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Mill between Aristotle & Bentham Author(s): Martha C. Nussbaum Reviewed work(s): Source: Daedalus, Vol. 133, No.

2, On Happiness (Spring, 2004), pp. 60-68 Published by: The MIT Press on behalf of American Academy of Arts & Sciences Stable URL: . Accessed: 29/09/2012 22:39
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C. Nussbaum

Mill between Aristotle &Bentham


is the happy Warrior? Who is he That every man in arms should wish to be? -William Wordsworth, "Character of

Bentham's Utilitarianism ers. His concern with interests


oth the

the Happy Warrior" Man does not strive after happiness does that. ;only

aggregating of each and every person ob scured, for a time, the fact that some issues of justice cannot be well handled mere summing of the interests through of all. His radical abhorrence of suffering to bring all ambition to a state of well-being beings for a time, and satisfaction obscured, and satisfaction the fact that well-being and his admirable sentient

the Englishman

- Friedrich Nietzsche,

"Maxims and

might conceptions philosophical even while conceal, they reveal. By shin some im genuinely ing a strong light on life, Jeremy aspects of human portant Jtowerful good, Other

not be all there

is to the human

or even all there is to happiness. such as activity, loving, things also be fullness of commitment might involved. Indeed, so powerful was the obscuring a ques power of Bentham's insights that tion that Wordsworth took to be alto indeed, he gether askable, and which, lines answering the spent eighty-five is soon what happiness really question under Bentham's looked to philosophers


C. Nussbaum,




guished Service Professor of Law and Ethics at theUniversity of Chicago, is appointed in thePhi losophyDepartment, Law School, and Divinity School. A Fellow of theAmerican Academy since 1988, Nussbaum is the author of numerous books, including "TheFragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics inGreek Tragedy and Philoso phy" (1986), "Women and Human Develop ment" (2000), "Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions" (2001), and "Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and theLaw" (2004). ? 2004 by the American & Sciences
6o D dalus

answer influence like a question whose was so obvious that it could not be asked
in earnest.

Thus Henry Prichard, albeit a foe of was so influenced Utilitarianism, by in his thinking Bentham's conception that he simply assumed about happiness who talked about that any philosopher must have been identifying it happiness or satisfaction. When Ar with pleasure istotle asked what happiness is, Prichard


of Arts




asking the question been asking, since

he could not really have been he appears to have its answer was so or

and political and activities excellences,2 involved in love and friendship. Plea is not identical with sure, he believed, but usually accompanies happiness, the unimpeded of the performance activities that constitute happiness. was on a concep Wordsworth relying tion like this when he asked what the character and demeanor of the happy Warrior would be in each of the many areas of life. As J. L. Austin memorably wrote in a devastating critique of Prich worth who ard on Aristotle, meant... "I do not think Words : 'This is the warrior


Aristotle Bentham

between &

: is contentment obvious happiness Instead of asking what satisfaction. consists

piness have been means to the production of happiness.1 understood Nietzsche, similarly, hap a state of and con piness to be pleasure and expressed his scorn for tentment, that goal rath who pursued Englishmen for a noble er than richer goals involving suffering ac end, continued striving, at risk, and tivities that put contentment so forth. Unaware tradition Wordsworth's of the richer English that concerning happiness

hap in, then, he must really asking about the instrumental

he sim poem embodied, to be what took English 'happiness' ply Bentham said itwas. poem, indeed, rep and longer tradition of derived from thinking about happiness ancient Greek thought about eudaimonia resented an older and its parts, and inherited via the usual of eudaimonia as translation English 'happiness.' But Wordsworth's

feels pleased.' Indeed, he is 'Doomed to go in company with Pain / And fear and bloodshed, miserable train.'" As Austin saw, the important thing about

is that he has traits the happy Warrior that make him capable of performing all in an exemplary of life's many activities way, and that he acts in accordance with those traits. He ismoderate, kind, coura geous, loving, a good friend, for the community, honest,3 to honor or attached sively concerned not exces

represented Nicomachean

ly agreed tive, inclusive of all that has intrinsic val that ue, and complete, lacking nothing it richer or better. Aristotle would make to argue for a more spe then proceeded cific conception of happiness that iden tified itwith a specific plurality of valu for example, activities able activities in accordance
i Henry A.

