MASAHIRO INAMI

THE PROBLEM OF OTHER MINDS IN THE BUDDHIST EPISTEMOLOGICAL TRADITION

1. INTRODUCTION

Do minds other than one’s own exist? This is a serious problem especially ˜a for the Vijn¯nav¯dins, Buddhist idealist, for they deny the existence of a the external objects. If other minds were admitted, their theory would be inconsistent. If other minds were denied, it would be meaningless to preach to others. ¯ ¯ Dharmak¯ti, in the Santanantarasiddhi, the first independent treatise ı on this problem, explains that the existence of other minds can be ˜a inferred even from the viewpoint of the Vijn¯nav¯dins. According a to him, the existence of other minds is inferred from the appearance of other persons’ speeches and actions. However, Ratnak¯rti, in ı ¯ ¯ ¯. . Santanantaradusana, another independent treatise on this problem, from ˜a the viewpoint of the Vijn¯nav¯dins, explains in detail that other minds a cannot be inferred at all and denies their existence. His view seemingly contradicts Dharmak¯rti’s view. The purpose of this paper is to analyze ı their views and to consider how the problem of other minds is dealt with in the Buddhist epistemological tradition.1
¯ ¯ 2. DHARMAK¯ IRTI’S SANTANANTARASIDDHI

2.1. Dharmak¯rti, when he takes the Sautr¯ntika standpoint, of ı a course admits the existence of other minds. As is well known, in ¯. ¯ the Pramanavarttika, he argues against the C¯rv¯kas that inference is a a a means of valid cognition by pointing out that we can know other minds only through inference. For the Sautr¯ntikas, the existence of a other minds as well as of external objects is known by inference.2
¯ ¯ 2.2. In the Santanantarasiddhi, on the other hand, Dharmak¯rti consisı ˜a ˜a tently adopts the Vijn¯nav¯da standpoint. Dharmak¯rti as a Vijn¯nav¯din a ı a discusses the problem of other minds with the Sautr¯ntikas there. a

Journal of Indian Philosophy 29: 465–483, 2001. c 2001 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

6 On this problem.5 2. The Vijn¯nav¯din’s a process of inference can be stated as follows: Observing that the appearance of our bodily and verbal actions is preceded by our minds. Other minds can never be perceived. 3) If other persons’ actions were based on our minds. the Sautr¯ntikas explain that we can infer other a minds from other persons’ actions because our own minds are not fit to be a cause of other persons’ actions. therefore. For them. should be produced by causes other than our minds. we infer the existence of other minds from the appearance of other persons’ bodily and verbal actions.3.´ we cannot apply the relation between our own minds and actions to them. Since other minds are imperceptible (adrsya). By observing our own minds and the appearance of our actions. Dharmak¯rti states the view of the Sautr¯ntikas as ı a follows: Observing in our own bodies that [our bodily and verbal] actions are preceded by [our] mental [actions]. According to the Sautr¯ntikas. The cognitions ı a in which our own actions appear are caused by our own minds. A question now arises.3 After that. a 7 the unfitness is for the following three reasons: 1) We do not experience that our own minds produce other persons’ actions. But the Vijn¯nav¯dins do not admit that actions exist outside of minds. in which other persons’ actions appear as external. In principle. we infer [the existence of other] minds from the fact that the [bodily and verbal actions] are grasped in other [bodies as well]. 2) The actions based on our minds are observed in our own bodies. Then. . not in the body of another person. Dharmakirti maintains that the existence of other minds ˜a can be inferred even from the viewpoint of the Vijn¯nav¯dins in the same a ˜a a manner. Dharmak¯rti agrees with the Sautr¯ntikas. Then. how can we infer them? We can observe only that our own actions are preceded by our minds. other persons’ actions would be experienced just like our own actions. the existence of other minds is inferred ˜a from the appearance of other persons’ actions. we establish the causal relation between mind and appearance of action. and then the actions appear as internal.466 MASAHIRO INAMI First of all. Therefore. the cognitions. .4 This can be regarded as the inference based on the probans as effect ¯ (karyahetu). we infer the existence of other minds from the appearance of other persons’ actions which are the effect of other minds.

but because our behaviors based on it do not fail us. 3) The object of inference would have causal efficiency ¯´ (arthakriyasakti).12 Moreover. Although it cannot reveal other minds themselves. ¯ 13 The inference of other minds is regarded as a basis of its validity. concerned only with the universal. it is valid because our behaviors based on it do not fail us. our own actions appear as things which are not separated ı from our body.BUDDHIST EPISTEMOLOGICAL TRADITION 467 The difference between the appearance of one’s own actions and that of other persons’ actions is taken into consideration here.4. Dharmak¯rti notes that such a difference is not fundamental. If not.8 However. He points out there that if inference could reveal the unique characteristics of objects. Therefore. For example. the existence of an object other than one’s own mind would be accepted. What is known through such an inference? Are other minds themselves known through it? If other minds themselves are known.10 On the problem. they are caused by our own intentions. although the movement of the stone cast by us and the movement of another person shaken by us appear as separated from our own body. It is concerned only with the universal. inference cannot reveal the unique ı characteristics of objects.14 . Dharmak¯rti insists that another person’s mind not ı in particular but in general is known through the inference.11 In Dharmak¯rti’s epistemology. According to Dharmak¯rti. The correspondence (avisamvada) is . the following unacceptable results would occur: 1) There would be no difference between perception and inference. Let us turn to the next problem. 2) Inference could be concerned neither with the things in the future and the past nor with unreal things.9 2. other minds would not be known through the inference. Dharmak¯rti explains that inference is a means of valid ı cognition not because it reveals an object itself. If mind in particular were known through the inference. ı There can be some exceptions. ¯ ¯ He reaffirms this in the Santanantarasiddhi. But other persons’ actions appear as things separated from our own body. the specific forms of another person’s mind would be known through it just as those of one’s own mind are known through perception. Dharmak¯rti concludes that whether the ı actions are separated from our own body or not is not a crucial factor in inferring other minds.

As is well known. ı Firstly.17 ¯ ¯ ¯ 3. Yogin’s knowledge of other minds is regarded as valid just because their behaviors based on it do not fail them. takes up their knowledge of other minds. Let us turn now to Ratnak¯rti’s Santanantaradusana. Causal relation is then established by perception and non-perception and consists of positive and negative concomitance. in the ı ¯ ¯ final portion of the Santanantarasiddhi. we first determine the causal relation between intention and appearance of verbal [and bodily] action. Observing that our verbal and bodily actions appear immediately after our ¯ intentions (icchacitta) and that they do not appear in the absence of [our intentions]. 3.468 MASAHIRO INAMI 2.15 To the problem whether Buddha knows other minds themselves or not. observing that verbal and bodily actions separated [from our own body] appear even when any intentions . There. because they have not attained enlightenment yet. we establish the causal relation between the mind and the appearance of action. They do not truly know other minds. Dharmak¯rti comments only that Buddha’s omniscience is beyond ı our understanding because Buddha’s knowledge is beyond our knowledge and words. It is regarded as valid because of its correspondence. in the Buddhist tradition it is admitted that Yogins and Buddha can directly know other minds. Yogins are not free of the distinction between the grahya ı ¯ ‘object apprehended’ and the grahaka ‘subject apprehending’.16 ¯ ¯ 2. First of all. According to ¯ Dharmak¯rti. The inference of other minds stated in the Santanantarasiddhi can be summarized as follows: Observing in our own bodies that the appearance of our bodily and verbal actions is preceded by the activity of our minds. ¯ ¯ ¯.1. he states opponent’s view as follows: Some people explain as follows: There exist other minds. They are considered to know other minds not because they know other minds themselves but because those which have great resemblance to other minds clearly appear in their knowledge. ı Ratnak¯rti explains in detail that other minds cannot be inferred at all ı and denies their existence.6. And then. RATNARK¯ IRTI’S SANTANANTARADUSANA . Other minds in general are known through the inference.5. Then we infer other minds from the appearance of actions which are not caused by us and which appear as separated from our body in most cases. Dharmak¯rti points out that Yogin’s knowledge of other minds does not reveal other minds themselves. . . Dharmak¯rti. which are known through inference.

Even if a particular fire is remote in space or time. smoke. Accordingly. which is substantially . the following objection is raised: Intention in general can be regarded as perceptible in reference to self-consciousness (svasamvedana) because other persons’ intentions are perceived by . we infer [other] intentions to be the cause of the [appearance of the actions]. its nonexistence will be proved. . If we could regard something as perceptible on the basis ´¯ of other persons’ experience. . how is the causal relation established? We can determine only that our own intention. if it is perceptible. A globlin can be perceived by some Yogins or another goblin. Secondly. we do not perceive the intention and therefore we will establish its absence by the non-perception of a perceptible object (drsyanupalabdhi).2.´ ¯ 20 If we do perceive it.BUDDHIST EPISTEMOLOGICAL TRADITION 469 are not perceived.18 Here. we can suppose that it should be perceived if it were here. As for intention. ˜a the Santanantaradusana. Therefore. ¯ different (svabhavaviprakrs.. we can never determine that intention in general is the cause of the appearance of action. Let us examine Ratnak¯rti’s refutation. Thus. 3. While inferring. Thus. which need not be qualified by perceptibility or imperceptibility?19 Firstly. However. we cannot determine that a fire common even to the fire of digestion is the cause of smoke. Ratnak¯rti refutes the Vijn¯nav¯din’s argument ı a for the existence of other minds as it is stated by Dharmak¯rti in the ı ¯ ¯ Santanantarasiddhi.ta) from the fire regarded as the cause of . First of all. Ratnak¯rti ı ı analyzes the intention which is regarded as a cause of the appearance of actions. other minds are established. a mind common to other . is the cause of the appearance of our action. we cannot suppose that intention common to other persons should be perceived if it were here. In ı ¯ ¯ ¯.21 Here. if intention in general is regarded as a cause of the appearance of action. or does the inference use intention in general. a goblin (pisaca) would be perceptible.22 Ratnak¯rti answers this by pointing out that ı we should not take into consideration the person other than the one who infers. we can determine the causal relation between fire and smoke in general. we can ¯ never perceive the fire of digestion (jatharagni). It is substantially different from the intention regarded as the cause of the appearance of action. Since we can never perceive other persons’ minds. Is it perceptible for one who infers. this argument is quite similar to Dharmak¯rti’s. We can never determine that intention in general is the cause of the appearance of action. their self-consciousness. which is perceptible. there is no need to infer it. we notice.

