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Case No. 11 CM 696

Defendant’s Supplemental Brief in Response to the State’s First Supplemental Motions in Limine
The Defendant, Vernon Hershberger, by his attorneys, Elizabeth Gamsky Rich, Glenn Reynolds, and Amy Salberg, submits the following Supplemental Brief in Response to the State’s First Supplemental Motions in Limine. I. INTRODUCTION

The criminal Complaint filed against Mr. Hershberger alleged three licensure violations and a holding order violation. The issues addressed in this brief arise in connection with evidence Mr. Hershberger seeks to present to defend against Count 4 of the Complaint, the alleged holding order violation. The State filed a Motion in Limine seeking to exclude the evidence, and at a hearing on December 21, 2012, the Court called for briefing on the issue of whether its ruling in favor of excluding the proffered evidence implicates Mr. Hershberger’s freedom of religion as protected by the Wisconsin Constitution. This Brief and the accompanying Affidavit of Vernon Hershberger address Mr. Hershberger’s sincerely held religious beliefs and the significance of those beliefs in connection with (1) the proposed expert testimony; (2) the ability to present evidence regarding the facts set forth in the holding order and the Summary Special Order (as opposed to challenging the 1

validity of the orders themselves); and (3) Mr. Hershberger’s privilege to act in preservation of private property as it relates to the holding order.1 II. STANDARD

The Wisconsin Constitution2 includes broad protections for freedom of religion and the rights of conscience. W.S.A. Const. Art. 1, §18 provides, in pertinent part: The right of every person to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of conscience shall never be infringed; nor shall any person be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, without consent; nor shall any control of, or interference with, the rights of conscience be permitted, or any preference be given by law to any religious establishment or modes of worship . . .” Wisconsin’s seminal case regarding freedom of religion under Article 1, §18 of the Wisconsin Constitution is State v. Miller, 202 Wis. 2d 56, 549 N.W.2d 235 (1996). Under Miller, the challenger carries the burden to prove (1) that he or she has a sincerely held religious belief; (2) that is burdened by the application of the state law at issue. Upon such proof, the burden shifts to the State to prove: (3) that the law is based on a compelling state interest, (4) which cannot be served by a less restrictive alternative.3 Miller at 70.


This last issue was not mentioned at the December 21 hearing; however, since this defense also implicates Mr. Hershberger’s religious beliefs it is addressed here along with the other issues. 2 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides a separate, independent protection for Mr. Hershberger’s Right to Religious Freedom. State v. Miller, 202 Wis. 2d 56, 65-66, 549 N.W.2d 235, 239 (1996). The test under the First Amendment is the same as under the Wisconsin Constitution: a compelling governmental interest must be shown to overcome Mr. Hershberger’s religious liberty challenge to the administrative procedure. As discussed herein, there is no compelling governmental interest sufficient to require Mr. Hershberger to violate his conscience. In the interest of avoiding repetition, Mr. Hershberger hereby preserves his First Amendment claim without repeating the argument made under the Wisconsin Constitution. 3 The Miller test is articulated, and is typically applied, in the context of application of a state law. The Constitutional provision, however, is broader and applies to “any control of, or interference with, the rights of conscience”. Mr. Hershberger argues that exclusion of the evidence at issue here would violate Mr. Hershberger’s constitutional rights. Even if it would not, however, the evidence should be allowed based on the equitable factors articulated infra at 9,11.




On June 2, 2010, representatives of the Wisconsin Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection (DATCP) conducted a raid at the Hershberger farm. The agents destroyed 2,000 gallons of fresh milk in the bulk tank by pouring blue dye into the tank, claiming the milk was “adulterated and misbranded”—even though there was no logical, factual, or scientific basis for this conclusion. The milk was unpasteurized, as is all milk on all farms that is stored in bulk tanks. The agents then proceeded to place a holding order on fresh, wholesome food in coolers on the property, most of which belonged to members of the Hershberger’s private buying club, and some of which belonged to the Hershberger family. On June 8, 2010, DATCP issued a Summary Special Order against Mr. Hershberger. The Order recited that it was issued pursuant to Wis. Stat. §97.12(2)(c), and included the following specific findings of fact: 7. 8. Consumption of unpasteurized raw milk is dangerous to health. The sale or distribution of unpasteurized raw milk creates an imminent health hazard. The public health value of pasteurization is a significant factor in the prevention of disease which may be transmitted through consumption of raw milk. Pasteurization and processing milk in a licensed dairy plant substantially reduces the risk to public health.

