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Dreyfus, Georges B.J., Recognizing Reality: Dharmak¯rti’s Philosophy ı and Its Tibetan Interpretations. [SUNY Series in Buddhist Studies.] Albany: State University of New York Press 1997, pp. xxi, 622. ISBN 0-7914-3097-9, 0-7914-3098-7. The book under review is a splendid harvest from the field of the studies of Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition at the end of the twentieth century. The author, Prof. Georges B.J. Dreyfus, is well known for his varied education and career. He studied Buddhist philosophy with Tibetan teachers for fifteen years in Tibetan monasteries in India, where he completed the Ge-shay (dge shes) degree. He then started learning Western philosophy and Sanskrit literature in the USA. In 1991, he brought together his broad knowledge and deep philosophical insight successfully in his Ph.D. thesis (“Ontology, Philosophy of Language and Epistemology in Buddhist Tradition”, University of Virginia), on which this book is based. His long and extensive academic training in both Tibetan and Western cultural circles allowed him a critical analysis of his materials. The book deals with the three streams of the Buddhist logicoepistemological tradition: Indian tradition (Dharmak¯rti and his predeı cessors and successors) and two Tibetan lineages, viz. the Sa skya lineage and bKa’ gdams-dGe lugs lineage.1 That is to say, the historical development of thought over one thousand five hundred years from the fourth to the twentieth century comes into the scope of the author’s investigation. Moreover, the author takes account of Indian non-Buddhist philosophy as well as Western philosophy, including modern philosophy, for he thinks that such a comparison helps readers with a correct understanding of Indian and Tibetan terminology. His enthusiasm for a deeper exploration of the tradition pushed him to this challenge and opened the door to a systematic exposition of the development of Dharmak¯rti’s philosophy ı within a considerably wide scope. The present book is indeed the most convincing demonstration of the methodological consciousness that any intellectual tradition must be examined not in isolation from but in connec1 See the lists of thinkers and authors belonging to each lineage handled in the book

(pp. xvi–xix). Indo-Iranian Journal 46: 349–368, 2003. © 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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tion with its historical and cultural circumstances. Not only scholars who have been confronted with Tibetan interpretations of Indian thought but those who are interested in any philosophical inquiry have given Dreyfus a warm welcome for this publication. The present reviewer, who has been receiving great benefit from his studies, should also like to express her sincere gratitude to him. The focus of this book centers upon Tibetan articulations of Dharmak¯rti’s system, especially the interpretation of universals in the ı classical period of Tibetan Buddhism between the end of the fourteenth and the end of the fifteenth centuries. In various stages of his discussion, the author analyzes the problem of universals in its various aspects. The entire work is divided into two books entitled “Ontology and Philosophy of Language” (Book I) and “Epistemology” (Book II). Book I has three parts (“Ontology”, “the Problem of Universals” and “Philosophy of Language”), consisting of fifteen chapters. Later twelve chapters from 16 to 27 belong to Book II, which is compiled under the subjects “Valid Cognition” and “Perception”. For each topic, the author opens his discussion with an introductory chapter to explain terminology, basic ideas and historical backgrounds, which is followed by the chapter for examining Dharmak¯rti’s original thought. Then, the author proceeds to the chapters ı where its Tibetan interpretations are investigated. In particular, theoretical discrepancies between Sa skya thinkers and dGe lugs thinkers are closely examined. This simple but solid procedure gives the entire discussion an enormous clarity. Readers can survey the structure of the book by looking at the table of contents (pp. v–ix), in which all subtitles are included. The author gives careful explanation by using a standard Western philosophical vocabulary to the most important terms and ideas of Dharmak¯rti’s tradition ı such as valid cognition (pram¯ na, tshad ma), momentariness (ksanikatva, a. . . skad cig ma nyid), elimination of others (any¯ poha, gzhan sel), universal a (s¯ m¯ nya, spyi), and perception (pratyaksa, mngon sum). The rich matea a . rials in Sanskrit, Tibetan and modern literature, which the author has consulted, are referred to in the notes to each chapter (pp. 463–561). The book also includes glossaries (Tibetan-Sanskrit-English, SanskritTibetan-English, pp. 563–580), bibliography (pp. 581–601), author index (pp. 603–609), and subject index (pp. 611–622). Tibetan names are phoneticized in accordance with the “essay phonetic” system developed by Jeffrey Hopkins. Covering a tremendously extensive field, this book undertakes an ambitious enterprise to deal with the interactions between history and philosophy, between India and Tibet, between Buddhism and non-Buddhism,

56(4): 1083–1086) Dreyfus’ way to subsume the variety of thinkers under one doctrinal lineage. abh¯ vadhi (abh¯ vadh¯) p. arth¯ pati a s a . (arth¯ patti) p. 106. it is required to provide a detailed picture of the philosophical positions of each tradition and each thinker.2 and stimulates readers of different interests to further discussion. The author proposes as the framework of his discussion to differentiate Dharmak¯rti’s antirealist position from ı the realism of his Hindu opponents on the basis of his rejection of real universals (p. Ontology is. 3 Corrections are given in parentheses: anavayin (avayavin) pp. parin¯ ma (parinama) p. 355. 106 infra). 83. Dreyfus’ a a . the author tries to analyze Dharmak¯rti’s ontological position in ı Chapter 1 by contrasting it with that of his contemporary adversaries. vi´aya (visaya) p. 179). 563. 140.¯ bedh¯ bedha (bhed¯ bheda) p. Regarding his treatment of Sanskrit literature. Quine. or. Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge . Dharmak¯rti opposes the concept of “specifically charı acterized” (svalaksana. In Glossary: samvrti (samvrti) p. 233. and universals have some reality. (hetus¯ magr¯) p.REVIEW ARTICLE 351 between India and West. 49). 137. 370. 563. between traditions. in his words. p.3 For some Tibetan words. . a a . . “closely linked to the question of whether universals exist”. This picture is now accepted to a certain ı degree. 480. puru´a (purusa) pp. paramarthasatya (param¯ rthasatya) p. The author seems to have successfully performed this difficult task by centering his discussion upon the question of universals. as well as with the ontology of modern a philosophers such as W. continua. 577. 56. 247. spyi mtshan). belongs to this realist lineage. or “generally characterized” (s¯ m¯ nyalaksana.V. . 299. 173. s . . 477. whereas most Sa skya scholars conform to Dharmak¯rti’s antirealistic view. Specialists of relevant fields are expected to review critically Dreyfus’ evaluation of respective theories of Indian and Western philosophy. hetus¯ magri a s a a a a a . 54). namely. special interest attaches to the Tibetan interpretations of the ontological status of universals. prati´edha (pratisedha) a a a a ı s . a ı ˙ . they “can be thought of as designated by general terms” (p. . between tradition and modern thinking. gattva (gotva) p. In order to establish a critical comparison. consider that coarse objects. k´anikatv¯ num¯ na (ksanikatv¯ num¯ na) p. From this viewpoint. It is undoubtedly an important contribution of this book to have revealed the detail of dGe lugs realism. which he designates “moderate” realism in contrast with the “extreme” realism of the Ny¯ ya a school (pp. if not completely. adhyavasaya (adhyavas¯ ya) pp. mKhas grub and rGyal tshab. a more adequate Sanskrit equivalent 2 L. van der Kuijp has questioned in his review of the present book (Journal of Asian Studies 1997. Tsong kha pa. especially the Ny¯ ya school. Misspelling of terms should have been avoided. there seems to remain some unsatisfactory points. 84. and “linguistically”. . . 137. however. but they do not accept the independent existence of these objects from svalaksana or rang mtshan (p. spyi) a a . rang mtshan) to that of universal (s¯ m¯ nya. 288.