Then. we cannot establish a rule applicable to other minds. The distinction between one’s own mind and another also depends on the knowledge of them. in the Tarkabhasa.21–22. what is it distinct from? (RNA 147. After Ratnak¯rti finds faults with the argument for the existence of other minds. [i. Ratnak¯rti quotes ı ˜a s ı ¯ ¯ ´¯ Jn¯na´r¯mitra’s words from the Sakarasiddhisastra. another mind].25 Ratnak¯rti refers to the following three difficulties in admitting the ı distinction between one’s own mind and another: . Cf. one’s own mind should be distinct from them. But we can only perceive our own minds.470 MASAHIRO INAMI persons’ should not be regarded as perceptible.23 As we have seen. (RNA 147.19. we cannot perceive a rabbit’s horn. If one’s own mind is distinct from another by nature. But such a distinction never appears. Here. he presents an ¯ argument against it (badhaka). we cannot make a distinction between our minds and a rabbit’s horn. He points out the non-appearance of the distinction between one’s own mind and another. Ratnak¯rti refutes the proof of other minds’ existence by ı pointing out that a mind neither in general nor in particular is fit to be proved. ı 3. Let us turn now to the next refutation.3. Ratnak¯rti seems ı to point out that only by observing our own mind and the appearance of our action. If other minds were existent. Therefore.) Our notion of distinction depends on the knowledge of two things. Thus. When we know only one of them.] Nor should it be apprehended that [one’s own mind] is identical with [another mind]. we can never distinguish one from another. [Therefore.19 = JNA 456.15–16).e. other things do not appear at all. Such a theory is refuted by Ratnak¯rti here. since we cannot perceive other minds.17–18 = JNA 458. it ¯.. Similarly. Cf. regards other persons’ a . For example.24 But such a standpoint is rejected here. one’s own mind should not be distinct from another. ¯ is noted that Moks¯karagupta.24. Even if one has a distinction. JNA 570. while perceiving our own minds. JNA 573. He insists there that we can establish the inevitable relation between mind in general and action in general. Moreover. we cannot make a distinction between our own minds and other minds. Dharmak¯rti explains that it is a mind in general ı ı that is proved. minds as perceptible on the grounds that they are perceived by other persons’ self-consciousness. it should appear together with a limiting object (avadhi). and that we can infer the existence of other minds.

Ratnak¯rti presents the proof of the nonexistence of ı other minds as follows: [Vy¯pti:] If something (X). cannot admit the existence of other minds. being perceived. without any reference to the qualifier “perceptibility”. here. could not reject the objection that the theory is refuted by perception grasping a distinction. causality should be admitted. There. who prove the nonduality of a cognition. Since cognition has nonduality. But. By which means is the nonexistence of other minds proved? The existence of other minds may be refuted in the above manner. with regard to distinction. in ı ı reality. The ı acceptance of the distinction conflicts with Dharmak¯rti’s statement.29 Answering this. the next objection is raised. the distinction between one’s own mind and external objects ˜a should be admitted as well. insists that causal efficiency was admitted only conventionally.4. because imperceptible objects cannot be proved to be nonexistent through inference. Ratnak¯rti ı seems to point out that the acceptance of the existence of other minds ˜ ¯ ¯ is contradictory to the theory of vijnaptimatrata. For example. not appear in a form distinct from other minds. is there any means of establishing the nonexistence of other minds? It cannot be established through perception. the distinction between them cannot be apprehended. who deny the existence a of external objects. we can not prove them to be either existent or nonexistent. This is. However. then a X cannot be dealt with as a thing existing in that form (Y). [Paksadharmat¯:] One’s own mind. since two things differing in time are not apprehended together. pays attention ı ¯ to the inconsistency with the theory of citradvaita. does a . Dharmak¯rti ı . Ratnak¯rti quotes Dharmak¯rti’s ¯. This is formulated when it is denied that another mind is identical with one’s own mind. causality can never be known. ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ Pramanavarttika III 4d: samvrtyastu yatha tatha. if the distinction between one’s own mind and another is admitted. being perceived.30 .28 3. Therefore. if the distinction is admitted. because perception leads us to affirmative judgement and not to negative judgement. cannot be dealt with as a thing existing in the yellow form. ¯ ¯ the non-perception of the object itself (svabhavanupalabdhi). if they admitted the distinction between one’s own mind and the mind of another. The Vijn¯nav¯dins. Here. The apprehension of causality presupposes that of distinction.26 Secondly. the acceptance of the distinction is contradictory to the ¯ ˜a theory of citradvaita.BUDDHIST EPISTEMOLOGICAL TRADITION 471 Firstly. which does not appear in the yellow form. does not appear in some form (Y). Since other minds are regarded as imperceptible.27 Thirdly. nor through inference. . no distinction can be perceived. The Vijn¯nav¯dins. a blue thing. Ratnak¯rti.

ı If the distinction appeared. Finally. Buddha never knows them. But. ¯ ¯ other minds are unreal. by which means does Buddha know them? First. ı Ratnak¯rti proves the nonexistence of another mind. 3. he denies the distinction between one’s own mind and other minds. the limiting object (avadhi). he cannot know them by perception. If other minds are existent. even if Buddha does not know ı them. and consequently the theory of external object ¯ (bahirarthavada) would be accepted. Secondly. Ratnak¯rti clearly denied Buddha’s knowledge of other minds. ı According to Ratnak¯rti. Since they are imperceptible. just as a rabbit’s horn. But Ratnak¯rti does not offer any comments on this ı contradiction.36 . therefore. who is ˜ an omniscient being (sarvajna). as we have seen. how does Buddha know them? Ordinary people may suspect that there exist other minds. should not a accept that a mind other than one’s own is grasped by perception. Ratnak¯rti explains that the probans is not illegitimate (asiddhi). but Buddha.33 The last point is noteworthy. denying the distinction between one’s own mind and another. Therefore. would appear. the universal (samanya) 32 and so on. Ratnak¯rti concludes that other minds do not exist at all. i. If he knew them by inference.31 Thus. The ˜a ˜ ¯ ¯ Vijn¯nav¯dins. According to him. he should indubitably know them. ¯ ¯ there would exist the grahya-grahaka relation between other minds and Buddha’s mind. Such ı a standpoint seems to contradict the traditional view that Buddha can know other minds. because the inference of other minds is not correct. their nonexistence cannot be proved by inference.5. another mind. the distinction between one’s own mind and another is not perceived.e. If Buddha knows other minds by perception. does not have such a suspicion at all. Since another mind is not perceived. Ratnak¯rti does not directly prove the nonexistence of other ı minds. Ratnak¯rti argues about Buddha’s knowledge of other minds.472 MASAHIRO INAMI Here. who advocate the theory of vijnaptimatrata. here points out that the ı acceptance of the existence of other minds is contradictory to the theory ¯ ¯ that the grahyagrahaka relations are denied in the ultimate sense. the fault that he would not be omniscient does not follow. He considers that the denial of the distinction implies the nonexistence of other minds. he does not know them by inference. Since other minds do not exist at all.35 Here.. Ratnak¯rti. ı If there exist other minds.34 Thus. he would know them indirectly and therefore he would not be omniscient.

validity based on correspondence is not truly known. other minds are denied because the distinction between one’s own mind and another is not known at all.. i. Our notion of them is only a mistaken belief. In our conventional world. causality is not truly known. Therefore. the convenı ¯ tional (samvrti) and the ultimate (paramartha). Although other minds are not ultimately existent. Even if one who denies the existence of other minds says to others that other minds do not exist at all. and it does not reveal the correspondence between them.6. we could not act with respect to other persons. Similarly. the distinction neither between ¯ ¯ grahya and grahaka nor between one’s own mind and another exists. ı . The notion of causality needs the cognition of two things. But. in the Santanantarasiddhi. But. Ratnak¯rti introduces the theory of two truths. Both causality and validity are objects of empirical knowledge which has not yet been analyzed. each of two cognitions reveals its own object only. in the realm of convention. ı explains that the validity of Yogin’s knowledge of other minds is guaranteed only by its correspondence. minds.BUDDHIST EPISTEMOLOGICAL TRADITION 473 3.40 Ratnak¯rti’s view on other minds is quite similar ı to these views on causality and validity. ı ¯ ¯ there would be the grahya-grahaka relation between one’s own mind and other minds. Therefore they are admitted only in the conventional sense. Moreover. validity based on correspondence needs two cognitions. ¯ ¯ We must remember here that Dharmak¯rti.38 ˜a As I have examined in another paper. since two things cannot be cognized in reality. Ratnak¯rti calls our attention to the point that the ı existence of other minds is denied not in the conventional sense but in the ultimate sense.39 Prajn¯karagupta and ˜a s ı Jn¯na´r¯mitra explain that both causality and validity are admitted only in the conventional sense because nonduality is ultimate. . one can speak about it to others in order to enlighten them. But they are not denied in the conventional sense. He notes there that a Yogin ¯ ¯ is not free of the distinction between grahya and grahaka. there may be such a suspicion.e.) Dharmak¯rti seems to understand that if other minds were perceived. The acceptance of the existence of other minds. Dharmak¯rti. is contradictory to the theory of ˜ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ vijnaptimatrata. He does not intend that other minds are suspected to be existent from any viewpoints. Nonduality is admitted as ultimate. to the problem of other .37 Thus. Otherwise. in the Santanantarasiddhi. just as that of the existence of external objects. In the ultimate sense. there is no fault of self-contradiction. In this respect. On the level of the ultimate truth.5. (See 2.

