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[G.R. No. 159755. June 18, 2009.] GRACE GOSIENGFIAO GUILLEN, deceased EMMA GOSIENGFIAO GALAOS, represented by her daughter EMELYN GALAOS-MELARION, deceased FRANCISCO GOSIENGFIAO, JR., represented by his widow EDELWISA GOSIENGFIAO, JACINTO GOSIENGFIAO, and absentees ESTER GOSIENGFIAO BITONIO, NORMA GOSIENGFIAO, and PINKY BUENO PEDROSO, represented by their attorney-in-fact JACINTO GOSIENGFIAO, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JIMMY HENRY F. LUCZON, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch I, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, LEONARDO MARIANO, AVELINA TIGUE, LAZARO MARIANO, MERCEDES SAN PEDRO, DIONISIA M. AQUINO, and JOSE N.T. AQUINO, respondents.
BRION, J :
At issue in this petition is the timeliness of the exercise of the right of legal redemption that this Court has recognized in a final and executory decision.
The petitioners, heirs of Francisco Gosiengfiao (petitioner-heirs), assail in this Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari the January 17, 2003 decision and September 9, 2003 resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 63093. 1(1) The assailed CA decision ruled that the thirty-day period for the exercise of the right of legal redemption should be counted, not from the notice of sale by the vendor but, from the finality of the judgment of this Court. BACKGROUND FACTS I. G.R. No. 101522 — Mariano v. Court of Appeals
The previous case where we recognized the petitioner-heirs' right of legal redemption is Mariano v. CA. 2(2) To quote, by way of background, the factual antecedents that Mariano recognized:
Copyright 1994-2012 CD Technologies Asia, Inc. Jurisprudence 1901 to 2011 1
It appears on record that the decedent Francisco Gosiengfiao is the registered owner of a residential lot located at Ugac Sur, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, particularly described as follows, to wit: The eastern portion of Lot 1351, Tuguegarao Cadastre, and after its segregation now designated as Lot 1351-A, Plan PSD-67391, with an area of 1,346 square meters. and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-2416 recorded in the Register of Deeds of Cagayan. The lot in question was mortgaged by the decedent to the Rural Bank of Tuguegarao (designated as mortgagee bank, for brevity) on several occasions before the last, being on March 9, 1956 and January 29, 1958. On August 15, 1958, Francisco Gosiengfiao died intestate survived by his heirs, namely: Third-Party Defendants: wife Antonia and Children Amparo, Carlos, Severino and herein plaintiffs-appellants Grace, Emma, Ester, Francisco, Jr., Norma, Lina (represented by daughter Pinky Rose), and Jacinto. The loan being unpaid, the lot in dispute was foreclosed by the mortgagee bank, and in the foreclosure sale held on December 27, 1963, the same was awarded to the mortgagee bank as the highest bidder. On February 7, 1964, third-party defendant Amparo Gosiengfiao-Ibarra redeemed the property by paying the amount of P1,347.89 and the balance of P423.35 was paid on December 28, 1964 to the mortgagee bank. On September 10, 1965, Antonia Gosiengfiao on her behalf and that of her minor children Emma, Lina, Norma, together with Carlos and Severino, executed a "Deed of Assignment of the Right of Redemption" in favor of Amparo G. Ibarra appearing in the notarial register of Pedro (Laggui) as Doc. No. 257, Page No. 6, Book No. 8, Series of 1965. On August 15, 1966, Amparo Gosiengfiao sold the entire property to defendant Leonardo Mariano who subsequently established residence on the lot subject of this controversy. It appears in the Deed of Sale dated August 15, 1966 that Amparo, Antonia, Carlos and Severino were signatories thereto. Sometime in 1982, plaintiff-appellant Grace Gosiengfiao learned of the sale of said property by the third-party defendants. She went to the Barangay Captain and asked for a confrontation with defendants Leonardo and Avelina Mariano to present her claim to the said property. On November 27, 1982, no settlement having been reached by the parties, the Barangay Captain issued a certificate to file action. On December 8, 1982, defendant Leonardo Mariano sold the same property to his children Lazaro F. Mariano and Dionicia M. Aquino as evidenced by a Deed of Sale notarized by Hilarion L. Aquino as Doc. No. 143, Page No. 19, Book No. V, Series of 1982.
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On December 21, 1982, plaintiffs Grace Gosiengfiao, et al. [herein petitioner-heirs] filed a complaint for "recovery of possession and legal redemption with damages" against defendants Leonardo and Avelina Mariano [herein respondent-buyers]. Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that as co-heirs and co-owners of the lot in question, they have the right to recover their respective shares in the said property as they did not sell the same, and the right of redemption with regard to the shares of other co-owners sold to the defendants. Defendants in their answer alleged that the plaintiffs has [sic] no cause of action against them as the money used to redeem the lot in question was solely from the personal funds of third-party defendant Amparo Gosiengfiao-Ibarra, who consequently became the sole owner of the said property and thus validly sold the entire property to the defendants, and the fact that defendants had already sold the said property to their children, Lazaro Mariano and Dionicia M. Aquino. Defendants further contend that even granting that the plaintiffs are co-owners with the third-party defendants, their right of redemption had already been barred by the Statute of Limitations under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, if not by laches.
On September 16, 1986, the trial court dismissed the complaint before it, as "only Amparo redeemed the property from the bank" using her money and solely in her behalf so that the petitioner-heirs had lost all their rights to the property. 3(3) The trial court explained that what Gosiengfiao's heirs inherited from him was only the right to redeem the property, as it was then already owned by the bank. By redeeming the property herself, Amparo became the sole owner of the property, and the lot ceased to be a part of Gosiengfiao's estate.
On May 13, 1991, the CA reversed the trial court's decision, declaring the petitioner-heirs "co-owners of the property who may redeem the portions sold" to the respondent-buyers. The CA denied the respondent-buyers' motion for reconsideration; 4(4) thus, they came to this Court to question the CA's rulings. Our Decision, promulgated on May 28, 1993, affirmed the appellate court decision. stated in its penultimate paragraph and in its dispositive portion that:
Premises considered, respondents have not lost their right to redeem, for in the absence of a written notification of the sale by the vendors, the 30-day period has not begun to run. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
Aside from this express declaration, the Court explained that, as the property was mortgaged by the decedent, co-ownership existed among his heirs during the period given by law to redeem the foreclosed property. Redemption of the whole property by co-owner Amparo did not vest in her the sole ownership over the property, as the redemption inured to the benefit of all co-owners; redemption will not put an end to co-ownership, as it is not a mode of terminating a co-ownership. The Court also distinguished 6(6) between Articles 1088 7(7) and 1620 8(8) of the Civil Code and ruled as inapplicable the doctrine that "the giving of a copy of the deed of sale to the co-heirs as equivalent to a notice". 9(9) On July 12, 1993, this Court denied the respondent-buyers' motion for reconsideration. The entry of judgment was made on August 2, 1993.
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They argued they can remain in possession of the property as co-owners because the judgment did not divest them of possession. Carlos. (3) denying the third motion as no written notice of the sale has been served on the petitioner-heirs by the vendor or by the vendee. and tendered the redemption price of P53. 1994 order granting the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.R. the notice of redemption. through Judge Orlando Beltran. 15(15) From 1994 to 1995. 1996.R. but did not sign. No. Inc. but were not signed by. (2) denying the motion to ascertain third-party defendants' shares. the clerk of court issued a writ of execution and a notice to vacate. Antonia. as winning parties. the redemption money was tendered to. the trial court. and Severino. duly served on the respondent-buyers. Jurisprudence 1901 to 2011 4 . each of the 10 heirs has 1/10 equal share of the lot. 1994. Jose Aquino who received. The Incidents On April 26. 101522) By the Lower Court a. which motion the trial court granted on May 11. filed a motion for the execution of our Decision in G. 17(17) a motion to declare the petitioner-heirs to have lost their right of legal redemption. The Judge Beltran Rulings On December 4. 1995. 1994. On March 31. 14(14) On the same date.760. 16(16) a motion to ascertain the redemptive shares of third-party defendants. the sheriff went back to check if the respondent-buyers had complied. They had not. After the expiration of the 45-day period to vacate. 1994 order and prayed for the nullification of the notice to vacate.II. as Amparo's redemption inured to the benefit of her co-heirs. and (4) denying the last motion for lack of legal and factual basis. 1995. 22(22) On May 30. and after the aggrieved heirs deposited the redemption money with the court. the court denied their motion to nullify the certificate of redemption and Copyright 1994-2012 CD Technologies Asia. 10(10) The next day. thus. 11(11) The respondent-buyers moved for a reconsideration of the May 11. 1995. but was not accepted by. No. 12(12) The sheriff later informed the trial court that copies of the notice to vacate and the writ of execution were served on. the respondent-buyers filed four motions: a motion for reconsideration of the May 11. the respondent-buyers. 101522. the petitioner-heirs filed a notice of redemption with the court of origin. the petitioner-heirs. 13(13) On April 18. 1995. 19(19) b. Engr. 20(20) issued an order (1) recalling the writ of execution for "incorrectly" quoting the dispositive portion of the CA decision and nullifying the notice to vacate. the sheriff issued a certificate of redemption after the first and second buyers refused to sign the notice and accept the tender. for the shares of Amparo. 21(21) The trial court thereafter denied the respondent-buyers' motion for reconsideration that followed. 18(18) and a motion to expunge from the records the petitioner-heirs' notice of redemption. the sheriff issued a return of service informing the court that on March 31. arguing that the dispositive portion of the decision to be executed merely declared and recognized the petitioner-heirs as co-owners of the lot and did not authorize the sheriff to remove their houses from the land. Execution of the Mariano Decision (G.
