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Domestic Political Accountability and the Escalation and Settlement of International Disputes
PAUL K. HUTH and TODD L. ALLEE Journal of Conflict Resolution 2002 46: 754 DOI: 10.1177/002200202237928 The online version of this article can be found at: http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/46/6/754

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Huth, Allee / DOMESTIC POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY JOURNAL OF CONFLICT 10.1177/002200202237928 RESOLUTION

Domestic Political Accountability and the Escalation and Settlement of International Disputes
PAUL K. HUTH
Center for Political Studies Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan

TODD L. ALLEE
Department of Political Science University of Michigan

A political accountability model is developed to explain how the accountability of incumbent democratic leaders to domestic political opposition influences the diplomatic and military policies of governments. The model is situated within the democratic peace literature and compared with existing theoretical work. Empirically, the hypotheses are tested on a new data set of 348 territorial disputes for the period from 1919 to 1995. Each dispute is divided into three separate stages so that hypotheses about the initiation and outcome of both negotiations and military confrontations, and opposing patterns of war and dispute settlement, can be tested. Results provide strong support for a number of hypotheses concerning the importance of electoral cycles and the strength of opposition parties in explaining patterns of both conflictual and cooperative behavior by democratic states.

An extensive literature on the relationship between democracy and international conflict has developed over the past decade.1 Nevertheless, several basic questions and puzzles remain about the existence of, and explanation for, a democratic peace. In this study, we present two main arguments. First, the theoretical literature on the democratic peace is underdeveloped with respect to explaining differences in the conflict behavior of democratic states. We present a series of hypotheses that relate variation in the political accountability of democratic leaders to differences in foreign policy behavior. Second, the prevailing quantitative approach to testing hypotheses about the democratic peace based on dyad-years as the units of observation suffers from several limitations. We propose an alternative research design that focuses on the multiple
1. The literature is too large to cite fully here, but recent works of particular interest include Auerswald (2000), Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999), Cederman (2001), Elman (2000), Gartzke (1998, 2000), Gowa (1999), Reiter and Stam (2002), Russett and Oneal (2001), Schultz (2001b), and Snyder (2000). AUTHORSNOTE: We thank the National Science Foundation and the U.S. Institute of Peace for financial support of our research. The comments and suggestions of Curt Signorino are especially appreciated. The data sets used in this article can be found at the JCR data site: http://www.yale.edu/unsy/jcr/jcrdata.htm.
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Vol. 46 No. 6, December 2002 754-790 DOI: 10.1177/002200202237928 2002 Sage Publications

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stages through which international disputes progress and the diplomatic and military policies adopted by state leaders at each of these different stages. The results of our statistical analyses provide strong evidence in support of the theoretical and empirical approach we adopt for studying the democratic peace. In particular, we find that (a) opposing patterns of accommodative as well as conflictual behavior by democratic states can be explained by differences in the political accountability of democratic leaders, and (b) the explanatory power of domestic- and international-level variables varies in consistent ways across the different stages of a territorial dispute. We divide this study into the following sections. First, we present a brief review of the democratic peace literature and highlight the limitations that provide the rationale for our theoretical and empirical work in this study. We then outline the different stages of territorial disputes and develop a series of testable hypotheses that drawn on broader theoretical models. In the third section, we describe a series of statistical tests and present the results of such tests. Finally, we conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for the literature on the democratic peace.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE Although many scholars have argued that domestic political conditions play a central role in explaining patterns of diplomatic and military conflict among states, those employing a realist theoretical framework have challenged the claim that domesticlevel variables provide powerful findings and have questioned the assertions of democratic peace proponents (e.g., Elman 1997; Gowa 1999; Layne 1995). The premise of our theoretical analysis is that realist critics have failed to make a compelling logical case that domestic-level variables should not be expected to shape the foreign policy choices of state leaders. Thus, the starting point for our theory-building efforts is that foreign policy leaders are attentive to the struggle within their country for political power and influence. In our theoretical framework, then, state leaders attempt to protect and promote national security interests abroad while seeking to ensure their tenure and position of political power at home. The focus of research on the democratic peace has been directed largely at comparing and explaining differences in the conflict behavior of democratic versus nondemocratic states. Nevertheless, one of the theoretical puzzles of the democratic peace literature stems from the empirical findings that indicate substantial variation in the conflict behavior of democratic states (e.g., Auerswald 2000; Elman 2000; Snyder 2000). We believe that an important subject of theoretical work, underdeveloped in the current democratic peace literature, is the extent to which domestic political constraints and accountability vary in important ways for the leaders of democratic governments. As a result, a more systematic analysis of such differences among democratic regimes is required. Finally, we believe that hypotheses about the democratic peace should be related more directly to the unfolding of international disputes into different stages and the choices made by state leaders at each stage of a dispute. The commonly employed

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dyad-year research design has produced many important findings (e.g., Maoz 1997, 1998; Russett and Oneal 2001), yet such designs for empirical tests of the democratic peace feature several limitations. First, these studies simply code whether two states experience some conflict in a particular year but do not identify patterns of military initiation and response or patterns of conflict resolution. Second, these studies do not capture that international disputes progress through a number of stages, namely, (1) the emergence of a dispute, (2) attempts to settle the dispute through negotiations, (3) the escalation of diplomatic conflict and the issuance of military threats, and (4) the further escalation of these militarized crises to war. The democratic peace literature addresses only those situations later in the dispute evolution process in which democratic institutions may prevent states from escalating a dispute. However, democratic peace arguments are not applicable to situations where conflict is absent because states are not involved in a dispute in the first place, and thus there is no reason for leaders to consider using force (also see Gartzke 1998, 2000). Using a dyad-year design, however, states that do not get into disputes for reasons unrelated to democratic institutions may appear as cases in support of the democratic peace. Finally, when using dyads, variables that are particular to each state, such as the level of democracy or the relative strength of a leaders domestic political position, must be combined somewhat unnaturally into some type of joint or composite measure. As a result, it is difficult to draw causal inferences about individual state-level behavior using dyads. Our alternative approach for studying the democratic peace therefore includes the following:
1. a focus on the behavior of individual states involved in international disputes, 2. an attempt to explain how disputes progress through different stages of diplomatic and military conflict, and 3. an analysis of the diplomatic and military actions of challenger and target states at each stage of a dispute, including an attempt to identify patterns of initiation and response in the policy choices adopted by state leaders.