484). Although this work focuses the Tibetan reception of Indian Buddhist epistemology. 5 Notes 27.¯ (vastubalapravr tt¯ num¯ na). sabdasy¯ vi´ayah (´abdasy¯ visayah) a ´ a s . not vijñaptisat (p. 577. a .5 Since the author clearly states that his aim is not only to clarify the Tibetan interpretations of Indian Buddhist epistemology but also to investigate Dharmak¯rti’s philosophy in its Indian context. 288. . 538) and 31 (p.´ p. (vastubalapravr tt¯ num¯ na) corresponds to dngos po stobs shugs kyi rjes dpag rather than a . Dreyfus missed referring to some important modern studies. 578. 486). 519) to Chapter 13. 578).. cit. pp. 575. ı a Ny¯ yabindut¯k¯ (NBT). and Kamala´¯la’s Tattvasamgrahapañjik¯ are a ı a sı a . 488) to Chapter 4. temporally and essentially determinate. 518). . . 527) to Chapter 16. cited.) as well as Seiji Kimura in his review of the present book (Journal of Buddhism. I have tried to present a philosophically meaningful interpretation of Dharmak¯rti that is ı more than the sum total of the scholarly contributions on which I have relied” (p. ni´cayajñ¯ na is to be given (pp. by Department of Buddhism. Dharmottara’s s a. 478). (nirvikalpakapratyaks a). note 19 (p. As van der Kuijp (op. 479) to Chapter 2. . anavayin (avayavin) pp. arth¯ pati (arth¯ patti) pp. btags yod is a translation of prajñaptisat. By consulting some of the Sanskrit texts and the views of modern scholars on the topic. 12). 571. In the section entitled “Dharmak¯rti’s ı ı Ontology and Its Relation to the Problem of Universals” (p. their being individual. viddhi (vidhi) p. 4 adhyavasaya (adhyavas¯ ya) is not adequate for nges shes or nges pa. 570. He terms these three qualifications of an individual “identity conditions” and takes them as criteria of reality for Dharmak¯rti. 564. The author ascribes to Dharmak¯rti the idea that ı svalaksanas are real insofar as they are individuals in the sense of being . 1977.. 575. .6 it is important for readers ı too to examine the author’s interpretation of Dharmak¯rti’s tenets. 579. 540) to Chapter 20. 37 (p. 6 “My understanding of Dharmak¯rti’s ideas is not independent of that of traditional ı Tibetan scholars. . 67) in Chapter 2 (“Dharmak¯rti’s Ontology”). s a . 1086). vastubalapravr ttanumana s a . spatially. 35 (p. 576. 42. 44 (p. . p. . 578). 578. also the corrections of Western..4 In the notes in which the texts from Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmako´abh¯ s ya. 37. . For nges a shes. it also investigates the Indian side of the story. Nevertheless. my view of Dharmak¯rti is not ı reducible to the Tibetan interpretations either. Tibetan and Japanese personal names made by van der Kuijp (op. 23 (p. notes 6 (p. a dnogs po stobs skugs (shugs) kyi rigs pa (p. (asadrsa). 29. t¯ d¯ tmya-sahbandha (t¯ d¯ tmyasambandha) p. Komazawa Junior College. 567. asadrsa (asadrsa) a n n a a . notes 22. cit. . 31.352 REVIEW ARTICLE could be proposed. vastubalapravr ttanumana a . 575). and notes 9 (p. the author outlines the charı acteristics of “specifically characterized phenomena” (svalaksana) in . 575. . parin¯ ma (parinama) p. ed. ı The present reviewer should like to confine herself to reconsidering the author’s identification of svalaksana with the real on the basis of . 155– 160) have indicated. p. adhyavasaya (adhyavas¯ ya) p. as it is based mostly on a philosophical reading of the Tibetan versions of his texts and their Tibetan commentaries. nirvikalpakapratyaksa a a a a . it would be more helpful if the Sanskrit originals were referred to.´ . 38 (p. Cf. 355. 567. asadrsa a . 30 (p. Dharmak¯rti’s Ny¯ yabindu (NB). accordance with Dharmak¯rti’s own words: a) being “causally efficient” ı pr¯ sa˙ ga (prasa˙ ga) pp.

They are described as causes and effects. . . svalaksana and . a a a . All activities of human beings are carried out to abandon . and (4) apprehensible without relis a . . 9 PV III 54cd: tasya svaparar¯ p¯ bhy¯ m gater meyadvayam matam || “This [particular u a a. The other is designated as conventionally existent. He renders the Tibetan text of 171d–172ab as follows: “These [real things] are differentiated from other [things]. a . so that the object of cognition is considered to be twofold [i. and the other [i. . . here as ultimately existent. . ´ a . . [from others] with regard to this [particular].. a (p. in the form of . . .e. a. . . ´¯ .11 7 PV III 3: arthakriy¯ samartham yat tad atra param¯ rthasat | anyat samvrtisat proktam a a . At the end of this section. . a . 10 NB I 12–15: tasya visayah svalaksanam || yasy¯ rthasya samnidh¯ n¯ sam nia a a . This alone is ultimately existent. . they are evidently reducible to PV III . (svalaksana)] is apprehended in either its own form or another form (i. . a a . d) “objects of perception (pratyaksa)” according to NB I .e. . . or obtain this [particular]”. This is regarded as svalaksana. 8 PV I 171c–172: sa ev¯ rthas tasya vy¯ vrttayo ’pare || tat k¯ ryam k¯ ranam coktam a a . universal). 479) is more puzzling: “These others are the exclusions of this. s¯ m¯ nyalaksana]”. (3) not (directly) denotable by language . ke´adir n¯ rtho ’narth¯ dhimoksatah || sadrsasadrsatv¯ c ca visay¯ visayatvatah | s¯ a a . ance on other factors (nimitta. don byed nus pa). 11 PV III 1–2: m¯ nam dvividham visayadvaividhy¯ c chaktya´ aktitah | arthakriy¯ y¯ m a . dh¯ n¯ bhy¯ m jñ¯ napratibh¯ sabhedas tat svalaksanam || tad eva param¯ rthasat || a a a. They are described as causes and effects. . . c) “being apprehended through their own entity (svar¯ pa)” according to PV III u 9 54cd (p. a .. which has no correspondence in the originals. Its Tibetan translation runs: de nyid don || de ni gzhan las log pa yin || de ni rgyu dang ’bras bur bshad || de ni rang gi mtshan nyid ’dod || de ni blang dor ’bras can pas || skyes bu thams cad ’jug pa yin || Dreyfus’ translations from both Sanskrit and Tibetan texts strangely include the term “generally characterized”. . b) “causes and effects” and “the objects to which all persons apply themselves practically” according to PV I 171c–1728 (p. however. . His rendering of the Sanskrit in note 35 (p. a . . ¯ . he replaces them by slightly different descriptions (p. . They are [respectively] the particular and the universal”.´ (´abdasy¯ vis aya. They are accepted as specifically characterized and generally characterized phenomena” (p. te svas¯ m¯ nyalaks ane || “That which is capable of producing an effect is designated a a . “This a a . . . 12–1510 (p. . 68). object. arthakriy¯ s¯ marthyalaks anatv¯ d vastunah || “The [perception] has the particular as its aa . . india´ vidual (asadrsa. Although the author does not suggest any textual source for these four characteristics of svalaksana. . . ¯. reading tat k¯ ryam to tatk¯ ryam in accordance with the edition of PVSVT. . universals] is the exclusions s . . 68). [particular (vi´esa)] alone is real thing.REVIEW ARTICLE 353 (arthakriy¯ samartha) and “real” according to Pram¯ nav¯ rttika (PV) III 37 a a. that is. . 67). They are accepted as specifically characterized and generally characterized phenomena”. rgyu mtshan) such as language and conceptuality”.e. 4). mi ’dra ba). since the real entity is characterized as being capable of producing an effect”. The thing which appears to a cognition differently according to whether it is placed near or far is the particular. sgra’i yul ma yin). . 69): “(1) having the power to produce effects (arthakriy¯ sakti. tat svalaksanam isyate | tatty¯ g¯ ptiphal¯ h sarv¯ h purusanam pravrttayah || (I prefer the a a a. a s a a. (2) being specific. . 330.. . 67). 67). This [particular] is called effect and cause. 1–2.

