could simply buy directly from them the property at its fair market value if it wanted to. just like what it did with the neighboring lots. Petitioner deposited with the Philippine National Bank the amount of P51. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the commissioners' report was inaccurate since it included an area which was not subject to expropriation. Cebu filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession pursuant to Section 19 of R. Thereafter. shall turn over to the FIRST PARTY the title of the lot and within the lapse of the fifteen (15) days grace period will voluntarily demolish their house and the other structure that may be located thereon at their own expense. The Dedamos filed a motion to dismiss the complaint because the purpose for which their property was to be expropriated was not for a public purpose but for benefit of a single private entity. more or less. CEB-14632 a complaint for eminent domain against respondents spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo for a public purpose. the Dedamos alleged that they have no other land in Cebu City. On the basis of the commissioners' report and after due deliberation thereon. Inc.Mabelle O. Pursuant to said agreement. That in the meantime the SECOND PARTY agrees to receive the amount of ONE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS (1. 4.00 representing the compensation mentioned in the Complaint.786. 6. the Cebu Holdings. 7160. That the SECOND PARTY hereby conforms to the intention to [sic] the FIRST PARTY in expropriating their parcels of land in the above-cited case as for public purpose and for the benefit of the general public.400. That the FIRST PARTY in the light of the issuance of the Writ of Possession Order dated September 21. Buot.A.786. 2. the commissioners submitted their report.00. for the construction of a public road which shall serve as an access/relief road of Gorordo Avenue to extend to the General Maxilum Avenue and the back of Magellan International Hotel Roads in Cebu City. which contained their respective assessments of and recommendation as to the valuation of the property. The State or its authorized agent may still subsequently exercise its right to expropriate the same property. Besides. That the SECOND PARTY upon receipt of the aforesaid provisional amount. Alfredo Cisneros.00) as provisional payment for the subject parcels of land.e. To rule otherwise will not only improperly diminish the power of eminent domain. 5.865. Spouses Dedamo Facts: The City of Cebu filed in Civil Case No.A. Finally.. the trial court appointed three commissioners to determine the just compensation of the lots sought to be expropriated.

hence. upon payment of just compensation. 1528 and fixed it at P12.50. 70 . The remaining 315 square meters is the subject of a separate expropriation proceeding in Civil Case No.339. pursuant to the decision in NPC vs. That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided finally. It asserts that it should be.826. (2) petitioner did not interpose any serious objection to the commissioners' report of 12 August 1996 fixing the just compensation of the 1. CA Affirmed RTC.A. We explicitly stated therein that although the general rule in determining just compensation in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of the complaint. No. it was estopped from attacking the report on which the decision was based. Petitioner alleged that the lower court erred in fixing the amount of just compensation at P20. which docketed the case as CA-G. Issue: WON just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. the rule "admits of an exception: where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. 59204. That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner. – Upon the entry of the order of condemnation. the applicable law as to the point of reckoning for the determination of just compensation is Section 19 of R. or purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless.  NPC Ruling misread! We did not categorically rule in that case that just compensation should be determined as of the filing of the complaint. CV No. the Government must pay the owner thereof just compensation as consideration therefor. the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court. then pending before Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City.826. Ascertainment of compensation. exercise the power of eminent domain for public use.624-square meter lot at P20.824. – A local government unit may. or in the amount of P20.Mabelle O. based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property. Eminent Domain.R. in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State. and (3) the determined just compensation fixed is even lower than the actual value of the property at the time of the actual taking in 1994. CA  Dedamos: Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the decision of the trial court because (1) the trial court decided the case on the basis of the agreement of the parties that just compensation shall be fixed by commissioners appointed by the court. The assessment was approved as the just compensation thereof by the trial court in its Order of 27 December 1996.339. which in this case should be 17 September 1993 and not at the time the property was actually taken in 1994. CEB-8348. That. 5.50.  Eminent domain is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. further. which provided as follows: SEC.9 However. the dispositive portion of the decision was amended to reflect the new valuation. In the case at bar.826. The just compensation should be based on the prevailing market price of the property at the commencement of the expropriation proceedings.339. through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals." Also.10 per square meter. the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. It is the Government's right to appropriate. which expressly provides that just compensation shall be determined as of the time of actual taking. The order of appointment shall designate the time and place of the first session of the hearing to be held by the commissioners and specify the time within which their report is to be filed with the court. which was Section 5 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.50. The Section reads as follows: SECTION 19. pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided. 7160. Accordingly. the trial court followed the then governing procedural law on the matter. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests is only 478 square meters. however. private property for public use or purpose. The commissioners submitted an amended assessment for the 478 square meters of Lot No. and such offer was not accepted: Provided.

the petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. as approved.  Finally. The Secretary of Justice dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was filed out of time. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests  More than anything else. It has the force of law between them and should be complied with in good faith. YES. induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief. such law cannot prevail over R. Article 1159 and 1315 of the Civil Code explicitly provides: Art. 1996. Citing the case of Tañada vs. 28. enacted an ordinance. The agreement is a contract between the parties. 1996 and that the ordinance. petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. while Section 4. during the hearing on 22 November 1996. so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts. it urged that the Secretary of Justice should have overlooked this “mere technicality” and ruled on its petition on the merits. Respondent opposed the appeal.” When the petition was completed. by a solemn document freely and voluntarily agreed upon by them. after the required publication or posting has been complied with. Municipality of Hagonoy Facts: On October 1. thus: during the preparation of the petition on October 21. WON the CA was correct in dismissing the petition for review for petitioner’s failure to attach certified true copies of the assailed Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice. which is a substantive law. was already time-barred. 1998.A. according to their nature. as prescribed under Section 187 of the 1991 LGC. the petitioner’s members were personally given copies of the approved Ordinance and were informed that it shall be enforced in January. it was pointed out that petitioner’s appeal. Issues: 1. the Sangguniang Bayan of Hagonoy. 7160. On December 8. 1996. may be in keeping with good faith. Estoppel in pais arises when one. Article 3 provided that it shall take effect upon approval. 1998.Mabelle O. beyond 30 days from the effectivity of the Ordinance on October 1.  In its Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals. and from that moment the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which. i. Art. it was raining very hard due to (t)yphoon “Loleng. its petition for review was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for being formally deficient as it was not accompanied by certified true copies of the assailed Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice. In the last week of November. 1159. Petitioner did not assail the finding of the Secretary of Justice that their appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period. usage and law. It is therefore too late for petitioner to question the valuation now without violating the principle of equitable estoppel. petitioner did not interpose a serious objection. intentionally or through culpable negligence. Bulacan. 1996. copy was served on the Department of Justice at about (sic) past 4:00 p. 1997. It cannot detract from its agreement now and assail correctness of the commissioners' assessment. Rule 67 of the Rules of Court provides that just compensation shall be determined at the time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation. representations or admissions. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith. The subject ordinance was posted from November 4-25. Kautusan Blg.e. Instead. of October 21. Undaunted. 1997. It contended that the ordinance took effect on October 6. made over a year later. which increased the stall rentals of the market vendors in Hagonoy.m. the petitioner’s President filed an appeal with the Secretary of Justice assailing the constitutionality of the tax ordinance. 1315.  Furthermore. Hagonoy Market Vendors Ass’n v. the Secretary of Justice held that the date of effectivity of the subject ordinance retroacted to the date of its approval in October 1996. by his acts. Hence. Contracts are perfected by mere consent. pursuant to Section 3 of said ordinance. the petitioner satisfactorily explained the circumstances relative to its failure to attach to its appeal certified true copies of the assailed Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice.. or by his own silence when he ought to speak out. Tuvera. agreed to be bound by the report of the commission and approved by the trial court. Unfortunately. with (the) instruction to have 71 . was posted as required by law. Petitioner claimed it was unaware of the posting of the ordinance. After its motion for reconsideration was denied. 1998. the parties. Records show that petitioner consented to conform with the valuation recommended by the commissioners.

despite the flooded roads and heavy rains. 1998. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests the Resolutions of the Department of Justice be stamped as “certified true copies. it is essential that the validity of revenue measures is not left uncertain for a considerable length of time. 187. 2.” Thus. That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof: Provided. WON the period to appeal should be counted not from the time the ordinance took effect in 1996 but from the time its 72 . Being its lifeblood. herein counsel served a copy by personal service on (r)espondent’s lawyer at (sic) Malolos. the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings. respondent appellate court should have tempered its strict application of procedural rules in view of the fortuitous event considering that litigation is not a game of technicalities 2. the law provided a time limit for an aggrieved party to assail the legality of revenue measures and tax ordinances. In the case at bar.  The applicable law is Section 187 of the 1991 LGC which provides: “SEC. October 22. It is clear from the records that the petitioner exerted due diligence to get the copies of its appealed Resolutions certified by the Department of Justice. it is apropos to state that the timeframe fixed by law for parties to avail of their legal remedies before competent courts is not a “mere technicality” that can be easily brushed aside. Ordinance No. as the herein counsel went back to Manila. petitioner was again unable to have the Resolutions of the Department of Justice stamped “certified true copies. due to bad weather. but failed to do so on account of typhoon “Loleng. 1998. Thus. finally. WON the appeal was time-barred. That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal. That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and accrual and payment of the tax. 28 is a revenue measure adopted by the municipality of Hagonoy to fix and collect public market stall rentals.  The aforecited law requires that an appeal of a tax ordinance or revenue measure should be made to the Secretary of Justice within thirty (30) days from effectivity of the ordinance and even during its pendency. the Secretary of Justice correctly dismissed it for being time-barred.”  CA erred in dismissing petitioner’s appeal on the ground that it was formally deficient. Mandatory Public Hearings. “To avoid being timebarred in the filing of the (p)etition. Bulacan. YES. the effectivity of the assailed ordinance shall not be suspended. the person in charge (at the Department of Justice) was no longer available to certify to (sic) the Resolutions. However. was declared a nonworking holiday because of (t)yphoon “Loleng.” In the morning of October 23. Municipal Ordinance No. (official business in) government offices were suspended in the afternoon and the personnel of the Department of Justice tasked with issuing or stamping “certified true copies” of their Resolutions were no longer available. At this point. further. however. more than a year after the effectivity of the ordinance in 1996.Mabelle O. 28 took effect in October 1996. collection of revenues by the government is of paramount importance. .” Under the circumstances. However.The procedure for the approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided. fee or charge levied therein: Provided. the same was filed with the Court of Appeals “as is. Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures. That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the receipt of the appeal: Provided. The periods stated in Section 187 of the LGC are mandatory. The funds for the operation of its agencies and provision of basic services to its inhabitants are largely derived from its revenues and collections. “The following day. due to time constraint(s) . Petitioner filed its appeal only in December 1997. Clearly. Hence.

petitioner cannot validly claim lack of knowledge of the approved ordinance. and municipal tax ordinances or revenue measures shall be published in full for three (3) consecutive days in a newspaper of local circulation. Then Acting Municipal Mayor Maria Garcia Santos approved the Ordinance on October 7. Bulacan. viz: in front of the municipal building. These views. all in 1996. no public hearing was conducted prior to the passage of the ordinance and. however. the Ordinance was approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Municipal Ordinance No. Within ten (10) days after their approval. 28 was enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Hagonoy on October 1. NO  Petitioner insists that it was unaware of the approval and effectivity of the subject ordinance in 1996 on two (2) grounds: first. 28 and so the posting could not have been made in November 1996 was sufficiently disproved by the positive evidence of respondent municipality. Publication of Tax Ordinance and Revenue Measures. cities and municipalities where there are no newspapers of local circulation. are not binding on the legislative body and it is not compelled by law to adopt the same. To be sure.”  Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Hagonoy. Section 188 of the LGC provides: “Section 188. presented evidence which clearly shows that the procedure for the enactment of the assailed ordinance was complied with.25. Provided.Mabelle O. the approved ordinance was not posted. Thus. certified true copies of all provincial. 1996. 73 . 1996 in three (3) public places. the same may be posted in at least two (2) conspicuous and publicly accessible places. for the proposed increase in the stall rentals. That in provinces. petitioner’s ambiguous and unsupported claim that it was only “sometime in November 1997” that the Provincial Board approved Municipal Ordinance No. This fact was known to and admitted by petitioner. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests members were personally given copies of the approved ordinance in November 1997. 1996. The filing of its appeal a year after the effectivity of the subject ordinance is fatal to its cause. city. They are mandated to use their discretion and best judgment in serving the people. Given the foregoing circumstances. July 15 and August 19. After its approval. public hearings are conducted by legislative bodies to allow interested parties to ventilate their views on a proposed law or ordinance. it enumerated the various objections raised by its members before the passage of the ordinance in several meetings called by the Sanggunian for the purpose. The Ordinance was posted during the period from November 4 . Sanggunian members are elected by the people to make laws that will promote the general interest of their constituents. In petitioner’s two (2) communications with the Secretary of Justice. Parties who participate in public hearings to give their opinions on a proposed ordinance should not expect that their views would be patronized by their lawmakers.  Petitioner’s bold assertion that there was no public hearing conducted prior to the passage of Kautusan Blg.  On the issue of publication or posting. at the bulletin board of the Sta. copies of the Ordinance were given to the Municipal Treasurer on the same day.  Petitioner cannot gripe that there was practically no public hearing conducted as its objections to the proposed measure were not considered by the Sangguniang Bayan. Ana Parish Church and on the front door of the Office of the Market Master in the public market. These show beyond doubt that petitioner was aware of the proposed increase and in fact participated in the public hearings therefor. however. 28 is belied by its own evidence. Posting was validly made in lieu of publication as there was no newspaper of local circulation in the municipality of Hagonoy. The respondent municipality likewise submitted the Minutes and Report of the public hearings conducted by the Sangguniang Bayan’s Committee on Appropriations and Market on February 6. second. 1996. On November 9.

to be utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for the “Voice of the Philippines” project. was made within the reglementary period that thereby interrupted the 5-year prescriptive period within which to enforce the 1979 judgment. the petition must fail. through the Philippine Information Agency. President Estrada issued Proclamation No.000. since a motion. Rule 39.55 by the provincial treasurer of Bulacan.683. such that a little over five years later. Furthermore.55 on 23 July 1984 constituted partial compliance on the part of petitioners and effectively estopped respondents from invoking prescription expressed in Section 6. respondents filed a manifestation with a motion seeking payment for the expropriated property. transferring 20 hectares of the expropriated property to the Bulacan State University for the expansion of its facilities and another 5 hectares to be used exclusively for the propagation of the Philippine carabao. to be considered otherwise.” had ceased its operations thereat. should instead be made by the prevailing party. submitted a counter-motion to adjust the compensation from P6.683. of the Rules of Court.Mabelle O. 22. The motion for payment. took over the premises after the previous lessee.00 per square meter or. Section 6c. the receipt by respondents of partial compensation in the sum of P72. NO. it requires no recognition by the Constitution. Fundamental to the independent existence of a State. the failure of petitioner to execute the judgment. its scope 74 . not rentals. the “Voice of America. to cause the return to them of the expropriated property.683. dated 26 February 1979. the burnt but reconstructed Lumang Palengke and the more recent Lumang Palengke with wet market. in this case by petitioner. could not be considered as having interrupted the five-year period. This time. rendered it unenforceable by mere motion. In opposing the petition. Republic v.00 by way of just compensation for the expropriated property of the late Luis Santos subject to such final computation as might be approved by the court. Respondents further questioned the right of PIA to transfer ownership of a portion of the property to the Bulacan State University even while the just compensation due the heirs had yet to be finally settled. Respondents maintained that the P72.  The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. as well as the subsequent disbursement to them of the sum of P72. Rule 39. Assailing the finding of prescription by the trial court. However. whose provisions are taken as being merely confirmatory of its presence and as being regulatory. CA Facts: Petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings covering contiguous land situated along MacArthur Highway. dilapidated place. the Ordinance covered the three (3) concrete public markets: the two-storey Bagong Palengke. the Santos heirs. and no action was taken on their case until petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to permit the deposit in court of the amount of P4. within five years after it had become final and executory. followed up by other motions subsequent thereto.04 of the 1993 Municipal Revenue Code and Section 191 of the LGC limiting the percentage of increase that can be imposed apply to tax rates.664. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests **Even on the substantive points raised. intended for transient peddlers who used to sell their goods along the sidewalk. The national government failed to pay to herein respondents the compensation pursuant to the foregoing decision. Issue: WON the expropriated property may be returned. petitioner here posited that a motion which respondents had filed on 17 February 1984.00 per square meter previously fixed in the 1979 decision to its current zonal valuation pegged at P5. Petitioner. respondents advanced the view that pursuant to Section 6. The remaining portion was retained by the PIA. dated 09 May 1984. petitioner claimed.55 paid to them by the provincial treasurer of Bulacan pursuant to the 1984 order of the trial court was part of the initial deposit made by petitioner when it first entered possession of the property in 1969 and should not be so regarded as a partial payment. in the due exercise of the power. the power is inherent. Neither can it be said that the rates were not uniformly imposed or that the public markets included in the Ordinance were unreasonably determined or classified. at most. In the hands of the legislature. of the Rules of Court.000. To be sure. In the meantime. the Palengkeng Bagong Munisipyo or Gabaldon was excluded from the increase in rentals as it is only a makeshift. with no doors or protection for security. Bulacan. Malolos. opposing the manifestation and motion. in the alternative. The Santos heirs remained unpaid.

The property has assumed a public character upon its expropriation. Respondents question the public nature of the utilization by petitioner of the condemned property. respondents ignore the fact that the right of the expropriatory authority is far from that of an unpaid seller in ordinary sales. however. but only of inferior. Surely.  Obviously. thereby preempting any claim of bar by prescription on grounds of non-execution. It is also useful to view the matter as being subject to constant growth. a power of eminent. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests matching that of taxation. and the defendant asserts title or interest in the property. it must. respondents would exhort on the pronouncement in Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. it is. by enabling law. upon the other hand. on the one hand. to which the remedy 75 . which. Thus. It reaches to every form of property the State needs for public use and. the power is not without its limits: first. this delegated power of eminent domain is not.  The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of the expropriation proceedings. as the condemnor and as the owner of the property. themselves in line with the requirements of public purpose. a significant portion thereof being ceded for the expansion of the facilities of the Bulacan State University and for the propagation of the Philippine carabao. decidedly. by effectively restraining the former and affording protection to the latter. The grant of the power of eminent domain to local governments under Republic Act No. but even then. by filing the action.Mabelle O. For local governments to be able to wield the power. not to prove a right to possession. Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense. In arguing for the return of their property on the basis of nonpayment. pointing out that its present use differs from the purpose originally contemplated in the 1969 expropriation proceedings. the taking must be for public use. its demands upon the individual so increases. in many respects.the first is public employment or the actual use by the public. domain or only as broad or confined as the real authority would want it to be. for the condemning authority is not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. the condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession of the property. and each demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual may be devoted. which is to say that as society advances. even that of police power itself.” two approaches are utilized . These twin proscriptions have their origin in the recognition of the necessity for achieving balance between the State interests. de Villaroya where the unpaid landowners were allowed the alternative remedy of recovery of the property there in question. Vda. In determining “public use. and the second is public advantage or benefit. strictly speaking. be delegated to it by the national legislature. the only limitation being that it be for public use. to which the power of eminent domain is not inherent. as an old case so puts it. but merely delegated and of limited application. all separate interests of individuals in property are held under a tacit agreement or implied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the right to resume the possession of the property whenever the public interest so requires it. and private rights. that just compensation must be given to the private owner of the property. and second. is well within its rights to alter and decide the use of that property. It might be borne in mind that the case involved the municipal government of Sorsogon.  In insisting on the return of the expropriated property. The argument is of no moment.  The expropriated property has been shown to be for the continued utilization by the PIA. but to prove a right to compensation for the taking. petitioner.  The exercise of such rights vested to it as the condemnee indeed has amounted to at least a partial compliance or satisfaction of the 1979 judgment. 7160 cannot be understood as being the pervasive and allencompassing power vested in the legislative branch of government.

The prescribed period for review is only directory and the Secretary of Finance may still review the ordinance and act accordingly even after the lapse of the said period provided he acts within a reasonable time.  Consequently even after the prescribed period has lapsed. RTC: the tax imposed by the Ordinance is not among those that the Sanggunian may impose under the Local Tax Code. Zamboanga appealed the suspension in the RTC. Costales Facts: The Sangguniang Panglunsod of Zamboanga City passed Ordinance No. in whole or in part.01 tax per liter of softdrinks produced. condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for securing better title against all the world than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance. manufactured. may impose. although not entitled to the return of the expropriated property.. should the Secretary of Finance. upon review.  Even if the Secretary of Finance failed to review or act on the Ordinance within the prescribed period of 120 days it does not follow as a legal consequence thereof that an otherwise invalid ordinance is thereby validated.  The Ordinance is ultra vires as it is not within the authority of the City to impose said tax. confiscatory.00 per square meter. deserve to be paid promptly on the yet unpaid award of just compensation already fixed by final judgment of the Bulacan RTC on 26 February 1979 at P6. shall be at the rate of not exceeding 2% of the gross sales or receipts of the softdrinks for the preceding calendar year. 19 September 1969 (institution of condemnation proceedings) .  Private respondents. contrary to the Estanislao v. 76 . like Zamboanga. An in rem proceeding. oppressive. i. All that the law says is that after said period. 44 which imposes a P0. find that the tax or fee levied or imposed is unjust. or when the tax ordinance is. with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum computed from the date of "taking" of the property. The Minister of Finance sent a letter to the Sanggunian suspending the effectivity of the Ordinance on the ground that it contravenes Sec 19 (a) of the Local Tax Code. or not among those that the particular local government may impose in the exercise of its power in accordance with this Code. by giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title. The tax being imposed under said Ordinance is based on the output or production and not on the gross sales or receipts as authorized under the Local Tax Code. but upheld its validity saying that the Finance Minister did not act on it w/in 120 days from receipt of the petition. the tax ordinance shall remain in force.Mabelle O. Issue: WON Ordinance 44 is valid. the paramount title is in the public under a new and independent title.  Much less can it be interpreted to mean that the Secretary of Finance can no longer act by suspending and/or revoking an invalid ordinance even after the lapse of the 120-day period. in lieu of the graduated fixed tax prescribed under Section 19 of the Local Tax Code. thus. The authority of the City is limited to the imposition of a percentage tax on the gross sales or receipts of said product which. a percentage tax on the gross sales for the preceding calendar year of nonessential commodities at the rate of not exceeding two per cent and on the gross sales of essential commodities at the rate of not exceeding one per cent. condemnation acts upon the property. NO.  A city. After condemnation. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests of rescission might perhaps apply. Finance Secretary appealed. being non-essential. and/or bottled within the city. until the due amount shall have been fully paid. excessive.e.

(c) both 77 . combustible. as the case may be. gasoline. mayor’s permit fee. 1 was reviewed and approved by the Provincial Treasurer of Rizal on January 13. 26-73 and 26 A-73. 1. Municipality of Pililia Facts: PPC is engaged in the manufacture of lubricated oil basestock which is a petroleum product with its refinery plant in Malaya. mayor's permit and sanitary inspection fees from 1975 to 1984. Pililia. distillers. wholesaling. 436 was promulgated increasing the specific tax on lubricating oils. distillers. PPC. Provincial Circular No. (b) the above declaration covers not only old tax ordinances but new ones. and mayor's permit and sanitary inspection fee unto Pililla based on Municipal Ordinance No. 143). including brewers. sanitary inspection fee. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests declared national economic policy. 142 (NIRC of 1939): Manufactured oils and other fuels are subject to specific tax. Finance Secretary issued Provincial Circular No. and compounders of liquors. The questioned Municipal Tax Ordinance No. including brewers. MR denied. Any taxes paid under protest thereunder should be accordingly refunded to the taxpayers concerned. 44: null and void. 1977. Philippine Petroleum Corporation v. 144 and 145 of the NIRC. RTC: PPC to pay business tax. importers or producers of any article of commerce of whatever kind or nature. The same rule should apply to the provincial and city treasurers. 1977 was also issued directing all city and municipal treasurers to refrain from collecting the so-called storage fee on flammable or combustible materials imposed under the local tax ordinance of their respective locality. cities and municipalities certain shares in the specific tax on such products in lieu of local taxes imposed on petroleum products.  Ordinance No. is still liable to pay tax on business and storage fees.D. 1975 (Rollo. and compounders of liquors. except those for which fixed taxes are provided on manufacturers. petroleum products subject to the specific tax under the NIRC pursuant to ordinances enacted before or after the effectivity of the Local Tax Code on 1 July 1973. but was not implemented and/or enforced by the Municipality of Pililla because of its having been suspended up to now in view of Provincial Circular Nos. without prejudice to the right to appeal to the courts within 30 days after receipt of the notice of suspension. diesel fuel oil and other similar petroleum products levied under Sections 142. 6-77 dated March 13. bunker fuel oil. and Provincial Circular No. On June 3. importers or producers of any article of commerce of whatever kind or nature. and granting provinces. except for those which fixed taxes are provided in the LTC on manufacturers. said fee partaking of the nature of a strictly revenue measure or service charge. retailing or dealing in petroleum products subject to specific tax under the NIRC. distilled spirits. p. storage permit fee. and/ or wines as well as mayor’s permit. Section 153 of which specifically imposes specific tax on refined and manufactured mineral oils and motor fuels. storage permit fees from 1975 to 1986. rectifiers. P. as amended. 26-73 which directed all LGU treasurers to refrain from collecting any local tax imposed in old or new ordinances in the business of manufacturing. 2673 declared as contrary to national economic policy the imposition of local taxes on the manufacture of petroleum products as they are already subject to specific tax under the NIRC. as well as costs of suit. have already paid the last-named fees starting 1985. Rizal. PD 231: Local Tax Code: Municipality may impose taxes on business. the Secretary of Finance may certainly suspend the effectivity of such ordinance and revoke the same. under Section 44 of the Local Tax Code. the respondent filed a complaint against PPC for the collection of the business tax from 1979 to 1986. or explosive substances On April 13. 26 A-73: Instructed treasurers to stop collecting any local tax imposed on the businesses of manufacturing. 1974. distilled spirits. and/ or wines.  PPC: (a) Provincial Circular No. P. 1 (Pililia Tax Code) Sec 9&10 imposed a tax on business.D.Mabelle O. rectifiers. wholesaling. Issue: WON PPC whose oil products are subject to specific tax under the NIRC. or when the ordinance is discriminatory in nature on the conduct of business or calling or in restraint of trade. or dealing in. retailing. Enforcing the provisions of the above-mentioned ordinance. as well as those which may be enacted in the future. 1158 otherwise known as the NIRC of 1977 was enacted. Sec. however. Municipality of Pililia imposed Municipal Tax Ordinance No. sanitary inspection fee and storage permit fee for flammable.

436 prohibits the imposition of local taxes on petroleum products. unless and until revoked. No. in view of Section 22 (b) of the Code regarding non-imposition by municipalities of taxes on articles.  Well-settled is the rule that administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. retailers. 26 A73 suspended the effectivity of local tax ordinances imposing a tax on business under Section 19 (a) of the Local Tax Code (P. wholesalers. if the imposition of tax on business of manufacturers. But P. 426 amending the Local Tax Code is deemed to have repealed Provincial Circular Nos.D.D. said decree did not amend Sections 19 and 19 (a) of P. combustible or explosive substances. . To allow the continuous effectivity of the prohibition set forth in PC No.D.Mabelle O. subject to specific tax under the provisions of the NIRC.  There is no question that Pililla's Municipal Tax Ordinance No. A tax on business is distinct from a tax on the article itself. No. No. As aptly held by the court a quo: Necessarily. 231. there could not be any other logical conclusion than that the framers of P.D. etc. 426. 426. 426 really and actually intended to terminate the effectivity and/or enforceability of Provincial Circulars Nos. wholesalers or dealers in petroleum products subject to the specific tax under the NIRC NIRC. 26-73 and 26 A-73 inasmuch as clearly these circulars are in contravention with Sec. or dealers in petroleum products." It conforms with the mandate of said law. 26-73 (1) would be tantamount to restricting their power to tax by mere administrative issuances. Under Section 5. 436 prohibits the imposition of local taxes on petroleum products. producers of any article of commerce of whatever kind or nature. it should have been expressly stated in P. Thus.D. consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy .D. any effort on the part of the respondent to collect the suspended tax on business from the petitioner would be illegal and unauthorized. PC No.D. .D. No. That intention to terminate is very apparent and in fact it is expressed in clear and unequivocal terms in the effectivity and repealing clause of P. the former prevails. 1 imposing the assailed taxes. 19 (a) of P. No. but by      78 .D.D. hence. 231 as amended by P. were carried over into P. No. 426 Furthermore. and (d) Section 2 of P. only guidelines and limitations that may be established by Congress can define and limit such power of local governments. 426-the amendatory law to P. Article X of the 1987 Constitution. 6-77 enjoining all city and municipal treasurers to refrain from collecting the so-called storage fee on flammable or combustible materials imposed in the local tax ordinance of their respective locality frees petitioner PPC from the payment of storage permit fee. No. 426 and no exemptions were given to manufacturers. 436. wherein the municipality is granted the right to levy taxes on business of manufacturers.D. Inasmuch as said storage makes use of tanks owned not by the municipality of Pililla. while Section 2 of P. importers. fees. The exercise by local governments of the power to tax is ordained by the present Constitution. 26-73 and PC No. 26-73 and 26 A-73 issued by the Secretary of Finance when Sections 19 and 19 (a). The storage permit fee being imposed by Pililla's tax ordinance is a fee for the installation and keeping in storage of any flammable. Thus: Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes. and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide. in petroleum products contravenets a declared national policy.D. fees and charges is valid especially Section 9 (A) which according to the trial court "was lifted in toto and/or is a literal reproduction of Section 19 (a) of the Local Tax Code as amended by P. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Provincial Circulars (PC) 26-73 and 26 A-73 are still effective.D. Provincial Circular No. 231). retailers. with regard to manufacturers.

PREMISES CONSIDERED. silica. As already stated. Tax exemptions are looked upon with disfavor.  this Court has consistently held that it is not a mineral product but rather a manufactured product. Article 1143 of the Civil Code applies. and therefore cannot be a charge for service by the municipality). in the absence of a clear and express exemption from the payment of said fees. the waiver cannot be recognized. same is obviously not a charge for any service rendered by the municipality as what is envisioned in Section 37 of the same Code. and Ordinance No. since the Local Tax Code does not provide the prescriptive period for collection of local taxes. the minerals had already undergone a chemical change through manufacturing process. grinding. and not an executive like the mayor. mixing. a permit fee like the mayor's permit. Said law provides that an action upon an obligation created by law prescribes within ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues. WON cement is a mineral product. 2. with the MODIFICATION that business taxes accruing PRIOR to 1976 are not to be paid by PPC (because the same have prescribed) and that storage fees are not also to be paid by PPC (for the storage tanks are owned by PPC and not by the municipality. The Municipality of Pililla can therefore enforce the collection of the tax on business of petitioner PPC due from 1976 to 1986.  the power of taxation is a high prerogative of sovereignty. 5 (Municipal Revenue Code). v. He who claims an exemption must be able to point     79 . passed pursuant to PD 231. before cement reaches its saleable form. the relinquishment is never presumed and any reduction or diminution thereof with respect to its mode or its rate. More specifically stated. 52 of PD 463. NO. and NOT the tax that had accrued prior to 1976. the trial court did not err in holding that "since the power to tax includes the power to exempt thereof which is essentially a legislative prerogative. As to the authority of the mayor to waive payment of the mayor's permit and sanitary inspection fees. and the same must be coached in clear and unmistakable terms in order that it may be applied. it is not merely an admixture or blending of raw materials. calcining adding of retarder or raw gypsum In short. While cement is composed of 80% minerals. WON PPC may claim exemption from paying manufacturer’s and exporter’s taxes. it is the law-making body. Floro Cement Corp. Misamis Oriental filed a complaint for collection of manufacturer’s and exporter’s taxes plus surcharges against Floro Cement Corporation. which covers all taxes except income tax. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests petitioner PPC. 10. Issues: 1. NO. Floro’s defense: not liable since the plaintiff’s power to levy fees on “Mines. Thus.Mabelle O. Mining Corporations and Mineral Products” was limited by Sec. Under Section 36 of the Code. and that it was granted by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources a certificate of tax exemption for a period of 5 years. It is an ancient rule that exemptions from taxation are construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. However. shall be required before any individual or juridical entity shall engage in any business or occupation under the provisions of the Code. It is the result of a definite process-the crushing of minerals. 1 prescribing a permit fee is a permit fee allowed under Section 36 of the amended Code. Section 10 (z) (13) of Pililla's Municipal Tax Ordinance No. must be strictly construed. shale and others. Gorospe Facts: Municipality of Lugait." The waiver partakes of the nature of an exemption. Lugait based it on Municipal Ordinance No. it follows that a municipal mayor who is an executive officer may not unilaterally withdraw such an expression of a policy thru the enactment of a tax. who can make an exemption. the general rule is that any claim for exemption from the tax statute should be strictly construed against the taxpayer. as lime. the assailed DECISION is hereby AFFIRMED.

it cannot be allowed to exist upon a mere vague implication or inference. 463 refers only to machineries. by the parties' own stipulation of facts submitted before the court a quo. and a well-founded doubt is fatal to the claim. The petitioner failed to meet this requirement. The CA failed to offer any explanation for its conclusion nor does it discuss its own concept of the nature of the resolution.  However. which were enacted pursuant to P. 52 of P.  If it is to be considered as a tax ordinance. No. Jurado filed a special civil action for mandamus w/ damages to compel the issuance of the mayor’s permit and license and a petition for declaratory judgment against Res 9 and the implementing agreement for being illegal either as a donation/tax measure RTC: Upheld Res 9 and implementing agreement. it goes against the nature of a donation. Issue: WON the tax measure contravenes the limitations on the taxing powers of LGUs under Sec 5 of the LGC.  If Res. His payment was returned on the ground that he failed to comply with Res 9. Sec. As such. for every presumption is against it. Cagayan adopted Resolution No. 53 of the same decree. 426. 5 1973 Consti “subject to such limitation as may be provided by law” and (2) Art. To implement the resolution. it is admitted that Floro Cement Corporation is engaged in the manufacturing and selling. and other contributions from … private agencies and individuals”. 19 of P. in addition to the requisites for publication of ordinances in general 80 . 29 of PD 231 “…the barrio council may solicit monies. materials. 231 and P. Sec.Mabelle O. It must be shown indubitably to exist.. XI. It would include the holding of a public hearing on the measure. and since the taxes sought to be collected were levied on these activities pursuant to Sec. and dismissed claims for damages CA: Affirmed validity of Res 9 and implementing agreement. equipment. including exporting of cement. Municipal Treasurer Mapagu prepared an agreement to donate for signature of all thresher/owner/ operators applying for a mayor’s permit. 9 is claimed to be a “solicitation”: Implementing agreement makes the “donation”obligatory and a condition precedent to the issuance of a mayor’s permit.D. CA Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan of Camalaniugan. Such 1% shall come from the value of the palay threshed by them in the area. It is not cement that is mined only the mineral products composing the finished product.  As held by the lower court. 9 which solicits a 1% donation from thresher operators who apply for a “permit to thresh” within the municipality’s jurisdiction to help finance the construction of the municipality’s Sports and Nutrition Center. No. Mapagu refused to accept payment and required Jurado to first secure a mayor’s permit. tools for production. No. etc. 231. but found Mayor Tuzon and Treasurer Mapagu to have acted maliciously and in bad faith when they denied Jurado’s application. its subsequent approval by the Secretary of Finance. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests out some provision of law creating the right. it observes that that CA said no more than Res 9 was passed by the Sangguniang Bayan in the lawful exercise of its legislative powers in pursuance to (1) Art. The manufacture and the export of cement does not fall under the said provision for it is not a mineral product.  Furthermore. 4. Therefore.D. 5 and 10. respectively. The SC said that this was an oversimplification. Jurado ignored the requirement and sent his license fee payment through postal money order. it must be shown to have been enacted in accordance with the requirements of the Local Tax Code. No. as provided in Sec. the exemption mentioned in Sec.D. Mayor Tuzon said that Jurado should first comply with Res 9 and sign the agreement before the permit could be issued. properly apply to petitioner Floro Cement Corporation.D. Ordinances Nos. Jurado sent his agent to the Treasurer’s office to pay the license fee for thresher operators. Tuzon and Mapagu v.  SC will not rule on validity of Res 9 and the implementing agreement because the issue has not been raised as an assigned error.

He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law. however. That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal. a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local Autonomy Act. 81 . If the rules are not observed. That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law. Santos cited in the decision has no application here because the jurisdiction claimed by the Secretary of Local Governments over election contests in the Katipunan ng Mga Barangay was held to belong to the Commission on Elections by constitutional provision. Justice Secretary: It is constitutional and the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the LGC had indeed not been observed. not supervision or control. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code.  An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act.  Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and. that is. if warranted. he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. Provided. however. As we see it. which provided in its Section 2 as follows: A tax ordinance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day after its passage. but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. Lim Facts: Pursuant to Sec 187. the Manila RTC sustained the ordinance. otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code.  Taule v. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed. that was an act not of control but of mere supervision. declared Ordinance No. If they are not followed. the Secretary of Justice had. That the Secretary of Finance shall have authority to suspend the effectivity of any ordinance within one hundred and twenty days after receipt by 1 Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures. Secretary Drilon did precisely this. with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under the LGC. It also declared Section 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional since it vests in the Justice Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution. or charge levied therein: Provided. fee. In the opinion of the Court. The conflict was over jurisdiction. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. but he himself does not lay down such rules. That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof. unless the ordinance shall provide otherwise: Provided. to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. further. LGC1. In Manila’s petition for certiorari. What he found only was that it was illegal. on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer. he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. and so performed an act not of control but of mere supervision. Supervision does not cover such authority. and no more nor less than this. finally. YES. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Drilon v. he may. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. — The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided. the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance. Issue: WON Sec 187 of the LGC is constitutional. in his discretion. null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. 7794.  Significantly.Mabelle O. Mandatory Public Hearings.

it is unjust.  The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code is another matter. Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds. considering that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general 82 .  The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does not affect its validity. Q-1. of the tax measure. the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires provisions and noncompliance with the prescribed procedure in its enactment. oppressive or confiscatory. 5. and Q-3. He declared that all the procedural requirements had been observed in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code and that the City of Manila had not been able to prove such compliance before the Secretary only because he had given it only five days within which to gather and present to him all the evidence (consisting of 25 exhibits) later submitted to the trial court. conformably to Sec. M-2. Notices of the public hearings were sent to interested parties as evidenced by Exhibits G-1 to 17. the local legislative body may not reimpose the same tax or fee until such time as the grounds for the suspension thereof shall have ceased to exist.  That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity of a tax ordinance if. in his opinion. to with. 276(b) of the Implementing Rules of the LGC nor were copies of the proposed ordinance published in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation pursuant to Art. or confiscatory. We have carefully examined every one of these exhibits and agree with the trial court that the procedural requirements have indeed been observed. not the wisdom or reasonableness. Neither were copies of the measure as approved posted in prominent places in the city in accordance with Sec. All he is permitted to do is ascertain the constitutionality or legality of the tax measure. oppressive or confiscatory.Mabelle O. as shown by Exhibits Q. excessive. it would smack of control rather than mere supervision. 511(a) of the LGC.  Judge Palattao found otherwise. without the right to declare that. and the approved ordinance was published in the July 3. Secretary Drilon declared that there were no written notices of public hearings on the proposed Manila Revenue Code that were sent to interested parties as required by Art. excessive. Determination of these flaws would involve the exercise of judgment or discretion and not merely an examination of whether or not the requirements or limitations of the law had been observed. In his resolution. the tax or fee levied was unjust. 59(b) of the Code. Q-2. Exhibits B and C show that the proposed ordinances were published in the Balita and the Manila Standard on April 21 and 25. for a period of thirty days within which period the local legislative body may either modify the tax ordinance to meet the objections thereto. M1. either in part or as a whole. the Secretary of Justice is not given the same latitude under Section 187. The minutes of the hearings are found in Exhibits M. 4. Thereafter. 1993 issue of Balita. the Manila Revenue Code was not translated into Pilipino or Tagalog and disseminated among the people for their information and guidance. otherwise. or file an appeal with a court of competent jurisdiction. and M-3. if. hence. in his opinion. shall be considered as revoked.  To get to the bottom of this question. oppressive. Finally. That power was never questioned before this Court but. In fact. 276(a). These grounds affected the legality. He has no discretion on this matter. 1993 issues of the Manila Standard and in the July 6. No minutes were submitted to show that the obligatory public hearings had been held. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests him of a copy thereof. the Court acceded to the motion of the respondents and called for the elevation to it of the said exhibits. excessive. the tax ordinance or the part or parts thereof declared suspended. at any rate. 1993. respectively. in his opinion. the tax or fee therein levied or imposed is unjust. and when the said Secretary exercises this authority the effectivity of such ordinance shall be suspended. or when it is contrary to declared national economy policy.

it is exempted as provided for by Sec. claiming that it is exempt from payment of reality taxes. MCIAA paid the tax account under protest but it filed a petition for declaratory relief saying that the powers of LGUs do not extend to the levy of taxes or fees of any kind on an instrumentality of the national government. it has the power to impose. provides that the rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable and Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation. Nevertheless. this exemption was withdrawn by Sec. Thus. The City insisted that MCIAA is not tax exempt as its exemption had been withdrawn by Sections 193 and 234 of the 83 .  As a general rule. MCIAA objected. assess. PAGCOR. While it may be true that under its Charter MCIAA was exempt from the payment of reality taxes. MR denied. for instance. MCIAA: It is a GOCC mandated to perform functions in the same category as an instrumentality of the government and it is an attached agency of the DOTC. acknowledging in its very nature no limits. Such power is guaranteed by the Constitution and enhanced further by the LGC. It also said that as it is an instrumentality of the government performing governmental functions. Cebu: as local a government unit and a political subdivision. and collect taxes within its jurisdiction. its tax exemption privilege under its charter cannot be considered as withdrawn with the passage of the LGC because Sec 133 specifically states that the taxing powers of LGUs shall not extend to the levy of taxes or fees or charges of any kind on the national government. 234 does not distinguish between GOCCs performing governmental and purely proprietary functions. Issue 1. but this requirement applies to the approval of local development plans and public investment programs of the local government unit and not to tax ordinances. NO. In relation to Section 234. 234 of the LGC. levy. Sec. effective limitations thereon may be imposed by the people through their Constitutions. WON MCIAA is exempt from paying taxes. TC: dismissed the petition for declaratory relief. 133 of the LGC. Cebu has no power nor authority to impose realty taxes upon it based on Sec 133 of the LGC. So potent indeed is the power that it was once opined that "the power to tax involves the Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. The Office of the Treasurer of Cebu City demanded payment for realty taxes on several parcels of land belonging to MCIAA. same code.Mabelle O. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests circulation will satisfy due process. cites Basco v. its agencies or instrumentalities. it may stand in the same footing as an agency or instrumentality of the national government. It has also not been shown that the text of the ordinance has been translated and disseminated. Our Constitution. so that security against its abuse is to be found only in the responsibility of the legislature which imposes the tax on the constituency who are to pay it. of the LGC that the legislature meant to exclude instrumentalities of the national government from the taxing power of the local government units. Marcos Facts: MCIAA was created by RA 6958 which provided that it be exempted from payment of realty taxes. the power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in its range. Hence.

 There can be no question that under Section 14 of R. exemption therefrom is the exception. (v) a barangay. These exemptions are based on the ownership. A claim of exemption from tax payment must be clearly shown and based on language in the law too plain to be mistaken. Section 234 of LGC provides for the exemptions from payment of real property taxes and withdraws previous exemptions therefrom granted to natural and juridical persons. Article X of the Constitution. But since taxes are what we pay for civilized society. it may be exercised by local legislative bodies. directed and exclusively used for religious.  Among the "taxes" enumerated in the LGC is real property tax. (a) Ownership Exemptions. (iii) a city. and the exemption from taxation. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests power to destroy. The "taxes. agencies. character. direct and exclusive use to which they are devoted are: (i) all lands buildings and improvements which are actually. and instrumentalities. The only exception to this rule is where the exemption was granted to private parties based on material consideration of a mutual nature. the exercise of the power may be subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide which.  The power to tax is primarily vested in the Congress. especially in the light of the above enumeration. Article X of the constitution provides for the exercise by local government units of their power to tax. the rigid rule of construction does not apply because the practical effect of the exemption is merely to reduce the amount of money that has to be handled by the government in the course of its operations. the exemption may thus be withdrawn at the pleasure of the taxing authority. while "charges" are pecuniary liabilities such as rents or fees against person or property. Elsewise stated. 6958 the petitioner is exempt from the payment of realty taxes imposed by the National Government or any of its political subdivisions.Mabelle O. (ii) a province. charitable or 84 . (iv) a municipality. and (iii) non profit or religious cemeteries. which is governed by Section 232. if the grantee of the exemption is a political subdivision or instrumentality.  Section 133 of the LGC prescribes the common limitations on the taxing powers of local government units. which then becomes contractual and is thus covered by the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. hence they include all of these. No. unless otherwise provided by the LGC. fees or charges" referred to are "of any kind". except as provided therein. Exemptions from real property taxes on the basis of ownership are real properties owned by: (i) the Republic.A. (ii) houses and temples of prayer. Thus. The term "fees" means charges fixed by law or Ordinance for the regulation or inspection of business activity. however. in our jurisdiction. however. tax statutes must be construed strictly against the government and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. the law frowns against exemptions from taxation and statutes granting tax exemptions are thus construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayers and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. Exempted from real property taxes on the basis of their character are: (i) charitable institutions. Nevertheless. Exempted from real property taxes on the basis of the actual. taxation is the rule. and use of the property. Under the latter." Verily. (b) Character Exemptions. taxation is a destructive power which interferes with the personal and property for the support of the government. and (vi) registered cooperatives. (c) Usage exemptions. must be consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. no longer merely by virtue of a valid delegation as before. the scope thereof or its limitations. since taxation is the rule and exemption therefrom the exception. including government owned and controlled corporations. but pursuant to direct authority conferred by Section 5. The term "taxes" is well understood so as to need no further elaboration. or are the lifeblood of the nation. enacted pursuant to Section 3.  The LGC. Accordingly. However.

but not under Section 133. fees. except upon the effectivity of the LGC.  In light of the petitioner's theory that it is an "instrumentality of the Government". the exemption is withdrawn if the beneficial use of such property has been granted to taxable person for consideration or otherwise. On the other hand. has been withdrawn.A. . except those granted to local water districts. inter alia. directly and exclusively used or by local water districts or by government-owned or controlled corporations engaged in the supply and distribution of water and/or generation and transmission of electric power. undoubtedly. Section 193 of the LGC prescribes the general rule. or any of the Philippines. to a taxable person. including government-owned and controlled corporations. The latter proviso could refer to Section 234.Mabelle O. cities. R. 232 and 234 of the LGC. 6938. or charges of any kind on the National Government. viz. Since the last paragraph of Section 234 unequivocally withdrew. it necessarily follows that its exemption from such tax granted it in Section 14 of its charter. as shown above. the petitioner can no longer invoke the general rule in Section 133 that the taxing powers of the local government units cannot extend to the levy of: (o) taxes. No. "instrumentalities" and "agencies" or expediency we quote: (a) real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines. or any of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted. and the petitioner is. including government-owned or controlled corporations.A. they are withdrawn upon the effectivity of the LGC. the LGC authorizes local government units to grant tax exemption privileges. "real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial used thereof has been granted. as laid down in Section 133 the taxing powers of local government units cannot extend to the levy of inter alia. provinces. cooperatives duly registered under R. No. all others not included in the enumeration lost the privilege upon the effectivity of the LGC. upon the effectivity of the LGC. it could only be within be first item of the first paragraph of the section by expanding the scope of the terms Republic of the Philippines" to embrace . and unless otherwise provided in the LGC. and (iii) all machinery and equipment used for pollution control and environmental protection.  As to tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by natural or juridical persons. a governmentowned corporation. But the last paragraph of Section 234 further qualifies the retention of the exemption in so far as the real property taxes are concerned by limiting the retention only to those enumerated there-in. . fees. its agencies. Moreover. "taxes. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests educational purpose. . to a taxable person". This view does not 85 . we conclude that as a general rule. since. .  Reading together Section 133. however. municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila Area may impose the real property tax except on. non stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions. or any of its political subdivisions covered by item (a) of the first paragraph of Section 234. as it now asserts. .. or instrumentalities. and local government units". and charges of any kind of the National Government. which enumerates the properties exempt from real property tax. (ii) all machineries and equipment actually. except as provided in the said section. and local government units. its agencies and instrumentalties. exemptions from real property taxes granted to natural or juridical persons. the said section is qualified by Section 232 and 234. pursuant to Section 232.  Section 193 of the LGC is the general provision on withdrawal of tax exemption privileges. even as the real property is owned by the Republic of the Philippines. In short. for consideration or otherwise. Any claim to the contrary can only be justified if the petitioner can seek refuge under any of the exceptions provided in Section 234. for consideration or otherwise. 6958. as provided in item (a) of the first paragraph of Section 234.

Mabelle O. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests
persuade us. In the first place, the petitioner's claim that it is an instrumentality of the Government is based on Section 133(o), which expressly mentions the word "instrumentalities"; and in the second place it fails to consider the fact that the legislature used the phrase "National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities" "in Section 133(o),but only the phrase "Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivision "in Section 234(a).  The terms "Republic of the Philippines" and "National Government" are not interchangeable. The former is boarder and synonymous with "Government of the Republic of the Philippines" which the Administrative Code of the 1987 defines as the "corporate governmental entity though which the functions of the government are exercised through at the Philippines, including, saves as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous reason, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivision or other forms of local government." These autonomous regions, provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions" are the political subdivision.  On the other hand, "National Government" refers "to the entire machinery of the central government, as distinguished from the different forms of local Governments." The National Government then is composed of the three great departments the executive, the legislative and the judicial.  An "agency" of the Government refers to "any of the various units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein;" while an "instrumentality" refers to "any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy; usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and governmentowned and controlled corporations".  If Section 234(a) intended to extend the exception therein to the withdrawal of the exemption from payment of real property taxes under the last sentence of the said section to the agencies and instrumentalities of the National Government mentioned in Section 133(o), then it should have restated the wording of the latter. Yet, it did not Moreover, that Congress did not wish to expand the scope of the exemption in Section 234(a) to include real property owned by other instrumentalities or agencies of the government including governmentowned and controlled corporations is further borne out by the fact that the source of this exemption is Section 40(a) of P.D. No. 646, otherwise known as the Real Property Tax Code, which reads: Sec 40. Exemption from Real Property Tax. — The exemption shall be as follows: (a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions and any government-owned or controlled corporations so exempt by is charter: Provided, however, that this exemption shall not apply to real property of the above mentioned entities the beneficial use of which has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person.  Note that as a reproduced in Section 234(a), the phrase "and any government-owned or controlled corporation so exempt by its charter" was excluded. The justification for this restricted exemption in Section 234(a) seems obvious: to limit further tax exemption privileges, especially in light of the general provision on withdrawal of exemption from payment of real property taxes in the last paragraph of property taxes in the last paragraph of Section 234. These policy considerations are consistent with the State policy to ensure autonomy to local governments 33 and the objective of the LGC that they enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them effective

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partners in the attainment of national goals. The power to tax is the most effective instrument to raise needed revenues to finance and support myriad activities of local government units for the delivery of basic services essential to the promotion of the general welfare and the enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the people. It may also be relevant to recall that the original reasons for the withdrawal of tax exemption privileges granted to government-owned and controlled corporations and all other units of government were that such privilege resulted in serious tax base erosion and distortions in the tax treatment of similarly situated enterprises, and there was a need for this entities to share in the requirements of the development, fiscal or otherwise, by paying the taxes and other charges due from them. Secretary of Finance v. Ilarde Facts: Cabaluna failed to pay land taxes. A breakdown of the computation of the delinquent taxes and penalties on his lots and residential house as reflected in the various receipts issued by the City Treasurer's Office of Iloilo City, shows that more than twentyfour percent (24%) of the delinquent taxes were charged and collected by way of penalties. Cabaluna paid his land taxes and the corresponding receipts were issued to him by the City Treasurer's Office with the notation "paid under protest." Cabaluna filed a formal letter of protest with the City Treasurer of Iloilo City wherein he contends that the City Treasurer's computation of penalties was erroneous since the rate of penalty applied exceeded twenty-four percent (24%) in contravention of Section 66 of P.D. No. 464, otherwise known as the Real Property Tax Code, as amended. In response, however, Assistant City Treasurer Tulio, for and in behalf of the City Treasurer of Iloilo, turned down private respondent's protest, citing Sec. 4(c) of Joint Assessment Regulations No. 1-85 and Local Treasury Regulations No. 2-85 of the then Ministry (now Department) of Finance. which reads: Sec. 4. Computation of Penalties on Delinquent Real Property Taxes. – (a) Unless condoned, wholly or partially, in a duly approved resolution of the Local Sanggunian, delinquent real property taxes shall be subject to penalty at the rate of two per cent (2%) for every month of delinquency, provided that the total penalty for one tax year shall not exceed twenty-four percent (24%). (b) Failure to pay on time at least the first quarter installment of the real property tax shall constitute a waiver on the part of the property owner or administrator to avail of the privilege granted by law for him to pay without penalty his annual realty tax obligation in four (4) equal installment on or before the end of every quarter of the tax year. Accordingly, if the portion of the real property tax due for the first quarter of tax year is not paid on or before the thirty-first day of March of the same year, the penalty shall be reckoned from the first day of January at the rate of two per cent (2%) for every month of delinquency on the basis of the total amount due for the entire year and not only on the amount due for the said first quarter of the tax year. (c) The penalty of two percent (2%) per month of delinquency, or twenty-four percent (24%) per annum, as the case may be, shall continue to be imposed on the unpaid tax from the time the delinquency was incurred up to the time that it is paid for in full. Cabaluna filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Damages on 06 July 1993 before the sala of respondent Judge, assailing Joint Assessment Regulations No. 1-85 and Local Treasury Regulations No. 2-85 which, according to him, flouted Section 66 of P.D. No. 464 which fixed the maximum penalty for delinquency in the payment of real estate taxes at 24% of the delinquent tax. RTC: Section 4(c) of Joint Assessment Regulation No. 1-85 and Local Treasury Regulation No. 2-85 null and void. Penalty that should be imposed for delinquency in the payment of real property taxes should be two per centum on the amount of the delinquent tax for each month of delinquency or fraction thereof, until the delinquent tax is fully paid but in no case shall the total penalty exceed twenty-four per centum of the delinquent tax as provided for in Section 66 of P.D. 464 otherwise known as the Real Property Tax Code. Issue: WON Joint Assessment Regulations No. 1-85 and Local Treasury Regulations No. 2-85 are valid. NO.  The subject Regulations must be struck down for being repugnant to Section 66 of P.D. No. 464 or the Real Property Tax Code, which provides: “That in no case shall the total penalty exceed twenty-four per centum of the delinquent tax. The rate of penalty for

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tax delinquency fixed herein shall be uniformly applied in all provinces and cities.”  Upon the other hand, Section 4(c) of the challenged Joint Assessment Regulations No. 1-85 and Local Treasury Regulations No. 2-85 issued by respondent Secretary (formerly Minister) of Finance provides that "the penalty of two percent (2%) per month of delinquency or twenty-four percent (24%) per annum as the case may be, shall continue to be imposed on the unpaid tax from the time the delinquency was incurred up to the time that the delinquency is paid for in full." As adeptly observed by the trial court, the penalty imposed under the assailed Regulations has no limit inasmuch as the 24% penalty per annum shall be continuously imposed on the unpaid tax until it is paid for in full unlike that imposed under Section 66 of the Real Property Tax Code where the total penalty is limited only to twenty-four percent of the delinquent tax. * The secretary anchors his claim on EO73 "The Minister of Finance shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to implement this Executive Order." E.O. No. 73 did not touch at all on the topic of amendment of rates of delinquent taxes or the amendment of rates of penalty on delinquent taxes. Neither did E.O. No. 1019 directly or indirectly vest upon the Department of Finance the right to fiddle with the rates of penalty to be assessed on delinquency taxes as contained in the Real Property Tax Code. Despite the promulgation of E.O. No. 73, P.D. No. 464 in general and Section 66 in particular, remained to be good law. NO repeal by implication itcab! Assuming argumenti that E.O. No. 73 has authorized the petitioner to issue the objected Regulations, such conferment of powers is void for being repugnant to the wellencrusted doctrine in political law that the power of taxation is generally vested with the legislature. The power delegated to the executive branch, in this case the Ministry of Finance, to lay down implementing rules must, nevertheless, be germane to the general law it seeks to apply. The implementing rules cannot add to or detract from the provisions of the law it is designed to implement. * the fact that private respondent Cabaluna was responsible for the issuance and implementation of Regional Office Memorandum Circular No. 04-89 which implemented Joint Assessment Regulations No. 1-85 and Local Treasury Regulations No. 2-85 does not put him in estoppel from seeking the nullification of said Regulations at this point.