Our theoretical and empirical analyses of the democratic peace are built around the behavior of states involved in territorial disputes. We assemble a data set consisting of 348 territorial disputes during the period from 1919 to 1995 and examine the diplomatic and military behavior of states seeking to change the territorial status quo and those preferring to preserve it.2 We believe there are several advantages to analyzing a data set of territorial disputes. First, by requiring that a territorial disagreement exists to begin with, we minimize problems of irrelevant no-conflict observations. Our data set consists of cases in which the use of diplomatic or military activity to advance ones claim is always a possibility. A related benefit is that focusing on state behavior in territorial disputes allows us to develop and test more specific hypotheses about state behavior. In particular, we are able to examine the conditions under which states are likely to resolve disputes through negotiations, reach a deadlock in talks, or see their dispute escalate into a
2. See Huth and Allee (2002) for a more detailed description of the coding rules used for identifying cases of territorial disputes and summary descriptions of territorial disputes.

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war. A third advantage of this alternative research design is that by looking at the different stages of a territorial dispute, we can capture the impact of particular variables at each stage. This helps us to address potential problems of selection bias (e.g., Fearon 1994a; Huth 1996; Reed 2000; Schultz 2001b; Smith 1995). A fourth and final advantage of studying territorial disputes is that they are a central issue over which militarized disputes and wars have erupted. As a result, the study of territorial disputes should provide a demanding test for the impact of democratic institutions on the conflict behavior of foreign policy leaders. If democratic political institutions have the capacity to discourage military conflict and promote peaceful resolution of disputes, then territorial disputes will push that capacity to its limits.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK We start by discussing how territorial disputes typically move through three different stages. We then present a theoretical framework to explain the foreign policy choices selected by state leaders in each of these stages. Our starting point is a situation in which two states have a disagreement over the control of and sovereign rights to territory. One state, the challenger, is seeking to alter the prevailing territorial status quo, whereas a target state has rejected the challengers territorial claims. In the challenge the status quo stage, we focus on the decision of the challenger whether to actively seek a change in the status quo and, if so, by what diplomatic and/or military policies. The challengers policy options can be grouped into three categories: (1) no active challenge to the territorial status quo, (2) the pursuit of diplomatic initiatives and negotiations over disputed territory, and (3) a coercive policy of using military force to compel a change in the status quo. The next stage in a territorial dispute depends on what choice was initially selected by the challenger. If the challenger pursues neither diplomatic nor military initiatives, the status quo persists. However, we move to the negotiation stage in those cases in which the challenger has proposed negotiations. Our theoretical analysis in this negotiating phase centers on the extent of concessions made by both the challenger and target in a given round of talks. A policy of no concessions represents an unyielding bargaining position in which political leaders maintain all territorial claims. Alternatively, leaders may pursue a more accommodative policy in which they offer limited or even extensive concessions. If the challenger state initiated a military threat in an attempt to alter the status quo, then a military escalation stage ensues. The challenger and target are now in a military confrontation, and each state must now decide whether to escalate a military confrontation and risk war. The challenger and target choices can be portrayed as falling into one of two policy categories: (1) low escalation or (2) high escalation. A policy of low escalation indicates that a state engages in at most limited military preparations and the buildup of forces beyond initial military actions, even if the other party escalates to higher levels of military preparedness. Escalation to high levels occurs when the challenger or target refuses to offer any territorial concessions and mobilizes for a large-

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scale attack or resorts to the large-scale use of force when the other party stands firm and refuses concessions. Over the duration of a dispute, decision makers make numerous choices regarding the maintenance of the status quo, strategies for negotiations and dispute settlement, and the use of coercive military pressure. These choices regarding diplomacy and military forceand the resulting pathways to stalemate, dispute settlement, and warare the focus of our analysis in the remainder of this article. We present our hypotheses by discussing the expected impact of each independent variable on state behavior in each of these three stages.

POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL We begin our theoretical analysis at the domestic level with a focus on the accountability of incumbent leaders to domestic political opposition. We provide only a summary description of the model here due to space limitations (see Huth and Allee 2002). We first describe a number of premises that provide the foundation for our hypothesisbuilding efforts and then move to the presentation of the hypotheses themselves.
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

Premise 1: The primacy of retaining office for incumbent leaders. A critical goal of incumbent leaders is to maintain their position of political leadership and protect their hold on office from political opposition.

Building on this first premise, we expect political leaders to be strategic in their pursuit of both domestic and foreign policies and to try to anticipate the domestic political responses to various policies they might adopt. Leaders generally should not be expected to choose policies that might produce high political costs; they should instead prefer policies that will maintain, if not improve, their political standing.
Premise 2: The strategic behavior of political opposition. In all political systems, there are political elites who seek to remove the current leadership from office and assume positions of political power themselves. Opposition elites, however, are strategic in deciding when to challenge incumbents and seek their removal.

We expect that counterelites and political opposition will be more active in challenging incumbents when the latters foreign policy initiatives have failed or proven controversial (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Goemans 2000). To help understand what foreign policy actions by governments are likely to prove controversial, we argue that the policy preferences of opposition elites and groups in territorial disputes are often characterized by what we term a pragmatic nationalist bias. That is, a policy of unilateral concessions by state leaders in a territorial dispute is a policy that generally risks greater domestic political opposition than a policy of continued diplomatic stalemate. Furthermore, although the threat or use of military force in support of territorial claims is likely to generate short-term domestic support, costly or failed

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attempts at military coercion will also mobilize domestic opposition. Opposition elites and mass publics therefore do not generally hold more dovish diplomatic and military policy preferences than incumbent leaders. Instead, they simply seek to punish leaders who adopt controversial or failed foreign policies.3
Premise 3: Differences in domestic political institutions lead to varying levels of political accountability. The accountability of state leaders varies across and within political systems because differences in political institutions affect the ability of opposition groups to contest government policies.