it cannot be refuted on the level of the ultimate truth. Therefore. we may recall Jn¯na´r¯mitra’s remarks on causality in the ˙ ¯ ¯ Ksanabhangadhyaya. admitted only in the conventional sense. the other hand. causality cannot be refuted. in the Santanantarasiddhi. it cannot be refuted on the level of the ultimate truth. CONCLUSION ¯ ¯ Dharmak¯rti. not in the conventional sense. Such an inference is conventional and is denied on the level of the ultimate truth. the existence of other minds is denied as is causality. Nonduality is ultimately admitted.43 Ratnak¯rti insists that his refutation is not absolute. from this point of view. all distinctions disappear. . batsky (1922). as we have seen. . Moreover. neither the argument for nor the argument against the existence of these things is absolute. The ultimate truth is beyond our argument.41 ˜a s ı Here. denies it ı in the ultimate sense. In this sense. Ratnak¯ ırti’s Santanantaradusana . argues for the existence of ı ˜a other minds from the standpoint of the Vijn¯nav¯dins. The ultimate truth is beyond our argument. Ratnak¯rti.42 The same may be true of the existence of other minds.474 MASAHIRO INAMI deals with other minds only in the conventional sense. It is admitted only in the conventional sense. all distinctions disappear. both proof and refutation. he often insists that the inference of other minds can be regarded as valid because of its correspondence.44 4. however. The distinction neither between pramana and prameya nor between ¯ ¯ sadhana and sadhya exists. . ¯. But. Ratnak¯rti. But. therefore. NOTES 1 ¯ ¯ Dharmak¯ ırti’s Santanantarasiddhi was translated into modern languages in Stcher¯ ¯ ¯. they are only conventional. Kitagawa (1955). on the highest level. the existence of other minds should not be refuted. Their views are seemingly contradictory to each other. We ı should cling neither to the acceptance of other minds nor to the denial of it. he does not clearly mention that the existence of other minds is denied in the ultimate sense. on the level of the highest truth. Since our logical arguments. and Katsura (1983). on a ı ¯ ¯ ¯. He explains there that although causality is . and is denied in the ultimate sense. In the ultimate sense. It does not matter whether the existence of other minds is known in the conventional sense or in the ultimate sense. But. He comments only that Buddha’s knowledge is beyond our argument. In this sense. argues against it in the Santanantaradusana. According to him. are based on the premise that such a distinction is existent.

. . . s¯m¯nyayor iva dr´y¯tmanor eva k¯ryak¯ranas¯m¯nyayoh pratyaks¯nupalambhato a a a a . 1965). 62. ˜ .s a .10–12: nanu yadi dr´y¯gnidhumaa a a a . .). a ba’i me dang du ba spyi dag gi bzhin du bltar rung ba’i bdag nyid kho na’i ’bras bu dang rgyu spyi dag nyid kyi khyab pa mngon sum dang mi dmigs pa las yin na de’i tshe gzhan gyis sems rjes su dpag pa nyams te / gzhan gyi sems ni bltar mi rung ba nyid kyis khyab pa ’dzin pa’i dus na nan du ’dus pa ma yin pa’i phyir ro zhe na . ¯ ´ pravrttes ca siddhas tadbhavaniscayah // . TBh 44.tva svadehe ’nyatra tadgrahanat .18–5.. . (Kajiyama 2000) The problem of other minds in the Buddhist epistemological tradition was treated with in Sharma (1985).15–16: gal te gzhan gyi shes pa’i byed pa mi dmigs pa’i phyir gzhan gyi blo rjes su dpag par mi rung ngo zhe na / Cf.) Cf.¯ ˜¯ / jnayate yadi dh¯s (cittam¯tre ‘py esa nayah samah // See Kitagawa 409. ¯ ¯ ¯ PV III 68: siddhan ca paracaitanyapratipatteh pramanadvayam / vyaharadau . . (R¯makan. . 17: re zhig bya ba de nyid kyis kyang sems de ci ste rtogs par byed // 40 // sems kyi ’bras bu yin pa’i phyir ro // 41 // de’i ’bras bu yin pa ni sems gzhan la yang ’dra bas ci ste rtogs par mi byed // 42 // gzhan yang gal te bya ba de rang yod pa tsam gyis rang gi rgyud rtogs par byed na ni / mi dmigs pas kyang de lta bu rtogs par ’gyur ro // 43 // gal te rtags ni shes pa la ltos pa’i phyir mi ’gyur ro zhe na // 44 // de la de’i tshe gzhan gyi sems las ni bya ba’o / bya ba las ni shes pa’o / shes pa las ni de rtogs pa’o zhes bya ba brgyud pa ’dis ci zhig bya // 45 // bya bar snang ba gzhan gyi sems las rab tu skye ba’i chos can gyi shes pa kho na ’di* rtogs par byed pa yin par ’gyur te // 46 // de rtogs pa ni tha mar yang de la brten pa’i phyir ro // 47 // (*B: ’dis. .a ¯ humas¯m¯nyayor iva dr´y¯tmanor eva k¯ryak¯ranas¯m¯nyayoh pratyaks¯nupalambhato a a a a . Nyayaviniscayavivarana 303. Tattvartharajavarttika .5–7: rang lus blo sngon du ’gro ba yi / bya ba mthong nas gzhan la’ang ´ de / ’dzin phyir gal te blo shes ’gyur / .ı ¯ .v¯ tasy¯´ as . D: ’di) 5 As Katsura (1983) pointed out.5: sems tsam du smra bas kyang gzhan gyi sems rjes su dpag par nus te // 1 // de yang shes pa gzhan gyi g-yo ba’i khyad par med par lus dang ngag gi rnam par rig byed du snang ba’i shes pa de lta bu dag yod par ni mi ’dod do // 2 // Cf. ¯ vy¯ptis. . .s a . a ı . ı´ a . .s a . 4 SS 5.¯ . . Negi (1997). tad¯ samtanantaranumanam na syat. C. 3 SS 1. . D: dmigs par ’gyur ba zhig na) . 6 SS 6. . (TBht D355b5–6: ’o na bltar rung a a a .t a cest¯bhidh¯dikam // paracitt¯num¯nan ca na sy¯d ¯tmany adar´an¯t / sambandhasya a a a ˜ a a s a .s a a . who recently published a Japanese translation of the same work. ¯ ¯ vy¯ptigrahanak¯le ’nantarbh¯v¯d iti cen . . the inference stated by Dharmak¯ in the ırti ¯ ¯ Santanantarasiddhi is similar in essence to the so-called ‘argument from analogy’ for other minds in Western philosophy.a ¯ ¯ . ´ . . 2 ˜ ¯.13–14: nanu yadi ¯ dr´y¯gnidhumas¯m¯nyayor iva dr´y¯tmanor k¯ryak¯ranas¯m¯nyayoh pratyaks¯gnida a a a . SS 29.t ¯ ¯..a ¯ vy¯ptis tad¯ paracitt¯num¯naksatih /. ´ ¯ ´ ¯ ¯ ¯ Siddhiviniscayat¯ka I 164–167.s a . 17–32.: buddhipurvam kriyam dr.6: gal te bdag nyid kyi sems gzhan la yod pa dag gi rgyu mtshan nyid du mi rung ba’i phyir gzhan gyi sems shes par ’gyur ro zhe na / ci ltar mi rung // 5 // (1) rang gi kun nas slong ba’i sems so sor yang dag par myong ba med pa’i phyir dang // 6 // (2) bdag nyid gyi sems kyi rten can yang bdag nyid la mthong ba’i phyir te / 7 / (3) de dag kyang de lta bu yin na ni de dang ’dra bar dmigs par ’gyur ba zhig na* / 8 / de lta ma yin par mthong bas / rgyu mtshan gzhan grub pa yin no zhe na / 9 / (*B: dmigs par ’gyur. . 26. etc. . . . .BUDDHIST EPISTEMOLOGICAL TRADITION 475 had been translated into English by Yuichi Kajiyama (Kajiyama. PV III 475cd–476c: pratyaksan ca dhiyam drs. a a .a .2–6.s a . . SS 4. .3–10. RNA (¯ ISD) 45. .) 7 SS 8. parcittasy¯dr´y¯tmakatay¯ a a a . a a .ha’s Naresvarapar¯ksavrtti.2: gal te bdag nyid la bya ba dang brjod pa sems kyi g-yo ba sngon du ’gro ba can dag mthong nas / gzhan la de dag mthong bas g-yo ba rjes su dpog par byed na / . a a . p. s ¯ Kashmir Series.