Benguet Corporation v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals Facts: BC seeks to annul and set aside the Decision of the CBAA of May 28, 1991, as well as the Resolution of July 1, 1991, denying its motion for reconsideration, which affirmed the decision of respondent Local Board of Assessment Appeals of the Province of Benguet declaring as valid the tax assessments made by the Municipal Assessor of Itogon, Benguet, on the bunkhouses of petitioner occupied as dwelling by its rank and file employees based on Tax Declarations Nos. 8471 and 10454. The Provincial Assessor of Benguet, through the Municipal Assessor of Itogon, assessed real property tax on the bunkhouses of petitioner Benguet Corporation occupied for residential purposes by its rank and file employees under Tax Declarations Nos. 8471 (effective 1985) and 10454 (effective 1986). According to the Provincial Assessor, the tax exemption of bunkhouses under Sec. 3 (a), P.D. 7452 (Liberalizing the Financing and Credit Terms for Low Cost Housing Projects of Domestic Corporations and Partnerships) , was withdrawn by P.D. 19553 (Withdrawing, Subject to Certain Conditions, the Duty and Tax Privileges Granted to Private Business Enterprises and/or Persons Engaged in Any Economic Activity, and Other Purposes). Petitioner appealed the assessment on Tax

2

"Section 3. Pursuant to the above incentive, such domestic corporations and partnerships shall enjoy tax exemption on: (a) real estate taxes on the improvements which will be used exclusively for housing their employees and workers . . ."

3

"Section 1. The provisions of any special or general law to the contrary notwithstanding, all exemptions from or any preferential treatment in the payment of duties, taxes, fees, imposts and other charges heretofore granted to private business enterprises and/or persons engaged in any economic activity are hereby withdrawn, except those enjoyed by the following: . . . (e) Those that will be approved by the President of the Philippines upon the recommendation of the Minister of Finance,"

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Declarations Nos. 8471 and 10454 to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals (LBAA) of the Province of Benguet, docketed as LBAA Cases Nos. 42 and 43, respectively. Both were heard jointly. Meanwhile, the parties agreed to suspend hearings in LBAA Cases Nos. 42 and 43 to await the outcome of another case, LBAA Case No. 41, covering Tax Declaration No. 3534 (effective 1984), which involved the same parties and issue until the appeal was decided by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA). On July 15, 1986, CBAA handed down its decision in LBAA Case No. 41 holding that the buildings of petitioner used as dwellings by its rank and file employees were exempt from real property tax pursuant to P.D. 745. Thereafter, the proceedings in LBAA Cases Nos. 42 and 43 proceeded after which a decision was rendered affirming the taxability of subject property of petitioner. On appeal, CBAA sustained the decision holding that the realty tax exemption under P.D. 745 was withdrawn by P.D. 1955 and E.O. 93, so that petitioner should have applied for restoration of the exemption with the Fiscal Incentives Review Board (FIRB) The decision of CBAA clarified that Case No. 41 was different because it was effective prior to 1985, hence, was not covered by P.D. 1955 nor by E.O. 93. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied with CBAA holding that petitioner's "classification" of P.D. 745 is unavailing because P.D. 1955 and E.O. 93 do not discriminate against the socalled "social statutes". Hence, this petition. SC: should be read in connection with Ministry Order No. 39-84, Sec. 1 (d), of the then Ministry of Finance, which took effect October 15, 1984, states: "Section 1. The withdrawal of exemptions from, or any preferential treatment in, the payment of duties, taxes, fees, imposts and other charges as provided for under Presidential Decree No. 1955, does not apply to exemptions or preferential treatment embodied in the following laws: . . . (d) The Real Property Tax Code . . ." Executive Order No. 93, promulgated December 17, 1986, is also to the same effect. Both P.D. 1955 and F.O. 93 operate as wholesale withdrawal of tax incentives granted to private entities so that the government may re-examine existing tax exemptions and restore through the "review mechanism" of the Fiscal Incentives Review Board only those that are consistent with declared economic policy. Thus wise, the chief revenue source of the government will not be greatly, if not unnecessarily, eroded since tax exemptions that were granted on piecemeal basis, and which have lost relevance to existing programs, are eliminated. Issues: 1. WON respondent Assessors may validly assess real property tax on the properties of petitioner considering the proscription in The Local Tax Code (P.D 231) and the Mineral Resources Development Decree of 1974 (P.D. 463) against imposition of taxes on mines by local governments. YES.  On the first issue, petitioner contends that local government units are without any authority to levy realty taxes on mines pursuant to Sec. 52 of P.D. 463, which states: Sec. 52. Power to Levy Taxes on Mines Mining Operations and Mineral Products. Any law to the contrary notwithstanding, no province, city, municipality, barrio or municipal district shall levy and collect taxes, fees, rentals, royalties or charges of any kind whatsoever on mines, mining claims, mineral products, or any operation, process or activity connected, therewith, and Sec. 5 (m) of The Local Tax Code, as amended by P.D. 426 (reiterated in Secs. 17 [d] and 22 [c], same Code), which provides: Sec. 5. Common limitations on the taxing powers of local governments. The exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities and barrios shall not extend to the imposition of the following: . . . (m) Taxes on mines, mining operations; and minerals, mineral products, and their by-products when sold domestically by the operator.  The Solicitor General observes that the petitioner is estopped from raising the question of lack of authority to issue the challenged assessments inasmuch as it was never raised before, hence, not passed upon by, the municipal and provincial assessors, LBAA and CBAA. This observation is well taken. The rule that the issue of jurisdiction over subject matter may be raised anytime, even during appeal, has been qualified where its application results in mockery of the tenets of fair play, as in this case when the issue could have been disposed of earlier and more authoritatively by any of the respondents who are supposed to be experts in the field of realty tax assessment. As We held in Suarez v. Court of Appeals: . . . It is settled that any

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decision rendered. without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on appeal before this Court. The only exception is where the party raising the issue is barred by estoppel.  Tijam v. Sibonghanoy: While petitioner could have prevented the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the case by seasonably taking exception thereto, they instead involved the very same jurisdiction by filing an answer and seeking affirmative relief from it. What is more, they participated in the trial of the case by crossexamining respondent. Upon the premises, petitioner cannot now be allowed belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the court to which they had submitted themselves voluntarily  Aguinaldo Industries Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Court of Tax Appeals:"To allow a litigant to assume a different posture when he comes before the court and challenge the position he had accepted at the administrative level, would be to sanction a procedure whereby the court which is supposed to review administrative determinations would not review, but determine and decide for the first time, a question not raised at the administrative forum. This cannot be permitted, for the same reason that underlies the requirement of prior exhaustion of administrative remedies to give administrative authorities the prior opportunity to decide controversies within its competence, and in much the same way that, on the judicial level, issues not raised in the lower court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal."  Besides, the special civil action of certiorari is available to pass upon the determinations of administrative bodies where patent denial of due process is alleged as a consequence of grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction, or question of law is raised and no appeal is available. In this case, petitioner may not complain of denial of due process since it had enough opportunity, but opted not, to raise the issue of jurisdiction in any of the administrative bodies to which the case may have been brought. BC: realty taxes are local taxes because they are levied by local government units; citing Sec. 39 of P.D. 464, which provides: Sec. 39. Rates of Levy. The provincial, city or municipal board or council shall fix a uniform rate of real property tax applicable to their respective localities . . . While local government units are charged with fixing the rate of real property taxes, it does not necessarily follow from that authority the determination of whether or not to impose the tax. In fact, local governments have no alternative but to collect taxes as mandated in Sec. 38 of the Real Property Tax Code, which states: Sec. 38. Incidence of Real Property Tax. There shall be levied, assessed and collected in all provinces, cities and municipalities an annual ad valorem tax on real property, such as land, buildings, machinery and other improvements affixed or attached to real property not hereinafter specifically exempted." It is thus clear from the foregoing that it is the national government, expressing itself through the legislative branch, that levies the real property tax. Consequently, when local governments are required to fix the rates, they are merely constituted as agents of the national government in the enforcement of the Real Property Tax Code. The delegation of taxing power is not even involved here because the national government has already imposed realty tax in Sec. 38 above-quoted, leaving only the enforcement to be done by local governments. The challenge of petitioner against the applicability of Meralco Securities Industrial Corporation v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals, et al., 3 is unavailing, absent any cogent reason to overturn the same. Thus "Meralco Securities argues that the realty tax is a local tax or levy and not a tax of general application. This argument is untenable because the realty tax has always been imposed by

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the lawmaking body and later by the President of the Philippines in the exercise of his lawmaking powers, as shown in Sections 342 et seq. of the Revised Administrative Code, Act No. 3995, Commonwealth Act No 470 and Presidential Decree No. 464. "The realty tax is enforced throughout the Philippines and not merely in a particular municipality or city but the proceeds of the tax accrue to the province, city, municipality and barrio where the realty taxed is situated (Sec. 86, P.D. No. 464). In contrast, a local tax is imposed by the municipal or city council by virtue of the Local Tax Code, Presidential Decree No. 231, which took effect on July 1, 1973 (69 O.G. 6197)."  Consequently, the provisions of Sec. 52 of the Mineral Resources Development Decree of 1974 (P.D. 463), and Secs. 5 (m), 17 (d) and 22 (c) of The Local Tax Code (P.D. 231) cited by petitioner are mere limitations on the taxing power of local government units, they are not pertinent to the issue before Us and, therefore, cannot and should not affect the imposition of real property tax by the national government. 2. WON the real tax exemption granted under P.D. 745 (promulgated July 15, 1975) was withdrawn by P.D. 1955 (took effect October 15, 1984) and E.O. 93. YES.  Court held that it has no recourse but to apply the express provision of P.D. No. 1955 and rule in favor of the withdrawal of the real property tax exemption provided under P.D. No. 745.  As regards the second issue, petitioner, which claims that E.O. 93 does not repeal social statutes like P.D. 745, in the same breath takes refuge in Sec. 1 (e) of the same E.O. 93, to wit: Section 1. The provisions of any general or special law to the contrary notwithstanding, all tax and duty incentives granted to government and private entities are hereby withdrawn except: . . . (e) those conferred under the four basic codes, namely: . . . (iv) the Real Property Tax Code, as amended . . . in relation to Sec. 40 of the Real Property Tax Code, which provides: Sec. 40. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. The exemption shall be as follows: . . . (g) Real property exempt under other laws, and concluding that P.D. 745 is one of the "other laws" referred to. We do not agree. If We are to sanction this interpretation, then necessarily all real properties exempt by any law would be covered, and there would be no need for the legislature to specify "Real Property Tax Code, as amended", instead of stating clearly "realty tax exemption laws". Indubitably, the intention is to limit the application of the "exception clause" only to those conferred by the Real Property Tax Code. This is not only a logical construction of the provisions but more so in keeping with the principle of statutory construction that tax exemptions are construed strictly against taxpayers, hence, they cannot be created by mere implication but must be clearly provided by law. Nonexemption, in case of doubt, is favored. Quite obviously, the exception in Sec. 1 (e), (iv), of E.O. 93, refers to "those conferred under . . . Real Property Tax Code, as amended", and that the exemption claimed by petitioner is granted not by the Real Property Tax Code but by P.D. 745. When Sec. 40 (g) of the Property Tax Code provides that "[T]he exemption shall be as follows: . . . Real Property exempt under other laws". the Code merely recognizes realty tax exemptions provided by other laws, otherwise, it may unwittingly repeal those "other laws". The argument of petitioner that P.D. 745 is a social statute to give flesh to the Constitutional provisions on housing, hence, not covered by P.D. 1955, was squarely met by respondent CBAA in its Resolution of July 1, 1991, to which We fully agree "The phrase 'any special or general law' explicitly indicates that P.D. No. 1955 did not distinguish between a social statute and an economic or tax legislation. Hence, where the law does not distinguish, we cannot distinguish. In view thereof, we have no recourse but to apply the express provision of P.D. No. 1955 and rule in favor of the withdrawal of the real property tax

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3 par. therefore. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests exemption provided under P. . plaintiff is 92 . 4. There is justification in the contention of plaintiff-appellee that . CFI: Cebu to refund the real estate taxes paid by NDC for the parcel of land covered by Presidential Proclamation No. Jose Yulo Tobias." National Development Co. and is subject to taxation. it was held that .31 was paid by NDC of which only P3.A. was constructed thereon. On 20 March 1970. No. 745 also speaks of investment incentives in Sections 2 and 3 thereof . on which NDC claims real estate tax exemption. No. — The exemptions shall be as follows: (a) Property owned by the United States of America. a warehouse with a floor area of 1. In part. By the first quarter of 1970. provides — Section 3. 1966 CA: certified the case to SC as one involving pure questions of law. NWC dissolved.316. par (a). . If the National Development Company would be exempt from paying real property taxes over these properties. its primary aim is the formulation of national recovery program to meet and overcome the grave emergency arising from the current economic crisis. R. . Cebu did not acquiesce in the demand. No. 17. pursuant to Sec. . Although Section 20 of said B. Province of Nueva Ecija where We held that its properties were not comprehended in Sec. 296. whether NDC may recover in refund unprotested real estate taxes it paid from 1948 to 1970. city. hence. .D. which authorizes the President to restructure investment incentives systems/legislation s to align them with the overall economic development objectives is one of the declared policies of P. it is an entity different from the government. Besides. 3. the town of Gabaldon will be deprived of much needed revenues with which it will maintain itself and finance the compelling needs of its inhabitants 2. any province. 7 SCRA 692.D. We stated: 1. . the scope of P. Cebu City Facts: Proclamation No.P. 430 was issued by the President which reserved Block no. it is noted that P. Commencing 1948. the present suit filed 25 October 1972 in the Court of First Instance of Manila. Subsequently. 1955 is limited to investment incentives.P. it cannot be maintained that its provisions apply only to investment incentives. 1939. (a).D. NDC took over. and in the affirmative. of the Assessment Law. No. 1955. .599 square meters. Hence. of Cebu City. No. municipality at municipal district . In the case NDC vs. [I]t is undeniable that to any municipality the principal source of revenue with which it would defray its operation will came from real property taxes. and in this sense. Issue: WON NDC is exempted from payment of the real estate taxes on the land reserved by the President for warehousing purposes as well as the warehouse constructed thereon. 1955. 745.  Section. v.940 square meters more or less. consisting of 4.D. and the warehouse erected thereon from and after October 25. of the Assessment Law. a total of P100. the Commonwealth of the Philippines.895.  The same opinion of NDC was passed upon in National Development Co. 391 (Investment Incentives Policy Act of 1983) is the source and reason for the existence of P. Property exempt from tax.06 was under protest.D. even granting that its scope is limited. . defendant corporation may be sued without its consent. NDC wrote the City Assessor demanding full refund of the real estate taxes paid claiming that the land and the warehouse standing thereon belonged to the Republic and therefore exempt from taxation. No. . 430 of August 10. We also find without merit the contention of PetitionerAppellan t that B. . v. Reclamation Area No. for warehousing purposes under the administration of National Warehousing Corporation.Mabelle O. 182 which created NDC contains no provision exempting it from the payment of real estate tax on properties it may acquire . 4. Commonwealth Act No. Defendant-appellant NDC does not come under classification of municipal or public corporation in the sense that it may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private corporations. Cebu assessed and collected from NDC real estate taxes on the land and the warehouse thereon.

For. CTA and NWSA. be stated that tax exemption of property owned by the Republic of the Philippines "refers to properties owned by the Government and by its agencies which do not have separate and distinct personalities (unincorporated entities). mortgage and alienate personal and real property in the Philippines or elsewhere. mining.Mabelle O. supra. and other enterprises which may be necessary or contributory to the economic development of the country. hold. like most GOCC's engages in commercial enterprises all properties of the government and its unincorporated agencies possessed in propriety character are taxable. " Hence. 1383. while the BAA ruling concerns properties belonging to the Republic. while it may be stated that the Republic owns NDC.  NDC cites Board of Assessment Appeals. as amended by Commonwealth Act 311) pursuant to Section 3 of which it "shall be subject to the provisions of the Corporation Law insofar as they are not inconsistent" with the provisions of said Commonwealth Act. The latter case appears to be exceptional because the parties therein stipulated 1. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests neither the Government of the Republic nor a branch or subdivision thereof. "and shall have the general powers mentioned in said" Corporation Law. although referring to lands which would eventually be transferred to private individuals. "may engage in commercial. should not apply equally to this case. supra." as well as "acquire. No. and BAA v. is apparent from its Organic Act (Commonwealth Act 182.  The foregoing discussion does not mean that because NDC.  The conflict between NDC v. the Court observed: "It is conceded. and that it is owned by the Government of the Philippines as well as all property comprising waterworks and sewerage systems placed under it (Emphasis supplied). . 3. . hence. cannot invoke the exemptions thereof –– but is an agency for the performance of purely corporate. ownership of subject properties should first be established. We held that properties of NWSA. Nueva Ecija. There. like any individual. In that case. 93 . industrial. proprietary or business functions. it is a business corporation. The NDC decision speaks of properties owned by NDC. . hence. that the property involved in this case "is owned by the Government of the Philippines. Court of Tax Appeal and National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NWSA). Province of Laguna v. were exempt from real estate tax because Sec.A. and."  In the case at bar. permit greater independence and flexibility in its operations. The separate personality allows a GOCC to hold and possess properties in its own name and. thus. it does not necessary follow that properties owned by NDC. may form a corporation with personality and existence distinct from its own. are also owned by Republic — in the same way that stockholders are not ipso factoowners of the properties of their corporation.  The Republic. a GOCC. make contracts of any kind and description" . . in the stipulation of facts. That plaintiff herein does not exercise sovereign powers — and. it belongs to the Republic of the Philippines and falls squarely within letter of the above provision. . and as such. but a government owned and controlled corporation which cannot be said to exercise a sovereign function. its causes of action are subject to the statute of limitations. That the petitioner National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA) is a public corporation created by virtue of Republic Act. of R. is more superficial than real. no similar statement appears in the stipulation of facts."  We find no compelling reason why the foregoing ruling. therefore. . and "perform any and all acts which a corporation or natural persons is authorized to perform under the laws now existing or which may be enacted hereafter. 470 did not distinguish between those possessed by the government in sovereign/governmen tal/political capacity and those in private/proprietary /patrimonial character. par (c). It may. agricultural. hence. or important in the public interest.

hence. the warehouse constructed on the reserved land by NWC (now under administration by NDC).  Since the reservation is exempt from realty tax. par. therefore. CEBU argues that in any case NDC is not entitled to refund because Sec. .A. the erroneous tax payments collected by Cebu should be refunded to NDC. indeed. As We view it. 83 is to segregate a piece of public land and transform it into non-alienable or non-disposable under the Public Land Act." Consequently. of the Assessment Law. 3 of the Assessment Law. 3. consequently.  As regards the requirement of paying under protest before judicial recourse. Cebu: reservation of the property in favor of NWC or NDC is a form of disposition of public land which. there having been no appropriate prior demand. 436. whether for proprietary or sovereign purposes. applies to disposable public lands. 3857. becomes immaterial. the effect of reservation under Sec. 83. Clearly. in the case at bar. and these are taxable by the state . resort to judicial remedy is premature. and once government ownership is determined. requires paymentunder protest before resorting to judicial action for tax refund. NDC has yet to exhaust administrative remedies by way of appeal to the Department of Finance and/or Auditor General before taking judicial action. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Similarly. at their own expense.     94 . as well as any GOCC so exempt by its charter. . A reserved land is defined as a "[p]ublic land that has been withheld or kept back from sale or disposition. it merely means "a withdrawal of a specified portion of the public domain from disposal under the land laws and the appropriation thereof. that. or occupants." Absolute disposition of land is not implied from reservation. Incidentally. a different rule should apply because "[t]he exemption of public property from taxation does not extend to improvements on the public lands made by pre-emptioners. to some particular use or purpose of the general government. should properly be assessed real estate tax as such improvement does not appear to belong to the Republic." As its title remains with the Republic. This is in consonance with Sec. for the time being. (a). the reserved land is clearly recovered by the tax exemption provision. that it could not have acted on the first demand letter of NDC of 20 May 1970 because it was sent to the City Assessor and not to the City Treasurer. in the case before Us. 75 of R. and. 115 of the Public Land Act. 115 does not apply to lands reserved under Sec.A. the subject reserved public land remains tax exempt. 430." The government "does not part with its title by reserving them (lands). it is important to establish that the property is owned by the government or its unincorporated agency. To come within the ambit of the exemption provided in Art.  As regards the warehouse constructed on a public reservation. " The land remains "absolute property of the government. but simply gives notice to all the world that it desires them for a certain purpose. the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu. the parties never raised the issued the issue of ownership from the court a quo to this Court. subjects the recipient (NDC ) to real estate taxation under Sec. the nature of the use of the property. NDC proceeded on the premise that the BAA ruling declared all properties owed by GOCC's as properties in the name of the Republic. exempt under Sec. Sec. as amended by R. that even on the premise that there was proper demand. (a) of the former Real Property Tax Code which exempted from taxation real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions. 40. is merely the administration of the property while the government retains ownership of what has been declared reserved for warehousing purposes under Proclamation No. par. homesteaders and other claimants. What appears to have been ceded to NWC (later transferred to NDC). on the other hand.Mabelle O. Consequently. Section 115.

D. heat and power shall be two (2%) of their gross receipts received from the sale of electric current and from transactions incident to the generation. This prompted TE to file a motion praying that petitioner be directed to desist from proceeding with the public auction sale. No. the franchise tax payable by all grantees of franchises to generate. Its pertinent provisions state: SECTION 1. v. light.D."  We do not agree with the lower court that the phrase "in lieu of all taxes and assessments of whatever nature" in the second paragraph of Sec. distribution and sale of electric current."  P. City of Butuan: the court ruled that local-governments are without power to tax the electric companies already subject to franchise tax unless their franchise allows the imposition of additional tax. subjects of the complaint. 1 of P. Inc.D. No. Sets. distribute and sell electric current for light. . TE moved to dismiss. paragraph (g) of PD 464 in relation to P. the Real Property Tax Code: SEC.D. an ice drop factory. be in lieu of all taxes assessments of whatever nature imposed by any national or authority on earnings. it being a grantee of a franchise to generate. Real estate taxes of the aforesaid properties from 1974 to December 31. distribution and sale of city gas" between the phrases ". it was exempt from paying said tax. 551. LC: issued an order granting said motion to prevent mootness of the case considering that the properties to be sold were the. Thereafter.D. Province of Tarlac v. 464 in relation to P.Mabelle O. . Tarlac. . 551 (Lowering the Cost to Consumers of Electricity by Reducing the Franchise Tax Payable by Electric Franchise Holders and the Tariff on Fuel Oils for the Generation of Electric Power by Public Utilities). any provision of the Local Tax Code or any other law to the contrary notwithstanding. NO. No. 551. 1982. as amended.D. a machinery shed all located at Mabini. heat and power" and "shall be two (2%) . real property taxes had been made but it refused to pay the same for the reason that under Sec. 852 10 with the insertion of the phrase "and for the manufacture.435. distribution and sale of electric current.. Tarlac. No. No. 40. The court held that in lieu of said taxes. As correctly observed by the petitioner. No. Tarlac set the auction sale of TE's properties to satisfy the real estate taxes due. LC denied. 40.55 including principals and penalties has not been paid. LC: dismissed the complaint. No. The exemption shall be as follows:(g) Real property exempt under other laws. in the total amount of P532. MR: denied. Tarlac now prays for payment as well as damages and costs of suit. 1975 by P. ISSUE: WON TE is exempt from the payment of real property tax under Sec. TE contends that the "other laws" referred to in this Section is P. Any provision of law or local ordinance to the contrary notwithstanding. MR denied. It ruled that P. said proviso is 95 .D. 551 expressly exempts private respondent from paying real property taxes. machinery of Diesel Elect. income and privilege of generation. No. receipts. as amended. distribute and sell electric current for light. 551 expressly exempts private respondent from paying the real property taxes demanded. 551 was amended on December 19. . . Exemptions from Real Property Tax. 40(g) of P.D.  Such franchise tax shall be payable to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or his duly authorized representative on or before the twentieth day of the month following the end of each calendar quarter or month as may be provided in the respective franchise or pertinent municipal regulation and shall. 40 (g) of P. 464.  Sec. TE’s answer: demands for the payment of. Judge Alcantara Facts: Tarlac Enterprises is the owner of a parcel of land. No. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests  NDC exempt from real estate tax on the reserved land but liable for the warehouse erected thereon. Butuan Sawmill.D. private respondent had been required to pay two percent (2%) franchise tax in line with the intent of the law to give assistance to operators such as the private respondent to enable the consumers to enjoy cheaper rates. abandoned or otherwise extinguished or barred by the statute of limitations.. It also raised as affirmative defenses that the complaint stated no cause of action and that the claims had been waived.

No. 852 deals with franchise tax and tariff on fuel oils and the "earnings." On the other hand. shall be collected from business holding franchises but not from establishments whose franchise contains the in lieu of all taxes' proviso. viz. Lastly.D. 35-74 dated September 16. the machinery for the generation and distribution of electric power. 551 as amended by P. distribution and sale of electric current" are the items exempted from taxation by the imposition of said tax or tariff duty. No. No. No. receipts. income and privilege of generation.D. 2(j) of the Local Autonomy Act from imposing "taxes of any kind…on person paying franchise tax. the letter of the then BIR Acting Commissioner addressed to the Matic Law Office granting exemption to the latter's client from paying the "privilege tax which is an excise tax on the privilege of engaging in business" clearly excludes realty tax from such exemption. No. Private respondent apparently does not quite comprehend the distinction among the subject matters or objects of the taxes involved. " to construe said decree as having granted such franchise holders exemption from payment of real property tax would unduly extend the ambit of exemptions beyond the purview of the law. 551 merely reiterates the "in lieu of all taxes" proviso. 852 was enacted to amend P. and the land on which said building is constructed. It bears emphasis that P. distribution and sale" which specifies the kinds of taxes and assessments which shall not be collected in view of the imposition of the franchise tax. In that case." thereby clearly indicating that said proviso exempts taxpayers like private respondent from paying the franchise tax collected by the provinces under the Local Tax Code. On the other hand.. Department Order No. P.  If the intention of the law is to exempt electric franchise grantees from paying real property tax and to make the two (2%) percent franchise tax the only imposable tax.  We also find misplaced the lower court's and the private respondent's reliance on Butuan Sawmill. 551 was intended to give "assistance to the franchise holders by reducing some of their tax and tariff obligations.D.  The annexes attached to private respondent's comment on the petition to prove by contemporaneous interpretation its claimed tax exemption are not of much help to it. then said enumerated items would not have been added when P. City of Butuan. Said enumerated items upon which taxes shall not be imposed. receipts. have no relation at all to. therefore.D. The City of Butuan is categorically prohibited therein by Sec.  We likewise do not find merit in private respondent's contention that the real properties being taxed. real properties subject to tax. 551. they should be exempted from taxation. the collection complaint filed by petitioner specified only taxes due on real properties. it went on to enumerate what should not be subject to tax thereby delimiting the extent of the exemption. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests modified and delimited by the phrase "on earnings. While P. the building housing said machinery. No. 551 is not as all-encompassing as said provision of the Local Autonomy Act for it enumerates the items which are not taxable by virtue of the payment of franchise tax. are necessary for the operation of its business of generation. 1974 regulating the implementation of P.Mabelle O. The legislative authority would have simply stopped after the phrase "national or local authority" by putting therein a period. Local Tax Regulations 3-75 12 issued by then Secretary of Finance Cesar Virata and addressed to all Provincial and City Treasurers enjoins strict compliance with the directive that "the franchise tax imposed under Local Tax Ordinances pursuant to Section 19 of the Local Tax Code. income and privilege of generation.D. 96 . and are entirely different from. distribution and sale of electric current and. No. the questioned tax is a tax on the gross sales or receipts of said sawmill while the tax involved herein is a real property tax. v. On the contrary.D.D. as amended.

Casiño v. noticeably omitting the ice drop factory mentioned in its complaint by the petitioner. an action for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction was filed by Gallera before the RTC against petitioner. Gingoog Gallera protested the operation of Coliseum before the Philippine Gamefowl Commission. issued to petitioner the aforestated permit to operate a cockpit dated April 2. The classification led to the cancellation of Casiño’s license to operate such cockpit. on the ground that Resolution No. the same should be considered waived. machinery shed and machinery. However. of the petitioner's failure to assign such omission as an error. The ordinance provides that changes in the zoning ordinance as a result of the review by the Local Review Committee shall be treated as an amendment provided that such is carried out through a resolution of three fourths vote of the SP. Thereafter. 1986. The vice-mayor. although city mayor's permits were issued to petitioner. the lower court found that private respondent owns only three real properties consisting of the parcel of land. however. Code Ordinance. the PGC eventually sent a telegram to the city mayor to stop any cockfight in the Coliseum in view of its failure to register with the PGC. By virtue of said Resolution No. reclassified Block 125 as within the recreational zone. Mayor Lugod. Series of 1985. including Casiño’s coliseum which was licensed as a cockpit. On August 13. thereby 97 . 378. he returned the same to the SP within ten days. broke the deadlock by voting for the amendment. with four (4) members voting for the amendment. through OIC Orog sent a telegram to the Station Commander of Gingoog City to suspend in the meantime the operation of the cockpit.Mabelle O. in its decision. 1987. 378. It asserted that the classification of Coliseum's site as still within the residential zone of Gingoog City was accordingly maintained and unchanged. 1986. On April 11. it is the taxpayer's duty to justify the exemption "by words too plain to be mistaken and too categorical to be misinterpreted. without any action. Private respondent has utterly failed to discharge this duty. and with one (1) abstention. to be exempted from payment of taxes. stating that his approval thereof was not necessary since it did not involve a disposition of city government funds. participated. CA Facts: The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Gingoog passed Resolution 49 which classified certain areas. as presiding officer. 378. the PGC. 1986. which was renewed by another permit issued on January 5. Nine (9) members of the said SP. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests  It has always been the rule that "exemptions from taxation are construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority" primarily because "taxes are the lifeblood of government and their prompt and certain availability is an imperious need. purportedly amending zoning Ordinance No. Said amendments shall take effect only after approval and authentication by the HSRC. 378 was transmitted to then City Mayor Miguel Paderanga for approval. 49. The protest was founded on the fact that no certificate of registration had as yet been issued by the PGC.  Lower court erred in exempting TE from paying real property tax on its properties which are enumerated in the complaint. On April 24. while four (4) voted against. is invalid. thus allegedly amending Resolution No." Thus. 49. 1985. as provided by Section 180 of the LGC and Section 14 of the charter of Gingoog City. Resolution No. In view. When Resolution No.

This is specifically granted to them by Section 4 of Presidential Decree No.Mabelle O.44 of Resolution 49.  PGC has the power not of control but only of review and supervision.  While this Court agrees with the movant that a mayor's permit/ license is a condition precedent to the issuance of the PGC Registration Certificate. the city mayor's permits issued to movant were null and void as they were granted pursuant to Resolution No. RTC: declared the aforesaid mayor's permits null and void and ordered Casiño and all persons representing him or acting in his behalf from further operating the cockpit in question. holidays and fiestas in Gingoog City. YES. PGC may. City and Municipal Mayors with the concurrence of their respective Sanggunians shall have the authority to license and regulate regular cockfighting pursuant to the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission and subject to its review and supervision. This the PGC did by bringing to the attention of the local authorities the non-compliance by petitioner with the rules involved in this case which we find reasonable and necessary in the discharge of the regulatory functions of PGC. 4. WON the mayor's permits issued by the Mayor of Gingoog City for the years 1986 and 1987 are null and void because Resolution 378 did not amend Section 6. the three-fourths (3/4) votes not having been obtained in passing said Resolution 378. 1802 as amended by Presidential Decree No.  The power of review is exercised to determine whether it is necessary to correct the acts of the subordinate and to see to it that he performs his duties in accordance with law. The decision of the First Division that it is the Municipal/City Mayor with the authorization of the Sangguniang Bayan that has the primary power to issue licenses for the operation of ordinary cockpits is of the same tenor and effect as the decision of this case as can be seen in the following wordings: The task of granting licenses to operate cockpits is lodged with City and Municipal Mayor with the concurrence of their respective Sanggunians. The spring cannot rise higher than its source 2. indicate its disapproval of the acts of the local officials concerned to stress and perform its role with respect to the regulation of cockpits. Rather. C-86816 issued to movant is likewise null and void. It did not whimsically order the suspension and the consequent stoppage of Coliseum's operations. 1802-A which states: Sec. MR denied. vs. He contends 98 . WON the PGC controls the operations of the Don Romulo Rodriguez Coliseum with respect to the local/ordinary cockfights during Sundays. the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining petitioner to desist from operating the Coliseum until the PGC shall have finally decided the controversy between petitioner and private respondent Gallera. for that purpose and as it did here. And because of the nullity of the Mayor's permit.  Petitioner: legal because the same was passed by the sanggunian by a majority of five affirmative votes as against four negative votes. the Registration Certificate No. 49.  The decision of the First Division of this Court in Gingoog Gallera. 578 which never took effect because of non-compliance with the procedure prescribed in Resolution No. This power was validly exercised by said commission over Coliseum when it sought to stop the former's operations through the local officials. YES. Inc. PGC only exercised its power of review over the acts performed by the local authorities in relation to or which affect the exercise of its functions. despite the fact that the Mayor of Gingoog City issued a mayor's permit for 1986 and 1987 with the concurrence of the sangguniang panlungsod. in the case at bar. PGC is not "diametrically opposed to" the decision rendered in this case in regard to the primacy of the power/authority between the local officials of the City of Gingoog and the PGC. Issues: 1. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests rendering the mayor's permits issued to the latter null and void for being in violation of Section 6 of the Rules and Regulations of the PGC. 1986. Code Ordinance of 1984. On April 25. Both decisions are in accord with one another.

"in an apparent attempt to get rid of this legal stumbling block (the prohibition against a cockpit in a residential zone under Proclamation 49). aside from its being merely a formal requirement. Section 6. instead of the usual majority Vote. . much less authorization to operate given by the PGC to the private respondentappellant. Undeniably. Resolution No.44 of Resolution No. the governor designated Gamboa as Acting Governor for the duration of the former's official trip abroad until his return. to pass the appropriate ordinance to attain the main object of the law. 49.  In the instant case. Code Ordinance. Aguirre and 99 . Although the charter of the City of Gingoog and the LGC require only a majority for the enactment of an ordinance.Mabelle O. 49 shall govern since municipal authorities are in a better position to determine the evils sought to be prevented by the inclusion or incorporation of particular provisions in enacting a particular statute and. respectively.44. which should actually be the principal basis for the nullification by respondent court of the two mayor's permits issued. 378 was declared invalid by the Court of Appeals for failure to comply with the required votes necessary for its validity. the higher requisite vote in Resolution No." . is an enactment of the sanggunian which is ultra vires. Gamboa. Where there is in the same statute a particular enactment and also a general one which in its most comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the former. and the general statement must be taken to affect only such cases within its language as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment. When the SP held its regular session on September 6. This more stringent requirement on the necessary votes for amendments to Resolution No. Sometime in August of 1995. Obviously. Resolution No. Coscolluela. 378. that the vote requirement in certain ordinances may be specially provided for. a condition precedent before a grant of mayors permit or license to conduct cockfighting. 1995. Therefore. to borrow the words of respondent court.  Block 125 where Coliseum is located remains classified as a residential area. however. as in the case of Section 6. the mayor's permits issued to private respondent are null and void. The pertinent provisions in the aforesaid city charter and the LGC obviously are of general application and embrace a wider scope or subject matter. ViceGovernor and SP members. 49 cannot be validly amended by the resolution in question without complying with the categorical requirement of a three-fourths vote incorporated in the very same ordinance sought to be amended. 49. and Araneta were elected Negros Occidental Governor. there was no registration certificate issued. it is legally permissible. Jr.  In the case at bar. Gamboa v. the PGC did not grant the private respondent-appellant the proper registration certificate to operate his cockpit because the same was not constructed within the appropriate areas as prescribed in zoning laws or ordinances of Gingoog City pursuant to Section 6 of Rules and Regulation of the PGC. therefore.. and Aguirre. series of 1985." Withal. hence the operation of a cockpit therein is prohibited. the Sangguniang Panglunsod of Gingoog City passed Resolution No. Jr. In the enactment of ordinances in general. the application of the aforementioned laws cannot be disputed. This weighty consideration. 49 apparently forestalled the apprehended contingency for. "thereby reclassifying Block 125 into a recreational zone.  SC: Resolution No. Aguirre Facts: In the 1995 elections. the particular enactment must be operative. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests that the three-fourths vote requirement under Section 6. although the general law on the matter requires a mere majority. .44 of said ordinance regarding amendments thereto is a specific and particular provision for said ordinance and explicitly provides for a different number of votes. as exceptions to the general provisions on measures covered by city charters and the LGC.

In another session. But the problem is. regular elective SP members. is merely temporary. A Vice-Governor who is concurrently an Acting Governor is actually a quasiGovernor. while concurrently the Acting Governor. whereas plain members of the provincial board perform functions partaking of a legislative character. But. 1995. A&A filed before the lower court a petition for declatory relief and prohibition. (not Governor) or by merely exercising the powers and duties of the higher officer. duties and responsibilities of the Vice-Governor. On September 22. Necessarily. He only "acts" as the Governor but does not "become" the Governor. but also the presiding officer of the local legislative body. the trial court rendered a decision and declared petitioner as "temporarily legally incapacitated to preside over the sessions of the SP during the period that he is the Acting Governor. while in such capacity. refused to do so.A. Later." which is "the legislative body of the province. president of the provincial federation of sangguniang members of municipalities and component cities. None being included in the 100 . as presiding officer. just like the 1983 LGC. the Governor re-assumed his office. continue to preside over the sessions of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Under R. 49(a) and 466(a) (1) of the LGC provide that the Vice-Governor shall be the presiding officer of the SP." Aggrieved. namely president of the provincial chapter of the liga ng mga barangay. This is because the authority vested by law in the provincial boards involves primarily a delegation of some legislative powers of Congress. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Araneta questioned the authority of petitioner to preside therein in view of his designation as Acting Governor and asked him to vacate the Chair. In addition to such function. Gamboa filed a petition for review raising the issue earlier mentioned.  Sec. he does not assume the latter office. in case of "permanent vacancy" therein. he is deemed as a non-member of the SP for the time being. does he temporarily relinquish the powers. the new Code delineated the union of the executive-legislative powers in the provincial. 1995. seven (7) members of the SP voted to allow petitioner to continue presiding while four (4) others voted against with one (1) abstention. Unlike under the old Code. where the Governor is not only the provincial Chief Executive. three elective sectoral representatives. His assumption of the powers. This means. and those ex-officio members.  It is correct that when the Vice-Governor exercises the "powers and duties" of the Office of the Governor." and enumerates therein membership consisting of the: Vice-Governor. he "become(s)" the Governor and "assume(s)" the higher office for the unexpired term of his predecessor. city and municipal levels except in the Barangay. the Governor was deprived of the power to preside over the SP and is no longer considered a member thereof. Issue: WON an incumbent Vice-Governor. the offices of the provincial Governor and Vice-Governor are essentially executive in nature. the Vice-Governor "shall automatically exercise the powers (subject to certain limitations) and perform the duties and functions" of the Governor. In the meantime. but YES. By tradition. on October 2. however. when it provides that "local legislative power shall be vested in the SP. including the power to preside over the sessions of the SP? LGC silent. 7160. however. This is clear from the law. president of the panlalawigang pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan. It may be noted that the code provides only for modes of succession in case of permanent vacancy in the office of the Governor and the Vice-Governor (whether single or simultaneously) as well as in case of a temporary vacancy in the office of the Governor. no such contingency is provided in case of temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor. duties and functions of the provincial Chief Executive does not create a permanent vacuum or vacancy in his position as the Vice-Governor.Mabelle O. he does not relinquish nor abandon his position and title as Vice-Governor by merely becoming an Acting Governor. Gamboa. When the vacancy. that for purposes of exercising his legislative prerogatives and powers. functions.

the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong. Considering the silence of the law on the matter. petitioners filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. the mode of succession provided for permanent vacancies.  Being the Acting Governor. The municipality of Morong did not take any action on the petition within 30 days after its submission. 13 Consequently. 10. so that either department now comprises different and nonintermingling official personalities with the end in view of ensuring a better delivery of public service and provide a system of check and balance between the two. A sensu contrario. to discharge the powers and prerogatives of his office. the law necessarily excludes. This doctrine should equally apply to the Vice-Governor since he is similarly situated as the Vice-Mayor. the members present and constituting a quorum shall elect from among themselves a temporary presiding officer. the union of legislative-executive powers in the office of the local chief executive under the former Code has been disbanded. Although it is difficult to lay down a definite rule as to what constitutes absence. To repeat. there is a vacancy when there is no person lawfully authorized to assume and exercise at present the duties of the office. local executive power in the province is vested alone in the Governor. There is no vacancy whenever the office is occupied by a legally qualified incumbent. This event constitutes an "inability" on the part of the regular presiding officer (Vice Governor) to preside during the SP sessions. the ViceMayor should discharge the duties of the mayor during the latter's absence. in the office of the Vice-Governor may likewise be observed in the event of temporary vacancy occurring in the same office.  It has been held that if a Mayor who is out of the contrary is considered "effectively absent". the Governor is deemed excluded applying the rule in legal hermeneutics that when the law enumerates. 1993. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests enumeration. Bataan agreed to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with RA 7227. Petitioners then resorted to their power of initiative under the LGC. for the time being. the office to which he was elected was left barren of a legally qualified person to exercise the duties of the office of the ViceGovernor. On May 24. The continuity of the Acting Governor's (Vice Governor) powers as presiding officer of the SP is suspended so long as he is in such capacity. Serye 1993. that is. it can be said that the designation. On the contrary. Under Section 49(b). "(i)n the event of the inability of the regular presiding officer to preside at the sanggunian session. one that renders the officer concerned powerless. the Vice-Governor cannot continue to simultaneously exercise the duties of the latter office. since the nature of the duties of the provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant to discharge them. appointment or assumption of the Vice-Governor as the Acting Governor creates a corresponding temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor during such contingency. This is so because in the eyes of the law. Serye 1993 and sought to allow the inclusion of Morong subject to certain conditions. By virtue of the foregoing definition. Such is not only consistent with but also appears to be the clear rationale of the new Code wherein the policy of performing dual functions in both offices has already been abandoned. They started to solicit the required number of signatures to cause the repeal of said 101 ." Garcia v.Mabelle O. COMELEC Facts: In its Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10. which thus calls for the operation of the remedy set in Article 49(b) of the LGC — concerning the election of a temporary presiding officer. yet this term should be reasonably construed to mean "effective" absence. the creation of a temporary vacancy in the office of the Governor creates a corresponding temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor whenever the latter acts as Governor by virtue of such temporary vacancy. under the new Code.

and Initiative and Referendum. a resolution cannot be the subject of a local initiative. wrote a letter dated June 11. 3. for this purpose." Thus. Black: defines an act as "an expression of will or purpose .1. whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress.. . 10. COMELEC opposed the petition." On July 13. Unknown to the petitioners. on National and Local Laws. and a. SC: The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as appropriate subjects of a local initiative. as a legislature. and the exceptions therefrom.3. a. counter productivity and futility. it contends that under the LGC. . 1991. There are three (3) systems of initiative. as early as possible. but also decrees. 1993. municipal. provincial. laws. Chapter 2. . Book I: Local initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose. provincial. if the words or provisions are obscure. 6735 entitled "An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor. provide for a system of initiative and referendum. modified or amended. or to enact a national legislation." An act includes a resolution. it may denote something done . and determinations . Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution. edicts. namely: a. its section 3(a) expressly includes resolutions as subjects of initiatives on local legislations. . Title XI. The same stance is assumed by the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong. . resolutions) as appropriate subjects of initiative was implemented by Congress when it enacted Republic Act No. or if the enactment is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation. by the local legislative body concerned within six (6) months from the date therefrom. even though it may be necessary. or local legislative body . Bataan is the proper subject of an initiative. Article I of its Rules states: "Scope of power of initiative” The power of initiative may be exercised to amend the Constitution. or ordinance. In its session of July 6. judgments. enact. the COMELEC en banc resolved to deny the petition for local initiative on the ground that its subject is "merely a resolution (pambayang kapasyahan) and not an ordinance. . . or barangay law. the COMELEC en banc further resolved to direct Provincial Election Supervisor to hold action on the authentication of signatures being gathered by petitioners. 1993 to the Executive Director of COMELEC requesting the denial of the petition for a local initiative and/or referendum because the exercise will just promote divisiveness. Issue: WON Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.  In Re Guarina that "if there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning of the legislative. 2300 entitled "In Re Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution. only an ordinance can be the subject of initiative. Definition of Terms: For purposes of this Act. Section 32 of Article VI: "The Congress shall.Mabelle O.     102 . Section 16: "Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies ” Any proposition on ordinance or resolution approved through the system of initiative and referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed. the following terms shall mean. awards. resolves. On January 16. resolution. Section 5. to disregard the more usual or apparent import of the language used. a regional. however. city." It is basic that a law should be construed in harmony with and not in violation of the constitution. serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong.2. viz: Sec. including not merely physical acts.e. or amend any ordinance." It likewise recognized resolutions as proper subjects of initiatives." The constitutional command to include acts (i. section 120. the Vice Mayor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong. the COMELEC also promulgated its Resolution No. . that interpretation will be adopted which will avoid the effect of unconstitutionality. (a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose. Resp: under the LGC. 1993. Through the Solicitor General. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests resolution. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional. .

. Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes. 32. resolutions are not normally subject to referendum for it may destroy the efficiency necessary to the successful administration of the business affairs of a city. and the exceptions therefrom. Calimbas and their companions filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. Not satisfied. On September 5. 10. as required by said Sec. the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong submitted Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10. resolution or ordinance. municipal or barangay law. requesting Congress of the Philippines so amend certain provisions of RA 7227. 18. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives except to the extent reserved to the people by the provisions on initiative and referendum. may invoke their power of initiative. by promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. respondents Garcia. Serye 1993. In April 1993. Article VI: Sec. 93-1623 denied the petition for local initiative by herein private respondents on the ground that the subject thereof      103 . the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong. and economic existence of the people of Morong by the inclusion of their municipality in the Subic Special Economic Zone. This is apparent from a reading of section 12 of Republic Act No. to join the Subic Special Economic Zone. Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10. On July 6. political. 7227 entitled "An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses. 12 of RA 7227. herein respondents resorted to their power initiative under the LGC Sec. Sec. and within 30 days from submission of their petition. 1993." There can hardly be any doubt that when Congress enacted Republic Act No. et al. expressing therein its absolute concurrence. Distinction between a resolution and an ordinance: a resolution is used whenever the legislature wishes to express an opinion which is to have only a temporary effect while an ordinance is intended to permanently direct and control matters applying to persons or things in general. Serye 1993. 6735 it intend resolutions to be proper subjects of local initiatives. Through an initiative. Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority For This Purpose. Serye 1993 to the Office of the President. provide for a system of initiative and referendum. 122 paragraph (b) which provides that if no favorable action thereon is taken by the sanggunian concerned. whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of registered voters. Thus. The Congress shall. 1993. 1. Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition of respondents Garcia. It is not material that the decision of the municipality of Morong for the inclusion came in the form of a resolution for what matters is its enduring effect on the welfare of the people of Morong. Calimbas. giving notice thereof to the sangguniang concerned. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests city. Respondents do not give any reason why resolutions should not be the subject of a local initiative. it is but logical to hear their voice on the matter via an initiative. 1992. In the case at bench.Mabelle O." Considering the lasting changes that will be wrought in the social. as early as possible. the proponents. Serye 1993. through their duly authorized and registered representatives. The inclusion of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone has far reaching implications in the governance of its people. 1993. of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters thereto. Congress enacted the BCDA (RA 7227) which provided for the creation of the Subic Economic Zone. the people were also endowed with the power to enact or reject any act or law by congress or local legislative body. respondent Commission En Banc in Comelec Resolution No. it cannot be argued that the subject matter of the resolution of the municipality of Morong merely temporarily affects the people of Morong for it directs a permanent rule of conduct or government. On May 24. COMELEC Facts: On March 13. however.

The sole issue presented by the pleadings was the question of "whether or not a Sangguniang Bayan Resolution can be the subject of a valid initiative or referendum"  In the present case. On July 10. inter alia. 2845. 1993. to set aside Comelec Resolution No. the documents were called "referendum returns". vs. the process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM only. that public respondent "is intent on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an amendment of a national law. 1993. et al. 1996. in fine. 1996. 93-1676 insofar as it prevented the Provincial Election Supervisor of Bataan from proceeding with the authentication of the required number of signatures in support of the initiative and the gathering of signatures. Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong. "Referendum Board of Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the description "referendum". is sufficient in form and substance for submission to the people for their approval.  To begin with. this exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE. on "the very issue raised in (the) petition: whether or not there can be an initiative by the people of Morong.  SC: The only issue resolved in the earlier Garcia case is whether a municipal resolution as contradistinguished from an ordinance may be the proper subject of an initiative and/or referendum. Bataan is now sought to be enjoined by petitioner. WON a bar by final judgment exists. public respondent Comelec En Banc (thru Comelec Resolution no. the Comelec promulgated the assailed Resolution No. including Grande Island and that portion of the former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong. Said proclamation included in the SSEZ all the lands within the former Subic Naval Base. 532 defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ. 93-1676) further directed its Provincial Election Supervisor to hold action on the authentication of signatures being solicited by private respondents. In fact. et al. it bears emphasizing. YES. 93-1623 insofar as it disallowed the conduct of a local initiative to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10. On August 15. Bataan. and which indicated. 2848 and alleging. the scheduled Referendum Day (July 27.  WON the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in promulgating and implementing Resolution No. 1996.Mabelle O. On June 18. . the counting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee". 19956. Serye 1993. And yet. 12 of RA 7227. 2848 providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Kapasyahan Blg. Bataan on the subject proposition ” the very same proposition. To repeat. petitioner instituted the present petition for certiorari and prohibition contesting the validity of Resolution No. Garcia. 2848.  Garcia contends that this Court had already ruled with finality in Enrique T.  "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the 104 . Issues: 1. On February 1. On June 27. 10. respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. not once was the word "initiative" used in said body of Resolution No. private respondents instituted a petition for certiorari and mandamus before this Court against the Commission on Elections and the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong. Commission on Elections. 2848. Bataan". Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests was merely a resolution (pambayang kapasyahan) and not an ordinance. 10. adopting therein a "Calendar of Activities for local referendum on certain municipal ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong. On July 13. petitioner is not contesting the propriety of a municipal resolution as the form by which these two new constitutional prerogatives of the people may be validly exercised. the canvassers. the word "referendum" is repeated at least 27 times. . Serye 1993. pursuant to Sec. among others. but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. 1995. Bataan". and Comelec Resolution No. The Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum". . the submission of which to the people of Morong. What is at issue here is whether Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 2848. in the body of the Resolution 11 as reproduced in the footnote below. as worded. the President of the Philippines issued Proclamation No. whether the Comelec acted properly and juridically in promulgating and implementing Resolution No. Saturday).

municipal. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law. for approval or rejection.  SC: initiative is resorted to (or initiated) by the people directly either because the law-making body fails or refuses to enact the law. ordinance. while referendum consists merely of the electorate approving or rejecting what has been drawn up or enacted by a legislative body. or barangay law.  While initiative is entirely the work of the electorate. 13 of R. and 3. "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called for the purpose. the local legislative body is given the opportunity to enact the proposal. it follows that there is need for the Comelec to supervise an initiative more closely. The Comelec shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum.  From the above differentiation. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests purpose. enact. resolution or act that they desire or because they want to amend or modify one already existing. Initiative is a process of law-making by the people themselves without the participation and against the wishes of their elected representatives. resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies. If it refuses/neglects to do so within thirty (30) days from its presentation. or part thereof. 2. the lawmaking body submits to the registered voters of its territorial jurisdiction. "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative body for action. provincial. any ordinance or resolution which is duly enacted or approved by such law-making authority. 6735. the proponents through their duly-authorized and registered representatives may invoke their power of initiative. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution." LGC: Local initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters of local government unit may directly propose. giving notice thereof to the local legislative body concerned. Cruz: Initiative . forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities and thirty (30) days in case of baranggays. It may be of two classes." referendum . The local referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Comelec within sixty (60) days in case of provinces and cities. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional. the process and the voting in an initiative are understandably more complex than in a referendum where expectedly the voters will simply write either "Yes" of "No" in the ballot. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation. Should the proponents be able to collect the number of signed conformities within the period granted by said statute. its authority thereon extending not only to the counting and canvassing of votes but     105 . passed by Congress. in a local referendum. city. Said referendum shall be conducted also under the control and direction of the Commission on Elections. or amend any ordinance. referendum is begun and consented to by the lawmaking body.  On the other hand. 3 systems: 1. Under Sec. resolution or ordinance."power of the people to propose bills and laws. the Commission on Elections "shall then set a date for the initiative (not referendum) at which the proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the local government unit concerned . Hence. namely: 1.Mabelle O. and to enact or reject them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly."is the right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative body and which in most cases would without action on the part of electors become a law. Local referendum is the legal process whereby the registered voters of the local government units may approve.A. amend or reject any ordinance enacted by the sanggunian. and 2.

upon all propositions to create any liability against the municipality. NO. Posadas Facts: Seven of the thirteen members present.  The law is clear. courts may decide only actual controversies. is devoid of merit. the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the process itself. Care must also be exercised that "(n)o petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate.. upon the request of any member. This is especially true where the proposed legislation is lengthy and complicated. and they shall be entered upon the journal. These law-making powers belong to the people. Other measures prevail upon the majority vote of the members present "Creating indebtedness" refers to "proposition" and not to "ordinance. It needs only application. Nevertheless we would invite attention to the case of McLean vs. and (3) any other proposition. In the exercise of its authority. Albay.  Corroborative authority is really superfluous. It is only when the people have voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be enforced or implemented thereunder. (2) all propositions to create any liability against the municipality. and should thus be broken down into several autonomous parts. it may (in fact it should have done so already) issue relevant and adequate guidelines and rules for the orderly exercise of these "people-power" features of our Constitution. the English text which governs is not. ISSUE: WON the ordinance is valid. Ortiz v. The ayes and noes are taken upon (1) the passage of all ordinances. Constitutionally speaking. it is merely a proposal and the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility. concerning cockpits. each such part to be voted upon separately. 106 . the affirmative vote of a majority of all the members of the municipal council shall be necessary. except as otherwise specially provided. hence the respondent Commission cannot control or change the substance or the content of legislation." The contention that only ordinances creating indebtedness require the approval of a majority of all the members of the municipal council. While the Spanish text may be ambiguous." although "two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative". Should the people reject it. akin to its powers over the conduct of elections. including the president.  Section 224 of the Administrative Code reads as follows: Journal of Proceedings ” Majorities necessary for transaction of business.Mabelle O. but other measures. not interpretation. Louis ([1906]. The ayes and noes shall be taken upon the passage of all ordinances. The affirmative vote of a majority of all the members of the municipal council shall be necessary to the passage of any ordinance or of any proposition creating indebtedness. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests also to seeing to it that the matter or act submitted to the people is in the proper form and language so it may be easily understood and voted upon by the electorate. The same idea is carried into the succeeding sentence.  WON Withdrawal of Adherence and Imposition of Conditionalities are Ultra Vires. 222 Ill. ” The council shall keep a journal of its own proceedings. upon the request of any member. 25. City of East St. and upon any other proposition. It is not yet an approved law. The law is entirely consistent in context. and six members voted against the ordinance. of the municipal council of Tabaco. with three members absent. then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. At this point. For the passage of (1) any ordinance or (2) any proposition creating indebtedness .  SC: premature! The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. voted in favor of Ordinance No.  In initiative and referendum. shall prevail upon the majority vote of the members present at any meeting duly called and held. not hypothetical questions or cases.