but his chief concern is the second characteristic. since. p. Having expressly stated. Tibetan scholars often use a similar expression. 2. 42. Having elucidated the three “identity conditions” in his own words. they occupy a definite spatial location. which is determined in causal terms. They come into and go out of existence at definite moments. Dreyfus’ translation runs (p. [The object is divided into two kinds further] according to whether it is similar or dissimilar [to others]. 69). p. Dreyfus conclusively remarks (p. yul a. a a ngo bo nges pa or ngo bo ma ’dres pa). . . the individuality of svalaksana . a a a a . 70): ı 1. they partake in the differentiation between [themselves and the other] similar and dissimilar things”. since ´ a a a. essential nature.e. Real things are determinate with respect to their entity (¯ k¯ raniyata. for the author. it has its own distinctive essence” (p. or whether its knowledge arises when there exist other causes and does not arise [unless there exist other causes. 480). (pp. . the object is [divided into] two kinds according to whether it is capable or incapable of producing an effect. 69): “Because all things essentially abide in their own essence. Real objects are temporally determinate (k¯ laniyata. 69). a a .. 480). v¯ bhy¯ m yasm¯ d vy¯ vrttibh¯ ginah || “Since all things by nature consist in their respective a a. yul nges pa or yul s ma ’dres pa). ¯ dus rang bzhin ma ’dres pa. a . in which ma ’dres pa appears instead of niyata (nges pa) and rang bzhin instead of ak¯ ra (ngo bo or rnam pa). a ı . . for these criteria imply that real entities must be spatially and temposabdasy¯ nyanimitt¯ n¯ m bh¯ ve dh¯sadasattvatah || “There are two kinds of cognition. . 71): Accepting these criteria of reality commits Dharmak¯rti to a radical rejection of realism ı regarding universals. ı the author suggests both Indian and Tibetan sources for the terminology: de´aniyata. they are distinguished from their homogeneous and heterogeneous [things]”. 3. k¯ laniyata and ak¯ raniyata are found in Moksakaragupta’s s a ¯ a . or its knowledge exists independently from other causes]”.354 REVIEW ARTICLE The author then moves to the new section “Uncommonness and Identity Conditions” in order to “explain the first two of the four”. 12 PV I 40: sarve bh¯ v¯ h svabh¯ vena svasvabh¯ vavyavasthiteh | svabh¯ vaparabh¯ a a. whether it is the object of words or not. and only if. Go ram pa’s sDe bdun rab gsal is the author’s main ground for Dharmak¯rti’s implication of these conditions (n. PV I 4012 is cited as well in relation with these ¯ a conditions (p. since they are fallaciously trusted as a [real] object. the individuality of svalaksana connotes its reality. Real things are spatially determinate (de´aniyata. Besides. that is. the author introduces the three “identity conditions” that “Dharmak¯rti implies” (p. Hairs [appearing in a diseased eye-cognition] and the like are not the object [of cognition]. 41. . dus nges pa or a dus ma ’dres pa). as rGyal tshab does (n. 69–72).¯ Tarkabh¯ sa (TBh). Moreover. “An entity can be considered to be real if. he shifts his focus from svalaksana to the real. i.

but they do not thereby enter into discussion of the real either. . Therefore. Dharmak¯rti neither states explicitly what ı these conditions are. mKhas grub and rGyal tshab. So. and individual essence (p. they refuse to identify the real with the individual. constantly changing. 117). according to the author. who do not exclude universals from the domain of real things. This idea of the criteria of reality provides a theoretical basis for the author’s explanation of dGe lugs realism in Chapter 5. refuse to define rang mtshan (svalaksana) as that which is deter. In this way. time and essence. The dGe lugs pas in turn do not accept these conditions as defining characteristics of svalaksana (rang mtshan). Dharmak¯rti never asserts that things’ being individual determines their ı . 118).REVIEW ARTICLE 355 rally localized and. the author reveals that such dGe lugs thinkers as dGe ’dun grub. Dharmak¯rti does not give any ı other characterization of specifically characterized phenomena. For Dharmak¯rti. For Dharmak¯rti specifically characterized phenomena are real ı inasmuch as they are individuals (p. and entity (p. the real is that which is determinate in space. Dharmak¯rti’s criteria clearly ı imply the philosophical position of antirealism and the commitment to an event ontology. “Ge-luk Thinkers on Specific Ontology”. First of all. including universals. and entity entails that only individuals are real. time. the three sets of identity conditions define the real because real ı things and constructs are distinguished from each other on the basis of being or not being individuals (p. and entity. real things are not strictly determinate in space. This is to say that these three sets of identity conditions play an extreme important role in Dharmak¯rti’s thought ı (p. Accepting these identity conditions would exclude the real and recurrent properties required for a moderate solution to the problem of universals. Second. time . time. therefore. 116). the textual sources to which the author reverts possibly support the idea that svalaksana is a determinate existence in space. 117). definite spatio-temporal location. nor defines the real as that which fulfills these conditions. minate in space. Static entities. 69). 116). . for the Ge-luk tradition. ı There is no need to add any qualification to that statement. time. 118). where the author closely investigates the discrepancy between Dharmak¯rti and dGe lugs realists. emphasizing the importance of the “identity conditions” as the essential conditions of reality in Dharmak¯rti’s system. Thus. as the ı author himself admits (p. and essential nature. Third. Dreyfus develops his discussion. ı Yet one might doubt whether such “identity conditions” are really assigned to define reality in Dharmak¯rti’s ontology. exist in the same state in different places and times. Strict determination in space. Ge-luk thinkers do not define the specifically characterized in ı relation to the three sets of identity conditions. In the section entitled “Realist ı Explanation of the Nature of the Specifically Characterized” (p. The author contrasts this dGe lugs position with that of Dharmak¯rti: ı Contrary to Dharmak¯rti. . . For Dharmak¯rti. but they do not imply that these conditions are related to the definition of the real.

. 11. “Purview of the Real” (p. In the following will be reexamined 1) the textual sources that the author adduces in support of the idea of “identity conditions” and 2) the author’s problematic treatment of Dharmak¯rti’s thought about the real. the reviewer will attempt to specify problems that confront Dreyfus as well as all interpreters of Dharmak¯rti’s philosophy. . it follows that the “identity conditions” or “being individual” would be just one defining characteristics of the real among many others. Accordingly. and that svalaksana would not be . however. real things. not because of their being individual. thus. he further investigates what the real is for Dharmak¯rti. Although it is true that. The first half of Chapter 2 ı (“Dharmak¯rti’s Ontology) is devoted to analyzing the notion of causal ı efficacy as well as the theory of momentariness (ksanikatva). In this perspective. The interrelationship ı of the different positions is.). the author’s emphasis lies on the variety of Dharmak¯rti’s thought concerning the real. the author takes notice of the significance of causal efficacy in Dharmak¯rti’s system.14 Go ram pa indicates that Dharmak¯rti implies these defining 13 Cited above in n. 83 infra. 14 sDe bdun rab gsal 18a2: ’dra dang mi ’dra nyid phyir dang || (PV III 2a) zhes pas rang spyi gnyis kyi thun mong ma yin pa’i don ldog ston pas de gnyis kyi mtshan nyid rim bzhin | yul dus rang bzhin ma ’dres par gnas pa’i dngos po dang | yul dus rang bzhin thun mong par snang ba’i sgro btags so || “By the statement ‘because of being similar and dissimilar’. . collecting different accounts of the real from various ı sources. for Dharmak¯rti. time and essential nature (yul dus rang bzhin ma ’dres par gnas pa’i ı dngos po). [Dharmak¯rti] teaches the specific meaning-exclusion (i.e. . ı Thereby.. meaning itself) ı of the particular and universal respectively. svalaksanas count among ı . It is not completely clear how the author relates the idea of the “identity conditions” as criteria of reality to the theory of causal efficacy or that of momentariness. In Chapter 4. . real from a certain viewpoint. space. they are defined as real because of their having causal efficacy (arthakriy¯ sakti). The author’s treatment of Dharmak¯rti’s ontology as a whole. the definitions of these two are . One suggestion that the author gives to solve the complexity of Dharmak¯rti’s ı ontology is to assume that Dharmak¯rti adopts different views to define ı the real from a strategic viewpoint and assigns them to different levels of philosophical investigation. ı Textual sources Having presented in accordance with PV III 2a13 the definition of svalaksana (rang mtshan) as a thing that exists not sharing with others . as will be seen in the later part of this review. a´ As a matter of course. must be ı said to leave problems.356 REVIEW ARTICLE reality. Throughout the present book. left unsolved.