24(24) On July 15. (They had earlier filed an Appeal Ad Cautelam which the CA consolidated with the petition for certiorari. the respondent-buyers moved to reconsider this denial on July 9. which move the petitioner-heirs opposed. as affirmed by this Court. they cited the lower court's lack of jurisdiction since the motions ruled upon were really initiatory pleadings based on causes of action independent of. 1996 order denying their motion to nullify the certificate of redemption and to order its cancellation at the back of TCT No. through Judge Jimmy Henry F. declared that the notice and the certificate of redemption were filed late. III. The Judge Luczon Rulings On September 26. 1995 order. declaring the petitioner-heirs to have lost their right of redemption. consequently. jurisprudence. 25(25) issued an order granting the respondent-buyers' omnibus motion for reconsideration of the December 4. T-2416. 1993 as the last day of the redemption period. 1997 order. Jr. ruling that the introduction of the deed of sale as the parties' evidence in the trial and higher courts was sufficient to give the petitioner-heirs written notice of the sale. and that no certificate of non-forum shopping was attached. and that the Civil Code does not require any particular form of written notice or distinctive method for written notification of redemption. Civil Case No. They also claimed that the respondent-buyers' motion was a prohibited second motion for reconsideration that the lower court could not rule upon. c. 1996. The respondent-buyers questioned the petition on technicalities. 26(26) Noting the absence of a written notice of sale or manifestation received by the petitioner-heirs. arguing that the December 4.) 27(27) As grounds.. and nullifying the notice and the certificate of redemption. the respondent-buyers filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration. The Assailed Court of Appeals Decision The petitioner-heirs thereupon went to the CA on a petition for certiorari to question the lower court's orders. 1993. They also argued that it was untrue that the basis of the April 18. The trial court denied the petitioner-heirs' motion for reconsideration of the September 26. nor any docket fees paid. 1996. as established in Mariano. 1995 certificate of redemption was the May 31. 23(23) On June 11. 3129. 1997. the respondent-buyers again filed a motion for reconsideration of the May 30. but focused on the issue of Copyright 1994-2012 CD Technologies Asia.cancellation of the certificate at the back of TCT No. Jurisprudence 1901 to 2011 5 . and the sheriff had no power to do anything without a court sanction. and the decisions of the CA and this Court on this case. the trial court. 1996. and one that was filed beyond the 15-day period of appeal. because the certificate was "inexistent" when those decisions were promulgated. the trial court deemed as notice of sale this Court's decision which became final and executory on August 2. 1995 order is contrary to law. They argued that the decision of this Court was not self-executing. The trial court considered September 1. Luczon. they faulted the lower court for ignoring the law of the case. although related to. 1991 decision of the CA. Inc. and. 28(28) Finally. T-2416.
Costs against the petitioners. WHEREFORE. the very existence of the Supreme Court's Entry of Judgment negates plaintiffs-appellants' claim that no notice of what [sic] nature was received by them insofar as G. 1993 become final and executory and is hereby recorded in the book of Entries of Judgment. and. had already lapsed.R. thus: This is to certify that on May 26. the Court concurs with the argument of respondents-appellees [herein respondent-buyers] that the thirty (30) days grace period within which to redeem the contested property should be counted from 02 August 1993. aIcCTA The CA followed the respondent-buyers' lead and likewise focused on the effect of our Decision on the petitioner-heirs' redemption of the disputed co-owned property. the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. As it is an established procedure in court that when an entry of judgment was issued. Concomitantly. xxx xxx xxx It is undisputed that the Highest Magistrate's Decision in G. SO ORDERED. Thus. they continued to maintain that the redemption period should run from the finality of our Decision. As they failed to redeem the same in accordance with the instruction of the High Court.whether the final and executory decision of this Court in Mariano was effectively a written notice of sale to the heirs. Inc. on August 2. plaintiffs-appellants lost all the rights and privileges granted to them by the Supreme Court in Copyright 1994-2012 CD Technologies Asia. the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: Premises considered. 1993 a decision rendered in the above-entitled case was filed in this Office.R. To quote the appellate court: The pivot of inquiry here is: whether or not the final and executory Decision of the Supreme Court constitutes written notice to plaintiffs-appellants [herein petitioner-heirs]. the 30-day period has not even begun to run. it means that the contending parties were already properly notified of the same either through the parties themselves or through their respective counsels. for in the absence of a written certification of the sale by the vendors. Jurisprudence 1901 to 2011 6 .R. respondents have not lost their right to redeem. 101522 was concerned. The Entry of Judgment of G. thus. 101522 states as follows. and that the same has. 101522 had become final and executory on 02 August 1993 and that it was only on 26 April 1994 or after the lapse of more than eight (8) months from the finality of the said Decision that plaintiffs-appellants filed a Motion for Execution.
They argue in this petition and in their memorandum that the January 17. Inc. The Decision negates the notion that it serves as a "notice". The "non-reviewable" findings of facts of the trial and appellate courts that plaintiffs exercised their right of redemption late. because it clearly states that the period of redemption had not begun to run. First. the Court holds and so rules that the court a quo erred not in reversing itself. No. the appellate court held that the 30-day redemption period should run from August 2. and that the decision in G. the Mariano Decision is deemed to have been served on the petitioner-heirs. the Decision is not the source of their right to redeem. the petitioner-heirs argue that the 30-day redemption period under Article 1623 cannot be reckoned from the date of finality of this Court's Decision in G. Jurisprudence 1901 to 2011 7 . All told. they "lost all the rights and privileges granted to them by the Supreme Court in G. the appellate court ruled that (1) because an entry of judgment had been made. No. The CA erred and abused its discretion in concluding that they lost their right of redemption under this Court's Decision because the start of the redemption period is not reckoned from the date of the finality of that decision. the petitioner-heirs filed the present petition with this Court. They clarify that their theory that the Decision of this Court is not the written notice required by law was not anchored on lack of notice of that decision. and the lower courts erred in considering the 30-day period as an extinctive prescriptive period because legal redemption under Article 1623 does not prescribe.G.R. No. To summarize. Having previously exercised the right of redemption. 101522". and (3) for the petitioner-heirs' failure to redeem within that period.R. bind this Court. In their Comment. this Court is not the vendor and a written notice by the vendor is mandatory for the 30-day redemption period to run.R.R. had been lost. but on Article 1623 of the Civil Code: the written notice should be given by the vendor. 101522 because it is not and cannot be a "notice" in writing by the vendor. From the foregoing facts. 101522 had already become final. 1993 (the date of the entry of judgment). Their use of the services of the sheriff to exercise their right of redemption through a motion for execution was approved by this Court as a method of redemption. No. Second. In their Reply to Comment. They posit a redemption period is not a prescriptive period. the respondent-buyers stress that the main issue in this petition is whether the petitioner-heirs' right of legal redemption. as recognized in G. the Copyright 1994-2012 CD Technologies Asia. not by this Court by virtue of a final decision. The period has not even begun to run.R. 2003 decision of the CA is erroneous for the reasons outlined below. 101522. (2) based on this premise. DaEATc THE PETITION Faced with the CA's ruling and the denial of their motion for reconsideration. it is clear that plaintiffs-appellants had slept from their rights and their failure to exercise the same within the period allowed by the High Court is deemed a waiver on their part. 101522.