They say that it is not unusual for courts. in the construction of statutes. It is the rule that where the intention of the legislature is ascertained with reasonable certainty and it appears that words have been used inconsistent with such intention. MTDC: Motels and inns should not have been prohibited as they are not establishments for amusement or entertainment. karaoke bars. in this instance. and in all other cases at the request of any member. a word erroneously used for another may be eliminated and the proper word substituted. to make the changes suggested would be merely juggling with the words of the statute to give it a different meaning from that which was intended. Laguio Facts: The Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the DOTC as a hotel. an ordinance passed by less than that majority is invalid. the majority of a quorum is sufficient. or entertainment where women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community. Albay. the requirement is the same. the correction may be made for the purpose of giving effect to the intention plainly manifested in the act as a whole. City of Manila v. 91. The law the passage of all ordinances. neither were 107 . and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community in the Ermita-Malate area. dance halls. and the concurrence of a majority of the legislative body is necessary to their passage. Lim (mayor). Such businesses include sauna parlors. it shall require two-thirds of all the aldermen elect to sell any city or school property" Commenting on this provision of law. at meetings hastily called is wise. to substitute one word for another where the plain meaning of the statute will justify it. 173 Ill. or for the expenditure or appropriation of its money. In our opinion. Section 13 of the Act for the incorporation of cities and villages in the State of Illinois provided: "The yeas and nays shall be taken upon the passage of all ordinances and on all propositions to create any liability against the city. the Supreme Court of Illinois.  The basic idea of the legislative body to make impossible the approval of ordinances or of propositions creating indebtedness by minority votes of municipal councils. clubs. while as to other propositions. vs. through Justice Cartwright. intended to limit the requirement of a majority vote to ordinances creating a liability or appropriating money. 25 of Tabaco. and the concurrence of a majority of all the members elected in the city council shall be necessary to the passage of any such ordinance or proposition: Provided. praying that the Ordinance they enacted which prohibited motels and inns be declared unconstitutional. requiring in mandatory language the affirmative vote of a majority of all the members of the municipal council for the passage of any ordinance. massage parlors. But we do not agree with the theory that the legislature. If a proposition not in the form of an ordinance creates any liability or provides for the expenditure or appropriation of money. Atienza (vice-mayor). whether or not an ordinance creating indebtedness. and that by eliminating some words and substituting others this section will express what they think was the intention of the legislature. Section 2224 of the Administrative Code. Where the context affords the means of correcting a mistake in the use of language. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests 510). and the members of the city council of Manila. We recognized that construction of the statute in Hibbard & Co. motels and inns. which shall be entered on the journal of its proceedings. Legislative intention should be effectuated. MTDC filed a petition for declaratory relief against the City of Manila. City of Chicago. The Ordinance prohibited the establishment or operation of businesses providing amusement.. services.Mabelle O. is void. observed: Some of the counsel for appellee argue that section 13 relates only to ordinances and propositions creating a liability against a city or providing for the expenditure or appropriation of its money. whether the yeas and nays are entered upon the journal or not. and that all other ordinances may be passed by a majority of a quorum. annoy the inhabitants. Ordinance No.

Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests they services or facilities for entertainment and did not use women as tools. operation and maintenance of motels. The right to be let alone it is the most comprehensive of rights and is the beginning of all freedom and the right most valued by civilized men. infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person's fundamental right to liberty and property. (4) Must not prohibit but may regulate trade. is subordinate to constitutional limitations the exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. II. and (5) It violates MTDC’s constitutional rights. and Art.  The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power as found in Sec. It must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of 108 .  To be constitutional. The City of Manila then filed a petition assailing the Decision rendered by Laguio. YES.  To be valid. The right to privacy is a constitutional right. an ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) It must not contravene the Constitution or any statute. he rendered a decision enjoining the City of Manila from implementing the Ordinance. (2) It is violative of PD 499 which declared portions of the Ermita-Malate area as a commercial zone. the governmental interference itself. City of Manila: power of regulation includes the power to control. Manila: The City Council had the power to prohibit certain forms of entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community. (4) It is an ex post facto law. Kwong Sing vs. it must include privacy as well. require an interference with private rights. with restrictions (3) It is not a proper exercise of police power as there is no relation to legitimate municipal interests sought to be protected. if it is to be a repository of freedom. LGUs are able to legislate only by virtue of their derivative legislative power. the exercise of police power. (5) Must not be unreasonable. also violates the equal protection clause. Secs. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal. Also. (5) Must be general and consistent with public policy. Motel patrons who are single and unmarried may invoke this right to autonomy to consummate their bonds in intimate be it stressed that their sexual conduct within the motel's premises consensual sexual behavior does not contravene any fundamental state policy as contained in the Constitution. Liberty should be the rule and restraint the exception. Judge Laguio issued an ex-parte TRO against the enforcement of the Ordinance.Mabelle O. as long as they do not run afoul of the law. as provided in Sec. After trial. Adults have a right to choose to forge such relationships with others in the confines of their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. etc. etc. the invasion of which should be justified by a compelling state interest. The Ordinance violates the 1987 Constitution. a delegation of legislative power from Congress. 16 of the LGC. as distinguished from those of a particular class. but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. (2) Must not be unfair or oppressive. Their right to liberty under the due process clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government. Secs. III.  Liberty in the constitutional sense not only means freedom from unlawful government restraint. there are 2 requirements: It must pass muster under the test of constitutionality and the test of consistency with prevailing laws. (3) Must not be partial or discriminatory. Issue: WON the Ordinance is unconstitutional. This is also in conjunction with its police power as found in Revised Charter of Manila.  As regards the first criterion. the relevant provisions of which are Art. govern. the Ordinance was unconstitutional and void because (1) The City Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels as the LGC granted only the power to regulate the establishment. 5 and 14. confiscatory and is an invasion of property rights. 1 and 9. 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the LGC.  The means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes. and restrain places of exhibition and amusement. not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally. This police power. while far-reaching.

 Distinction should be made between destruction from necessity and eminent domain. or of an opportunity for the exercise. in order to be valid and constitutional. liberty.  The Ordinance was enacted to address and arrest the social ills purportedly spawn as it substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its property." and "adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community. but not to the detriment of liberty and privacy which are covenants. be destroyed without compensation. by zoning. the law may operate only on some and     109 . Ordinances placing restrictions upon the lawful use of property must. Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike. It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals.  The City of Manila cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. then certainly the public should bear the cost of reasonable compensation for the condemnation of private property for public used by the establishments in the Ermita-Malate area. Due process furnishes a standard to which governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life. Property taken in the exercise of police power is destroyed because it is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose while the property taken under the power of eminent domain is intended for a public use or purpose and is therefore "wholesome. It in no way controls or guides the discretion vested in them." If it be of public benefit that a wholesome property remains unused or relegated to a particular purpose. in other words. The City Council instead should regulate human conduct that occurs inside the establishments. so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.Mabelle O. or property is valid." There are no comprehensible standards to guide the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions. A zoning ordinance. The Ordinance in Section 1 forbids the running of the enumerated businesses in the ErmitaMalate area and in Section 3 instructs its owners/operators to wind up business operations or to transfer outside the area or convert said businesses into allowed businesses. Similarly. of unbridled discretion by the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests private rights can work.  The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses allowed under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes." "annoy the inhabitants. It provides no definition of the establishments covered by it and it fails to set forth the conditions when the establishments come within its ambit of prohibition. specify the rules and conditions to be observed and conduct to avoid. and must not admit of the exercise. the Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments "tend to disturb the community. premiums and blessings of democracy. Similar subjects. the means employed is oppressive and unreasonable. If the classification is reasonable. although a valid exercise of police power. The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down establishments. A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation. The Ordinance fails to set up any standard to guide or limit the petitioners' actions. should not be treated differently. both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. which limits a "wholesome" property to a use which cannot reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such property without just compensation. Private property which is not noxious or intended for noxious purposes may not. In this case.

and other similar establishments. thing. Under the LGC.  Also. and not prohibit the establishments enumerated in Sec. This discrimination based on gender violates equal protection as it is not substantially related to important government objectives. The Code still withholds from cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment. and other places for entertainment or amusement (Section 458 (a) 4 (vii)). 1 of the Ordinance. LGUs are empowered to regulate. operation. or consequence is tantamount to an express exclusion of all others. and restrain. it is a general rule in statutory construction that the express mention of one person. then. Both men and women have an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. power to prohibit is impliedly withheld. pension houses. motels. not be arbitrary.Mabelle O. while its power to regulate the establishment. public dance halls. hotels and other similar establishments is found in Section 458 (a) 4 (iv). The classification is thus invalid (similar subjects are not similarly treated) and arbitrary (it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance) (2) No logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. said powers are to be construed strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting said powers must be construed against the City Council. and other similar establishments (Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)). and maintenance of motels.  Congress unequivocably specified the establishments and forms of amusement or entertainment subject to regulation among which are beerhouses. as an indispensable requisite. operation and maintenance of such establishments. it must conform to the following requirements:1) It must be based on substantial distinctions. pension houses. suppress or prohibit. sauna baths. and to prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment is provided under Section 458 (a) 4 (vii). The word regulate includes the power to control. public dancing schools. but it should not be construed as synonymous with suppress or prohibit.  The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are expressly granted to it and those which are necessarily implied or incidental to the exercise thereof. The classification must. 2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law. the only power of the City Council to legislate relative to these establishments is to regulate them to promote the general welfare. govern. lodging houses. inns. massage parlors. lodging houses. operation and maintenance of any entertainment or amusement facilities. the Code being a later expression of the legislative will must necessarily prevail and override the earlier law. As a general rule when a municipal corporation is specifically given authority or power to regulate or to license and regulate the liquor traffic. hotels. Moreover. This enumeration therefore cannot be included as among "other events or activities for amusement or entertainment. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests not all of the people without violating the equal protection clause.  According to the SC: (1) No substantial distinctions between motels. By reason of its limited powers and the nature thereof. To be valid. inns. The power of the City Council to regulate by ordinances the establishment. 3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only. All are commercial establishments providing lodging. As 110 . (3) The standard "where women are used as tools for one of the hinted entertainment" is also discriminatory as prostitution ills the Ordinance is not a profession exclusive aims to banish to women. particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants" or "certain forms of amusement or entertainment" which the City Council may suspend. Clearly.  As to consistency with prevailing laws: (1) The Ordinance contravenes the LGC. hotels. 4) It must apply equally to all members of the class. the Revised Charter of Manila.

cinemas. acts." Thus. The Ordinance now vainly attempts to lump these establishments with houses of illrepute and expand the City Council's powers in the second and third clauses of Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code in an effort to overreach its prohibitory powers. (2) The Ordinance also contravenes the provisions of P. proclamations and administrative regulations. As correctly argued by MTDC. avocation. executive orders. which are irreconcilably inconsistent. circuses and other places of amusement where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances. In addition. it would have so declared in uncertain terms by adding them to the list of the matters it may prohibit under the abovequoted Section." and "amusement places" to include "theaters. gasoline service station.  Manila also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. the statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. hotels. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. since it is the latest expression of legislative will. motels and lodging houses as among the "contractors" defined in paragraph (h) thereof. it must not only be within the powers of the council to enact but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the general law. city charters. de la Cruz Facts: In 1968 during a private conference held at the office of the petitioner Naga vice-mayor Perez with 7 councilors . concert halls.  The City Council was conferred powers to prevent and prohibit certain activities and establishments in Section 458 (1) (v).  It is important to distinguish the punishable activities from the establishments themselves. sauna." Thus. or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests between two laws on the same subject matter. pastime or fun. that which is passed later prevails. operation and maintenance. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se. light industry with any machinery or funeral establishment. It is a legitimate business. motor repair shop. A motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention. Section 131 under the Title on Local Government Taxation expressly mentioned proprietors or operators of massage clinics. submitting to petitioners' interpretation that the Revised Charter of Manila empowers the City Council to prohibit motels. that portion of the Charter stating such must be considered repealed by the Code as it is at variance with the latter's provisions granting the City Council mere regulatory powers. health or comfort of the community. If it were the intention of Congress to confer upon the City Council the power to prohibit the establishments enumerated in Section 1 of the Ordinance.Mabelle O. Section 534(f) of the Code states that "All general and special laws. the matter of 111 . Perez v. Turkish and Swedish baths. 499. decrees. it can be inferred that the Code considers these establishments as legitimate enterprises and activities. or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It cannot be said that motels are injurious to the rights of property. The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial establishments except warehouse or open storage depot. The same Section also defined "amusement" as a "pleasurable diversion and entertainment." "synonymous to relaxation. The rule is that for an ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect. That these establishments are recognized legitimate enterprises can be gleaned from another Section of the Code.D. dump or yard. It is evident that these establishments may only be regulated in their establishment.

Act 2259 on whether the vice-mayor. Respondents alleged that the vice-mayor of Naga City is not a member of the municipal board but only its presiding officer. At the indication by the 4 Nacionalista Party councilors of their desire to vote for a particular person as secretary of the board and to hold the chairmanship of the committee on markets for one of them.  Bagasao. besides being the presiding officer of the municipal board. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests selecting the secretary of the municipal board of the city as well as the chairmen of the various standing committees came up for discussion. Thus section 3 of said law provides: The position of Vice-Mayor is hereby created in chartered cities which at present have no position for Vice-Mayor by provision of their corporate charters: Provided. resolution or motion. and as presiding officer the right to vote again in case of a tie. is a member of the board. in the deliberation of such matters. the presiding officer.  Perez now contends that since under the Naga City charter the mayor was the presiding officer of the municipal board. one of which is "membership in the municipal board. in contrast with sec. 11 of Republic Act 521 creating the city of Cagayan de Oro which explicitly made the vicemayor a member of the municipal board."  Quiem v. Issues: 1. also a member thereof? NO. In the second place. the vice-mayor acquired all the rights and prerogatives of the presiding officer under the charter. to create a tie vote and to then exercise her power to break such deadlock. was not enough ground for excluding the vice-mayor from membership in the board. That the Vice-Mayor shall be the presiding officer of the City Council or Municipal Board in all chartered cities. vice-mayor and councilors in chartered cities. the position of vicemayor. section 11 of Republic Act 305 creating the City of Naga failed to provide even for the position of vice-mayor. except in the event of a tie vote. Tumangan: the vice-mayor "as the presiding officer of the Municipal Board of the City of Cabanatuan is a member thereof" and "he may exercise his right to vote as a member on any proposed ordinance. WON the vice-mayor of Naga city. Perez expressed her intention to vote." In the case at bar. A writ was issued hence vice-mayor Perez assailed the issuance of the writ as undue interference in matters purely legislative in character. vs. the vice-mayor of Cagayan de Oro City is a member of the board" because "that city's original charters calls for an appointive ViceMayor who 'shall be a member of the Municipal Board'. and since under Republic Act 2259 creating the position of vice-mayor who was made the presiding officer. Republic Act 1325. et al. amending the Cagayan de Oro charter. And as we have re repeatedly stated.Mabelle O. But the legal setting and premises in Quiem are widely disparate from those in the case at bar. at the same time that she denied the existence of a threatened invasion of the rights of the four councilors. however. and from voting on any legislative proposal or measure or in any proceeding of the said board except when the members thereof are equally divided." as such similar statutory basis can be cogently invoked for the petitioner Perez." But we so held because "both the unamended and amended provisions of section 11 of the Charter of the City of Cabanatuan provide that the presiding officer of the Municipal Board is a member thereof. Subsequently. the vice-mayor simply replaced the mayor as "presiding officer" of the municipal board. in Quiem we found that "by express legal mandate.  upon approval of Republic Act 2259 3 making elective the offices of mayor. there is no provision whatever in Republic Act 305 creating the City of Naga that provides for the position of vice- 112 . Seriña: the silence of Rep. among others was created. Liberal councilors passed an amendment to the Rules of Procedure of the Naga municipal board granting the chairman thereof the right to vote as a member. 10 particularly section 1 thereof. expressly reiterated that the vice-mayor "shall be a member of the Municipal Board. In the first place. The four aforesaid councilors filed with the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur a petition for prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction to prevent Perez from casting her vote in the selection of the secretary of the municipal board and in the choice of chairmen and members of the different standing committees.

NO.  The petitioner now argues that as vice-mayor she merely stepped into the shoes of the mayor as presiding officer of the board. section 3 of Rep. prohibition refers only to proceedings of any tribunal. Under the law. corporation. et al. YES. to the approval of Rep. She invokes Vera. WON the judge has jurisdiction to issue the writ of prohibitory injunction against Perez. however. who was a member of the municipal board under Rep. it is clear that the dispute falls beyond the scope of such special remedy." 26 Certainly. and the amendatory provisions of Republic Act 2259 making the vice-mayor the presiding officer of the municipal board does not make him a constituent member thereof. the vice-mayor who merely stepped into the shoes of the mayor could have no greater power than that possessed by the mayor who could not create a tie vote and then break it. as the four respondents councilors had walked out of the session hall. she asserts that Republic Act 2259 effected a mere change in the officer who will preside the meetings of the board. The proposed amendment was. judicial or ministerial. Avelino. by the private respondents of their petition in civil case 6504. that the above provision was amended by the 6th municipal board. 1968. therefore. and (3) although on the date the said amendment was passed. 2. WON she can vote twice: to create a deadlock and then to break it. the vice-mayor must. one of which is membership in the board. that restraining order dated February 20. Act 2259 simply installs the vice-mayor as the presiding officer of the board in all chartered cities. to break the tie. almost two months after the filing on January 15. For. 113 . a member of the Board acting as chairman. 1968 of the Court of Appeals was in force. 1968. 3. to read as follows: (g) The Chairman. that is. except in case of a tie. there was no quorum in the board. In the same manner. pendente lite. performing legislative functions. headed by her. be deemed a member of the municipal board. As respondents do not exercise such kind of functions. the vice-mayor acquired all the rights and prerogatives of the presiding officer. Such insistence is a sheer exercise in futility because (1) the amended rule presupposes that the chairman is a "member of the Board" — an assumption that is without legal basis. This is especially true in the case of Naga where the position of vice-mayor (whether appointive or elective) was originally not even provided for in its charter — the official nextin-rank to the mayor being the city treasurer.Mabelle O. may vote as a member and as Chairman. a member of the Board acting as chairman may vote as a member and as chairman to break a tie.  Petitioner’s theory that since the mayor of Naga City. It does not install the vice-mayor as a member thereof. was replaced by the vice-mayor as presiding officer thereof. 192) where we held: Petitioners pray for a writ of prohibition. (2) the said amendatory rule was passed on March 5.  The petitioner's final contention is that as a legislative official. the mayor of a municipality was a member of the municipal council. Act 2259. et al. and since the mayor was considered a member thereof. leaving only the three Liberal Party councilors and the petitioner. powers and prerogatives of voting as the mayor. Pressing her bid.  Paragraph (g) of Rule III of the Rules of Procedure adopted by the municipal board of Naga City. and since the vice-mayor replaced the mayor as "presiding officer" thereof. There is no gainsaying the fact that prior. she is not subject to any prohibitory process by the courts. as member of the Board can vote and as a Presiding Officer may vote again in case of a tie. vs.  The petitioner insists. she too became a member entitled to the same rights. a complete nullity. which recites: (g) The chairman cannot vote. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests mayor. perforce. (77 Phil. Act 305. but his right to vote could be exercised only in "case of a tie. 25 besides being the presiding officer thereof. theirs being legislative. This contention finds no support either in law or logic. board or person exercising functions. However.

otherwise known as the Bill of Rights — the police power measure must be "reasonable". individual rights may be adversely affected by the exercise of police power to the extent only — and only to the extent — that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. Issue: WON the Ordinance is valid. since an emergency is by nature temporary in character.  In reply to the petitioner's assertion that the acts sought to be restrained are mere "probable individual actuations" beyond the reach of a prohibitory writ. In other words. that the power of the City of Manila to "regulate the business of . illegal and void ab initio. chairmanship of different committees and in voting in other legislative matters. executives at the local or municipal level are vested with both legislative and sometimes judicial functions.Mabelle O. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests  Invocation of this ruling is completely inapposite.  The authority of municipal corporations to regulate is essentially police power. 1968.. 4841 which regulates rentals of lots and buildings for residential purposes. Municipal Board of Manila Facts: The City of Manila passed Municipal Ordinance No. by and large. limitation or restriction demanded by the regard. Inasmuch as the same generally entails a curtailment of the liberty. the interference upon individual rights. And. the respect and the obedience due to the prescriptions of the fundamental law. It is not disputed that the present proceeding for prohibition has for its objective to prevent the petitioner from "participating in the election of Secretary of the Board.. and that the same cannot be deemed sanctioned by the general welfare clause in the City Charter. the exercise of police power is necessarily subject to a qualification. in addition to their purely executive duties. LC: struck down the questioned ordinance upon the ground that the power to "declare a state of emergency . to be valid and legal. must be. NO. The Homeowners' Association of the Philippines.." Withal. In the language of Justice Holmes. must be for a 114 ." It is our view that the petitioner. which are protected and even guaranteed by the Constitution. that said ordinance constitutes an unreasonable and unjustified limitation on the use of private properties and arbitrarily encroaches on the constitutional rights of property owners". petitioner's threat of voting twice in the municipal board was not an empty or meaningless gesture. letting or subletting of lands and buildings" does not include the authority to prohibit what is forbidden in said ordinance. the petitioner proceeded to act by voting twice for the approval of an alleged amendment to the rules of procedure of the municipal board. Inc. that "there is no longer any state of emergency" which may justify the regulation of house rentals. and may be validly prevented and restrained by a writ of prohibition. as a means to tide over a critical condition. co-extensive. unconstitutional."circumstances may so change in time or differ in space as to clothe with such an interest what at other times or in other places would be a matter of purely private concern. the rights and/or the property of persons. exclusively pertains to Congress". The doctrine therein laid down is based on the principle of separation of powers and cheeks and balances and is not applicable to local governments. By explicit statutory command. soon after the writ complained of was lifted by the Court of Appeals through the latter's restraining order of February 20. Moreover. and its President sought to nullify the ordinance. 1968. co-equal or coterminous with the existence thereof.. suffice it to state that prohibition is essentially a "preventive remedy" and is "not intended to provide for a remedy for acts already accomplished. If such demands are brought about by a state of emergency. acted without jurisdiction and power to do so. in insisting to exercise the right to vote twice in the municipal board. resulting from the regulations adopted to meet the situation. so must the regulations promulgated therefor be. proposals and proceedings. particularly those forming part of the Constitution of Liberty."  As a consequence a law or ordinance affecting the rights of individuals. other than to break a tie. Homeowners Association of the Philippines v. CFI: ordinance is ultra vires. for the record shows that on March 5. courts are given authority to determine the validity of municipal proceedings.

which was raised. non-compliance therewith and with Section 4 of Rule 64 — the interpretation of which should be harmonized with said Section 23 of Rule 3 — affected neither the jurisdiction of the trial court nor the validity of the proceedings therein. in a "supplement" to said motion for reconsideration. accordingly. again. in principle. the length of which must be "reasonable". and said period would. 545 and 546. the determination of the question whether or not the Solicitor General should be required to appear "in any action involving the validity of any treaty. should be considered a part of our legal system. may be enacted under the police power" of a municipal corporation. Then. the repeal might not meet with the approval of the President. we held: that the requirement regarding notification to the Provincial Fiscal of the pendency of an action 115 . issued on November 10. in connection with the present case. not merely as ultra vires. since our law on municipal corporations is. also. said emergency regulations would purport to be in force for an indefinite and unlimited period of time. for the first time. but discretionary. 225 and 226 — promulgated subsequently thereto — "were issued without authority of law".  The powers of municipal corporations delegated thereto by the National Government cannot escape the inherent limitations to which the latter — as the source of said powers — is subject. Inasmuch as said requirement is not mandatory. even if it would. law. in relation to the nature and duration of the crisis it seeks to overcome or surmount. and the Congress might not be able to override the veto". this Court felt that Commonwealth Act No. negative and uncertain". and.  The practical reason for the requirement that a statute passed to meet a given emergency. by making permanent a law intended to afford a relief for a temporary emergency. either in his answer or in a motion to dismiss in the lower court. that appellant did not raise this question or invoke said Section 4. should limit the period of its effectivity.  The same considerations impelled the Court to invalidate Executive Order Nos. he filed a memorandum. 1946.  It should be noted." and that Executive Orders Nos. pursuant to Section 23 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. so that "that which was intended to meet a temporary emergency may become a permanent law". the City Fiscal of Manila was notified therein. 1952. emergency legislation. Indeed. a new and different law would be necessary to repeal it. In fact. although petitioners herein had assailed Municipal Ordinance No.Mabelle O. patterned after that of the United States. because. however. in San Buenaventura vs. 4841. 192. otherwise known as the Emergency Powers Act. the Solicitor General had been neither heard nor notified in connection therewith. indefinite. ordinance or executive order. be "unlimited. but. Municipality of San Jose. is that. Neither did his motion for reconsideration of the appealed decision touch upon said question. rules or regulation" is a matter left to the "discretion" of the Court. to the effect that "in a proper case.  At any rate. otherwise. otherwise "the result would be obvious unconstitutionality". because "Congress might not enact the repeal. Upon the other hand. as unconstitutional.  Appellant assails the validity of the proceedings in the lower court upon the round that. in violation of Section 4 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. In line with the basic philosophy underlying the authority to affect individual rights. 62. limited in time. 671. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests "definite" period of time. the rule therein. was meant to be and "became inoperative when Congress met in regular session on May 25. Thus. and. otherwise. the length of which should be "fixed in the law itself and not dependent upon the arbitrary or elastic will of either Congress or the President". hence. apart from the memorandum submitted by counsel for appellant herein. would be unconstitutional.

We believe the purpose of the above-quoted rule is simply to give the Provincial Fiscal. that the ordinance in question is patently illegal. who is the legal officer of the local governments.Mabelle O. the requirements of Sec. as in the present case. and failure on the part of petitioner to notify the Provincial Fiscal will not be a sufficient ground to throw the case out of court. and the matter had already been passed upon by a competent court. 116 . is not jurisdictional. If it appears. 4 of Rule 64 of the Revised Rules of Court) may be dispensed with. a chance to participate in the deliberation to determine the validity of a questioned municipal ordinance before the competent court. as provided in Sec. Rule 66 of the Rules of Court (now See. 4. Rule 64 of the Revised Rules of Court). Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests involving the validity of a municipal ordinance. 5 of Rule 66 of the Rules of Court (now See. 5. however.

[5] Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may in the interest of justice determine upon recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Local Government. MR denied. petition. the animosity generated by protracted court litigations between members of the same political unit. [2] Where one party is a public officer or employee. MTD denied.D.Mabelle O. [2] Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings. as written. and [4] Where the action may otherwise be barred by the Statute of Limitations  Section 2 of the law defines the scope of authority of the Lupon thus: Subject matters for amicable settlement. and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions. the Lupon has the authority to settle amicably all types of disputes involving parties who actually reside in the same city or municipality. No complaint. However.  Thus. [4] Offenses where there is no private offended party. in contradistinction to the limitation imposed upon the Lupon by paragraph (3). as well as the absence of a certification by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary that no conciliation or settlement had been reached by the parties. or a fine exceeding P200. Go Facts: Victor and Flora Go filed a complaint with the CFI against Julius and Ma. The law. section 2 thereof as regards its authority over criminal cases. or unless the settlement has been repudiated. a disruptive factor toward unity and cooperation. The motion was opposed. citing as grounds the failure of the complaint to allege prior availment by the Gos of the barangay conciliation process required by P. It must be borne in mind that the conciliation process at the barangay level is likewise designed to discourage indiscriminate filing of cases in court Morata v.—The Lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except: [1] Where one party is the government . action for proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman. The Moratas filed a motion to dismiss. [3] Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days. the parties may go directly to court in the following cases: [1] Where the accused is under detention. in defining the Lupon's authority. Section 2 of said law employed the universal and comprehensive term "all". Luisa Morata for recovery of a sum of money plus damages. We should not distinguish. 1508. is avoided. makes no distinction whatsoever with respect to the classes of civil disputes that should be compromised at the barangay level. [3] 117 .  SECTION 6.  By compelling the disputants to settle their differences through the intervention of the barangay leader and other respected members of the barangay. YES. to which usage We should neither add nor subtract in consonance with the rudimentary precept in statutory construction that "where the law does not distinguish.00. In fact.or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof. The parties are all residents of Cebu City. Issue: WON the Katarungang Pambarangay law apply to cases heard by the Regional Trial Courts. attachment. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction. except in the instances enumerated in sections 2 and 6 of the law. delivery of personal property and support pendente lite.

1508? And why. Fernando: “Effective upon your receipt of the certification by the Minister of Local Government and Community Development that all the barangays within your respective jurisdictions have organized their Lupons provided for in Presidential Decree No. indeed.D. 1508]. petitions. deal with the nullification or execution of the settlement or arbitration awards obtained at the barangay level.  There can be no question that when the law conferred upon the Lupon "the authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes. No. These sections conferred upon the city and municipal courts the jurisdiction to pass upon and resolve petitions or actions for nullification or enforcement of settlement/arbitration awards issued by the Lupon. should the law seek to ease the congestion of dockets only in inferior courts and not in the regional trial courts where the log-jam of cases is much more serious? Indeed. .  Any doubt on the issue before Us should be dispelled by Circular No. dated November 12. For what would stop a party. actions or proceedings in cases falling within the authority of said Lupons. relied upon by respondent judge. But there is nothing in the context of said sections to justify the thesis that the mandated conciliation process in other types of cases applies exclusively to said inferior courts."  The conciliation process at the barangay level. the first paragraph of which reads as follows: "with the view to easing up the log-jam of cases and solving the backlogs in the case of dockets of all government offices involved in the investigation. prescribed by P. petitions. whereas Sections 11. juvenile and domestic courts and courts of agrarian relations. to wit: However. enhance the quality of justice dispensed by it. 1508. . the lawmakers could not have intended such half-measure and self-defeating legislation. 22 issued by Chief Justice Enrique M. all disputes which involve real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the Barangay where the real property or and part thereof is situated.  It is significant that the above-quoted circular embodying the directive "to desist from receiving complaints. Marcos in a Letter of Implementation. then it would not have provided in Section 3 thereof the following rule on Venue.." has been addressed not only to judges of city and municipal courts. you are hereby directed to desist from receiving complaints. actions and proceedings in cases falling within the authority of said Lupons. if it is the intention of the law to restrict its coverage only to cases cognizable by the inferior courts. otherwise known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law. in implementation of the barangay system of settlement of disputes. from bloating up his claim in order to place his case beyond the jurisdiction of the inferior court and thereby avoid the mandatory requirement of P. now known as regional trial courts under B. but also to all the judges of the courts of first instance. regardless of the amount involved or the nature of the original dispute. to say that the authority of the Lupon is limited to cases exclusively cognizable by the inferior courts is to lose sight of this objective. 1508 as a pre-condition for filing a complaint in court. The said circular was noted by president Ferdinand E. Uy v. 1979.P. as in the instant case. it would make the law a selfdefeating one. but for actions cognizable by the regional trial courts as well." its obvious intendment was to grant to the Lupon as broad and comprehensive an authority as possible as would bring about the optimum realization of the aforesaid objectives. circuit criminal courts.  The authority of the Lupon is clearly established in Section 2 of the law. Worse. trial and adjudication of cases.. 12 and 14. is compulsory not only for cases falling under the exclusive competence of the metropolitan and municipal trial courts. Thus.Mabelle O. Contreras 118 . These objectives would only be half-met and easily thwarted if the Lupon's authority is exercised only in cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. it is hereby ordered that immediate implementation be made by all government officials and offices concerned of the system of amicably settling disputes at the barangay level as provided for in the Katarungang Pambarangay Law [Presidential Decree No.D. 129. in the process. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests in order to decongest its clogged dockets and.  Moreover. say in an action for a sum of money or damages.

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal filed two informations for slight physical injuries against Uy. Uy then filed an MTD for noncompliance with the requirement of P. Elsewise stated. They then filed a complaint with the barangay captain of Valenzuela. 1508 to those offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding P5. that there was an ongoing conciliation between the parties. That barangay may not be the appropriate venue in either paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of the said section.D. This rule provides convenience to the parties.00. No. including private respondent Javier on the other. convenience is the raison d'etre of the rule on venue. Makati. Procedural rules including those relating to venue are designed to insure a fair and convenient hearing to the parties with complete justice between them as a result. such that the resumption of the running of the prescriptive period shall. She also attached to it a certification by the barangay captain of Valenzuela. The sublease contract expired. however. suffers from some ambiguity when it provides that the prescriptive periods "shall resume upon receipt by the complainant of the complaint or the certificate of repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by the lupon or pangkat secretary. which is covered by paragraph (d). it provides that disputes arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at the institution where such parties are enrolled for study. shelves. the phrase "the complaint or" is not found. few cases would reach the regular courts. No. be from receipt by the complainant of the certificate of repudiation or the certification to file action issued by the lupon or the pangkat secretary. shall not exceed sixty days. YES. Uy submitted the required counter-affidavits where she specifically alleged the prematurity of the filing of the criminal cases for failure to undergo conciliation proceedings as she and the private respondents are residents of Manila. 1508 on prior referral to the Lupong Tagapamayapa and pursuant to Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. cordial relationships among protagonists in a small community would be restored. but only Uy appeared. The confrontation of the parties was scheduled by the barangay captain. shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or institution is located. The argument degenerated into a scuffle between the petitioner.Mabelle O. Accordingly.D. Three new features: (1) It increased the authority of the lupon in criminal offenses from those punishable by imprisonment not exceeding thirty days or a fine not exceeding P200. and peace and order therein enhanced. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Facts: Uy subleased from Atayde the other half of the second floor of a building located at corner Reposo and Oliman Streets. it could have been a drafting oversight. No. However. Makati. (3) It provides for the suspension of the prescriptive periods of offenses during the pendency of the mediation. 119 . Issue:WON it is mandatory for the parties herein to submit to the mediation of the katarungang pambarangay before a case in court.  The first feature has necessarily broadened the jurisdiction of the lupon and if the mediation and conciliation process at that level would be effectively pursued.  The law on the katarungang pambarangay was originally governed by P. MR denied. a mirror. also broadens the authority of the lupon in the sense that appropriate civil and criminal cases arising from incidents occurring in workplaces or institutions of learning shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or institution is located.00 in P. obviously. a shampoo bowl. Such suspension. frames. 1508.  Paragraph (c) of Section 410 of the law. and an airconditioning casing. the Uy was not able to remove all her movable properties. Judge Contreras ordered the petitioner to submit her counter-affidavit and those of her witnesses. (2) As to venue. properly. Makati. The confrontation was reset. however. and Atayde and several of Atayde's employees. She operated and maintained therein a beauty parlor. on the one hand. or arbitration process.000. conciliation.  The second feature. Section 409 of the LGC. An argument arose between the Uy and Atayde when the former sought to withdraw from the subleased premises her remaining movable properties such as cabinets. MTD denied. now repealed by LGC. The private respondent had themselves medically examined for the alleged injuries inflicted on them by Uy. in the above quoted Section 11 of the Rules and Regulations issued by the Secretary of Justice. justice would be achieved at less expense to the litigants." What is referred to as receipt by the complainant of the complaint is unclear.D.

1508.D.D. realizing the weakness of their position under P. the fact of non-compliance with and nonobservance of such procedure has been seasonably raised as an issue before the court first taking cognizance of the complaint. wearisome.  While P. of course. 1508. No. No. and Vda.Mabelle O. or the lack of earnest efforts to compromise suits between family members. which constituted substantial compliance with the said requirement. No. Even in her instant petition. The parties herein fall squarely within the ambit of P. when such defect was initially present when the case was first filed in the trial court.  There were. 1508 makes the conciliation process at the Barangay level a condition precedent for the filing of a complaint in Court. The petitioner further invoked the aforequoted Section 18. However. Where. 125 SCRA 444 (1983). cured the defect. Go. 1508 since they did refer their grievances to what might be a wrong forum under the decree. Furthermore. the controversy there alleged is not ripe for judicial determination. 1508 where applicable is much the same effect produced by non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests  The third feature is aimed at maximizing the effectiveness of the mediation. lacking which the case can be dismissed. In their Comment. Court of Appeals: prior recourse to the conciliation procedure required under P."  Such non-compliance is not.  Revised Rule on Summary Procedure: Sec.  In the proceeding before the court a quo. however. dismissal of the action is proper.D. non-compliance with which would deprive a court of its jurisdiction either over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant. They are actual residents in the same barangay and their disputes does not fall under any of the excepted cases. The precise technical effect of failure to comply with the requirement of P. It discourages any intentional delay of the referral to a date close to the expiration of the prescriptive period and then invoking the proximity of such expiration as the reason for immediate recourse to the courts. the petitioner and the respondent had in mind only P. which is condemnable for it disregards the virtue of candor.D. de Borromeo vs. the complaint becomes afflicted with the vice of pre-maturity. 1508 where there is no showing of compliance with such requirement. No. Non-compliance with that condition precedent could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity. cases where this Court ruled that the failure of the defendant to seasonably invoke non-referral to the appropriate lupon operated as a waiver thereof. and expensive litigation between the parties. It also affords the parties sufficient time to cool off and face each other with less emotionalism and more objectivity which are essential ingredients in the resolution of their dispute. Makati. No. The sixty-day suspension of the prescriptive period could spell the difference between peace and a full-blown. in compliance with the requirement of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law under the LGC. Morata vs. 1508 has been repealed by the LGC of 1991. the petitioner invokes the decree and Section 18 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.D. Pogoy. the jurisprudence built thereon regarding prior referral to the lupon as a pre-condition to the filing of an action in court remains applicable because its provisions on prior referral were substantially reproduced in the Code. This provision shall not apply to criminal cases where the accused was arrested without a warrant. changed tack.D. None knew of the repeal of the decree by the LGC of 1991. The complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss.D. Panis: Thus. This Court said so in Garces vs. jurisdictional. the private respondents. or arbitration process.  Peregrina vs. and may be revived only after such requirement shall have been complied with. they assert that the said law is not applicable to their cases before the court a quo because (a) the petitioner and respondent Atayde are not residents of barangays in the 120 . they assert that on 20 April 1993 Atayde "filed a complaint against petitioner before the barangay council of Barangay Valenzuela. 18 Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for conciliation under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. shall be dismissed without prejudice. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement. in a deliberate effort to be cunning or shrewd." Yet. the subsequent issuance of the certification to file action by the barangay. however. conciliation. 126 SCRA 217 (1983) have held that P. The condition is analogous to exhaustion of administrative remedies.

He cannot justify its denial by taking refuge under Section 6 of P. The penalty therefor would only be "arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure. 21 He should have applied the revised katarungang pambarangay law under the LGC. having brought the dispute before the lupon of barangay Valenzuela. Section 412 of the LGC.  Accordingly." These penalties are light under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code and would prescribe in two months pursuant to Article 90. and (c) even assuming that the law applies insofar as Atayde is concerned. pursuant to paragraph (a). His total unawareness of the LGC of 1991. the prescriptive period was automatically suspended for a maximum period of sixty days from 23 April 1993 when the private respondents filed their complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela Makati. considering that the accused and the complainant are residents of different 121 .  The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal should have exerted enough diligence to inquire from the private respondents if prior referral to the lupon was necessary before filing the informations. Had he done so. may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations.  In view of the private respondents' failure to appear at the first scheduled mediation on 28 April 1993 for which the mediation was reset to 26 May 1993.  Respondent judge did not do any better. If no mediation or conciliation could be reached within the said period of suspension and. 145233 and 145234 with the said court on 11 May 1993 was premature and. The filing then of Criminal Cases Nos. there was no basis for the invocation by the respondent judge of the exception provided for in paragraph (b). since the slight physical injuries charged in Criminal Cases Nos. the private respondents are estopped from disavowing the authority of the body which they themselves had sought.  Granting arguendo that the petitioner did inflict the alleged physical injuries. courts are mandatorily required to take judicial notice of "the official acts of the legislative.Mabelle O. Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. Makati. more specifically on the provisions on the Katarungang pambarangay.  Moreover. on 23 April 1993 and automatically suspended for a period of sixty days. as in the said cases. Section 412 of the LGC. Evidently. is distressing. No. Their act of trifling with the authority of the lupon by unjustifiably failing to attend the scheduled mediation hearings and instead filing the complaint right away with the trial court cannot be countenanced for to do so would wreak havoc on the barangay conciliation system. the offense for which she may be liable would only be slight physical injuries under paragraph (2). Makati. or until 22 June 1993. Nevertheless." We have ruled that a judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. respondent Judge Contreras should have granted the motion to dismiss the criminal cases. no complaint for slight physical injuries could be validly filed with the MTC of Makati at any time before such date.  Neither are we persuaded by the reasoning of the respondent Judge that the petitioner "had already waived the right to a reconciliation proceedings before the barangay of Valenzuela. 145233 and 145234 were allegedly inflicted on 17 April 1993. Section 410 of the Code. she has substantially complied with it. the prescriptive period therefor would have expired two months thereafter. the private respondents would still have fifty-six days within which to file their separate criminal complaints for such offense. considering that per the medical certificates 22 the injuries sustained by the private respondents would "heal" in nine days "in the absence of complication" and there is no showing that the said injuries incapacitated them for labor or would require medical attendance for such period. Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code.D. a certification to file action is issued. (b) the law does not apply when the action. Section 412(b)(4) of the LGC) which states that the parties may go directly to court where the action is about to prescribe. 1508 (more properly. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests same city or municipality. This is because. Makati. ever mindful that under Section 1. He should have taken judicial notice thereof. as earlier stated. pursuant to paragraph (c). its running was tolled by the filing of the private respondents' complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela. accordingly. executive and judicial departments of the Philippines. this petition would not have reached us and taken valuable attention and time which could have been devoted to more important cases.

the Office of the Court Administrator made the following findings:that under Art. YES. 2664 in his Order of April 16. that the crime of grave threats falls within the purview of this section. In its Memorandum.  Nor would this Court accept the contention of the private respondent that the parties could not agree on a compromise and that they had to request the barangay captain to issue a certification to file action. in any event. Initially. there was substantial compliance with the requirement of referral to the lupon. this was done to support their contention in the said court that. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests barangays.  Parties to disputes cognizable by the lupon should. and trial courts should not hesitate to impose the appropriate sanctions for noncompliance thereof. However. and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto. or nearly one and a half months after Criminal Cases Nos. The present controversy could have been avoided had he kept faith with the injunction that a member of the bench must continuously keep himself abreast of legal and jurisprudential developments because the learning process in law never ceases. did not exhibit abstruse factual matters or complicated legal questions. that Art. Judge Mejia took cognizance of the case and issued a warrant of arrest against Wingart. he later dismissed the same and indorsed it to the barangay official concerned for barangay conciliation. Makati. 1993 upon motion of the defense counsel. 145233 and 145234.(a) Precondition to filing of Complaint in Court . 408(c). Issue: WON Judge Mejia is liable for incompetence and gross ignorance of the law for taking cognizance of the case when such was not first submitted to the Katarungang Pambarangay for conciliation. administrative sanction is warranted against respondent Judge. Such an actuation. exhaust the remedies provided by that law.000 require prior barangay conciliation. however. This notwithstanding. LocGov Code. The request is dated 23 June 1993. petition. respondent Judge dismissed Criminal Case No. government prosecutors should exercise due diligence in ascertaining compliance with it. Munar against Johan Wingarts for grave threats. He should have carefully examined all relevant facts and issues and avoided the improvident issuance of the warrant of arrest without a circumspect review of the case which. Title One. bias or partiality on his part. she submitted to it and attended the scheduled conciliation on 28 April 1993 and invoked the pre-condition of referral to the lupon in her counter-affidavit.  Although there is no clear proof of malice. Evidently. Chapter 7.  The respondent judge thus acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. after all. bad faith. 412(a) likewise provided the following: CONCILIATION .No complaint. Wingarts v. Judge Mejia should have exercised the requisite prudence. It must be stressed that the private respondents. Case 2664 which was filed by Col. The Court Administrator later concluded the following: "Had respondent Judge observed the mandate of the aforequoted provision of law he could have remanded the case to the lupon instead of taking cognizance thereof and prematurely issuing the warrant of arrest against the accused. Mejia Facts: Administrative complaints were filed against Judge Mejia in connection with 3 criminal cases decided by him. As can be gleaned from the records. offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 1 year or a fine not exceeding P5. Wingarts charges Judge Mejia with incompetence. Book III. In the present case. does not appear to be tainted with malice or evil intent. Absence of bad faith & fact that Judge 122 . had no right to demand the issuance of a certification to file action. One of them is Crim. action or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filled (SIC) or instituted directly in court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat. ignorance of the law and abuse of authority for taking cognizance of Crim Case 2664 and issuing a warrant of arrest despite the lack of prior barangay conciliation." The petitioner did not waive the reconciliation proceedings before the lupon of Valenzuela. especially under the environmental circumstances of the aforesaid criminal case where personal liberty was involved. after failing to appear at the initial confrontation and long after the criminal cases were filed. with sincerity.Mabelle O. 145233 and 145234 were filed with the court a quo.

if filed without compliance with the precondition... Alvarado raised two major defenses.  The prevailing doctrine is that suits or actions for the annulment of sale. CA: outlined the following cases involving the annulment of the title or document over the property which 123 . petitions. and ruled that Alvarado cannot be legally expelled from the subject premises. the MTC of Manila handed down on a decision ordering Alvarado to vacate the room. MR denied. Alvarado and Corpuz were two of the tenants of a certain Lorenzo Barredo who. Consequently. Judge Mejia was order to pay a P2.000 fine with stern warning. the only issue to be resolved in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases is the physical or material possession over the real property. WON the "Affidavit of Waiver" between Corpuz and Barredo was authentic  It is elementary that the MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over ejectment cases. however. As a result of the sale. a tenancy relationship was established between Corpuz and Alvarado. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Mejia subsequently issued an order to recall the warrant of arrest mitigates but will not altogether exculpate him from the charge. may be dismissed on motion of any interested party on the ground that it fails to state a cause of action.500. Issues: 1. It cannot. the RTC reversed and decided that the purported sale between Corpuz and Barredo was the subject of a controversy pending before the National Housing Authority (NHA) which must be resolved first by said agency. resolve the issue of ownership. Court of Appeals. v. Corpuz v."  Since the present petition involves the issue of possession intertwined with the issue of ownership (i. the controversy pending in the NHA). decided to sell his property to the tenants.  Refugia v. Due to economic difficulties. Alvarado and the other lessees executed an "Affidavit of Waiver" granting Barredo the right to sell his house to any person who can afford to purchase the same.  Judges are directed to desist from improvidently receiving and desultorily acting on complaints. Proceedings before the lupon are a precondition to the filing of any action or proceeding in court or other government office. Finding the defenses of Alvarado to be without merit. however. which Corpuz' children allegedly needed for their own use. Such an initiatory pleading. held that the inferior court may look into the evidence of title or ownership and possession de jure insofar as said evidence would indicate or determine the nature of possession. Consequently. It also concluded that the "Affidavit of Waiver" executed by Alvarado and Barredo was a forgery. Barredo sold his house to Corpuz for P37. possession de facto. Branch 6. and (2) the dispute was not referred to the Lupong Tagapayapa. et al. 129. the doctrinal pronouncement in Refugia is applicable. for recovery of possession of the room being occupied by the latter. MR denied.00. title or document do not abate any ejectment action respecting the same property. CA Facts: Corpuz filed an action for unlawful detainer against private respondent Alvarado with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. et al. With this as a premise and taking into consideration the amendment introduced by Batas Pambansa Blg. because the resolution of said issue would effect an adjudication on ownership which is not sanctioned in the summary action for unlawful detainer.Mabelle O. CA affirmed. prompting Corpuz to seek his ejectment. it ordered the dismissal of the case for unlawful detainer. On appeal. in May 1988.e.CA: "In the case of De la Santa vs. As the law now stands.  Wilmor Auto Supply Construction Company Corporations. it may be suggested that inferior courts are now conditionally vested with adjudicatory power over the issue of title or ownership raised by the parties in an ejectment suit. In October 1991. Corpuz sent a written notice to Alvarado demanding that he vacate the room which he was occupying because the children of Corpuz needed it for their own use. in making a distinction between the reception of evidence and the resolution of the issue of ownership. that is. WON Corpuz' unlawful detainer suit filed before the MTC against Alvarado should be suspended until the resolution of the case lodged in the NHA impugning the sale of said property 2. this Court. by declaring who among the parties is the true and lawful owner of the subject property. Alvarado refused to vacate the room as demanded. to wit: (1) the alleged "Affidavit of Waiver" executed between him and Barredo was a forgery. that is. In his answer. actions or proceedings in cases falling within the authority of the Lupon Tagapamayapa.

A perusal of Alvarado's answer reveals that no reason or explanation was given to support his allegation. Furthermore. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests should not be considered in the abatement of an ejectment suit. We have ruled that a judgment rendered in an ejectment case shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building nor shall it be conclusive as to the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession. or title. or document affecting property operate to abate ejectment actions respecting the same property. Clearly. which is deemed a mere general averment.     124 . We are not persuaded. the proceeding outlined in P. We have held in Dui v. Alvarado raises the issue in the instant petition that the ejectment suit was not referred to the Lupon Tagapayapa as required by Presidential Decree No. 1508. Thus. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement and non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the lower court had already acquired over the subject matter and the parties therein. the controversy pending before the NHA for the annulment of the Deed of Sale and assailing the authenticity of the "Affidavit of Joint Waiver" cannot deter the MTC from taking cognizance of the ejectment suit merely for the purpose of determining who has a better possessory right among the parties. This defense was only stated in a single general short sentence in Alvarado's answer. which is summary in nature. It may be stressed that Alvarado is not without remedy. to wit: "Neither do suits for annulment of sale. by the simple expedient of asserting ownership thereon. Court of Appeals that failure of a party to specifically allege the fact that there was no compliance with the Barangay conciliation procedure constitutes a waiver of that defense. In any event.Mabelle O.D. the underlying reason for the above rulings is for the defendant not to trifle with the ejectment suit.