According most fully is general Ethics, happiness to be a kind of living that is ac

to this tradition, in Aristotle's

am worldly a lover of reason, an lover bition, equal of home and family. His life is happy be cause it is full and rich, even though it sometimes may involve pain and loss. John Stuart Mill knew both the Ben thamite and the Aristotelian/Wordswor thian conceptions of happiness and was torn between them. Despite his many
2 I thus render the Greek Arete even need be trans usually in be ethical; a trait of a person. It is arete, not is, that thing sort of thing can Plato speak of that that

lated deed a trait

as Virtue.' it need not



o?Agathon in J. L. in the Ethics of Papers, (Oxford Press, 1979), Austin's, im ed. and 1-


in the Ethics of Aristotle,

27 39, famously Austin,

"The Meaning " and

Philosophy 10 (1935) :

of anything, whatever it good at doing what makes does. Thus characteristically the arete of a pruning see knife.


and Eudaimonia "Agathon in Austin, Aristotle," Philosophical and G. J. Warnock J. O. Urmson New 31. My including plicit York: Oxford account his University of Prichard account follows


of Prichard's

the one major from departure to Words seemed apparently worth Aristotle required by British morality. re In other of honesty. does not make much to is close spects, Wordsworth remarkably 3 Here Aristotle that Aristotle, whether he knew it or not.







Martha Nussbaum on happiness


of Bentham, he never stopped as a defender himself of representing he line. Meanwhile, Bentham's general was a lover of the Greeks and a lover of criticisms he credited the poet whom Wordsworth, Mill seems with curing his depression. never to have fully realized the extent of the tension between the two concep the con ; thus he never described nor flict between them, argued for the of the pieces he appropriat importance tions ed from each one. the The unkind way of characterizing be to say that Mill was and had no coherent deeply confused result would The kinder of happiness. conception I believe, more accurate thing to say and, is that, despite Mill's lack of unfortunate clarity about how he combined he really did have conceptions, or less coherent idea of how to integrate richness of life and com them giving a place they do not plexity of activity have in Bentham, and giving pleasure and the absence of pain and of depres never sufficient sion a role that Aristotle out. The result is the basis, at lymapped that of happiness for a conception least, - more is richer than both of its sources capable of doing justice to all the ele as ments that thoughtful people have sociated with that elusive idea. the two amore

diminish whose


the happiness of the party :or, what is in question


to pro the same thing in other words, mote or to oppose that happiness." In amanner that turn, he defines utility in shows his characteristic tinctions philosophers By utility

of dis disregard that have mattered greatly to : ismeant that property in any it tends to produce bene
good, or happi

object, whereby


ness, (all this in the present case comes to the same thing) or (what comes again to the same thing) to prevent the happening to of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness the party whose interest is considered. the long Western flouting tradition that had debated philosophical whether could be identified happiness - a in which tradition the with pleasure answer negative greatly predominated, answer the positive being endorsed by Ben few apart from the Epicureans Ignoring that pleasure, tham simply declares are all the same and happiness good, on from there. thing, and goes An equally long philosophical tradi tion before Bentham had debated how we should understand the nature of as a type pleasure. We speak of pleasure we also say of experience, but things are like, "My greatest pleasures listening toMahler and eating steak." Such ways for in of talking raise several questions, a stance : Is pleasure single unitary thing, a or a way or many things ? Is it feeling, of being active, or, perhaps, activity it a sensation at all, if such very self? Is it count as plea different experiences sures? Could there be any one feeling or toMahler's sensation that both listening Tenth and eating a steak have in com mon? and awhole line of Plato, Aristotle, subsequent questions discussed such philosophers with great subtlety. Bentham or

Be?,hamhaSawayofmaki?gMeseem asserts that the on simpler than it is. He in itself is pleasure, and the ly thing good only thing bad in itself is pain. From the assertion that these two "masters" have a very influence on human powerful to he passes without conduct, argument claim that the proper goal the normative and pleasure of utility, The principle minimize pain. as he puts it, is "that principle which of every action approves or disapproves of conduct to the tendency whatsoever, according it appears to have to augment or which is to maximize