We expand on this third premise with two specific claims. First, we believe that democratic leaders are typically more accountable for their foreign policy choices. This is because political opposition in democratic regimes is generally more capable of derailing policy programs and removing leaders from power (Bienen and van de Walle 1992; Gelpi and Grieco 2001; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995) due to institutions such as well-organized and independent political parties, regular competitive elections, and independent legislatures. Second, the degree of political accountability among democratic leaders can vary depending on political conditions. In particular, we believe two factorselection cycles and differences in the strength of opposition parties in legislaturesaffect the degree to which democratic leaders are accountable at any point in time (e.g., Alt and King 1994; Lohmann and OHalloran 1994; Martin 2000; Milner 1997; Powell 2000).
Premise 4: The impact of political vulnerability on foreign policy. The greater the political vulnerability of leaders, the higher the political costs to leaders for pursuing controversial or unsuccessful foreign policy actions.

We believe that this fourth premise provides insights into bluffing and deception in international disputes. Because bluffing is always a possibility in international disputes, state leaders try to judge whether their adversary is in fact bluffing (e.g., Fearon 1994b). Leaders who are less vulnerable to political opposition should be more willing to bluff because the domestic political risks of retreating from a clear and firm diplomatic or military policy are less extensive.
HYPOTHESES ON COMPARISONS ACROSS POLITICAL SYSTEMS

We now turn to a series of hypotheses that draw on the theoretical framework we have presented. In this first section, we focus on comparisons between democratic and nondemocratic regimes.
Hypothesis 1a: The leaders of democratic states should be less willing to rely on military force to achieve territorial goals. As a result, democratic leaders should be
3. We are not convinced that mass opinions are consistently anchored at dovish policy positions, nor do we accept the claim that the foreign policy preferences in the mass public are consistently more dovish than the preferences of incumbent political elites (e.g., Gaubatz 1995; Holsti 1996; Nincic 1992, chap. 2; Page and Shapiro 1992).

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(a) less likely to initiate military threats as opposed to accepting the status quo, but more likely to challenge the territorial status quo with a call for negotiations rather than a threat of military force, (b) more likely to make concessions in negotiations, (c) less likely to resort to higher levels of escalation in military confrontations.

Because we argue that political opposition in authoritarian systems is less capable of effectively contesting state policies (see our discussion of premise 3), we expect political leaders from such countries to be more willing to adopt more conflictual policies in an attempt to overturn the territorial status quo by coercive threats and pressure. Such leaders are not only more willing to escalate the level of force, but they can also back away from threats with fewer domestic political costs if the target stands firm (see our discussion of premise 4). Therefore, we should expect more frequent bluffs and military probes by nondemocratic leaders to test the resolve of targets, including more frequent threats of force to bolster their bargaining position in negotiations. In contrast, democratic leaders should be more cautious about initiating such military actions because limited military probes and bluffs should carry a greater likelihood of political opponents charging the government with irresolution and a foreign policy setback. Democratic leaders generally prefer a nonviolent settlement through negotiations because they view any possible military conflict as potentially more costly than their nondemocratic counterparts. As a result, although we do believe that territorial concessions can be politically costly for democratic leaders, the generally higher expected political costs of threatening and using military force should induce democratic leaders to rely more frequently on offering limited concessions as part of a negotiating strategy designed to achieve an agreement based on reciprocal compromise.
Hypothesis 1b: The greater domestic audience costs of retreating in the face of diplomatic and military pressure can provide a bargaining advantage to democratic states. As a result, we expect leaders to be (a) less likely to challenge the status quo with military threats against democratic target states, (b) more likely to offer concessions in negotiations when democratic adversaries strongly signal their resolve to stand firm, (c) less likely to escalate to higher levels in military confrontations when democratic adversaries strongly signal their resolve to use military force.

The logic of hypothesis 1b is that if adversaries know that democratic leaders are constrained by domestic audience costs to avoid foreign policy retreats under diplomatic or military pressure, then they should prefer to target nondemocratic leaders, who have greater domestic political flexibility to back down in the face of military threats and probes. Furthermore, the greater costs of backing down should help democratic leaders to send more credible signals of resolve in rounds of negotiations or in military confrontations. As a result, if democratic leaders clearly and publicly communicate their intention to stand firm in talks or to use force in a military confrontation, then their adversaries should believe that they face a resolved opponent and should adopt less confrontational policies (see Fearon 1994b; Schultz 2001a, 2001b).

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The next two hypotheses build on the general logic supporting hypothesis 1a, but now we focus on the unwillingness of democratic leaders to offer concessions when domestic political costs are expected to be high.
Hypothesis 2a: The bargaining strategies of nondemocratic leaders in response to stalemates should be more variable and difficult to predict. In contrast, democratic leaders should pursue more consistent policies of (a) responding to a deadlock in talks by continuing to seek further talks as opposed to turning to military coercion, but (b) avoiding a sharp reversal of policy in subsequent negotiations, in which intransigence is followed by concessions.