1991 LGC. Respondent’s argument: In all cases where there is failure of settlement of mediation proceedings before the Barangay Chairman. Atty. In the case of complainant.5 of the Rule on Summary Procedure. he decided not to pursue the case and filed a notice to withdraw complaint dated August 20. it is necessary that the Pangkat be constituted by the parties from the Lupon members in order that they may have a second opportunity to amicably settle their dispute. 412. now Sec. Ricardo M. Salomon Jr.00.Mabelle O.000. Following said advice. After defendants filed their comment. 1996. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests behind such order and he was advised that perhaps he should submit the minutes of the hearings held in the barangay. He then inquired personally with the court about the status of the case and he was told that no action could be taken unless the Order of April 2. After the filing of said compliance. 1508. He then inquired from the respondent’s branch clerk of court the reason 125 . Bewildered with such Order. Said withdrawal however was denied by respondent on the basis of the action already taken thereon as contained in the questioned Order dated April 2. 1996 referring the said ejectment case back to the barangay for conciliation proceedings despite the fact that it was alleged in the verified complaint. 1996 had been complied with. that the matter had already been referred to the barangay and that a copy of the Certification to File Motion was attached [to] the verified complaint as ANNEX E thereof. and obvious partiality. of the Bonifacio Law Office charged then acting Judge Reynaldo B. instead of rendering judgment. It is a mandatory duty of the Barangay Chairman to set the meeting of the parties for the constitution of the Pangkat upon failure of parties to amicably settle otherwise there is no compliance with the requirements of P. Branch 34. 1997. grave abuse of discretion. it appears from the records thereof that there was Bonifacio Law Office v. Bellosillo of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. When defendants failed to file an Answer. The inordinate delay of respondent on acting upon said case has caused him so much suffering as his family is forced to rent a house to live in at a monthly rental rate of P19. 1996. with ignorance of the law. However. he filed a compliance with respondent’s court attaching therewith a copy of his complaint filed before the barangay and the minutes of the proceedings held thereat. It was only after a year from the time the complaint was filed that respondent ordered that summons be served on defendants. respondent merely required defendants to comment on the motion to render judgment. Bellosillo Facts: In a letter-complaint dated August 28. he (complainant) filed a Motion to Render Judgment in accordance with the provisions of Sec. respondent still did not act on the said motion. He then filed a Notice of Dismissal but the same was still unacted upon by respondent. no action was taken by the court despite the fact that the case falls under the Rule on Summary Procedure and respondent judge has still to come up with a determination as to whether summons should be issued or not. Dismayed by the Court’s insistence of referring the case to the barangay though it had already gone through all the requisite proceedings thereat.D. he tried to talk with respondent judge but was prevented to do so because of the strict and extremely tight ‘cordon sanitaire’ of the latter. Salomon assails the Order dated April 2.

he shall forthwith set a date for the constitution of the pangkat in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter. there having been no agreement to arbitrate (Sec. Records show that the hearing was scheduled for February 26. A case filed in court without compliance with prior Barangay conciliation which is a pre-condition for formal adjudication x x x may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant/s or the court may suspend proceedings upon petition of any partyand refer the case motu proprio to the appropriate Barangay authority. respondent judge was not incorrect in remanding the case to it for completion of the mandated proceedings. Moreover. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests premature issuance of the Certificate to File Action considering that there is no proof to show that the Pangkat was duly constituted before the said certificate was issued. the following guidelines are hereby issued for the information of trial court judges in cases brought before them coming from the Barangay. Sec. – Upon receipt of the complaint. because it is now mandatory for him to constitute the Pangkat before whom mediation. 410-{b}. and that no face to face conciliation of the parties had taken place before it is substantiated by the Minutes submitted by complainant. In what appears to be a pre-printed standard form thereof. If he fails in his mediation effort within fifteen (15) days from the first meeting of the parties before him.[1]. “[II] 4. as a pre-condition to judicial action. Rule III. Evidently.  Complainant contends that he has complied with the mandatory barangay conciliation proceedings as evidenced by the Certification to File Action attached to the Complaint for ejectment. respectively. reveal that such Certification was improperly and prematurely issued. particularly whether the certification to file action attached to the records of the case comply with the requirements hereinabove enumerated in part II. Issue: WON Judge was correct inreferring the case back to the barangay for conciliation proceedings. 1996. If mediation or conciliation efforts before the Punong Barangay proved unsuccessful. Rule VI.  Evidently. or where the respondent fails to appear at the mediation proceeding before the Punong Barangay (3rd par. The records. 1. His referral of the case back to the barangay cannot 126 . less than fifteen days after the first scheduled hearing before the barangay chairman. 14-93. Respondent’s position that the Pangkat was not constituted. 1996 and was reset for February 29. the barangay failed to exert enough effort required by law to conciliate between the parties and to settle the case before it. 8. which was inaccurate and difficult to decipher glaringly reveals the non-compliance of complainant with the requirement of the aforecited law. 1996. attested by the Lupon/Pangkat Chairmen. Sec. We also note that the Complaint before the barangay was dated February 16. Katarungang Pambarangay Rules). All complaints and/or informations filed or raffled to your sala/branch of the Regional Trial Court. Revised Rule Katarungang Pambarangay Law. We cannot fault him for seeking to promote the objectives of barangay conciliation and for taking to heart the provisions of Supreme Court Circular No. Hence. the Certification to File Action [8] was issued on March 1. And yet.Mabelle O. the belated submission by complainant of the Minutes of Proceedings before the Barangay Chairman. however.  Section 410 (b) of the LGC is quoted hereunder: “Mediation by lupon chairman. improper and/or premature issuance of certifications to file actions in court by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretaries. 1996. (Emphasis and italics supplied) IV.a. with notice to the complainant(s) for them and their witnesses to appear before him for a mediation of their conflicting interests. 14-93 provides: “In order that the laudable purpose of the law may not be subverted and its effectiveness undermined by indiscriminate. the Punong Barangay shall not cause the issuance of this stage of a certification to file action. Metropolitan Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court shall be carefully read and scrutinized to determine if there has been compliance with prior Barangay conciliation procedure under the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. Katarungang Pambarangay Rules). complainant failed to complete the barangay conciliation proceedings. the “x” before the second enumerated statement clearly shows that no personal confrontation before a duly constituted Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo took place. the lupon chairman shall within the next working day summon the respondent(s). or arbitration proceedings shall be held. conciliation.”  Administrative Circular No. YES. III.c.

Quintua. vs. complainant filed a Motion praying that the proceedings already held before the barangay be considered as substantial compliance with the requirements of the law. Palada. “This is for slight physical injuries and is therefore a light offense. He did so after noting that complainant was apparently not making any move to complete the barangay proceedings after the case had been remanded to the barangay. Afable of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Julian–Sulat. Procedure for Amicable Settlement (c) Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses. The prescriptive periods shall resume upon receipt by the complainant of the complaint or the certificate of repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by the Lupon 127 . “Under Art. Nevertheless. and that the case fell under the Rules on Summary Procedure. Abraham L. “People of the Philippines. Cabago also certified in an undated “Minutes In Settling Disputes” that the case was set for hearing on March 16. Eastern Samar a complaint for slight physical injuries against Robert Palada. 1998. conciliation or arbitration. this case be DISMISSED. Effect of failure to answer. Eastern Samar. docketed as Criminal Case No. 1999. On November 3. Quiloña were subscribed and sworn to before the undersigned also on May 4. Pangkat Chairman Eufemia L. 22 and 29.Mabelle O. with ignorance of the law relative to Criminal Case No. 1998. “SO ORDERED. Mendova charged Judge Crisanto B. On May 4. Plaintiff. which state: Section 410. Accused. From the date of the commission of the alleged offense.” for slight physical injuries.” Mendova v. because he chose to continue with the proceedings of the case. the court shall render judgment. Barangay Chairman Ronie D. the crime having already prescribed. more than two months have elapsed. – Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the last affidavits and position papers. THEREFORE. He alleged that in dismissing the case. This action is required under the Rules on Summary Proceedings. but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. The affidavits of complainant as well as prosecution witness Melvin C. complainant filed with the Office of the Court Administrator an administrative complaint against respondent judge. – While the dispute is under mediation. 2198-98. 1998 was filed with this Court on May 4. Neither does it constitute grave abuse of discretion or obvious partiality. respondent judge issued the summons and opted to continue with the court proceedings without insisting on strict compliance with the mandated barangay proceedings. the court. he should have rendered judgment within thirty (30) days from the expiration of the period to file an answer. or the expiration of the period for filing the same. or on motion of the plaintiff. motu proprio. the same should be considered as already having prescribed because the case against the accused was filed after two months. respondent judge rendered his Decision dismissing the case on the ground of prescription. 1999. provides that such cases may be revived only after the requirement for conciliation has been complied with. 7160 (The LGC). respondent judge showed his ignorance of the law when he did not apply the provisions of Section 410(c) of Republic Act No. 1999. criminal liability is totally extinguished by presciption of the crime. Roberto Q. 1998. Acting on the Motion. shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein  “Sec. At any rate. 1998. “Article 90 of the same Code provides that light offenses prescribe in two months. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests be equated with gross ignorance of the law. 1998. Complainant Mendova alleged in his affidavitcomplaint that on February 18.  Section 18 of the Rules on Summary Procedure. however. .” On July 7. 10. and because respondents failed to answer the ejectment Complaint on time.  Thereafter. in his Certification dated April 19. 1998. the prescriptive periods for offenses and causes of action under existing laws shall be interrupted upon filing of the complaint with the Punong Barangay. “LET. Eastern Samar a complaint for slight physical injuries against Palada. “The alleged offense took place on February 15. This being a light offense. respondent judge’s error is judicial in nature and cannot be corrected in administrative proceedings. 1998 he filed with the Office of the Barangay Chairman of Poblacion San Julian. 6. Rendition of judgment. which state: “Sec. thus: "Complaint in this case dated April 20. 2198-98. 89 of the Revised Penal Code. Afable Facts: In an affidavit-complaint dated July 1.Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the period above provided. complainant filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Julian–Sulat. [1] confirmed such fact.

respondent judge made the additional comment that the complainant did not allege bad faith or malice on his (respondent’s) part in rendering the questioned decision. these judicial remedies.” According to him. are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of the judges concerned. a motion for new trial). and must wait on the result thereof.. That such interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the filing of the complaint with the punong barangay. the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of. Indeed. and appeal. WON respondent Judge is liable for dismissing the case on the ground of prescription. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable. however. that the door to an inquiry into his criminal. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies.00 with a warning that a commission of similar acts will be dealt with more severely. administrative. “Now. He begged for kindness and understanding. or closed.) are inter alia the special civil actions of certiorari. whether of civil. It is only where the error is so gross.e. whimsical. respondent admitted that his Decision being assailed by complainant “was wrong. assuming he has erred. would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position doubly unbearable. Eastern Samar. In his manifestation. nor a substitute for. or a motion for inhibition.Mabelle O. capricious. if subsequent developments prove the judge’s challenged act to be correct. “(w)hen I rendered the questioned decision. Issue: 1. whether ordinary or extraordinary. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality. as this Court has repeatedly stressed. despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty. without pressure or influence 128 .  It is axiomatic. error in appreciation or admission of evidence. prohibition or mandamus. In its Evaluation and Recommendation. through Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. or incurred with evident bad faith that administrative sanctions may be imposed against the erring judge. such as a motion for reconsideration. found respondent guilty as charged and recommended that he be fined P3. what entered my mind was the rule on prescription as provided under the Revised Penal Code. “Flores (complainant) resorted to administrative prosecution (or institution of criminal actions) as a substitute for or supplement to the specific modes of appeals or review provided by law from court judgments or orders.” as he was likewise designated the Acting Presiding Judge of MCTC Llorente-Hernani. or an appeal." Complainant further alleged that respondent's conduct caused him injury and grave injustice. The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as normal in nature (i. since judges must be free to judge. as this Court has already more than once ruled. there would be no occasion to proceed against him at all. the Office of the Court Administrator.’ This is impermissible. Besides. a petition for change of venue. There was a mental lapse on my part caused by heavy workload. etc. Elepaño. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests or Pangkat Secretary: Provided. as the case may be. stating that he has been a trial judge for 10 years and that this is the “first kind of mistake” he has ever committed. The extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character (i. Both parties filed their respective manifestations that they are willing to have the case so decided. Law and logic decree that ‘administrative or criminal remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is available. For. civil or administrative liability may be said to have opened..e. or in construction or application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order. that an administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available. Abesamis: “As everyone knows. the law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. In his comment dated September 13. or criminal nature. as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding. obviously. deliberate and malicious. 1999. on the theory that the Judges’ orders had caused him ‘undue injury. to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders. for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.  Flores vs.000.

respondent Voluntary Arbitrator denied members of petitioner union substantial justice as a result of her erroneous interpretation of the CBA. quoted earlier. and Sangguniang Bayan. thereby entitling petitioners members at the AMS Farming Corp. who are between the ages of 15 and 21 and who are registered as members. is an ex officio member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. the fear of civil. however. criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions they may make in the performance of their duties and functions. 2198-98 for slight physical injuries with respondent's court. thereby justifying judicial review. which is composed of citizens of the Philippines residing in the barangay for at least six (6) months. The chairman of the SK is an ex officio member of the Sangguniang Baranggay with the same powers duties. Clearly. sec 3 of the CBA and the day on which it is held to be a holiday. 22 and 29. we noticed from the records before us that the complainant did not bother at all to file a motion for reconsideration of respondent judge’s decision dismissing the criminal case. 1998. or municipality. until the dismissal of the case on November 3. which must be recognized independently of statute. he still failed to present proof of his receipt of the Barangay Certification to File Action. and x x x also evidence of malice or bad faith. Thus. 7160) creates in every barangay a Sangguniang Kabataan composed of a chairman. Here. ignorance or inexcusable negligence. Issue: WON the Sangguniang Kabataan Election Day considered a regular holiday for purpose of the CBA.  We hold that it is and that. No reason was advanced by complainant why he failed to do so. his instant administrative complaint is premature. complainant filed his complaint with the Office of the Barangay Chairman at Poblacion. to the payment of holiday on such day. No. which is imposed of the SK chairmen of the sangguniang kabataan of the barangays in the province.  First. and that exceptionally. 3 The chairman and the seven members are elected by the Katipunan ng Kabataan. functions and privileges as the regular members of the Sangguniang Barangay. such filing interrupted the prescriptive period [8] and started to run again upon receipt by the complainant of the Certification to File Action issued by the Pangkat Secretary. San Julian. 1992 was not a regular holiday within the contemplation of the CBA. Hence. Robert Palada committed the crime of slight physical injuries on February 15. On February 18. Letrondo-Montejo Facts: The President of the Philippines declared December 4. they should not be subject to intimidation. Sangguniang Panlungsod. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 410(c) of The LGC. VII. city. he cannot now fault respondent judge for dismissing the case on the ground of prescription. the election for members of the SK may properly be considered a "local election" within the meaning of Art. records fail to show when complainant received the Barangay Certification to File Action. Eastern Samar.  According to complainant. following our settled pronouncements cited above. 1998. The Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) is part of the local government structure. The undated certification he submitted merely states that the case was set for hearing before the barangay on March 16. but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. 1998. a secretary and a treasurer. as the Solicitor General points out. that judges are not generally liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith. prosecution of a judge can be had only if ‘there be a final declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or order. 1998 Criminal Case No. pursuant to their CBA subsequently filed claims for the payment to them of holiday pay for that day. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests from external forces or factors.Mabelle O. 1992 a "special day" for the holding of election for Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) throughout the nation. 5 The President of the Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan. The LGC (Rep. and it is sound rule. Employees. ALU v. 1998. Private respondent. When he filed on May 4. in denying petitioner's claim. Act.  In the present case. refused their claims on the ground that December 4. seven (7) members. on the part of the judge in rendering said judgment or order’ or under the stringent circumstances set out in Article 32 of the Civil Code. 129 .

the reopening of the ballot box and the recount of the votes for SK Chairman. 1992 President Ramos declared the day as "a special day through the country on the occasion of the Sangguniang Kabataan Elections" and enjoined all "local government units through their respective Chief Local Executives [to] extend all possible assistance and support to ensure the smooth conduct of the general elections. on the basis of its tally which showed Mercado winning by one vote over his rival. The BES ordered . Mercado assailed the jurisdiction of the BES to act on the protest filed by Pangilinan as the ground cited therein was allegedly in the nature of an election protest properly cognizable by the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court in accordance with Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code. Batangas. He further claimed that. Mercado was proclaimed winner in the 4 December 1992 election for chairman of the SK of Barangay Mabalor. as distinguished from the special elections for such officers. It was a nonworking holiday and this was announced in the media. Mercado' s victory was. Indeed. The Voluntary Arbitrator held. 2499 of the COMELEC did not vest in the RTC jurisdiction over controversies affecting Sangguniang Kabataan elections. Mercado then filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City a petition for certiorari and mandamus praying for the annulment of Pangilinan's proclamation by the BES. The Constitution provides. 10 Only voters belonging to the relevant sectors can take part in the election of their representatives. the CBA provision in question merely reiterates the provision on paid holidays. private respondent Crisanto P."  A "special day" is a "special day". in the context of SK elections. as provided by the Administrative Code of 1987. however. and that the BES acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the petitioner of due process when it ordered the reopening of the ballot box and the recounting of the votes without affording him the opportunity to be heard. assuming that the BES has jurisdiction over the protest. Mercado moved for a reconsideration of the dismissal order. December 4. 1992 was not a nonworking holiday. The proclamation was made by the Board of Election Tellers (BET) acting as the Board of Canvassers. the regular elections for members of the SK. which is under COMELEC jurisdiction . among others. Ibaan. Vice Governors. it is not true that December 4.Mabelle O. 118 dated December 2. Mercado v. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests  Second. who was thereupon proclaimed the duly elected SK Chairman by the BES. Board of Election Supervisors Facts: Jose M. Mayors and Vice Mayors and the various local legislative assemblies (sanggunians) because the SK election is participated in only by the youth who are between the ages of 15 and 21 and for this reason the day is not a nonworking holiday. the fact that only those between 15 and 21 take part in the election for members of the SK does not make such election any less a regular local election. 9  Moreover. 7 In Proclamation No. Yet it cannot be denied that such election is a regular national election and the day set for its holding. the RTC dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. for example. Pangilinan. which issued for that purpose its own Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation. constituting instead the BES. a holiday. In his petition docketed as Civil Case No. He alleged that the BET Chairman. The recount reversed the earlier tally to 51 to 49 in favor of Pangilinan. 3565. In its Order dated 13 January 1993. He argued that the RTC was competent to act on his petition because (a) one mode of seeking judicial review 130 . and for the issuance of an order to compel the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) to recognize him as the duly elected SK Chairman of Barangay Mabalor and to allow him to take his oath of office and discharge his duties as such. however. Pangilinan filed a formal protest questioning the results of the election. Immediately after Mercado's proclamation as the winner by the BET. The trial court stated that it was not aware of any law by which it could act on the matters raised in Mercado's petition since Resolution No. To begin with. had invalidated some votes without consulting the other board members. Whether in the context of the CBA or the Labor Code. that the election for members of the SK cannot be considered a local election as the election for Governors . 8 On the other hand. drinking gin and Coke during the counting. the grounds raised therein were deemed waived by Pangilinan's failure to invoke them at the level of the BET. the term "general elections" means. women and youth. short-lived. for the sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives of. 1992 was a holiday for which holiday pay should be paid by respondent employer. as the final arbiter of all election controversies within its level.  Third.

337 (The LGC). 2499 is illegal and unconstitutional because it makes the BES the final arbiter of election contests involving the SK in contravention of Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code which vests in the proper metropolitan or municipal trial court original jurisdiction over such contests and. the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. Blg. with the former having direct general supervision in the conduct of such election and as the final arbiter of all election protests. the COMELEC was to provide only technical assistance in the conduct of the SK election and therefore could not grant any relief from the action of the BES. in its Order dated 2 March 1993. and the secretary and the treasurer to be appointed by the SK chairman with the concurrence of the SK. 7160 (The LGC).A. It ruled that the reopening of the ballot box for Barangay Mabalor and the recounting of the votes cast therein were perfectly within the ambit of the BES's authority. paragraph (e) Article 203. The chairman. who should at least be 15 years of age or over but less than 18 The then Secretary of Local Government and Community Development was authorized to promulgate the implementing rules and regulations.Mabelle O. No preproclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the election of sangguniang kabataan chairman and members. the jurisdictional and due process issues raised therein being legal in nature. Issue: WON the BES may take cognizance of Pangilinan’s protest  SK history: the SK was initially organized by P.A. 4 The katipunan ng kabataan is composed of all citizens of the Philippines actually residing in the barangay for at least six months who are 15 but not more than 21 and who are duly registered in the list of the SK or in the official barangay list in the custody of the barangay secretary.(b) under its Resolutions Nos. 7160.D. Article V of Resolution No. 2499 which closely followed the pattern set in the Constitution of the Kabataang Barangay providing for a Board of Election Supervisors and Board of Election Tellers. Under R. a youth organization composed of all barangay residents who were less than 18 years of age which aims to provide its members with the opportunity to express their views and opinions on issues of transcendental importance. Its affairs were administered by a barangay youth chairman together with six barangay youth leaders. 129. upon assumption of office. b) city/municipal election officer as member. No. the Pambansang Katipunan ng Kabataang Barangay ng Pilipinas was constituted as "a body corporate" with "the powers and attributes of a corporation" and placed directly under the Office of the President.P. the Kabataang Barangay was changed to the Sangguniang Kabataan. Rule XXVII of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC 7 the conduct and administration of the elections for sangguniang kabataan members shall be governed by the rules promulgated by the COMELEC. 2 which raised the maximum age requirement of the members from 18 to 21. in contravention of Section 2. shall automatically become an ex-officio member of the sangguniang barangay  Under subparagraph (5). such courts 131 . under said Resolution No. No. composed of a chairman and seven members to be elected by the katipunan ng kabataan. This youth organization was recognized in B. No. no appeal to a higher administrative level wash allowed from the action of the BES and (c) the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies did not apply to the case at bar. on a more fundamental ground.D.P. and c) city/municipal secretary as member. The board shall have direct general supervision in the conduct of elections for sangguniang kabataan in the barangay and shall act as final arbiter in the resolution of all election protests. 684 (15 April 1975) as the Kabataang Barangay (KB). Pursuant to P. moreover. Article IX-C of the Constitution which lodges on. 3 It remains as a youth organization in every barangay. Blg. 2499 and 2520. Unconvinced. and that Mercado should have gone to the DILG which has direct control and supervision of the SK elections. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests is through the writ of certiorari which may be issued by the RTC under B. No. 1191 (1 September 1977). Its affairs were to be administered by the Executive Committee which was empowered to promulgate rules and regulations governing the KB. 2499 expressly provides: There shall be created aboard of election supervisors (BES) in every city or municipality composed of the following: a) city/municipal local government operations officer as chairman. denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. 2499. the RTC.Pursuant to such authority and for purposes of the SK election authorized under Section 532 of R.  The petitioner contends that COMELEC Resolution No.

Article IX-C of the Constitution on the COMELEC's exclusive appellate jurisdiction over contests involving elective barangay officials refer to the elective barangay officials under the pertinent laws in force at the time the Omnibus Election Code was enacted and upon the ratification of the Constitution. appealed to COMELEC Regional Director Filemon A. Sangguniang Kabataan. however.     132 . The decisions of these courts were appealable to the Regional Trial Courts. filed with the COMELEC en banc a "Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy" against petitioner Garvida for falsely representing her age qualification in her certificate of candidacy. Sales. Bangui-Pagudpud-Adams-Damalneg. She filed a "Petition for Inclusion as Registered Kabataang Member and Voter" with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. On June 2. That same day Rios issued the memorandum to petitioner. thus. 10 They are also the same officers referred to by the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines on election of barangay officials. it is part of the system of checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications. Petitioner won. and the elective barangay officials referred to were the punong barangay and the six sangguniang bayan members. Ilocos Norte. we hold that the Regional Trial Court is competent to review the decision of the BES in election controversies within its level. Metropolitan and municipal trial courts had exclusive original The jurisdiction over contests relating to their election .. In accordance with the May 2. It is generally understood that as to administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial or legislative power there is an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute. but the RTC judge inhibited himself by reason of his close relation with her. As correctly stated by the petitioner. Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code and that portion of paragraph (2). This contention is without merit for it assumes that the SK election is an election involving elective barangay officials within the purview of the aforesaid statutory and constitutional provisions. Petitioner. private respondent Florencio G. 1996. Bangui." On July 5. The purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect substantial rights of parties affected by its decisions. 337. otherwise known as the LGC. Asperin who set aside the order of respondents and allowed petitioner to run. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests exclusive original jurisdiction over contests involving elective barangay officials. Jr. Rios. Sales Facts: Petitioner applied for membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan but was denied such as she was already 21 years and 10 months old. 1996. the Board of Election Tellers did not proclaim petitioner as the winner. 1996 order of the COMELEC en banc. The Court recognizes the consequences of the quasi-judicial acts performed by the BES pursuant to Section 24 of COMELEC Resolution No. the instant petition for certiorari was filed on May 27. The Board of Election Tellers appealed. Garvida v. Election Officer Dionisio F. disapproved petitioner's certificate of candidacy again due to her age. Blg. The proclamation was "without prejudice to any further action by the Commission on Elections or any other interested party. 2499 under the operative fact doctrine. She won as Auditor and was proclaimed one of the elected officials of the Pederasyon.P.Mabelle O. Ilocos Norte. Barangay San Lorenzo. it is a basic principle in administrative law that the absence of a provision for the review of an administrative action does not preclude recourse to the courts. The court found her qualified. 9 They were to be elected by those qualified to exercise the right of suffrage. Hence. Earlier and without the knowledge of the COMELEC officials. the COMELEC en banc issued an order directing the Board of Election Tellers and Board of Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo to suspend the proclamation of petitioner in the event she won in the election. however. per advice of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli Pipo. Section 2. That law was B. Rios issued a memorandum to petitioner informing her of her ineligibility and giving her 24 hours to explain why her certificate of candidacy should not be disapproved. 1996. Petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Chairman. a rival candidate for Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan. petitioner ran in the Pambayang Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan for the municipality of Bangui. Ilocos Norte. the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed petitioner the winner for the position of SK chairman.

337 at 15 but not more than 21 years old. a barangay youth organization composed of all residents of the barangay who were at least 15 years but less than 18 years of age.. Section 428 provides that the maximum age of an elective SK official is 21 years old "on the day of his election. (c) a resident of the barangay at least one (1) year immediately preceding the election. argues that Section 3 [b] of Resolution No. The affairs of the Katipunan ng Kabataan are administered by the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) composed of a chairman and seven (7) members who are elected by the Katipunan ng Kabataan. 1981. the voter must be born between May 6. (b) a qualified voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan. There is no further provision as to when the member shall have turned 21 years of age. She contends that the Code itself does not provide that the voter must be exactly 21 years of age on election day. (c) 15 but not more than 21 years of age. i. and (d) duly registered in the list of the Sangguniang Kabataan or in the official barangay list. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio. On the other hand.Mabelle O." The addition of the phrase "on the day of his election" is an additional qualification. Batas Pambansa Blg. she was still twenty-one years of age on election day and therefore qualified as a member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and as candidate for the SK elections. however. YES. and (c) able to read and write. Its affairs were administered by a barangay youth chairman together with six barangay youth leaders who were actual residents of the barangay and were at least 15 years but less than 18 years of age.  Except for the question of age. In 1983. 1996 SK elections if he is: (a) a Filipino citizen. She urges that so long as she did not turn twenty-two (22) years old. however. The courts may distinguish when there are facts and circumstances showing that the legislature intended a distinction or qualification.  A member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan may be a qualified voter in the May 6.  The Katipunan ng Kabataan was originally created by PD 684 in 1975 as the Kabataang Barangay. petitioner has all the qualifications of a member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and a candidate for the Sangguniang Kabataan. Section 424 of the Code sets a member's maximum age at 21 years only. and (f) must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. and (c) a resident of the Philippines for at least one (1) year and an actual resident of the barangay at least six (6) months immediately preceding the elections. then the LGC. Section 428 of the Code requires that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen. It. Petitioner. Petitioner's age is admittedly beyond the limit set in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. The elective official. 2824. The distinction is understandable considering that the Code itself provides more qualifications for an elective SK official than for a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan.  The qualification that a voter in the SK elections must not be more than 21 years of age on the day of the election is not 133 .e. (e) able to read and write. raised the maximum age of the Kabataang Barangay members from "less than 18 years of age" to "not more than 21 years of age. The member may be more than 21 years of age on election day or on the day he registers as member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. inclusive. 337. ultra vires and beyond the scope of Sections 424 and 428 of the LGC. (d) at least 15 years but not more than 21 years of age on the day of his election.  Membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan is subject to specific qualifications laid down by the LGC: (a) a Filipino citizen. (b) an actual resident of the barangay for at least six months. however. 1975 and May 6.P. 2824 is unlawful. A candidate for the SK must: (a) possess the foregoing qualifications of a voter. (b) be a resident in the barangay at least one (1) year immediately preceding the elections.  A closer look at the LGC will reveal a distinction between the maximum age of a member in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and the maximum age of an elective SK official. (b) 15 but not more than 21 years of age on election day. retained the age limit of the members laid down in B. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Issue: WON the cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the ground that she has exceeded the age requirement to run as an elective official of the SK is valid. must not be more than 21 years old on the day of election. The Kabataang Barangay sought to provide its members a medium to express their views and opinions and participate in issues of transcendental importance." The LGC changed the Kabataang Barangay into the Katipunan ng Kabataan.

On the 365th day of the second cycle.Mabelle O. According to Senator Pimentel. 1996. Reading Section 423 [b] together with Section 428 of the Code. "Not more than 21 years old" is not equivalent to "less than 22 years old." If the intention of the Code's framers was to include citizens less than 22 years old. It does not mean 21 years and one or some days or a fraction of a year because that would be more than 21 365day cycles." Conversely.  The provision that an elective official of the SK should not be more than 21 years of age on the day of his election is very clear. not beyond 21 years. the first year is reached after completing the first 365 days. The LGC speaks of years." Section 424 of the Code does not provide that the maximum age of a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan is determined on the day of the election." This provision clearly states that the youth official must be at least 15 years old and may be 17 years and a fraction of a year but should not reach the age of eighteen years. the age qualification of a barangay youth official was expressly stated as "at least fifteen years of age or over but less than eighteen. 134 . This cycle goes on and on in a lifetime. When the LGC increased the age limit of members of the youth organization to 21 years. This means on his 21st birthday. One born on the first day of the year is consequently deemed to be one year old on the 365th day after his birth -. the 365-day cycle for his 22nd year begins. then it may be assumed that a "qualified voter" is a "member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. After this birthday. 684. 11 months and 5 days old. 2824. The only exception is when the official reaches the age of 21 years during his incumbency.  In P. It means 21 365-day cycles. they should have stated so expressly instead of leaving the matter open to confusion and doubt." contrary to petitioner's claims. 2824 is therefore ultra vires insofar as it sets the age limit of a voter for the SK elections at exactly 21 years on the day of the election. 1996 SK elections. The maximum age of a youth official must therefore be exactly 21 years on election day. 1974. Section 423 [b] of the Code allows him to serve the remaining portion of the term for which he was elected.  The phrase "not more than 21 years of age" means not over 21 years. 1996. Section 3 [b] in relation to Section 6 [a] of COMELEC Resolution No. not months nor days.  The general rule is that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must not be more than 21 years of age on the day of his election. the person turns two years old.  In the case at bar. The day after the 365th day is the first day of the next 365-day cycle and he turns 22 years old on the 365th day. When the law speaks of years. the law that created the Kabataang Barangay. she was 21 years. 1996 Sangguniang Kabataan elections. When she assumed office on June 1. 2824. After the first 365th day. it did not reenact the provision in such a way as to make the youth "at least 15 but less than 22 years old. Petitioner may have qualified as a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan but definitely. In computing years. The law does not state that the candidate be less than 22 years on election day. Since a "qualified voter" is not necessarily an elective official. petitioner was born on June 11. A person turns 21 years old on the 365th day of his 21st 365-day cycle. it is understood that years are of 365 days each. petitioner was over the age limit for elective SK officials set by Section 428 of the LGC and Sections 3 [b] and 6 of Comelec Resolution No. She was ineligible to run as candidate for the May 6. he can be declared ineligible. 11 months and 20 days old and was merely ten (10) days away from turning 22 years old. the day she registered as voter for the May 6. the youth leader must have "been elected prior to his 21st birthday. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests provided in Section 424 of the LGC. On March 16. petitioner was twenty-one (21) years and nine (9) months old. the SK official must not have turned 21 years old before his election. the latest date at which an SK elective official turns 21 years old is on the day of his election. 2824 is not ultra vires insofar as it fixes the maximum age of an elective SK official on the day of his election. In fact the term "qualified voter" appears only in COMELEC Resolution No.the last day of the year. On the day of the elections. the first day of the second 365-day cycle begins. Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No.D. he has completed the entire span of 21 365-day cycles.  The requirement that a candidate possess the age qualification is founded on public policy and if he lacks the age on the day of the election. she was 21 years.

2002. petitioner Antoniette V. despite his claims. 2002." The question of the age qualification is a question of eligibility. Montesclaros also urged the Comelec to respond to her letter within 10 days upon receipt of the letter. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility. nor will it validate his election. capable of being legally chosen. To avoid a hiatus in the office of SK Chairman. on the other hand. Montesclaros sent a letter to the Comelec. A defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.Mabelle O. WON there exists a justiciable controversy. the Comelec Chairman intimated that it was “operationally very difficult” to hold both elections simultaneously in May 2002. 2002.C. 1996 elections. On March 11. (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the     Montesclaros v. The fact that the candidate was elected will not make the age requirement directory. petitioners filed the instant petition. Bangui. the Comelec Chairman expressed support for the bill of Senator Franklin Drilon that proposed to hold the Barangay elections in May 2002 and postpone the SK elections to November 2002. 1996 elections." Ineligibility. then Comelec Chairman. Being "eligible" means being "legally qualified. Instead. The ineligibility of petitioner does not entitle private respondent. is removed from office. In his letters. Neither can this Court order that pursuant to Section 435 of the LGC petitioner should be succeeded by the Sangguniang Kabataan member who obtained the next highest number of votes in the May 6. 2002. and enjoy the rights and privileges appurtenant to said office. 2002 recommending to Congress the postponement of the SK elections to November 2002 but holding the Barangay elections in May 2002 as scheduled. 4763 dated February 5. The member chosen shall assume the office of SK Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term. 2002. and shall discharge the powers and duties. Ten days lapsed without the Comelec responding to the letter of Montesclaros. voluntarily resigns. refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office. the Senate and the House of Representatives passed their respective bills postponing the SK elections. Ilocos Norte by simple majority from among themselves. Section 435 applies when a Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman "refuses to assume office. fails to qualify. Subsequently. (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question. demanding that the SK elections be held as scheduled on May 6. if the candidate is over the maximum age limit on the day of the election. 2050 [14] and House Bill No. private respondent has failed to prove that the electorate themselves actually knew of petitioner's ineligibility and that they maliciously voted for her with the intention of misapplying their franchises and throwing away their votes for the benefit of her rival candidate. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests In the same vein. is convicted of a felony. COMELEC 135 . he is ineligible. the Senate approved the Bicameral Committee’s consolidated bill and on March 13.  The Court’s power of judicial review may be exercised in constitutional cases only if all the following requisites are complied with. dies. 2002. the Court deems it necessary to order that the vacancy be filled by the SK member chosen by the incumbent SK members of Barangay San Lorenzo. she will seek judicial relief. petitioners received a copy of Comelec En Banc Resolution No. The President signed the approved bill into law on March 19. namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case or controversy. otherwise. 2002. the Bicameral Conference Committee (“Bicameral Committee” for brevity) of the Senate and the House came out with a Report recommending approval of the reconciled bill consolidating Senate Bill No. On March 11. Facts: On February 18. Ineligibility is not one of the grounds enumerated in Section 435 for succession of the SK Chairman. 2002. wrote identical letters to the Speaker of the House and the Senate President about the status of pending bills on the SK and Barangay elections. On March 6. 2002. Alfredo L. [15] The Bicameral Committee’s consolidated bill reset the SK and Barangay elections to July 15. On March 11. 2002 and lowered the membership age in the SK to at least 15 but not more than 18 years of age. NO. Benipayo. is permanently incapacitated. 4456. Moreover. On February 20. Issues: 1. the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes in the May 6. or has been absent without leave for more than three (3) consecutive months. the House of Representatives approved the same. to be declared elected.

Article VIII of the Constitution states – “Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case. or from setting into motion the legislative mill according to its internal rules.”     136 . Petitioners have not shown that the Comelec acted illegally or with grave abuse of discretion in recommending to Congress the postponement of the SK elections. 2002. The power of judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. as claimed by petitioners. 9164 has reset the SK elections to July 15. The second paragraph of Section 1. coordinate and independent branches of government. 2002. (2) the letter of then Comelec Chairman Benipayo addressed to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate. The evidence consist of the following: (1) Comelec en banc Resolution No. 2002 SK elections. there can be no justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality of a proposed bill. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court. A proposed bill. RA No. The Court has also no power to dictate to Congress the object or subject of bills that Congress should enact into law. 2002 SK elections. a date acceptable to petitioners. there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review.  The Comelec exercised its power and duty to “enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. violates no constitutional right or duty. the approval of bills by each chamber of Congress. plebiscite. 1. A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review because it is not a law.  RA No. the Court cannot restrain Congress from passing any law. the Court cannot exercise its power of judicial review over the internal processes or procedures of Congress. The Court has no power to compel Congress by mandamus to enact a law allowing petitioners. referendum and recall” and to “recommend to Congress effective measures to minimize election spending. This law also fixes the date of the SK elections. having no legal effect. Petitioners’ prayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill lowering the membership age in the SK does not present an actual justiciable controversy. WON the postponement of the SK elections amounted to a grave abuse of discretion. the reconciliation by the Bicameral Committee of approved bills. Absent a clear violation of specific constitutional limitations or of constitutional rights of private parties. 9164 is now the law that prescribes the qualifications of candidates and voters for the SK elections. and (3) the Conference Committee Report consolidating Senate Bill No. With respect to the date of the SK elections. 2002 that recommended the postponement of the SK elections to 2003. 4456. to vote and be voted for in the July 15. and the eventual approval into law of the reconciled bills by each chamber of Congress. and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. there is therefore no actual controversy requiring judicial intervention. In the instant case. These acts cannot constitute proof. Under the separation of powers. The very evidence relied upon by petitioners contradict their allegation of illegality.” Thus. not before. 2050 and House Bill No.Mabelle O. 4763 dated February 5.” The Comelec’s acts enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. petitioners are nevertheless amenable to a resetting of the SK elections to any date not later than July 15. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests earliest opportunity. The Court can exercise its power of judicial review only after a law is enacted. the following acts of Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers are not subject to judicial restraint: the filing of bills by members of Congress. The Court has no power to declare a proposed bill constitutional or unconstitutional because that would be in the nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act of Congress. initiative. NO. The judicial power to review the constitutionality of laws does not include the power to prescribe to Congress what laws to enact. To do so would destroy the delicate system of checks and balances finely crafted by the Constitution for the three coequal. regardless of their age. Thus. that there “exists a connivance and conspiracy (among) respondents in contravention of the present law. While seeking to prevent a postponement of the May 6.

which fixed the maximum age for membership in the SK to youths less than 18 years old. The new law restricts membership in the SK to this specific age group. 2002 SK elections. A party must also show that he has a real interest in the suit. Only those who qualify as SK members can contest. After the passage of RA No. Congress merely restored the age requirement in PD No. for the power to make laws includes the power to change the laws. Petitioners failed to prove that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in recommending to Congress the postponement of the May 6. Youths from 18 to 21 years old as of May 6. This. This petition does not raise any constitutional issue. and cannot participate in the July 15. NO. Every law passed by Congress is always subject to amendment or repeal by Congress. 1. 2002 SK elections. RA No. based on a statutory right. this right is limited to those who on the date of the SK elections are at least 15 but less than 18 years old. contingent. To grant petitioners’ prayer to be allowed to vote and be voted for in the July 15. One who is no longer qualified because of an amendment in the law cannot complain of being deprived of a proprietary right to SK membership. 2002 SK elections. 9164. Petitioners have no personal and substantial interest in maintaining this suit. subordinate. 2002 SK elections necessitates assailing the constitutionality of RA No. Petitioners do not have a vested right to the permanence of the age requirement under Section 424 of the LGC. The presumption remains that the decision of the Comelec to recommend to Congress the postponement of the elections was made in good faith in the regular course of its official duties.  Under RA No. with the passage of RA No. At the time petitioners filed this petition. The Court cannot restrain Congress from amending or repealing laws. Congress exercises the power to prescribe the qualifications for SK membership. or is about to be denied some personal right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled.  The Court cannot also direct the Comelec to allow over-aged voters to vote or be voted for in an election that is limited under RA No. 2002 are also no longer SK members. Petitioners’ remedy is legislation. petitioners have not done. 2002 SK elections. we find no grave abuse of discretion in their assailed acts. which reset the SK elections and reduced the age requirement for SK membership. SK membership is not a property right protected by the    1. 9164 to youths at least 15 but less than 18 years old. 684. NO. 9164. WON SK membership is a property right. was not yet enacted into law. or inconsequential interest. petitioners failed to assail any provision in RA No. 9164.  137 . as distinguished from a mere expectancy or future. Congress will have to decide whether to enact an amendatory law. 2002 to participate in the July 15. any act disqualifying them from SK membership or from voting in the SK elections. The evidence cited by petitioners even establish that the Comelec has demonstrated an earnest effort to address the practical problems in holding the SK elections on May 6. the original charter of the SK. WON the exclusion of persons 18-21 from the SK was unconstitutional. A party must show that he has been.  Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. 2002. 9164.Mabelle O. petitioners seek to enforce a right originally conferred by law on those who were at least 15 but not more than 21 years old. petitioners no longer have a personal and substantial interest in the SK elections. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests  The 1987 Constitution imposes upon the Comelec the duty of enforcing and administering all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections. 9164. Not falling within this classification. 9164 that could be unconstitutional. The Court will not strike down a law unless its constitutionality is properly raised in an appropriate action and adequately argued. In the instant case. Plainly. not judicial intervention. Public respondents having acted strictly pursuant to their constitutional powers and duties. A law is needed to allow all those who have turned more than 21 years old on or after May 6. By “real interest” is meant a present substantial interest. petitioners have ceased to be members of the SK and are no longer qualified to participate in the July 15. Now.

but where every officer accepts office pursuant to the provisions of the law and holds the office as a trust for the people he represents. While RA No.  A public office is not a property right. As the Constitution expressly states. a “[P]ublic office is a public trust.Complainant filed a complaint against Mayor Irisari for grave misconduct and usurpation of judicial function with the Office of the Ombudsman as well as administrative complaint for violation of the Constitution.  This argument deserves scant consideration. once an employee reaches mandatory retirement age. After preliminary investigation. should realize from the very start that no one has a proprietary right to public office. much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a public office. Originally raffled to the judge of that court.”  Petitioners. decided in 1920. The basic idea of the government is that of a popular representative government. Judge Ariño denied the motion to quash on the ground that the power of mayors to issue warrants of arrest had ceased to exist as of February 2. 1989. the officers being mere agents and not rulers of the people. While the law makes an SK officer an ex-officio member of a local government legislative council. when the SK elections are held. they cannot invoke any property right to cling to their SK membership. 337). WON the postponement of the SK elections would allow the incumbent SK officers to perpetuate themselves in power. one where no one man or set of men has a proprietary or contractual right to an office. although no investigation was later conducted. however. 143(3) of the former LGC (Batas Pambansa Blg. 1987 when the Constitution took effect. the law does not confer on petitioners a proprietary right or even a proprietary expectancy to sit in local legislative councils. In the same manner. As complainant failed to attend the conference. the investigating officer of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a case for usurpation of judicial function against Mayor Asuero Irisari in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Loreto. On July 15. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Constitution because it is a mere statutory right conferred by law. Congress has the power to define who are the youth qualified to join the SK.  Moreover. The warrant was served and by virtue of it complainant was brought before Mayor Irisari. the hold-over period expires and all incumbent SK officials automatically cease to hold their SK offices and their ex-officio public offices. 9164 contains a hold-over provision. while the State policy is to encourage the youth’s involvement in public affairs. this policy refers to those who belong to the class of people defined as the youth. depriving other youths of the opportunity to serve in elective SK positions. since petitioners are now past the maximum age for membership in the SK. for this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition. incumbent SK officials can remain in office only until their successors have been elected or qualified. misconduct in office and abuse of authority with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur. Agusan del Sur summoned to his office herein complainant Apolinario S. Those who do not qualify because they are past the age group defined as the youth cannot insist on being part of the youth. but is a public trust or agency. Munez v.” It is. Mayor Irisari issued a warrant of arrest against him on December 27. 2002. Accused Irisari moved to quash the information on the ground that the acts complained of did not constitute a crime under the law. He contended that under Sec. it would be necessary to consider an office a “property. NO. Congress may amend at any time the law to change or even withdraw the statutory right. well settled that a public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional guaranties of due process of law. In Cornejo v. In government service. The constitutional principle of a public office as a public trust precludes any proprietary claim to public office. the Court already ruled: ”Again. who apparently desire to hold public office. Muñez for conference respecting a land dispute which Muñez had with one Tirso Amado. Agusan del Sur.Mabelle O. he cannot invoke any property right to cling to his office. 1. the criminal case was later assigned to respondent Judge Ciriaco Ariño on account of the inhibition of the first judge. mayors were authorized to issue warrants of arrest. Ariño Facts: Mayor Irisari of Loreto. Gabriel.” No one has a vested right to any public office. which itself is a creation of Congress. Even the State policy directing “equal access to opportunities for public service” cannot bestow on petitioners a proprietary right to SK membership or a proprietary expectancy to ex-officio public offices. For its part the Sangguniang 138 .

It was." This provision had. however.Mabelle O. III. upon probable cause after examination of witnesses. rendered functus officio by the 1987 Constitution which took effect on February 2. have the authority to order the arrest of the accused. asserts that since the question about the warrant of arrest issued against Apolinario Muñez has been resolved in an administrative proceedings as not the warrant of arrest contemplated by law. Section 2.. the function of determining probable cause and issuing. Mayor Irisari filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of denial of respondent judge. the crime of usurpation of judicial authority involves the following elements: (1) that the offender is an officer of the executive branch of the government. Cuerdo vs. Ariño with knowingly rendering an unjust judgment for dismissing the case against Mayor Irisari. Agusan del Sur. complainant Muñez sent two letters dated July 5 and 12. although denominated "Warrant of Arrest. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized. 143(3) of the former LGC which expressly provided that in cases where the mayor may conduct preliminary investigation. Upon receipt of this order.” (Sgd) ASUERO S.R. may be validly exercised only by judges. the date of its ratification by the Filipino people." The constitutional proscription has thereby been manifested that thenceforth. The matter was indorsed to the Office of the Ombudsman which. Sec. The Court finds that the subject matter in this case and that in the administrative complaint arose from one and the same incident and it involved the same parties.  It is not true that what he had issued against the complainant was not a warrant of arrest. acting on the administrative complaint against the mayor. 1988). YES.. Respondent said in his order: The accused. Section 143 of the LGC. Courts are not bound by the findings of administrative agencies like the DILG as in this case if such findings are tainted with unfairness and there is arbitrary action or palpable serious error. in his Motion for Reconsideration.  The acts alleged in the information constitute a crime. Blue Bar Coconut Philippines vs. Commission on Audit. 1988. much less issue orders of arrest. 1988. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Panlalawigan. de Castro. or obstructs the execution of any order or decision rendered by any judge within his jurisdiction. July 29. however. it would follow then that this case now before this Court against the accused be dismissed. G. The Court believes that the resolution by the administrative agency in DLG-AC-60-91 is not tainted with unfairness and arbitrariness neither it shows arbitrary action or palpable and serious error. Issue: WON the Judge may be held administratively liable. July 28.R. et al. In plain terms it stated: “You are hereby requested/ordered to effect the arrest of Apolinario Muñez of Poblacion. invoking the resolution of the DILG. G. 1933 to the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission charging respondent Judge Ciriaco C. conferring this power on the mayor has been abrogated. 1987. 47051. As a matter of fact Mayor Irisari justified his order on the basis of Sec. G. These elements were alleged in the information. the mayor shall. it must be respected (Mangubat vs. October 27. For and in the absence of the Municipal Circuit Judge.R. as already stated. 2 of the 1987 Constitution  Ponsica v. 84592. for his refusal to acknowledge the Summons dated December 26. and (2) that he assumes judicial powers. Mayor Irisari was an officer of the executive branch. IRISARI. Jr. Loreto. warrants of arrest or search warrants. referred it to this Court for possible disciplinary action against respondent judge. and bring him before the Office of the Municipal Mayor to answer an inquiry/investigation in connection with the complaint of one Tirso Amado held pending before this Office. the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) reversed on the ground that what the mayor had issued to the complainant. 1989. Tantuico. Judge Ariño reconsidered his previous order and dismissed the case. been repealed by Art. 241 of the Revised Penal Code. Ignalaga: No longer does the mayor have at this time the power to conduct preliminary investigations. 33892. Municipal Mayor." was actually just an invitation or a summons. this 139 . found him guilty of misconduct in office and abuse of authority and accordingly ordered him suspended for eight (8) months without pay.  Any one reading the warrant could not have been mistaken that it was a warrant for the arrest of the complainant Apolinario Muñez. Under Art. therefore. on the basis thereof. On appeal. Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertinently provides that "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.

All the more. respondent judge should not have dismissed the criminal case against the mayor. Indeed. respondent had previously denied the motion to dismiss which the accused Mayor Irisari had filed on the ground that the authority invoked by him as basis for his warrant of arrest had been abrogated by the Constitution.M. but only a land dispute as it is now being made to appear. The summons issued by Mayor Irisari shows clearly that he understood the difference between a summons and a warrant of arrest. therefore. That there was no pending criminal case against the complainant did not make the order against him any less an order of arrest. it must be respected. then and there to answer in an inquiry/investigation in connection with a certain complaint of Mr. for it would then appear that he assumed a judicial function which even a judge could not have done." He said.Mabelle O. "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" found in the counterpart provision of said 1973 Constitution . "must be respected. "therefore." Since the DILG decision was not so tainted. aside from judges. there was no basis for applying the rule on substantiality of evidence. only made it worse for the mayor.who. finding Mayor Irisari not guilty. The summons read: “You are hereby demanded to appear before the Office of the Municipal Mayor on 27 December 1989 at around 9:30 A. the issuance of the warrant when there was before him no criminal case. contrary to the opinion of DILG. He subsequently reversed himself on the ground that the decision of the DILG. It cannot be pretended that Mayor Irisari merely intended to invite or summon Muñez to his office because he had precisely done this the day before he issued the warrant of arrest. On the other hand." Judge Ciriaco Ariño should have known that the case of Mayor Irisari was not before him on review from the decision of an administrative agency and. and he ordered the arrest of complainant because the latter had refused to appear before him. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests being evidenced by the elimination in the present Constitution of the phrase. might conduct preliminary investigation and issue warrants of arrest or search warrants. "Courts are not bound by findings of administrative agencies like the DILG as in this case if such findings are tainted with unfairness and there is arbitrary action or palpable serious error. Tirso Amado lodged in this office. therefore. What was before him was a criminal case and he should have considered solely the facts alleged in the information in resolving the motion to dismiss of the accused. Greater Balanga Development Corporation (supra)      140 .

Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests 141 .Mabelle O.

again disrupted Bistro’s business operations. court granted Bistro’s application for a writ of prohibitory preliminary injunction. Lim filed a motion to dissolve the injunctive order and to dismiss the case. for the year 1993. suspend or revoke business permits and licenses. Bistro withdrew its motion on condition that Lim would respect the court’s injunction. Bistro filed an "Urgent Motion for Contempt" against Lim and the policemen who stopped Bistro’s operations. Lim filed with the CA a petition for certiorari. 1992 Bistro filed before the trial court a petition for mandamus and prohibition. with prayer for temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction. CA 142 . Manila City Ordinance No. Article II of the Revised Lim and Garayblas v. even sending policemen to carry out his closure order. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Facts: On December 7. Issue: WON Lim. Lim also refused to accept Bistro’s application for a business license. This statutory power is expressly provided for in Section 11 (l). Despite the trial court’s order. This caused the stoppage of work in Bistro’s night club and restaurant operations. MR denied. Bistro filed the case because policemen under Lim’s instructions inspected and investigated Bistro’s license as well as the work permits and health certificates of its staff. On the same day. prohibition and mandamus against Bistro and Judge Wilfredo Reyes. TC denied. paragraph 3 (iv) of the LGC. acting through his agents and policemen. as well as the work permit applications of Bistro’s staff. against Lim in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila. Lim still issued a closure order on Bistro’s operations. Lim insisted that the power of a mayor to inspect and investigate commercial establishments and their staff is implicit in the statutory power of the city mayor to issue. Article II of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and in Section 455. The law expressly provides for such authority. Meanwhile.Mabelle O. At the hearing of the motion for contempt.  The authority of mayors to issue business licenses and permits is beyond question. after hearing. 778314 took effect. Lim claimed that the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the writ of prohibitory preliminary injunction. as Mayor of the City of Manila. Lim. TC: issued first assailed TRO. which order the police implemented at once. Lim ordered the Western Police District Command to permanently close down the operations of Bistro. NO. Section 11 (l). CA denied. properly closed down the operations of Bistro.

There is no provision in these laws expressly or impliedly granting the mayor authority to close down private commercial establishments without notice and hearing. In accordance with R. 426. "An Act Providing for An Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. "Placing the Control and Supervision of the Offices of the Department of Public Works and Highways within the ARMM under the Autonomous Regional 143 . However. such provision would be void. Section 455 (3) (iv) of theLGC provides: (b) For efficient. effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the City and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code. or for any other reason of general interest. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Charter of the City of Manila. the mayor has no power to order a police raid on these establishments in the guise of inspecting or investigating these commercial establishments. Similarly.  The regulatory powers granted to municipal corporations must always be exercised in accordance with law. Maguindanao.Mabelle O. Lim closed down Bistro’s operations even before the expiration of its business license on December 31. or if acts prohibited by law or municipal ordinances are being committed under the protection of such licenses or in the premises in which the business for which the same have been granted is carried on. pursuant to law or ordinance.A. the power to suspend or revoke these licenses and permits is expressly premised on the violation of the conditions of these permits and licenses. the power to refuse to issue such licenses and permits is premised on non-compliance with the prerequisites for the issuance of such licenses and permits. the City Mayor shall: (iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the condition upon which said licenses or permits had been issued. pursuant to a plebiscite became the ARMM. Datumanong Facts: RA 6734. Lim acted beyond his authority when he directed policemen to raid the New Bangkok Club and the Exotic Garden Restaurant."  From the language of the two laws. to wit: No member of the Western Police District shall conduct inspection of food and other business establishments for the purpose of enforcing sanitary rules and regulations. the mayor has the power to inspect and investigate private commercial establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses and permits. Still. Such act of Lim violated Ordinance No. and/or enforcing internal revenue and customs laws and regulations. Lanao del Sur. then President Aquino issued E. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically. arbitrarily or despotically.  True. 771618 which expressly prohibits police raids and inspections. This responsibility should be properly exercised by Local Government Authorities and other concerned agencies. revoke or even refuse to issue the same. and even if there is." was enacted and signed into law. The mayor must observe due process in exercising these powers. in effect denying the application without examining whether it complies with legal prerequisites. The laws specifically refer to the "violation of the condition(s)" on which the licenses and permits were issued. it is clear that the power of the mayor to issue business licenses and permits necessarily includes the corollary power to suspend. reads: The general duties and powers of the mayor shall be: (l) To grant and refuse municipal licenses or permits of all classes and to revoke the same for violation of the conditions upon which they were granted. 6734. The due process clause of the Constitution requires that Lim should have given Bistro an opportunity to rebut the allegations that it violated the conditions of its licenses and permits. In the instant case." On the other hand. Lim cannot take refuge under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and the LGC. Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. Lim also refused to accept Bistro’s license application for 1993."  Lim has no authority to close down Bistro’s business or any business establishment in Manila without due process of law. However. Disomancop v. inspecting licenses and permits. which means that the mayor must give the applicant or licensee notice and opportunity to be heard. 1992. we find that Lim’s exercise of this power violated Bistro’s property rights that are protected under the due process clause of the Constitution. with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law.  Lim did not charge Bistro with any specific violation of the conditions of its business license or permits.O.