The appellate court unfortunately failed to appreciate the breadth and significance of this issue. was reiterated in the case of Garcia v. and rightly so. April 17. In their memorandum. a verbal notice or information was sufficient. not of fact. it completely missed the thrust and substance of the Mariano Decision. Jurisprudence 1901 to 2011 8 . Inc. thus: Both the letter and spirit of the New Civil Code argue against any attempt to widen the scope of the notice specified in Article 1088 by including therein any other kind of notice. xxx xxx xxx The ruling in Castillo v.execution was nothing more than the implementation of what had been the final ruling of this Court. We grant the petition and hold — pursuant to the Mariano Decision and based on the subsequent pleaded developments — that the petitioner-heirs have effectively exercised their right of redemption and are now the owners of the redeemed property pursuant to the Sheriff's Certificate of Redemption. as the respondent-buyers erroneously claim. Samonte. the respondent-buyers maintain that the petitioner-heirs' "time-barred" right to redeem the property was not cured by the notice of redemption and by their "late" tender of the redemption money. simply ruling on the case based on the implications of an entry of judgment. supra. THE COURT'S RULING The parties' positions all focus. thus. under the old law. on the main issue: when did the 30-day period to redeem the subject property start? This is a question of law. since the petitioner-heirs were exercising their right of legal redemption by virtue of the Decisions of this Court and the CA. 26855. such as verbal or by registration.R. Because of this myopic view. Calaliman (G. If the intention of the law had been to include verbal notice or any other means of information as sufficient to give the effect of this notice. The "belated" notice of redemption and tender of payment of redemption price were not bona fide. No. A significant aspect of Mariano that the CA failed to appreciate is our confirmation of the ruling that a written notice must be served by the vendor. Hernaez (32 Phil. 1023 ) where this Court quoted the ruling in Hernaez v. the lower courts' findings cannot bind this Court. as they were not made within the required period. 172 SCRA 201) where We also discussed the reason for the requirement of the written notice. 214). it was incumbent upon them to effectuate the steps of redemption seasonably. in the interpretation of a related provision (Article 1623 of the New Civil Code) this Court had stressed that written notice is Copyright 1994-2012 CD Technologies Asia. 1989. Samonte (106 Phil. We said: Consistent with aforesaid ruling. 29(29) We ruled as follows: The requirement of a written notice has long been settled as early as in the case of Castillo v. then there would have been no necessity or reasons to specify in Article 1088 of the New Civil Code that the said notice be made in writing for.
Court of Appeals et al. this was not supported by the evidence presented. and the tender of payment were all duly served. 63093. Rule 56. Rule 39." These premises and conclusion leave no doubt about the thrust of Mariano: The right of the petitioner-heirs to exercise their right of legal redemption exists. we hereby GRANT the petition and. Cabrera v. Rule 51. 75069. governs. Jurisprudence 1901 to 2011 9 . We also made the factual finding that: The records of the present petition.indispensable. Section 6. in light of the foregoing.. Eight (8) months after the finality of the judgment to be executed is still a seasonable time for execution by motion pursuant to this provision. Court of Appeals. and Copyright 1994-2012 CD Technologies Asia. Ibarra. for in the absence of a written notification of the sale by the vendors. so that it was legally in order for the Sheriff to issue a Certificate of Redemption when the respondent-buyers failed to comply with the writ and to accept the notice and the tender of payment.R. CV No. though the Code does not prescribe any particular form of written notice nor any distinctive method for written notification of redemption (Conejero et al. He or she is still entitled to written notice. their notice of redemption. In seeking the execution of a final and executory decision of this Court. 33(33) on the question of timeliness of the execution. The law not having provided for any alternative. From these premises. Before the trial court executing the decision. via a writ of execution. actual knowledge of the sale acquired in some other manners by the redemptioner. we ruled that "[P]etitioner-heirs have not lost their right to redeem. although they applied for the issuance of the writ some eight (8) months after the finality of the Decision. notwithstanding. . the method of notifications remains exclusive. and the running of the period for its exercise has not even been triggered because they have not been notified in writing of the fact of sale. Carlos Gosiengfiao. 148 SCRA 507 . 1982 private respondent. we see no need to discuss the other presented issues. as the penultimate paragraph and the dispositive portion clearly state. 30(30) For the Luczon ruling and the CA to miss or misinterpret the clear ruling in Mariano — the Decision subject of the execution — is a gross and patent legal error that cannot but lead to the reversal of their decisions. as exacted by the code to remove all uncertainty as to the sale. Etcuban v. REVERSE and SET ASIDE the January 17. April 15. 1988). No. In light of this conclusion. The petitioner-heirs' exercise of their right of redemption of co-heirs Amparo G. Grace Gosiengfiao was given a copy of the questioned deed of sale and shown a copy of the document at the Office of the Barangay Captain sometime November 18. 1982. the 30-day period has not even begun to run. G. The writ. 2003 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. 16 SCRA 775 . This is the law of the case that should guide all other proceedings on the case. 31(31) in relation to Section 2. We hold that the computation of the 30-day period to exercise the legal right of redemption did not start to run from the finality of the Mariano Decision. and that the petitioner-heirs seasonably filed.R. 2003 decision and September 9. v. and to quiet any doubt that the alienation is not definitive. WHEREFORE. petitioners allege that sometime on October 31. Gosiengfiao. Villanueva. Antonio C. . particularly its execution. what controls is Section 11. 32(32) of the Rules of Court. however. Inc. notice of redemption. Although. show no written notice of the sale being given whatsoever to private respondents [petitioner-heirs]. accordingly. . This is what our Decision held. its terms and its validity.
111-112. p. and Justices Teodoro R. 101522. fully or in part. Jurisprudence 1901 to 2011 10 3. CD Technologies Asia. v. 12. 1088. et al. Tuguegarao.. the right recognized in Article 1088 exists. in the abstract sense. 10. No. Cagayan. The Court further held: "Petitioners allege that upon the facts and circumstances of the present case." Art. 5. concur. We do not dispute the principle laid down in the Conejero case. pp. citing as authority the case of Conejero. Court of Appeals. Nocon. redemptioner Enrique Conejero was shown and given a copy of the deed of sale of the subject property. Jr. concurring. Narvasa (Chairperson). Padilla and Florenz D. Branch 1. 222 SCRA 736. the fine distinction between Article 1088 and Article 1620 is that when the sale consists of an interest in some particular property or properties of the inheritance. the right of redemption that arises in favor of the other co-heirs is that recognized in Article 1620. RTC. 1995 Notice of Redemption and the April 18. II. 429. p. Justice Rodolfo A. Costs against the respondents. 11. the facts in the said case are not four square with the facts of the present case. On the other hand. if the sale is the hereditary right itself. covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. Supra note 1. 6. The Court in that case stated that the furnishing of a copy of the deed was equivalent to the giving of a written notice required by law. 1995 Certificate of Redemption issued by the Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court. Inc. Reyes. in view of their March 31. Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Regalado E.. 1620. is hereby declared VALID and LEGAL. Cagayan. Cagayan. Quisumbing. provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor. Tuguegarao. SO ORDERED. The decision was penned by Judge Juan P. Plan Psd-67391. 161-163. May 28. Vol. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them are sold to a third person. 9. ponente." Records. Ynares-Santiago. without specifying any particular object. respondents failed to exercise their right of legal redemption during the period provided by law. Copyright 1994-2012 . 164. ***(36) JJ. ponente. T-2416. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive. CA Justice Andres B. 13. 8. concurring. et al. The Court held: "According to Tolentino. Maambong. However. any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale..Severino Gosiengfiao's shares over Lot 1351-A. Id. 7. pp. *(34) Chico-Nazario **(35) and Leonardo-de Castro. Chief Justice Andres R. Branch IV. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition. Id. Rollo. 4. Tuguegarao. Jimenez. In Conejero. and located in Ugac Sur. 1993. the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one. Regalado. G.R. 2. Art. (16 SCRA 775) wherein the Court adopted the principle that the giving of a copy of a deed is equivalent to the notice as required by law in legal redemption... Supra note 2. Footnotes 1.
which involved the same issues and parties. Section 7 (b) (3) of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals directing that the consolidated cases shall pertain to the justice to whom the civil case is assigned. we said: Despite the plain language of the law. Id. 2005. Branch 1. 1524). so that the party notified need not entertain doubt that the seller may still contest the alienation. 21. The interpretation was somehow modified in the case of De Conejero. its perfection. 456 SCRA 193. Id. Id. Tuguegarao. and that method must be deemed exclusive.. 152-155. Cagayan. 71-73. 134. it was immaterial who gave the notice. SP No. p..R. 26. State. Rollo. In Perpetua vda. Associate Justice Elvi John S. 16. The reasons for requiring that the notice should be given by the seller. Jur. 133638. pp.R. Also. Court of Appeals. 19. pp. 148-151. p. RTC. 116-119. et al. 63093. On February 23.W. pp. the redemption period began to run. 26). 113. v. It is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in Article 1623 deliberately selected a particular method of giving notice. Id. Asuncion of the then Seventh Division of the CA conformed to the consolidation of cases (see CA-G. p. No. 15. G. 24. so long as the redeeming co-owner learned of the alienation in favor of the stranger. in 75 Law Ed. pp. 18. pp. pp. 28. over the years. 20. et CD Technologies Asia. 468-479.R. 107-110. Inc. Branch IV. 2000. 237. 427-431. CV No.. 458 (affd. Id.. 51857 was ordered consolidated with CA-G. and its validity. Payne v. pp. 102-106. SP No. Rollo. that a state of facts in respect thereto existed. pp. April 15.] 275) — why these provisions were inserted in the statute we are not informed. In the case Butte v. 2 (d) 528). Art.R. p. Under the old law (Civ. Manuel Uy & Sons. This assurance would not exist if the notice should be given by the buyer.14.. Code of 1889. CV No.. which warranted the legislature in so legislating. Id. 51857 rollo. (39 Am. Jurisprudence 1901 to 2011 11 Copyright 1994-2012 .. Lecompte. Cagayan.R. but we may assume until the contrary is shown. Inc. Tuguegarao. Id. we declared that — In considering whether or not the offer to redeem was timely. supported by Annexes A to A-20.. 63093 rollo. Id. Rollo. RTC. 12 S.. [U. 25. Per Resolution dated February 9. been tasked to interpret the "written notice requirement" of the above-quoted provision. 17. Court of Appeals. 22. Id. 27. The text of Article 1623 clearly and expressly prescribes that the thirty days for making the redemption are to be counted from notice in writing by the vendor.. this Court has. we think that the notice given by the vendee (buyer) should not be taken into account. Mariano is not the latest ruling on the requirement of notice from the vendor. 150 Atl.. 245-247).S. the notice being a reaffirmation thereof. 2000 of the Former Fifteenth Division of the CA (see CA-G. 120-123. CA-G. De Ape v. 15. 23. pp. and not by the buyer. The seller of an undivided interest is in the best position to know who are his co-owners that under the law must be notified of the sale. As ruled in Wampler v. pp. Parenthetically. 29. are easily divined. the notice by the seller removes all doubts as to fact of the sale. provided that the ponencia of the civil case conformed to the consolidation pursuant to Rule 3.