Cf. As regards atatk¯ rya. These faults do not result [from our theory of exclusion]. . dvayor api ca vidyate || “The nature of a spotted [cow] is not present in a black [cow]. without moving from its own place. a a a . ´¯ a a a a . . . 1f. a a . a a a.15 . Cf. 139cd. ¯. . in one [particular] occurs. tena tatra na || “Words express [the meaning] that is conventionally postulated. but exclusion from that which does not produce the [one and the same] effect [of cows] is common to both”. PVSV 45. 17 sDe bdun rab gsal 21b6: de ’bras can min las ldog pa || gnyis ka la yang yod pa yin || cited from PV I 139: yad rupam sabaleyasya b¯ huleyasya n¯ sti tat | atatk¯ ryapar¯ vr ttir ¯ . The superimposed [thing] that appears sharing place. of one and the same object conceals another form by its own form. and PV I 92c. . 15 sDe bdun rab gsal 21b3f. [you have] too good argument”. .21 respectively [given as follows]: The thing that does not share place. 21 sDe bdun rab gsal 21b5: de tshe rang gi mtshan nyid med || cited from PV I 92: sabd¯ h samketitam pr¯ hur vyavah¯ r¯ ya sa smrtah | tad¯ svalaksanam n¯ sti samketas ´ a. 20 sDe bdun rab gsal 21b4f. A single nature [in many things] or many natures [in sole thing] are illusions of [conceptual] cognition with regard to these [ultimate existents]”. . u . Namely. the particular [based on which the meaning was formed] does not exist. . prasa˙ ginah || “Supposing that [the universal is] distinct from [the particular]. This [meaning] is formed for the purpose of verbal communication. . u . 68ab. a aa a a .19 139ab. a 18 sDe bdun rab gsal 22a1: ldog pa kun la yod pa’i phyir || cited from PV I 136: abhedavyavah¯ r¯ s ca bhede syur anibandhan¯ h || sarvatra bh¯ v¯ d vy¯ vrtter naite dosah a a´ a. PVSV 78. time and essential nature [with other things is the definition of the universal]. time and essential nature [with other things is the definition of the particular]. verbal convention is not [applied to] this [particular]”. PV I 137–138 cited below in n. every time and in every form”. At the time [of communication]. 24. with nor separate from [other things] by themselves. 16 sDe bdun rab gsal 21b6: tha dad dngos rnams la brten nas || don gcig tu ni snang ba’i blo || cited from PV I 68: parar¯ pam svar¯ pena yay¯ samvryate dhiy¯ | u . he cites PV I 153ab. and 136b for rang bzhin ma ’dres pa. cf. times and individuals”. .: khra bo yi ni ngo bo gang || de ni ser skya la yod min || cited from PV I 139 (see n. “Because this [particular] does not pervade different s a a a a places.16 139cd. 19 sDe bdun rab gsal 21b4: dam pa’i don gyi don rnams ni || rang gi ’dre dang tha dad med || cited from PV I 87: samsrjyante na bhidyante svato ’rth¯ h p¯ ram¯ rthik¯ h || r¯ pam a. 17 above). that the verbal expressions [to be applied] to the same [object] as well would be groundless.REVIEW ARTICLE 357 characteristics of svalaksana in his PV.17 and 136b18 for yul ma ’dres pa.: sarvatra sarvad¯ sarv¯ k¯ rasthit¯ tmeti cet. 28: tasya de´ak¯ lavyaktibhed¯ n¯ skandan¯ t.: gzhan la gnas par gyur pa ni || rang gi gnas las mi g-yo zhing || cited from PV I 153: anyatra vartam¯ nasya tato ’nyasth¯ najanmani | svasm¯ d a a a acalatah sth¯ n¯ d vrttir ity atiyuktimat || “[If you assert] ‘the [universal] that is occuring a a .20 68ab. PV I 87ab. since exclusion is present in all [homogeneous things]”. . in [another particular] which arises in a different place from this [particular]’. . [despite] depending on individual things”. Hence. it follows n . . “[The opponent] says that a a a a [the universal] has the nature of abiding everywhere. ekam anekam ca tesu buddher upaplavah || “The ultimate existents neither intermingle . . ek¯ rthapratibh¯ siny¯ bh¯ v¯ n asritya bhedinah || “The cognition that has an appearance a a a a a ¯´ .

a . a´ . . they support Dharmak¯rti’s acceptance of the definiı tion of svalaksana (rang mtshan) as a thing that exists not sharing with . with universals the unique and uncommon characteristics of svalaksana.¯ solely explains what svalaksana is: Svalaksana. . among which Dreyfus mentions PV I 153. kury¯ d apy anyadar´ane | “Although [things] are different [from each other]. PV I 137–138: ekak¯ ryesu bhedes u a . 22 sDe bdun rab gsal 21b5: phan tshun ’dre ba med pa yi || yig cha rim ldan ji ltar na || cited from PV III 486–487: avasthit¯ v akram¯ y¯ m sakrd abh¯ san¯ n matau | varnah a a a.. . Dharmak¯rti thereby contrasts a a ı . . . he does not suggest that such characteristics are the criteria for reality. In the same manner. impossible and useless to denote [each of] different things [respectively by a specific word]. How can the part[s] of a [long] letter that [occurs] gradually cause a nongradual [cognition]. because it is redundant. a a a a a. one may recognize [something as identical with that which one saw before]. 70 and n. a . . . which is the object of . . they have a s the function to produce an effect such as causing [one and the same] cognition. despite seeing something different”. For Go ram pa. tatk¯ ryaparicodane | gaurav¯ saktivaiphaly¯ d bhed¯ khy¯ y¯ h sam¯ srutih || krt¯ vrddhair a a´ a a a a. time and essential nature.358 REVIEW ARTICLE III 486d–487a. atatk¯ ryavy¯ vr ttivinibandhan¯ | na bh¯ ve sarvabh¯ v¯ n¯ m svabh¯ vavyavasthiteh || “The a a . . Then. However. . . . . Nor does Go ram pa appeal to these verses to confirm the criteria of reality. because it appears at once in the nongradual (i. simultaneous) cognition. a akramo ’d¯rghah kramav¯ n akram¯ m katham || upakury¯ d asamslisyan varnabh¯ gah ı a a. others space. u . . v¯ bhede ’pi a a a . the object of which is the elimination from other [things] than those [which have the same effect]. a .22 I 98ab. a . sy¯ d akramo d¯rghah kramav¯ n akram¯ m katham || upakury¯ d asamslisyan varnabh¯ gah a ı a a. . . .t a kurvatah | arth¯ ms tadanyavi´lesavisayair dhvanibhih saha || samyojya pratyabhijñ¯ nam a. but they do not serve to establish the reality of an individual existent. Having observed each function. grah¯ d ante kramavad dh¯s ca no bhavet | “Supposing that [a cognition] lasts [more than a ı´ one moment]. p. . a letter would not be gradual and [a long vowel] would not be long. a a a .´ . a a . a ´ . 45. The cognition in turn would not be gradual. .. All of the verses from PV I are involved in refuting the real existence of universals or generally characterized phenomena (s¯ m¯ nya.e. .e. one associates things with the words. a .. see n. . s . sages have given the same word to different things that have one and the same effect for the purpose of indicating this [one and the same] effect on the basis of the exclusion from those which do not have this [one and the same] effect. parasparam | antyam p¯ rvasthit¯ v urdhvam vardham¯ no dhvanir bhavet || akramena ¯ a ¯ a . the sound would augment later. simultaneously) at the end”. 23 sDe bdun rab gsal 22a1: gsal ba rnams ni tha dad kyang || bya ba de dang de byed pa’i || cited from PV I 98–99ab: jñ¯ n¯ dyarthakriy¯ m t¯ m t¯ m drs. . . for all things are established in their own nature”.: avasthit¯ v akram¯ y¯ m sakrd¯ bh¯ san¯ n matau | varnah sy¯ d a a a.. 480). PV III 485– a ı´ . . 487ab in Tosaki 1985: 167ff. III 486 infra. parasparam | akramena grah¯ d antakramavad dh¯s ca no bhavet || Cf. a a s¯ m¯ nyalaks ana) as the object of words. . not uniting with each other? If the previous [part] lasts to the end. since it cognizes [the long vowel] nongradually (i. ¯ a a . and I 138–13924 (p. . 24 As for PV I 139. [A word is] not [given to indicate real] thing[s]. in the relevant passage. . . 17 above. a . .23 and 136b for dus ma ’dres pa. Moksakaragupta.