In nondemocracies, the limited ability of political opposition to challenge incumbent leaders lessens the political costs for such leaders of either making concessions or turning to military coercion. Thus, nondemocratic leaders should display more divergent patterns of diplomatic and military behavior in deciding how to respond to a situation of deadlocked negotiations. Democratic counterparts, however, have less flexibility in their bargaining position because unilateral or high levels of concessions are potentially quite costly once negotiations have already ended in deadlock. This is because we expect both parties to publicly blame the other side for the prior deadlock in talks. As a result, negotiations in context of continued stalemate become a much more salient issue domestically for democratic leaders, and opposition elites and segments of public opinion are likely to be very critical of offering concessions to a truculent adversary (see our discussion of the pragmatic nationalist bias associated with premise 2). Threats of military force and coercive bluffing are also potentially more costly for democratic leaders. Therefore, we expect such leaders to be wary of turning to military threats or offering concessions as way to break a stalemate. The next hypothesis argues that the greater accountability of democratic leaders under certain conditions can induce such leaders to adopt more conflictual diplomatic and military policies.
Hypothesis 2b: When ethnic conationals populate disputed territory, democratic leaders will face stronger domestic pressures to adopt hard-line policies than their nondemocratic counterparts. As a result, democratic leaders should be (a) more likely to challenge the status quo with calls for talks and military threats and especially likely to favor military threats over a reliance on negotiations, (b) less likely to make concessions in negotiations, (c) more likely to escalate military confrontations to high levels.

On the basis of earlier findings by Huth (1996) and Saideman (2001), we generally expect incumbent leaders in all political systems to secure domestic support for backing demands of greater political self-determination when ethnic conationals are located across international borders in disputed territory. However, we argue further that democratic leaders will face particularly strong pressures from domestic opposition groups and public opinion to take forceful initiatives to challenge the status quo and support their ethnic conationals. We expect the defense of principles of political

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self-determination to have a high level of legitimacy in democratic systems. Therefore, opposition elites and mass publics will take advantage of their greater ability to apply political pressure to push for supporting the political rights of ethnic conationals in disputed territory. For democratic leaders, the domestic political costs of diplomatic and military inaction in such circumstances are greater, and thus they are actually more likely to consider initiating and escalating military threats and to adopt unyielding positions in negotiations.
HYPOTHESES ON COMPARISONS WITHIN DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEMS

In this section, we present hypotheses that focus on comparisons among democratic regimes. Our primary argument is that varying levels of political accountability are linked to electoral cycles and differences in the strength of opposition parties in legislatures and parliaments.
Hypothesis 3a: The presence of strong political opposition forces in legislatures and parliaments generally induces more conservative foreign policy choices by democratic leaders. On the other hand, the stronger the ruling governments position in the legislature, the more likely political leaders are (a) to challenge the territorial status quo with calls for talks and threats of force, especially through the use of threats of military force; (b) to make concessions in negotiations; (c) to resort to higher levels of escalation in military confrontations. Hypothesis 3b: As the strength of the ruling governments position in the legislature of a democratic adversary increases, leaders are (a) less likely to challenge the territorial status quo with threats of military force and instead to favor negotiations, (b) more likely to make concessions in negotiations, (c) less likely to resort to higher levels of escalation in military confrontations.

Weak party support (e.g., divided government or minority government) should push democratic leaders away from an active foreign policy and toward the maintenance of the status quo. This is because the lack of a cohesive majority in the legislature should make a president or prime minister wary of diplomatic or military initiatives. For one, the executive is likely to lack bargaining flexibility in international negotiations, and therefore stalemate is more likely because a settlement is unlikely to be based only on the other states unilateral concessions. The same logic applies to decisions to initiate militarized disputes. The political costs of a military setback or the failure to achieve diplomatic gains as a result of coercive pressure (military probes and bluffs) are higher because opposition parties are in a stronger position in the legislature or parliament to criticize failed government policies and more credibly threaten a vote of no confidence (for prime ministers). However, if these constrained leaders do challenge the status quo by initiating negotiations or military threats, then they will seek to avoid the high political costs associated with either accommodative policies (substantial concessions in negotiations) or war (military setback following escalation to high levels).

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In contrast, when the executives party commands a majority position in the legislature, then opposition parties should be in a much weaker position to (a) veto the terms of international agreements they dislike, (b) ensure criticism through legislative debate and hearings, and (c) threaten removal in the event of a diplomatic or military retreat. As a result, democratic leaders with greater political security should be more willing to pursue controversial policies such as making concessions in negotiations or initiating and escalating military confrontations. In hypothesis 3b, we argue that secure democratic governments are more likely to be the targets of calls for talks based on the expectation that they can offer concessions and still secure domestic ratification. It follows, then, that adversaries will view secure democratic governments as more politically capable partners for trying to achieve a negotiated settlement. The important task for a countrys leaders is to calculate the most opportune time to put offers of concessions on the negotiating table that will be reciprocated by their negotiating partner. Political leaders do not want to incur the political heat at home for offering concessions unless they believe their negotiating partner can withstand the same type of domestic political pressure in their battle for ratification and approval of any agreement. If leaders expect a negotiated agreement to unravel due to domestic opposition in the other country, then they have few incentives to expose themselves politically to charges of selling out from their own domestic opposition. Because of the greater political flexibility of secure democratic leaders, one might argue that such leaders are more likely to be targets of threats and higher levels of escalation. The argument would be that if opponents know that secure democratic leaders are better able to fight off domestic opposition following a military retreat, then these opponents should be more willing to probe, bluff, and even escalate. Although this logic is plausible, we emphasize the military risks associated with gambling that a secure leadership in another country will back down under military pressure or accept a limited military defeat. We would only expect risk-acceptant states to gamble by challenging secure adversaries, yet we do not think that most states are consistently risk acceptant in this way. The next set of hypotheses considers the effects of elections on foreign policy choices.
Hypothesis 4a: The more recently national elections have been held, the more likely are incumbent leaders to (a) challenge the territorial status quo, especially through a threat of military action; (b) make concessions in negotiations; (c) resort to higher levels of escalation in military confrontations. Hypothesis 4b: The more recently national elections have been held in a democratic state, the more likely are adversaries of that democratic state to (a) challenge the territorial status quo with calls for talks instead of threats of military action, (b) make concessions in negotiations, (c) avoid higher levels of escalation in military confrontations.