62 D

dalus Spring 2004

simply ignores them. As Mill writes, "Bentham failed in deriving light from For him, pleasure is a sin other minds." sensation containing gle homogeneous no qualitative differences. The only vari : it can ations in pleasure are quantitative or vary in intensity, duration, certainty or remoteness, uncertainty, propinquity and, finally, in causal properties (tenden to produce more pleasure, etc.). Per cy concern with pain haps Bentham's deep can somewhat con which plausibly be as a unitary sensation varying sidered is the only in intensity and duration source of his that various plea feeling sures do not differ in quali meaningfully But this conclusion, Mill says, is the ty. result of "the empiricism of one who has had little experience" either external, he adds, or internal, through the imagi

from large our scope of consideration one person to many we people, simply of quantity. just add a new dimension defined as that Right action is ultimately which produces the greatest pleasure for the greatest number. Moreover, Ben in extending tham sees no problem the class to the entire world comparison sentient animals. Another economists of

Mill between
Aristotle Bentham &

that has troubled problem in the Benthamite tradition If people harm get on others, that count as

is that of evil pleasures. from inflicting pleasure

as so often they do, should a that makes pleasure society better? Most economists who follow Bentham have tried to draw some lines here, in order to rule out the most sadistic and In so doing, they malicious pleasures. the Utilitarian system in a complicate way that Bentham would approved, that is not

time, plays no Activity, role in Bentham's system. The special goal of right action is to maximize plea as a sensation. That is sure, understood the only good thing there is in the world. So, in effect, people and animals are of sensations of plea large containers sure or satisfaction. Their capacity for agency is of interest only in the sense that itmakes them capable of choosing utility. A person who gets pleasure by being hooked up to an experience machine the famous of the late Robert Nozick is example as well off as the person who gets just that produce pleasure by loving and eating and listen ing. Even in the context of nonhuman this is a very reduced picture of animals, what is valuable in life. Where are concerned, beings or less everything. Nor is Bentham worried a comparisons, personal which dition there economists human it leaves out more about inter on tra actions

at the same

introducing itself reducible attractive

not have an ethical value to pleasure or

about Ben is its focus on the urgent needs beings for relief from Indeed, one of the most ap suffering. pealing aspects of his thought is its great tham's program of sentient for the suffering of animals, compassion which he takes to be unproblematically to human suffering.4 But comparable cannot be said to have devel Bentham account like a convincing oped anything or of of pleasure and pain, of happiness, social utility. Because of his attachment to a dogmatic simplicity, his view cries out for adequate philosophical develop



sees that the LJnlike Bentham, Aristotle nature of happiness is very difficult to down. In book i of the Nicomachean pin
4 It should animals and be noted, suffered thus he that death, that he denied however, at the very of thought that the painless kill argued sometimes be permit

problem in the Utilitarian

have labored greatly. For Bentham : is no such problem when we en

an animal ing of ted.






Martha Nussbaum on happiness


Ethics, he sets about that task. He argues on sever that there is general agreement : It al formal characteristics of happiness must be most final, that is, inclusive of all value. Itmust be self which he means that there sufficient, by is nothing that can be added to it that would increase its value. (He immediate makes clear that self-sufficiency does ly :the sort of self not imply solitariness he is after is one that includes sufficiency that has intrinsic with family, friends, and relationships fellow citizens.) Itmust be active, since we all agree that is equivalent happiness to "living well and Itmust doing well." be generally available, to anyone who makes the right sort of effort, since we to define happiness as some a few can enjoy. And itmust thing only be relatively that stable, not something can be removed chance misfor by any don't want

to the more precise definition of pertains these excellences because presumably in each of these spheres we all have to some choice or another: we have make to devise some way of facing the risk of death, some way of coping with our bod etc. ily appetites, in all of this does pleasure Where fig ure? Early in the work, Aristotle dis misses the claim that pleasure is identi cal with happiness, that living for saying pleasure only would be "to choose the life of dumb grazing animals." Later some further he advances arguments the identification. First of all, it against is by no means easy to say exactly what is. Aristotle himself offers two pleasure of pleasure, very different conceptions one in book 7 and one in book 10. The first identifies pleasure with unimpeded that activity (not so odd ifwe remember and "enjoy speak of "my pleasures" The second, and probably bet ments"). is some ter, account holds that pleasure that neces along with, on, activity, "like the sarily supervenes bloom on the cheek of youth" ;one gets it by doing the relevant activity in a cer or complete tain, apparently unimpeded thing way. In any case, Aristotle does not re as a gard pleasure single thing that varies in intensity and duration ; it con only tains qualitative differences related to the activities to which it attaches. that comes we