loc. . by insisting that svalaksana is real insofar as it is individual. . NBT 70. 69. . vidhasya pratyaksasya svalaksanam visayo boddhavyah | svalaksanam ity as¯ dh¯ ran am a a . . . gives the same definition (3b6. which is recognizable in his substitution of one concept by another and abrupt shifting of the subject of discussion from one to another. . 28 See PV I 40 cited above in n. (p.. . .26 whereas the dGe lugs pas like rGyal tshab. (tr. Cf. 12. not what the real is. 129 ad NB I 12 (tasya visayah . e. cited in Kajiyama. seems one of those which are handed down by tradition rather than Tsong kha pa’s own idea. Yoshimizu 2000: 24) to svalaksana. according to which they are distinguished from their homogeneous and heterogeneous things. Besides his aforementioned shifting in p. None of these texts. Kajiyama 1966: 56): tasya visayah svalaksanam | tasya catur. cf.27 In this respect too. . after all. . vastusvar¯ pam de´ak¯ l¯ k¯ raniyatam | “The [perception] has the particular as its object. . This.: rang lugs la | rang mtshan gyi mtshan nyid rtog pas btags pa min par rang ngos nas thun mong ma yin pa’i rang bzhin du gnas pa’i dngos po’o || “In our own system [of the Sautr¯ ntika]. their controversy remains as to what svalaksana is. the author seems . a not being conceptually imposed.7f. n. but not to the s aa a condition of reality. . . Cf. 83). applies these accounts to the real. (rang mtshan).g. The author. the definition of the particular is the thing which consists. . . . s aa a The fourfold perception is to be known to have the particular as its object. . rang mtshan)” (p. . . in its essential nature uncommon [with other things]”. .28 25 TBh 21. . cit. . . Yid kyi mun sel 21b2f. “The Purview of the ‘Real’ ”. . mKhas grub and dGe ’dun grub assert different definitions of svalaksana . intrinsically]. is the specific nature of real entity (vastusvar¯ pa) that is u determined in space. 82). time and form (de´ak¯ l¯ k¯ raniyata).25 The phrase s aa a de´ak¯ l¯ k¯ raniyata refers to the mode of a real existent. The verse teaches that things have their own essential nature. . also Yoshimizu (forthcoming). Cf. for instance. svalaksanam): tasya caturvidhasya pratyaksasya visayah bodhavyah svalaksanam |. time and form”.. .. What is the particular is the intrinsic nature of real entity that is unique and determined in space. 116–117). . Such Tibetan scholars as Go ram pa consider this description of svalaksana as its definition. to be firmly convinced of the identification of svalaksana with the real. Indeed. . 27 Dreyfus discusses their respective definitions of svalaksana (pp. nevertheless. The same substitution is seen in his interpretation of PV I 40. but from its own side [i. the author opens Chapter 4. u . . . . . . . for this treatise is a collection of terminology and supposed to have been compiled for educational purposes. 26 The sDe bdun la ’jug pa’i sgo don gnyer yid kyi mun sel ascribed to Tsong kha pa. provides support for the author’s view that things are defined as real if they fulfill the three “identity conditions”. . having announced that he would turn to the consideration of “the purview of ‘specifically characterized phenomenon’ (the famous svalaksana. 8ff. however.e.REVIEW ARTICLE 359 perception. . .

e. 27 above). Tested in this way.. insofar as svalaksana is defined as such. ces rang mtshan rnams rigs mthun mi mthun gyi chos . we can define specifically characterized as that which ‘essentially abides in its own essence’. Cf. .. but from its own side (i. such an essence must correspond to clear identity conditions. Here the subject of the verse is replaced by svalaksana. they consist. intrinsically). for he explains (p. PV I 40) is said by the commentarial tradition to explain the nature of things (dngos po’i gnas lugs). The last sentence implies that universals etc. among main Tibetan commentators on PV I. accordance with the same verse (p. but from its own side” indicates that svalaksana . not being merely conceptually imposed. for he elucidates the subject of the verse by applying the same definition of rang mtshan as mKhas grub (cf. .31 The inserted phrase “not being conceptually imposed. but by nature [i. in its essential nature”. . Analytical table of contents of Thar lam gsal byed ad PV I 40–185 in Yoshimizu 1999: 470f. . rtog pas btags pa tsam min par rang bzhin gyis gzhan dang ma ’dres par rang gi ngo bo la gnas pa’i phyir | “All things are the subject . It is inter.29 Hence. the author construes this verse to express the condition of reality. and only if. . in its essential nature without intermingling with others”.. who have also taken the subject of the verse as svalaksana. 31 See ns. have formulated their own definition of rang mtshan (svalaksana) as “that . dngos po) to refer to real things. one can naturally infer that the author reads in the verse a definition of the real. 69): This passage (viz. Yid kyi mun sel 41b6f. esting to compare this reading with that of dGe lugs interpreters such as mKhas grub and rGyal tshab. rGyal tshab seems to concur with mKhas grub in this interpretation. do not satisfy the condition of reality. he comments on the verse as follows: dngos kun chos can | . . . Moreover. .e. individuals pass.30 Most presumably depending on this verse. . since they lack individuality.: . .). n. . it must be considered a particularly meaningful statement. which abides. . mind. An entity can be considered real if. In his Thar lam gsal byed (45b3f. The reviewer has discussed this issue in Yoshimizu (forthcoming). . 30 Cf. 118). not being conceptually imposed. . a One page later. intrinsically]. is a real thing. however. since it is a defining characteristic of ultimate reality for 29 As Dreyfus indicates (p. he gives the definition of svalaksana in .360 REVIEW ARTICLE First. they . namely. 27 and 30 above. it is rGyal tshab to have explicitly stated that PV I 40 sets forth the nature of things (dngos po’i gnas lugs) in his Thar lam gsal byed (45b1). . it has its own distinctive essence. a real entity is to be defined as that which essentially abides in its own essence. ı however. but universals and abstract entities do not. In the author’s . by taking the subject “things” (bh¯ va. From this explanation. 70): If we put together the bits and pieces that Dharmak¯rti and his commentators provide.