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Competitive elections and the threat of electoral defeat can be powerful sources of political accountability for democratic leaders. Opposition parties and elites can be expected to draw on controversial issues and setbacks in foreign policy to try to convince voters that incumbents should be removed. International agreements containing territorial concessions or failed military initiatives to change the territorial status quo are the types of foreign policy issues that opposition groups should seize on in an effort to discredit incumbents. Because leaders are aware of the electoral risks associated with such policies, we should expect a pattern to emerge between the timing of elections and the diplomatic and military policies pursued by leaders in territorial disputes. In hypothesis 4a, the logic is that the accountability induced by elections should be greater when democratic leaders expect to face elections relatively soon.4 In contrast, when elections are not expected for some time, then the threat of electoral defeat should have weaker political effects (e.g., Gaubatz 1999; Milner and Rosendorff 1997). Therefore, the more recently national elections have been held, the more willing incumbents should be to adopt an active foreign policy in which they seek negotiations or threaten the use of force in an attempt to change the status quo. Furthermore, democratic leaders should be more willing to make concessions in negotiations and resort to higher levels of escalation in military confrontations in the periods shortly after national elections. Precisely because democratic leaders are less constrained in the period shortly after elections and more capable of withstanding the political fallout of more accommodative policies, we argue in hypothesis 4b that other states will recognize this and judge this to be a favorable time to seek a negotiated agreement based on the logic we developed in support of hypothesis 3b. As a result, it makes political sense for state leaders to offer concessions to democratic negotiators when they believe that democratic leaders are less constrained by the political risks of concession making (i.e., elections are not expected to be held soon). Conversely, when democratic leaders face upcoming elections, they should shy away from territorial concessions in negotiations. Knowing this, adversaries should be less willing to offer concessions themselves. When we consider the effects of recent elections in a democratic adversary on the choices of state leaders to initiate or escalate the use of military force, we encounter the same opposing arguments about what to expect as discussed above for hypothesis 3b. Again, although it is possible that other states might be tempted to initiate and escalate military challenges against democratic governments that have recently held elections in an attempt to pressure secure leaders into making territorial concessions by military bluffs or the use of force, we believe this is a quite risky strategy. Instead, we argue that adversaries would be less likely to initiate and escalate military confrontations because they are worried that politically secure democratic leaders are more willing to risk a military conflict to defend their territorial claims.
4. Of course, in presidential systems, the time period between elections is fixed and thus known in advance. In parliamentary systems, elections must be held within a certain period of time, but exactly when they will be held is likely to be a function of a range of political conditions. Despite the greater uncertainty facing leaders in such a situation, the general logic of the argument still holds. Once elections have occurred, they are unlikely to be held again within a short period of time.

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HYPOTHESES ON COMPARISONS AMONG DYADS

In this last section, the hypotheses focus on the political institutions of both challenger and target and how they influence patterns of strategic interaction.
Hypothesis 5: Lower levels of diplomatic and military conflict are expected in territorial disputes between two democratic states. As a result, state leaders in democratic dyads should be (a) less likely to initiate military challenges and more likely to seek negotiations, (b) more likely to make concessions in negotiations over disputed territory, (c) less likely to resort to higher levels of escalation in military conflicts over disputed territory.

The logic of hypothesis 5 extends the reasoning presented in support of hypothesis 1a by considering the effects of high levels of political accountability in both challenger and target states. When foreign policy leaders in both states face political opposition forces that are in relatively strong positions to hold them responsible for pursuing policies in territorial disputes that prove controversial or fail, we should expect decision makers to be particularly wary of the political costs associated with active military policies. As a result, democratic leaders should be worried about the political dangers that crises and the large-scale use of military force entail (i.e., the audience costs to be borne for backing down or suffering high losses in a war), and each side should be less inclined to initiate military threats. Instead of relying on military threats and coercion, democratic leaders should turn to negotiations more frequently. Nevertheless, the political costs of conceding territory should compel democratic negotiators to avoid unilateral concessions and instead to favor mutual compromise as a way to secure domestic support for a territorial settlement despite criticism by political opponents who reject any territorial concessions. The next hypothesis considers diplomatic and military interactions in territorial disputes between mixed dyads (i.e., disputes between a democratic and an authoritarian state).
Hypothesis 6a: In mixed dyads, military confrontations generally result from nondemocratic challengers threatening democratic targets. Hypothesis 6b: In mixed dyads, the resort to high levels of escalation in a military confrontation is most likely by nondemocratic leaders against democratic adversaries.

The argument of hypotheses 6a and 6b is that in territorial disputes between democratic and nondemocratic states, it is the decisions of nondemocratic leaders that typically lead to military confrontations and higher levels of military escalation. The logic centers on the more limited political costs that nondemocratic leaders face both in initiating military probes and bluffs and resorting to the large-scale use of force (see our discussion of premises 3 and 4). As a result, if military conflict is frequent within mixed dyads, the primary explanation is not that democratic states often adopt aggressive policies or that democratic states are targeted because they are vulnerable to

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coercive pressure. Rather, military conflict occurs because nondemocratic states are less constrained in initiating and escalating the use of force.