The Order also included a notice of appeal rights, indicating that Mr. Hershberger could challenge whether the Order was justified by demanding a hearing pursuant to Wis. Admin. Code ATCP 1.03(3). On October 18, 2012, Mr. Hershberger filed a witness list which included Ted Beals, a microbiologist who would offer expert testimony regarding the question of whether raw milk is dangerous. Pursuant to Wis. Stats. §97.12(2)(a), the inspector issuing the holding order must have “reasonable cause to believe that any food examined by him or her is adulterated or 3

misbranded and is dangerous to health or misleading to the injury or damage of the purchaser or consumer . . .” Mr. Hershberger intends to demonstrate at trial that the holding order was invalid under the statutory standard, and that several of the findings of fact set forth therein are incorrect.4 Specifically, Mr. Hershberger will show that the food subject to the holding order was not adulterated, misbranded, or dangerous; that raw milk is not inherently dangerous; that pasteurization is not a significant factor in the prevention of disease; that pasteurization and processing of milk do not reduce public health risks and that in fact the opposite is likely true. On December 14, 2012, the State filed a Motion in Limine seeking to exclude testimony of Dr. Beals, arguing that his expert testimony was not relevant. In a brief filed in response to the State’s Motion on December 19, 2012, Mr. Hershberger argued that he was charged with violating a holding order; that the proposed testimony was necessary to demonstrate that the order was invalid, and was therefore directly relevant to the issues in the case; and that his due process rights would be impinged should he be precluded from introducing the testimony.5 At the hearing on the State’s Motion, held on December 21, 2012, the State put forth a new argument: that Mr. Hershberger cannot present evidence challenging the validity of the holding order in these proceedings because he could have filed an administrative appeal when the order was issued and he failed to do so—in other words, he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and therefore is precluded from presenting evidence that could have been presented earlier. The Court ruled in favor of the State based on the exhaustion of remedies argument, and Mr. Hershberger requested permission to file a brief to address the freedom of

As indicated on pages 1-2, supra, it is not Mr. Hershberger’s intention to seek a ruling invalidating the Order or otherwise launch a legal challenge to the Order itself; rather, he wants to introduce evidence challenging the facts set forth therein. 5 Mr. Hershberger maintains that requiring the jury to accept that the State’s holding order was properly issued, which further requires accepting that raw milk is dangerous, violates his constitutional right to due process of law. Those arguments are set forth in the Defendant’s Response to the Plaintiff’s First Supplemental Motions in Limine and will not be repeated here.


religion issues raised by the ruling and in support of the Defendant’s request that the ruling be reconsidered in light of those issues.




Mr. Hershberger has a constitutional right to free exercise of his religious beliefs without interference from the State. Filing an appeal of the Summary Special Order would have violated his sincerely held religious beliefs and freedom of conscience, which prohibit him from initiating conflict. He therefore has not yet had an opportunity to challenge the facts set forth in either the holding order or the Summary Special Order. For this reason, he must be permitted to present evidence that the holding order was not valid, and that the facts asserted in the Summary Special Order are incorrect. A. The Wisconsin Constitution protects Mr. Hershberger’s right to refrain from conflict by initiating a proceeding against the State. 1. Mr. Hershberger holds a sincere religious belief that prohibits him from initiating conflict.

Wisconsin courts use several factors to determine the sincerity of religious beliefs, including the history of the belief and the length of time the belief has been held. Miller at 67 (citing United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 186-187, 85 S.Ct. 850 (1965)(sincerity was demonstrated by defendant’s Roman Catholic upbringing and close studies of Quaker belief)). Mr. Hershberger was raised in an Amish community and still adheres to the fundamental principles of that community, including its commitment to avoiding conflict.6 Hershberger Aff. ¶3. In his Affidavit, Mr. Hershberger has articulated in detail the foundations of his beliefs as they relate to avoiding conflict. His Christian beliefs are borne out of Scripture. Id. He believes that the Bible teaches that we should not be aggressors in court actions and that we may not initiate conflict. Id. at ¶¶4-6.