31. 645 dated May 15. The Honorable Court of Appeals.. the records are bereft of any indication that Fortunato was given any written notice of prospective or consummated sale of the portions of Lot No. Pantangco. 6. et al. Execution of judgment. et al. is ordered to be immediately executory. After the lapse of such time.. therefore. we defined the law of the case as: [T]he opinion delivered on a former appeal. v. 2009 per Special Order No. Hon. This view was reiterated in Etcuban v. wherein the plaintiffs were not furnished any written notice of sale or a copy thereof by the vendor. 49. or a portion thereof.R. prohibition. It means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case. February 6. There is. thus: Art. As observed by Justice Vicente Mendoza. Jurisprudence 1901 to 2011 12 Copyright 1994-2012 .. — The procedure in original cases for certiorari. Rules applicable. Sec. 11. in the case of Salatandol v. — A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. 1623 of the Civil Code is clear in requiring that the written notification should come from the vendor or prospective vendor. 52 and this Rule. laws. In Vios v. v. et al. Inc. Effect must be given to this change in statutory language. — Except where the judgment or final order or resolution. 1524 of the former Civil Code and Art. Rule 51. 48. However. the redemption period starts to run. Distrito. Cabrera v.. Villanueva. this Court again referred to the principle enunciated in the case of Butte. 51. G. 2009. Court of Appeals. et al. whereas the present one expressly says the notice must be given by the vendor.. et al. no room for construction. Calaliman. Execution by motion or by independent action. The thirty (30)-day redemption period under the law. Sec. * ** al. Garcia. xxx xxx xxx Rule 56. and Mariano. 33. and before it is barred by the statute of limitations. 32. CD Technologies Asia. Jr. 2. nor any distinctive method for notifying the redemptioner" thus. and Rules 46.30. 163103. the motion for its execution may only be filed in the proper court after its entry. has not commenced to run. Designated additional Member of the Second Division per Special Order No. subject to the following provisions: a) All references in said Rules to the Court of Appeals shall be understood to also apply to the Supreme Court. wherein it was pointed out that Article 1623 "does not prescribe a particular form of notice. 2009. the question there settled becomes the law of the case upon subsequent appeal. Retes. et al. et al. v. therefore. whether correct on general principles or not. such reversion is only sound. the principal difference between Art. It is a term applied to an established rule that when an appellate court passes on a question and remands the case to the lower court for further proceedings. 2319 by the vendors or would-be vendors. a judgment may be enforced by action. as long as the redemptioner was notified in writing of the sale and the particulars thereof. so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. quo warranto and habeas corpus shall be in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Constitution. not from any other person. Designated additional Member of the Second Division effective June 3. 1623 of the present one is that the former did not specify who must give the notice. xxx xxx xxx Rule 39. In this case. mandamus. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations. Sec. The Honorable Court of Appeals. Indeed.
who was a passenger in the same bus. 635 dated May 7. and the Resolution 3(39) dated 14 October 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. Jaen's necklace was taken by Santos' cohort Teodoro Almadin (Almadin). vs. 2009 per Special Order No. J : p This petition assails the Decision 1(37) dated 30 January 2002 of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Decision 2(38) dated 25 November 1999 of the Regional Trial Court finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Presidential Decree No. purportedly by a man later identified as Ricardo Santos (Santos). Three (3) persons then proceeded to divest the passengers of their belongings.] ROMEO SAYOC y AQUINO and RICARDO SANTOS y JACOB. Designated additional Member of the Second Division effective May 11. petitioners. April 30. culled from the records. Under knife-point. The third robber. respondent. Jurisprudence 1901 to 2011 13 . reportedly threatened to explode the hand grenade he was carrying if anybody would move. Elmer Jaen (Jaen) was aboard a bus when a fellow passenger announced a hold-up. meanwhile. After taking Jaen's two gold rings. PO2 Remedios Terte (police officer). 2009. upon hearing somebody shouting about a hold-up. 532. are as follows: In the afternoon of 4 March 1999. 4(40) The facts. otherwise known as the Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. DECISION TINGA. 2009. Inc.R. 157723. Sayoc was found by the police officer Copyright 1994-2012 CD Technologies Asia. the trio alighted from the bus. bracelet and watch. SECOND DIVISION [G. Romeo Sayoc (Sayoc). No. 2009.*** 658 dated June 3. ran after the accused.
000. The victim's bracelet was recovered from Santos while the two rings were retrieved from Almadin. Sayoc disclaimed knowing the other accused. confederating with and mutually helping one another with intent to gain and by means of force and intimidation against person [sic] did then and there [willfully].000. Inc. Jurisprudence 1901 to 2011 14 . an information was filed against the accused in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The latter instructed Jaen to guard Sayoc while she pursued the two robbers. [sic] announce the hold-up and with the use of a knife poked[. He was later brought to a hospital for treatment. barangay officials arrived at the police station with Santos and Almadin. Sayoc was then brought to the police station. which reads: Criminal Case No.00 8.00 Philippine Currency to the damage and prejudice of said offended party in the aforementioned amount of P32.] a public highway. Brgy. Santos denied knowing his co-accused and his complicity in the hold-up.00 Philippine Currency. petitioners pleaded not guilty. robbed and carried away the following: One gold bracelet Two gold rings One Guess watch Total P20. 5(41) When arraigned. Apolonio Samson.00 4. He claimed to be a passenger on Copyright 1994-2012 CD Technologies Asia. For his part.000. this city. TaCIDS A few hours later.hiding in an "owner-type" jeep. the above-named accused armed with [a] deadly weapon[. EAcHCI CONTRARY TO LAW. Philippines.] it against herein complainant and took.] conspiring. unlawfully and feloniously rob one ELMER JAEN Y MAGPANTAY in the manner as follows: said accused pursuant to their conspiracy boarded a passenger bus and pretended to be passengers thereof and upon reaching EDSA Balintawak[.00 ======== Belonging to Elmer Jaen y Magpantay in the total amount of P32. Q-99-81757 That on or about the 4th day of March 1999 in Quezon City. They reported that the two accused were found hiding inside the house of one Alfredo Bautista but were prevailed upon to surrender.000.000. On 8 March 1999. who hit him in the head rendering him unconscious.000. He was suddenly dragged by the barangay officials. After arraignment however.00 ––––––––– P32. Almadin "jumped bail". He declared that he was engaged in a drinking session with his kumpare Alfredo Bautista when he went up to the comfort room to relieve himself.
They were also ordered to pay jointly and severally the amount of P4. The trial court also pointed out that the prosecution's witnesses "did not have any motive to perjure against the petitioners". as maximum. the legality of their arrest and the failure of the judgment of conviction in stating the legal basis in support thereof. and (4) the failure to declare as illegal the arrest of Santos. On 14 October 2002. As the persons who were running passed by him. the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. ascribing as errors. 10(46) relying on the same arguments presented before the lower courts. The appellate court viewed the alleged inconsistencies between the testimonies of the victim and the police officer as a minor variation which tends to strengthen the probative value of their testimonies. Petitioners again raise as issues the credibility of the prosecution witnesses with respect to the identification of the perpetrators. (3) the disregard of evidence adduced by Sayoc. It bears stressing that in criminal cases. four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal. he immediately descended from the bus. 8(44) In their motion for reconsideration. (2) the accordance of evidentiary weight to the conflicting testimonies of the victim and the police officer. the RTC rendered judgment against the petitioners and sentenced them to suffer imprisonment from twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal. Inc.the said bus when the hold-up was announced. 6(42) The trial court gave full credence to the testimonies of the prosecution. 13(49) The rationale of this rule lies on the fact that Copyright 1994-2012 CD Technologies Asia. Soon thereafter. 9(45) petitioners reiterated that the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the victim and the police officer refer to substantial matters. all appeals to this Court may be taken by filing a petition for review on certiorari. It noted that the defenses raised by petitioners. the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. Upon seeing a person holding a gun. The principal issue involved is the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. Anent the issue of illegal arrest. which were not corroborated. raising only questions of law. cannot prevail over the clear and positive identification made by the complainant. And when his findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 7(43) On 30 January 2002. he was apprehended by a police officer. namely: (1) the positive identification of the perpetrators.00 to the victim. According to Sayoc. as they establish the lack of positive and convincing identification of the petitioners. Petitioners filed the instant petition. Jurisprudence 1901 to 2011 15 . he entered a street where vehicles were passing. he went to the side and stood up behind a wall. 11(47) Settled is the rule that in criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion temporal or lower. On 25 November 1999. the conclusions of the trial court on the following issues. the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge.500. these are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court. as minimum to seventeen (17) years. the appellate court concluded from evidence that Almadin and Santos voluntarily surrendered. 12(48) It is evident from this petition that no question of law is proffered by petitioners.