this apparently uncontroversial of his argument by part that there is a further deep suggesting : ismade up of ac agreement happiness that is in accordance with excel tivity or, if there lence, either one excellence, concludes are more and most about than one, complete. then the greatest Scholars argue a lot


the precise meaning of this pas sage, but let me simply assert. He must the excellent activities mean, whatever of a human life turn out to be, happiness involves all of these in some suitable and the way all the activi combination, ties fit together to make up a whole life is an element in the value of that life. itself In the remainder of the Nicomachean considers the areas of Ethics, Aristotle human life in which we characteristical ly act and make choices, trying to identi fy the excellent way of acting in each of these areas. He seems to think that there is relatively little controversy about the fact that courage, moderation, justice, etc. are worth pursuing; the controversy 64 D dalus Spring 2004

Furthermore, by his account, pleasure is just not the right thing to focus on in a account of the good life for a normative are bad; human being. Some pleasures evil people take pleasure in their evil be mative havior. Happiness, is a nor by contrast, : since it is constitutive notion as "the human of what we understand life for a include evil

or "a good life," flourishing human being," we cannot in it. pleasures Another for Mill,

and a revealing one problem, is that some valuable activities

are not accompanied by pleasure. Aristo is the courageous warrior tle's example a source forWordsworth's po (perhaps who faces death in battle for the em) sake of a noble end. It is absurd to say at the pros Indeed, the pect of death, says Aristotle. better his life is, the more he thinks he has to lose and the more pain he is likely that this warrior is pleased of death. Nonethe to feel at the prospect he is acting in accordance with ex less, and is aware of that ;and so he cellence, is happy. This just goes to show, says Ar istotle, that pleasure does not always ac that constitute the activities company happiness. to Aristotle, Meanwhile, according are people whose there circumstances, them of activity, deprive by depriving He names the im them of happiness. If and tortured as examples. prisoned one has the unfortunate "luck of Priam" whose friends, children, and way of life were suddenly snatched away from him here too one can by defeat and capture from happiness." be "dislodged as is organized Utilitarianism IVliU's an extended defense of Bentham's pro gram against the most common objec tions Mill that had been raised against it. both the idea that pleasure and the idea is identical with happiness in producing that right action consists defends

"Neither enous"

nor pleasures pains : there are differences


homog "in kind,

Mill between & Aristotle Bentham

of intensity," apart from the question that are evident to any competent judge. We cannot avoid recognizing qualitative between differences, particularly er" and "lower" pleasures. How, judge between Mill refers them? "high then, to

Like Plato in book 9 of the Republic,

the choice to a competent both alterna has experienced shows Mill famous passage as very like activi thinking of pleasures so as experiences ties, or, with Aristotle, can that they closely linked to activities not be pursued apart from them. In a later text, he counts music, virtue, and judge who tives. This health shows as Elsewhere major pleasures. that he has not left sensation he ut

terly out of account: he asks "which is the most of existence of two modes uni grateful to the feelings." Clearly the - its reli calculus of the Benthamite ty ance on quantity as the only source of in pleasures has been thrown variation an idea of compe out, replaced here by tent judgment as to what "manner of ex "worth having." This istence" ismost like Aristotle, talk suggests that Mill, for a this judge as planning imagines as which should be complete whole life, awhole of all the major and inclusive
sources of value.




the way

in which

for the greatest the greatest happiness number. Along the way, however, with out open defection from the Benthamite a number of crucial he introduces camp, modifications. First of all, he admits clear view of the moral by... that "To give a standard set up

his judge makes choices, things get still more The reason an experi complicated. enced judge will not choose the lower is "a sense of dignity, which pleasures in one form all human beings possess or other,... is so essential a and which of those in whom part of the happiness with it is strong, that it could be, an object tarily, sense of dignity ness is for many keeper, conflicts nothing which than momen otherwise

more [Bentham's] theory, much to be said; in particular, what requires things it includes in the ideas of pain and pleasure ;and to what extent this is

left an open question." Shortly after it plain that, for him, ward, Mill makes

of desire to them." So a is a part of what happi : it acts as a gate people choice of a life de the preventing D dalus Spring 2004 65

Martha Nussbaum on happiness


expe clearly be rejected Mill continues, by this judge. Moreover, who supposes that this sense of anyone some dignity will cause people to forfeit two of their happiness "confoun[ds] rience machine would very different content." Mill more and ideas, of happiness, has thus rejected one of Bentham's equivalences.


to mere



to be is at variance unhappy, tle and Wordsworth.