It is well-recognized that the Amish avoid conflict and litigation. See, e.g., Donald Kraybull, Concise Encyclopedia of Amish, Brethren, Hutterites and Mennonites (2010) at 156 (“The representatives, generally laymen rather than ordained officials, also negotiate with public officials at local, state and federal levels to avoid conflict and litigation.”); and at 127 (“Most traditional groups forbid their members to file lawsuits. In some groups, initiating litigation will result in excommunication.”).


The sincerity of his belief that Scripture compels him to avoid conflict is further demonstrated by his past actions. He was sued in the case of Zimmerman v. Denker, Sauk County Circuit Court Case No. 07-CV-473. Mr. Hershberger declined to engage in the conflict and did not participate in the proceedings. A default judgment in excess of $800,000 was entered against him. Id. at ¶7. 2. Mr. Hershberger’s religious beliefs are burdened by the State’s requirement that he initiate an administrative proceeding as a condition to introducing evidence in this criminal proceeding. Because Mr. Hershberger did not violate his religious beliefs by initiating a proceeding challenging the State’s holding order, the State now claims that the findings of fact set forth in that order must be accepted as true. Unless he is permitted to challenge the facts set forth in the order in these criminal proceedings, the incorrect factual assertions in the order—and the fact that the order was unjustified—will be left unchallenged. The State’s position is coercive, excessive, unduly punitive, and violates the religious beliefs of Mr. Hershberger. Such a position would place those holding religious beliefs similar to Mr. Hershberger’s on a razor’s edge. If they hold true to their beliefs and avoid conflict, they lose their right to fully defend themselves in a subsequent criminal proceeding. The result is unfair, unjust, and unconstitutional. In order to have all of the facts favorable to its position accepted as true in a criminal proceeding, the State need only wait to file criminal charges until after the expiration of administrative appeal rights. Allowing such tactics certainly gives the State a heavy thumb on the scale of justice: in essence, it eliminates the presumption of innocence and relieves the State of its burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt.


3. The State cannot demonstrate a compelling interest in forcing Mr. Hershberger to violate his conscience as a precondition to challenging the facts alleged in the holding order in subsequent criminal proceedings. While the State certainly has some interest in requiring individuals to follow administrative procedure in challenging orders issued by the State, that interest becomes significantly less compelling once the State initiates a criminal action based upon that order. At that point the defendant must be permitted the opportunity to fully defend himself against the State’s allegations. Any other result violates both due process and, in this case, freedom of religion. Similarly, the State may have some interest in stream-lining administrative proceedings and a party’s ability to initiate actions against government agencies and their orders. This interest, however, is applicable to a challenger bringing a court action against the State. In this case, however, the State is the party bringing the action. The State does not have a compelling interest in forcing Mr. Hershberger to forfeit his right to defend against the State’s claims. There is certainly no interest compelling enough to require him to violate his religious beliefs lest he lose the right to challenge the “findings of fact” in the holding order at the heart of the criminal charge levied against him. 4. The State has less restrictive alternatives available to achieve any interest it may have in limiting litigants’ abilities to challenge administrative findings through the exhaustion of remedies doctrine. The State’s interest in having its holding orders challenged through administrative process, rather than in court, is met by not allowing challengers to bring a declaratory judgment or other action against the State in court without first going through the administrative procedure available to them. This is the principle underlying the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies. The posture of the parties is very different here: Mr. Hershberger is the defendant in a criminal