It was Ricardo Santos who announced the hold-up after which he pointed a knife at the neck of the complainant while Teodoro Almadin divested him of his jewelry. 15(51) As found by the trial court. such as: 1. On cross-examination. Romeo Sayoc held everyone at bay by threatening to explode a hand grenade if anyone moved. During the direct examination. stress and anxiety may have contributed to the hazy recollection of the victim pertaining to the identification of the perpetrators. With respect to the police officer. Jurisprudence 1901 to 2011 16 4. They argue that extreme fear. we are constrained not to disturb its factual findings. However. while on cross-examination. the victim did not mention any civilian who got off the bus with him. the latter was seated on the right side of the bus near her. on cross-examination however. 16(52) Petitioners also anchor their defense on the alleged inconsistencies of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. about three (3) persons proceeded towards the direction of Cubao. 20(56) CD Technologies Asia. 14(50) The findings of fact made by the trial court were substantially supported by evidence on record. she stated that her back was turned against the person who announced the holdup. 19(55) The police officer averred that after the holdup. she stated that she was actually seated on the seventh row. Jaen and the police officer were able to identify the petitioners. especially when uncorroborated. the former deserve more credence and weight. Therefore. Petitioners' weak denial. DaECST Petitioners contend that the identification made by the prosecution witnesses is not positive. as he had personally heard them and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. as among those who staged the robbery inside the bus. 18(54) TAacHE 2. As between the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses and the negative statements of the accused. only to retract her statement later. the police officer testified that when somebody announced the hold-up.the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most commonly performed by the trial judge who is in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before his sala. 3. Copyright 1994-2012 . Inc. the police officer testified that she was seated on the first row at the driver's side. the police officer stated that after the holdup. 17(53) On direct examination. one civilian together with the victim alighted from the bus. the accused were clearly and positively identified as the three men who staged the robbery/hold-up inside the California bus. petitioners insist that the former did not personally see the petitioners actually committing the crime charged. on the other hand. clear and convincing. thus: HADTEC Based on the testimonies of the complainant and PO1 Remedios Terte. to the effect that these persons turned left towards a street. cannot overcome the positive identification of them by the prosecution witnesses.
D. there is no shred of evidence to show that the police officer was actuated by improper motives to testify falsely against the petitioners. 22(58) 7. 23(59) The variance in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses is too trivial to affect their credibility. the indeterminate sentence law is applicable in this case. VIII of the 1987 Constitution and Section 2. never mentioned such call. for the crime of highway robbery. the indeterminate prison term is from seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision Copyright 1994-2012 CD Technologies Asia. Jaen. albeit in a concise manner. Finally. The victim testified that it took the petitioners five to ten minutes to rob him while the police officer stated that it took them about five minutes. he voluntarily surrendered to the barangay officials. Moreover. The penalty for simple highway robbery is reclusion temporal in its minimum period. Inc. The police officer testified during the direct examination that she saw Sayoc "inside" an "owner-type" jeep. No. 25(61) Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. the police officer witnessed a civilian calling 117 while she was running after the perpetrators. ISCaDH We disagree. ITScAE The contention of Santos that he was illegally arrested and searched deserves scant consideration. We are not convinced. 21(57) TcIHDa 6. However. Simon. Accordingly. 24(60) Art. instead. The positive identification of the petitioners as perpetrators made by the victim himself and the police officer cannot be overthrown by the weak denial and alibi of petitioners. Santos was not arrested. petitioners argue that the appellate court's decision failed to conform to the standards set forth in Section 14. The appellate court did not merely quote the facts presented by the trial court. Her testimony deserves great appreciation in light of the presumption that she is regularly performing her duties. only to change it later to "underneath" the vehicle. As held by the trial court. it arrived at its own findings. After citing and evaluating the evidence and arguments presented by both parties. This was not mentioned in her direct-examination.5. Inaccuracies may in fact suggest that the witness is telling the truth and has not been rehearsed as it is not to be expected that he will be able to remember every single detail of an incident with perfect or total recall. This Court maintains that minor inconsistencies in the narration of a witness do not detract from its essential credibility as long as it is on the whole coherent and intrinsically believable. consonant with the ruling in the case of People v. however. 532 is a special law which adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their technical terms. During the cross-examination. with the penalty imposed by the lower court. on the other hand. and no countervailing evidence to dispute this fact appears from the record. 26(62) since P. with their technical signification and effects. It dealt with the issues submitted by petitioners. This constitutes sufficient compliance with the constitutional and statutory mandate that a decision must state clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based. the appellate court favored the prosecution. Jurisprudence 1901 to 2011 17 .
52. 27(63) WHEREFORE. Rollo. at 59. 5. citing People v. Appellants are hereby sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision mayor. Id. Inc. citing Roca v. 443 Phil. 2. 8. Id. to thirteen (13) years. Id. Since appellants are detention prisoners. 66-71. Jurisprudence 1901 to 2011 18 . Jr. at 83. finding appellants Romeo Sayoc and Ricardo Santos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple highway robbery. *(64) Velasco. Id. concur. 2 May 2006. Id. 114917.00 to the private complainant. at 31-33. as maximum. Id. Id. Id. 12. Macalaba. at 19. 431 SCRA 345 (2004). 3 provides: Mode of Appeal. 578 (2003) and People v. No. Escote.R. Id. Supra note 4. No. 16. G. to thirteen (13) years. Footnotes 1. 14. Id. Leonardo-de Castro **(65) and Brion. p. 143487. 3. 480 SCRA 276. G. reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Court of Appeals. 436 Phil.R. 430 (2002). Matore. G. CR No. 33. this Court AFFIRMS WITH MODIFICATION the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the Decision dated 30 January 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. and to pay jointly and severally the amount of P4. at 13-14. 6. 11. citing People v. Nos. as maximum. 4. Chico-Nazario. 350 SCRA 414. 125256 and 126973. at 72-78. 447. 10. at 50-62. Magno v. 488 SCRA 438. Duran v. 21. Id. 483 SCRA 31. RULES OF COURT. 15.mayor. Sec. Id. except in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is death. they shall be credited with the period of their temporary imprisonment. 18. 7.. 286. Ferrer v. SO ORDERED. CTaIHE TADaCH 13.R. Supra note 1.500. Id. Court of Appeals. 565.R. — An appeal to the Supreme Court may be taken only by a petition for review on certiorari. 17. G. Copyright 1994-2012 CD Technologies Asia. 29 January 2001. People. 22 February 2006. nine (9) months and ten (10) days of reclusion temporal. 133896. No. 20. at 8-28. 24140. 22. with legal interest from the filing of the Information until fully paid. as minimum. JJ. Elmer Jaen as their civil liability. Rollo. at 29. People. nine (9) months and ten (10) days of reclusion temporal. 27 January 2006. at 20. Rule 56.R. 9. as minimum.. 19. Id. at 18. pp.
and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party. accomplice or accessory after the fact. Inc. 24. Leonardo-de Castro is hereby designated as additional member of the Second Division in lieu of Justice Leonardo A. vs. JR. Jurisprudence 1901 to 2011 19 . 93028. * ** Id.. 1997 1(66) of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.23. GONZAGA and ALFREDO GONZAGA. it shall state: (1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission. 27. SP No.R. 26. if there is any. Justice Teresita J. and ROWENA AGAN. Quisumbing. 43793. 234 SCRA 555. unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived. who is on official leave. 329 (2000). 29 July 1994. 2008. respondents. (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused. Chico-Nazario is hereby designated as additional member. In lieu of inhibition of Justice Conchita Carpio Morales. (2) the participation of the accused in the offense. February 26. 619. denying the petition for Copyright 1994-2012 CD Technologies Asia.R. Per Special Order No. J : p The Case This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks to reverse and set aside the Resolution dated April 10. G. 381 Phil. 25. 315. COURT OF APPEALS. Justice Minita V. BIENVENIDO AGAN. DECISION VELASCO. If the judgment is of conviction. whether as principal. People v. Cerbito. petitioners. 130841. No. SECOND DIVISION [G. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.] SPOUSES VIRGINIA G. No.R.