32 That is to say. Yid kyi mun sel 44a6f. It is. His particular stress is laid on the variety of thoughts contained in Dharmak¯rti’s works with regard to ı the question of what the real is. as cited in Yoshimizu 1998: 64. being svalaksana or abiding in own essential nature. intrinsically]”. but he does not intend to say that universals are unreal since they are not individuals. they have required a different condition of reality from the individuality in the sense of abiding in own essential nature to indicate that svalaksana is real. . however. . n. 32 Cf.REVIEW ARTICLE 361 both mKhas grub and rGyal tshab.e. one can hardly agree with the author’s understanding that PV I 40 suggests by the expression “essentially abiding in own essence” the “identity conditions” or “being individual” as criteria of reality. PV I 40 is often quoted out of context by later interpreters. with which they are essentially endowed. e.. The author’s problematic treatment of Dharmak¯rti’s thought about the ı real Having thus elucidated the core of Dharmak¯rti’s ontology on the ground ı of the idea of “identity conditions”. however. intends to define svalaksana or the ı . Such a minimum unit a. is a . . His new inquiry is. contrastively. although one may properly identify the subject of the verse as real or individual things.. It is very unlikely that Dharmak¯rti. “The Purview of the ‘Real’ ”. whether the real is to be reduced to a minimum existent such as a partless atom (param¯ nu) or a momentary phase of a continuum. since it asserts that things are to be differentiated into species. Dharmak¯rti thereby precludes the ı objection that real universals are the ground of differentiation as well as the object of words. not by virtue of universals.g. real. 33 In the context of apoha theory. The same definition is found in many other treatises of dGe lugs pa. considering its relation to previous and succeeding verses with the help of the autocommentary. For Dreyfus. etc. He thinks that it is unnecessary at all to postulate universals to explain the formulation of concepts or the function of words. . where he analyzes Dharmak¯rti’s various ı commitments to the concept of reality. The verse seeks to clarify what makes things different. the author proceeds to Chapter 4. Dharmak¯rti disproves the existence of real universals ı by various arguments. 11. These all are. . indispensable to reexamine this verse in broad context of both logic and semantic. but established from its own side [i. primary condition of reality.: don dam bden pa’i mtshan nyid | rtog pas btags pa tsam ma yin par rang ngos nas grub pa’i chos | “The definition of ultimate reality is the thing which is not merely conceptually imposed. later interpretations of PV I 40. in short. in this verse.. but on the ground of their different features.33 To sum up.

Dharmak¯rti. svalaksana. only their infinitesimal components are real. cannot stop there. the author assumes that Dharmak¯rti accepts ı ı both a single atom and extended objects as real.. he shows that Dharmak¯rti’s analysis of external objects is articulated around three levels of analysis: ı (1) At a commonsense level. 35 Dreyfus says (p. and yet manages not to contradict himself (p. 98f.362 REVIEW ARTICLE is not the object of perception. objects of commonsense disappear and the color of the fire a is distinguished from the fire. he refuses to describe Dharmak¯rti ı as opting exclusively for one or the other of the views we described here. he rejects it within the framework of Sautr¯ ntika ontology. ske mched). is less ı due to mistaken interpretations than to a multiplicity of views within Dharmak¯rti’s own ı work. . as the author indicates. to understand that Dharmak¯rti handles the problem of the real. arise other atoms [than the previous ones]. Dharmak¯rti is supposed to accept the reality of extended ı objects. although they are ´a wrong to claim to represent Dharmak¯rti’s exclusive view. (2) At a deeper level. these preanalytical ideas cannot stand. I would argue.): “Our analysis reveals a surprising diversity among Dharmak¯rti’s Sa-gya commentators . at a deeper level. That is to say. When examined in relation to sense spheres (¯ yatana. whereas. however. 86. he conforms to the Sautr¯ ntika view that only single a ´a atoms are real. . . Supposing that a single atom is real. citing PV III 19534 that perception can merely apprehend the aggregate of atoms. there a . 485). In the Buddhist tradition. This third level corresponds to what I have described as the standard interpretation”. In order to avoid this undesirable . Instead. Who is right? This diversity. where commonsense objects are reduced to phenomenologically available entities. objects such as jars and so on are said to exist. Contrary to other Sa-gya scholars and most modern commentators. it follows that such an extended object as the aggregate of atoms would not be real. adopting ı “contradictory ontologies”. They are indeed the cause of the origination of cognition”. This seems to be S¯ kya Chokı den’s approach in some parts of his work. The ontological analysis. Such a view is quite helpful here. According to the author.35 a 34 PV III 195: arth¯ ntar¯ bhisam bandh¯ j j¯ yante ye ’navo ’pare | ukt¯ s te sañcit¯ s te a a a a a a . through a “strategy of ascending scales of analysis” from a pragmatic standpoint (pp. . this level is reflected in the Abhidharma. the object of perception. The author’s solution is. would not be real. Cited by Dreyfus together with III 196–197 in p. consequence for Dharmak¯rti. hi nimittam jñ¯ najanmanah || “By virtue of [atoms’] connecting with other [atoms]. maintains that spatially ı extended objects. but on the other hand. namely. on one hand. however. which are to be cognized by perception. Hence. for even entities such as color are not real. The author . 86 (notes 17–18 in p. This is the level of analysis corresponding to what I describe as the alternate interpretation. At a commonsense level. Therefore (3) at the deepest level. exist in reality. which are called ‘aggregated’. 98). in a certain way all three interpretations are partly right. Dharmak¯rti offers a variety of conflicting views ı which he sees pragmatically compatible. viz. 83. . following S¯ kya mchog ldan. 83): Rather than proposing a unified system.

From this classification of levels. adds to these three the fourth level. too. moreover. on which the existence of external objects is refuted in conformity with Yog¯ c¯ ra doctrine (p. the “identity conditions” or “being individual”. can be . The author’s problematic commitments to Dharmak¯rti’s philosophy. svalaksana would . It is not entirely meanı ingless but is unconvincing to argue. arthakriy¯ samartha/ don byed nus pa. s¯ m¯ nyalaksana/ spyi mtshan. . They might not really be Dharmak¯rti’s own views. . dravya/ a rdzas. that Dharmak¯rti adopts different views at different levels from a pragmatic ı point of view. supposed to derive from the dichotomous classification of different concepts. . often attributes to Dharmak¯rti different views. following later interpretations. vy¯ vrtti/ ldog pa. . As the author emphasizes. . Although the author has not discussed in detail the reality of temporally extended objects. would be discredited as fundamental criteria of reality. He. as he admits (p. param¯ rtha/ don dam pa. . seem mainly due to his reading of Dharmak¯rti’s texts based on ı later Tibetan commentaries and modern interpretations. in dependence on later interpretations. vyakti/ gsal ba. Finally. . where ı . anitya/ mi rtag pa. nitya/ rtag pa. 83). 85): ı And although Dharmak¯rti never provides a detailed statement of his ontology. . which the author has proposed in the preceding chapters. ı without identifying them in Dharmak¯rti’s words. is an extended object. which has been widely accepted by Tibetan thinkers. anarthakriy¯ samartha/ a . The second group of equivalents which refer to the unreal are: s¯ m¯ nya/ spyi. that is svalaksana. where only a single atom is qualified to be real. emphasizing that in his system reality is reducible to ı partless atoms interacting with moments of consciousness. it is true that one can encounter in Dharmak¯rti’s works several answers to the question of what the real is. since the object of perception. a a ma ’dres pa. ı This accounts for the rich diversity of interpretations among his commentators. and may also account for the author’s varied explanations of the real. In this way. in fact.REVIEW ARTICLE 363 It should. no philosophical investigation is required. not be identical with the real at a deeper level. If that were so. we could ı expect him to follow this Sautr¯ ntika view. The first group of equivalents which refer to the real are: svalaksana/ rang mtshan. dngos med. bh¯ va or vastu/ dngos po. however. ı however. the author’s discussion on the real is leading away from his initial approach. a a . a . Several traditional and modern scholars have a explained Dharmak¯rti in this way. it follows that Dign¯ ga and a Dharmak¯rti postulated svalaksana as real at a commonsense level. . abh¯ va/ a a a a a . samvrti/ kun rdzob. be noted that this account by Dreyfus is again not based on Dharmak¯rti’s own words. it must result in the same absurdities. ı The author’s identification of svalaksana and the real.