a a .5: gzhang gyi sems rjes su dpag pa la yang mngon pa ’dod pa’i don la mi slu ba yod pa kho na ste // 78 // ’jug par byed pa de’i sgo nas srog chags gzhan yod par rtogs nas yang nas yang du tha snyad dag la ’jug na / de’i dbang gis ’byung ba’i don thob pa’i phyir ro // 79 // 15 SS 68.2–3: de lta bas na bya ba’i khyad par gyi spyi ni g-yo ba’i khyad par spyi rtogs par byed pa yin no // 22 //. P: de) 11 SS 52.1-17. SS 57. . . SS 34. 14–58.9–10: rnam par chad pa dang rnam par ma chad par snang bas byas pa’i khyad par ni. PV II 1a–b: pram¯nam avisamv¯di jn¯nam. 13 SS 56. .7: gnas ma gyur pa’i phyir rnal ’byor pa gzung ba dang ’dzin pa’i rnam par rtog pa ma spangs pa rnams kyis gzhan gyi sems shes pa yang / tha snyad la mi slu ba nyid kyis gzugs la sogs pa mthong ba bzhin du tshad ma nyid yin no . D:ba’i) Cf.a . .9–71. .8: ‘di yang thal bar ’gyur ba mtshungs te // 67 // bya ba dang tshig dag gis gzhan gyi sems rtogs pa ltar na yang de’i ngo bo’nyid yul du byed na ni / de’i tshe rang gi sems shes pa bzhin du de’i rnam pa yang shes par thal bar ’gyur ro // de mi shes na ni des de’i ngo bo nyid ci ltar ’dzin // 68 // gal te rtags kyis ni spyi rtogs pa’i phyir rnam pa rtogs pa ma yin no zhe na // 69 // spi de ci gzhan gyi sems nyid yin nam / ’on te gzhan zhig gam / ’on te brjod du mi rung zhig yin // 70 // gzhan nyid dang brjod du mi rung ba nyid dag gcig yin na ni ’dis spyi de kho na gzung gi / gzhan gyi sems mi ma yin na / ci ltar ’dis de rtogs par ’gyur // 71 // spyi gzhan gyi sems nyid kyang ma yin te / de yod na de’i rnam pa yang shes par thal bar ’gyur ro zhes bshad zin te // 72 // ’di ni rjes su dpag pa’i tshul yang ma yin no // 73 // Cf. a a . SS 13.7–9: g-yo ba tsam gyi spyi ni bya ba dang brjod pa’i shes pa spyi’i rgyu yin pas ’bras bus rgyu rtogs pa yin no // 12 SS 55. 14 SS 58. 9 SS 15.12–11. PV III 56: a.5: ghzan la yang rang gi kun nas slong bar byed pa’i sems yang dag par myong ba med pas ’dra la / 10 / rnam par rig byed du snang ba’i shes pa rang gi sems kyi g-yo ba’i rgyu mtshan can dag kyang kha nang du bltas pa’i snang ba yin par rtogs pa’i phyir / kha phyir bltas pa’i ba dag rgyu mtshan gzhan las skye bar ’gyur ro // 11 //.15: ‘o na ci zhe na / rnam par chad pa la yang bya ba’i khyad par du snang ba kho na yin no // 17 // mda’ dang rdo ’phang ba dang / rgyogs dang sprul ba dang gzhan gyis rab tu bskyod pa la sogs pa’i bya ba’i khyad par du snang ba can rnams yul chad par snang ba yang g-yo ba sngon du ’gro ba can yin pa’i phyir la / 18 / gzhan gyis byas pa’i g-yo ba la sogs pa rnam par ma chad pa yin yang de sngon du ’gro ba can ma yin pa’i phyir ro // 19 // de lta bas na ’dir bya ba’i khyad par tsam gyis g-yo ba rtogs pa yin par rigs so // 20 //.10–55. . SS 19. 5–6: khyad par ’di ni phal che ba’i dbang du byas pa yin no // 10 SS 51.2–8: ci ste bya ba la sogs par snang ba’i rnam par shes pa ’bras bu’i rtags las skyes pa gzhan gyi sems shes pa de* gzhan gyi sems yul du byed dam / ’on te ma yin te / yul du byed na ni don gzhan yin par ’gyur ro // yul du mi byed na ni shes pas pha rol gyi sems yod pa ci ltar shes te / de’i ngo bo nyid ma shes par de ’grub pa mi srid pa’i phyir ro zhe na // 66 // (*B: de dag. 12–15: rjes su dpag pa ni don gyi rang gi ngo bo ’dzin par byed pa ma yin te / mngon sum dang ’dra bar snang ba khyad par med pa la sogs par thal bar ’gyur ba’i phyir ro // 74 //. SS 33.476 MASAHIRO INAMI 8 SS 10. .2: du ba la sogs pa’i rtags las skyes pa yang me la sogs pa’i rang gi ngo bo’i yul can ma yin te / (1) mthong ba dang khyad par med par thal bar ’gyur ba’i* phyir ro // (2) rjes su dpag pa ’das pa la sogs pa dang / ngo bo nyid med pa dag la yang ’jug par mi ’gyur ba’i phyir dang / (3) don byed par thal bar ’gyur ba’i yang phyir ro // 77 // (*B: pa’i. s a . . krtottarah // . a abhipr¯y¯visamv¯d¯d api bhr¯nteh pram¯nat¯ / gatir apy anyath¯ drst¯ paksa´ c¯yam a a a . a. NB I 16–17: anyat s¯m¯nyalaksanam // 16 // so ’num¯nasya visayah // 17 // a a a . 15–19. .10–18: de’i phyir ’di ni tshad ma nyid ma yin no // 75 // de’i rang gi ngo bo mi ’dzin kyang mngon par ’dod pa’i don la mi slu bas tshad ma nyid yin ˜a pa’i phyir ro // 76 // Cf.