7(72) private respondents alleged that they are the occupants of a portion of what is known as the "Sabroso Village. and pay the costs. denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. and further defendants are ordered to pay plaintiffs the reasonable value of the use of the land occupied by them. from June 1995. Damages. 3001-E-96. Jurisprudence 1901 to 2011 20 . Petitioners admitted that they do not reside at this property. 8(73) who knew of the shanty's existence for a long time and consented to their stay in the village.000. Gonzaga and Alfredo Gonzaga. judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs. Petitioners claimed that there was no occupant on the land when construction began in June 1995. Bienvenido Agan and Rowena Agan was docketed as Civil Case No. Copyright 1994-2012 CD Technologies Asia. 4(69) In May 1995. A demand later made on private respondents to vacate the lot in question went unheeded. petitioners went to inspect the above lot and discovered that a shanty belonging to private respondents Bienvenido and Rowena Agan had been built on the land in question. Branch 33.00 a month. and Attorney's Fees with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in Davao City. until they vacate. As alleged by petitioners. 1997 2(67) of the CA. at P1. 5(70) Thus. 1992 in the name of Ponciano Sabroso. 1996. and located in Ecoland Subdivision. The Ruling of the MTCC Thereafter.review of petitioners-spouses Virginia and Alfredo Gonzaga of the Decision dated December 20. on April 26. T-240379. the spouses Virginia G. 3(68) with an area of 247 square meters. Matina. and the Resolution dated August 29." They further alleged that their shanty is within the land covered by a Free Patent Application dated February 9. private respondents put up the structure by stealth and strategy. TaDSCA In their Answer dated June 10. The case entitled Spouses Virginia Gonzaga and Alfredo Gonzaga v. 1996. ordering the defendants to vacate plaintiffs' property covered by TCT No. the dispositive portion of which states: WHEREFORE. 1996 of the Davao City Regional Trial Court (RTC).000. petitioners decided to construct a house on the said parcel of land and engaged the services of a civil engineer to prepare the corresponding construction plan. Davao City. or shanty therefrom. 1996 6(71) against private respondents for Forcible Entry. petitioners filed a Complaint dated April 18. more or less. Inc. the MTCC rendered a Decision dated August 26. and the sum of P10. T-240379 and to remove their improvements and structures. Sometime in June 1995. 1996 9(74) in favor of petitioners.00 for attorney's fees. The Facts Petitioners are the registered owners of a residential lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. Phase IV. and against the defendants Bienvenido Agan and Rowena Agan.
43793. petitioners have not asserted prior possession thereof. a necessary element in an action for ejectment. The counterclaim is likewise dismissed. much less the manner of their dispossession. SO ORDERED. not for forcible entry. 1996. we have this Petition for Certiorari. the RTC rendered a Decision dated December 20. However. the appealed decision is REVERSED and judgment is entered dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action for forcible entry. 11(76) From this Resolution. 1997 a petition for review docketed as CA-G.SO ORDERED. petitioners sought reconsideration. 1997. plaintiffs' action should be one for recovery of possession or an accion publiciana. In so ruling. SP No.R. To the RTC.772-96. which is essential in an action for forcible entry. although claiming to be owners of the subject property. Copyright 1994-2012 CD Technologies Asia. in view of all the foregoing. failed to prove prior actual physical possession. Eventually. 10(75) HAIDcE The RTC predicated its ruling on the premise that petitioners. denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. No costs. the CA. As correctly pointed out by respondent Court. The Ruling of the CA On April 10. The Decision of the RTC Unconvinced. the MTCC held that private respondents failed to rebut allegations that they entered petitioners' property by stealth. petitioners filed with the CA on March 4. Hence. 24. Jurisprudence 1901 to 2011 21 . 1997. the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE. Inc. private respondents appealed the above MTCC ruling to the Davao City RTC docketed as Civil Case No. petitioners should have not commenced an action for forcible entry but an accion publiciana suit. The MTCC found as untenable private respondents' counter-allegation that they gained entry to the land in 1983 that is allegedly covered by the Free Patent Application of Ponciano Sabroso. the CA issued the first assailed Resolution. Thus. in its second assailed Resolution dated August 29. denying due course to petitioners' petition for review mainly on the strength of the following observations: A perusal of the complaint would show that apart from claiming ownership of the lot in question.
nor any plain. (Emphasis supplied. The court a quo erred in holding that petitioners' action should not be for forcible entry but for accion publiciana. The provision states: Section 1. the Sandiganbayan. may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petition shall raise Copyright 1994-2012 CD Technologies Asia. or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. the CA had already finally disposed of the case with the issuance of the Resolution dated April 10. a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court. Jurisprudence 1901 to 2011 22 . At the outset.The Issues The issues raised in the petition are set forth in the following assignment of errors: I. and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. –– A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals. and there is no appeal. — When any tribunal. board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction. 1997 denying due course to petitioners' petition for review of the RTC's decision. Sec. the remedy of certiorari may only be availed of in the absence of any other remedy in the ordinary course of law open to the petitioner. TaIHEA II. 1997 denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. speedy. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. the remedy of an appeal under Rule 45 was then already available to petitioners. 12(77) The Ruling of this Court The petition must be dismissed. and the Resolution dated August 29. Inc. it must be pointed out that petitioners invoked the certiorari jurisdiction of the Court under Rule 65 when an appeal under Rule 45 is the proper remedy and should have been filed. board or officer. Under the first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 65. The court a quo committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to give due course to the petition for review filed therewith as it committed a gross mistake in appreciating the facts of the case. alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal.) In the instant case. 1 of Rule 45 states: Section 1. Petition for certiorari. the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law. Thus.
or other person. the issues raised by petitioners revolve around the matter of possession before private respondents allegedly entered forcibly the property. express or implied. 1997 of the Resolution dated August 29. against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession. for the restitution of such possession. or until September 25.) It is quite clear from the foregoing provision that for a forcible entry suit to prosper. thus: Section 1. intimidation. Who may institute proceedings. contrary to the findings of the CA and RTC. at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession. 1 of Rule 70 prescribes the rules when an action for forcible entry and unlawful detainer is proper. 13(78) Thus. The foregoing notwithstanding. the recourse must still be dismissed. Petitioners. 5 (f) of Rule 56. or a lessor. the plaintiff must allege in his complaint that he had prior physical possession of the land and that the Copyright 1994-2012 CD Technologies Asia. — Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section. Jurisprudence 1901 to 2011 23 . together with damages and costs. 1997. vendor or vendee or other person. even if we overlook the procedural infirmity of the instant petition and treat it as an appeal under Rule 45. 1997. petitioners state that absolute ownership necessarily connotes possession. bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or person unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession. a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force. Instead. (Emphasis supplied. therefore. As it were. This Court has repeatedly ruled that reviews under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court are mutually exclusive and the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 cannot be made a substitute for a petitioner's failure to timely appeal under Rule 45. threat. 1997 the instant Petition for Certiorari dated September 18. intimidation. then had 15 days from their receipt on September 10. Pursuing the point. the proper remedy in the instant case should have been the filing of a petition for review under Rule 45. 1997 within which to file a petition for review under Rule 45. or stealth. strategy. they had prior possession of the subject property. they filed on September 25. Petitioners' posture is specious. strategy. the person lawfully entitled to the possession of the property must allege and prove that he was deprived of such possession by means of force. or any person or persons claiming under them. threat. IcCATD Clearly. may. for a complaint for forcible entry to prosper. 14(79) a petition for certiorari interposed when an appeal is proper and available may be dismissed. or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor.only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. under Sec. Inc. HEDSIc Sec. Petitioners argue that. To borrow from Justice Edgardo Paras. or stealth. And when the law speaks of possession. by virtue of any contract. and when. vendee. vendor. as contra-distinguished from possession de jure. the reference is to prior physical possession or possession de facto.
Then. Sec. they equate possession as an attribute of ownership to the fact of actual possession. 15(80) The requirement of prior physical possession in ejectment cases was explained by this Court in Mediran v. the action must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry to the property or. and the parties cannot be permitted meanwhile to engage in a petty warfare over the possession of the property which is the subject of dispute. to wit: Juridically speaking. and (2) deprivation of said possession by another by means of force. Sterling Technopark III. from the date the plaintiff learned about it. intimidation. possession is distinct from ownership. the complaint must contain two mandatory allegations: (1) prior physical possession of the property by the plaintiff. They are of course wrong. It is obviously just that the person who has first acquired possession should remain in possession pending this decision. is what the Court wrote in Bejar v. is the issue. but only to determine the question of possession. Obviously. but formulated a bit differently. not possession de jure. the court may pass upon such question. where a person supposes himself to be the owner of a piece of property and desires to vindicate his ownership against the party actually in possession. 1. and he can not be permitted. possession de facto and Copyright 1994-2012 CD Technologies Asia. If ownership is raised in the pleadings. and in case of controverted right. as here. strategy or stealth.) aSIHcT In Heirs of Pedro Laurora v. Else. by invading the property and excluding the actual possessor. the Court stressed the basic inquiry in forcible entry cases: The only issue in forcible entry cases is the physical or material possession of real property — possession de facto. complainants in forcible entry cases must allege and eventually prove prior physical possession. 18(83) (Emphasis supplied. Caluag: To make out a suit for illegal detainer or forcible entry. to place upon the latter the burden of instituting an action to try the property right.) Clearly then. To permit this would be highly dangerous to individual security and disturbing to social order. This latter requirement implies that the possession of the disputed property by the intruder has been unlawful from the very start. In giving recognition to the action of forcible entry and detainer the purpose of the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual possession. 17(82) Of the same tenor.defendant unlawfully deprived him of such possession through any of the grounds provided in Rule 70. threat. Villanueva. 16(81) (Emphasis supplied. it requires the parties to preserve the status quo until one or the other of them sees fit to invoke the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the question of ownership. not title. and from this distinction are derived legal consequences of much importance. it is incumbent upon him to institute an action to this end in a court of competent jurisdiction. Inc. their cases fail. Therefore. Petitioners' claim that they have prior physical possession by virtue of their absolute ownership of the subject land is untenable. Jurisprudence 1901 to 2011 24 . in cases where stealth was employed. Only prior physical possession.