A. or is about to be. Nearly nine years later. 8999. or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement. or a mere incidental interest. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Government. President Corazon C. an interest in issue affected by the decree. In several cases. 6734 and R. was taken on the petition. (2) labor and employment.  Legal standing or locus standi is defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. and (7) environment and national resources.A. WON petitioners have legal standing. this Court is inclined to take cognizance of a suit although it does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interests are involved. 9054 contains detailed provisions on the powers of the Regional Government and the retained areas of governance of the National Government. (4) public works and highways. petitioner Disomangcop holds the position of Engineer IV. R.A. At that point. functions and responsibilities of the petitioners and the DPWH-ARMM. R.A. but also that he has sustained or is in immediate. petitioners Disomangcop and Dimalotang addressed a petition to then DPWH Secretary Datumanong. The headquarters of the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office shall be at the former quarters of the Marawi City Engineering Office. 119 and the creation of and appropriation of funds to the First Engineering District of Lanao del Sur as directed under R. the seat of the Regional Government." He must show that he has been." ARMM was formally organized on 6 November 1990. Office of the District Engineer of the First Engineering District of DPWH-ARMM. entitled An Act Providing for the ARMM. When he filed this petition. YES. and for other purposes.O. But following the new trend. A party challenging the constitutionality of a law. Aquino flew to Cotabato. or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of. for the inauguration. 8999 which constituted the City of Marawi and the municipalities comprising the First District of the Province of Lanao del Sur into an engineering district to be known as the First Engineering District of the Province of Lanao del Sur. It is thus not far-fetched that the creation of the Marawi SubDistrict Engineering Office under D.O. 9054 are collectively referred to as the ARMM Organic Acts. Lanao del Sur. act. On the other hand. No action. It was ratified in a plebiscite. as Amended. as distinguished from a mere interest in the question involved. denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled. In the instant case.A." Like its forerunner. 9054 lapsed into law. which provides that a DPWH Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office shall have jurisdiction over all national infrastructure projects and facilities under the DPWH within Marawi City and the province of Lanao del Sur. As the two offices have apparently been endowed with functions almost identical to those of DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur.A. "An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. or statute must show "not only that the law is invalid. it is likely that petitioners are in imminent danger of     144 . (6) tourism. Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 119.O. (3) science and technology. The province of Basilan and the City of Marawi also voted to join ARMM on the same date. then DPWH Secretary Vigilar issued D. however. seeking the revocation of D. Personnel of the above-mentioned Sub-District Engineering Office shall be made up of employees of the National Government Section of the former Marawi City Engineering Office who are now assigned with the Iligan City Sub-District Engineering Office as may be determined by the DPWH Region XII Regional Director. the Court has adopted a liberal stance on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people.Mabelle O. and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. petitioner Dimalotang is an Engineer II and President of the rank and file employees also of the First Engineering District of DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur.A. 6734. Almost 2 years later. 9054. Congress later passed R. The term "interest" means a material interest. namely: (1) local government. R. On 23 July 2001.A. 119 and the non-implementation of R. he was the Officer-in-Charge. she had already signed 7 EOs devolving to ARMM the powers of 7 cabinet departments. Both are charged with the duty and responsibility of supervising and implementing all public works projects to be undertaken and being undertaken in Lanao del Sur which is the area of their jurisdiction. (5) social welfare and development. Issues: 1. 8999 will affect the powers. then President Estrada approved and signed into law R.

Perforce. It advances the constitutional grant of autonomy by detailing the powers of the ARG covering. The amendatory law should therefore first obtain the approval of the people of the ARMM before it could validly take effect. 8999 is constitutional.A. Thus. 6074. R.        145 . Regional Autonomy Under R. has ineluctably tied the hands of progress in our country .A.Mabelle O. Their material and substantial interests will definitely be prejudiced by the enforcement of D.A. 9054. our varying regional characteristics are factors to capitalize on to attain national strength through decentralization. 8999 is patently inconsistent with R. Even at present. devolved the functions of the DPWH in the ARMM which includes Lanao del Sur (minus Marawi City at the time)38 to the Regional Government. 8999 has not even become operative.A. in essence. 8999. and it destroys the latter law's objective.A. R. regional autonomy is also a means towards solving existing serious peace and order problems and secessionist  2. 8999 contravenes true decentralization which is the essence of regional autonomy. Hence. R. 9054 is anchored on the 1987 Constitution. not remotely. 426. cultural. R. as a national policy. . however.A. to my mind.42 According to Commissioner Jose Nolledo.A. Of course. R.A. ventures to reestablish the National Government's jurisdiction over infrastructure programs in Lanao del Sur. The kernel of the antagonism and disharmony lies in the regional autonomy which the ARMM Organic Acts ordain pursuant to the Constitution. one of which is its jurisdiction over regional urban and rural planning. they can legitimately challenge the validity of the enactments subject of the instant case.A. effective and forceful autonomy. The first ARMM Organic Act. It strives to free Philippine society of the strain and wastage caused by the assimilationist approach. Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when the two statutes cover the same subject matter. Their political struggle highlights their unique cultures and the unresponsiveness of the unitary system to their aspirations. These cultures. . 6074. Where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject. that is. as a matter of right. The amendatory law has to be submitted to a plebiscite. and both cannot be given effect.A.O. Clearly. 6734 and R. R. must be allowed to flourish. 9054. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests being eased out of their duties and. as implemented by E. 8999 is antagonistic to and cannot be reconciled with both ARMM Organic Acts. Lanao del Sur and Marawi City. democracy becomes an irony to the minority group. The idea behind the Constitutional provisions for autonomous regions is to allow the separate development of peoples with distinctive cultures and traditions. 9054. and even religious diversities. On the other hand. it "is an indictment against the status quo of a unitary system that. R. that intention must be given effect. recognizes the wholeness of the Philippine society in its ethnolinguistic. From another perspective. 9054: The 1987 Constitution mandates regional autonomy to give a bold and unequivocal answer to the cry for a meaningful.A.A. R. 8999. even their jobs.A. By creating an office with previously devolved functions. Such injury is direct and immediate. As a result. WON R. 6734 and R. The Moros' struggle for selfdetermination dates as far back as the Spanish conquest in the Philippines. While they are classified as statutes. The need for regional autonomy is more pressing in the case of the Filipino Muslims and the Cordillera people who have been fighting for it. R.A. they are clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each other that they cannot be reconciled or harmonized. Chairman of the Committee which drafted the provisions.A. R.A. such as R.A. Absent compliance with this requirement. 119 and R. 8999.A. the provisions thereof cannot be amended by an ordinary statute. the Organic Acts are more than ordinary statutes because they enjoy affirmation by a plebiscite. sought to amend R. among others. Autonomy. the struggle goes on. Policies emanating from the legislature are invariably assimilationist in character despite channels being open for minority representation.A. 8999 was repealed and superseded by R. the intention to repeal must be clear and manifest. The ARMM Organic Acts are deemed a part of the regional autonomy scheme. The challenged law never became operative and was superseded or repealed by a subsequent enactment. 8999 in this case. that one law cannot be enforced without nullifying the other.O.

exercise their rights. This necessarily includes the freedom to decide on. realigned. or used in any manner. on the other hand. cultural and economic content of their development path within the framework of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippine Republic. or the transfer of powers. whether geographically or functionally defined.  The diminution of Congress' powers over autonomous regions was confirmed in Ganzon v. Federalism implies some measure of decentralization. but unitary systems may also decentralize. in international law. it involves the transfer of functions or the delegation of authority and responsibility from the national office to the regional and local offices. autonomy. to exercise authority in certain areas. build. connotes political decentralization. This mode of decentralization is also referred to as administrative decentralization. Decentralization comes in two forms—deconcentration and devolution. decentralization and regionalization. 9054 transferred and devolved the administrative and fiscal management of public works and funds for public works to the ARG.  The aim of the Constitution is to extend to the autonomous peoples. as it can be installed only "within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. It aims to grant greater autonomy to local government units in cognizance of their right to self-government. the creation of autonomous regions does not signify the establishment of a sovereignty distinct from that of the Republic. Deconcentration is administrative in nature. as specified in Sections 18 and 20. to develop freely their ways of life and heritage. This is achieved through the establishment of a special governance regime for certain member communities who choose their own authorities from within the community and exercise the jurisdictional authority legally accorded to them to decide internal community affairs. the right to determine the political. This is a more liberal form of decentralization since there is an actual transfer of powers and responsibilities. Devolution. no public works funds allocated by the central government or national government for the Regional Government or allocated by the Regional Government from its own revenues may be disbursed. the right to self-determination—a right to choose their own path of development. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests movements. Unless approved by the Regional Assembly. Congress itself through R. Expressly not included therein are powers over certain areas. with a common tradition and shared social-cultural characteristics. Worthy of note is that the area of public works is not excluded and neither is it reserved for the National Government.80 Self-determination refers to the need for a political structure that will respect the autonomous peoples' uniqueness and grant them sufficient room for selfexpression and self-construction. ethnic conflict and threat of secession. Parenthetically." This is true to subjects over which autonomous regions have powers. However. have become politically acceptable answers to intractable problems of nationalism. It involves decision-making by subnational units.  In treading their chosen path of development. separatism. the people of Muslim Mindanao in this case. the Muslims in Mindanao are to be given freedom and independence with minimum interference from the National Government. responsibilities. Decentralization differs intrinsically from federalism in that the sub-units that have been authorized to act (by delegation) do not possess any claim of right against the central government. Court of Appeals: "the omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments' autonomy from Congress and to break Congress' 'control' over local government affairs. Decentralization is a decision by the central government authorizing its subordinates. supervise and maintain the public works and infrastructure     146 . distributed." Regional autonomy is the degree of selfdetermination exercised by the local government unit vis-àvis the central government. wherein a larger government chooses to delegate certain authority to more local governments.Mabelle O. and resources for the performance of certain functions from the central government to local government units. More importantly. to make them self-reliant. Article X of the 1987 Constitution. It is typically a delegated power. The objective of the autonomy system is to permit determined groups. and be in charge of their own business.A. and to improve their administrative and technical capabilities.

6734—the validity of which this Court upheld in the case of Abbas v. women in development. this freedom is taken away.A. manage and disburse all public work funds allocated for the region by the central government. agricultural extension and watershed management. he states:It is clear from the foregoing provision of law that except for the areas of executive power mentioned therein. it is not amiss to cite Opinion No. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests projects within the autonomous region.  E. Nos. 8999. once more. 426 clearly ordains the transfer of the control and supervision of the offices of the DPWH within the ARMM. shall be placed under the control and supervision of the Regional Government pursuant to a schedule prescribed by the oversight committee. education. Article IV84 of this Organic Act. by virtue of E. of the autonomous peoples are reined in and tied up. therefore. have been previously devolved to the DPWH-ARMM. S.O. women. 426 (Department of Public Works and Highways). 459 (Department of Education. 425 (Department of Labor and Employment. The devolution of the powers and functions of the DPWH in the ARMM and transfer of the administrative and fiscal management of public works and funds to the ARG are meant to be true. the DPWH-ARMM. personnel. Referring to Section 2. education. such responsibility has been transferred to the ARG. 199182 of the Secretary of Justice on whether the national departments or their counterpart departments in the ARG are responsible for implementation of roads. meaningful and unfettered. Local Government.A. and budgets to the ARG. These are E. Article XVIII of said Act. 426. construction and supervision of public works. on the centrality of decentralization of power as the appropriate vessel of deliverance for Muslim Filipinos and the ultimate unity of Muslims and Christians in this country. The continued enforcement of R. The execution of projects on infrastructure. however.O. E. 426 manifests an unmistakable case of devolution.  The challenged law creates an office with functions and powers which. and other public works within the ARMM. but by virtue of the aforestated EOs. In this regard. Thus. According to R. It is noted that programs relative to infrastructure facilities."  Evidently.  Reinforcing the above view are the various executive orders issued by the President providing for the devolution of the powers and functions of specified executive departments of the National Government to the ARG.O.83 In Section 4.A. equipment. health. "central government or national government offices and agencies in the autonomous region which are not excluded under Section 3. powers and responsibilities. and the National Government takes control again. Environment and Natural Resources. rural water supply. R. Among its other functions. 8999. all other such areas shall be exercised by the Autonomous Regional Government ("ARG") of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. 120. agricultural extension and watershed management do not fall under any of the exempted areas listed in the abovequoted provision of law. properties.A. runs afoul of the ARMM Organic Acts and results in the recall of powers which have previously been handed over. 426 was issued to implement the provisions of the first ARMM Organic Act. Commission on Elections. Social Welfare and Development and Science and Technology). 9054. First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur. the reach of the Regional Government enables it to appropriate. including their functions. reached at the Constitutional Commission and ratified by the entire Filipino electorate. Its scope of power includes the planning. the intention is to cede some. Tourism. under the control of the Regional Government shall be responsible for highways. 6734 which enumerates the powers of the ARG.  The use of the word "powers" in E. the inevitable conclusion is that all these spheres of executive responsibility have been transferred to the ARG. if not most. This unassailable conclusion is grounded on a clear consensus. agricultural extension and watershed management within the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao normally fall within the responsibility of one of the aforementioned executive departments of the National Government. This 147 . of the powers of the national government to the autonomous government in order to effectuate a veritable autonomy. flood control and water resource development systems.Mabelle O. Culture and Sports) and 460 (Department of Agriculture).O. The hands.O. education. women in development. Article V of R.  With R. health. design.A.

O.  The office created under D. House Bill No. it identified four (4) District Engineering Offices in each of the four (4) provinces. 426. 119 is based. 119 was also rendered functus officio by the ARMM Organic Acts. The DPWH's order. to the Regional Government and effectively repealed R. Further. in effect. No.  DPWH Department Order No. R.A.85 Apparently. 8999 was passed in record time on second reading (not more than 10 minutes). having essentially the same powers."93 With the repeal of E. In particular. 9054. the existing DPWH-ARMM engineering districts failed to measure up to the task. As it was. upon which D. in its repealing clause.86 The precipitate speed which characterized the passage of R. like spring water. 8999 in January 2001.O. 8999 is difficult to comprehend since R. absolutely without the usual sponsorship speech and debates. takes back powers which have been previously devolved under the said executive order. 119.  E. Article II of the 1987 Constitution)  R.A. 8999 has made the DPWH-ARMM effete and rendered regional autonomy illusory with respect to infrastructure projects.88 E. the ARMM Organic Acts and their ratification in a plebiscite in effect superseded E. WON DO 119 is constitutional. But if it was indeed the case. 119. 9054 states that "all laws. 8999 could have resulted in the amendment of the first ARMM Organic Act and. Maguindanao. where it reaffirmed the devolution of the DPWH in ARMM.O. that the "lack of an implementing and monitoring body within the area" has hindered the speedy implementation. It bears stressing that national laws are subject to the Constitution one of whose state policies is to ensure the autonomy of autonomous regions. 426.mandated autonomous region87 and which defined the basic structure of the autonomous government. including Lanao del Sur and Marawi City. The Executive Order was issued pursuant to R. rules and regulations. 426 in the instant case." These consolidated petitions pray that the Court: (1) enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting the plebiscite and the Secretary of Budget and Management from releasing funds to the COMELEC for that purpose.A. Abbas v. 119 runs counter to the provisions of E. 995 which ultimately became R. the problem could not be solved through the simple legislative creation of an incongruous engineering district for the central government in the ARMM. therefore. 426 is a special law transferring the control and supervision of the DPWH offices within ARMM to the Autonomous Regional Government. 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which has jurisdiction over infrastructure projects within Marawi City and Lanao del Sur is violative of the provisions of E. (Section 25. of infrastructure projects. in the legislature's estimation.O. could not take effect without first being ratified in a plebiscite. The latter statute specifically applies to DPWH-ARMM offices. namely: Lanao del Sur. D.  In any event.O.O. orders. is a duplication of the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur formed under the aegis of E. The Congressional Record shows. 124. 2. "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the ARMM. which are inconsistent with this Organic Act. In case of an irreconcilable conflict between two laws of different vintages. and other issuances or parts thereof. the second ARMM Organic Act. 6734—which initiated the creation of the constitutionally. COMELEC Facts: The present controversy relates to the plebiscite in 13 provinces and nine 9 cities in Mindanao and Palawan in implementation of RA 6734. 8999. 426 sought to implement the transfer of the control and supervision of the DPWH within the ARMM to the Autonomous Regional Government. or barely two (2) months after it enacted R. are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. E. 124. the later enactment prevails because it is the later legislative will. What is more baffling is that in March 2001. Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. the First Engineering District of the DPWHARMM in Lanao del Sur has jurisdiction over the public works within the province. Congress passed R.A.O.O.O.O.O.O. cannot rise higher than its source of power—the Executive. on the other hand.O. and (2) declare 148 .Mabelle O.A. 119: D. 426.O. 124 which is the basis of D.A.O. it necessarily follows that D.A. The department order. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests should not be sanctioned. elsewise the Organic Acts' desire for greater autonomy for the ARMM in accordance with the Constitution would be quelled. decrees.A. is a general law reorganizing the Ministry of Public Works and Highways while E. 124 should therefore give way to E.A.O.89 Accordingly.

 In the first place. but on the will of the majority in each of the constituent units and the proviso underscores this. No. R.. Article X. 6734. 6734." It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes approving the organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together. Thus. No. this is also the sense in which the vote requirement in the plebiscite provided under Article X. section 27. WON majority refers to a majority of the total votes cast in the plebiscite in all the constituent units.A. But as internal law it would not be superior to R. it would then constitute part of the law of the land.A. No. sec. No. and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage.A.  149 . No. it is now the Constitution itself that provides for the creation of an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao. 2]. Thus. [Art. economic and social structures. 6734 was enacted and signed into law on August 1. rather it would be in the same class as the latter. 6734 would be amendatory of the Tripoli Agreement. No.A. a new Constitution was ratified. "the creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose.A. petitioner claims that Congress has expanded the scope of    2. WON certain provisions of R. In 1987. economic and social structures. 6734 would therefore be what is so provided in the Constitution. and other relevant characteristics should be properly included within the coverage of the autonomous region.e. Issues: 1. 6734 is unconstitutional because only the provinces of Basilan. as well as in the individual constituent units. Only a determination by this Court that R. any conflict between the provisions of R. No. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate.A. which the for the first time provided for regional autonomy. if at all.Mabelle O. cities. The standard for any inquiry into the validity of R. R. municipalities. and not all of the 13 provinces and 9 cities included in the Organic Act. not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite. i. It will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to depend. provided that only provinces. 2. WON only those areas which. which reads: The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose.A. More importantly. Mama-o insists that R. 6734 contravened the Constitution would result in the granting of the reliefs sought. No. share common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage. for if the intention of the framers of the Constitution was to get the majority of the totality of the votes cast. or both?  If the framers of the Constitution intended to require approval by a majority of all the votes cast in the plebiscite they would have so indicated.A. No.A. unconstitutional. Lanao del Norte and Maguindanao and the cities of Marawi and Cotabato. 6734 conflict with the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement. Tawi-Tawi. or parts thereof. and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. Comparing this with the provision on the creation of the autonomous region. being a subsequent law. 18. an enactment of the Congress of the Philippines. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests R. 1989. they could have simply adopted the same phraseology as that used for the ratification of the Constitution.. cities and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region. para. because of its categorical language. possess such concurrence in historical and cultural heritage and other relevant characteristics. 6734 and the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement will not have the effect of enjoining the implementation of the Organic Act. section 18 must have been understood by the people when they ratified the Constitution. it is provided that "[t]his Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose . Thus. By including areas which do not strictly share the same characteristic as the others. Sulu. or a majority in each of the constituent units. in Article XVIII. X. to his view. Lanao del Sur. section 15 of the charter provides that "[t]here shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces. Assuming for the sake of argument that the Tripoli Agreement is a binding treaty or international agreement.

the Court in this case may not be called upon to resolve what is merely a perceived potential conflict between the provisions the Muslim Code and national law. would necessarily carry with it the exclusion of other areas. municipalities and barangays. economic and social structures. Any determination by Congress of what areas in Mindanao should compromise the autonomous region. Guided by these constitutional criteria. cities. Petitioner's argument is not tenable.   2. This the Court cannot do without doing violence to the separation of governmental powers. i. and the national law on the other hand. This being so. 4 of the Constitution]. equal protection permits of reasonable classification. While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution. whose wisdom may not be inquired into by this Court. As enshrined in the Constitution. Petitioner's contention runs counter to the very same constitutional provision he had earlier invoked. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests the autonomous region which the constitution itself has prescribed to be limited. the classification having been made by Congress on the basis of substantial distinctions as set forth by the Constitution itself. Thus it may not be subjected to any "man-made" national law. judicial power includes the duty to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.Mabelle O. no actual controversy between real litigants exists.D. The guarantee of equal protection is thus not infringed in this case. 6734 is the merger of administrative regions. and other relevant characteristics. Regions I to XII and the National Capital Region. municipalities or barangays. WON RA 6734 violates the constitutional guarantee on free exercise of religion.  2. There is no conflict between the power of the President to merge administrative regions with the constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local government units because the requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to provinces. X. Moreover. cities. WON other non-Muslim areas in Mindanao should likewise be covered. The Court ruled that once class may be treated differently from another where the groupings are based on reasonable and real distinctions. Petitioner Abbas supports this objection by enumerating possible instances of conflict between provisions of the Muslim Code and national law. taking into account shared historical and cultural heritage. the ascertainment by Congress of the areas that share common attributes is within the exclusive realm of the legislature's discretion. He argues that since the Organic Act covers several nonMuslim areas. Petitioners maintain that the islamic law (Shari'ah) is derived from the Koran. and therefore is violative of the Constitution. wherein an application of national law might be offensive to a Muslim's religious convictions. which are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes Administrative regions are not territorial and political subdivisions like provinces. appropriations. WON RA 6734 grants the President the power to merge regions. The Constitution lays down the standards by which Congress shall determine which areas should constitute the autonomous region.    2. not to administrative regions. the Shari'ah courts created under the same Act should apply national law. 150 . its scope should be further broadened to include the rest of the non-Muslim areas in Mindanao in order for the other non-Muslim areas denies said areas equal protection of the law. As earlier stated. No. which makes it part of divine law.e. WON provisions in the Organic Act which create an Oversight Committee to supervise the transfer to the autonomous region of the powers. sec. such determination by Congress of which areas should be covered by the organic act for the autonomous region constitutes a recognized legislative prerogative. There are no conflicting claims involving the application of national law resulting in an alleged violation of religious freedom. In the present case. What is referred to in R. 1083] and the Tribal Code (still be enacted) on the one had. it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments [see Art.A. No. and  2. Any review of this ascertainment would have to go into the wisdom of the law. The objection centers on a provision in the Organic Act which mandates that should there be any conflict between the Muslim Code [P.

the creation of the autonomous region immediately takes effect. and the Minister of Health was the appointing power of provincial health officers. who was then DOH-ARMM Assistant Regional Secretary. if the Organic Act is approved by majority of the votes cast by constituent units in the scheduled plebiscite. 133 was the operative act that actually transferred the powers and functions of the Department of Health. 151 . issued a Memorandum reiterating Pandi’s designation as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH. Marawi City challenging the August 9. and that Governor Mahid Mutilan has the power and authority to appoint the provincial health officer. CA Facts: Macacua. CA: Saber is the lawfully designated Officer-inCharge of the IPHO-APGH. again in her capacity as DOH-ARMM Secretary-Designate . Saber filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for quo warranto with prayer for preliminary injunction.  Under the constitution. then the provincial health officer of the IPHO-APGH. Sani filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Sur. On November 6. Lanao del Sur Provincial Governor Mahid M. 6734 requiring an oversight Committee to supervise the transfer do not provide for a different date of effectivity. The questioned provisions in R. Much less would the organization of the Oversight Committee cause an impediment to the operation of the Organic Act. Lanao del Sur. and not the Provincial Governor. as Officer-inCharge of the Integrated Provincial Health Office-Amai Pakpak General Hospital (IPHO-APGH). the requirement of organizing an Oversight committee tasked with supervising the transfer of powers and properties to the regional government would in effect delay the creation of the autonomous region. In the same Memorandum. together with its regional personnel. as well as Sani’s detail to the Regional Office of the DOH-ARMM in Cotabato City . Second Period: After the Organic Act of 1989  It was not until October 29.Mabelle O. Executive Order No. Lanao del Sur. 1993. the Regional Governor or the ARMM Secretary of Health? First Period: Prior to the Organic Act of 1989  The provincial health office was an agency of the Ministry of Health. Who can designate the Officer-in-Charge in the provincial health office of Lanao del Sur . CA maintained that the Organic Act of 1989 and the ARMM Local Code could not prevail over the LGC. WON an incumbent provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur can be assigned to another province and if so. Branch 10. The constitutional objection on this point thus cannot be sustained as there is no bases therefor. 1993. the creation of the autonomous region hinges only on the result of the plebiscite. to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato City. who can order such assignment. alleging that he is the holder of a permanent appointment as provincial health officer of the IPHOAPGH. Issues: 1. No. Lanao del Sur. Macacua detailed Dr. Lanao del Sur. Mamasao Sani. 133. Pandi v. 1993 Memorandum transferring him to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato City . Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests properties vested upon the regional government by the organic Act are unconstitutional because while the Constitution states that the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect upon approval in a plebiscite. Ramos issued Executive Order No.the Provincial Governor. Mutilan issued Office Order No. for such is evidently aimed at effecting a smooth transition period for the regional government. who exercises a recommendatory prerogative in the appointment of the provincial health officer. Lanao del Sur. 2. claiming that he is the lawfully designated Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH. Lanao del Sur. that the regional offices of the Department of Health in the ARMM were placed under the supervision and control of the Regional Government. Lanao del Sur. Macacua. 07 designating Saber also as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH. 133 transferring the powers and functions of the Department of Health in the region to the Regional Government of the ARMM.A. in her capacity as Regional Director and as Secretary of the Department of Health of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. issued a Memorandum designating Pandi. President Ramos issued Executive Order No. CA interpreted Section 457 (b) and (d) of the ARMM Local Code to mean that it is the ARMM Regional Governor.the Provincial Governor or the ARMM Secretary of Health? 3. Who is empowered to appoint the provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur . when then President Fidel V.

previously exercised by the Secretary of Health. Significantly. with the authority to assign a provincial health officer to any province within the region. 1993. the power to appoint provincial health officers. previously conferred by law on the Secretary of Health. the provincial health officers one of the officials of the provincial government to be appointed by the provincial governor if his salary came mainly from provincial funds. the Provincial Governor is the appointing power. 133. The ARMM Local Code also states that if the salary of the provincial health officer comes mainly from provincial funds. properties and budgets of the Department of Health in the ARMM to the Regional Government pursuant to Section 4.  Thus.  The devolved powers under the Organic Act of 1989.  Even after the passage of the 1991 LGU Code. The Regional Governor appoints the provincial health officer from a list of three recommendees of the Provincial Governor. Article XIX of the Organic Act of 1989. 133. There could be no gap or lacuna in the devolution of powers from the National Government to the Regional Government because the exercise of these powers was essential to the maintenance of basic services for the general welfare."  Fourth   152 . to the Regional Government. The power to appoint provincial health officers is one that the Regional Assembly could thus grant by law to the Regional Secretary of Health. was devolved to the Regional Governor. Third Period: After the LGC of 1991  Unlike the 1984 LGU Code. 133. 133. The power of the Regional Governor to appoint provincial officials applies only to provincial officials "paid by regional funds. The ARMM Local Code provides that the salary of the provincial health officer shall be paid from regional funds. the Secretary of Health of the National Government continued to appoint provincial health officers in the ARMM. equipment. finally transferring the powers and functions of the Department of Health in the autonomous region to the Regional Government.  Upon the effectivity of Executive Order No. the Regional Assembly has not enacted a law authorizing the Regional Secretary of Health to appoint provincial health officers. and cannot be implied from the power of supervision and control. 133. the 1991 LGU Code made. The Secretary of Health also continued to exercise the authority to assign provincial health officers to any province within the region. however. as implemented by Executive Order No. Period: After the ARMM Local Code Under the ARMM Local Code. the power to appoint provincial health officers is not one of the powers transferred to the Regional Secretary of Health under Executive Order No. included the power of supervision and control over provincial health officers. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests equipment. carried with it the authority to assign provincial health officers to any province within the region pursuant to Section 17 of Executive Order No. was only temporary. Assignment within a region of personnel appointed to a region is an administrative matter exercised by the head of office who is vested with the power of supervision and control over the office. until the effectivity of Executive Order No. This transfer of administrative authority to the Regional Secretary was essential to insure the continuation of vital health services to residents in the ARMM. the provincial health officer in the ARMM. previously a regional official. this ruled out the Regional Secretary of Health as the appointing power of provincial health officers. arising from the need for a phased transfer of the personnel. properties. for the first time. has also become a provincial government official. Executive Order No. the Secretary of Health continued to be the appointing power of provincial health officers who remained national government officials. the administrative authority of the Secretary of Health to assign provincial health officers to any province within a region was transferred to the ARMM Secretary of Health as the regional counterpart of the national Secretary of Health. 119. This situation. This was the state of the law after the passage of the Organic Act of 1989 until the effectivity of Executive Order No. The power of supervision and control. as well as the power to appoint provincial health officers. However. Since the power to appoint must be expressly conferred by law.  On October 29. catching up with the status of provincial health officers outside of the ARMM. and budgets. 133 was issued. On the other hand.Mabelle O.

1988. Since a provincial health officer was now appointed to a specific province. " is not a grant of power to governors and mayors to appoint local health officers. being essential for public services.  The state of the law after the enactment of the ARMM Local Code became more favorable to Provincial Governors. Moreover.Mabelle O. Lanao del Sur. 1993. Consequently. The Secretary of Health was also the official authorized by law to assign the provincial health officer to any province within the region. the designation of Saber as such Officer-in-Charge is void. The Secretary of Health. on September 15. is a mandatory obligation on the part of those vested by law with the power to appoint them. 1993. which provides that "[T]he appointment of a health officer shall be mandatory for provincial. In short. if the provincial government assumes payment of the salary of the provincial health officer. Indisputably. The Secretary of Health exercised supervision and control over the provincial health officer. Section 478 of the 1991 LGU Code. Finally. The Regional Governor can appoint only from among the three nominees of the Provincial Governor even though the salary of the provincial health officer comes from regional funds. expressly stated that provincial health officers were to be appointed to a region. city and municipal governments. the charter of the Department of Health. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests  Section 459 of the ARMM Local Code vests in the Provincial Governor the power to exercise supervision and control over all provincial government officials. Lanao del Sur. On this date the provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur was still a national government official paid entirely from national funds. The conversion of the provincial health officer from a regional government official to a provincial government official under Section 457 of the ARMM Local Code placed the provincial health officer under the supervision and control of the Provincial Governor.  Re: Saber: Lanao del Sur Provincial Governor Mahid M. this authority of the Regional Secretary ceased to exist. upon recommendation of the Regional 153 . while before the Regional Secretary of Health could assign provincial health officers to other provinces within the region.  The Court of Appeals’ reliance on Section 478 of the 1991 LGU Code as Provincial Governor Mutilan’s authority to appoint Saber is misplaced. It is simply a directive that those empowered to appoint local health officers are mandated to do so. Sani was appointed provincial health officer in Region XII since at that time Executive Order No. then the Provincial Governor becomes the appointing power of such provincial official. by a Provincial Governor in the ARMM. Provincial Governor Mutilan had no power to designate Saber as Officer-inCharge of IPHO-APGH. This is now the present state of the law on the appointment of provincial health officers in the ARMM. Moreover. the Provincial Governor now exercises supervision and control over the provincial health officer who has become a provincial government official. The provincial health officer was still appointed by the national Secretary of Health to a region and not to a province. on September 15.  Re: Sani: Sani was appointed provincial health officer by then Secretary of Health Alfredo R. Likewise. Bengzon on January 1. While before the appointment of provincial health officers was solely the prerogative of the Regional Governor. Consequently. If the provincial health officer’s salary comes mainly from regional funds. then the ARMM Local Code applies. the appointment of local health officers. he could no longer be assigned to another province without his consent. Mutilan designated Saber as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHOAPGH. at least with respect to the appointment and assignment of provincial health officers. now a Provincial Governor has the power to recommend three nominees. the Provincial Governor appoints the provincial health officer if the latter’s salary comes from provincial funds. in which case the Regional Governor is the appointing power but he must appoint only from among the three nominees of the Provincial Governor. the Provincial Governor exercises supervision and control over the provincial health officer because the ARMM Local Code has classified him as a provincial government official. Fifth Period: The Organic Act of 2001  The passage of the Organic Act of 2001 means that the powers and functions of a Provincial Governor under the 1991 LGU Code are now enjoyed. 119. as a minimum. Thus. with the passage of the ARMM Local Code the Regional Secretary of Health lost the authority to assign provincial health officers to other provinces within the region.A.

therefore. However. Macacua was. being the only province which voted favorably legally constitutes the CAR. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Director. The designation of Pandi. Congress enacted RA 6861 which set the elections in the CAR. in her capacity as Regional Director and ARMM Secretary of Health. The ARMM Local Code vests in the Provincial Governor the power to "exercise general supervision and control over all programs. The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid CAR as the  154 . the power of supervision and control over the provincial health officer passed from the Regional Secretary to the Provincial Governor. Ordillo et al then filed a petition with the COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of the Organic Act for the Region. the Regional Secretary of Health lost the authority to make such a designation. the designation of Pandi on November 6. while valid is only temporary in nature. is within the authority of Macacua as Regional Secretary of Health.899 votes in only the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148.Mabelle O. The COMELEC results showed that the creation of the Region was approved only by a majority of 5. As a result of this. 133. 1993. the provincial health officer became for the first an official of the provincial government even though he is appointed by the Regional Governor and draws his salary from regional funds. in the interest of public service. Consequently. 1993 to designate an Officer-inCharge in the provincial health office of Lanao del Sur pending the appointment of the permanent provincial health officer. 1993 is void since the Regional Secretary at that time did not yet exercise supervision and control over the provincial health offices of the ARMM. and the Secretary of Health of the National Government still exercised the power to assign the provincial health officers in the ARMM. services. 1993. the province of Ifugao. The Regional Secretary. As Regional Secretary of Health. an Officer-in-Charge if the office becomes vacant. From then on the Provincial Governor began to exercise the administrative authority to designate an Officer-in-Charge in the provincial health office pending the appointment of a permanent provincial health officer. the second detail of Sani is valid. Re: Pandi: The designation dated August 9. issued on November 6. 133 had already been issued vesting in the Regional Secretary of Health supervision and control over all functions and activities of the Department of Health in the ARMM. Sec of Justice: considering the proviso that only the provinces and city voting favorably shall be included in the CAR. The president issued AO 160 declaring that the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly and other offices created under EO220 are abolished in view of the ratification of the Organic Act. Macacua. The official exercising supervision and control over an office has the administrative authority to designate. and activities of the provincial government. Macacua.     Ordillo v. 1993 is valid since at that time Executive Order No. detailed Sani to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato City on August 9. could assign provincial health officers to any province within the region. 1993 directive of Macacua detailing or assigning Sani to the Regional Office in Cotabato City is void. Thus. however. Ifugao. the powers and functions of the Department of Health were not yet transferred to the Regional Government.676 votes in the rest of the provinces and city abovementioned. projects. COMELEC Facts: The people of the provinces of Benguet. Consequently. assumed the administrative powers and functions of the Secretary of Health of the National Government with respect to provincial health offices within the ARMM. the official vested by law to exercise supervision and control over all provincial health offices in the ARMM. Abra and Kalinga Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to RA 6766.  Under the ARMM Local Code. As of that date. The second detail or assignment of Sani to the Regional Office in Cotabato. by virtue of Executive Order No. 1993. Sani cannot claim any security of tenure as provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur because he was never appointed to that office. After the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code." Upon the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code. Mountain Province. the August 9. as of November 6. good until a new designation or a permanent appointment is made. had the authority on November 6.

we would be faced with the absurd situation of having two sets of provincial officials and another set of regional officials exercising their executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area. municipalities and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage. it could only mean that a larger area must be covered at the regional level. Sec. There is nothing in the Abbas case that deals with the issue on whether an autonomous region could exist despite the fact that only one province or city is to constitute it. Moreover.  Art. as well as the individual constituent units. If it takes only one person in the provincial level to perform such functions while it takes an entire board to perform the same in the regional level. They pray that the court declare COMELEC Res.  This case must be distinguished from the Abbas case which laid down the rule on the meaning of majority: what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes approving the Organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together. it must join other provinces. Cordillera Broad Coalition v. Such will result in an awkward predicament where there will be two legislative bodies: the Cordillera Assembly and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their licenses. the Garin addressed a letter to then MMDA Chairman Oreta requesting the return of his driver's license. and geographical areas. thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution. Garin Facts: Dante O. They also pray that it declare EO 220 constituting the CEB and the CRA and other offices to be still in force and effect until another organic law for the Autonomous Region shall have been enacted and duly ratified. In support of his application for a writ of preliminary injunction. pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity of the deprivation. Binondo. the province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of the total population of the areas which were enumerated in the law. cities. the Provincial Planning and Developmental Coordinator. being the only province which voted favorably for the creation of the CAR can. This is supported by the fact that the 13 regions into which the Philippines is divided for administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Constitution and RA 6766 require that the said region be composed of more than one constituent unit. in the absence of any implementing rules and regulations. economic and social structures. Garin alleged that he suffered and 155 .  The term “region” used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. Bel-Air (supra) MMDA v. cities. Otherwise. The law also provides an allocation for 10MPhp for its initial organizational requirements. 15 of 1987 Constitution: There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordillera consisting of provinces. The respondent further contended that the provision violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority. Ifugao is a province by itself. X Sec. and restrain the respondents from implementing the same. Such cannot be construed as funding only a lone and small province.fines and other penalties on erring motorists.  RA 6766 shows that Congress never intended that a single province may constitute the autonomous region. Garin filed the original complaint with application for preliminary injunction contending that. alone. Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity. allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose unspecified – and therefore unlimited . Garin was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) for parking illegally along Gandara Street. Receiving no immediate reply. Issue: WON the province of Ifugao. and expressing his preference for his case to be filed in court. and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. and RA6861 as null and void. To become part of a region. municipalities. 5(f) of Rep. His driver's license was also confiscated. Manila. exercising their legislative powers over the province of Ifugao. legally and validly constitute such region. COA (supra) MMDA v. 2259 AO 160.Mabelle O. Act No.  RA 6766 provides for a Regional Planning and Developmental Board which has a provincial counterpart. NO. No.

is void ab initio. YES. and that all its functions are administrative in nature. Respondent Garin. but a privilege subject to reasonable regulation.Mabelle O. depriving him of a property right (driver's license) without DUE PROCESS. 5(f) of Rep. Since motor vehicles are instruments of potential danger. Sullivan: "the legislative power to regulate travel over the highways and thoroughfares of the state for the general welfare is extensive. let alone legislative power. Such a general law is manifestly directed to the promotion of public safety and is well within the police power. One of the primary purposes of a system of general regulation of the subject matter.  The petitioner correctly points out that a license to operate a motor vehicle is not a property right. it becomes an engine of destruction. TT-95-001. when operated by careless or incompetent persons. The Legislature. For its part. The right to operate them in public places is not a natural and unrestrained right. NO. an automobile is still a dangerous instrumentality. the governing board and policy making body of the petitioner. Rel."  Commonwealth v. There was indeed no quorum in that First Regular Meeting of the MMDA Council held on March 23. the judiciary retains the right to determine the validity of the penalty imposed. not only may. under the police power. Act No. which may be suspended or revoked by the state in the exercise of its police power. in the exercise of police power. and the MMDA was directed to return the respondent's driver's license. WON the MMDA is vested with police power. in the interest of the public safety and welfare. has as yet to formulate the implementing rules for Sec. 5(f) of RA 7924 are limited to the fixing. The MMDA also refuted Garin's allegation that the Metro Manila Council. 2. Act No. as here by the Vehicle Code. Funk: "Automobiles are vehicles of great speed and power. is to insure the competency of the operator of motor vehicles. not filling (sic) in Court the complaint of supposed traffic infraction.  State ex. collection and imposition of fines and penalties for traffic violations. but a privilege granted by the state. which has the power and responsibility to regulate how and by whom motor vehicles may be operated on the state highways. we categorically stated that Rep. Carefully operated. hence MMDA Memorandum Circular No. but.. The summary confiscation of a driver's license without first giving the driver an opportunity to be heard. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests continues to suffer great and irreparable damage because of the deprivation of his license and that. their registration and the licensing of their operators have been required almost from their first appearance. TT-95-001 dated 15 April 1995. Bel-Air Village Association. represented by the Office of the Solicitor General. cannot be justified by any legislation (and is) hence unconstitutional. authorizing confiscation of driver's licenses upon issuance of a TVR. 7924 and directed the court's attention to MMDA Memorandum Circular No. prescribe how and by whom motor vehicles shall be operated on the highways. RTC decision: a. The use of them constitutes an element of danger to persons and property upon the highways. A preliminary mandatory injunction was granted. but must. TT-95-001. pointed out that the powers granted to it by Sec. as he claims that it was passed by the Metro Manila Council in the absence of a quorum. Inc. WON a license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that the state may withhold in the exercise of its police power. in the interest of the public safety and welfare. The power to license imports further power to withhold or to revoke such license upon noncompliance with prescribed conditions. the MMDA. absent any implementing rules from the Metro Manila Council. questioned the validity of MMDA Memorandum Circular No. b. It further argued that the doctrine of separation of powers does not preclude "admixture" of the three powers of government in administrative agencies. Issues: 1. we concluded that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed 156 ."  The common thread running through the cited cases is that it is the legislature. 1995. however. It may be exercised in any reasonable manner to conserve the safety of travelers and pedestrians. in the exercise of the police power of the commonwealth. which powers are legislative and executive in nature. the TVR and the confiscation of his license have no legal basis. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power.  Metro Manila Development Authority v. RTC: issued a temporary restraining order extending the validity of the TVR as a temporary driver's license for twenty more days. subject to the procedural due process requirements. Tracing the legislative history of RA 7924 creating the MMDA.

fix. may delegate this power to the president and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units (LGUs). which exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and administrative region" and the administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed under "a development authority" referred to as the MMDA. Thus: the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation. is the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make. The power delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of the MMDA's functions. ordain. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units. No. management. duly licensed security guards. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. A. Once delegated. it cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. the MMDA is not a political unit of government. A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. Section 5 of RA 7924 enumerates the "Functions and Powers of the Metro Manila Development Authority. WON Sec." Thus. and may deputize members of the PNP. No. A. The MMDA is. statutes and ordinances. cities." and that "(f)or this purpose. The National Legislature. as termed in the charter itself. Having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature. the Metro Manila Commission. regulation.Mabelle O. approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. subject to such conditions and requirements as the Authority may impose. and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations. 1605 to the contrary notwithstanding. it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests with legislative power. through its traffic operation center. in the absence of an ordinance from the City of Makati. as an inherent attribute of sovereignty. No. coordination. 5(f) states that the petitioner shall "install and administer a single ticketing system. where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the legislature or those agencies to whom legislative powers have been delegated (the City of Manila in this case).  Police power. implementation." Local government units are the provinces. monitoring. either with penalties or without. whether moving or nonmoving in nature.   157 . There is no syllable in R. as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth. a "development authority. the provisions of RA 4136 and P. Clearly. Thus.D." It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies. the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. traffic enforcers of local government units. municipalities and barangays. there is no provision in R. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power. its own order to open the street was invalid. the Authority shall enforce all traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila. nongovernmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. With the passage of Rep. YES. preparation. 5(f) grants the MMDA with the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and regulations." The contested clause in Sec. installation of a system and administration.  Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in LGC. impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and regulations. the petitioner is not precluded – and in fact is duty-bound – to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport and  2. 7924 in 1995. not repugnant to the Constitution. or members of nongovernmental organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority. and for the subjects of the same. setting of policies. unlike its predecessor. Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units. people's organizations. let alone legislative power. and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws. Act No. and. however.

450 of the LGC by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million was enacted. the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. COMELEC Facts: 11th Congress: 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities were enacted. The Cityhood Laws direct 158 . Following the advice of Sen. Pimentel. However. 13th Congress: JR 29 was re-adopted as JR 1 and was forwarded to the Senate for approval. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests traffic management. After the effectivity of RA 9009. through their respective sponsors. The cityhood bills lapsed into law without the President’s signature. except that of Naga. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009. On 22 December 2006. the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. League of Cities v. However. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007.Mabelle O. 16 municipalities filed. 29 which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. traffic engineering services and traffic education programs. Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. as well as the administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement operations. However. 29. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain. the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. in the words of Sen. “the mad rush” of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.Pimentel. individual cityhood bills. the House adopted Joint Resolution No. 12th Congress: RA 9009 which amended Sec. Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007.

even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. clear and unambiguous. as amended by RA 9009. as amended by RA 9009. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the LGC all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city. RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 or during the 11th Congress. NO  Congress passed the Cityhood Laws long after the effectivity of RA 9009. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law. members of Congress discussed exempting respondent municipalities from RA 9009. including the Cityhood Laws. In enacting RA 9009. all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009. Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. Since the law is clear. not even to respondent municipalities whose cityhood bills were then pending when Congress passed RA 9009. within the law’s four corners. such exemption must be written in the LGC and not in any other law. Courts determine the intent of the law from the literal language of the law. as amended by RA 9009. WON RA 9009 violates the principle of non-retroactivity. courts simply apply the law according to its express terms. Article X of the Constitution. Hence. Article X of the Constitution. This is fatal to the cause of respondent municipalities because such     159 . is not being applied retroactively but prospectively. Congress could have easily included such exemption in RA 9009 but Congress did not. The Cityhood Laws. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the LGC. there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the law in applying Section 450 of the LGC. WON RA 9009 violates Sec 10 Art X of the Constitution. contains no exemption whatsoever. If a literal application of the law results in absurdity. Section 450 of the LGC. impossibility or injustice. Issues: 1. like the Cityhood Laws. This took effect on 30 June 2001. explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the LGC. However. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the LGC violates Section 10. Congress did not write this intended exemption into law. If the language of the law is plain. as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Congress. clear and unambiguous. did not provide any exemption from the increased income requirement.  RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the LGC to increase the income requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a city. Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10. Section 450 of the LGC. There is only one LGC. including the conversion of a municipality into a city. can govern such creation. No other law. The 13th Congress passed in December 2006 the cityhood bills which became law only in 2007. as shown by the various deliberations on the matter during the 11th Congress. respondent municipalities cannot invoke the principle of non-retroactivity of laws. then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction like the legislative history of the law. not even the charter of the city. as amended by RA 9009. non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the LGC. There can be no resort to extrinsic aids — like deliberations of Congress — if the language of the law is plain. does not contain any exemption from this income requirement. The criteria prescribed in the LGC govern exclusively the creation of a city. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the same uniform. an earlier law to the Cityhood Laws. in enacting RA 9009 to amend Section 450 of the LGC. To be valid. plain and unambiguous that any municipality desiring to convert into a city must meet the increased income requirement. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the LGC and not in any other law. Thus.  The Constitution is clear. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10. True.Mabelle O. This basic rule has no application because RA 9009. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city. from that moment the LGC required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100 million income requirement. 2.

When their respective authors re-filed the cityhood bills in 2006 during the 13th Congress. are material in determining the “just share” of local government units in national taxes. the bills had to start from square one again. All unapproved bills filed in one Congress become functus officio upon adjournment of that Congress and must be refiled anew in order to be taken up in the next Congress. WON the deliberations of unapproved bills by the 11th Congress may be used as basis for those approved by the 12th . Article X of the Constitution provides: Local government units shall have a just share. The members and officers of each Congress are different. must be strictly followed because such criteria. Thus. could be assailed on the ground of absence of a valid classification. the criteria for the exemption. population and income. If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and discriminatory. The unapproved cityhood bills filed during the 11th Congress became mere scraps of paper upon the adjournment of the 11th Congress. going through the legislative mill just like bills taken up for the first time. WON the equal protection clause was violated. NO Congress is not a continuing body. they prevent the fair and just distribution of the Internal Revenue Allotment in violation of Section 6. as amended by RA 9009. Section 450 of the LGC.Mabelle O. there can be no fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units. 9009. Section 6. Even if the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the LGC. Article X of the Constitution.    2. Uniform and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the LGC are essential to implement a fair and equitable distribution of national taxes to all local government units. if found in the LGC. including any exemption from such criteria. All the hearings and deliberations conducted during the 11th Congress on unapproved bills also became worthless upon the adjournment of the 11th Congress. prescribed by law. must all be written in the LGC. all other criteria being equal. which are unconstitutional because such exemption must be prescribed in the LGC as mandated in Section 10. Article X of the Constitution. If Section 450 of the LGC. such exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. the criteria for such exemption could be scrutinized for possible violation of the equal protection clause. as prescribed in Section 450 of the LGC. Since the Cityhood Laws do not follow the income criterion in Section 450 of the LGC. have no legal significance. “Exemption from Republic Act No. WON the Cityhood Laws violate Sec 6Art X of the Constitution. These hearings and deliberations cannot be used to interpret bills enacted into law in the 13th or subsequent Congresses. The criteria of land area. They do not qualify as extrinsic aids in construing laws passed by subsequent Congresses. contained an exemption to the P100 million annual income requirement. as well as the deliberations during the 12th and 13th Congresses on the unapproved resolution exempting from RA 9009 certain municipalities. as amended by RA 9009. as amended by RA 9009. Even if we take into account the deliberations in the 11th Congress that municipalities with pending cityhood bills  2. 9009 ─ The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. A city with an annual income of only P20 million. The exemption is contained in the Cityhood Laws. In short. The exemption provision merely states.” This one sentence exemption provision contains no classification standards or guidelines differentiating the exempted municipalities from those that are not exempted. Congress cannot prescribe such criteria or exemption from such criteria in any other law. The deliberations during the 11th Congress on the unapproved cityhood bills. The Constitution requires that the criteria for the conversion of a municipality into a city. in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.   160 . as determined by law. from the filing to the approval. Congress cannot create a city through a law that does not comply with the criteria or exemption found in the LGC. However. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests exemption must appear in RA 9009 as an amendment to Section 450 of the LGC. should not receive the same share in national taxes as a city with an annual income of P100 million or more. does not contain any exemption.   2.

Inc. the classification in the present case must be based on substantial distinctions. This is not a valid classification between those entitled and those not entitled to exemption from the P100 million income requirement. In short. This requirement is illustrated in Mayflower Farms. [23] not limited to existing conditions only. This violates the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. These municipalities. or for the protection of. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. 2. we have no right to conjure up possible situations which might justify the discrimination. the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16 municipalities a unique advantage based on an arbitrary date − the filing of their cityhood bills before the end of the 11th Congress – as against all other municipalities that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009.Mabelle O. that the provision will discourage monopoly.  The fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. 161 . or laws forbidding slaughterhouses within certain areas. the public. cognizable by law. rationally related to a legitimate government objective which is the purpose of the law.  Municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills were not informed that a pending cityhood bill in the 11th Congress would be a condition for exemption from the increased P100 million income requirement. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. The challenged provision is unlike such laws.  There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. which apply only to those entering the profession subsequent to the passage of the act and exempt those then in practice.  In the same vein. even if they have bigger annual income than the 16 respondent municipalities. Examples are statutes licensing physicians and dentists. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. many municipalities would have caused the filing of their own cityhood bills. in the milk business. but an attempt to give an economic advantage to those engaged in a given business at an arbitrary date as against all those who enter the industry after that date. Supreme Court held: We are referred to a host of decisions to the effect that a regulatory law may be prospective in operation and may except from its sweep those presently engaged in the calling or activity to which it is directed. Had they been informed.S. the U. 3. this Court has ruled:  The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the following conditions: 1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions. it is not a regulation of a business or an activity in the interest of. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality. Ten Eyck. where the challenged law allowed milk dealers engaged in business prior to a fixed date to sell at a price lower than that allowed to newcomers in the same business. or that it was aimed at any abuse. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests should be exempt from the P100 million income requirement. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class. The classification is arbitrary and unreasonable and denies the appellant the equal protection of the law. The exemption will be based solely on the fact that the 16 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in the 11th Congress when RA 9009 was enacted. In the absence of any such showing. since. the classification criterion − mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress − is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities. on its face.  To be valid. and applicable to all similarly situated. The appellees do not intimate that the classification bears any relation to the public health or welfare generally. there is still no valid classification to satisfy the equal protection clause. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law. Thus. v. and 4. That specific condition will never happen again. cannot now convert into cities if their income is less than P100 million. In Mayflower. or zoning laws which exempt existing buildings. but excepting existing establishments.

which amended Section 450 of the LGC. No. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities. 9009.A. 9009.  162 . the Cityhood Bills now under consideration will have the same effect as that of House Joint Resolution No. Based on these data.  Sec 10 mandatory. Thus.00 imposed by R. 9009 can be seen in the sponsorship speech of Senator Pimentel on Senate Bill No. and following the rule that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself. No. 9009. Congress has now made its intent express in the cityhood laws.00. Thus. and lead to absurdity.00 imposed by R. but to the spirit that vivifieth. not only do the legislative records bear the legislative intent of exempting the cityhood laws from the income requirement of P100. are in accordance with the "criteria established in the LGC.000.  Reyes dissent: 1. Thus." pursuant to Section 10.00 in the income requirement for municipalities and cluster of barangays wanting to be converted into cities is the "mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities. 1 because each of the 12 bills seeks exemption from the higher income requirement of RA 9009.Mabelle O.A.  The intent of R.A.A. Article X of the 1987 Constitution. kung hindi ang diwa na nagbibigay buhay. The cityhood laws do not violate Section 10.000. No.000.  The purpose of the enactment of R. No. No. 9009. injustice.A. Hindi ang letra na pumapatay. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests  Furthermore. Noteworthy is his statement that the basis for the proposed increase from P20. 9009. No. It was made clear by the Legislature that R. It is very clear that Congress intended that the then pending cityhood bills would not be covered by the income requirement of P100. No. the cityhood laws.A. Article III of the Constitution by granting special treatment to respondent municipalities in exempting them from the minimum income requirement imposed by R.000. Not to the letter that killeth. The proponents are invoking the exemption on the basis of justice and fairness. though the word "shall" may receive a permissive interpretation when necessary to carry out the true intent of the provision where the word is found." and in order that the country "will not be a nation of all cities and no municipalities. Article X of the 1987 Constitution. a reading of Section 10.000. which states: "Exemption from Republic Act No. It then becomes clear that the basis for the inclusion of the exemption clause of the cityhood laws is the clear-cut intent of the Legislature of not giving retroactive effect to R. 9009.000. while the 16 respondent municipalities can. is to exempt respondent municipalities from the income requirement of P100.000. Article X cannot be construed as anything else but mandatory.00 to P100. limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated. However. No. would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.A."  What Congress had in mind is not at all times accurately reflected in the language of the statute. or contradiction. even if it were written in Section 450 of the LGC. 2157. The city of [___] shall be exempt from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009." The deliberations of Congress are necessary to ferret out the intent of the legislature in enacting R.A. 9009 would not have any retroactive effect. The use of the word "shall" in a constitutional provision is generally considered as a mandatory command. All of them satisfy the mandatory requirement on   1. which merely carry out the intent of R. 9009.A.000. The cityhood laws do not violate the equal protection clause under Section 1. it is not always the case that the use of the word "shall" is conclusive. Petitioners and petitioners-intervention were not able to discharge their onus probandi of overcoming the presumption of constitutionality accorded to the cityhood laws. resort should be had to the principle that the spirit of the law controls its letter. In fact. it is clear that all the 12 municipalities under consideration are qualified to become cities prior to RA 9009. the literal interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless.000. In essence. Clearly. 9009. as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws.105 When this happens. The cityhood laws contain a uniformly worded exemption clause. No.000.