´ ¯ . a a . . ¯ ¯ . . . 12–13: atredam ¯locyate / tad icch¯cittam vy¯h¯r¯dy¯bh¯sasya k¯ranatay¯ a a a aa a a a . ´ ´.s a .s . 12–15: athecch¯cittam¯tram svasamvedanam¯tr¯peksay¯ na a a .18–72.´ . a a a ..´ ¯ . . a .3: bcom ldan ’das kyis don thams cad thugs su chud pa ni bsam gyis mi khyab ste / rnam pa thams cad du shes pa dang brjod pa’i yul las ’das ˜ pa’i phyir ro // 94 // Cf. . 22 SD 146. s a . .s . api drsyam eveti / (*RNA: dr´yam) .BUDDHIST EPISTEMOLOGICAL TRADITION 477 // 90 // rnal ’byor gyi stobs kyis ni de dag la shes pa gzhan gyi sems kyi rnam pa’i bye brag gi rjes su byed pa gsal bar snang ba ’byung bar ’byur te / las dang lha la sogs pa’i byin gyis rlabs kyi stobs kyis rmi lam bden pa mthong ba bzhin no // 91 // de dag la yang gzhan gyi sems kyi yul can nyid kyi shes pa ’byung ba ni yin te / de dag kyang rang gi sems snang ba de dang rnam pa mtshungs pa kho na nyid shes pa las / gzhan gyi sems shes pa zhes bya ba nges par gzung bas tha snyad ’dogs so // 92 // mngon sum de ni de’i rnam pa’i rjes su byed pa gsal bar snang ba’i phyir dang / mi slu ba’i tshad ma zhes bya bar ’dod do // 93 // 16 SS 71. 7–34. ¯ tatk¯ranabhutam icch¯cittam anum¯ a . . 17 SS 33. . . ıtya tadutpattisiddhigavesan¯ / na cecch¯m¯trasya a a .6: g-yo ba tsam gyi spyi ni bya ba dang brjod pa’i shes pa syi’i rgyu yin pas ‘bras bus rgyu pa yin no // 48 // de la bdag nyid kyi g-yo ba’i rgyu mtshan can ni kha nang du bltas par ’jug la / gzhan ni gzhan du yin te / khyad par ’di ni phal che ba’i dbang du byas pa yin no // 49 // 18 SD 145. e .6: atha dvit¯ ıyo vikalpah / tath¯ h¯ ¯cittam¯tram a ıccha a . .s ˜a dr´yah* / tatra yath¯ caksurvijn¯nam¯tr¯peksay¯ aginim¯tram dr´yam iti vyavasth¯pyate a a a . a . .s a . 13–16: yadi t¯vad ¯dyo vikalpas tad¯num¯tur dar´anayogyatv¯d a a a a s a icch¯cittasy¯num¯nak¯le ’nupalabdhir abh¯vam eva gamayat¯ anupalambh¯khyaa a a a a ıty a pratyaksab¯dhitatv¯t kv¯num¯n¯vak¯´as tasya / yadi punar icch¯cittam anum¯nak¯le a a a a as a a a .. svabh¯vaviprakrstasya a .a a aa a a .s . a . a .s a . a a . . bandh¯bhy¯m avi´esitam yasya kasyacit purusasyendriyajn¯nam vastuvisay¯ a a s .23–146. a aa a a h¯ ¯m¯tr¯bh¯ve ’bh¯vam prat¯ ıccha a a a a . tath¯tr¯pi svasamvedanamatrapeksaya icchacittamatram svaparasantanasadharanam a a . . a ¯ ’py anubhuyeta. pr¯gabh¯vo ’vadh¯ryam¯nas tadutpattisiddhim adhy¯sayat¯ vyavahitade´ak¯lasy¯pi a a a a. . a a a ‘vadh¯ryecch¯cittasy¯pratisamvedanasamaye ’pi vicchinnavvy¯h¯r¯dy¯bh¯sadar´an¯t a a a a aa a a s a . . prat¯ ıtam / tath¯ h¯ ¯cittasamanantaravy¯h¯ravyavah¯rabhasasya dar´an¯t a ıccha a a a ¯ ¯ s a tadabh¯ve c¯dar´an¯d vy¯h¯r¯dyabhasasya k¯ryak¯ranabh¯vam ¯tmasant¯ne a a s a a aa ¯ ¯ a a . a . ˜a . ¯ cittamatre ’stamiteyam katheti // . . a a . . . . .. a ıti s a a ¯ vahner dhumam¯tram prati k¯ranatv¯vadh¯ranam. tad¯ kim asy¯num¯nena / a a a 21 SD 145. svaparasant¯nas¯dh¯ranadr´y¯dr´yavi´esan¯napeksam vy¯h¯r¯dy¯bh¯sam prati a a a . ˜a svabh¯vaviprakrstam / na hy agnir apy eko yenaivendriyavijn¯ena dr´yate tenaiv¯nyo ’pi a a ..t . . ¯ ¯ ¯ tadvyatirekasiddhidvarena karanatayavadharyate / kevalam svabhavaviprakrs.a svaparasant¯nas¯dh¯ranasya svasamvedanen¯nyena v¯bh¯vah ´aky¯vagamah / a a a .¯ vyavasth¯pyam¯nam anum¯tur (1) darsanayogyam atha (2) drsyadrsyavisesananapeksam a a a . ıkurv¯nam asya dr´yat¯sambhave ’pi n¯nimittam abhimatam / yady evam pi´¯c¯dir api a sa a . a. a a. vy¯ptibahirbh¯va eva / tath¯tr¯p¯cchacittam parasantanasadharanam api a a a a ı ¯ .s 23 SD 146. . ¯ ¯ icchamatram / 20 SD 145. a a itikasya . 19 SD 145. sı krteyam sarvath¯ s¯ tu na cinty¯ buddhagocarah // 22 // a a a . dr´yah sy¯t / so ’pi hi kasyacit pumso yogy¯deh svaj¯t¯ a a . .. a a . .16–25: atrocyate / kim atra m¯tra´abden¯num¯trpurusasambandh¯sama s a a. a . a ıyam¯nam sant¯n¯ntaram eva vyavatisthata iti / a . . ¯ yath¯ hi vahnim¯trasya de´ak¯lavyavahitasy¯pi dhumotp¯dade´ak¯layor yadi sy¯d a a s a a a s a a ¯ upalabhyetaiva mayeti sambh¯vitasy¯num¯trpurusendriyapratyaks ena dhumotp¯d¯t a a. ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ yavad yad¯ha syad upalabhyetaiva mayeti yadi sambhavayitum sakyeta tada ı . Vim´atik¯ 22: vijnaptim¯trat¯siddhih sva´aktisadr´¯ may¯ / a a a s a . tu jatharabhav¯dis¯dh¯ranasya sarvath¯num¯trpurus¯´aky¯bh¯vaprat¯ a a a . as ¯ ¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯ ¯ . a a . k¯ranatay¯vadh¯ryate / tadavadh¯ranam kena pram¯nena / vy¯h¯r¯dy¯bh¯sasya a . a. . . a a . a ıyasya v¯ pi´¯c¯ntarasya a sa a . ˜a bhavaty evendriyajn¯nagocara iti na ka´cit svabh¯vaviprakrstah sy¯t / tasm¯d s a a a . ¯ . 6–11: evam hi kecid ¯huh / asty eva sant¯ntaram anum¯naa . a a a .s s .´ . ¯ ¯ ¯ . .

a ´a´avis¯naparasant¯n¯v apeksya sam¯ne svasant¯napratibh¯se ´a´avis¯n¯peksay¯ na s s .24. . a . ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯´ ¯ ¯ bhedena svasantanasyavasyam bhavitavyam / anyatha svasantanad api prakasamanat ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ tasya parasantanabhimatasya bhedo na syat / na cabhedas tayor iti svasantanad ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ´ ´ . . . a .´ ¯ . . a a a . ı ¯ ¯ ¯ paracittam syat niyamena mad¯yasya svasamveda[na]matrasya visayi syad iti // ı . na para iti svasamvedam evaitad udayam ¯s¯dayati / natra paramarthato vibhagah / aa aham pra´nayit¯ parah kathayati dvayor api sv¯k¯roparaktapratyayasamvedanam s a a a . . a a a a a s s .7–10: kim ca m¯ n¯ma bh¯sista bahirarthah kasyacid api tath¯pi katham a a a . evaitan na tu vibhagah svapnapratyayavat / unmattapratyayapral¯pavac ca /.a . . ¯ pratibh¯sate / bhedapratibh¯se hi upagamyam¯ne tadavadhibhutasy¯pi parasant¯nasya a a a a a pratibh¯so durapahnavah sy¯t / a a . . ava´yam bh¯vyah / sa ca bhedah sant¯nasya svabh¯vah svasant¯ne pratibh¯sam¯ne s a a a . a a . a a s s . .. . . RNA (¯ ISD) 45. . a tasvasamvedanam¯tr¯peksay¯ paracittasy¯pi dr´yatv¯t / (TBht D355b6–7: gang gi a a . . .21–22. s . .¯ ˜¯ ¯ ´ caksurvijnanamatrasya visay¯bhaved iti / paracitte tu na sakyam evam / yad¯ha ı . a a . ¯ durots¯ritaivety asamamjasam sarvam eva saugatam ´¯stram iti / na hi bhed¯dyasiddhau a a . 6–25: evam tarhi sant¯n¯ntaras¯dhakasy¯bh¯v¯d b¯dhakasy¯pi a a a a a a a a . ´ ¯ ¯ ¯ yad¯ha dese kale va syad ghatadir niyamenopalabhyeta. . . . JNA 456. . ıpas ısa a a a yath¯ hi svasant¯nam¯tre parisphurati ´a´avis¯n¯d asphurato na bhedah pratibh¯ti tath¯ a a a s s . . . .13–14: svasamvedanam hi tatra vy¯ptigr¯hakam / svaparasamt¯nagaa a . . niyamena pratibh¯seta / katham aparath¯ pratibh¯n¯pratibh¯nalaksanaviruddhadharm¯dh a a a a a a . . .16–19: tad evam gr¯hyagr¯hakayor abhedav¯din¯m svasant¯ne [’pi] a a a a. a ¯ ¯ ¯ abhidh¯ ıyam¯nam avadh¯ ¯m / yadi hi santanantaram sambhavet tada tato a ıyata . hi svapnadrst¯nt¯bhy¯m gamanavacanapratibh¯s¯bhy¯m v¯stav¯ purus¯ntarasiddhir a. . ˙ ˙ tath¯ yaksa iti kin kena sangatam // 410 // anenaitad api nir¯krtam / “advaite katham a a . a . .: api ca a a .5–6. mad¯yasya ı ı . ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ savadher asya bhasah syan na va grahyam tadatmana // (Cf. a a a . a .) ity¯di / tenaivam drsyatasambhavana a . asmad bhinnam it¯dam cet svarupam svasya cetasah / ı . . a avasth¯payitum ´akyam / Cf. 15–16. . .a . ˙ evam¯dikam a´esam iha pravacanaprad¯ ´r¯ ¯k¯rasangrah¯divacanam anusmaryat¯m / a s . y¯se ’pi svasant¯nasya prasant¯n¯d bhedah svabh¯vat¯m ¯s¯dayet // na c¯sau bhedah a a a a a a aa a .16ff. .a . a . 24 TBh 44. ¯ ¯ ¯ . paraprabodhan¯ya pravarttata” iti / svaparayor asy¯rthasy¯siddheh / ayam paro ’han a a a . PVA 293.a upapadyate . NBhu 152. . . / na c¯tra ka´cid dosah / tasm¯d bahirarthena s¯dh¯ranam sant¯n¯ntaram iti a s a a a . a a . . . .2ff. ¯ ¯ ´ . a a . svapnavat sarvapratyay¯ nir¯lamban¯ iti bruv¯nasya katham sant¯n¯ntarasiddhih? na a a a a. PV III 212–213: paricchedo ’ntar anyo ’yam bh¯go a a . ¯ ¯ . kutah sant¯n¯ntarasiddhih? tata´ ca paralokabuddh¯div¯rt¯pi a a s a a a . a .a . . apy abh¯vena dvayam apy avah¯ a ıyate / tasm¯t tad eva tasy¯pi tattvam y¯ dvaya´unyat¯ a a s¯ a . bhedo n¯py abhedah pratibh¯ti / parasant¯n¯peksay¯ tu bheda eva bh¯t¯ evam a a a a a ıty . a ı . tadabh¯vasiddhir bhedapratibh¯s¯bhyupagamav¯dina it¯ a a a a ıyanm¯tram iha vivaksitam a . ¯ ¯ . kasyacid adar´an¯d bhavatu tatra sandeha eveti kecit / tair idam b¯dhakam s a . a a a. . a a . a a a . ¯ ¯ bhedabhedabhyam abadhyasya parasantanasya samanyasasavisanadivad abhava ¯ ¯ evayata iti katham sandehah / tasm¯t parasant¯n¯peksay¯ svasant¯nasya bhedo ’py a a a . 25 SD 147. . . ¯ . 570. .478 MASAHIRO INAMI ˜a anum¯trpurusasambandhitvam an¯pasya vijn¯nasya svalaksan¯dibhedanir¯sapara eva a.a . . ¯. ˜ ¯ katham vijnaptiv¯din¯m api sammatam bhavisyati / Cf. . a . s ˜a bahir iva sthith / jn¯nasy¯bhedino bhedapratibh¯so hy upaplavah // 212 // tatraikasya a a . ˜a a jn¯n¯ntaragrahanam n¯sti. a // 213 //. . . parasant¯n¯d api sphuranavirahino na bh¯ty eva bhedah / na hi parasant¯n¯peksay¯ a a a a a .19. 573. a ¯ NBhu 140. sa ¯. . JNA 458. ka´cid vi´esale´ah svasant¯nasya pariphurati yo n¯sti ´a´avis¯n¯peksay¯ / na ca s s . .a m¯tra´abdo yuktah / etad ev¯´ankya Dharmottaren¯bhihitam – “ekapratipattrapeksam a s as ˙ .) ´ bhede ’nyalesam api naiti kuto bhinnah / (Cf. .s phyir rang rig pa ni der khyab pa ’dzin pa po ste / rang dang gzhan gyi rgyud du son ba’i rang rig pa tsam la blots pas na / gzhan gyi sems kyang bltar rung ba tsam nyid kyi phyir to //) Cf.21–24: advaite ’pi katham vrttir iti codyanir¯krtam / yath¯ balis .a s¯dhanadusan¯divyavah¯ra upapadyate / a a 26 SD 148.) . ¯ ¯ cedam pratyaksalaksanam /” (NBT 104. .a a . .