proceeding. In this context, he must be allowed to defend himself against all factual allegations raised by the State, including those “findings” in the holding order. According to the State, before Mr. Hershberger can defend himself against charges brought against him in a criminal case initiated by the State, he must have jumped through all of the administrative hoops set up by the State. His failure to do so years before the State filed criminal charges against him means he is out of luck and the facts as alleged by the State are unchallengeable. This is an improper application of the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies. The exhaustion doctrine is used where a claimant has failed to participate in an administrative procedure available to him to obtain some remedy, then tries to seek the same remedy in court: [W]here a statute sets forth a procedure for review of administrative action and court review of the administrative decision, such remedy is exclusive and must be employed before other remedies are used. Nodell Inv. Corp. v. City of Glendale, 78 Wis.2d 416, 422, 254 N.W.2d 310 (1977). Courts will generally deny judicial relief until the parties have exhausted their administrative remedies. Id. at 424; accord St. Croix Valley Home Builders Ass'n, Inc. v. Twp. of Oak Grove, 2010 WI App 96, 327 Wis. 2d 510, 518, 787 N.W.2d 454, 458. The exhaustion doctrine is typically applied when a party seeks judicial intervention before completing all the steps in the administrative process. Metz v. Veterinary Examining Bd., 2007 WI App 220, ¶ 13, 305 Wis. 2d 788, 801, 741 N.W.2d 244, 250, citing County of Sauk v. Trager, 118 Wis.2d 204, 210, 346 N.W.2d 756 (1984). That is not this case. Mr. Hershberger has not brought this proceeding, so it is clear he is not seeking judicial intervention before completing all the steps in the administrative process. Indeed, he is not seeking any remedy, much less one that he could have obtained through the administrative proceeding identified by the State. Mr. Hershberger is merely seeking to defend 9

himself against the State’s charges by challenging the facts set forth in the order that forms the basis for the charges brought against him by the State. We could find no cases in which the exhaustion of remedies doctrine was used as a sword instead of a shield. In other words, each case we could find in which the State asserted “failure to exhaust administrative remedies” had been brought by the person who did not exhaust his remedies. Further, the doctrine is not to be applied rigidly, but consideration must be given for situations where it would be unfair to apply it: The law is also clear that a court “need not apply the exhaustion doctrine in a rigid, unbending way.” A court may “assume jurisdiction of a case, notwithstanding a party's failure to exhaust administrative remedies, where the court finds that the reasons supporting the exhaustion rule are lacking.” State ex rel. Mentek v. Schwarz, 2001 WI 32, 242 Wis. 2d 94, 101-02, 624 N.W.2d 150, 154 (citations omitted); accord Lamar Cent. Outdoor, LLC v. Wisconsin Dept. of Transp., 2008 WI App 187, 315 Wis. 2d 190, 202, 762 N.W.2d 745, 751, citing Trager, 118 Wis.2d at 214, 346 N.W.2d 756. The Mentek Court articulated the factors that should be weighed by a court deciding whether to apply the doctrine in a particular case: In exercising its discretion in deciding whether to apply the exhaustion doctrine, the court must look at the circumstances under which the doctrine arises and the reasons for the doctrine, and then balance the advantages and disadvantages of applying the doctrine in a particular case, including the litigant's need for judicial review, the agency's interests in precluding litigation, and the public's interest in the sound administration of justice. Mentek, 242 Wis.2d 94, ¶ 9, 624 N.W.2d 150 (citing Trager, 118 Wis.2d at 210, 214, 346 N.W.2d 756). As with other cases applying this doctrine, Mentek was the one seeking judicial


review. Because Mr. Hershberger is the defendant, the terminology used in the test established by the Mentek court is not a perfect fit here. Applying it to this case, the test set forth in Mendez requires the court to consider: 1) Mr. Hershberger’s need for a defense to the charges brought against him; 2) the agency’s interests in precluding the testimony; and 3) the public’s interest in the sound administration of justice. Mentek involved appeal of an administrative revocation of probation. The Court recognized that the need for judicial review is significant when a person’s liberty is at stake: ¶ 11 First, we consider Mentek's need for judicial review. Mentek appeals the administrative revocation of his probation, which directly impacts his liberty interest. Mentek has been incarcerated under protest since 1997. The record suggests that he has made credible legal arguments in his pro se filings in the circuit court and the court of appeals, and the documents filed with Mentek's petition provide factual support for his allegations. We therefore conclude that Mentek's need for judicial review is substantial. Similarly, Mr. Hershberger’s interest in presenting a defense is substantial in the context of a criminal proceeding, where his liberty is at stake. Applying the second factor, the Mentek Court held that, although the agency has a substantial interest in exhaustion of administrative procedures, its interest in precluding Mentek from litigation was weak: The facts of the present case, however, suggest that the Division of Hearings and Appeals' interest in precluding Mentek from litigation is weak. Mentek alleges that he was not permitted to argue various due process and other constitutional rights during the probation revocation proceedings and that he was instructed to pursue these issues on writ of certiorari.13 Thus the administrative proceedings, including the administrative appeal, apparently would not provide Mentek with a forum to state his objections. Mentek at ¶ 13, 102-03, 154. Similarly, DATCP’s interest in preventing Mr. Hershberger from presenting a defense, now that it is too late to go through an administrative proceeding, is weak. 11