ESTIMATION AND RESULTS Now we examine the performance of the political accountability model as an explanation for the behavior of states during the various stages of territorial disputes. We should note that when we test each variant of the political accountability model, we also include in the statistical model a number of common control variables that attempt to capture the international strategic environment in which states interact. These variables include measures of common security ties, the value of the disputed territory, the military balance between the two states, and each states involvement in other militarized disputes.5 Once again, we are interested in three decisions: (1) the decision of challenger states regarding whether and how to challenge the territorial status quo, (2) the decisions of both challengers and targets to offer concessions during rounds of talks over the disputed territory, and (3) the decisions of challengers and targets to escalate initial military confrontations by resorting to higher levels of force. We investigate these different stages and test our hypotheses through a series of quantitative tests using our data set on 348 territorial disputes that span the period from 1919 to 1995. It is useful to begin by describing a few features of our data. First, we pinpoint the outcomes and dates of all rounds of talks and all military confrontations between the challenger and target in each dispute, and then we measure all such actions on a monthspecific basis. Instead of using an annual observation to summarize the outcomes of any talks or military confrontations that might have taken place during that year, we let the actual rounds of negotiations and military confrontations serve as the units of observation. This allows us to identify and code multiple foreign policy actions over disputed territory that take place within a given year.6 Because the actual episodes themselves serve as the unit of analysis, we are able to more easily accommodate situations in which a given round of negotiations or military confrontation spills over into the next year (see Bennett and Stam 2000). Furthermore, nearly all explanatory variables in our data set are also measured in a month-specific manner. This allows us to more accurately capture the timing of important events, such as any foreign policy initiatives concerning the disputed territory. We can also pinpoint more precisely the timing of important domestic political shiftssuch as elections, changes in domestic coalitions, or broader changes in regime typethat take place within a given year. The
5. See Huth and Allee (2002, chap. 3) for a more detailed description of these international political and military variables. 6. In our data set, there are 211 instances in which multiple foreign policy initiatives concerning disputed territory are initiated within the same year. For example, two states might hold talks twice in 1 year, or a pair of states might engage in negotiations over disputed territory in March, only to see the challenger mobilize troops against the target in October.

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month-specific nature of our data also ensures that the sequencing of important events is captured accurately. Although we employ a different statistical model for the status quo stage as opposed to the negotiation and military escalation stages, several model estimation features are common across the three stages. First, for each stage, we estimate three separate statistical models to test the various hypotheses from the political accountability model. These three models mirror the distinctions between accountabilitybased arguments we made in the earlier theoretical section. We estimate an acrossregimes model, a within-regimes model, and then a dyadic model. Dividing the estimation in this manner makes the most sense conceptually and is the most effective way to test such a wide range of arguments. When estimating each model, we also include the set of international political-military variables described at the beginning of this section. Furthermore, due to the nonlinear nature of all of our models, we also present a series of predicted probability results to provide a more substantive interpretation of variable effects (see Tables 4, 8, and 12). We estimate the impact of discrete changes in particular variables on the predicted probability of certain outcomes by holding all other variables constant. Although the coefficient results for each econometric model generally provide a basic sense of the estimated direction and significance of hypothesized relationships, these predicted probability results are often more substantively meaningful. Finally, we estimate all models using Huber or robust standard errors due to concerns with possible contemporaneous correlation and nonconstant variances across the units of observation.7
ESTIMATION OF THE CHALLENGE THE STATUS QUO STAGE

Our first question concerns the decision of challenger states to initiate diplomatic or military actions in pursuit of their countrys claims to disputed territory. There are three distinct options available to the leaders of challenger states: (1) refrain from any initiatives and maintain the status quo, (2) propose talks and rely on negotiations in an attempt the alter the status quo, and (3) resort to threats of military force in support of territorial claims. Because these three choices are not clearly ordered, we require a model that treats outcomes as nominal instead of ordinal (Long 1997, chap. 6). As a result, we estimate a series of multinomial logit models to explain the decisions of leaders in the challenge the status quo stage. The primary drawback of multinomial logit is the fairly restrictive independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption. However, we employ the two best-known tests for the IIA assumption and find no evidence to reject IIA in any of our models.8
7. Because the observations in our data set span different numbers of months, we are especially sensitive to concerns with heteroscedasticity. 8. The independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption is met when an individuals preferences among alternatives remain consistent regardless of which choices are or are not available (see McFadden 1981). We employ both the Hausman and the Small-Hsiao tests to examine the IIA assumption (Hausman and McFadden 1984; Small and Hsiao 1985). In all cases, we perform the tests after first eliminating the option of negotiations and then the option of military force. At times, we obtain a negative chi-square statistic, which Hausman and McFadden (1984, 1226) claim should be interpreted as evidence that IIA has not been violated.

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We end up with 6,542 observations for the challenge the status quo stage. There are 1,782 cases in which a challenger initiates a round of talks and 390 cases in which a challenger initiates the use of force. For operational purposes, information on independent variables for the challenge the status quo stage is drawn from the month in which the challenger initiates a militarized confrontation or a round of talks begins. Cases in which the challenger does not challenge the status quo are more difficult to conceptualize and operationalize. We use a 12-month rule, which holds that if 12 months have elapsed since a challenger state has threatened force or called for talks, then it is considered to have done nothing during that period of time. That period is then included in the data set as a case in which no challenge was made.9 Each successive 12 months of activity is treated in the same way until the state once again calls for a new round of talks or threatens force.10 Finally, the temporal structure of the data also raises some concerns about serial correlation. In the spirit of Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998), we include a variable to count the number of months since the challenger last undertook some activitywhether it was a call for talks or threat of force (see also Beck 1998). This variable serves primarily as a control for the impact of time and past history on decisions to challenge the status quo.
RESULTS FOR THE CHALLENGE THE STATUS QUO STAGE

The multinomial logit results are presented in Tables 1 through 3. In each of these models, we set the choice to accept the status quo as the baseline category, which generates results that compare the options of doing nothing versus both pursuing negotiations and initiating force. However, because we also care about the choice between challenging through talks versus force, we also present results for this direct comparison.11 Tables 1 through 3 contain three columns of coefficient results that compare each choice to the remaining two options. The impact of discrete changes in hypothesized variables on the probability of calls for negotiations and threats of force is summarized in Table 4. We first examine the results of the political accountability model hypotheses (see Tables 1-3). In sum, the very clear overall conclusion we draw is that democratic leaders are much less likely to turn to threats of force in attempt to change the territorial status quo and are considerably more likely to challenge the territorial status quo by calling for negotiations. These results hold in both the monadic and dyadic contexts and
9. In this case, we randomly sample one of the months during this period of no challenge and include it as an observation in the operational challenge the status quo stage data set. 10. We also consider and employ a number of additional specifications for the decision not to challenge. One option is to use a modified version of the 12-month rule, in which case the 12-month rule is used for up to 5 years after some action and 3 or fewer years before some observable action. The logic is that states are only likely to actively consider contesting territory when the territorial issue is salient as opposed to dormant. Yet another strategy is to randomly sample periods of inactivity from the months in which no action was taken. We include varying numbers of random no-challenge cases and find only negligible differences based on the number of random observations included. As a result, we find the results for the challenge the status quo stage to be remarkably stable regardless of the coding rule we employ for including observations in which no challenge was made. 11. The comparison of talks versus force is a straightforward transformation of the same model (see Liao 1994).