. a a a ıyam¯ne ca a . a a a . all vices arise. 28 SD 148.e. the notion of “other” occurs. Ratnak¯ who refuses the distinction between one’s own mind and others. . JNA 417. a a a a . kutah sant¯n¯ntarasiddhih? a a a . a. cet svarupam a a a a ıdam . . PVA 240. . yena rupena na bh¯sate na tat tena rupena sadvyavah¯rayogyam yath¯ n¯ . ¯ uttaritavyam bhavat¯ / Cf. n¯n¯dharm¯nah prat¯ a a a.22–418. a . ˙ ¯ ¯ ¯ anutp¯dam vad¯my aham //” (Lankavatarasutra X 592) anutp¯dam iti phalanisedhah a . 573. parasant¯nasya pratibh¯so durapahnavah sy¯t / “asm¯d bhinnam it¯ . . . .a 31 SD 148. the attachment to self and the hatred for others].2: tath¯ a a. Moreover. other minds does not mean the affirmation of the sole existence of one’s own mind.s a a a 30 ¯ SD 148. PV I 219cd–220ab): ¯tmani sati parasamjn¯ svaparavibh¯g¯t parigrahadves au / anayoh sampratibaddh¯h a a a a.)” s . . avadhyapratibh¯se tu bhedapratibh¯s¯bh¯vah ´a´avis¯nabhedapratibh¯s¯bh¯vavat siddha a a a a .10–17: kim ca k¯ryak¯ranabh¯vo ’pi vijn¯nadvayasya bhedapratibh¯sav¯din¯ a a . a ¯ ca sutram. . ıpas ısa a a a ¯ . a . .19. a ¯ purvatvam c¯tmano grhn¯ty ev¯vadhipratibh¯savigame ’pi // parabh¯viny api samvittih a a a .) According to Ratnak¯ however. .1–2: tasm¯d avadher abodhe ’vadhimato matir a iti vimatir eveti kuta´cid bhedagr¯hi pratyaksam apratibh¯sinah /. When the distinction disappears. . ıyante /. yastasya prak¯´am¯natv¯dihetor bhedagr¯hakapratyaks¯pahrtavisayatvam udbh¯vayatah as a a a a . 570. must ırti. ˙ evam¯dikam a´esam iha pravacanaprad¯ ´r¯ ¯k¯rasangrah¯divacanam anusmaryat¯m a s . . . ˜a .29: asm¯kam a a a . .a .16–17: tad evam gr¯hyagr¯hakayor abhedav¯din¯m a a a a a. t¯vat pratyaksena tasya vidhivisayasya pratisedhas¯dhan¯nadhik¯r¯t / n¯py anum¯nena. Connected to these two [i.23–28: atra brumah / sant¯n¯ntarasambhave niyatabh¯vah tato bhedah a a a . . JNA 458. . 32 The denial of the existence of other minds has been understood as a kind of solipsism (see Kajiyama. a . p¯ upena / a a a ılam ıtar¯ . svacittasya / abhede svasant¯n¯t parasant¯na eva sy¯t / yath¯ ca yad upalabhyam¯nam a a a a a a . ¯ b¯dhitum a´akyah / purvabh¯vin¯ hi samvittih parasamvittyapeksay¯ bhedam a s a ı . svasya cetasah / s¯vadher asya bh¯sah ay¯n na v¯ gr¯hyam tad¯tman¯ // (= JNA 458. SD 147. .a .21– a a .17–20: api ca citr¯k¯racakre dharminy advaitas¯dhan¯rtham upana a a a ..a . .24: avadhir s a a . a . tasya dr´y¯bh¯vas¯dhananiyatasy¯t¯ a ındriyaparacitt¯bh¯vas¯dhane ’navat¯r¯d iti cet / a a a aa . . 29 SD 148. . a a a .” (PV II 219 (Miyasaka ed. a a . nopalabhyate ca svacittam upalabhyam¯nam parasant¯n¯d bhinne[na] rupeneti bhedasya a . a a a ¯ eva / Cf. NBhu 140. a a a a a .15–16. . if the ¯ ¯ notion of “one’s own” or “self” were admitted. . . the atmavada would be accepted. / cittam¯trasthitir eva hetuphalanisedho vyaktah / See Inami (2000). a yato vy¯varttante tatas tato bhedam avadhibhedopakalpitam tam tam up¯d¯nam ¯d¯ya a a a a a . etc. . ˜a a svasant¯ne [’pi] jn¯n¯ntaragrahanam n¯sti. . . a . a a a aa a a . 22. . .) bhede ’nyale´am api naiti kuto bhinnah / (= JNA 456. /.BUDDHIST EPISTEMOLOGICAL TRADITION 479 27 ˜a SD 148.24. tu advaitav¯din¯m na param¯rthatah k¯ryak¯ranabh¯vo n¯ma /. . a a .s . a a .21–23: nanv evam api sant¯n¯ntar¯bh¯vah kena pram¯nena siddhah / na a a a a . the denial of ırti. JNA 459. . s s . deny not only the existence of other minds but also the existence of one’s own mind. PVA 606. . ¯ . ¯ iti bhagavato v¯rttikak¯rasya vacanena phalitam atra mate / Cf.15–20: bhedapratibh¯se hi upagamyam¯ne tadavadhibhutasy¯pi a a a ¯ . . prativ¯dino bhedagrahan am anumanyam¯nena sant¯n¯ntarasandeham ca vin¯ katham a a a a a . .29–30: n¯py asiddhih bhedapratibh¯se tadavadher api pratibh¯sapr¯pteh / a a a a . We should remember Dharmak¯ ırti’s words: “When self exists. ¯ purvasamvittyapeksay¯ bhedam paratvam c¯tmano ’dhigacchaty eva sant¯n¯ntaravad a a . sarve dos¯h praj¯yante // a . . ¯ . . . even one’s own mind cannot survive at all. 1965. api hi sambandhivi´esa eva / s . . the attachment [to self] and the hatred [for others] arise.a . svacittat¯d¯tmyanisedhe dr´yavi´esanaprayog¯napeks¯ svabh¯v¯nupalabdhir iyam // a a s . a ¯ a iti niyatapurv¯parabh¯valaksane k¯ryak¯ranabh¯ve ’vabh¯sam¯ne ’vas¯ a a a . . “hetupratyayavy¯vrttim k¯ranasya nisedhanam / cittam¯travyavasth¯nam a . . a a . For the notion of “one’s own mind” also depends on the same distinction. n¯ ¯dicitr¯k¯ravat katham ıla a a ¯ ¯ samvrttyastu yatha tatha (PV III 4d) . From the distinction between self and others.10–11: saj¯t¯ a ıyavij¯t¯ a ıyavy¯vy¯vrttibh¯jo hi jagati janmabhutah / te yato a a .