Having brought this action against Mr. Hershberger, the State cannot now cite to failure to exhaust its administrative procedure 18 months prior to suit as a method to bar testimony of experts and others in his defense. At this point, it is not relevant whether Mr. Hershberger jumped through all the administrative hoops set by the State. Now that the State has filed a criminal complaint against him, he must be permitted to defend against that. Finally, the Mentek Court held that the public interest in the sound administration of justice was on the side of the criminal defendant, who should not be denied judicial review: . . . Despite nearly three years of legal efforts remarkable for a pro se litigant filing from behind bars, Mentek has yet to receive meaningful judicial review of any of his allegations. In contrast, the State has thus far avoided the merits of Mentek's challenges by relying on a statute that on its face is inapplicable to the facts of the present case. We conclude that the public interest in the sound administration of justice would suffer if we denied Mentek meaningful judicial review under the circumstances. Id. at ¶ 16, 104, 155. Mr. Hershberger is in a similar position: the State is attempting to avoid a challenge to the merits of the allegations that serve as the foundation for the criminal complaint. The public interest in the sound administration of justice favors Mr. Hershberger’s due process right to put on a defense and address the merits of the allegations. Even assuming the doctrine were potentially applicable, there are sufficient reasons for the court to decline to apply it here based on the standard articulated in Mentek (supra,at 9), including the procedural posture of the parties, Mr. Hershberger’s conscientious objection to being the initiator of conflict, and his due process rights to present a defense. This combination of factors should be sufficient to allow Mr. Hershberger to put on his defense and allow the jury to determine whether, after hearing both the State’s case and Mr. Hershberger’s defense, the State has met its burden of proof.


Based on the foregoing, there is a far less restrictive alternative to foreclosing Mr. Hershberger’s ability to fully defend himself in this criminal action: prohibit litigants from bringing actions against the State without exhausting administrative procedures (which is, of course, how the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is intended to be applied). This would serve the goal of judicial economy without infringing upon the constitutional rights of criminal defendants. B. Mr. Hershberger’s alleged violation of the holding order was founded upon his sincerely held religious beliefs and was protected by the privilege to act in the defense of preserving private property. Vernon Hershberger has consistently maintained that he allowed the members of his private buying club to retrieve their food from the farm in spite of the holding order. The testimony at trial will be that on the day of the raid of farm, DATCP agents intentionally destroyed 2,000 gallons of fresh milk in the bulk tank by pouring dye into the tank. DATCP took this action on the grounds that the milk was “adulterated and misbranded” even though there was no basis for that conclusion. The hold order was subsequently placed on the food in the coolers, most of which did not belong to Mr. Hershberger. DATCP representatives agreed to exempt the Hershberger family food from the hold order. Mr. Hershberger then faced a serious dilemma: allow the remaining wholesome, perishable food to go to waste while he engaged in protracted administrative wrangling with DATCP or prevent the imminent destruction of the lawful property of others by allowing them to take it from the coolers. Mr. Hershberger chose the latter course of action and allowed the owners to retrieve their food before it spoiled and had to be thrown away.