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TABLE 1

Multinomial Logit Model of Challenger Decisions to Challenge the Status Quo: Political Accountability ModelComparing Differences across Regimes
Talks vs. No Action Political accountability across-regimes variables Challenger democracy level Target democracy level Challenger Democracy Stalemate Control for recent stalemate Challenger Democracy Ethnic Ties Control for ethnic ties International politics variables Common security ties Strategic value of territory Challenger involved in other dispute Target involved in other dispute Military balance Months since last challenge Constant Force vs. No Action Force vs. Talks

.018 (.006) .002 (.004) .003 (.010) .450*** (.127) .015 (.008) .144 (.099) .050 (.063) .196 (.067) .101 (.074) .020 (.068) .012 (.125) .006 (.001) .755*** (.088)

.056 (.012) .005 (.008) .014 (.018) .332 (.209) .049 (.016) .258 (.169) .431 (.130) .365 (.119) .503*** (.126) .322 (.129) 1.48 (.218) .016 (.003) 3.22*** (.199)

.074 (.013) .003 (.008) .011 (.018) .119 (.216) .034 (.016) .114 (.180)

.381 (.135) .168 (.125) .603*** (.133) .342 (.135) 1.49 (.230) .009*** (.003) 2.47*** (.205)

NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses. N = 6,542. Log likelihood = 4796.27. Hausman test for inde2 pendence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA): drop talks: = 7.88 (df = 13), p = .85, do not reject IIA; drop force: 2 = .22 (df = 13), do not reject IIA. Small-Hsiao test for IIA: drop talks: 2 = 11.08 (df = 13), p = .61, do not reject IIA; drop force: 2 = 13.32 (df = 13), p = .42, do not reject IIA. ***p < .01, two-tailed. p < .10, one-tailed. p < .05, one-tailed. p < .01, one-tailed.

suggest that democracies are not more passive; they simply choose the route of negotiations to pursue their territorial claims. We also see that democracies tend to propose negotiations right after elections have been held in either state, and in some scenarios, democratic leaders actually become more likely to turn to force when there may be domestic political benefits for doing so. First, we find strong support for the broad democratic peace argument that democracies are less likely to use force (hypotheses 1a and 5). In our model, democracies are less likely to turn to force than to accept the status quo or call for talks. The coefficients comparing force with other options are negative and statistically significant for both

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TABLE 2

Multinomial Logit Model of Challenger Decisions to Contest the Territorial Status Quo: Political Accountability Model Comparing Differences within Democratic Regimes
Talks vs. No Action Political accountability within-regimes variables Strength of challenger ruling coalition Strength of target ruling coalition Months since elections in challenger Recent elections in target Control for challenger democracy Control for target democracy International politics variables Common security ties Strategic value of territory Challenger involved in other dispute Target involved in other dispute Military balance Months since last challenge Constant Force vs. No Action Force vs. Talks

.001 (.003) .001 (.002) .008 (.003) .219 (.092) .670*** (.204) .075 (.168) .101 (.063) .157 (.066) .109 (.074) .041 (.067) .076 (.124) .007 (.001) .581*** (.080)

.010 (.010) .004 (.005) .011 (.007) .002 (.194) .949* (.624) .155 (.363) .528 (.126) .315 (.116) .480*** (.125) .369 (.129) 1.25 (.214) .017 (.003) 2.35*** (.157)

.011 (.010) .005 (.006) .002 (.007) .221 (.202) 1.62*** (.632) .229 (.378) .428 (.132) .158 (.122) .589*** (.133) .410 (.136) 1.32 (.228) .010*** (.003) 1.77*** (.164)

NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses. N = 6,542. Log likelihood = 4830.15. Hausman test for inde2 pendence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA): drop talks: = 6.49 (df = 13), p = .93, do not reject IIA; drop force: 2 = .13 (df = 13), do not reject IIA. Small-Hsiao test for IIA: drop talks: 2 = 18.98 (df = 13), p = .12, do not reject IIA; drop force: 2 = 18.55 (df = 13), p = .14, do not reject IIA. *p < .10, two-tailed. ***p < .01, two-tailed. p < .10, one-tailed. p < .01, one-tailed.

democratic challengers (see Table 1) and democratic challengers in democratic dyads (see Table 3).12 The substantive differences across regimes are striking. Very nondemocratic challengers are more than three times more likely to issue threats of force than very democratic challengers (see Table 4). Similarly, challengers in nondemocratic dyads are more than two-and-a-half times as likely to issue threats of force to pursue territorial claims than are challengers in democratic dyads (see Table 4). These general
12. These results for monadic and dyadic democracy remain strong under a variety of model specifications, including when we omit the various interaction terms that include a democracy component.