171277. 91. Id.possession flowing from ownership are different legal concepts. Santos. 19(84) It differs from a forcible entry action in that it does not require prior physical possession in order to prosper. Costs against petitioners. a plenary action for recovery of possession in ordinary civil proceedings in order to determine the better and legal right to possess. Id. at 145-147. 184-185. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. JJ. 440 SCRA 365. 19. 6. 9. Copyright 1994-2012 CD Technologies Asia. SO ORDERED. Additionally. and that an action for forcible entry may only be filed within one (1) year from the plaintiff's deprivation of possession of the land.R. Id. 132467. 2003. 146815. Rollo. Chua v. ESHAIC WHEREFORE. Luna (Chairperson) and Hector L. 2. p. 5 (f) states: Section 5. — The appeal may be dismissed motu proprio or on motion of the respondent on the following grounds: xxx xxx xxx (f) Error in the choice or mode of appeal..R. 5. considering that more than one (1) year has already elapsed from the time that possession of the subject land was allegedly taken from petitioners. 372-373. Id. Jurisprudence 1901 to 2011 25 . 17. 14. Inc.R. Id. 12. at 112. Penned by Associate Justice Artemio G. October 18. at 64-77. 516 SCRA 84. Id. 10. Id. We agree with the CA and RTC that the proper remedy in the instant case is to file an accion publiciana case. Id. 43793. No. Id. 1990). 752. Quisumbing. Sec. 189-192. Footnotes 1. 401 SCRA 181. 8.. G. No. Rollo. February 15. at 78-88. 1997 in CA-G. at 90. April 9. we DISMISS the petition. Carpio. Carpio-Morales and Tinga. Hofilena. and AFFIRM the CA's Resolutions dated April 10. 7. at 60. Id. 11. cDCIHT ECTIcS 15. 18. 15. G. at 58 & 78. No. pp. 1997 and August 29. an accion publiciana is the only remedy available to petitioners now to determine who has the better right to possession of the land. at 220-221. 13. concur.R. Rule 56. 16. 761 (1918). 2007. G. Supra note 1. Tuquero and concurred in by Associate Justices Artemon D. 4. at 192. 3. 37 Phil. SP No. 2 RULES OF COURT ANNOTATED 163 (1st ed. independently of title. 2004.
Copyright 1994-2012 CD Technologies Asia. Inc. Jurisprudence 1901 to 2011 26 .
Popup) 6. Chief Justice Andres R.Popup) 5. the right recognized in Article 1088 exists. Art.Endnotes 1 (Popup .. any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale. fully or in part. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition.Popup) 2. Supra note 2. ponente." 7 (Popup . Maambong. without specifying any particular object. and Justices Teodoro R.R. 3 (Popup . Branch 1. RTC. 2 (Popup .Popup) 7. 1993.Popup) 3.Popup) 1. Art. 5 (Popup . Justice Rodolfo A. On the other hand. Inc. Padilla and Florenz D. Regalado. 1088. Jr. The decision was penned by Judge Juan P. concurring. CA Justice Andres B.Popup) 4. the fine distinction between Article 1088 and Article 1620 is that when the sale consists of an interest in some particular property or properties of the inheritance. No. Narvasa (Chairperson).Popup) 8. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the CD Technologies Asia. ponente. in the abstract sense. if the sale is the hereditary right itself. Reyes. Jimenez. 101522. The Court held: "According to Tolentino. May 28. the right of redemption that arises in favor of the other co-heirs is that recognized in Article 1620. 4 (Popup . Cagayan. 6 (Popup . Supra note 1. concurring. Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Regalado E. G. Tuguegarao. 1620. provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor. 8 (Popup . Nocon. Jurisprudence 1901 to 2011 27 Copyright 1994-2012 . 222 SCRA 736.
Popup) 11. 15. 11 (Popup . II. 15 (Popup . p. The Court further held: "Petitioners allege that upon the facts and circumstances of the present case.. et al.. the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one. 14 (Popup . 16 (Popup . Id. Records..other co-owners or of any of them are sold to a third person. Vol. We do not dispute the principle laid down in the Conejero case.. pp. 113. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive. citing as authority the case of Conejero. pp.Popup) 16. the facts in the said case are not four square with the facts of the present case.Popup) 12. Id.Popup) 15. Inc. p. Id. Rollo. et al. Id.. However. Jurisprudence 1901 to 2011 28 Copyright 1994-2012 . Court of Appeals. CD Technologies Asia.Popup) 14.Popup) 10. 9 (Popup . v. 13 (Popup . 12 (Popup .Popup) 13.Popup) 9. In Conejero. p. (16 SCRA 775) wherein the Court adopted the principle that the giving of a copy of a deed is equivalent to the notice as required by law in legal redemption. 111-112. Id. p. 161-163. pp. The Court in that case stated that the furnishing of a copy of the deed was equivalent to the giving of a written notice required by law. 429. respondents failed to exercise their right of legal redemption during the period provided by law. 164. redemptioner Enrique Conejero was shown and given a copy of the deed of sale of the subject property. 427-431.." 10 (Popup .
pp. 24 (Popup . Id.Popup) 26.Popup) 17.Popup) 21. Rollo. pp.. Id.Popup) 18.17 (Popup . 134.. Tuguegarao.Popup) 22. Rollo. 102-106. Id. 19 (Popup . pp. pp. CD Technologies Asia. 20 (Popup . Branch IV.. Cagayan. 26 (Popup . 21 (Popup .. pp. 22 (Popup . 23 (Popup . Id. RTC. pp. Id. 152-155.Popup) 20. 468-479. 25 (Popup . p.Popup) 24.Popup) 19. Id.. 116-119. Inc. RTC. 148-151.Popup) 25. 120-123. 18 (Popup .. Cagayan. Branch 1. Tuguegarao. Jurisprudence 1901 to 2011 29 Copyright 1994-2012 . 107-110.Popup) 23. pp.
SP No. Also. 456 SCRA 193. Under the old law (Civ. 2005. 51857 rollo. which involved the same issues and parties.] 275) — why these provisions were inserted in the statute we are not informed. The text of Article 1623 clearly and expressly prescribes that the thirty days for making the redemption are to be counted from notice in writing by the vendor. CA-G. Jur. 51857 was ordered consolidated with CA-G. No. 2 (d) 528). Jurisprudence 1901 to 2011 30 Copyright 1994-2012 . Parenthetically. 29 (Popup . 133638. we said: Despite the plain language of the law. 12 S. so that the party notified need not entertain doubt that the seller may still contest the alienation. G. SP No. 2000 of the Former Fifteenth Division of the CA (see CA-G. pp. supported by Annexes A to A-20. and that method must be deemed exclusive. In Perpetua vda. are easily divined.. Payne v. Rollo. CV No.W. over the years. this Court has. This assurance would not exist if the notice should be given by the buyer. Court of Appeals. as long as the redemptioner was notified CD Technologies Asia. CV No. The reasons for requiring that the notice should be given by the seller. v.Popup) 28. we declared that — In considering whether or not the offer to redeem was timely. Associate Justice Elvi John S. Manuel Uy & Sons.Popup) 27. 63093. the redemption period began to run. April 15. As ruled in Wampler v. Lecompte. the notice by the seller removes all doubts as to fact of the sale. 150 Atl. pp. The seller of an undivided interest is in the best position to know who are his co-owners that under the law must be notified of the sale. that a state of facts in respect thereto existed. Mariano is not the latest ruling on the requirement of notice from the vendor. its perfection. State. 26). nor any distinctive method for notifying the redemptioner" thus.. we think that the notice given by the vendee (buyer) should not be taken into account. 63093 rollo. which warranted the legislature in so legislating. and not by the buyer.Popup) 29. been tasked to interpret the "written notice requirement" of the above-quoted provision. but we may assume until the contrary is shown.R. 2000. In the case Butte v. 458 (affd. it was immaterial who gave the notice. 245-247). Section 7 (b) (3) of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals directing that the consolidated cases shall pertain to the justice to whom the civil case is assigned. and its validity. [U. Art. It is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in Article 1623 deliberately selected a particular method of giving notice. the notice being a reaffirmation thereof..S. Inc. p. 1524). The interpretation was somehow modified in the case of De Conejero. et al. Inc. wherein it was pointed out that Article 1623 "does not prescribe a particular form of notice. Court of Appeals.27 (Popup . On February 23.R. provided that the ponencia of the civil case conformed to the consolidation pursuant to Rule 3. Code of 1889. in 75 Law Ed. 71-73. 28 (Popup . (39 Am.R. De Ape v. Per Resolution dated February 9. et al. so long as the redeeming co-owner learned of the alienation in favor of the stranger.R.R. 237. Asuncion of the then Seventh Division of the CA conformed to the consolidation of cases (see CA-G.