A. considering that the cityhood laws only expressed the intent of R. It must also be made for future acquisitions of the class as other subjects acquire the characteristics which form the basis of the classification.A. 9009. No. 9009 if their cityhood laws were pending when R.000. 9009 to argue for the alleged unconstitutionality of the cityhood laws.000. is that the imposition of a much higher income requirement on those that were qualified to become cities before the enactment of R. 9009. They seek to prevent the great injustice which would be committed to respondent municipalities.A.000.A.A. is denied to those who. 9009. No.A. An analogy may be found in the Constitution. Citizenship. No.000. No. 9009 by making a law which exempts municipalities from the P100. What distinguishes respondent municipalities from other municipalities is that the latter had pending cityhood bills before the passage of R. It is applicable as long as the concerned municipalities have filed their respective cityhood bills before the effectivity of R. The exception is when the statute is curative or remedial. petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention do not question the constitutionality of R.A. the peculiar conditions of respondent municipalities. this does not automatically mean that they are unconstitutional. who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.A. Even if the classification of the cityhood laws is limited to existing conditions only. No.00.A.A.A. and qualify for conversion into city under the original version of Section 450 of the LGC. Citizenship may be granted to those born before January 17.A. they use R. furnish sufficient grounds for legislative classification. Again. the cityhood laws are not contrary to the spirit and intent of R. 9009 to exempt respondent municipalities from the income requirement of P100. This is absurd. The common exemption clause in the cityhood laws is an application of the non-retroactive effect of R.000. of Filipino mothers.Mabelle O. Curiously. 1973. 9009. 9009. The equal protection clause does not merely prohibit Congress from passing discriminatory laws." Thus. however. No. like any sport changing the rules in the middle of the game. No. 9009 was "unfair. This was what Congress actually did in enacting the cityhood laws. The general rule is that a classification must not be based on existing conditions only. No. which led to their exemption from the increased P100.000. The exemption of respondent municipalities from the P100.00 income requirement of R.00 imposed by then Section 450 of the LGC. 9009. of Filipino mothers. The equal protection clause also commands Congress to pass laws which would positively promote equality or reduce existing inequalities. 9009. No.00 income requirement of R. In fact. and were compliant with the income threshold requirement of P20. although born before January 17. as their cityhood bills were not enacted by Congress in view of intervening events and for reasons beyond their control.000.A. The non-retroactive effect of R. In the words of Senator Lim.00 income requirement imposed by R. 9009 was unquestionably designed to insure that fairness and justice were accorded to respondent municipalities.A. No.000. "fairness dictates that they should be given a legal remedy by which they should be allowed to prove that they have all the necessary qualifications for city status using the criteria set forth under the LGC prior to its amendment by R. It is intended to apply for all time as long as the conditions set there exist.A. Congress has the power to carry out the intent of R. It is not a declaration of certain rights but a mere declaration of prior qualification and/or compliance with the nonretroactive effect of R. which are actual and real.000. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests income and one of the two optional requirements of territory. 9009 was passed.A.  The classification is germane to the purpose of the law. Here.  The classification rests on substantial distinctions. No. and thus temporary. These laws positively promote equality and reduce the existing inequality between respondent municipalities and the "other thirty-two (32) municipalities" whose cityhood bills were enacted during the 11th Congress. No.000. the peculiar conditions of respondent municipalities. 9009 is not limited in application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. 1973.  The classification is not limited to existing conditions only." Truly. No. No. No. did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.      163 . the cityhood laws are curative or remedial statutes. No.155 In like manner.

A. Thus. plain. and unambiguous. No.A. Section 6 of the Constitution speaks for itself.A. It overlooks that R. and  It is immaterial if Congress is not a continuing body. That the Court cannot sustain.000. apply to municipalities that had pending cityhood bills before the passage of R. In the end. 9009 remained an intent and was never written into law.00 income requirement imposed by R. 9009.A. for converting a municipality into a city are clear. (3) the cityhood laws violate Section 6. 9009. Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units. No.  The classification applies equally to all members of the same class.00. No." (5) the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the LGC. is tantamount to denying respondent municipalities the protective mantle of the equal protection clause.A. or injustice.A.A. needing no resort to any statutory construction. in carrying out the clear intent of R.  It does not matter if the officers of each Congress or the authors of the bills are different. 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became laws more than five (5) years later.A. 9009.000." (4) the intent of members of Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of R. to deny respondent municipalities the same rights and privileges accorded to the other thirty-two (32) municipalities when they are under the same circumstances. Article X. in application.00 imposed by R. 9009. Congress intended the cityhood laws in question to be exempted from the income requirement of P100. 9009.A.000.  Congress meant not to incorporate its intent in what eventually became R.A. not a retroactive application. No.000. While it is true that local government units shall have a "just share" in the national taxes. No.A. (6) the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress because it is not a continuing body. the rationale for exempting the cityhood bills from the P100. The cityhood laws also merely carry out the intent of R. (2) the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the LGC and not in any other law. because R. The cityhood laws. 9009 were being considered during the 13th Congress. Congress was well aware of such fact. it is qualified by the phrase "as determined by law.000.A. This is the context of the reference to the prospective application of the said R. 9009 is now Section 450 of the LGC.00. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests 9009 because Congress intended said law to be prospective.000.  Neither is the fifth item persuasive. 9009 to the present case is a prospective. No. Indeed. No. Senator Aquilino Pimentel gave a categorical answer: "I do not think it is necessary to put that provision because what we are saying here will form part of the interpretation of this bill. Congress intended the hiked income requirement in R. No. No. The hearings and deliberations conducted during the 11th or 12th Congress may still be used as extrinsic aids or reference because the same cityhood bills which were filed before the passage of R.000. No. 9009 and were compliant with then Section 450 of the LGC that prescribed an income requirement of P20. 9009 to exempt respondent municipalities from the income requirement of P100.Mabelle O. Senate President Franklin Drilon asked if there would be an appropriate language to be crafted which would reflect the intent of Congress.A. No. 9009 not to apply to the cityhood bills which became the subject cityhood laws.  The second point is specious. The dissent admits that courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction like the legislative history of the law if the literal application of the law results in absurdity.A. No.A. No. petitioners and petitioners-inintervention are creating an absurd situation in which an alleged violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution is remedied by another violation of the equal protection clause.  The third needs clarification.  cityhood bills were pending before the passage of R. **Summing Up Majority’s ground for unconstitutionality: (1) applying R. No. impossibility. In effect. 9009 remains the same: (1) the cityhood bills were pending before the 164 . not retroactive. as amended by R. To recall.000.

A. No. which was eventually amended by R. Aside from complying with the territory and population requirements of the LGC. 9009 was enacted. and (2) that were compliant with the income threshold of P20. No. 9009 was enacted.to avert the mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities and to prevent this nation from becoming a nation of all cities and no municipalities . 9009. Separation of powers prevents the Court from prying into the wisdom or judgment of Congress.Mabelle O. the majority does exactly the opposite.000.A. and (2) respondent municipalities were compliant with the P20. Congress is given the widest latitude in making classifications and in laying down the criteria.  What should not be overlooked is that the cityhood laws enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. 9009. No. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests passage of R. No. 165 .000. these municipalities also met the P20.A. The intent of Congress . However.A. (7) even if the exemption in the cityhood laws were written in Section 450 of the LGC. there is no unreasonable classification here. It shifts the onus probandi to respondent municipalities to prove that their cityhood laws are constitutional.is preserved. petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention cannot hardly claim the cityhood laws are unconstitutional on the ground they violate the criteria established in the LGC. Thus. Neither may they claim that the cityhood laws violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention bear the heavy burden of overcoming such presumption. Even if the Court did. 9009 is clear.A.000.000. much less grave abuse of discretion. No.000. That is violative of the basic rule of evidence. No. Respondent municipalities are covered by the twin criteria.  The exemption on the 16 municipalities is not only based on the fact that they had pending cityhood bills when R. ** intent of R. Congress intended to exempt municipalities (1) that had pending cityhood bills before the passage of R.A.00 income requirement imposed by the old Section 450 of the LGC.00 under the old Section 450 of the LGC. the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause because the exemption is based solely on the fact that the 16 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in the 11th Congress when R.00 income threshold of the old Section 450 of the LGC. 9009.000.

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despite his green card. Sec. This respondent has not done. Issues: 1. CA Facts: Merito Miguel won in the 1988 mayoral elections in Bolinao. under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. On the contrary. CA ordered the RTC to dismiss and desist from further proceeding in the quo warranto case on the ground that the COMELEC has already ruled on his qualifications. Miguel’s opponent. Miguel filed an MTD which was denied by the RTC. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Caasi v. Petitions were filed seeking to disqualify him on the ground that he holds a green card issued to him by the US Immigration Service which would mean that he his a permanent resident of the United States. Commissioner Badoy’s dissent: A green card holder being a permanent resident of or an immigrant of a foreign country and respondent having admitted that he is a green card holder. to prove that he "has waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant" to be qualified to run for elected office. 18. he has sufficiently indicated his intention to continuously reside in Bolinao as shown by his having voted in successive elections in said municipality. and 182 . it is incumbent upon him. Caasi also filed a petition for quo warranto. Pangasinan. and not of Bolinao. COMELEC dismissed the petitions on the ground that possession of a green card by Miguel does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines. WON a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the United States  Consti: Article XI. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times.Mabelle O.

" was “Permanently.. the country in which he resides.. Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law" is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of the United States before he was elected to public office. 881). Immigration: removing into one place from another.S. Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. prior to the local elections on January 18. not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao. the green card that was subsequently issued by the United States Department of Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to the respondent Merito C. Thus resident alien friends are entitled to the benefit of the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution that no state shall deprive "any person" of life liberty. liberty. he was issued by the U. the upper portion. Court took note of: a. his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in         2. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law." Despite his vigorous disclaimer. On the back of the card. statutes sometimes give a broader meaning to the term "immigrant. Person identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and work in the United States. For he did not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there. To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines. Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. the act of immigrating the entering into a country with the intention of residing in it. the law requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country. and the protection of this amendment extends to the right to earn a livelihood by following the ordinary occupations of life. Omnibus Election Code: SEC. However.S. Section 18. Based on that application of his.. So an alien is entitled to the protection of the provision of the Fifth Amendment to the federal constitution that no person shall be deprived of life.S." Therefore. he entered the limited States with the intention to have there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. while they are permitted to remain. Aliens reading in the limited States." b. Disqualifications . c. Pangasinan.Mabelle O. which provides: Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code. unless such person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. Government the requisite green card or authority to reside there permanently. so state). In general.. This is in return for the protection given to him during the period of his residence therein. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code. Blg.' WON Miguel waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to the U.S. Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance to the U.  183 . The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (B. aliens residing in the United States. unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. 1988. Immigrant: person who removes into a country for the purpose of permanent residence. are in general entitled to the protection of the laws with regard to their rights of person and property and to their civil and criminal responsibility. on its face. or property without due process of law. while they are permitted to remain are entitled to the safeguards of the constitution with regard to their rights of person and property and to their civil and criminal responsibility. the following information is printed:Alien Registration Receipt Card.P." As a resident alien in the U. 68. or property without due process of law.in the "Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" Miguel's answer regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently.A. or deny to any person the equal protection of the law.

Omnibus Election Code). and likewise denied a reconsideration thereof. for all that he wanted was a green card to enable him to come and go to the U. 1988.  Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests the Philippines. The COMELEC dismissed Marquez’ quo warranto petition in a resolution of February 2. which proves that he is a permanent resident or immigrant it of the United States. hence. 1995 MARQUEZ Decision sprung — was still then pending     184 . 1988. that all this time he only had one foot in the United States but kept his other foot in the Philippines. Rodriguez v. he would have this Court believe that he applied for immigration to the U. therefore. Miguel admits that he holds a green card. The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens who have cast their lot with our country "without mental reservations or purpose of evasion.S.S.S. Marquez challenged the COMELEC dismissal via petition for certiorari. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U. but the records of this case are starkly bare of proof that he had waived his status as such before he ran for election as municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18. Rodriguez is therefore a "fugitive from justice" which is a ground for his disqualification/ineligibility under Section 40(e) of the LGC. filed on November 12. In other words. 1995 election. 1988. and giving him the best of both worlds so to speak. he never really intended to live there permanently. with ease. 1993. he was "disqualified to run for any elective office" (Sec. Without such prior waiver. the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear policy of excluding from the right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who possess dual loyalties and allegiance.S. did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. based principally on the same allegation that Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice. Marquez challenged Rodriguez' candidacy via petition for disqualification before the COMELEC. 1995 when Rodriguez' petition for certiorari (112889) — from where the April 18." The assumption is that those who are resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such entire devotion to the interest and welfare of their homeland for with one eye on their public duties here. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. Marquez challenged Rodriguez’ victory via petition for quo warranto before the COMELEC. This time. our conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office. they must keep another eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign country of their choice in order to preserve their status as permanent residents thereof.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on January 18.Mabelle O. COMELEC Facts : Rodriguez won against Marquez for the gubernatorial post in Quezon province. under false pretenses. this Court will not allow itself to be a party to his duplicity by permitting him to benefit from it. We. 68. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U." This petition for disqualification was filed by Marquez on April 11. 1985. Even if that were true. Miguel insists that even though he applied for immigration and permanent residence in the United States. grand theft and attempted grand theft of personal property. his election thereto was null and void. In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residents or immigrants of a foreign country. hold that he was disqualified to become a candidate for that office. is pending against the latter before the Los Angeles Municipal Court for fraudulent insurance claims. Rodriguez and Marquez renewed their rivalry for the same position of governor. In the May 8. Marquez revealed that Rodriguez left the United States where a charge. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a permanent resident of the United States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on January 18. Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy. is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public office must possess.

[4] preceded the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November 12. Issue: WON Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice" as contemplated by Section 40(e) of the LGC based on the alleged pendency of a criminal charge against him. The EDSA Revolution led to the ouster of 185 . as per certifications issued by the Bureau of Immigrations dated April 27and June 26 of 1995.  Fugitive from justice: A person. after being charged.’ Mere commission of a 'crime' without charges having been filed for the same and flight subsequent thereto sufficiently meet the definition. in legal intendment. The same suggests nothing more than the sequence of events which transpired.  Filing of charges prior to flight is not always an antecedent requirement to label one a 'fugitive from justice. or if he was brought within the jurisdiction of the court and was tried and convicted. and (b) thereafter. fugitives from justice. On May 7. There is no dispute that his arrival in the Philippines from the US on June 25. Attention is directed at the use of the word 'crime' which is not employed to connote guilt or conviction for the commission thereof.'  Marquez decision: includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who. Richter: The simple fact that they (person who have committed crime within a state) are not within the state to answer its criminal process when required renders them. 92-28 (quo warranto case) and SPA No. For indeed.R. A subjective fact as that of petitioner's purpose cannot be inferred from the objective data at hand in the absence of further proof to substantiate such claim. he has successfully evaded service of sentence because he had jumped bail or escaped. the reason for disqualification being that a person 'was not brought within the jurisdiction of the court because he had successfully evaded arrest. And obviously. flees from jurisdiction of the court where crime was committed or departs from his usual place of abode and conceals himself within the district (Black’s Law)  Objective facts sufficient to constitute flight from justice are: (a) a person committed a 'crime' or has been charged for the commission thereof. or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.  "The circumstantial fact that it was seventeen (17) days after Rodriguez' departure that charges against him were filed cannot overturn the presumption of good faith in his favor. In fact. not long after petitioner's arrival in the country. is just nowhere to be found in the circumstances of Rodriguez. 1985. Marcos.  THE MERE FACT THAT THERE ARE PENDING CHARGES IN THE UNITED STATES AND THAT PETITIONER RODRIGUEZ IS IN THE PHILIPPINES MAKE PETITIONER A 'FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests before the Court. the evidence of petitioner Rodriguez sufficiently proves that his compulsion to return to the Philippines was due to his desire to join and participate vigorously in the political campaigns against former President Ferdinand E. 1995 and after the promulgation of the MARQUEZ Decision. No. 1985 and of the issuance on even date of the arrest warrant by that same foreign court.’  State v. It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US." The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular jurisdiction. The disqualification then is based on his ‘flight from justice.  Rodriguez' case just cannot fit in this concept. What prosecution or punishment then was Rodriguez deliberately running away from with his departure from the US? The very essence of being a "fugitive from justice" under the MARQUEZ Decision definition. the upheaval wrought by the political forces and the avalanche of events which occurred resulted in one of the more colorful events in Philippine history. the COMELEC promulgated a Consolidated Resolution for EPC No. 112889 elucidates that the disqualification for being a fugitive does not involve the issue of the presumption of innocence. who. having committed a crime. leaves the jurisdiction of the court where said crime was committed or his usual place of abode. there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment. by almost five (5) months. flee to avoid prosecution. Justice Davide's separate opinion in G. 95089 (disqualification case). as there was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant — much less conviction — to speak of yet at such time.Mabelle O.

No justifiable reason existed to curtail or fetter petitioner's exercise of his right to leave the United State and return home. While the law. And serving the people of Quezon province as such. He could not have gone back to the United States in the middle of his term nor could he have traveled intermittently thereto without jeopardizing the interest of the public he serves. petitioner Rodriguez had every reason to devote utmost priority to the service of his office. petitioner had every right to depart therefrom at the precise time that he did and to return to the Philippines. should be understood according to the definition given in the MARQUEZ Decision.Mabelle O.  "It must be noted that moral uprightness is not a standard too far-reaching as to demand of political candidate the performance of duties and obligations that are supererogatory in nature. in good faith. is more apparent when applied in petitioner's case. De La Torre v. However. The criminal process of the United States extends only within its territorial jurisdiction. sustaining the contrary proposition would be to unduly burden and punish petitioner for exercising a right as he cannot be faulted for the circumstances that brought him within Philippine territory at the time he was sought to be placed under arrest and to answer for charges filed against him.  "Having established petitioner's lack of knowledge of the charges to be filed against him at the time he left the United States. In the absence of an intent to evade the laws of the United States. Altogether. petitioner's plight is altogether a different situation. is under an obligation not to flee said place of commission. does not countenance flight from justice in the instance that a person flees the jurisdiction of another state after charges against him or a warrant for his arrest was issued or even in view of the imminent filing and issuance of the same. That petitioner has already left said country when the latter sought to subject him to its criminal process is hardly petitioner's fault. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests former Pres. His subsequent knowledge while in the Philippines and non-submission to the jurisdiction of the former country does not operate to label petitioner automatically a fugitive from justice. he was elected Governor in 1988 and continues to be involved in politics in the same capacity as re-elected Governor in 1992 and the disputed re-election in 1995. Clearly. To require that of petitioner would be to put him in a paradoxical quandary where he is compelled to violate the very functions of his office. the term "fugitive from justice" as a ground for the disqualification or ineligibility of a person seeking to run for any elective local position under Section 40(e) of the LGC. his departure from the United States may not place him under a similar obligation. intensive and extensive activity of varied political campaigns — first against the Marcos government. Not being a "fugitive from justice" under this definition. petitioner Rodriguez began serving his home province as OIC-Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Quezon in 1986. at the time of flight. a person leaves the territory of a state not his own. these landmark dates hem in for petitioner a period of relentless. Hence."  To summarize. When. And being a figure in these developments. homeward bound. Rodriguez cannot be denied the Quezon Province gubernatorial post. then for the governorship. as in petitioner's case. a person who is aware of the imminent filing of charges against him or of the same already filed in connection with acts he committed in the jurisdiction of a particular state. Then. Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that there has already been a conviction or at least. COMELEC 186 . As he was a public officer appointed and elected immediately after his return to the country. and learns subsequently of charges filed against him while in the relative peace and service of his own country. The severity of the law construed in the manner as to require of a person that he subject himself to the jurisdiction of another state while already in his country or else be disqualified from office. Marcos and precipitated changes in the political climate. it becomes immaterial under such construction to determine the exact time when he was made aware thereof. as interpreted by the Supreme Court. a charge has already been filed. We do not dispute that an alleged 'fugitive from justice' must perform acts in order not to be so categorized. the fact that he does not subject himself to the jurisdiction of the former state does not qualify him outright as a fugitive from justice. the position entails absolute dedication of one's time to the demands of the office.

The accused knows or should have known that the said article. item. or in any manner deals in any article. involves moral turpitude. 1995. 1990.” to wit: “It (moral turpitude) implies something immoral in itself. Section 40(a) of the LGC which provides as follows: The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment within two (2) years after serving sentence. or should be known to him. Flores.”  This guideline nonetheless proved short of providing a clearcut solution. In resolving the foregoing question. dated August 28. modesty.  Fencing is defined in Section 2 of P. which have been derived from the proceeds of the said crime. There are crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. the Court admitted that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by merely classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum. or good morals. however. the Court is guided by one of the general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude. or shall buy and sell.1995 elections. In disqualifying the petitioner.” And in this connection. object or anything of value. conceal. item. rendered inapplicable Section 40 (a) as well. the Court has consistently adopted the definition in Black’s Law Dictionary of “moral turpitude” as: an act of baseness. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Facts: Petitioner Rolando P. which however. Dela Torre via the instant petition for certiorari seeks the nullification of two resolutions issued by the COMELEC allegedly with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a case for disqualification filed against petitioner before the COMELEC. conceals. shall buy.1612 (Anti-Fencing Law) as: the act of any person who.Mabelle O. acquire. It is for this reason that “as to what crime involves moral turpitude. 2. regardless of the fact that it is punishable by law or not. The accused who is not a principal or accomplice in the crime of robbery or theft. sell or dispose of. In said motion. Laguna in the last May 8. The doing of the act itself.D. 1612.1995 declared the petitioner disqualified from running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti. Moral turpitude does not. contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice. but the act itself must be inherently immoral. acquires. vileness. for in “International Rice Research Institute v. or buys and sells. NLRC. The second assailed resolution.1991. the COMELEC held that: Documentary evidence established that herein respondent (petitioner) was found guilty by the Municipal Trial Court for violation of P. Respondent’s conviction became final on January 18. 1994 which suspended the execution of the judgment of conviction and all other legal consequences flowing therefrom. In the final analysis.  Section 40 (a): “when the conviction by final judgment is for an offense involving moral turpitude. (otherwise known as the Antifencing Law) in a Decision dated June 1. however. denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. honesty. petitioner claimed that Section 40 (a) of the LGC does not apply to his case inasmuch as the probation granted him by the MTC on December 21. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed. keeps. sells or disposes. item. the rationale of which was set forth in “Zari v. citing as the ground therefor. with intent to gain for himself or for another.[4] Issues: 1.D. receive.1990. or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen. affirmed respondent’s conviction in a Decision dated November 14. object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the 187 . possess. object or anything of value which he knows. receives. include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited. possesses. to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute. and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude.  Not every criminal act. buys. is for the Supreme Court to determine”. It must not be merely mala prohibita. while crimes mala prohibita do not. 3. The first assailed resolution dated May 6. Respondent appealed the said conviction with the Regional Trial Court . or to society in general.  Elements: 1. or in any manner deal in any article. keep. WON the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude.

Mabelle O. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests
crime of robbery or theft; and 4. There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another. Moral turpitude is deducible from the third element. Actual knowledge by the “fence” of the fact that property received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one’s rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. And although the participation of each felon in the unlawful taking differs in point in time and in degree, both the “fence” and the actual perpetrator/s of the robbery or theft invaded one’s peaceful dominion for gain thus deliberately reneging in the process “private duties” they owe their “fellowmen” or “society” in a manner “contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals.” The duty not to appropriate, or to return, anything acquired either by mistake or with malice is so basic it finds expression in some key provisions of the Civil Code on “Human Relations” and “Solutio Indebiti” The same underlying reason holds even if the “fence” did not have actual knowledge, but merely “should have known” the origin of the property received. In this regard, the Court held: “When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of the offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of the high probability of its existence unless he actually believes that it does not exist. On the other hand, the words ‘should know’ denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in the performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists.” WON a grant of probation affects Section 40 (a)’s applicability. Anent the second issue where petitioner contends that his probation had the effect of suspending the applicability of Section 40 (a) of the LGC, suffice it to say that the legal effect of probation is only to suspend the execution of the sentence. Petitioner’s conviction of fencing which we have heretofore declared as a crime of moral turpitude and thus falling squarely under the disqualification found in Section 40 (a), subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation. In fact, a judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the accused applies for probation, although it is not executory pending resolution of the application for probation. Clearly then, petitioner’s theory has no merit. Magno v. COMELEC Facts: A case was filed by private respondent on March 21, 2001 for the disqualification of petitioner Nestor Magno as mayoralty candidate of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija during the May 14, 2001 elections on the ground that petitioner was previously convicted by the Sandiganbayan of four counts of direct bribery penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code. It appears that on July 25, 1995, petitioner was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 3 months and 11 days of arresto mayor as minimum to 1 year 8 months and 21 days of prision correccional as maximum, for each of the four counts of direct bribery. Thereafter, petitioner applied for probation and was discharged on March 5, 1998 upon order of the Regional Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija. On May 7, 2001, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) rendered a decision granting the petition of private respondent and declaring that petitioner was disqualified from running for the position of mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections based on Sec 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. On May 10, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the COMELEC in its resolution dated May 12, 2001. Hence, this petition. Issue: WON petitioner was disqualified to run for mayor in the 2001 elections. a. whether the crime of direct bribery involves moral turpitude  Moral Turpitude: an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. (Black’s Law)  Elements of Bribery: 1. the offender is a public officer; 2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through another; 3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain

2.

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from doing something which it is his official duty to do; and 4. the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the performance of his official duties. Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from performing an official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and society in general. Also, the fact that the offender takes advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and good morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. whether it is the Omnibus Election Code or the LGC that should apply in this situation. There appears to be a glaring incompatibility between the five-year disqualification period provided in Sec 12 of the Omnibus Election Code and the two-year disqualification period in Sec 40 of the LGC. It should be noted that the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) was approved on December 3, 1985 while the LGC (RA 7160) took effect on January 1, 1992. It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later enactment must prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative will. Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. In enacting the later law, the legislature is presumed to have knowledge of the older law and intended to change it. Furthermore, the repealing clause of Section 534 of RA 7160 or the LGC states that: (f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. In accordance therewith, Section 40 of RA 7160 is deemed to have repealed Section 12 of BP 881. Furthermore, Article 7 of the Civil Code provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and not the other way around. When a subsequent law entirely encompasses the subject matter of the former enactment, the latter is deemed repealed.

 David v. COMELEC: RA 7160 is a codified set of laws that
specifically applies to local government units. Section 40 thereof specially and definitively provides for disqualifications of candidates for elective local positions. It is applicable to them only. On the other hand, Section 12 of BP 881 speaks of disqualifications of candidates for any public office. It deals with the election of all public officers. Thus, Section 40 of RA 7160, insofar as it governs the disqualifications of candidates for local positions, assumes the nature of a special law which ought to prevail.  The intent of the legislature to reduce the disqualification period of candidates for local positions from five to two years is evident. The cardinal rule in the interpretation of all laws is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the law. The reduction of the disqualification period from five to two years is the manifest intent.  Therefore, although his crime of direct bribery involved moral turpitude, petitioner nonetheless could not be disqualified from running in the 2001 elections. Article 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) must yield to Article 40 of the LGC. Petitioner’s disqualification ceased as of March 5, 2000 and he was therefore under no such disqualification anymore when he ran for mayor of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2001 elections. Lingating v. COMELEC Facts: Miguel M. Lingating filed a disqualification case against respondent Cesar B. Sulong as candidate for mayor of Lapuyan, Zamboanga del Sur in the May 14, 2001 elections, pursuant to §40(b) of the LGC, which disqualifies from running for any elective local position “those removed from office as a result of an administrative case. It appears that respondent Sulong had previously won as mayor of Lapuyan on January 18, 1988. In the May 11, 1992, and again in the May 8, 1995 elections, he was reelected. In a petition for disqualification, petitioner alleged that in 1991, during his first term as mayor of Lapuyan, respondent Sulong, along with a municipal councilor of Lapuyan and several other individuals, was administratively charged with various offenses, and that, on February 4, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur found him guilty of the charges and ordered his removal from office. Petitioner claimed that this decision had become final and executory, and consequently the

a. 

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then vice-mayor of Lapuyan, Vicente Imbing, took his oath as mayor vice respondent Sulong on March 3, 1992. Respondent Sulong denied that the decision in AC No. 12-91 had become final and executory. He averred that after receiving a copy of the decision on February 17, 1992, he filed a motion for reconsideration and/or notice of appeal thereof on February 18, 1992; that on February 27, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan required Jim Lingating, the complainant in AC No. 12-91, to comment on respondent Sulong’s motion for reconsideration and/or notice of appeal; that the said complainant had not yet complied therewith and his (respondent Sulong’s) motion had consequently remained pending. Respondent Sulong denied he had been removed from office by virtue of the decision in AC No. 12-91. After the parties had filed their memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution. Because the COMELEC was unable to render judgment before the elections of May 14, 2001, respondent Sulong was voted for in the elections, receiving 4,882 votes as against the 3,611 votes for petitioner. On May 16, 2001, respondent Sulong was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Lapuyan as the duly elected mayor of that municipality. In a resolution dated August 1, 2001, the COMELEC’s First Division declared respondent Cesar B. Sulong disqualified. Respondent Sulong filed a motion for reconsideration citing a certification, dated August 7, 2001, of Provincial Secretary of Zamboanga del Sur (OIC) Wilfredo Cimafranca that the decision in AC No. 12-91 “has not become final and executory as the final disposition thereof was overtaken by the local elections of May 1992.” He reiterated his claim that at no time had he been removed by virtue of the said decision. Petitioner filed an opposition contending, among other things, that the fact that Zamboanga del Sur Governor Ariosa had ordered the enforcement of the decision signified that respondent Sulong’s motion for reconsideration and/or notice of appeal had not been given due course by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan; and that respondent Sulong’s claim that he had not been removed from office was belied by the fact that he (respondent Sulong) brought charges against Vicente Imbing for Usurpation of Official Functions (I.S. No. 92-35), in support of which respondent Sulong attested under oath that Imbing had succeeded him as mayor of Lapuyan. In a separate motion, petitioner prayed that the resolution of August 1, 2001 be executed and that he be installed as mayor of Lapuyan in view of private respondent’s disqualification. On August 30, 2001, the COMELEC’s First Division denied petitioner’s motion for execution on the ground that the disqualification of an elected highest number of votes to occupy the office vacated. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration of this order. On April 4, 2002, the COMELEC en banc issued its resolution subject of the petition in this case, reversing the resolution, dated August 1, 2001, of its First Division insofar as it found respondent Sulong disqualified from running as mayor. In the May 1992 elections, respondent Sulong was re-elected mayor of Lapuyan, Zamboanga del Sur despite the decision of the Sangguniang dismissing him from office. In the 1995 May elections, respondent Sulong ran and won the mayoralty elections of Lapuyan, Zamboanga del Sur. The COMELEC en banc also ruled that, in any event, respondent Sulong was not entitled to occupy the office thus vacated. Hence, this petition by Lingating. Issue: WON an elective local executive officer, who is removed before the expiration of the term for which he was elected, is disqualified from being a candidate for a local elective position under §40(b) of the LGC.  Reyes case: Petitioner invokes the ruling in Aguinaldo v. COMELEC, in which it was held that a public official could not be removed for misconduct committed during a prior term and that his reelection operated as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. But that was because in that case, before the petition questioning the validity of the administrative decision removing petitioner could be decided, the term of office during which the alleged misconduct was committed expired. Removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was committed. If a public official is not removed before his term of office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter reelected [for] another term. This is the rationale for the ruling in the two Aguinaldo cases. The case at bar is the very opposite of those cases. Here, . . . the decision in the administrative case, . . . was served on petitioner and it thereafter became final on April 3, 1995, because petitioner failed to appeal to the Office of the President. He was thus validly removed from office and, pursuant to §40(b) of the LGC, he was disqualified from running for reelection.  It is noteworthy that at the time the Aguinaldo cases were decided there was no provision similar to §40(b) which

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disqualifies any person from running for any elective position on the ground that he has been removed as a result of an administrative case. The LGC of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) could not be given retroactive effect.  However, Reyes cannot be applied to this case because it appears that the 1992 decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, finding respondent Sulong guilty of dishonesty, falsification and malversation of public funds, has not until now become final. The records of this case show that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur rendered judgment in AC No. 12-91 on February 4, 1992, a copy of which was received by respondent Sulong on February 17, 1992; that on February 18, 1992, he filed a “motion for reconsideration and/or notice of appeal;” that on February 27, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, required Jim Lingating, the complainant in AC No. 12-91, to comment; and that the complainant in AC No. 12-91 has not filed a comment nor has the Sangguniang Panlalawigan resolved respondent’s motion. The filing of his motion for reconsideration prevented the decision of Sangguniang Panlalawigan from becoming final.  While R.A. No. 7160 on disciplinary actions is silent on the filing of a motion for reconsideration, the same cannot be interpreted as a prohibition against the filing of a motion for reconsideration. Thus, it was held[15] that a party in a disbarment proceeding under Rule 139-B, §12(c) can move for a reconsideration of a resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines although Rule 139-B does not so provide: Although Rule 139-B, §12(c) makes no mention of a motion for reconsideration, nothing in its text or history suggests that such motion is prohibited. It may therefore be filed . . . . Indeed, the filing of such motion should be encouraged before [an appeal is] resort[ed] to . . . as a matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies, to afford the agency rendering the judgment [an] opportunity to correct any error it may have committed through a misapprehension of facts or misappreciation of evidence.  There is thus no decision finding respondent guilty to speak of. As Provincial Secretary of Zamboanga del Sur Wilfredo Cimafranca attested, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan simply considered the matter as having become moot and academic because it was “overtaken by the local elections of May [11,]1992.”  Neither can the succession of the then vice-mayor of Lapuyan, Vicente Imbing, and the highest ranking municipal councilor of Lapuyan, Romeo Tan, to the offices of mayor and vice-mayor, respectively, be considered proof that the decision in AC No. 12-91 had become final because it appears to have been made pursuant to §68[16] of the LGC, which makes decisions in administrative cases immediately executory.  Indeed, considering the failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to resolve respondent’s motion, it is unfair to the electorate to be told after they have voted for respondent Sulong that after all he is disqualified, especially since, at the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had been rendered nearly ten years ago.  Having come to the conclusion that respondent Sulong is not disqualified from holding the position of mayor of Lapuyan, it is unnecessary to pass upon petitioner’s contention that, as the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes, he is entitled to be installed as mayor because the votes cast in favor of respondent Sulong were void. Flores v. COMELEC Facts: The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged in this original petition with prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order "to prevent useless and unnecessary expenditures of public funds by way of salaries and other operational expenses attached to the office . . . ." Paragraph (d) reads: Chairman administrator — The President shall appoint a professional manager as administrator of the Subic Authority with a compensation to be determined by the Board subject to the approval of the Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex oficio chairman of the Board and who shall serve as the chief executive officer of the Subic Authority: Provided, however, That for the first

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year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority. Petitioners, who claim to be taxpayers, employees of the U.S. Facility at the Subic, Zambales, and officers and members of the Filipino Civilian Employees Association in U.S. Facilities in the Philippines, maintain that the proviso in par. (d) of Sec. 13 infringes on the following constitutional and statutory provisions: (a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IXB, of the Constitution, which states that "[n]o elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure," because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official and the subject posts are public offices; (b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides that "[t]he President shall . . . . appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint", since it was Congress through the questioned proviso and not the President who appointed the Mayor to the subject posts; and, (c) Sec. 261, par. (g), of the Omnibus Election Code, which says: Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of an election offense: . . . (g) Appointment of new employees, creation of new position, promotion, or giving salary increases. — During the period of forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before a special election, (1) any head, official or appointing officer of a government office, agency or instrumentality, whether national or local, including governmentowned or controlled corporations, who appoints or hires any new employee, whether provisional, temporary or casual, or creates and fills any new position, except upon prior authority of the Commission. The Commission shall not grant the authority sought unless it is satisfied that the position to be filled is essential to the proper functioning of the office or agency concerned, and that the position shall not be filled in a manner that may influence the election. As an exception to the foregoing provisions, a new employee may be appointed in case of urgent need: Provided, however, That notice of the appointment shall be given to the Commission within three days from the date of the appointment. Any appointment or hiring in violation of this provision shall be null and void. (2) Any government official who promotes, or gives any increase of salary or remuneration or privilege to any government official or employee, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations . . . .for the reason that the appointment of respondent Gordon to the subject posts made by respondent Executive Secretary on 3 April 1992 was within the prohibited 45day period prior to the 11 May 1992 Elections. Issue: WON proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 which states, "Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority," violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts.  Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution:No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.  Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including governmentowned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.  The section expresses the policy against the concentration of several public positions in one person, so that a public officer or employee may serve full-time with dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public services. It is an affirmation that a public office is a full-time job. Hence, a public officer or employee, like the head of an executive department described in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, and Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. v. Philip Ella C. Juico, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 83815, 6 ". . . . should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other governmental duties or employment. He should be precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention and energy among too many positions of responsibility, which may result in haphazardness and inefficiency . . . ."  In the case before us, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA). Since this is precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, it needs no stretching of the imagination to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. Here, the fact that the expertise of

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an elective official may be most beneficial to the higher interest of the body politic is of no moment.  It is argued that Sec. 94 of the LGC (LGC) permits the appointment of a local elective official to another post if so allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office. 8 But, the contention is fallacious. Section 94 of the LGC is not determinative of the constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, for no legislative act can prevail over the fundamental law of the land. Moreover, since the constitutionality of Sec. 94 of LGC is not the issue here nor is that section sought to be declared unconstitutional, we need not rule on its validity. Neither can we invoke a practice otherwise unconstitutional as authority for its validity.  In any case, the view that an elective official may be appointed to another post if allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office, ignores the clear-cut difference in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. X-B, of the Constitution. While the second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple offices by an appointive official when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, the first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against appointment or designation of an elective official to the government post, except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself, e.g., the President as head of the economic and planning agency; 9 the Vice-President, who may be appointed Member of the Cabinet; 10 and, a member of Congress who may be designated ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.  The distinction between the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, was not accidental when drawn, and not without reason. It was purposely sought by the drafters of the Constitution as shown in their deliberation, thus — MR. MONSOD. In other words, what then Commissioner is saying, Mr. Presiding Officer, is that the prohibition is more strict with respect to elective officials, because in the case of appointive officials, there may be a law that will allow them to hold other positions. MR. FOZ. Yes, I suggest we make that difference, because in the case of appointive officials, there will be certain situations where the law should allow them to hold some other positions. The distinction being clear, the exemption allowed to appointive officials in the second paragraph cannot be extended to elective officials who are governed by the first paragraph. It is further argued that the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City, hence, an excepted circumstance, citing Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, where we stated that the prohibition against the holding of any other office or employment by the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants during their tenure, as provided in Sec. 13, Art. VII, of the Constitution, does not comprehend additional duties and functions required by the primary functions of the officials concerned, who are to perform them in an ex officio capacity as provided by law, without receiving any additional compensation therefor. This argument is apparently based on a wrong premise. Congress did not contemplate making the subject SBMA posts as ex officio or automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor of Olongapo City without need of appointment. The phrase "shall be appointed" unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City. Had it been the legislative intent to make the subject positions ex officio, Congress would have, at least, avoided the word "appointed" and, instead, "ex officio" would have been used. Even in the Senate deliberations, the Senators were fully aware that subject proviso may contravene Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, but they nevertheless passed the bill and decided to have the controversy resolved by the courts. Indeed, the Senators would not have been concerned with the effects of Sec. 7, first par., had they considered the SBMA posts as ex officio. Petitioners also assail the legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the President. Section 13, par. (d), itself vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman of the Board and the Chief Executive Officer of SBMA, although he really has no choice under the law but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City. As may be defined, an "appointment" is "[t]he designation of a person, by the person or persons having authority therefor, to discharge the duties of some office or trust," 17 or "[t]he selection or designation of a person, by the person

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Intermediate Appellate Court: The power to appoint is. it is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe qualifications where only one. 7227.  In the case at bar. Even on the pretext of prescribing the qualifications of the officer. VI.A. of the Constitution where "(n)o Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government . ". he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City. by the authority vested with the power. Justice Malcolm adds that an "[a]ppointment to office is intrinsically an executive act involving the exercise of discretion.e. deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. the proviso nevertheless limits the appointing authority to only one eligible. . is no power at all and goes against the very nature itself of appointment."  Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. to fill an office or public function and discharge the duties of the same. notwithstanding his ineligibility. of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. the proviso limiting his choice to one is certainly an encroachment on his prerogative.. when the qualifications prescribed by Congress can only be met by one individual. It is therefore clear that ineligibility is not directly related with forfeiture of office. directly or indirectly. Philippine Political Law. Art.Mabelle O. Such supposed power of appointment. The effect is quite different where it is expressly provided by law that a person holding one office shall be ineligible to another.. Such a provision is held to incapacitate the incumbent of an office 194 . . while the conferment of the appointing power on the President is a perfectly valid legislative act. . According to Woodbury.. such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment. On the contrary. Once the power of appointment is conferred on the President. the appointing power necessarily exercises a discretion. while other incumbent elective officials must first resign their posts before they can be appointed. can qualify.  This provision should not be confused with Sec. such conferment necessarily carries the discretion of whom to appoint. his appointment or designation thereto cannot be valid in view of his disqualification or lack of eligibility.e.  Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or during his incumbency. appointed to other government posts. it (Congress) cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. thus running the risk of losing the elective post as well as not being appointed to the other post. as in the case of respondent Gordon. It is a prerogative of the appointing power  When Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer. . sans the essential element of choice." The difference between the two provisions is significant in the sense that incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts only after they have been appointed to another government office. Senior Associate Justice Isagani A. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests or persons having authority therefor. and no other. As long as he is an incumbent. discretionary. . i. while Congress willed that the subject posts be filled with a presidential appointee for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of R. he does not automatically forfeit his elective office nor remove his ineligibility imposed by the Constitution. i. Cruz defines appointment as "the selection. 13. "the choice of a person to fill an office constitutes the essence of his appointment. during his term without forfeiting his seat . in essence. Consequently. While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the officer during the first year of operations of SBMA. In his treatise. Accordingly. an incumbent elective official was." and Mr. Since only one can qualify for the posts in question. the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City. . an elective official remains ineligible for appointment to another public office. of his discretion to pick his own choice. since an incumbent elective official is not eligible to the appointive position. J.  Where. . the President is precluded from exercising his discretion to choose whom to appoint. Congress may not abuse such power as to divest the appointing authority. The appointing power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment. he may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment." Considering that appointment calls for a selection. .

though not those of a lawful officer. hence. Garvida v. Issues: 1. Province of Bohol. . The COMELEC held that the fifteen (15) ballots in the same precinct containing the initial "C" after the name "Galido" were marked ballots and. COMELEC 195 . "one whose acts. REGALADO: It is understood. Galeon then filed an election protest before the RTC of Bohol.Mabelle O. upon principles of policy and justice. void because the officer was not eligible. if any was filed. does not preclude a recourse to this Court by way of a special civil action of certiorari. TRO issued.  The COMELEC has exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections. provincial. returns. . he may be considered a de facto officer. the ballots containing the same should be rejected as marked ballots. his appointment thereto pursuant to a legislative act that contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained. or because there was a want of power in the electing or appointing body. will hold valid so far as they involve the interest of the public and third persons. and city officials and has appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. . . (Article IX (C). RTC decision was reversed and Galeon was declared duly-elected mayor by a plurality of 5 votes. Galido was proclaimed dulyelected Mayor by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. executory and not appealable.  The fact that decisions. therefore. where the duties of the office were exercised . On appeal to the COMELEC. respondent Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of SBMA. by a majority of 11 votes. under color of a known election or appointment. before the same is adjudged to be such. Galido filed petition for certiorari and injunction with prayer for a restraining order which contains the same allegations and legal issues. not appealable. or appointment. and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void. WON final decisions of the COMELEC are appealable. invalid. therefore. such ineligibility. want of power or defect being unknown to the public . Sales (supra. . either generally or of a certain kind. 116) Facts: Galido and Galeon were candidates during the 18 January 1988 local elections for the position of mayor in the Municipality of Garcia-Hernandez. SC dismissed for failure of petitioner to comply with par. . that while these decisions with respect to barangay and municipal officials are final and immediately executory and. that does not rule out the possibility of an Galido v. The COMELEC said that where a word or a letter recurs in a pattern or system to mark and identify ballots. Section 2 (2).  MR. MR denied. order or resolution was received and the date of receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration. Galido filed a petition for certiorari and injunction. paragraph 1 of the 1987 Constitution). respondents required to file comment. the law. 4 of the Court's Circular No. After hearing. the prohibition has been held to incapacitate the incumbent of the first office to hold the second so that any attempt to hold the second is void  As incumbent elective official. final orders or rulings of the Commission on Elections in contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices are final. the said court upheld the proclamation of Galido as the duly-elected Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez. or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise. or statutes declare that persons holding one office shall be ineligible for election or appointment to another office. 1-88 which requires that a petition shall contain a verified statement of the date when notice of the questioned judgment. by or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law. MR denied. however. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests from accepting or holding a second office and to render his election or appointment to the latter office void or voidable "Where the constitution. see p. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City. [or] under color of an election. and qualifications of all elective regional.

The Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Rivera as the duly elected Mayor by a majority of 10 votes. Sec. No. WON the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion. Upon the other hand. In this light. arguing that the same had not yet become final and executory as of the time this petition was filed. charging the Regional Trial Court of grave abuse of discretion in Case No. and that the extent to which such precedents apply rests on its discretion. the trial court found Garcia to have obtained 6.R. and upon considering the report of a Revision Committee it had earlier created. this Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit on 7 March 1989. wherein the same issue now raised in this petition was raised by Rivera. The main purpose of prohibition is to suspend all action and prevent the further performance of the act complained of. reaffirmed with modification (123 votes). Rivera appealed to the COMELEC. Petitioner maintains further that he has a period of thirty (30) days from 6 September 1990 or until 6 October 1990 within which to elevate the COMELEC decision. second sentence. After due hearing. Rule 39 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Rivera v. The COMELEC sustained with modification (found Garcia leading by 153 instead of 154). believe that the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering the questioned decision. Garcia filed an election protest with the RTC. 196 . **The records disclose that private respondent had already assumed the position of Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez as the dulyelected mayor of the municipality by virtue of the COMELEC decision. Article IX-A of the Constitution (Supreme Court authority to review on certiorari a Comelec decision. law and justice. COMELEC Facts: Rivera and Garcia II were candidates for the position of Mayor of Guinobatan. (2). equity. orders and rulings) of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.222. order or ruling). Albay.Mabelle O. (2) of the 1987 Constitution. the exercise of which should not be controlled unless such discretion has been abused to the prejudice of either party. 2. He also contends that since the COMELEC decision of 6 September 1990 has not yet become final and executory." Lastly. Par. 87046. He also prayed for the issuance of an order restraining the implementation of the said judgment. 2. 1987 Constitution).  We do not. respondent Garcia contends that: 1. the COMELEC has no authority to issue the assailed order and writ of execution. as said rule applies only to "decisions in pre-proclamation cases and petitions to deny due course or to disqualify a candidate. pursuant to Section 1. Rule 39 of the COMELEC Rules. on certiorari. MR denied. executory and not appealable (Article IX-C. to this Court. In an earlier petition for certiorari filed by Rivera with this Court. 01-88. Garcia commenced to discharge the duties and functions of Mayor of Guinobatan on 10 October 1990. par. He submits that the questioned COMELEC decision is not one that became final and executory unless restrained by this Court as provided under Section 3. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests original special civil action for certiorari. as the case may be. Rule 39.  As correctly argued by public respondent COMELEC. docketed as G. it has the inherent power to decide an election contest on physical evidence. It is settled that the function of a writ of certiorari is to keep an inferior court or tribunal within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. according to petitioner. the petition at bar has become moot and academic. Rivera filed the present petition on 5 October 1990 seeking annulment of the COMELEC en banc decision rendered in favor of respondent Garcia. prohibition. by virtue of a writ of execution implementing the COMELEC decision of 6 September 1990. during the local elections in January 1988. Section 1 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. and apply established jurisprudence in support of its findings and conclusions. under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Constitution declares the decisions of the COMELEC on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials to be final. He continued as mayor until 10 November 1990 when he was served notice of this Court's temporary restraining order. Section 2. issued upon Rivera's motion. in relation to Part VII. should be read in the context of Section 7. or mandamus. He cites Article IX-C. and postpone or suspend elections. 2.376 votes as against Rivera's 6. however. Section 13(a) of Rule 18 (finality of Comelec decisions or resolutions) and Section 1 of Rule 39 (review by the Supreme Court of Comelec decisions.

On September 2.  Flores v. upon the death of the incumbent. COMELEC Facts: Capco was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18. not by a petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 65. 1998 elections. Jr. Succession into office is not counted as 1 term for purposes of the computation of the three-term limitation under the Constitution and the LGC. On March 27. 1998 elections. who was also a candidate for mayor. annulling the proclamation of the petitioner as the duly elected Mayor of Guinobatan. he was reelected mayor for another term of three years ending June 30. Section 1.  The main thrust of the present petition for certiorari is that the respondent COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the decision of its First Division. he became mayor. In fact. Metro Manila. WON the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion. Borja. 14 ballots originally adjudicated in Garcia's favor were overruled by the Commission en banc. 1998. 1998. 1998. We find none in this case. and not appealable" applies only to questions of fact and not of law. 16 ballots were added in Rivera's favor. the Second Division of the COMELEC ruled in favor of Borja and declared Capco disqualified from running for reelection as mayor of Pateros. voting 5-2. The majority stated in its decision: In both the Constitution and the LGC.  We have closely scrutinized the challenged COMELEC decision and find that the said decision was not arrived at capriciously or whimsically by respondent COMELEC. 1992. WON the decisions of the COMELEC in election contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials. correctible by appeal. the COMELEC en banc. the three-term limitation refers to the term of office for which the local official was elected. findings of fact of administrative bodies are final unless grave abuse of discretion has marred such factual determinations. However. dated May 7. Capco won and was proclaimed elected by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. sought Capco’s disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30.  Galido Case. the appreciation and re-evaluation of ballots are factual determinations. preclude the filing of a special civil action of certiorari. Issue: WON a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit. Borja. 1988 for a term ending June 30. It made no reference to succession to an office to which he was not elected. 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that. 1995. 197 . of the Rules of Court. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests 3.445 contested ballots. promulgated on 2 May 1990. On April 30.087 votes. of the COMELEC and to seed a declaration that Capco is disqualified to serve another term as Mayor of Pateros. That provision was not intended to divest the Supreme Court of its authority to resolve questions of law as inherent in the judicial power conferred upon it by the Constitution. on motion of private respondent. Borja v. Section 2(2) of the Constitution that "decisions. final orders. 1995. We eschew a literal reading of that provision that would contradict such authority.. Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11. 1998. it is an error in judgment. If true. 1989. On the other hand. the provision of Article IX-C. It is settled that in a petition for certiorari.Mabelle O. being final and executory and not appealable. outside of those objected votes already ruled upon by the COMELEC" does not deserve any consideration. 2. or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final. 1992. A painstaking re-evaluation of the questioned 67 ballots was made by the COMELEC en banc. executory.  Moreover. Albay and when it did not exclude from the total votes of Garcia at least ten (10) votes which were allegedly misappreciated in Garcia's favor. he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years which ended on June 30. by operation of law. This is a petition for certiorari brought to set aside the resolution. COMELEC: Obviously. The supplemental ground raised by petitioner Rivera that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion "by not excluding from the total votes of Garcia at least ten (10) votes which were misappreciated in Garcia's favor. Issues: 1. reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor in the May 11. On May 11. thus reducing the number of votes in his favor to 894 votes out of the 2. On May 8. thus increasing the votes in his favor to 1.

which shall be determined by law. except barangay officials. In discussing term limits.” Petitioner contends that. the Representative is elected to fill the vacancy. X. X. This provision is restated in §43(b) of the LGC (R. therefore. derived from the concern about the accumulation of power as a result of a prolonged stay in office. The second is the idea of election. without it. It underscores the constitutional intent to cover only the terms of office to which one may have been elected for purpose of the three-     198 . would therefore be to violate this principle.  There is a difference between the case of a vice-mayor and that of a member of the House of Representatives who succeeds another who dies. §8 with regard to elective local officials.” The purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective official may serve.Mabelle O. derived from the concern that the right of the people to choose those whom they wish to govern them be preserved. Indeed. a fundamental tenet of representative democracy is that the people should be allowed to choose whom they please to govern them. X. shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. 7160): No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. the vice-mayor should likewise be considered to have served a full term as mayor if he succeeds to the latter’s office and serves for the remainder of the term. Conversely. his service of the unexpired term is rightly counted as his first term. states that “voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.” The term served must therefore be one “for which [the official concerned] was elected. not only historical examination but textual analysis as well supports the ruling of the COMELEC that Art. who simply steps into the Presidency by succession would be qualified to run for President even if he has occupied that office for more than four years. Two ideas thus emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission. The first is the notion of service of term. §4 of the Constitution which provides for succession of the Vice-President to the Presidency in case of vacancy in that office. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests  Article X. the drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving by reason of reelection. In a real sense. if he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds. After stating that “The President shall not be eligible for any reelection. or is removed from office. in explaining when an elective local official may be deemed to have served his full term of office. resigns. such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term now withstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration. As the purpose of the constitutional provision is to limit the right ot be elected and to serve in Congress. §8 on elective local officials throws in bold relief the difference between the two cases. although the first as a result of succession by operation of law rather than election. Rather than refute what we believe to be the intendment of Art. VII. The vice-mayor succeeds to the mayorship by operation of law. by analogy.  The framers of the Constitution included such a provision because.A. the Vice-President. On the other hand.  Petitioner also cites Art. The absence of a similar provision in Art. §8 of the Constitution provides: The term of office of elective local officials. The second sentence. To bar the election of a local official because he has already served three terms. §8 contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive terms as a result of election. No. The first sentence speaks of “the term of office of elective local officials” and bars “such official[s]” from serving for more than three consecutive terms. the case of a Representative who succeeds another confirms the theory.” this provision says that “No person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time. Second. such Representative serves a term for which he was elected. becomes incapacitated.

Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests term limit on local elective officials. during his first term.” Since A is only completing the service of the term for which the deceased and not he was elected. interrupted by the death . the mayor is entitled to run for reelection because the two conditions for the application of the disqualification provisions have not concurred. the fact remains that he has not been elected three times. can he run for one more term in the next election? Yes. For their part. Hence. To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the understanding of the Constitutional Commission that while the 199 . His assumption of the mayorship in the event of vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design. he proves to be a good mayor. Can he run again for mayor in the next election. Yes. He has distinct powers and functions. 3. §8. A cannot be considered to have completed one term. His resignation constitutes an interruption of the full term. X. Suppose A is a vice-mayor who becomes mayor by reason of the death of the incumbent. It cannot be said of him. But if. In both cases. he is the presiding officer of the sanggunian and he appoints all officials and employees of such local assembly. X §8. the electors likewise choose as Vice-President the candidate who they think can fill the Presidency in the event it becomes vacant. because he has served only two full terms successively. If he is twice reelected after that. If the vicemayor turns out to be a bad mayor. In running for Vice-President. permanent disability. disregarding for this purpose service by automatic succession.  This is not so in the case of the vice-mayor. voluntary renunciation of the office is not considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term only if the term is one “for which he was elected. on the other hand.  To recapitulate. Under the LGC. is he qualified to run again in the next election? Yes. **Case No. Consequently. namely. Suppose B is elected Mayor and. the people can remedy the situation by simply not reelecting him for another term.Mabelle O. he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. he may thus be said to also seek the Presidency. that the local official concerned has been elected three consecutive times and that he has fully served three consecutive terms. as much as of the Vice-President in the event of a vacancy in the Presidency. **Case No. Suppose he is twice elected after that term. 1. In the second case. he has not actually served three full terms in all for the purpose of applying the term limit. of the deceased mayor. Under Art. While he may be appointed to the cabinet. because although he has already first served as mayor by succession and subsequently resigned from office before the full term expired. 2. service in the presidency for more than four years may rightly be considered as service for a full term. because he was not elected to the office of the mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. removal or resignation. In the first case. succession to mayorship in the event of vacancy therein being only one of them.  There is another reason why the Vice-President who succeeds to the Presidency and serves in that office for more than four years is ineligible for election as President. but he has not fully served three consecutive terms. even if the local official is considered to have served three full terms notwithstanding his resignation before the end of the first term. The Vice-President is elected primarily to succeed the President in the event of the latter’s death. he resigns and is twice elected thereafter. The case of vice-mayor C who becomes mayor by succession involves a total failure of the two conditions to concur for the purpose of applying Art. he is twice suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year. it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office. the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. To consider C in the third case to have served the first term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them. Six months before the next election. he also seeks the mayorship. the local official has been elected three consecutive times. there will be no way the people can return him to office (even if it is just the third time he is standing for reelection) if his service of the first term is counted as one of the purpose of applying the term limit. his becoming so is entirely dependent on the good graces of the President. Neither had he served the full term because he only continued the service. that in running for vice-mayor. **Case No. Hence. his service in that office should not be counted in the application of any term limit.

Accordingly. although he was later unseated before the expiration of the term. 43 of the LGC (R. care should be taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed. Zambales by plurality of votes cast in his favor totaling 1.488 votes for Lonzanida.720 votes as against 1. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. 1998 his opponent Eufemio Muli timely filed a petition to disqualify Lonzanida from running for mayor of San Antonio in the 1998 elections on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms in the same post. 1997 declared a failure of elections. On May 13. 1995 elections. 1998. 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of San Antonio. On February 27. The finding of the COMELEC First Division was affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc in a resolution dated August 11. The COMELEC found that Lonzanida's assumption of office by virtue of his proclamation in May 1995. which in a decision dated January 9. Zambales prior to the May 8. 7160) restates the same rule: No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same position. The said disqualification was primarily intended to forestall the accumulation of massive political power by an elective local government official in a given locality in order to perpetuate his tenure in office. No. Zambales and he is therefore disqualified to run for the same post for the fourth time. the office of the mayor of the Municipality of San Antonio. He assumed office and discharged the duties thereof. recognized and took note of the fact that some local government officials run for office before they reach forty years of age. His proclamation in 1995 was however contested by his then opponent Juan Alvez who filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of Zambales. X of the Constitution was initially proposed to be an absolute bar to any elective local government official from running for the same position after serving three consecutive terms. 1998 the First Division of the COMELEC issued the questioned resolution granting the petition for disqualification upon a finding that Lonzanida had served three consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio. petitioner Lonzanida was proclaimed winner.A. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests people should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of political power may bring about. COMELEC Facts: Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio. On May 21. Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. 8. The delegates also considered the need to broaden the choices of the electorate of the candidates who will run for office. and Alvez assumed office for the remainder of the term. Issue: WON Lonzanida's assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local government officials.  Sec. In the May 11. the COMELEC declared Alvez the duly elected mayor of San Antonio. except barangay officials. 1998 the COMELEC issued a writ of execution ordering Lonzanida to vacate the post. Lonzanida v. it was agreed that an elective local government official should be barred from running for the 200 .Mabelle O. Art. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. Zambales is hereby declared vacant.  Sec. should be counted as service for one full term in computing the three term limit under the Constitution and the LGC. which he obeyed. The drafters however. thus to perpetually bar them from running for the same office after serving nine consecutive years may deprive the people of qualified candidates to choose from. and to infuse new blood in the political arena by disqualifying officials from running for the same office after a term of nine years. The mayor was compared by some delegates to the President of the Republic as he is a powerful chief executive of his political territory and is most likely to form a political dynasty. On appeal. On April 21.  The records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that the three-term limit which is now embodied in section 8. As finally voted upon. X of the Constitution provides: The term of office of elective local officials. which shall be determined by law shall be three years and no such officials shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Art. 1998.

..  Borja Case: This Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office. and second. The respondents' contention that the petitioner should be deemed to have served one full term from May 1995-1998 because he served the greater portion of that term has no legal basis to support it. In the May 1995 elections he again ran for mayor of San Antonio. the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term. Alvez served the remaining portion of the 1995-1998 mayoral term.First. It stated: To recapitulate. the duly elected mayor of San Antonio. The Resolution of the COMELEC finding him disqualified on this 201 .e. i. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit. After a hiatus of at least one term.Mabelle O. that he has fully served three consecutive terms. 1997 on the election protest against the petitioner which declared his opponent Juan Alvez. he may again run for the same office. He assumed office and discharged the rights and duties of mayor until March 1998 when he was ordered to vacate the post by reason of the COMELEC decision dated November 13. the petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections. After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his previous proclamation as winner was declared null and void. he merely assumed office as presumptive winner. involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.  Second. not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. conversely. It has been repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all 5 and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the election protest.  The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently.  Petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and that he did not hold office for the full term. his assumption of office from 1995 to March 1998 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three term limit. it disregards the second requisite for the application of the disqualification. "Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. 6 Petitioner Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio. the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. His assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation. which presumption was later overturned by the COMELEC when it decided with finality that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections. The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests same post after three consecutive terms. Zambales and was proclaimed winner. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus. he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. "The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people's choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision.  It is not disputed that the petitioner was previously elected and served two consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio Zambales prior to the May 1995 mayoral elections.. Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 because he was not duly elected to the post. hence. it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office.

If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election.  This court held that the clear legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case to its conclusion i. is no bar to the exercise of such power. was not without legal recourse to move for the early resolution of the election protest while it was pending before the regional trial court or to file a motion for the execution of the regional trial court's decision declaring the position of mayor vacant and ordering the vice-mayor to assume office while the appeal was pending with the COMELEC. The instant petition for disqualification was filed on April 21. Sec. may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. Talaga was then the incumbent mayor. It of course may not be availed of where there has been a valid proclamation. the court or commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action. It was held in the case of Sunga vs.e. we perceive that inquiry into this issue is within the area allocated by the Constitution and law to COMELEC . . There is no specific allegation nor proof that the delay was due to any political maneuvering on his part to prolong his stay in office. the fact that a candidate has been proclaimed elected does not signify that his disqualification is deemed condoned and may no longer be the subject of a separate investigation . 1998 or after the petitioner's proclamation. Obviously. we have said. Since private respondent's petition before the COMELEC is precisely directed at the annulment of the canvass and proclamation. until judgment is rendered. Such delay cannot be imputed to the petitioner.  2. inquiry or protest and. COMELEC Facts: Adormeo and Talaga were the only candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy for mayor of Lucena City in the May 14. if elected. 2001 elections. upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor. COMELEC: Time and again this Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that COMELEC is with authority to annul any canvass and proclamation which was illegally made. WON the delay in resolving the election protest between petitioner and his then opponent Alvez which took roughly about three years and resultantly extended the petitioners incumbency in an office to which he was not lawfully elected. The fact that Trinidad was already proclaimed and had assumed the position of mayor did not divest the COMELEC of authority and jurisdiction to continue the hearing and eventually decide the disqualification case.. Really. 6 of RA 6646 specifically mandates that: any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for.   202 . Such delay which is not here shown to have intentionally sought by the petitioner to prolong his stay in office cannot serve as basis to bar his right to be elected and to serve his chosen local government post in the succeeding mayoral election.Mabelle O. The fact that a candidate proclaimed has assumed office.  Aguam v. and the votes cast for him shall not be counted.  Purpose of a disqualification proceeding : to prevent the candidate from running or. . Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests ground to run in the May 1998 mayoral elections should therefore be set aside. baneful effects may easily supervene. 1998 or before the May 1998 elections and was resolved on May 21. Talaga 2. WON the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after he was proclaimed winner. protestant Alvez. or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. were a victim of a proclamation to be precluded from challenging the validity thereof after that proclamation and the assumption of office thereunder. Moreover. COMELEC and Trinidad that the proclamation nor the assumption of office of a candidate against whom a petition for disqualification is pending before the COMELEC does not divest the COMELEC of jurisdiction to continue hearing the case and to resolve it on the merits. from serving. Adormeo v. The outright dismissal of the petition for disqualification filed before the election but which remained unresolved after the proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified will unduly reward the said candidate and may encourage him to employ delaying tactics to impede the resolution of the petition until after he has been proclaimed.

He posits that to interpret otherwise. after canvassing. he lost to Tagarao. in the contemplation of the law and the Constitution. known as the LGC. (2) in the election of May 1995. can he run for one more term in the next election? Yes. In the election of 1998. and thus his mayorship was not for three consecutive terms of three years each. 2001 for 13 months and eighteen (18) days was not a full term. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests was elected mayor in May 1992. 1998 elections is considered an interruption in the continuity of his service as Mayor of Lucena City. except barangay officials.Mabelle O.  Private respondent. To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the understanding of the Constitutional Commission that while the people should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of political power may bring about. where he served the full term. covering the period May 12. he again won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30. MR reversed COMELEC ruling and held that 1) respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms because he did not win in the May 11. Respondent added that his service from May 12. 3) that his victory in the recall elections was not considered a term of office and is not included in the 3-term disqualification rule. and 4) that he did not fully serve the three (3) consecutive terms. care should be taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed.  Petitioner contends that private respondent was disqualified to run for city mayor by reason of the three-term rule because the unexpired portion of the term of office he served after winning a recall election. 2001. which shall be determined by law. In the recall election of May 12. He pointed to his defeat in the 1998 election by Tagarao. private respondent would be serving four (4) consecutive terms of 10 years. Article X of 1987 Constitution[4] and Section 43 (b) of R. 2001 until June 30. The COMELEC found Talaga disqualified for the position of city mayor on the ground that he had already served three (3) consecutive terms. 1998 to May 12. in violation of Section 8. in turn.  In its comment.  Borja Case: Case No. On March 2. the COMELEC restated its position that private respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms having lost his third bid in the May 11. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. Adormeo filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor. private respondent was proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of Lucena City. maintains that his service as city mayor of Lucena is not consecutive. thus he had not been mayor for 3 consecutive terms. 2000. shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. during Tagarao’s incumbency. Suppose B is elected mayor and. because he has served only two full terms successively. Because of his defeat the consecutiveness of his years as mayor was interrupted. and. 2001. 2001 is considered a full term. Again. where he served only the unexpired term of Tagarao after having lost to Tagarao in the 1998 election. he was a private citizen. he was re-elected in 1995-1998.  COMELEC’s ruling that private respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms should be upheld. and his loss in the May 11. 1998 elections. Issue: WON COMELEC Talaga is qualified to run forMayor in Lucena City for the 2001 elections. He lost his bid for a second re-election in 1998 and between June 30. Petitioner contended that Talaga’s candidacy as Mayor constituted a violation of Section 8. 2. 2000.A. If he is twice reelected after that. 2000. On May 19. He served the full term. Lucena City a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/or Disqualification of Talaga on the ground that the latter was elected and had served as city mayor for three (3) consecutive terms as follows: (1) in the election of May 1992. Talaga responded that he was not elected City Mayor for three (3) consecutive terms but only for two (2) consecutive terms. and his Certificate of Candidacy was ordered withdrawn and/or cancelled. Article X of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the term of office of elective local officials. (3) in the recall election of May 12. he is twice suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year.  Lonzanida Case: Two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: a) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. during his first term. 7160. where he again served the full term. 1998 elections. 2) that he was installed only as mayor by reason of his victory in the recall elections. 2000 to June 30. For nearly 203 . said defeat is an interruption in the continuity of service as city mayor of Lucena. 2001.

The COMELEC fixed the campaign period from August 27.” In a resolution promulgated on September 20. Joaquin Bernas.” The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people’s choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. The PRA requested the COMELEC to schedule the recall election for mayor within 30 days from receipt of the Recall Resolution. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests two years he was a private citizen. COMELEC Facts: On July 2. the COMELEC dismissed for lack of merit and declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election. that unexpired. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit. Hagedorn. stating that in interpreting said provision that “if one is elected representative to serve the unexpired term of another. 312 out of 528 members of the then incumbent barangay officials of the Puerto Princesa convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall of Victorino Dennis M. 2002 to September 5. Socrates v. will be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed. In Lonzanida vs. respondent adverts to the comment of Fr. 2002. Hagedorn won and filed motions to lift the order restraining the COMELEC from proclaiming the winning candidate and to allow him to assume office to give effect to the will of the electorate. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections. On August 23. Fr. On August 14. 2002. the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.Mabelle O. 204 . no matter how short. we said: The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states. On July 16. The petitions were all anchored on the ground that “Hagedorn is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term. 2002. 2002 to September 24. The members of the PRA designated Mark David M. to run in the May 1998 election violates Article X. Ollave and Manaay also. Bernas’ comment is pertinent only to members of the House of Representatives. there is no recall election provided for members of Congress. involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. the COMELEC dismissed Socrates’ petition and gave due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall election on September 7. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus. Jr. Unlike local government officials. Issues: 1.. Socrates filed with the COMELEC a petition to nullify and deny due course to the Recall Resolution. 2002. 2002. PRA passed a resolution which declared its loss of confidence in Socrates and called for his recall. Adovo and Gilo filed a petition to disqualify Hagedorn from running in the recall election and to cancel his certificate of candidacy. conversely. the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution prescribing the calendar of activities and periods of certain prohibited acts in connection with the recall election. On August 21. Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall election. as interim chair of the PRA. president of the Association of Barangay Captains.  Neither can respondent’s victory in the recall election be deemed a violation of Section 8. a Constitutional Commission member. having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full terms immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same post.” As pointed out by the COMELEC en banc. “Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. 2001. MR denied. 2002. 2002. WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduling the recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections. 2002 or a period of 10 days. Socrates who assumed office as Puerto Princesa’s mayor on June 30.  Patently untenable is petitioner’s contention that COMELEC in allowing respondent Talaga. Article X of the Constitution as “voluntary renunciation” for clearly it is not.  To bolster his case. Section 8 of 1987 Constitution. The COMELEC also reset the recall election from September 7. 2002. COMELEC.

which states: The term of office of elective local officials. in the month of June 2002. 2001. The immediate reelection that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular elections in 2001. and not to any subsequent election. stated. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected. in his Indorsement dated 10 July 2002.’  The Acting Director IV.’  The Provincial Election Supervisor of Palawan. 2002 is not an immediate reelection after his third consecutive term which ended on June 30. his candidacy in the recall election on September 24. The framers of the Constitution did not intend “the period of rest” of an elective official who has reached his term limit to be the full extent of the succeeding term. 01-02 calling for the recall of Mayor Victorino Dennis M. majority of all members of the PRA concerned approved said resolution. Socrates sent notices of the convening of the PRA to the members thereof pursuant to Section 70 of the LGC. Urbano Arlando. during the six-year period following the two term limit. Any subsequent election. Socrates. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms. The framers of the Constitution thus clarified that a Senator can run after only three years following his completion of two terms. otherwise known as the LGC. the proponents for the Recall of incumbent City Mayor Victorino Dennis M. which shall be determined by law. The proponents likewise utilized the broadcast mass media in the dissemination of the convening of the PRA. like a recall election.’ She likewise certified ‘that not a single member/signatory of the PRA complained or objected as to the veracity and authenticity of their signatures.Mabelle O. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The framers expressly acknowledged that the prohibited election refers only to the immediate reelection. Second. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. First. Atty. found that the PRA was validly constituted and that the majority of all members thereof approved Resolution No. which provides: No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Notices were likewise posted in conspicuous places particularly at the Barangay Hall.  The City Election Officer of Puerto Princesa City in her Certification dated 10 July 2002 certified that upon a ‘thorough and careful verification of the signatures. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. After three consecutive terms. 7160. found that on various dates. a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Hagedorn did not seek reelection in the 2001 elections. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.  The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests  Socrates argues that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the Recall Resolution despite the absence of notice to 130 PRA members and the defective service of notice to other PRA members. The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms.     205 . 2002. except barangay officials. all documents submitted are found in order. WON Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in the recall election of Puerto Princesa on September 24.” These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. ‘upon proper review. an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. however. shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.’ 2. is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. The COMELEC.”  This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. In the case of Hagedorn. Region IV. Article X of the Constitution.

1998 to May 12. Adormeo established the rule that the winner in the recall election cannot be charged or credited with the full term of three years for purposes of counting the consecutiveness of an elective official’s terms in office. Talaga’s recall term as mayor was not consecutive to his previous two terms because of this interruption. there having been a break of almost two years during which time Tagarao was the mayor. 2002 recall election if the recall term is made to retroact to June 30. the interruption occurred after the first two consecutive terms. from running for a fourth consecutive term as mayor. although short of a full term of three years. 2004 is not a seamless continuation of his previous three consecutive terms as mayor. The Constitution does not require the interruption or hiatus to be a full term of three years. the nearly 15-month period he was out of office.Mabelle O. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three-term limit. 2002 to June 30.  Adormeo Case: an interruption consisting of a portion of a term of office breaks the continuity of service of an elective local official. Under the Constitution and the LGC. Hagedorn’s recall term does not retroact to include the tenure in office of Socrates. Thus. Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. 2001 to September 24. 2002. The Constitution and the LGC disqualified Hagedorn. In the instant case. for 206 . but because of a legal prohibition.” The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people’s choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Hagedorn’s three consecutive terms ended on June 30.  In Hagedorn’s case. This period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn’s service as mayor. 1995 and 1998 elections and served in full his three consecutive terms as mayor of Puerto Princesa. Hagedorn can only be disqualified to run in the September 24. constituted an interruption in the continuity of his service as mayor.  From June 30. conversely.018 votes over his closest opponent. Socrates. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests  Hagedorn was elected for three consecutive terms in the 1992. involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30. Hagedorn did not run for mayor in the 2001 elections. One cannot stitch together Hagedorn’s previous three-terms with his new recall term to make the recall term a fourth consecutive term because factually it is not. 2001. stating that the period from June 30.  In the instant case. the respondents were seeking election for a fourth term. 2002 when he won by 3. The only difference between Adormeo and the instant case is the time of the interruption. is sufficient to break an elective local official’s continuity of service. who had reached the maximum three-term limit. In Adormeo. The issue in Adormeo was whether Talaga’s recall term was a continuation of his previous two terms so that he was deemed to have already served three consecutive terms as mayor. Hagedorn could no longer run for mayor in the 2001 elections. Hagedorn’s new recall term from September 24. when another elective official holds office. the mayor of Puerto Princesa was Socrates. 2001. The clear intent is that interruption “for any length of time. 2001. not because of his voluntary renunciation. 2000 when Talaga was out of office interrupted the continuity of his service as mayor. Socrates ran and won as mayor of Puerto Princesa in the 2001 elections. he became a private citizen until the recall election of September 24. During the same period. Clearly. In both cases. An involuntary interruption occurred from June 30. we likewise hold that the nearly 15 months Hagedorn was out of office interrupted his continuity of service and prevents his recall term from being stitched together as a seamless continuation of his previous three consecutive terms. The Court ruled that Talaga was qualified to run in the 2001 elections. constitutes an interruption in continuity of service.  Lonzanida Case: Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected.” as long as the cause is involuntary. the interruption happened after the first three consecutive terms.  The period of time prior to the recall term. 2002 which broke the continuity or consecutive character of Hagedorn’s service as mayor. 2001 until the recall election on September 24.

Article IX under the title "Commission on Elections" of the Constitution. mandamus and Injunction with temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the implementation of said RA and the consequent expenditure of public funds and to compel the Comelec to immediately and with all deliberate speed set up the machinery and make the necessary preparation for the holding of synchronized national and local elections on the second Monday of May. at all. valid justification for postponing the local elections to the second Monday of November 1992. Pave the Way for Synchronized and Simultaneous Elections Beginning 1995. 2002 to June 30. The same paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act 7056. But to consider Hagedorn’s recall term as a full term of three years. are not sufficient. **Hagedorn is qualified to run in the September 24. 207 .Mabelle O. If. Hagedorn’s recall term from September 24. retroacting to June 30. This Court cannot declare as consecutive or successive terms of office which historically and factually are not. 2001 to September 24. much less. del Mar. 2001. and in the process violating the Constitution itself. providing for the campaign periods for Presidential. Section 8 of Republic Act 7056. Term limits should be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the right of the electorate to choose their leaders. Congress can devise ways and means. This is the inherent limitation he takes by running and winning in the recall election. 2. and Guanzon. This unexpired term is in itself one term for purposes of counting the three-term limit. 1992.  A necessary consequence of the interruption of continuity of service is the start of a new term following the interruption. 7056 as unconstitutional and. 2002 recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa because: 1. 2002. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests only then can the recall term constitute a fourth consecutive term. shortens the term or tenure of office of local officials to be elected on the 2nd Monday of November. Republic Act 7056. Suit was instituted by Governor Osmeña. despite the fact that he won his recall term only last September 24. Hagedorn is not running for immediate reelection following his three consecutive terms as mayor which ended on June 30. The concept of term limits is in derogation of the sovereign will of the people to elect the leaders of their own choosing. Mendoza v. and Authorizing Appropriations Therefor) was enacted. Bacaltos. Term limits must be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the sovereign will of the people. 4. violates the provision of Section 9. 2. Vice-Presidential and Senatorial elections. and 4. 3.  To make Hagedorn’s recall term retroact to June 30. 1992 violates Section 8. Hagedorn’s continuity of service as mayor was involuntarily interrupted from June 30. COMELEC Facts: RA 7056 (An Act Providing for the National and Local Elections in 1992. 5. Representatives Garcia. An official elected in recall election serves the unexpired term of the recalled official. Article X of the Constitution. Governor Pagdanganan on behalf of the League of Governors of the Philippines. 3. city and municipal officials shall hold over beyond June 30. They pray for this Court to declare Republic Act No. within the parameters of the Constitution. providing that all incumbent provincial. The so-called many difficult if not insurmountable problems mentioned in Republic Act 7056 to synchronized national and local elections set by the Constitution on the second Monday of May. 1992. COMELEC Osmeña v. 2001 to make a fourth consecutive term because factually the recall term is not a fourth consecutive term.  An elective local official who serves a recall term can serve for more than nine consecutive years comprising of the recall term plus the regular three full terms. 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified violates Section 2. Article XVIII (Transitory Provision) of the Constitution. invalid and inoperative because: 1. which in effect. is to ignore reality. particularly the 2nd paragraph of Section 3 thereof. 2001. by way of a petition for Prohibition. 2004 cannot be made to retroact to June 30. 2001 creates a legal fiction that unduly curtails the freedom of the people to choose their leaders through popular elections. A local official who serves a recall term should know that the recall term is in itself one term although less than three years. Cainglet. therefore. Republic Act 7056 violates the mandate of the Constitution for the holding of synchronized national and local elections on the second Monday of May 1992. 2002 during which time he was a private citizen.

Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests to eliminate or at least minimize these problems and if this. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice President elected in the February 7. which provides among others. conformably with existing doctrine so that the important constitutional issue raised may be addressed. the Solicitor General contends that Republic Act 7056 is a valid exercise of legislative power by Congress and that the regular amending process prescribed by the Constitution does not apply to its transitory provisions. which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. hereby   2. 1992. The Court in its Resolution dated June 27. who. the Solicitor General prays for the denial of the petition arguing that the question raised by petitioners is political in nature and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity. viz (1) the existence of an appropriate case. Rollo) The Court also required respondents to comment on the petition within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice. 1986 election is. etc. is justiciable rather than political. 4-5. is not feasible. Sec 2of the 1987 Constitution: The Senators.Mabelle O. Commenting on the petition as required. that petitioners failed to show justification for the exercise of its judicial power. he contends are merely asking for an advisory opinion from the Court. We would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers in proper cases even political questions. Even if the question were political in nature. Issues: 1. and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. for purposes of synchronization of elections. On the merits of the case. As for the other alleged procedural flaws — lack of court standing. (pp. the same may be brushed aside. it would still come within our powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII. "ordering the respondents and/or anyone acting in their place or stead. And even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us is political in nature. provided naturally. still. that the question is not solely and exclusively political (as when the Executive extends recognition to a foreign government) but one which really necessitates a forthright determination of constitutionality. (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question. 1991 issued a restraining order. 1 of the 1987 Constitution clearly provides: The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The issue presented to us in the case at bar. not the wisdom of RA 7056.  What is before us is not a discretionary act of Congress or the Executive that may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. or by their authority. What is involved here is the legality. involving as it does a question of national importance. to cease and desist from implementing Republic Act 7056. Article XVIII. Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution. Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30. 29. Article VIII.   208 . there being no justiciable controversy for resolution. assuming the existence of such flaws. Sec. resort can be made to the self-correcting mechanism built in the Constitution for its amendment or revision. Petition) Similar claims have been made in the other cases mentioned in the caption. Ongpin. and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case. He stresses. He also questions the legal standing of the petitioners. for the holding of desynchronized national and local elections in 1992." (p. WON RA 7056 is constitutional. WON the court may act on the matter at bar. 5.. the first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for six year and the remaining twelve for three years. citing National Economic Protective Association v. Sec. 171 SCRA 657.

and contrary to the express mandate of the 1987 Constitution. 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified. 1992. Other Consti provisions violated by RA 7056: Section 2. 1995. Article X of the Constitution which provides that: The term of office of elective local officials. The term of office of elective local officials. Sections 2 and 5 of the 1987 Constitution. Term of synchronization is used synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. 5-on the second Monday of May. the President and the Vice-President have been synchronized to end on the same hour. their term would have expired on February 2. 1991. the synchronization of the elections so that the process can be completed in the 1995 elections with the result that beginning 1995 there shall be only one (1) simultaneous regular elections for national and local elective officials every three (3) years. Republic Act 7056 provides for two (2) separate elections in 1992 as follows: Sec. The incumbent local officials were elected in January 1988. The purpose of Republic Act 7056 is as stated in Section 1 thereof under the heading "Statement of Policy" — to start. and (b) An election of all provincial. except barangay officials which shall be determined by law shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. twenty four (24) Senators and all elective Members of the House of Representatives on the second Monday of May. But if the local election will be held on the second Monday of November 1992 under RA 7056. The reason for the said adjustment. 1992. the inevitable conclusion would be that Republic Act 7056 is clearly violative of the Constitution because it provides for the holding of a desynchronized election. The first regular elections for President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May. is the same — to synchronize the national and local elections. city and municipal elective officials on the second Monday of November. Therefore. 3. 209 . But under Sec. Section 9. The Constitution has mandated a synchronized national and local election prior to June 30. Under this     1. date and year — noon of June 30. But their term was adjusted to expire at noon of June 30. from November 30. the local officials. 1992. Sec. these incumbent local officials shall hold over beyond June 30. members of the House of Representatives. Start of Synchronization — To start the process of synchronization of election in accordance with the policy hereinbefore declared there shall be held: (a) An election for President and VicePresident of the Philippines. 1992. 8. is fixed by the Constitution at three years (Sec.Mabelle O. 1992 to June 30. 1992. President and Vice-President. 1992 or more specifically as provided for in Article XVIII. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests extended to noon of June 30. This common termination date will synchronize future elections to once every three years. Art. Article IX of the Constitution provides that: Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in special cases. 1992. With the clear mandate of the 1987 Constitution to hold synchronized (simultaneous) national and local elections in the second Monday of May. Article XVIII of the Constitution which provides that the local official first elected under the Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30. Terms of office of Senators. by an act postponing the election to fill an office the term of which is limited by the Constitution. 3 of RA 7056. as much as practicable. not three years as provided for by the Constitution. 1992.    2. even though the successors fail to qualify with the time. 2. Stated differently. the election period shall commence ninety days before the day of election and shall end thirty days thereafter. Members of the House of Representatives. 1992. Upon the other hand. Section 8. 1992. that is. Republic Act 7056 particularly Sections 1 and 2 thereof contravenes Article XVIII. there is no legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period. X). It has been held that It is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term and when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin. except barangay officials. as well as those of the Senators. American Jurisprudence: the legislature cannot. those to be elected will be serving for only two years and seven months. extend the term of the incumbent beyond the period as limited by the Constitution.

ninety (90) days before the day of the election. 5). Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests provision the filing of the Certificate of Candidacy and the ensuing campaign period must be embraced or circumscribed within that election period of ninety days." As discussed earlier. 1992 (Article XVIII. is the election for Senators. 1986 election is. **The contention of the Solicitor General that the method of amendment or revision prescribed by the Constitution (Article XVIII) does not apply to the Transitory Provisions because in the nature of things Transitory Provisions are to be carried out as soon as practicable. Sec. **Synchronization — as the act or result of synchronizing. deserves no consideration at all. **All these — the postponement of the holding of a synchronized national and local election from 1992 to 1995. Synchronize — to happen or take place at the same time. to represent or arrange event so as to indicate coincidence or coexistence. Members of the House of Representatives and local officials. the Comelec (not Congress) alters the period. But RA 7056 provides for a different campaign period. city and municipal officials forty-five (45) days before the day of the elections. except when in special cases. to cause to agree in time. are violative of the 1987 Constitution. the hold-over provision for incumbent local officials. The 1987 Constitution has stated in clear and categorical language that "the six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7. and Congress can. for purposes of synchronization of elections. as follows: Sec. 210 . in this case RA 7056. (b) For Senatorial elections. in the exercise of its legislative power enact the needed legislation. concurrence of events or motions in respect to time.Mabelle O. to be synchronized with the election of the President and Vice-President on the second Monday of May 1992. hereby extended to noon of June 30. the elections referred to. 8. (a) For President arid Vice-Presidential elections one hundred thirty (130) days before the day of election. and (c) For the election of Members of the House of Representatives and local elective provincial. the reduction of the term of office of local officials to be elected on the second Monday of November 1992 and the change in the campaign periods.

150) Menzon v. As a result of the foregoing communications between Quintero and Rubillar. the Regional Director wrote another letter to Acting-Governor Petilla. wrote a letter addressed to the Acting-Governor Petilla.P. 1989. in a special session held on July 7. by virtue of the fact that no Governor had been proclaimed in the province of Leyte. 1989. the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. the Regional Director of the Department of Local Government. if he was deprived of such. calls for the designation of the Sangguniang Member to act as vicegovernor temporarily. 1988. could concurrently assume the functions of both offices. of the clarificatory letter of Rubillar. Alegre. sought clarification from Undersecretary Rubillar regarding the June 22. where the electoral controversy in the Office of the Governor has not yet been settled. Menzon. as to previous actions made by his office and those of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which may have tended to discredit the validity of Menzon's designation as acting vice-governor. the Acting Governor and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. requesting the latter that Resolution No. Petilla 211 . see p. a senior member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was also designated by Santos to act as the Vice-Governor for the province of Leyte. the peculiar situation in the Province of Leyte. reiterating his earlier request. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Facts: On February 16. 505 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be modified accordingly. On August 3. Rubillar stated that since B. Menzon. Provincial Administrator Quintero inquired from the Undersecretary of the Department of Local Government Rubillar as to the legality of the appointment of the petitioner to act as the Vice-Governor of Leyte. 1988. 1989. According to Rubillar. the appointment of Menzon as the temporary Vice. In his reply letter dated June 22. 1989 opinion. issued Resolution 505 where it held invalid the appointment of the petitioner as acting Vice-Governor of Leyte on the ground that there is no permanent vacancy in said office since Petilla assumed the Office of the Vice-Governor after he took his oath of office to said position. Region 8. On May 29. On March 25.Mabelle O. Secretary of Local Government Santos designated Vice-Governor Petilla as Acting Governor of Leyte. Despite these several letters of request. COMELEC (supra. including the payment of his salary as Acting Vice-Governor. Atty.Governor is not necessary since the Vice-Governor who is temporarily performing the functions of the Governor. 1989. 1989. refused to correct Resolution 505 and correspondingly to pay the petitioner the Labo. on July 17. v. In view. 337 has no provision relating to succession in the Office of the Vice-Governor in case of a temporary vacancy. Jr. through the acting LDP Regional Counsel. Salvatierra.

The Department Secretary had the discretion to ascertain whether or not the Provincial Governor should devote all his time to that particular office. There is no vacancy whenever the office is occupied by a legally qualified incumbent. in order to obviate the dilemma resulting from an interregnum created by the vacancy.  There is no satisfactory showing that Leopoldo Petilla. the issue on the governorship of Leyte was settled and Adelina Larrazabal was proclaimed the Governor of the province of Leyte. it can be readily seen that the office of the Vice-Governor was left vacant when the duly elected Vice-Governor Leopoldo Petilla was appointed Acting Governor. the President. we have no problem ruling in favor of the President. more particularly on May 16. WON the Secretary of Local Government has the authority to make temporary appointments. notwithstanding his succession to the Office of the Governor.00. at that time. Thus. During the pendency of the petition. we see no cogent reason why the procedure thus outlined by the two laws may not be similarly applied in the present case. On September 6. in case of any vacancy that may occur. the Secretary of Local Government. Moreover. 1990. 1990. this Court dismissed the petition filed by Aurelio D. however. it is doubtful if the Provincial Board. until the law provides otherwise. However. acting through her alter ego. More so when the vacancy is for an extended period. It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. may remedy the situation. YES. Menzon’s temporary appointment valid. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. the provincial treasurer of Leyte. the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of our resolution. Issues: 1. the President is empowered to make temporary appointments in certain public offices. on November 12. may revoke an appointment made by a higher authority. The motion prayed that this Court uphold the petitioner's right to receive the salary and emoluments attached to the office of the Vice-Governor while he was acting as such. 1990.Mabelle O. Menzon. Under the circumstances of this case (there had been no de jure permanent Governor for the province of Leyte for about two years. 2. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests emoluments attached to the Office of Vice-Governor. had not yet been proclaimed due to a pending election case) and considering the silence of the LGC. the office to which he was elected was left barren of a legally qualified person to exercise the duties of the office of the Vice-Governor.  Applying the definition of vacancy to this case. This argument has no merit. there is a vacancy when there is no person lawfully authorized to assume and exercise at present the duties of the office. A sensu contrario.WON there was a vacancy  The law on Public Officers is clear on the matter. 1990. On August 28. The petition sought the nullification of Resolution No. In the meantime.710. The fact that the Secretary of Local Government was prompted to appoint the petitioner shows the need to fill up the position during the period it was vacant. Florencio Luna allowed the payment to the petitioner of his salary as acting ViceGovernor of Leyte in the amount of P17. 505 and for the payment of his salary for his services as the acting Vice-Governor of Leyte. unilaterally acting. It was Petilla's automatic assumption to the acting Governorship that resulted in the vacancy in the office of the ViceGovernor. in the absence of any contrary provision in the LGC and in the best interest of public service. the Menzon filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and mandamus. for the actual services rendered by the petitioner as acting Vice-Governor. In the eyes of the law. On September 21. The nature of the duties of a Provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant to discharge them. Albeit both laws deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive positions. by virtue of the above resolution requested Governor Larrazabal to direct the petitioner to pay back to the province of Leyte all the emoluments and compensation which he received while acting as the Vice-Governor of Leyte. the Court rules that. continued to simultaneously exercise the duties of the Vice-Governor. 1989. Governor Adelina Larrazabal. Petilla. The respondents contend that the provincial board is the correct appointing power.    212 . As between the President who has supervision over local governments as provided by law and the members of the board who are junior to the vice-governor. The records show that it was primarily for this contingency that Undersecretary Rubillar corrected and reconsidered his previous position and acknowledged the need for an acting Vice-Governor.

 By virtue of the surroundings circumstance of this case. the petitioner is a de facto officer entitled to compensation. the SPES was in effect reversed by Secretary Santos. On the same date. Issue: 1. Section 49: In case a permanent vacancy arises when a Vice-Governor assumes the Office of the Governor. capricious and wishy-washy desires to the detriment of decency and due process of law.  The LGC provides for the mode of succession in case of a permanent vacancy. The reaction of the SPES was to pass. 990.There is no denying that the petitioner assumed the Office of the Vice-Governor under color of a known appointment. fails to qualify. shall assume the office for the unexpired term of the Vice-Governor. is removed from office. This action was affirmed in a First Indorsement dated January 4. . 1991. . 213 . . to the position already occupied by Docena. Even granting the President. may be hampered. dated December 19. 505 was passed by the same persons who recognized him as the acting Vice-Governor that the validity of the appointment of the petitioner was made an issue and the recognition withdrawn. The Department Secretary acted correctly in extending the temporary appointment. Alar was appointed. . the SPES passed Resolution 75 recognizing Alar rather than Docena as the legitimate successor of the late Board Member Capito.Mabelle O. the majority rules through their chosen few.  In a republican form of government. voluntary resigns or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office the sangguniang panlalawigan . Alar has no legal basis in fact and in law and issued to fit his whimsical. 1 dated January 8. It was only when the controversial Resolution No. . . . 1991. acting through the Secretary of Local Government possesses no power to appoint the petitioner. moreover. . at the very least.. The respondents themselves acknowledged the validity of the petitioner's appointment and dealt with him as such. signed by Head Executive Assistant Agundo of the Department of Local Government. recalling the appointment of Atty. Resolution No. 1990. where it reiterated its previous recognition of Alar and declared that "the recall order issued by Secretary Santos. 1991. Provincial Prosecutor Labrador had rendered an opinion that the recall order of Secretary Santos was "void ab initio"' because Alar's right to the office "had become vested. The following day. the management of governmental affairs to that extent. On December 18. enjoining both Docena and Alar from assuming the office of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar. The record does not show why. there was a need to fill the vacancy." It is not clear if Secretary Santos agreed with these views. TRO issued. and if one of them is incapacitated or absent. another recall order. Docena then came to this Court in a petition for mandamus to compel the respondents to recognize and admit him as a lawfully appointed member of the SPES and also seeks to hold them officially and personally liable in damages for their refusal to do so in spite of his clear title to the disputed office. Secretary Santos of the DLG appointed Docena to succeed Capito on November 19. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests  A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no approbation under the law for it deprives the constituents of their right of representation and governance in their own local government. Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar Facts: Capito. dies. Necessarily. etc. this time addressed to Docena. . but at any rate he issued on February 20. 1990. but on November 27. the mode of succession provided for permanent vacancies may likewise be observed in case of a temporary vacancy in the same office. There is no question that Section 49 in connection with Section 52 of the LGC shows clearly the intent to provide for continuity in the performance of the duties of the Vice-Governor. but only the remainder. The petitioner is himself the member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan who obtained the highest number of votes. there will be a consequent delay in the delivery of basic services to the people of Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing. WON Docena may be recognized and properly admitted to office. is in full accord with the intent behind the LGC.  Menzon must be paid his salary attached to his office. refuses to assume office.  The appointment of the petitioner. . 1990. member who obtained the highest number of votes in the election immediately preceding. In this case. also by Santos. Docena v. . a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar died in office.

compared to Alar who did not even run for the office. It is noteworthy that absolutely no reason was given for the recall of Docena's appointment (or for that matter. The respondents also argue that the petitioner should have sought to enforce his claimed right in a petition not for mandamus but for quo warranto. Docena argues that he has a preferential right to the disputed office even on equitable grounds because he placed ninth in the election. Permanent Vacancies in Local Sanggunians. The Provincial Prosecutor's opinion that the office had "become vested" in Alar suffers from the same flaw and a lack of understanding of the nature of a public office. the appointee shall come from the political party of the sanggunian member who caused the vacancy. Later. capricious and wishy-washy" but they had no similar complaints about the recall of Docena's appointment although also apparently indecisive. the petitioner's appointment had already become complete and enforceable at the time it was supposed to have been "superseded" by the appointment in favor of Alar. They described the appointment as "whimsical. That is only secondary in this case. that both he and Capito ran for the provincial board in the 1988 elections under the banner of Lakas ng Bansa. For all legal intents and purposes. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests  Sec.   2. As such. who was entitled to serve "until noon of June 30. 1992. Except for the sangguniang barangay. and shall serve the unexpired term of the vacant office. Section 2.  The said appointment had been accepted by Docena.Mabelle O. It appears that after appointing Docena and later twice sustaining his title to the office. The real purpose of the present petition is to compel the respondent SPES to recognize and admit Docena as a member of the body by virtue of a valid appointment extended to him by the Secretary of Local Government. what is certain is that it was not based on careful legal study.  214 . Political rather than legal considerations seem to have influenced the action of the provincial government in rejecting the petitioner's claim despite its obvious merit. prescribed by the LGC. WON mandamus is the proper action. and for the unexpired portion of the deceased predecessor's term. The appointment was permanent in nature. who had in fact already assumed office as member of the SPES as per certification of the Provincial Secretary. the President of the Philippines. sangguniang bayan. Whatever gave the SPES the impression that the questioned appointments were revocable at will can only be left to conjecture. Docena's appointment having been issued and accepted earlier. as his purpose is to challenge Alar's title to the disputed office. and conformably to the procedure. 50. and the petitioner having already assumed office. in the case of sangguniang bayan members. there is no question that it was intended to be permanent. in the case of sangguniang barangay members. 1990. next to Capito. the recall of Alar's appointment). Docena had already acquired security of tenure in the position and could be removed therefrom only for any of the causes. — In case of permanent vacancy in the sangguniang panlalawigan. or sangguniang barangay. the governor. Secretary Santos simply had a change of heart and decided to award the position to Alar. On the contrary." in accordance with Article XVIII. it was to be valid for the unexpired portion of the term of the deceased member. and it has not been disputed by the respondents.  From the tenor of the appointment extended to Docena on November 19.  The petitioner makes the point. 1990. upon recommendation of the Minister of Local Government. they maintained a deep silence about this other recall and insisted simply that the subsequent appointment of Alar had invalidated the earlier appointment of Docena. he could not thereafter be just recalled and replaced to accommodate Alar. These requirements could not be circumvented by the simple process of recalling his appointment. sangguniang panlungsod.  The respondents are ambivalent about the power of the Secretary of Local Government to recall his appointments. of the Constitution. they both joined the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino under the leadership of Speaker Mitra. to fill the permanent vacancy caused by Capito's death. or the city or municipal mayor. who administered the oath of office to him when he was appointed to the SPES on November 19. shall appoint a qualified person to fill the vacancy in the sangguniang panlalawigan and the sangguniang panlungsod.

that the said prohibition applies only to presidential appointments. Faced with a strictly legal question. However. As a local legislative body subject to the general supervision of the President of the Philippines. and correctly so. In truth and in fact. reject.Mabelle O. The CSC also cited Rule V. The CSC found them entitled to their salaries. the same were effective immediately. Acting thereon. the petitioner is entitled to the payment of the salaries and other benefits appurtenant to the office of a Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar. they had no right and competence to resolve it in their discretion. Neither did he allege that the said appointments were tainted by irregularities or anomalies that breached laws and regulations governing 215 . such and deal with it accordingly. MR to CSC denied. for lack of merit. except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. de Rama wrote a letter dated July 13.  The Court will make no award of damages. NO. which provides that two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term. 1995 to the Civil Service Commission seeking the recall of the appointments of fourteen (14) municipal employees. done in violation of Article VII. the Court may in its own discretion consider the present petition a. De Rama v. Sections 9 and 10 of the Omnibus Rules. de Rama withheld the payment of their salaries and benefits pursuant to Office Order No. three of the employees filed with the CSC a claim for payment of their salaries. While the matter was pending before the CSC. Quezon. 95-01. On April 30. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests  Mandamus is employed to compel the performance of a ministerial duty to which the petitioner is entitled. there is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure. Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. there being no sufficient proof to overcome the presumption that the respondents have acted in good faith albeit erroneously. The CSC also dismissed petitioner’s allegation that these were “midnight” appointments. We find that as a petition for quo warranto. CA affirmed. and cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority until disapproved by the CSC. pointing out that the Constitutional provision relied upon by petitioner prohibits only those appointments made by an outgoing President and cannot be made to apply to local elective officials. the CSC denied de Rama’s request for the recall of the appointments of the 14 employees. Nevertheless. They have no such authority. and if they so decide. 2. Director II of the CSC Field Office based in Quezon. WON damages may be claimed. that it be filed on time and by a proper party asserting title to the office also claimed by the respondent. the respondents are asserting the discretion to review. from the time of his assumption of office and until he is actually admitted or reinstated. the CSC ruled. Petitioner certainly did not raise the issue of fraud on the part of the outgoing mayor who made the appointments. 1995. to wit. it complies with the prescribed requirements. leaving it to the courts of justice to decide which of the conflicting claims should be upheld. the SPES had no discretion to rule on the validity of the decisions of the Secretary of Local Government acting as her alter ego. MR denied. we hold that Docena has proved his right to the disputed office and could not be legally replaced by Alar. the only reason he cited to justify his action was that these were “midnight appointments” that are forbidden under Article VII. and declared that the appointments of the said employees were issued in accordance with pertinent laws. alleging that although their appointments were declared permanent by Gulim. 1996.  The records reveal that when the petitioner brought the matter of recalling the appointments of the 14 before the CSC. Thus. What they should have done was reserve their judgment on the matter. the Secretary's appointment. a President or Acting President shall not make appointments. Issue: WON de Rama validly recalled the appointments. De Rama justified his recall request on the allegation that the appointments of the said employees were “midnight” appointments of the former mayor Abeja. In arguing that the recognition and admission of the petitioner is not a ministerial duty.  Even assuming that the proper remedy is a petition for quo warranto. CA Facts: Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao. wherein the appointments of the said 14 employees were recalled. which was issued on June 30. Section 15 of the Constitution.

The appointment shall remain effective until disapproved by the Commission. much less a hearing accorded to the latter. In no case shall an appointment take effect earlier than the date of its issuance. Clearly. And yet.     216 . their appointments took effect immediately and cannot be unilaterally revoked or recalled by petitioner. right to the position. If ever there were other procedural or legal requirements that were violated in implementing the appointments of the private respondents. applies only to the President or Acting President. that the constitutional prohibition on socalled “midnight appointments.  The fourteen (14) employees were duly appointed following two meetings of the Personnel Selection Board held on May 31 and June 26. the same were not seasonably brought before the Civil Service Commission. Section 10 of the same rule provides: An appointment issued in accordance with pertinent laws and rules shall take effect immediately upon its issuance by the appointing authority. (c) Violation of the existing collective agreement between management and employees relative to promotion. which right cannot be taken away by either revocation of the appointment. he shall be entitled to receive his salary at once without awaiting the approval of his appointment by the Commission. Neither can he question the CSC’s jurisdiction to affirm or revoke the recall. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests appointments. but only when such appointment and approval are proven to be in disregard of applicable provisions of the civil service law and regulations. There is no showing that any of the private respondents were not qualified for the positions they were appointed to. 1995. This right is protected not only by statute. Moreover.  It has been held that upon the issuance of an appointment and the appointee’s assumption of the position in the civil service. not just an equitable. In doing so. Section 9 of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the Revised Administrative Code specifically provides that “an appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority and shall remain in force and in effect until disapproved by the Commission. or by removal. to his personal belief. These cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. but by the Constitution as well. Consequently. it was petitioner who acted in undue haste to remove the private respondents without regard for the simple requirements of due process of law. the only reason advanced by the petitioner to justify the recall was that these were “midnight appointments. he overstepped the bounds of his authority. While he argues that the appointing power has the sole authority to revoke said appointments. Section 20 of Rule VI also provides: Notwithstanding the initial approval of an appointment.” Thus.” Moreover.Mabelle O. their appointments were duly attested to by the Head of the CSC field office at Lucena City.” specifically those made within two (2) months immediately prior to the next presidential elections. it is the CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment initially approved. His solitary reason for recalling these appointments was that they were. By virtue thereof. or (d) Violation of other existing civil service law. provided that there is previous notice and hearing. “midnight appointments” which the outgoing mayor had no authority to make. “he acquires a legal right which cannot be taken away either by revocation of the appointment or by removal except for cause and with previous notice and hearing. there is no debate that he does not have blanket authority to do so. and if the appointee has assumed the duties of the position. There was no previous notice. 95-01 which recalled the appointments of the private respondents. the same may be recalled on any of the following grounds:(a) Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the agency’s Merit Promotion Plan. they had already assumed their appointive positions even before petitioner himself assumed his elected position as town mayor. unless there is valid cause to do so. it is well-settled that the person assuming a position in the civil service under a completed appointment acquires a legal. rules and regulations The appointments of the private respondents may only be recalled on the above-cited grounds.  Rule V.” The CSC correctly ruled. however.  Petitioner admits that his very first official act upon assuming the position of town mayor was to issue Office Order No. (b) Failure to pass through the agency’s Selection/Promotion Board.

” Note that both laws refer to the same officials who were elected “on the second Monday of May 1994. Comelec Resolution 2887 promulgated on February 5. 1997. the LGC. On February 11. It noted but did not grant petitioner’s Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated January 31. 1997. 1997. Under Sec. the later enactment prevails.” This provision is clearly inconsistent with and repugnant to Sec. Section 43(c) of R. Petitioner’s Urgent Omnibus Motion for oral argument and temporary restraining order was noted but not granted. 1997). The budgetary appropriation of P400 million contained in Republic Act No. 1996 a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. to act as amicus curiae.  RA 7160. Respondent Commission filed its Comment on March 6. the term of office of barangay officials was fixed at “three (3) years which shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994. was enacted later than RA 6679. 1997. the parties filed their respective memoranda. COMELEC Resolution Nos. The Petition for Leave to Intervene filed on March 17. Which law governs the term of office of barangay officials: RA 7160 or RA 6679? 7160. Acting on the petition. Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter represented by its president Rillon filed a petition “to seek a judicial review by certiorari to declare as unconstitutional: 1. 1997 by Punong Barangay Rodson F. RA 6653 empowers the seven elected barangay kagawads to select the punong barangay from among themselves. 2880 and 2887 fixing the date of the holding of the barangay elections on May 12. Under the Civil Code. 1997 and the Solicitor General. the Solicitor General filed his four-page Comment siding with petitioner and praying that “the election scheduled on May 12.” Facts (second case): On February 20. 1997 and other activities related thereto. the legislators could not have known the newer one and hence could not have intended to change what they did not know. On the other hand. It also requested former Senator Aquilino Q. 1997 moved certain dates fixed in Resolution 2880. 1996 and referred to above.” On the other hand. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests David v. 7160 which reads as follows: (c) The term of office of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall be for three (3) years. The petition was deemed submitted for resolution by the Court without need of memoranda. It is to be presumed that the lawmakers knew the older law and intended to change it. Accordingly. The rationale is simple: a later law repeals an earlier one because it is the later legislative will. the Court issued a Resolution giving due course to the petition and requiring the parties to file simultaneous memoranda. David filed on December 2. the Local Autonomy Code mandates a direct 217 . Pimentel. promulgated on December 27. filed his on March 6. Mayor was denied as it would just unduly delay the resolution of the case.”  RA 6679 requires the barangay voters to elect seven kagawads and the candidate obtaining the highest number of votes shall automatically be the punong barangay. The Court further resolved to consolidate the two cases inasmuch as they raised basically the same issue. Zone 7. which shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994. dated March 6.” The COMELEC filed a separate Comment. 1997 (as well as his Urgent Ex-Parte Second Motion to the same effect.” Comelec Resolution 2880. 3. 1997 required respondents to submit their comment thereon. to prohibit the holding of the barangay election scheduled on the second Monday of May 1997. In enacting the older law. Issues: 1. laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and not the other way around.A. the Court on February 25. Jr. adopted a “Calendar of Activities and List and Periods of Certain Prohibited Acts for the May 12. 1997 be held in abeyance. 8250 otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1997 intended to defray the costs and expenses in holding the 1997 barangay elections. On January 29. It is basic that in case of an irreconciliable conflict between two laws of different vintages.’ 2. 1 of RA 6679 which states that such “term shall be for five years. COMELEC Facts (first case): In his capacity as barangay chairman of Barangay 77. his interest like those of all other barangay officials being already adequately represented by Petitioner David who filed this petition as “president of the Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas. 43-c of RA 7160. 1997 Barangay Elections. dated February 1. in representation of the other respondent.Mabelle O. 1997 opposing the petition. Kalookan City and as president of the Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas. Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant.