Mr. Hershberger had good reason to believe that DATCP agents intended this food to go to waste, given the fact that they had just destroyed 2,000 gallons of fresh milk without ever testing it for impurities or adulteration. Accepting the inevitable but preventable outcome of standing by while nutritious food rotted was firmly against his religious principles. Hershberger Aff. ¶9. It will be up to the jury to decide whether Vernon Hershberger’s exercise of this privilege was justified, but he must be allowed to explain to the jury why he chose this course of action in the face of the State’s claim at trial that he is a reckless law breaker. The basis for the privilege to defend property is similar to self-defense as found in the common law and codified by statute. Wis. Stats. §939.45 provides in relevant part: The fact that the actor's conduct is privileged, although otherwise criminal, is a defense to prosecution for any crime based on that conduct. The defense of privilege can be claimed under any of the following circumstances:. . . (2) When the actor's conduct is in defense of persons or property under any of the circumstances described in s. 939.48 or 939.49; or. . . (6) When for any other reason the actor's conduct is privileged by the statutory or common law of this state. Section 939.49, Wis. Stats., codifies the right to protect the imminent destruction of another person’s property: (1) A person is privileged to threaten or intentionally use force against another for the purpose of preventing or terminating what the person reasonably believes to be an unlawful interference with the person's property. Only such degree of force or threat thereof may intentionally be used as the actor reasonably believes is necessary to prevent or terminate the interference. It is not reasonable to intentionally use force intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm for the sole purpose of defense of one's property. (2) A person is privileged to defend a 3rd person's property from real or apparent unlawful interference by another under the same conditions and by the same means as those under and by which the person is privileged to defend his or her own property from real or apparent unlawful 14

interference, provided that the person reasonably believes that the facts are such as would give the 3rd person the privilege to defend his or her own property, that his or her intervention is necessary for the protection of the 3rd person's property, and that the 3rd person whose property the person is protecting is a member of his or her immediate family or household or a person whose property the person has a legal duty to protect, or is a merchant and the actor is the merchant's employee or agent. An official or adult employee or agent of a library is privileged to defend the property of the library in the manner specified in this subsection. (3) In this section “unlawful” means either tortious or expressly prohibited by criminal law or both. (Emphasis added) Whether Vernon Hershberger’s belief was reasonable is a matter for the jury to decide. Since this is a criminal case, he entitled to present this defense and to produce relevant evidence in support. The jury must be entitled to hear the defendant’s explanation as to why he gave the owners of milk and cheese access to their property before it was spoiled. The State seems poised to exclude this evidence on the grounds that Mr. Hershberger took the wrong path under the law. That tactic might hold water for a civil case, but not within the context of a criminal case where Vernon Hershberger’s liberty interests are at stake. The United States Supreme Court has recognized this right for the last 40 years. “Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, ... or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, ... the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’ “ Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984)). “The right ... to call witnesses in one's own behalf ha[s] long been recognized as essential to due process.” Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973). Indeed, few rights are more fundamental. Id. at 302. Vernon Hershberger has a right to explain why he gave permission for the owners to take their property. It would be error to exclude this evidence which would prevent the jury from determining whether his efforts to protect the owner’s property subject to the hold order were 15

privileged. A decision to prohibit this testimony would violate his constitutional right to present a defense and to introduce relevant evidence. See State v. Thornton, 2012 WL 6571669 (attached). V. CONCLUSION The State cannot require Mr. Hershberger to don the mantle of the aggressor (in his sincerely held religious view) just to preserve his right to later raise the validity of the order upon which the State brought this criminal case in the first place. Such an extraordinary outcome— denying a criminal defendant the ability to present evidence that the order underlying the criminal case against him was wrongly used—is far from the least restrictive means by which the State can achieve its goal of judicial economy and exhaustion of remedies. For all of the reasons set forth above, the Defendant asks that the Court: (1) Deny the State’s First Supplemental Motions in Limine insofar as they attempt to prevent witnesses from testifying regarding the facts underlying the Holding Order at the heart of the State’s case against Mr. Hershberger; (2) Specifically, reconsider the Court’s order granting the State’s Motion to exclude the testimony of Ted Beals; and (3) Allow Mr. Hershberger the meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense consistent with the legal theories set forth above, notwithstanding any Motions in Limine previously granted by the Court.

Respectfully submitted this 1st day of February, 2013.


_______________________________ Elizabeth Gamsky Rich State Bar No. 1019123 Elizabeth Gamsky Rich & Associates SC Mill Street Transfer Building 435 E. Mill Street Plymouth, WI 53073 T: 920.892.2449 F: 866.623.4338 Glenn Reynolds State Bar No. 1017065 Reynolds & Associates 407 E. Main St. Madison, WI 53703 T: 608.257.3621 F: 608.257.5551 Amy M. Salberg State Bar No. 1025449 Salberg Law, LLC 305 N. 7th Avenue, Suite A West Bend, WI 53095 T: 262.353.9556