and Rules 46. laws. Retes. 11. 30 (Popup . the principal difference between Art. Rule 51. Jr. — Except where the judgment or final order or resolution. 31 (Popup .. It is a term applied to an established rule that when an appellate court passes on a question and remands the case to the lower court for further proceedings. There is. et al. This view was reiterated in Etcuban v. 2009. 1524 of the former Civil Code and Art. Villanueva. 49.Popup) 30. et al. the motion for its execution may only be filed in the proper court after its entry. et al. quo warranto and habeas corpus shall be in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Constitution. Hon. or a portion thereof. xxx xxx xxx 32 (Popup . therefore. Effect must be given to this change in statutory language. thus: Art. the redemption period starts to run. — The procedure in original cases for certiorari. However. 48. 51.R. has not commenced to run. so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. we defined the law of the case as: [T]he opinion delivered on a former appeal. et al. In this case. mandamus. et al. Rule 56. the question there settled becomes the law of the case upon subsequent appeal. Execution of judgment. the records are bereft of any indication that Fortunato was given any written notice of prospective or consummated sale of the portions of Lot No. wherein the plaintiffs were not furnished any written notice of sale or a copy thereof by the vendor. Court of Appeals. Distrito.Popup) 32.. xxx xxx CD Technologies Asia. Sec. Inc. 163103. Garcia. 52 and this Rule. The Honorable Court of Appeals. It means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case. 1623 of the Civil Code is clear in requiring that the written notification should come from the vendor or prospective vendor. 1623 of the present one is that the former did not specify who must give the notice. prohibition. in the case of Salatandol v. this Court again referred to the principle enunciated in the case of Butte. In Vios v. Indeed. The thirty (30)-day redemption period under the law.. Calaliman. v. et al. The Honorable Court of Appeals.. therefore. such reversion is only sound. 2. and Mariano. As observed by Justice Vicente Mendoza. is ordered to be immediately executory. et al. Cabrera v. whereas the present one expressly says the notice must be given by the vendor. G. Jurisprudence 1901 to 2011 31 xxx Copyright 1994-2012 . Sec. no room for construction. February 6. subject to the following provisions: a) All references in said Rules to the Court of Appeals shall be understood to also apply to the Supreme Court. Rules applicable. v. Pantangco. 2319 by the vendors or would-be vendors.in writing of the sale and the particulars thereof. v.Popup) 31. not from any other person. whether correct on general principles or not.
635 dated May 7. pp. Jurisprudence 1901 to 2011 32 Copyright 1994-2012 . 2009 per Special Order No.Popup) 2. 40 (Popup .Popup) ** Designated additional Member of the Second Division effective June 3.Popup) *** Designated additional Member of the Second Division effective May 11. 38 (Popup . 658 dated June 3. Rollo. Id. 2009 per Special Order No. Inc. CD Technologies Asia.Popup) * Designated additional Member of the Second Division per Special Order No. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations. Rule 39. a judgment may be enforced by action.Popup) 33. 2009. 34 (Popup . 645 dated May 15.Popup) 4. 39 (Popup . at 31-33. — A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. Execution by motion or by independent action. 35 (Popup . 66-71. and before it is barred by the statute of limitations. at 72-78. After the lapse of such time. 37 (Popup . 36 (Popup . Id. 6. Sec. Id. 2009.33 (Popup . 2009.Popup) 1.Popup) 3. at 83.
CD Technologies Asia. 447. 48 (Popup . Id. RULES OF COURT.41 (Popup .R. 125256 and 126973. G.Popup) 10.Popup) 5. Rule 56. G. Supra note 1. Supra note 4. 43 (Popup . citing Roca v. 29 January 2001. CTaIHE 45 (Popup . 114917. Jurisprudence 1901 to 2011 33 Copyright 1994-2012 . Court of Appeals. reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. at 13-14. 2 May 2006. at 8-28. at 29.Popup) 9. 47 (Popup . Nos. Id. Inc.Popup) 6. Id. Duran v. 488 SCRA 438. except in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is death. — An appeal to the Supreme Court may be taken only by a petition for review on certiorari. 3 provides: Mode of Appeal.R. at 59.Popup) 8. TADaCH 49 (Popup .Popup) 12. 350 SCRA 414.Popup) 7. No.Popup) 13. Court of Appeals. 44 (Popup . Sec. at 50-62.Popup) 11. Id. Id. 42 (Popup . 46 (Popup .
People.Popup) 15. 133896. Id. G. 578 (2003) and People v.Popup) 16. 27 January 2006. 55 (Popup . 57 (Popup . Inc. People. 443 Phil. at 18.Popup) 19. 22 February 2006. 53 (Popup . at 19. Macalaba. Rollo. STIHaE 52 (Popup .Popup) 14. citing People v. 430 (2002). G.Popup) 20. 51 (Popup . 52. Ferrer v. at 20. No. Copyright 1994-2012 CD Technologies Asia. Matore. Id.Popup) 22. 56 (Popup . 54 (Popup .Popup) 21. Id. Id. Escote. 58 (Popup . 483 SCRA 31. No.R. 286. Id.Popup) 18. citing People v. 431 SCRA 345 (2004). 480 SCRA 276. 436 Phil.R. p. 33. 143487. Jurisprudence 1901 to 2011 34 .Popup) 17. Magno v. 565.50 (Popup . Id.
If the judgment is of conviction. Justice Teresita J. accomplice or accessory after the fact. Justice Minita V. unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived. (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused. aAHSEC 61 (Popup . 381 Phil.R. G. 315. Quisumbing. 29 July 1994.Popup) 25. No. Copyright 1994-2012 CD Technologies Asia. who is on official leave. 93028.Popup) 27. 619. Rollo. Inc.Popup) 26. Jurisprudence 1901 to 2011 35 . and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party. Id. (2) the participation of the accused in the offense. Leonardo-de Castro is hereby designated as additional member of the Second Division in lieu of Justice Leonardo A. if there is any. Penned by Associate Justice Artemio G. 329 (2000). pp. Chico-Nazario is hereby designated as additional member. 64 (Popup . 63 (Popup . 234 SCRA 555. 66 (Popup . 189-192. whether as principal.Popup) 23. it shall state: (1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission.59 (Popup . SaICcT 65 (Popup .Popup) * In lieu of inhibition of Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales. Hofilena. HTCSDE 62 (Popup . Cerbito.Popup) 24. Luna (Chairperson) and Hector L. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.Popup) 1. People v. 60 (Popup .Popup) ** Per Special Order No. Tuquero and concurred in by Associate Justices Artemon D.
71 (Popup . at 78-88. 73 (Popup . at 58 & 78.Popup) 7. at 220-221.Popup) 5.Popup) 11. Id.Popup) 9. Inc. Id. 68 (Popup . at 192. Id. Id.Popup) 6.Popup) 2.Popup) 4. at 112. at 145-147. at 64-77. 75 (Popup . Id. at 60.Popup) 8.Popup) 10. 76 (Popup . 70 (Popup . 69 (Popup . Supra note 1. 72 (Popup . Id. Copyright 1994-2012 CD Technologies Asia. Id.67 (Popup . Jurisprudence 1901 to 2011 36 . Id.Popup) 3. 74 (Popup . Id.
October 18.Popup) 16.Popup) 18. at 90. February 15. G. 132467. Santos. 752. No. p. 761 (1918).R. Id. 2007. April 9. No.Popup) 15. 84 (Popup .Popup) 13. 2003. 372-373. 83 (Popup . Rollo. 81 (Popup . 78 (Popup .. 2004. Sec. Jurisprudence 1901 to 2011 37 . 171277.Popup) 12. 146815.Popup) 19. G. 401 SCRA 181. 91.Popup) 17. — The appeal may be dismissed motu proprio or on motion of the respondent on the following grounds: xxx xxx (f) Error in the choice or mode of appeal. 79 (Popup . 15.77 (Popup . G. 37 Phil. 440 SCRA 365. xxx 80 (Popup . 2 RULES OF COURT ANNOTATED 163 (1st ed. 82 (Popup . Grounds for dismissal of appeal. Inc. 516 SCRA 84. 5 (f) states: Section 5. 184-185. Copyright 1994-2012 CD Technologies Asia.R.Popup) 14. 1990).R. Chua v. No. Rule 56.
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