Under both RA 6679 and 6653. they cannot stand together. but they are incorrect in stating (without however giving the reasons therefor) that RA 7160 is necessarily a general law. With such particularity. his petition should be summarily dismissed. It then necessarily follows also that he is not the real party-ininterest and on that ground.” This judicial decision. 1994 (second Monday).[34] this Court said that “the next regular election involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away. they vote for only seven kagawads. should prevail over RA 7160. To strike down a law as unconstitutional.” There being a clear repugnance and incompatibility between the two specific provisions. It is a special law insofar as it governs the term of office of barangay officials.” Petitioners pompously claim that RA 6679. In its repealing clause. under Sec.Mabelle O. Hence. RA 7160. voters elect eight barangay officials. much less president of the national league of barangays which he purports to represent in this petition. We find this theory rather novel but nonetheless logically and legally flawed.” It is a special provision that applies only to the term of barangay officials who were elected on the second Monday of May 1994.[33] Congress appropriated the amount of P400 million to cover expenses for the holding of barangay elections this year. should thus prevail in accordance with its repealing clause. being a special law. 43-c of RA 7160. shall be three years. Congress ordained that a general registration of voters shall be held “immediately after the barangay elections in 1997. 2. 8.  SEC. except barangay officials. Comelec. 1997. It merely left the determination of such term to the lawmaking body. 7 of RA 8189. For a law to be nullified. the latter is deemed repealed. the Constitution thereby impliedly prohibits Congress from legislating a three-year term for such officers. In enacting the general appropriations act of 1997. there must be a     218 . Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests vote on the barangay chairman by the entire barangay electorate. thereby leaving to the lawmakers full discretion to fix such term in accordance with the exigencies of public service. It must be remembered that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. an alleged general law pursuant to the doctrine of generalia specialibus non derogant. Likewise. it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal (not just implied) breach of the Constitution. During the barangay elections held on May 9. separately from the seven kagawads. YES.  Undoubtedly. and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. the punong barangay plus the seven kagawads. per Article 8 of the Civil Code. Petitioner Alex David cannot claim to be a validly elected barangay chairman. 43-c that “the term of office of barangay officials shall be for three years. Petitioner may be correct in alleging that RA 6679 is a special law. is now a “part of the legal system of the Philippines. without any specific limitation or prohibition. Petitioners are wrong. the provision cannot be deemed a general law. It specifically and definitively provides in its Sec. under the Code. and not for the barangay chairman.” These are clear and express contemporaneous statements of Congress that barangay officials shall be elected this May. When a subsequent law encompasses entirely the subject matter of the former enactments. RA 7160 states that “all general and special laws which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. it follows that all the punong barangays were elected illegally and thus. in accordance with Sec. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. RA 7160 is a codified set of laws that specifically applies to local government units. In Paras vs. the Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress from fixing any term of office for barangay officials. The later law. which shall be determined by law. WON RA 7160 insofar as it shortened such term to only three years constitutional. namely.  Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter posits that by excepting barangay officials whose “term shall be determined by law” from the general provision fixing the term of “elective local officials” at three years. the same having been scheduled in May. If we agree with the thesis of petitioners. The term of office of elective local officials. the voters actually and directly elected one punong barangay and seven kagawads.

. She had asked permission from the personnel officer but not from the mayor.limiting the term of all elective local officials to three years.  The sum total of these absurdities in petitioners’ theory is that barangay officials are estopped from asking for any term other than that which they ran for and were elected to. Negros Occidental. through private practitioner Lezama.  In other words. The respondents opposed the motion. . 481 (b) [i] and [3] of the LGC.  There is absolutely no doubt in our mind that Sec. which can also be categorized as an act of insubordination. benefits such as . Manifesting that the municipality of Escalante has no legal officer. suspending Zonsayda for one month and one day commencing on 24 June 1992 for "a simple misconduct . she reported to said office the following day. there was to be no direct election for the punong barangay. . "not including their private capacities. Mayor Ponsica issued Office Order No. salary and PERA and leave credits during the duration of its effectivity. RA 7160. when she received a permanent appointment as Clerk III in the office of the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator of the same municipality. her suspension was an act of "political vendetta". “(i)gnorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. Zonsayda filed with the RTC a petition dated 07 July 1992. then (1) Petitioner David should not have run and could not have been elected chairman of his barangay because under RA 6679. illegal. On 10 June 1992. which was much more than David’s 112. She further alleged that said respondents' acts were "malicious. S. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests clear and unequivocal showing that what the fundamental law prohibits. 1 of Rep. The petitioner alleged that since her family supported Mayor Ponsica's rival in the 11 May 1992 elections. 3 of the Civil Code. . they asserted that both the LGC and the Administrative Code of 1987 do not have any provision "relative to the duty of any provincial legal officer or prosecutor to represent a municipality or its officials in suits filed 219 . she received an order from the newly proclaimed mayor Ponsica. On 19 June 1992. the statute permits. According to Fr. praying that the answer be disregarded and expunged from the record." they should have been represented by either the municipal legal officer or the provincial legal officer or prosecutor as provided for by Sec. following petitioners’ own theory. 10 and Art.” Alinsug v. the amendment was “readily accepted without much discussion and formally approved.was an amendment proposed by Constitutional Commissioner Davide. . who obtained the highest number of votes among the kagawads -.” 3. 31. unwarranted. the LGC. wrongful and condemnable. 8. RTC Facts: Zonsayda Alinsug was a regular employee of the municipal government of Escalante. (2) thus. Joaquin G. applying said law." The order also stated that the suspension "carries with it forfeiture of . as claimed by petitioners.. Petitioners’ belated claim of ignorance as to what law governed their election to office in 1994 is unacceptable because under Art. Sec. WON petitioners estopped from claiming a term other than that provided under RA 7160. the kagawad candidate who obtained the highest number of votes was to be automatically elected barangay chairman.J." Mayor Ponsica and the municipal treasurer filed an answer to the petition. (3) the electorate should have elected only seven kagawads and not one punong barangay plus seven kagawads. alleging that the petitioner had not exhausted administrative remedies and that her suspension was in accordance with law. for "injunction with damages and prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction" against Mayor Ponsica and the municipal treasurer. the applicable law is RA 6679. Act No. the election of Petitioner David as well as all the barangay chairmen of the two Liga petitioners was illegal. It also cited Sec." Forthwith. under the law governing their very claim to such offices: namely.150. except that of barangay officials which “shall be determined by law” -. On 23 June 1992. detailing her to the Office of the Mayor. Bernas. the punong barangay should have been Ruben Magalona.Mabelle O. and that the respondents be all declared in default on the ground that since the respondents were sued in their official capacities. . 177 of the Revised Penal Code which penalizes usurpation of public authority. 43-c of RA 7160 is constitutional. In compliance with the order. Article X of the Constitution -. Zonsayda absented herself from work allegedly to attend to family matters.  If. The petitioners have miserably failed to discharge this burden and to show clearly the unconstitutionality they aver. The foregoing elicited a motion from the petitioner.

it appears that the law allows a private counsel to be hired by a municipality only when the municipality is an adverse party in a case involving the provincial government or another municipality or city within the province. when the municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality in the same province. as such representation was violative Sec. as heir legatee. in his official capacity. since the petitioner prayed for the award of moral damages. third paragraph. is pecuniarily involved. the Court therein cited Enriquez. This strict coherence to the letter of the law appears to have been dictated by the fact that "the municipality should not be burdened with expenses of hiring a private lawyer" and that "the interests of the municipality would be best protected if a government lawyer handles its litigations. is later held to have exceeded his authority. 1683 of the old Administrative Code. or child. Ponsica and Patricio A. the lower court issued an Order. Villaflor entered his appearance as "counsel for Rolando P. on 08 September 1992. in collaboration with the municipal attorney and the fiscal. v. his defense would have then been underwritten by the people's money which ordinarily should have been his personal expense. they have acted by authority of the law." The same section specifies the functions of the legal officer. 443 (b) of the LGC provides that. Issues: 1. and one of them being that he shall: (i) Represent the local government unit in all civil actions and special proceedings wherein the local government unit or any official thereof.  Indeed.Mabelle O. ostensibly acting in his official capacity and sued in that capacity."  However. On 28 August 1992. that in actions or proceedings where a component city or municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to another component city or municipality.  Ramos v. in fact. cities and provinces. Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Daniel M. among other officials enumerated therein. On the one hand. and in conformity with the 220 . LGC) and the municipality of Escalante had not. in a case involving the municipality. a municipal legal officer. 481. petitioner's move to declare respondents in default "for having retained a private counsel" was not thereby legally sustainable. "municipal corporations are responsible for the acts of its officers. it can happen that a government official. however. a special legal officer may be employed to represent the adverse party. 3 their hiring of a private counsel was justified. and when. The Auditor General: the municipality's authority to employ a private attorney is expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal would be disqualified to serve and represent it. Moreover. personal liability can attach to him without. denying petitioners motion to declare the respondents in default and motion to expunge from the record respondents' answer." They contended that it was "unnecessary to provide such a provision because there are administrative and judicial rulings sustaining the validity of the employment of a private counsel by municipal officials. Torrens. his having had the benefit of assistance of a counsel of his own choice. is a party: Provided. Article 11 of Title V of the Code which provides for the appointment of local officials common to all municipalities. the only to the extent that. 1683 of the old Administrative Code as legal basis. Court of Appeals: a municipality may not be represented by a private law firm which had volunteered its services gratis. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests against them by an employee or a private individual. the mayor may appoint. if and when original jurisdiction of case involving the municipality is vested in the Supreme Court. CFI of Bulacan. Sr. the lower court issued the Order of 16 November 1992. On the other hand. designated any such legal officer. In Correa v. the Court held that in the discharge of governmental functions. Alvarez in their official capacities." With the filing of said notice at appearance. With Sec. states that "(t)he appointment of a legal officer shall be mandatory for the provincial and city governments and optional for the municipal government. WON a private counsel may represent municipal officials sued in their official capacities  Sec. Gimenez which enumerated instances when the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent in court a particular municipality. or his wife. denying said motion on the thesis that since the appointment of a legal officer was optional on the part of the municipal government (Art. Section 481." on the strength of this Court's ruling in Albuera v. in addition to the officials enumerated in the first paragraph thereof.  De Guia v. Acting on the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner. except if and when. he. creditor or otherwise.

Accordingly. Branch 80. 1991 the court below issued an order denying plaintiff municipality's motion for examination and execution of judgment on the ground that the judgment in question had already been satisfied. on March 31. The key then to resolving the issue of whether a local government official may secure the services of private counsel. are not awarded if the defendant had not acted in a wanton. 1989. who in the performance of his duty acts in such fashion. et al. Mendiola. Issue: WON Atty. NO. does so in excess of authority. to defend him for a wrongful act which cannot be attributed to the State itself. the RTC of Tanay. Albuera v. but without prejudice to the filing of a similar petition by the Municipality of Pililla through the proper provincial or municipal legal officer. Mendiola's authority to represent petitioner municipality. The SC affirmed with modification (1991 Pililia Case). 1991 Atty. Thereafter.. 1992 PPC filed a motion questioning Atty. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests requirements thereof. PPC filed a manifestation to the effect that on October 18.Mabelle O. On October 14. On March 2.. and his actions would be ultra vires that can thereby result in an incurrence of personal liability. oppressive or malevolent manner nor in the absence of gross or reckless negligence. Moral damages cannot generally be awarded unless they are the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission. where we ruled that private attorneys cannot represent a province or municipality in lawsuits. on the other hand. 057-T in favor of the Municipality of Pililla against PPC ordering it to pay business taxes as well as storage. the Alinsug claims moral and exemplary damages. Mendiola filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's aforesaid order of October 31. through the Office of the Solicitor General. again ostensibly in behalf of herein petitioner municipality. while the amount involved in the release and quitclaim executed by Mayor Patenia was only P12M. The Municipality filed an MR. 1991. lies on the nature of the action and the relief that is sought. in an action filed against him in his official capacity. this Court has sanctioned that representation by private counsel. Atty. and reiterated in Province of Cebu vs. On February 18. In this case. 1992. rendered judgment in Civil Case No. when quantified and added. Mendoza has authority to file a petition in behalf of and in the name of the Municipality of Pililla. which petition we referred to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition. Mendiola had registered two liens for alleged consultancy services of 25% and attorneys' fees of 25% which. Intermediate Appellate Court. et al. filed a petition for certiorari with us. the State. on October 31. 1991. Atty. and sanitary inspection fees. Court of Appeals. claiming that the total liability of defendant corporation to plaintiff municipality amounted to P24M . if due from the defendants. can never be the author of a wrongful act. amount to more than P12 million. as amended. Rizal." In such instance.  The matter of representation of a municipality by a private attorney has been settled in Ramos vs. 1991 and the records were remanded to the trial court for execution. 1991. as well as litigation expenses. CA Facts: On March 17. in connection with the execution of said judgment. Exemplary damages. Chavez: The accused public official should not expect the State. On October 21. mayor’s permit. must be satisfied by them in their private capacity. as evidence by the release and quitclaim documents executed by said mayor. Mendiola filed a motion in behalf of plaintiff municipality for the examination of defendant corporation's gross sales for the years 1976 to 1978 221 . which. much less commit a crime. a public official who is sued in a criminal case is actually sued in his personal capacity inasmuch as his principal. Torres: a provincial governor sued in his official capacity may engage the services of private counsel when "the complaint contains other allegations and a prayer for moral damages. Consequently. MR denied. 1991. on November 21. Pililla Mayor Nicomedes Patenia received from it the sum of P11M as full satisfaction of the above-mentioned judgment of the Supreme Court.  Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code provides: The provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any     Municipality of Pililia v. In the same light." Urbano v. and 1984 to 1991 for the purpose of computing the tax on business imposed under the Local Tax Code. A public official. and that the said mayor could not waive the balance which represents the taxes due under the judgment to the municipality and over which judgment the law firm of Atty. This judgment became final and executory on July 13. 1992 the CA dismissed the petition for having been filed by a private counsel in violation of law and jurisprudence.

The fiscal's refusal to represent the municipality is not a legal justification for employing the services of private counsel. after the decision in that case had become final and executory and/or had been duly executed. The provision is mandatory. a special attorney may be employed by its council. complemented by Section 3. In the instant case. Mendiola that private respondent cannot raise for the first time on appeal his lack of authority to represent the municipality is untenable. except in cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the municipality or municipal district in question is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality or municipal district in the same province. The legality of his representation can be questioned at any stage of the proceedings.  It is also significant that the lack of authority of herein counsel. Even the lawyers' right to fees from their clients may not be invoked by the lawyers themselves as a ground for disapproving or holding in abeyance the approval of a compromise agreement. Both at common law and under Section 26. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests municipality or municipal district thereof in any court. The contention of Atty. the issue of lack of authority of private counsel to represent a municipality was only raised for the first time in the proceedings for the collection of attorney's fees for services rendered in the particular case. A client.  Under the above provision. a client may dismiss his lawyer at any time or at any stage of the proceedings. Unlike a practicing lawyer who has the right to decline employment. Mendiola was duly authorized. the municipal council should request the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the provincial fiscal who has declined to handle and prosecute its case in court. Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the province. Mendiola. a fiscal cannot refuse to perform his functions on grounds not provided for by law without violating his oath of office. In the cases hereinbefore cited. was even raised by the municipality itself in its comment and opposition to said counsel's motion for execution of his lien. 2264. the Local Autonomy Law.Mabelle O.  The submission of Atty. through the municipal mayor and without said counsel's participation. The client has also an undoubted right to compromise a suit without the intervention of his lawyer. The municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it. is considered to have impliedly dismissed his lawyer. which was filed with the court a quo by the office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal in behalf of said municipality. said authority is deemed to have been revoked by the municipality when the latter. Atty. entered into a compromise agreement with herein private respondent with regard to the execution of the judgment in its favor and thereafter filed personally with the court below two pleadings entitled and constitutive of a "Satisfaction of Judgment" and a "Release and Quitclaim". When the interests of a provincial government and of any political division thereof are opposed. hence the appearance of herein private counsel is without authority of law. there is nothing in the records to show that the provincial fiscal is disqualified to act as counsel for the Municipality of Pililla on appeal. and there is nothing to prevent a litigant from appearing before the court to conduct his own litigation. The lawyers concerned can enforce their rights in the proper court in an appropriate proceeding in accordance with the     222 . even assuming that the representation of the municipality by Atty. When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political subdivision of a province. only the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a province or municipality in their lawsuits. Herein counsel cannot pretend to be authorized to continue representing the municipality since the latter is entitled to dispense with his services at any time. pursuant to Section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code. Mendiola that the exception is broad enough to include situations wherein the provincial fiscal refuses to handle the case cannot be sustained. For the aforementioned exception to apply. Furthermore. Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney. Republic Act No. by appearing personally and presenting a motion by himself. the fact that the provincial fiscal was disqualified to handle the municipality's case must appear on record.

Provincial Attorney Regalado appeared as collaborating counsel of Atty. Regalado's motion 'to formally adopt the entire proceedings including the formal offer of evidence'. 1990 to disqualify Atty. WON a municipality may be represented in a suit against it by a private counsel. Inc. Romanillos who submitted a written formal offer of evidence on July 17.petitioners' Opposition to respondents' motion to dissolve injunction. is adopting the entire proceedings participated in/undertaken by Atty. 1990. Romanillos to appear as counsel for the respondent municipality. Whereupon. Romanillos. Regalado. CA dismissed. At the pre-trial conference scheduled on May 28. 1990. Rizal vs. 1990.  Alinsug v. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Rules of Court.Mabelle O. The Provincial Fiscal did not appear. as already stated. among others.  Municipality of Pililla. and on June 15. 1980. 1990. Romanillos. 1990. 1990. is not only conjectural but without factual basis. On June 18. Romanillos. 1990 respondent Judge issued the Order now being assailed which. The municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it. CA: private attorneys cannot represent a province or municipality in lawsuits. which opposed the petition. in a case involving the municipality. It was also Atty. if and when original jurisdiction of case involving the municipality is vested in the Supreme Court. he. Romanillos from appearing as counsel for respondent municipality and to declare null and void the proceedings participated in and undertaken by Atty. but said rights may not be used to prevent the approval of the compromise agreement. on May 3. and was put in writing in petitioners' motion of August 20. Romanillos and Atty. With Sec. that Atty. filed a petition before the court a quo for the Declaration of Nullity of Municipal Ordinances No. v. and the Baliuag Market Vendors Association. RTC: Exceptions: the law allows a private counsel to be hired by a municipality only when the municipality is an adverse party in a case involving the provincial government or another municipality or city within the province. denied petitioners' motion to disqualify Atty. Regalado filed a joint motion dated August 22. It was Atty. The Auditor General where the Court held that the municipality's authority to employ a private attorney is expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal would be disqualified to serve and represent it. 1990. the Provincial Fiscal and the Provincial Attorney. Romanillos who submitted the Reply to. Bulacan. the Provincial Fiscal appeared as counsel for respondent Municipality of Baliuag. granted Atty. 7 (1990) and the contract of lease over a commercial arcade to be constructed in the municipality of Baliuag. Romanillos filed a motion to dissolve injunction and a motion to admit an Amended Answer with motion to dismiss. Romanillos appeared. the Court therein cited Enriquez. On September 19. Contrary to his pretensions. 1990 stating. as his collaborating counsel for respondent municipality. Romanillos was withdrawing as counsel for respondent municipality and that Atty. 1990. Atty. during the hearing on the petitioners' motion for the issuance of preliminary injunction. Sr. which opposition was reiterated on August 15. petitioners questioned the personality of Atty. Gimenez which enumerated instances when the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent in court a particular municipality. there is presently a manifestation and motion pending with the trial court filed by the aforesaid municipal mayor for the withdrawal of the "Satisfaction of Judgment" and the "Release and Quitclaim" previously filed in the case therein as earlier mentioned. and when. a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the court a quo on May 9. 91 (1976) and No. CA Facts: On April 18. or his wife. Perez. considering that the mayor who controls its legislative body will not take the initiative. Ramos. This provision has its apparent origin in the ruling in De Guia v. On April 27. MR denied. respectively. Atty. Castillo. or 223 . Romanillos as counsel for respondent municipality and to declare null and void the proceedings participated in by Atty. 1683 of the old Administrative Code as legal basis. Meanwhile. On the same date. manifesting that he was counsel for respondent municipality. and on the other hand. Meanwhile. Issues: 1.  The apprehension of herein counsel that it is impossible that the municipality will file a similar petition. MR denied. when the municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality in the same province. During the hearing on August 10. Romanillos. Ramos v. 1990 for respondent municipality. Regalado. filed an Answer on behalf of respondent municipality. Atty.

A motion to withdraw the appearance of an unauthorized lawyer is a non-adversarial motion that need not comply with Section 4 of Rule 15 as to notice to the adverse party. 2. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests child. To declare the said proceedings null and void — notwithstanding the formal adoption thereof by Atty.  Elementary fairness dictates that parties unaware of the unauthorized representation should not be held in estoppel just because they did not question on the spot the authority of the counsel for the municipality." Although a municipality may not hire a private lawyer to represent it in litigations. Municipality of Pililla. creditor or otherwise. His authority to appear for and represent petitioner in litigation. Unless so expressly adopted. WON "Joint Motion" Need Not Comply with Rule 15.Mabelle O. an analogous arrangement is not allowed in civil cases wherein a municipality is the plaintiff. Rizal vs. which work is beneficial to it (1) provided that no injustice is thereby heaped on the adverse party and (2) provided further that no compensation in any guise is paid therefor by said municipality to the private lawyer. Regalado as Provincial Attorney of Bulacan who is authorized to represent respondent municipality of Baliuag in court — and to require trial anew to cover the same subject matter. YES. the issue of lack of authority of private counsel to represent a municipality was only raised for the first time in the proceedings for the collection of attorney's fees for services rendered in the particular case. not having been questioned in the lower court.  224 . Court of Appeals held that the legality of the representation of an unauthorized counsel may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. thereby serving the relief prayed for by petitioners. Romanillos was what petitioners were really praying for when they questioned his authority to appear for the municipality. after the decision in that case had become final and executory and/or had been duly executed. WON the petitioners may be held in estoppels  Petitioners cannot be held in estoppel for questioning the legality of the appearance of Atty. stated that Atty. 5095-M. WON the adoption by Atty. we hold that a municipality may adopt the work already performed in good faith by such private lawyer. the private lawyer's work cannot bind the municipality. In the cases hereinbefore cited.  None of the foregoing exceptions is present in this case." This collaboration is contrary to law and hence should not have been recognized as legal. it will be presumed on appeal that counsel was properly authorized to file the complaint and appear for his client. Romanillos appeared for respondent municipality inasmuch as he was already counsel of Kristi Corporation which was sued with respondent municipality in this same case. Romanillos "entered his appearance as collaborating counsel of the provincial prosecutor and the provincial attorney. notwithstanding that they questioned the witnesses of respondent municipality during the hearing of its motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction. The order of the trial court dated September 19.  2. is pecuniarily involved. Romanillos in support of said motion and had even started to present their witnesses to sustain their objection to the motion — would have resulted in any substantial prejudice to petitioners' interest. Romanillos when he was private counsel— such as the proceedings on the motion to dissolve the injunction. This Court stated that: The legality of his representation can be questioned at any stage of the proceedings. The fact that the municipal attorney and the fiscal are supposed to collaborate with a private law firm does not legalize the latter's representation of the municipality of Hagonoy in Civil Case No. It may be said that Atty. It does not appear that the adoption of proceedings participated in or undertaken by Atty. to hear the same witnesses and to admit the same evidence adduced by the same parties cannot enhance the promotion of justice. wherein petitioners had even cross-examined the witnesses presented by Atty. The disqualification was granted. an attorney is presumed to be acting under authority of the  2. in the interest of substantial justice however. Romanillos. as heir legatee. While a private prosecutor is allowed in criminal cases. The disqualification of Atty." litigant whom he purports to represent. Romanillos validate such proceedings. The rule on appearances of a lawyer is that until the contrary is clearly shown. 1990. Regalado of the proceedings participated in by Atty.

Jesus R. On 4 June 1990. Salalima signed the retainer agreement. Sumulong of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG). 225 . the Ad Hoc Committee submitted its report to the Office of the President. this Court has likewise held that where a rigid application of the rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice. were filed with the Office of the President. Leviste. and Atty. the legal officer of the Province. this Court is empowered to suspend their operation. if filed. is not entitled to judicial cognizance. Antonio Jose F. On 8 January 1990. 129-89 authorizing respondent Governor to engage the services of a Manila-based law firm to handle the case against NPC. Atty. the Province sold at public auction the properties of NPC consisting of geothermal power plants. The Ad Hoc committee was composed of Undersecretary Victor R. On 14 November 1989. inter alia. OP Case 5469: Because of the refusal by the NPC to pay real property taxes assessed by Albay covering the period from 11 June 1984 up to 10 March 1987 amounting to P214. has filed a memorandum with the Supreme Court. Payments amounting to P7. Saldivar. machinery and other improvements located at Tiwi and Daraga. Cornago. technicalities may be disregarded in order to resolve the case. Issue: WON respondents have incurred administrative liability in entering into the retainer agreement with Atty. The action of the trial court allowing the motion of respondent municipality effectively granted petitioners' motion to disqualify Atty. no "notice directed to the parties concerned and served at least 3 days before the hearing thereof" need be given petitioners. what petitioners were questioning as to lack of authority was remedied by the adoption of proceedings by an authorized counsel. Guingona Facts: Sometime in 1993. through Atty. On 26 August 1994.410. Antonio Jose Cortes and Atty. filed it. NPC claims. Court of Appeals.R. the President issued AO 94 creating an Ad Hoc Committee to investigate the charges and to thereafter submit its findings and recommendations.184. Albay. on the one hand. the Albay Sangguniang Panlalawigan passed Resolution No. The Province was the sole and winning bidder at the auction sale. No. Regalado. Cornago. Jesus R. Cornago and Cortes & Reyna Law Firm. Atty. that its properties are not subject to real property tax. Acting thereon. Atty. the Albay Sangguniang Panlalawigan adopted Resolution No. NPC failed to redeem its properties. 01-90 authorizing respondent Governor to sign and confirm the retainer contract with the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm.31 were made by the Province to Atty. the President promulgated AO. we ruled that: "While it is true that any motion that does not comply with the requirements of Rule 15 should not be accepted for filing and. the questioned motion not being contentious. several administrative complaints against the petitioners. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Such being the case. Cornago bore the conformity of respondent Governor. Jesus R. Assistant Executive Secretary Renato C. Cornago entered his appearance with the Supreme Court as collaborating counsel for the Province in G. Besides. suggesting that a retainer agreement be signed between the Province. and Presidential Assistant Angel V. On 17 May 1989. Romanillos. In People vs. Litigations should. the Supreme Court issued a decision dismissing the NPC petition and upholding the validity of the auction sale conducted by the province to answer for NPC's tax liabilities. as much as possible. Corona. ‘an order of the court granting the motion to dismiss despite the absence of a notice of hearing.76. after conducting hearings. as collaborating counsel for the Province. or proof of service thereof."'  Rules of procedure are but tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. YES. The entry of appearance of Atty.845. comment on the NPC petition with the Supreme Court.Mabelle O. 153 which meted out suspensions to the petitioners. is merely an irregularity in the proceedings cannot deprive a competent court of jurisdiction over the Case. who were elective officials of the Province of Albay. 87479. Romulo Ricafort. Cortes of the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm sent respondent Governor a letter informing him that Atty. On 7 October 1994. As this Court held in Galvez vs. such that when rigid application of the rules tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. Cornago and the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm and in making payments pursuant to said agreement for purposes of the case filed by NPC with the Supreme Court against the province. On 25 August 1989. It later filed a petition with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the auction sale conducted by the Province. be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. the Province. On 2 June 1989. Salalima v.380. buildings.

Ricafort. the memorandum with the Supreme Court filed for the Province was signed by Atty. When Atty. Resolution No."  The Province has a legal officer. 280 Tomas Morato Avenue. Rodriguez Sr. Another irregularity in the transaction concerns the lawyers. et al. Jesus R. And yet. Cornago who appeared as collaborating counsel of record of the Province in the Supreme Court case (G R. Cornago       226 . Cornago of Jamecca Building. This ruling applies squarely to the case at hand because Sec. in actions or proceeding where a component city or municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to another component city or municipality.5 million. the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm was not counsel of record of the Province in G.  Finally. Blvd. 87479. standing alone and unexplained would be sufficient to show that an unfair advantage had been taken of the client. Cornago and not by the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm. respondents disbursed money to the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm although the latter did not appear as counsel for the Province in the Supreme Court in G.410.. Municipality of Bocaue. noted that the Province is represented in the Supreme Court by Attys. This conformity was. the attorney's fees agreed upon by respondent Salalima and confirmed by the other respondents are not only unreasonable but also unconscionable. the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan and his assistants are charged with the duty to represent the province and any municipality thereof in all civil actions. respondents exceeded their authority and violated the abovequoted section of the LGC and the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court. Moreover. 7160) requires the appointment of a legal officer for the province whose functions include the following: Represent the local government unit in all civil actions and special proceedings wherein the local government unit or any official thereof. "means nothing more than that the fee contracted for. The contingent fee of 18% of the "P214 million" claim of the Province against NPC amounts to P38. Even the Solicitor General. a special legal officer may be employed to represent the adverse party. Consequently. the disbursements to the lawyers amounting to P7. 481 of the LGC is based on Sec. No. Under the law. No. In hiring private lawyers to represent the Province of Albay.R. Atty. not only with the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm but also with Atty.  Complicating further the web of deception surrounding the transaction is the fact that it was only Atty. 1681 of the Revised Administrative Code which was the subject of interpretation in the abovecited case. No. v. The retainer contract signed by respondent Governor was. the entire transaction was attended by irregularities. 01-90 authorized the respondent Governor to sign and confirm a retainer contract for legal services with the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm at 202 E. What is required by COA Circular No. In entering into a retainer agreement not only with the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm but also with Atty. Antonio Jose Cortes. Quezon City. as applied to attorney's fee.380. six of the ten checks paid by the Province and amounting to more than P3. 481 of the LGC (RA. Provided. or that a legal fraud had been perpetrated on him. 87479. No. First. in his official capacity is a party. Furthermore. That. 01-90. Manotok: LGUs cannot be represented by private lawyers and it is solely the Provincial Fiscal who can rightfully represent them. 87479). Jose R.R. or that a legal fraud had been taken of the client. The comment filed by Atty. The word "unconscionable". respondent Governor exceeded his authority under Resolution No. in his letter to respondent Governor dated 15 July 1993. 86-255 dated 2 April 1986. however obtained after the disbursements were already made in 1990 and 1992. who had already filed a comment on NPC's petition against the Province. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests  Sec. 85-255 is a prior written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General. Ricafort Cornago and Glenn Manahan but not by the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm. Ricafort already covers the basic issues raised in the petition.6 million were issued in favor of the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm through Atty. The respondents attempted to dispute this finding by presenting the Solicitor General's conformity dated 15 July 3993. In other words. Cornago.Mabelle O. Quezon City.31 were disallowed by the Provincial Auditor on the ground that these were made without the prior written conformity of the Solicitor General and the written concurrence of the Commission on Audit (COA) as required by COA Circular No. however.

An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court. respondent Governor admitted that he had hired Atty. By allowing such scandalously exorbitant attorney's fees which is patently disadvantageous to the government. It is evident that respondent Governor hired Atty. Surely. (c) Dishonesty.  Sec. the skill and experience called for in the performance of the services and the professional character and social standing of the lawyers. sangguniang bayan. Hence.  Furthermore. Their term of office expired at noon of 30 June 1995. in this case. it had not even filed because it was not the counsel of record.5 million is unconscionable. and (h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws. misconduct in office.P. During the hearing. or dereliction of duty. An elective local official may be disciplined.5 million fee for the legal services rendered for the Province. and in suspending in the other petitioners. or removed from office on any of the following grounds: (a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. except in the case of members of the sangguniang panlalawigan. sangguniang panlungsod. which. (f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days. considering the labor and time involved. the attorney's fee of P38. foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an immigrant of another country. or constitutes.5 million. 60. And this Court is not prepared to rule that the suspension to the petitioners' removal office.  The offenses for which suspension may be imposed are enumerated in Section 60 of the Code. 66(b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or a period of six (6) months for every administrative offense. one memorandum could not be worth P38. Cornago are not such as would merit a P38. or acquisition of.  This provision sets the limits to the penalty of suspension. nor shall said penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long as he meet the qualifications for the office. It should not exceed six months or the unexpired portion of the term of office of the respondent for every administrative offense. An administrative offense means every act or conduct or omission which amounts to. Cornago not on the basis of his competency and standing in the legal community but purely for personal reasons. suspended. 2. although the aggregate thereof exceeded six months and the unexpired portion of the petitioners' term of office.Mabelle O. who was reelected on 11 May 1992. (d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at Least prision mayor. for an alleged administrative offense committed in 1989  We agree with the petitioners that Governor Salalima could no longer be held administratively liable in C. The fact remains that the suspension imposed for each administrative offense did not exceed six months and there was an express provision that the successive service of the suspension should not exceed the unexpired portion of the term of office of the petitioners. the petition was already been given due course by the Supreme Court and the only pleading to be filed by the parties before the Court would issue its decision was a memorandum. 5450 in connection with the negotiated contract entered into on 6 March 1992 with RYU Construction for additional 227 . the professional character and social standing of Atty. WON the OP acted with grave abuse of discretion in suspending petitioners for periods ranging from 12-20 months. Case No. which reads: Sec. every of the grounds or disciplinary action. and sangguniang barangay. (g) Acquisition for. for an alleged administrative offense committed during his first term. Likewise. respondents betrayed a personal bias to the lawyers involved and committed abuse of authority. Issues: 1. some of whom were elected and others reelected on 11 May 1992. (b) Culpable violation of the Constitution. oppression.5 million for one memorandum. gross negligence. (e) Abuse of authority.  Assuming then that the findings and conclusions of the Office of the President in each of the subject four administrative cases are correct. WON the OP committed grave abuse of discretion in suspending Salalima. Cornago because they were schoolmates at San Beda College. it committed no grave abuse of discretion in imposing the penalty of suspension. the standing of the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm is not such as would merit P38. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests filed an appearance and subsequently a memorandum for the Province.

184 Ala. State vs. apply to criminal acts 228 . 43 S. 161 S. who may not stop to hound the former during his new term with administrative cases for acts alleged to have been committed during his previous term. To rule otherwise would open the floodgates to exacerbating endless partisan contests between the reelected official and his political enemies. Gen. (NS) 553. is still a good law. Ward. 281 P. 280 P. We found that cases on the matter are conflicting due in part. As a matter of fact. As held on Conant vs.  However. Case No. 559. and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct.  The rule adopted in Pascual. It is not for the court. 332. if he had been guilty of any. however. we have resorted to American authorities. The foregoing rule. The weight of authority. Nowell. Blake. Hasty. Brogan (1887) 6 N. 248.J. 217). 388. or acts done. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija 17 and Aguinaldo vs.S. since his re-election to office operates a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor.R. and also. the rule is that a public official can not be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term. 2d 237. 559. (67 C. in Pascual the administrative complaint against Pascual for acts committed during his first term as Mayor of San Jose. Jur. 63 So. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to office.P. 2d.I. 147 A. it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character. Offenses committed. to which we fully subscribe. The rule makes no distinction. 130 P. 67. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests rehabilitation work at the Tabaco Public Market. 18 In Pascual.  This Court reiterated this rule in Aguinaldo and explicitly stated therein: Clearly then. seems to incline to the rule denying the right to remove one from office because of misconduct during a prior term. and that the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor (43 Am. In the absence of any precedent in this jurisdiction. This doctrine of forgiveness or condonation cannot. Jesus Cornago and the Corte's and Reyna Law Firm.V.Y. Shutler. as held in Pascual vs. to a divergence of views with respect to the question of whether the subsequent election or appointment condones the prior misconduct.R. was filed only a year after he was reelected. vs. 5469 for the execution in November 1989 of the retainer contract with Atty. during previous term are generally held not to furnish cause for removal and this is especially true where the constitution provides that the penalty in proceedings for removal shall not extend beyond the removal from office. finds no application to criminal cases pending against petitioners for acts he may have committed during the failed coup. p. We may add that sound public policy dictates it. The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms. p. by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people. 2d 418. State vs.R. however. 50 LRA (NS) 553 —The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. People ex rel. citing Rice vs. and disqualification from holding office for the term for which the office was elected or appointed. 63 So. cited in 17 A.W. Board of Com'rs of Kingfisher County vs. Nueva Ecija. Bagshaw vs. 222.Mabelle O.S. 45. probably. Santos. Montgomery vs. The fine distinction does not impress us. in part. Thompson. this Court ruled: We now come to one main issue of the controversy — the legality of disciplining an elective municipal official for a wrongful act committed by him during his immediately preceding term of office. 40 S W. citing Atty. 401. It is of the view that an official's reelection renders moot and academic an administrative complaint against him for acts done during his previous term only if the complaint was filed before his reelection. 281. to differences in statutes and constitutional provisions.. 121.A. Such a rule is not only founded on the theory that an official's reelection expresses the sovereign will of the electorate to forgive or condone any act or omission constituting a ground for administrative discipline which was committed during his previous term. In re Fudula. qualified in Aguinaldo insofar as criminal cases are concerned. however. His second term may thus be devoted to defending himself in the said cases to the detriment of public service. 2d. Nor could the petitioners be held administratively liable in O. 50 L. State. This is so because public officials cannot be subject to disciplinary action for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term. the Office of the Solicitor General maintains that Aguinaldo does not apply because the case against the official therein was already pending when he filed his certificate of candidacy for his reelection bid.

5469. As to petitioners Victoria. Osia. 229 .  We thus rule that any administrative liability which petitioner Salalima might have incurred in the execution of the retainer contract in O. 5469 and the incidents related therewith and in the execution on March 1992 of a contract for additional repair and rehabilitation works for the Tabaco Public Market in O. without prejudice to the institution of appropriate civil and criminal cases as may be warranted by the attendant circumstances. Marcellana. 129 authorizing petitioner Salalima to enter into the retainer contract in question and who were reelected in the 1992 elections. and Cabredo who became members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan only after their election in 1992.P. who signed Resolution No.P. case No. So are the liabilities. Case No. however. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests which the reelected official may have committed during his previous term. they could not beheld administratively liable in O. for they had nothing to do with the said resolution which was adopted in April 1989 yet.P. Case No. if any. of petitioner members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Albay.Mabelle O. This is. Reyeg. 5450 are deemed extinguished by his reelection in the 11 May 1992 synchronized elections.

Ganzon filed his "extremely urgent motion" (with supplemental motions later filed) questioning the validity of the said last mentioned suspension order. On the same day. Hence. on 29 August 1991. in connection with the 5 August 1991 main decision. Meanwhile. each of the orders to last for a 60-day period. the 230 . a series of 10 administrative complaints were filed by various city officials. 9 and 29 August 1991 alleging therein that the issues raised in petitioner's motion (6 July 1991) were rendered moot and academic by the said decision. and seeking clarification on whether it was still necessary to comply with this Court's resolutions requiring respondents to file comment on petitioner's said motion of 6 July 1991. CA (November 1991) Facts: Sometime in 1988. respondent Secretary Santos had issued on 3 July 1991 against petitioner Ganzon another order of preventive suspension in connection with an Administrative Case filed by Jopson. On 7 September 1988 and 5 July 1990. and restraining the enforcement of the CA’s 2 decisions. petitioner filed in these petitions his "manifestation and compliance. see p. Secretary Santos issued against Ganzon 3 separate orders of preventive suspension. we issued a TRO barring the respondent Secretary from implementing the suspension orders. supra. petitioner filed a motion praying for the issuance of a TRO. respondents filed motions dated. On 6 July 1991. On 26 June 1990. in reaction to the memorandum dated 29 August 1991 issued by respondent Santos. After the main decision in the present petitions was rendered by the Court on 5 August 1991. Ganzon filed with this Court 2 separate petitions assailing the decision. which motion was granted by the Court of Ganzon v. on various charges such as abuse of authority. against petitioner Ganzon. Meanwhile. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests elected City Mayor of Iloilo City. This Court issued a resolution dated 9 July 1991. the appellate court rendered a decision dismissing the petitions for lack of merit. However. oppression. CA (August 1991. 9) Ganzon v.Mabelle O. against respondents. stating therein that the third order of preventive suspension issued against petitioner on 3 May 1990 shall be deemed in force and effect. respondent Santos issued a memorandum addressed to petitioner Ganzon. Petitioner assailed the validity of the said orders by filing with the Court of Appeals 2 separate petitions for prohibition. grave misconduct and others. In the course of the hearing of the administrative cases. and that he should be allowed to re-assume his office starting 4 September 1991. it appears that even before the promulgation on 5 August 1991 of the main decision. petitioner Ganzon filed with the CA a petition for mandamus. requiring respondents to comment on petitioner's urgent motion. On 30 August 1991." alleging that he had already fully served the suspension orders issued against him. in compliance with the main decision of 5 August 1991.

In the main decision. the respondent Secretary could have pursued a consolidated effort. Another way to serve the 46 days would be to begin serving it only on 4 September 1991 (the day after 3 September 1991 which was the last day of service for the fourth suspension order). Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Appeals. it would follow that the remaining 46 days should be served starting 5 August 1991 (date of promulgation of main decision) until fully served.  If simultaneous service of two (2) suspension orders is allowed. as admitted by respondents no less. 1990 June 26. The records show that petitioner Ganzon. If we follow the mandate of such main decision which ordained that the third order be served and that the temporary restraining order 16 against it be lifted. allowing petitioner to serve simultaneously the overlapping third and fourth suspensions will favor him. Fourth: July 5. issued even before the main decision of 5 August 1991 was promulgated. remains suspended from office (as the elected Mayor of Iloilo City) and since the order of preventive suspension dated 3 July 1991 (the fourth suspension order 3 ) was issued against him by respondent Secretary. It would seem. Second: 11 October 1988. in other words. Third: 3 May 1990. not served because its enforcement was restrained by an order of the RTC upon petition of petitioner himself. Fourth: 3 July 1991. or on 4 September 1991. noting that successive suspensions have been inflicted on Mayor Ganzon we stated that what "is intriguing is that respondent Secretary has been cracking down. but any issue on its validity is now moot and academic. 1991 September 3. respondents filed with this Court a motion asking for the issuance of a restraining order addressed to the CA and against the TRO. this would work in favor of the petitioner (an elective local official) as the balance of his third preventive suspension would. 1991  However we take note of the fact that petitioner has already fully served the 60-day fourth order of preventive suspension which started 5 July 1991 (that is. he can then return to his official duties as Iloilo City Mayor. If we allow his submission and accept "simultaneous service". 1990 SC: June 9. (and presumably the local constituency) and certainly lessen if not offset the harsh effects of whatever 231 . Granting respondents' motion. it is clear that this fourth suspension order is not one of the three orders covered by and subject of the main decision). therefore.  First suspension: 11 August 1988. even before the main decision was rendered) and ended on 3 September 1991. it would mean the following: that from 5 August 1991 (the date the TRO issued by this Court was lifted) up to 3 September 1991 (the last day for serving the fourth order). on the Mayor piecemeal — apparently. that these twenty-nine (29) days which form part of his service for the fourth order can be also credited to his favor by treating said twenty-nine (29) days as forming part of his service of the third order. he would need to serve only seventeen (17) days more to complete the service of the third order. On 4 September 1991." 17 Surely. the main decision states that petitioner is allowed to serve the duration of said third suspension order. 1990 records show that he was then in office discharging the functions of the Mayor of Iloilo City.Mabelle O. that after petitioner has served in full the third suspension order as decreed in the main decision. so to speak. he has been serving the said fourth suspension order which is to expire after a period of 60 days. twenty-nine (29) days have elapsed. be reduced from 46 days to 17 days. in effect. Besides. however. WON petitioner can be allowed the benefit of simultaneous service of preventive suspensions. Petitioner raises the issue of whether he could or should be allowed to serve the third and the fourth orders "simultaneously". if this were so. to pin him down ten times the pain. This will be discussed shortly. Third: May 4. Issues: 1. fully served. or until 20 October 1991 (the 46th day from 4 September 1990). said seventeen (17) days from 3 September 1991 will expire on 20 September 1991. On 9 September 1991. 1990 May 18. which would be the last day for serving the third suspension order. petitioner Ganzon filed a motion to dissolve this Court's restraining order dated 5 September 1991. to this date. Hence 46 days still remain to be served as decreed by the main decision. when he. that petitioner has in fact fully served the fourth suspension order. (The records show. this Court on 5 September 1991 issued a temporary restraining order directing the CA to cease and desist from implementing the TRO it had issued dated 3 September 1991 immediately suspending the implementation of the order of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government dated 29 August 1991.

there appears to be no reason why the second order should not be served for another 60day period. pursuant to the recommendation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. On April 22. CA. petitioner to serve the third and fourth orders simultaneously (insofar as they overlap). LGC: Sec. Existing Special Civil Action in the RTC deemed moot and academic. despotic and arbitrary abuse of power" by the Governor. Garing was momentarily placed in custody for his own protection because he was drunk. that is. RTC Judge Virola issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Governor Espiritu from implementing the Order of suspension against Mayor      232 . did then and there wilfully. Since we can allow. starting from 3 September 1991 and ending on 20 September 1991. Artieda v. as we here allow.Mabelle O. Garing filed a complaint charging Mayor Melgar of Naujan with grave misconduct. Preventive Suspension b) . However. oppression. the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro required Mayor Melgar to answer the complaint. WON petitioner must also serve his second suspension. Governor Espiritu placed Mayor Melgar under preventive suspension. that. An open knife (balisong) was taken from him. as of this latter date. instead of consolidating the several administrative cases of similar nature and close vintage — we cannot allow the concept of simultaneous service to apply to the second order (as we did in the third order). further that in the event that several administrative cases are filed against an elective official. by boxing and kicking thereby inflicting upon the latter physical injuries on different parts of his body and not being contented ordered his arrest and detention in the municipal jail of Naujan. second preventive suspension has been affirmed. 1991. Meanwhile. . as explained earlier. On June 24. that respondent be preventively suspended for forty-five (45) days pending the investigation of the administrative complaint. dated 5 August 1991. 1991. culpable violation of the Constitution and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the public service. It was opposed by Garing. petitioner has complied with the mandate of the main decision for he has already fully served the third preventive suspension which ended on 20 September 1991. there is no cogent reason why. MTD dismissed. 1991. unlawfully and feloniously attack. Mayor Melgar filed a motion to dismiss the administrative complaint. Oriental Mindoro without filing any charges until he was released the following day. he was told to go home. On June 3. to the Provincial Governor. he cannot be preventively suspended for more than ninety (90) days within a single year on the same ground or grounds existing and known at the time of the first suspension. but he refused to go and only did so the following morning. The 60-day period from 5 August 1991 expired on 4 October 1991. On May 23. Hence. including the second order). with abuse of official function. . the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro recommended. Melgar. He forthwith filed a "Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction with prayer for Restraining Order" in the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro alleging that "the order of suspension was an arrogant. 63. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests motive may be behind the intriguing action of the respondent Secretary in issuing those successive suspension orders. Mayor Melgar received the Order of Suspension. Santos (Consolidated with Ganzon v. I was likewise informed that after he had sobered up. under the bizarre circumstances of this case — where the respondent Secretary has chosen to impose preventive suspensions piecemeal. 1991. any single preventive suspension of local elective official shall not extend beyond sixty (60) days: Provided. If we follow the decision which states that the three (3) suspensions are affirmed. under the bizarre circumstances of this case. this means that. Melgar Facts: On April 11. assault and use personal violence upon the person of Garing. Melgar alleged that Garing attended graduation ceremonies drunk and disrupted such ceremonies. After evaluation. petitioner shall serve only 17 days more (not 46 days) to complete the service of the third order. see above) Espiritu v. Under the main decision of this Court. According to the charge. 1991. It would follow then that the second order is also fully served to this date for the service of said second order would have started on 5 August 1991 (when the main decision was rendered as this was the time when this Court found and affirmed the validity of the three (3) suspension orders. abuse of authority.

(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at anytime after the issues are joined. within forty-eight (48) hours from receipt thereof. in this particular case. respondent Secretary of Local Government sent a telegram and a letter. Hence. having been elected to said position during the local elections held on January 17. The regional trial court had no jurisdiction over Special Civil Action No. as a general rule. when the evidence of culpability is strong.  Clearly. Governor Espiritu filed a motion to dismiss and/or for reconsideration which Judge Virola denied on July 16. R-5003 and gravely abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the case. When there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of. When the evidence of culpability is strong. he is deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the administrative investigation of the charges against him. by the provincial governor if the respondent is an elective municipal official. a sworn complaint for disloyalty to the Republic and culpable violation of the Constitution was filed by the 233 . Shortly after December 1989 coup d'etat was crushed. he should have sought relief first from the Secretary of Interior and Local Government. public policy and a becoming regard for the principle of separation of powers demand that the action of said officer or body should be left undisturbed. this petition for certiorari and prohibition. 63. neglect or request.Mabelle O. Aguinaldo v. since the 60day preventive suspension of Mayor Melgar was maintained by the Temporary Restraining Order which we issued on August 6. Preventive suspension is allowed so that the respondent may not hamper the normal course of the investigation through the use of his influence and authority over possible witnesses. to petitioner requiring him to show cause why should not be suspended or remove from office for disloyalty to the Republic.  There is nothing improper in suspending an officer before the charges against him are heard and before he is given an opportunity to prove his innocence. the office or body that is invested with the power of removal or suspension should be the sole judge of the necessity and sufficiency of the cause. to serve a term of four (4) years therefrom. when the gravity of the offense so warrants. On December 7. He took his oath sometimes around March 1988. the suspended official shall be deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against him until its termination. and therefore has already been served. 2.  Since respondent mayor believed that his preventive suspension was unjustified and politically motivated. 1991. When the gravity of the offense so warrants. both dated December 4. 1989. Issue: Won a provincial governor may suspend a municipal mayor. or 4. When the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. if the delay in the proceedings of the case is due to his fault. preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension. — (1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official. However. not from the courts. 1991. the time of the delay shall not be counted in computing the time of the suspension. (3) At the expiration of sixty-days. So. 3. or when the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. unless a flagrant abuse of the exercise of that power is shown. 1988. Mayor Melgar's direct recourse to the courts without exhausting administrative remedies was premature. Chapter IV of the LGC provides: Sec. In all cases.  There may exist honest differences of opinion with regard to the seriousness of the charges. Preventive Suspension. when there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of. the provincial governor of Oriental Mindoro is authorized by law to preventively suspend the municipal mayor of Naujan at anytime after the issues had been joined and any of the following grounds were shown to exist: 1. However.  Section 63. 1989. However. Santos Facts: Aguinaldo was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Melgar. or as to whether they warrant disciplinary action. or by the city or municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective barangay official.

and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units. On June 9. term.Mabelle O. in a resolution dated May 14. Consequently. 337 itself has constitutional roots. The Secretary found petitioner guilty and ordered his removal from office. 1992 elections. WON the power of respondent Secretary to suspend or remove local government official under Section 60. Petitioner denied being privy to the planning of the coup or actively participating in its execution.P. 1992. 3. initiative. Chapter IV of B. The constitutional basis is provided by Articles VII (17) and X (4) of the 1987 Constitution which vest in the President the power of control over all executive departments. power. and by the doctrine that the acts of the department head are presumptively the acts of the President unless expressly rejected by him. all based on the ground that he had been removed from office by virtue of the March 19. the Commission ruled that inasmuch as the resolutions of the Commission becomes final and executory only after five (5) days from promulgation. Blg. and providing for the qualifications. and duties of local government officials. A similar provision is found in Section 3. allocate among the different local government units their powers. however. petitioner may still be voted upon as a candidate for governor pending the final outcome of the disqualification cases with his Court. against petitioner for acts the latter committed during the coup. The Congress shall enact a LGC which shall provided for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall. the resolution paved the way for his eventual proclamation as Governor of Cagayan. The National Assembly shall enact a LGC which may not thereafter be amended except by a majority vote of all its Members. which reads: Sec. As petitioner won by a landslide margin in the elections. However. election and removal. thereby allowing the canvassing of the votes and returns in Cagayan to proceed.P. allocating among the different local government units their powers. The Court. respondent Secretary suspended petitioner from office for sixty (60) days from notice. Section 2 of which specifically provided as follows: Sec. 1992 resolution pending the outcome of the disqualification case. The foregoing rule. and referendum. a resolution was issued in the aforementioned case granting petition and annulling the May 9. any change in the existing form of local government shall not take effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite called for the purpose. acting upon a "Motion to Clarify" filed by petitioner. The COMELEC granted the petitions. pending the outcome of the formal investigation into the charges against him. While this case was pending before this Court. WON an officical may be punish for acts committed in a previous term  Case Moot and academic because of Aguinaldo’s reelection. defining a more responsive and accountable local government structure with an effective system of recall. 2.  A public official can not be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term. Blg. Issues: 1. mayors of municipalities in Cagayan. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Agateps and Mamba. on May 13. bureaus and offices and the power of general supervision over local governments. responsibilities. petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor of Cagayan for the May 11. However. seeking to nullify the resolution of the Commission ordering his disqualification. petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with this Court. 337 was repealed by the 1987 Constitution.     234 . issued a TRO against the Commission to cease and desist from enforcing its May 9. finds no application to criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup. On the basis thereof. Three separate petitions for his disqualification were then filed against him. having been enacted by the then Batasan Pambansa pursuant to Article XI of the 1973 Constitution. 1992. though he admitted that he was sympathetic to the cause of the rebel soldiers. The power of respondent Secretary to remove local government officials is anchored on both the Constitution and a statutory grant from the legislative branch. the Commission was ordered not to proclaim a winner until this Court has decided the case. and resources. 1992. On the same day. functions. 1990 resolution of respondent Secretary. 1992 resolution of the Commission on the ground that the decision of respondent Secretary has not yet attained finality and is still pending review with this Court. since his reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The statutory grant found in B. Article X of the 1987 Constitution. salaries.

7160) which states: §40. As to petitioner's argument of the want of authority of respondent Secretary to appoint respondent Melvin Vargas as Governor of Cagayan. Meanwhile. the vice-governor . The power of respondent Secretary of the Department of Local Government to remove local elective government officials is found in Secs. Subsequent attempts to serve the decision upon petitioner himself also failed. 1995. 1994. A TRO was issued by the court on February 7. fails to quality. after learning that the Sanggunian had terminated the proceedings in the case and was about to render judgment. On March 24. that certain checks issued to him by the National Reconciliation and D