g. . and the incapability to produce an effect are indeed the [respective] characteristics of real entity and unreal entity”. thing which is capable of producing an effect is ultimately existent”. . as for the relation of this definition with the “identity conditions”. however. | spyi dang gzhan sel dang | ldog pa dang | rnam gcod dang | ’dres pa dang | ’brel pa dang | kun rdzob ces bya ba sogs pa ni | don la mi gnas pa | dngos por ma grub pa | dbang po’i yul ma yin pa blos sgro btags pa | brtags pa’i chos dngos po la don byed mi nus pa | gzhan sel gyis ’brel pa dang | ’brel med dang | dgag pa dang bsgrub pa la sogs pa’i sgo nas | ’jug gi don byed mi nus par don mtshungs pa yin te | Sa pan’s source for these equivalents is PV I 171–172 (see . 37 See e.36 This kind of classification as well as equivalency is certainly of great help for the systematical apprehension of Dharmak¯rti’s philosophy. to be real. Sa pan sets forth them in order to investigate the nature of real things (dngos . for Dharmak¯rti explicitly defines a´ ı an ultimately existent (param¯ rthasat) or a real entity (vastu) as that which a has causal efficacy. PVSV 87. ı Since these objects possess their own individual essences.. Yoshimizu 1998: 63. Phenomena that do not possess their own characteristics cannot perform any function. the definition of reality just one page before introducing the idea of “identity conditions” (p. PV I 166abc: sa p¯ ram¯ rthiko bh¯ vo ya ev¯ rthakriy¯ ksamah. Almost the same equivalency appears in many treatises of dGe lugs pa (cf. 9). For what theoretical reason has Dharmak¯rti ascertained that only indiı vidual things or svalaksanas are real? From his own words. ’dres pa. Hence they do not appear to perception. 68): Following up on his idea that the definition of reality is the capacity to perform a functions. “Only the a a a a a . . 10 above). not universals. . one can safely . n. the author calls this. they are called specifically characterized objects.364 REVIEW ARTICLE don byed mi nus pa. . PVSV ad I 166: idam eva hi vastvavastuyor laksanam yad arthakriy¯ yogyat¯ ’yogyat¯ ca. . his explanation becomes intricate (p. too. 19a1). be conscious of the fact that ı it is not Dharmak¯rti but later commentators to have collected and classified ı these concepts. They alone can perform functions. have causal efficacy (arthakriy¯ sakti). 77) Sa pan’s presentation of these equivalents in Rigs gter rang .37 Demonstrating the special significance of causal efficacy. PV III 3 (see n. (176-2): rang gi mtshan nyid dang | gsal ba dang | dngos po dang | rdzas dang | log pa dang | don dam pa zhes bya ba la sogs pa ni don byed nus pa rdzas phan tshun ma ’dres pa rgyu dang ’bras bu grub pa | skyes bu thams cad kyi blang dor bya ba’i ’jug yul yin pas dngos po’i don du don gcig pa yin te . are real because they alone . Yet. 8 above). One must. n. one might be less concerned with the question of how and why Dharmak¯rti equals or ı opposes one concept to another. and it is none other than the particular”. Dharmak¯rti asserts that only individual objects are real. . ’grel 19a2f. 7 above). . 70): 36 Dreyfus introduces (p. If one gets familiar with such an equivalency. which is an accurate reflection of reality. NB I 12–15 (see n. po’i gnas lugs. 4 ad PV I 171cd: yad arthakriy¯ k¯ ri tad eva vastv ity a a uktam | sa ca vi´esa eva | “Nothing but that which produces an effect is said [in PV I 166] s . conclude that only svalaksanas. and 19a5ff. “For the capability a a a .

REVIEW ARTICLE 365 For Dharmak¯rti. svalaksana makes a difference. such a universal is unreal from a spatial point of view. which is created by a particular capacity of its . the reviewer would not agree with this interpretation. it is unclear how the author defines the relation between two essential characteristics of the real. 69: “An entity can be considered real if. Hence. After all. it is ambiguous whether a universal is unreal on account of its lacking spatial location or capacity of performing a function. Dign¯ ga’s epistemological qualification ı a of svalaksana as the object of perception (pratyaksa) can already entail . Although the author’s position on this issue is unclear. real and causally efficacious phenomena. being individual and being causally efficacious. 67): . primarily established on causal efficacy. that the ultimate reality of svalaksanas is established on their being causally . instead of ı distributing them into different levels of philosophical achievement. Dharmak¯rti equates svalaksanas with ı . according to Dharmak¯rti. in accordance with the criterion of reality that something is real if. 10). an individual entity. . .. that a svalaksana has the capacity to cause a perception of its own image. If the author thereby interprets the verse to state that causally efficacious phenomena are identifiable with svalaksanas or individual things because . The last sentence is. and only if. they are real. identified as real. according to ı which the real is to be distinguished from the unreal and svalaksana is . There is still one sentence which draws one’s attention. 7). appearing as . in particular. Any phenomenon that is causally efficient is real and included among specifically characterized phenomena. Here. . it has its own distinctive essence”. In the same way. In the reviewer’s view. the possession of causal efficacy is the most fundamental criterion of reality in Dharmak¯rti’s ontology. which occupies a certain location in space and time. . as the author asserts (p. it may be proper to say that the three identity conditions explain the individuality of svalaksana. . . in the same way as NB I 12–15 (cited I n. 67). Therefore. By virtue of this capacity. the essential nature of an individual is nothing other than ı causal efficacy of its own. Directly commenting on PV III 3 (cited in n. . . viz. since. the author subsumes that which has causal efficacy under svalaksanas (p. It is true that. and only if. confusing. . but its reality is . the impossibility of attributing a definite spatial location to fireness shows ı that it is not something that makes a real difference. efficacious. it can perform some function. and marks its unique features. it is worth attempting to clarify the links among concepts and theories and reveal what is the most essential to Dharmak¯rti’s philosophy. . but what Dharmak¯rti intends to ı say in PV III 3 is. For Dharmak¯rti. if compared with the aforementioned statement of his own in p. the individuality of things is understood to be grounded in causal efficacy. .