. . . . . only the first one is . . a a a . bhagavata´ cittena parasant¯navarttina´ cittaksan¯ avas¯ s a s ıyante. . sa . .a . ˜ sarvajna iti katham etat / anum¯nam ca sant¯n¯ntaravisayam pr¯g eva cintitam / na a .e. de bzhin gshegs pa rnams kyi don thams cad mkhyen pa ni rnam pa gnyis te / me long lta bu’i ye shes kyis chos thams cad kyi ngo bo nyid de bzhin nyid mkhyen pa dang / so sor rtogs pa’i ye shes kyis dngos po thams cad du mkhyen pa’o // de la me long lta bu’i ye shes gzung ba dang ’dzin pa’i rnam par rtog pa dang yang dag par bral ba chos thams cad kyi ngo bo nvid de bzhin nyid rig pas / don thams cad mkhyen pa don dam par thams cad mkhyen pa ni yin te/ ’jig rten las ’das pa’i ye shes kyi ngo bo yin pa’i phyir ro // so sor rtog pa’i ye shes ’jig rten las ’das pa’i ye shes kyi rjes las thob pa gzung ba dang ’dzin pa’i rnam par rtog pa dang ldam pas / dngos po phra ba dang / sgrib pa dang / bskal pa thams cad rnam pa thams cad du mkhyen pa pa ni ’jig rten pa’i rnam pa thams cad mkhyen pa yin te / ’jig rten las ’das pa’i ye shes kyi rjes la thob pa ’jig rten pa’i ye shes kyi ngo bo yin pa’i phyir ro // de’i phyir so sor rtog pa’i ye shes la don thams cad mkhyen pa’i tshul mi ’gal lo // de la gzung ba dang ’dzin par rnam par rtog pa yod par khas blangs pas phyin ci log pa yang ma yin te / de phyin ci ma log pa nyid du gzigs pa’i phyir ro // mnyam pa nyid kyi ye shes ni rten cing ’brel par ’byung ba’i dngos pa tsam gyi yul can yin pa’i phyir / me long lta bu’i ye shes la dmigs pa yin no // bya ba sgrub pa’i shes ni rang dang spyi’i mtshan nyid kyi yul can yin no // de ltar na de bzhin gshegs pa ni ye shes bzhi’i rang bzhin yin la / de la me long lta bu’i ye shes ni ’jig rten las ’das pa yin no // de’i rjes las thob pa gzhan dag ni ’jig rten pa yin no // des bas na bcom ldan ’das kyi don thams cad mkhyen pa ni ye shes bzhi po ’di dag la ci rigs par sbyar bar bya’o // 37 ¯ ¯ ¯ SD 149. ˜ a yate / bhagavatas tu kim avasth¯pyat¯m / samdeh¯vasth¯pane katham sarvajnat¯ a a a a . katham ayam vancayati v¯dah // a a a . sakalalokas¯ksikasya a a a . ˜¯ ¯ ˜¯ ¯ . ˜ a c¯num¯nena prat¯ ¯v api sarvajnat¯ bhavitum arhati / pratyaksena paracittaprat¯tau a a ıta ı . 1) adarsajnana. bhagavatah sarvajnat¯ksatidosah / (*RNA: [na]) Cf. ˜a a tasya grahanam na tena jn¯n¯ntaragr¯hyatay¯pi ´unyam” iti / a a s¯ . . . t ¯ ˜¯ 3) samatajnana. 2) pratyaveksanajnana. tasya bhagavatah . a ˜ . . api tu paramarthagatir iyam upadarsita / a . The others.a a a . ˙ sarv¯varanavigamena gr¯hyagr¯hakakalankarahitatv¯t / yatoktam – “gr¯hyam na a a a a a . ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ grahyagrahakabhavo ’pi paracittasya bhagavaccittena sahayata iti bahirarthav¯da a ˜ eva mukh¯ntarenopagatah sy¯t. . a a . ¯ ´ ¯ matam asm¯kam. SST 72. and is the all-knowing knowledge in the ultimate sense. beyond the conventional world.3–8: api ca sant¯n¯ntare t¯vad arv¯gdr´¯m sandeho bhavadbhir anumana a a a . . and 4) krtyanus.20: yang . 36 ¯ ¯ Commenting to the last portion of the Santanantarasiddhi. hanajnana. a .. . are conventional.11–13: na khalu sant¯n¯ntaravisayah sarvath¯ sandeho n¯sty evety abhia a a a . . .a a a s . sambhavaty eva / . sant¯n¯ntaram v¯ nesyate tat katham ayam dosah? ity asat. / vidyam¯nam eva kad¯cit sant¯n¯ntaram bhagavat¯ n¯vadh¯ryate tath¯py asau a a a a a a a a .480 MASAHIRO INAMI 33 SD 149. . Vin¯ ıtadeva. TSP 693. may suggest that Buddha knows other minds not by his ultimate knowledge. but by the conventional knowledge obtained after the enlightenment. ¯a param¯rthato nesyate tarhi kimartham “pram¯nabhut¯ya” ity¯din¯sau smarthitah a a. who calls our attention to the variations of Buddha’s knowledge. . 38 SD 149.3–9: tath¯ sarvajnajn¯nasya tajjneyasya cetaraa a. which are obtained after the enlightenment.10–11: y¯vac ca bhedagrahan abhimanarupa samvritis t¯vat sant¯n¯ntare a a a a . According to him. 35 SD 149. . .9–10: asmad¯ ıyamatena tu paracittam n¯sty eveti tadavadh¯ranakrto na* a . .¯ . Prameyakamalam¯rt¯nda 80. i.6–10: na ca buddhasya . stuta´ c¯dvait¯diprakaran¯n¯m ¯dau dign¯g¯dibhih siddhih / s a a a a .l16–73. ˜ sant¯n¯ntarasy¯bhyupagamam¯tren¯bh¯v¯siddheh / sugata´ ca sarvajno yadi a a a a . 34 ˜ ˜a ˜ Cf. . Vin¯ ıtadeva refers to ¯ ´ ˜¯ the four kinds of Buddha’s knowledge. sandeh¯t tadavabodhan¯rtham vacan¯dir api pravartata iti svavacanavirodho ’pi na a a a . . . a ˜ a . janacittasya sahopalambhaniyame ‘pi bhed¯bhyupagam¯d anek¯ntah / nanu sarvajnah a a a .

. tad¯ tad api na duram iti kim atra nirba a a a .a . ˙ JNA 10. ˜ . .24–25: s¯ mat¯ cet samvrty¯*. a a a a a PVA 295. a. / samvyavah¯ra´ ca vic¯ryam¯no vi´¯ a s a a. as . a ¯ tadat¯ . . .s ˜a a 21: yath¯ tannirabhil¯pyen¯tman¯ buddh¯n¯m gocarah / tath¯ tadajn¯n¯t tadubhayam a a a a a a. a a a a . . a . . . ¯ ¯ gatih). k¯ryak¯ranabh¯vah /. na ca kvacid a a . a . param¯rthatah samvedanam iti pratip¯ditam /. SS 68.23–24: na ca param¯rthato a a a . . NBhu a a a a aa . Vim´V ad Vim´ . k¯ryak¯ranat¯m gatih. a . . ¯ ¯ a purvarupat¯nubhav¯bh¯v¯t sam¯nak¯latay¯´akyavivecanatv¯d abheda eva kutah a a a a a as a . na yath¯rtham vitath¯pratibh¯satay¯ gr¯hyagr¯hakavikalpasy¯prah¯. PVA 25.6–8: sant¯n¯ntarabh¯vo ’yam na siddha´ cet phal¯ngavat / a a a s a˙ .31–32: param¯rthatas tu svasamvedanam ekam eva / n¯nyen¯nyasya a a a grahanasambhavah /. . . a. . JNA 416. JNA 4. ¯ a . s.13: anvayavyatirek¯bhy¯m bhedasy¯sya prakalpan¯ / a a .8: dvis. svarupenaiva grahanan na k¯ranatvena / k¯ry¯sy¯grahan¯t / k¯ryagrahanak¯le ca a . a a a a an¯div¯san¯sang¯d anvayavyatirekavit // 428 //. a a a a. . . . ˜ .s .a anvayavyatirekayoh / gatir yady anum¯n¯t sy¯d itaretarasam´rayah // 147 // (*PVA: a a a . PVA 25. . sant¯n¯ntarasiddhih kim samvrty¯stu* yath¯ tath¯ // v¯stu kim atra nirbandhena? a a a a a . a .t sati sambandhavedanam // 3 //. a. a a a a. a (*JNA: samvrtty¯ tu) Cf.s . a a . PVA 292. PV I 85–86: dharmadharmivyavasth¯ nam bhedo ’bheda´ ca a . a . . .21: tad eva punar ¯y¯tam a a . PVA 295. iti naikaniyatah svavacan¯divirodhas tatparih¯ro v¯ / a a a . .2–4: gal te gzhan gyi sems kyi rang gi ngo bo mngon sum du shes par gyur na ni de’i gzung ba don bzhan yin par ’gyur ro //. PVA 295.9–13: gnas ma gyur pa’i phyir rnal ’byor pa gzung ba dang ’dzin pa’i rnam par rtog pa ma spangs pa rnams kyis gzhan gyi sems shes pa yang / tha snyad la mi slu ba nyid kyis gzugs la sogs pa mthong ba bzhin du tshad ma nyid yin no // 90 // Cf. itatattv¯rtho yath¯ loke prat¯ a . a 44 SD 149. a a a .16–17: anvayavyatirek¯bhy¯n k¯ryak¯ranat¯gatih* / pram¯nan a a˙ a a . a . .s . na param¯rthena / a a a . pr¯m¯nyam pratip¯dayat¯ param¯rthata ekam eva svasamvedanam pratyaksam ity a a. . ca** na tatr¯sti pratyaksam anum¯ tath¯ // 146 // pratyaks¯nupalambh¯bhy¯m a a a a a . **JNA: samvrtty¯) . kim atra nirbandhena? (*JNA: s¯bh¯s¯ a a . .a 140. PVA 4.18–19: na hi bhed¯dyasiddhau s¯dhanadusan¯divyavah¯ra upapadyate / a a a 43 JNA 452. .16: na c¯nvayavyatirekayoh a a a ˙ a a . . ¯ s¯dhyas¯dhanasamsthitih / param¯rth¯vat¯r¯ya vidvadbhir avakalpyate // 86 //. **PVA: pram¯nan ja). . / asam¯ .19–20: s¯mvyavah¯rikam etad iti pratip¯ditam a. ıtikatv¯d ubhayoh / a . . a a bhinne vastuni samv¯dah / tasm¯t svavedan¯tiriktasya pr¯m¯nyam s¯mvrtam eva. . Vim´T a a a a a a a ın a . smaranagocara eva / na ca smaranam ananubhute na ca k¯ranatvasy¯nubhavah ıtam a . uktam bhavati /. . . itatattv¯rtho yath¯ loke prat¯ ıks a a ıyate // 85 // tam tath¯ eva sam¯´ritya a as .13–14: idam hi sant¯n¯ntar¯bh¯vas¯dhanam advayas¯dhanena s¯dh¯ranam a a a a a a a a .19–21: na ca tasya dusanena ksanabhangav¯dinah kincit / hetuphal¯pal¯pino a a a . a astu yath¯ tath¯ samvrty¯** param¯rthena v¯. atv¯t /. .18–20: samv¯d¯c ca pr¯m¯nyam. a . a . ¯ katham smaranam / atha k¯ryak¯le ’pi tad anubhuyata iti matih / tath¯ sati a a a . . ¯ . a a. . ıks a a ıyate // 85 // tam tath¯ ca y¯dr´ah a a . andheneti / Cf. PVA 183.24–25: s¯mvyavah¯rikam a. a a. .a a a . PVA 295. 41 SS 69. k¯ryak¯ranabh¯vo n¯ma /. tath¯ hetuphalavyavah¯ro ’pi s¯mvrta eva. s y¯dr´ah / asam¯ . . ˜ a a . a . ekaprat¯ a a a.19–23: na khalu pratyaksatah purv¯paravastudvayagrahan am . PVA 184. . ¯ samvrty¯ ´aktat¯gatih* / anirupitatattv¯ hi prat¯ samvrtir mat¯ // 152 // (*PVA: ´aktat¯ a a ıtis a s a . ¯ ’pi yadi tadapal¯p¯ya ny¯yasambhava. PVA 606. ’nvayavyatirekapratipattir anyatr¯bhim¯n¯t / abhim¯nam¯tram eva skalam iti /. .s . sıryata eva /.BUDDHIST EPISTEMOLOGICAL TRADITION 39 40 481 Inami (1998). .hasambandhasamvittir naikarupapravedan¯t / dvayasvarupagrahane a . . D194a6–7: gal te gzhan gyi sems shes na de’i tshe gzung dang ’dzin pa’i rnam par khas blangs pas rnam par rig pa nyid nyams ’gyur ro // 42 ¯. / k¯ry¯bhimatagraphanak¯le smaranam eva k¯ran¯bhimate / yad¯ sa grhyate tad¯ a a a . ¯. .29: asm¯kam tv advaitav¯din¯m na param¯rthatah a . . . a a a a aa cet samvrtty¯.