V Ve might put this point by saying that

Mill Aristotle higher than does. Aristotle thinks that for a person from tune dislodges happiness it impedes activity so severely when only that a person cannot execute his chosen is plan of life at all. The pained warrior sets the bar of fortune

his discussion, Mill Summarizing writes that the happiness which the an cient philosophers "meant was not a life of rapture ;but moments of such, in an existence made up of few and transitory pains, many and varied pleasures, with a decided predominance of the active over the passive." At this point Mill appears to have jettisoned of the equivalence :for with pleasure happiness happiness some is now "made up of" pleasures, and activity; and its "parts" in pains, clude virtue of dignity. and the all-important Even though pleasure sense itself is

can still live in his own happy because he chosen way, and that is a good way. For the presence of a great deal of pain Mill, seems its potential significant beyond A life full of ethi for inhibiting activity. cal and intellectual and ac excellences tivity according does not suffice is insufficiently pain is present. to those excellences for happiness if pleasure or if too much present,

tells us, he had experienced such a life in amo not, likeWordsworth's warrior, ment but dur risk-taking, of depression. This life ing long period was the result of an that em upbringing to the exclu excellent phasized activity a sion of emotional includ satisfactions, ing feelings of contentment, pleasure, and comfort. Mill, as he much other was brought records, and as famously evidence demonstrates, up by his father to be able of courageous

Well, as he Why didMill think this ?

in and heterogeneous, complex standing a close relation to it is here said activity, to be but one part of happiness. And an on yet pleasure persists emphasis throughout Mill's work; he cannot ut terly leave it aside. in one crucial passage, he Meanwhile, toward pained virtue is subtly different from that of a and Wordsworth. Aristotle Imagining virtuous man in the present "imperfect state of the world's he arrangements," that this man must sacrifice concludes mote to pro his own happiness if he wishes others. But Mill the happiness of does not tell us enough about this man. If his sacrifice is very great, so that his life is deprived of activity, Mill's position :for Aristotle, we be Aristotelian may recall, judges that Priam is "dislodged from happiness" by his many and great But if this man ismore like misfortunes. the happy Warrior who endures pain for a noble cause, then Mill, in judging him 66 D dalus Spring 2004 shows us that his attitude

to display prodigious of many mastery and to share his fa intellectual skills, ther's shame at powerful emotions. Nor did he receive elsewhere any successful or stable care for the emotional parts of his personality. Mill's mother was evi awoman of no marked dently al interests or accomplishments soon became very exhausted so many children. Her son intellectu ; she by bearing

this as a lack of warmth. from an early draft of the Autobiography the passage prior to publica (he deleted tion at the urging of his wife Harriet)

experienced In a passage


speaks of his mother : able harshness



death wish


his father. The


That rarity in England, a really warm hearted mother, would in the first place have made my father a totally different being, and in the second would have made his children grow up loving and being loved. But my mother, with the very best of intentions, only knew how to pass her life in drudging for them. Whatever she could do for them she did, and they liked her, because she was kind to them, but to make herself obeyed, loved, looked up to, or even required qualities which she un

sumption self with Marmontel, the desire to care for his family by dis the father he feared. No doubt placing

is that Mill

is identifying him so and expressing

Mill between Aristotle &


this interpretation is not altogether mis for hostility toward his father is guided, a emotion in the narrative, if palpable a great deal of love counterbalanced by and admiration. The problem with this is that Mill does not account, however, seem keen on caring for oth particularly ers, either before or after this episode. Indeed, he tells us that he tried to lift his depression by being actively concerned with the well-being of others, but that this effort did no good. Instead, the fo cus of his search is on care for finding and in particular for the emo himself, tions and subjective feelings that his fa ther had treated as shameful. It seems to me much more likely that Mill above all identifies with the orphaned family who were now to receive the care going they needed. He imagines someone saying to him, Your needs, your feelings of pain, and loneliness, will be recog deadness, nized and fulfilled, you will have the care that you need. Your distress will be seen love, and you will find someone who will be everything to you. Ifwe now examine the original Mar as interpreters montel of the passage, do not bother to Autobiography usually this do, we see that it strongly confirms it clear that makes reading. Marmontel his consolation of his family is accom with plished through the aid of a difficult con as he deliv trol over his own emotions, ers his "without a single tear." speech But at his words of comfort, streams of tears are suddenly released in his mother :tears no and younger siblings longer of bitter mourning, he says, but of relief at comfort.5 So Mill is clearly in receiving
5 Jean Fran?ois Marmontel, Mercure de France, 1999), M?moires 63: : (Paris mes "'Ma m?re,