Things are considered to have different causal efficacy at each moment.40 Nor does it incur any contradiction that svalaksana counts among momentary existents. it is not contradictory a . .38 One should also note that Dharmak¯rti demonstrates the theory ı of impermanence (anityatva) or momentariness (ksanikatva) on the basis .: k¯ ryotp¯ dana´ akteh k¯ ranasvabh¯ vatve ’py . . a˙ a a .e. . u a avasth¯ vi´esah k¯ ranasya k¯ ranan¯ti . since nothing but the aggregate of atoms has the capacity to cause a cognition. one may answer that the real is to be reduced to such a minimum phase in conformity with the theory of momentariness that whatever is real is exclusively momentary. Thus. as Dreyfus has done. also Steinkellner 1971: 183–188. . 39 Cf. “Therefore. of the definition of the real as being causally efficacious. a . Solely its momentariness . phase) of a s . ¯. ı to which his logical system is largely devoted. which are present at previous [moments]. a a a a. because [their] essential nature is determined by their primary and secondary causes. Other [things] do not [produce the same effect] since they do not have the [capacity to produce this effect] as their essential nature”. capacity to produce an effect is the essential nature of cause. p¯ rvabh¯ vinas tv a a s .. 40 Cf. 34. etc.g. PV III 195 cited above in n. whereas the special conditions [thereof]. certain a a [things] alone may produce a [certain] effect. is beyond the range of perception. for this . Although this analysis of Dharmak¯rti’s ontological system by the ı reviewer certainly requires further investigation. . even if it . 22f. e. Not only the identification of svalaksana with the real but . the discussion of momentariness in HB 8∗ . 38 Cf. . a .”. a . is to be identified as the aggregate of atoms. PVSV 87. Thus considered. . . . the reviewer would hereby like to propose to reexamine Dharmak¯rti’s own words in their ı respective context apart from later interpretations. If one takes account of the question as to whether the real is reducible to a momentary phase. 17f. . . for Dharmak¯rti ascribes a specific causal efficacy to each phase of the ı collection of causes (k¯ ranas¯ magr¯).39 Therefore. Steinkellner 1967: 44): tasm¯ d yo ’ntyo ’vasth¯ vi´esah sa ev¯ nkur¯ dijananasvabh¯ vah .g.]”. The establishment of this theory is no doubt the most important task for Dharmak¯rti. . The fact that there exist controversies among interpretations attests to the necessity of revisiting original texts. . e. does not mean that svalaksana is imperceptible. .¯ ı the last [moment of the collection of causes] alone has the nature to produce a sprout etc. .. “If the a a s a . the special condition (i. Cf.. (tr. PVSV 21. a ’tatsvabh¯ vatv¯ t . are causes of the cause [of sprout. . the possession of causal efficacy offers the most fundamental basis to Dharmak¯rti’s entire ı philosophical system. there is no need at all to conceive that Dharmak¯rti adopts “contradictory ontologies” or sets ı forth “different levels” of the real.: bhedam¯ tr¯ vi´es e ’pi svahetupratyayaniyamitasvabh¯ vatv¯ t kecid eva k¯ rak¯ h syuh n¯ nye a a s ..“Even if [causes] are not distinct with regard to mere difference. . a ı that svalaksana exists in ultimate reality as having causal efficacy.366 REVIEW ARTICLE causes. 11f.

the First Chapter with the Autocommentary. Kajiyama Y¯ ichi Kajiyama. 1968. Steinkellner. Pandita Durveka Mi´ra’s Dharmottaraprad¯pa [Being a ı a s ı . Kyoto. PV III Dharmak¯rti. Gnoli R. ed. sub-commentary on Dharmottara’s Ny¯ yabindut¯k¯ . Patna.. Rome. Pram¯ nav¯ rttikasvavrttit¯k¯ . a ı . 1967. An Annotated Translation of u the Tarkabh¯ sa of Moksakaragupta. a . a . ¯ . New Delhi. a NBT . Steinkellner Ernst Steinkellner.. ed. Complete Works of the Great Masters of the Sa skya sect of the Tibetan Buddhism 5. The Collected Works of Tsong kha pa 27 (bKra shis lhun po edition). Pram¯ nav¯ rttikavrtti of Dharmak¯rti. Übersetzung und Anmerkungen. a. a. The Toyo Bunko. Rigs gter rang ’grel Sa skya Pandita Kun dga’ rgyal mtshan. a commentary on Dharmak¯rti’s a ı .REVIEW ARTICLE 367 the dichotomy of the real and the unreal or individuals and universals are to be the subjects of reconsideration. a .ı a Ny¯ yabindu]. Malvania D. Dharmak¯rti’s Hetubinduh II. a. Wien. u PVSV Id. see PV I. pp.¯ NB Dharmak¯rti. Karnakagomin’s Commentary on the a. Tshad ma rigs pa’i gter gyi dka’ gnas rnam par bshad pa sde bdun rab gsal. sDe bdun rab gsal Go ram pa bSod names seng ge. . 1982 (reprint). ed. Tshad ma rigs pa’i gter gyi rang ’grel. The . Ernst ı . Dharmottara. ABBREVIATIONS sDe bdun la ’jug pa’i sgo don gnyer yid kyi mun sel Tsong kha pa Blo bzang grags pa’i dpal. Y¯ sh¯ Miyasaka. 1–206. Naritasan Shinshoji. The Toyo Bunko. The Complete Works of the Great Masters of the Sa skya sect of the Tibetan Buddhism 12. Karnakagomin. once problems are revealed. PVSVT . An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy. Pram¯ nav¯ rttikasvavrtti. 1969. a ı and Critical Notes. 1977. 1971/71. 1960. a a a u o Koten Kenky¯ (Acta Indologica) II. Dreyfus’ efforts toward a deeper exploration of Dharmak¯rti’s ı philosophy. Wien. Indo ı a. Tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit-Text. 1967. Ny¯ yabindut¯k¯ .ı a PV I The Pram¯ nav¯ rttikam of Dharmak¯rti.ı a . ed. Ny¯ yabindu. The scholars who are engaged in the study of Dharmak¯rti’s tradition should ı further Prof. HB Dharmak¯rti’s Hetubinduh I. . Pram¯ nav¯ rttika-k¯ rik¯ (Sanskrit and Tibetan). . ı . 1955 (second edition 1971). 1966. Kyoto. This is only the way to appreciate and reward his great contribution. Text a. see NB..

gSung ’bum. a a Thar lam gsal byed rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen. Delhi (forthcoming) (in print). Wien. Three Mountains and Seven Rivers: Prof. Musashi Tachikawa’s Felicitation Volume. Geluku ha ni yoru Ky¯ ry¯ bu gakusetsu rikai I nitai setsu (The dGe o o lugs pa’s Interpretation of the Sautr¯ ntika System I The Theory of the Two Kinds of a Reality). a o Yid kyi mun sel mKhas grub dGe legs dpal gzang po. pp. 1979. Defining and Redefining svalaksana: Dharmak¯rti’s Concept and its Tibetan Modiı . Yoshimizu Chizuko Yoshimizu. Bukky¯ ninshikiron no kenky¯ – Hossh¯ cho “Pram¯ nav¯ rttika” no o u o a. Ge (part II). J¯ (part I).¯ Jit¯ rip¯ da. Hiroshima 1997.368 REVIEW ARTICLE Steinkellner Id. . Tosaki Hiromasa Tosaki. Drsya and vikalpya or snang ba and btags pa Associated in a Conceptual Cognition.¯ .. Wirklichkeit und Begriff bei Dharmak¯rti. a. Tarkabh¯ sa. Tshad ma sde bdun gyi rgyan yid kyi mun sel. 1985. ¯ a.´ Proceedings of the 3rd International Dharmak¯rti Conference. TBh Moksakaragupta.. ed. 179–211. Pram¯ nav¯ rttika). gSung ’bum.. 4: 3–32. fication. pp. 1952. Cha (lHa sa Zhol edition). Tarkabh¯ sa and V¯ dasth¯ na of Moksakaragupta and a. Tsukuba Japan CHIZUKO YOSHIMIZU . 21: 51–76. Mysore. Tha (lHa sa Zhol edition). Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens ı 15. Yoshimizu Id. . u u Yoshimizu Id. a genry¯ ron (Study of Buddhist epistemology – The pratyaksa theory of Dharmak¯rti’s o ı . by Iyengar R. ı 1999. Journal of Naritasan Institute for Buddhist Studies 1998. Yoshimizu Id. Bukky¯ a o bunka kenky¯ ronsh¯ (Studies of Buddhist Culture) 2000. Tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi tshig le’ur byas pa’i rnam bshad thar lam phyin ci ma log par gsal bar byed pa. Geluku ha ni yoru Ky¯ ry¯ bu gakusetsu rikai II fuhen jitsuzai ron (The dGe lugs o o pa’s Interpretation of the Sautr¯ ntika System II The Theory of Real Universals). ¯ a a .. Tokyo. 459–474.

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