‘A Refutation of Solipsism’. In: Papers of Stcherbatsky. Tokyo 1965. [Chapters I (sv¯rth¯num¯na). Hidenori (1955). ‘Buddhist Solipsism – A free translation of Ratnak¯ ırti’s ¯. by A. II (pram¯nasiddhi). Thakur. Acta Indologica a. Yuichi (1965). ı ¯ ı . a a˙ . 2. ˜¯ Pramanavartikabhashyam or Vartikalankarah of Prajnakaragupta ¯. respectively. I. vyakhyanam Nyayabhusanam. Journal of the Greater India ¯ Society XIV–1. 1968. ırti: ˜¯ ´ ı ¯ Jnanasr¯mitranibandhavalih. ¯ ¯ ırti. 2. In: Yusho Miyasaka. V¯ranas¯ a ı a a . Yuichi (2000). . Fukuoka: 360–397 (in Japanese). . Katsura. Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies XIII–1: 9–24. ABBREVIATIONS ¯ ISD ¯´ ¯ ¯. ‘Establishment of the Existence of Other Mind’. Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies (Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyu) XLVII(1): 150–156 (in Japanese). Kajiyama. (1997). ed. ed. Kitagawa. a a a a a a a. Sv¯m¯ Yogindr¯nandah. ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ Negi. Ksanabhangadhyaya of Jn¯na´r¯ . Selected papers. ¯ ¯. and III (pratyaksa) correspond to III. Stcherbatsky. Sr¯mad-acarya-Bhasarvajnapran¯tasya Nyayasarasya svopajnam . ı . Gupta. ırti Journal of Indian Philosophy 13: 55–71. . Sant¯n¯ntaradusana –’. Kyoto 1989. a a Reprinted in: Y. Sarnath. a JNA KA ¯ NBhu PV PVA . ‘Dharmak¯ ırti’s Sant¯n¯ntarasiddhi – Japanese Translation a a and Synopsis –’. 2nd edn. 2 (1971/72). Pramanavarttika of Dharmak¯ Pram¯nav¯rttikak¯rik¯ (Sanskrit and Tibetan). ‘Dharmak¯ on the Existence of Other Minds’. Shoryu (1983). . . a ´ı ¯ ¯ ¯ ˜ ¯ ¯ ˜ . ‘Do Other People’s Minds Exist? With a Japanese Translation ¯ ¯ ¯. ‘astu yath¯ tath¯’. Studies in Buddhist Philosophy. ˙ ¯ ¯ ˜a s ımitra: JNA 1–159.] ¯. Soviet Indology Series No. Isvarasadhanadusana of Ratnak¯ RNA 32–57. Hiromasa Tosaki’s Seventieth Birthday. Calcutta 1969. Bibliotheca Indo Tibetica Series 37. ‘On the Method of Determining Causality in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition: Can Causality be Truly Determined?’. Sharma. ed. Kitagawa. A. Indo Koten Ronrigaku no Kenkyu. ed. ¯ (Being a commentary on Dharmak¯rti’s Pramanavartikam). ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ˙ ¯ . Kajiyama. Kajiyama. ¯ ¯ T¯ka of Acarya Vin¯tadeva. . Akamatsu. Masahiro (1998). . J. ¯. and II in Miyasaka’s edition . ˜ Nyayabhusana of Bh¯sarvajna.482 MASAHIRO INAMI REFERENCES Inami. (1922). Santanantarasiddhih of Acarya Dharmak¯rti and Santanantarasiddhih ı . ı R¯hula S¯nkrty¯yana. Inami. Ramesh Kumar (1985). . Reprinted in: H. Patna 1953. Patna 1987. ¯ ¯ ˙ ¯ ˜a Pramanavarttikalankara of Prajn¯karagupta. Annual Report of the International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology 3: 3–35 (in Japanese). Festschrift for a a Dr. S. ¯. The Hiroshima University Studies Faculty of Letters 43: 102–120 (in Japanese). Indo no Bunka to Ronri. ¯ ¯. Th. Masahiro (2000).ı ¯ ¯ . translated into English from Russian by Harish C. of Ratnak¯ ırti’s Santanantaradusana’. ed.

¯ ¯ ˜ ¯ ˙ sıla. Stcherbatsky. ed. ed. . Th. ¯ ¯ Santanantarasiddhi of Dharmak¯ ed. H. ırti: Santanantaradusana of Ratnak¯ RNA 145–149. ed. R. . . Patna 1975. ´ Tokyo Gakugei University Koganei.BUDDHIST EPISTEMOLOGICAL TRADITION 483 RNA SD SS ´ SSS SST . ´ ´ (la Vingtaine) accompagnee d’une Explication en Prose et Trimsika . sDe dge edn.s ¯ Ratnak¯ ırtinibandhavalih.¯ ¯ theca Buddhica XIX. ¯ ˜ ¯ ı Shantaraksita with the Commentary ‘Panjika’ of Shri Kamalash¯la. Dvarikadas Shastri. See Vim´. Thakur. . Petrograd 1916. ´ ¯ (la Trentaine) avec la commentaire de Sthiramati I. Bibliotheca ırti. Varanasi 1981. ¯ ¯ ¯. Iyengar. Stcherbatsky. ¯ ¯ ´¯ ˜a s ımitra: JNA 367–513. 2nd edn. ´ ˜ ¯ ¯ ´ ¯ Vijnaptimatratasiddhi. R. Vimsatika . 4264.s Vim´V . Sylvain e L´vi. . ¯ Tibetan translation of Moks¯karagupta’s Tarkabhasa.s . Mysore 1952. ¯ . 4065. 2 vols. ¯ Tarkabhasa of Moks¯karagupta. Buddhica XIX. sDe dge edn. . Petrograd 1916. Deux Traites de Vasubandhu.s Vim´T . Paris 1925. A. ı ¯ Vimsatikat¯ka of Vin¯ ıtadeva. TBh TBht TSP Vim´ . 1982.. Biblio. Vimsatikavrtti of Vasubandhu. ¯ ˜ ¯ ¯ Vimsatika Vijnaptimatratasiddhi of Vasubandhu. .a No. Tattvasamgrahapanjika of Kamala´¯ Tattvasangraha of Acarya .a ¯. ed. No. ed. ¯. ´ ¯. Th. Tokyo 184-8501 Japan . Sakarasiddhisastra of Jn¯na´r¯ ¯ ¯ Santanantarasiddhitıka of Vin¯ ıtadeva.. In: .

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