fortunately did not possess. I thus grew up in the absence of love and in the presence of fear ;and many and indelible are the ef fects of this bringing
my moral growth.

up in the stunting of

In his early twenties, Mill encountered a crisis of ac He remained depression. tive and carried out his plans, but he was aware of a deep inner void. He tried to relieve his melancholy through dedica tion to the general social welfare, but the blackness did not abate. The crucial in turning point was a very mysterious cident that has been much discussed:
Iwas Memoirs, relates his reading, and Marmontel's accidentally, came to the passage which death, the distressed



of the family, and the sudden in

spiration by which he, then amere boy, felt and made them feel that he would be everything to them would supply the place of all that they had lost. A vivid con ception of the scene and its feelings came
over me, and Iwas moved to tears. From

my burthen grew lighter. The oppression of the thought that all

feeling was no was dead within me, : Iwas was not gone. I longer or a stone... hopeless a stock

this moment

IViiU's ly been

Marmontel analyzed

episode has typical in terms of an alleged

dalus Spring 2004 67

C. Martha Nussbaum on happiness

not of the self position son, but of the weeping composed mother and children as they are relieved sorrow. to find a comfort that assuages the emotional In part, as the Autobiography makes clear, Mill's wish for care is fulfilled able to accept, care when he becomes and value the previously for, nourish, In part, too, hidden aspects of himself. in Harriet Taylor he shortly discovers emo as her letters show, an extremely tional person who is very skilled at cir de John's intellectual cumnavigating care for the person who would fenses him as his mother, he felt, did not. To relate plexities and Aristotle to the com the Autobiography of Mill's relation to Bentham

the very childlike character of Bentham, the man who loved the pleasures of in small creatures, who allowed the mice his study to sit on his lap, that made him able to see something did not Aristotle see :the need that we all have to be held the need to escape a ter and comforted, rible loneliness and deadness. is not a fully devel It frustrates philosophers work. oped to the who look for a tidy resolution Mill's Utilitarianism tensions it introduces into the many it has proved Utilitarian system. But over the ages because it con compelling tains a subtle awareness of human com that few philosophical works can plexity rival. Here, as in his surprising writings on women, Mill stands out - an adult an among the children, empiricist with aman who at experience, painfully that tained the kind of self-knowledge his great teacher lacked, and who turned into philosophy. that self-knowledge

But it is the is conjectural. sort of conjecture that makes sense, and, invites. the sort that Mill moreover, For Mill, Aristotelian the suppose, of happiness is conception on too cold. It places too much weight - not on the re 'correct' activity enough and childlike parts of the person ceptive act correctly and yet ality. One might feel like "a stock or a stone." Here the then, we may

childlike nature of Bentham's approach to life, which Mill often stresses, proves :for Bentham understood how valuable are for chil pain and pleasure powerful and for the child in us. Bentham dren, elements of did not value the emotional over in the right way; he the personality them, lacking all understand simplified

ing of poetry (asMill insists) and of love

(as we might add). But perhaps itwas

nous mes leur dis-je, soeurs, ?prouvons, des afflictions la plus grande ;ne nous y lais vous sons abattre. Mes enfants, perdez point un ; vous en retrouvez un en ser ;vous je p?re l'?tre ; j'en embrasse virai ; je le suis, je veux fr?res, tous ? les devoirs des moins s'?cria coeur, ; et vous ruisseaux am?res, ma m?re, 'mon connu ! fils! '" n'?tes de ces mots, larmes yeux. contre que bien 'Ah!' son plus larmes, en me mon orphelins.' de mais de leurs


pressant cher enfant!

je t'ai bien

68 D