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TABLE 3

Multinomial Logit Model of Challenger Decisions to Contest the Territorial Status Quo: Political Accountability ModelComparing Differences across Dyads
Talks vs. No Action Political accountability dyadic variables Democratic dyads Nondemocratic state in mixed dyad Control for mixed dyad International politics variables Common security ties Strategic value of territory Challenger involved in other dispute Target involved in other dispute Military balance Months since last challenge Constant Force vs. No Action Force vs. Talks

.477 (.094) .304*** (.104) .322*** (.092) .105 (.062) .162 (.066) .110 (.074) .038 (.068) .089 (.124) .007 (.001) .563*** (.081)

.876 (.246) .426 (.215) .467** (.186)

1.35 (.251) .730 (.224) .789*** (.193) .445 (.132) .166 (.122) .590*** (.132) .408 (.136) 1.33 (.227) .010*** (.003) 1.81*** (.164)

.550 (.126) .328 (.116) .479*** (.124) .370 (.129) 1.24 (.214) .017 (.003) 2.37*** (.157)

NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses. N = 6,542. Log likelihood = 4830.15. Hausman test for independence for irrelevant alternatives (IIA): drop talks: 2 = 5.97 (df = 10), p = .82, do not reject IIA; drop force: 2 = .19 (df = 10), do not reject IIA. Small-Hsiao test for IIA: drop talks: 2 = 11.53 (df = 10), p = .32, do not reject IIA; drop force: 2 = 12.27 (df = 10), p = .27, do not reject IIA. **p < .05, two-tailed. ***p < .01, two-tailed. p < .10, one-tailed. p < .05, one-tailed. p < .01, one-tailed.

patterns also apply to mixed dyads (hypothesis 6a). A nondemocratic challenger in a mixed dyad is more than 65% more likely to turn to force than a democratic challenger in a mixed dyad (see Table 4). However, democracies in general are much more likely to turn to negotiations in an attempt to change the territorial status quo (hypotheses 1a and 5). This result also holds across both the monadic and dyadic specifications. The coefficients that compare talks both with accepting the status quo and threatening force are in the predicted direction and statistically significant (see Tables 1 and 3). Substantively, democratic challengers are nearly 35% more likely to call for negotiations than nondemocratic challengers, and challengers in democratic dyads are more than 41% more likely to issue calls for negotiations than challengers in nondemocratic dyads (see Table 4). One interesting result from the across-regimes model (see Table 1) is that democracies are in fact willing to turn to force when they share ethnic ties with those who populate the disputed territory (hypothesis 2b). When the disputed territory is populated

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TABLE 4

The Impact of Selected Significant Variables on Challenger Decisions to Contest the Status Quo through Calls for Negotiations or Threats of Force (in percentages)
Initial Probability Probability of calls for negotiations Challenger democracy (very nondemocratic very democratic) Challenger Democracy Ethnic Ties (very nondemocratic very democratic) Time since elections in challenger (elections 6 months ago elections 4 years ago) Recent election in target (no yes) Democratic dyad (nondemocratic dyad democratic dyad) Strategic value of territory (no yes) Probability of threats of force Challenger democracy (very nondemocratic very democratic) Challenger Democracy Ethnic Ties (very nondemocratic very democratic) Time since elections in challenger (elections 6 months ago elections 4 years ago) Democratic dyad (change from a nondemocratic dyad) Nondemocratic challenger in mixed dyad (change from a democratic challenger in mixed dyad) Strategic value of territory (no yes) Security ties (no common TD opponent common TD opponent) Military balance (1 to 10 disadvantage 10 to 1 advantage) Postchange Probability Change in % Change in Probabilities Probabilities

26.7 27.0

36.0 30.2

+9.3 +3.2

+34.8 +11.9

42.5 28.7 29.4 26.9

34.7 33.3 41.6 30.4

7.8 +4.6 +12.2 +3.5

18.4 +16.0 +41.5 +13.0

8.1 6.5

2.5 14.4

5.6 +7.9

69.1 +121.5

3.5 6.5

2.6 2.4

0.9 4.1

25.7 63.1

3.8 3.8 5.1 3.3

6.3 5.1 3.4 10.3

+2.5 +1.3 1.7 +7.0

+65.8 +34.2 33.3 +212.1

NOTE: Unless specified otherwise, the territory is considered to be of strategic value to both states, the military balance is 3:2 in favor of the target, and democratic governments are assumed to hold a 55% legislative majority and to have won an election 2 years ago. All other variables are set to median values. TD = territorial dispute.

with ethnic conationals, democratic challengers now become more than twice as likely to threaten force compared with nondemocratic challengers (see Table 4). According to our data, democratic leaders in such scenarios stand a 14.4% probability of threatening force, whereas nondemocratic leaders are predicted to threaten force only 6.5% of the time.13
13. These probabilities represent the impact of democracy only in the presence of ethnic ties, removing the impact of democracy in any other way. All other democracy-based interaction term probabilities are examined in a similar manner.

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Among democratic states, electoral cycles (hypotheses 4a and 4b) also help explain when challengers are likely to challenge the territorial status quo, especially by turning to negotiations (see Table 2). Many of the hypothesized relationships about the impact of election timing are significant and in the predicted direction. As challenger states begin to approach elections, they become more conservative and less likely to issue any form of territorial challenge. Democratic leaders in challenger states are nearly 20% less likely to call for negotiations near the end of an electoral cycle and 25% less likely to threaten force to pursue territorial claims when they face upcoming elections. Similarly, the electoral cycle in target states also affects the challengers calculations. Challengers are 16% more likely to pursue talks right after the target has recently held an election as opposed to when the target is nearing a general election. We now turn to the results for the control variables relating to international political-military conditions. The impact of these variables is robust across the three different specifications of the political accountability model (see Tables 1-3).14 On the whole, these variables provide a strong explanation for decisions by challengers to employ threats of force to pursue their territorial claims, yet they say very little about challenger decisions to use negotiations to address territorial claims. Four of the five variables regarding threats of military force receive strong support. In general, military threats to the territorial status quo are more likely when the territory has strategic value, the military balance favors the challenger, and the target is currently involved in another militarized dispute. For example, challengers are 34% more likely to turn to military force in at attempt to acquire strategically valuable territory. In addition, challengers are more than three times as likely to threaten force to acquire disputed territory when they have a sizable military advantage compared with situations in which they are at a significant military disadvantage (see Table 4). On the other hand, challengers are less likely to issues coercive challenges to the territorial status quo when they share common security ties with the target. In fact, the likelihood of a military challenge drops by one-third when the two states are in other territorial disputes with a common opponent (see Table 4).
ESTIMATION OF THE NEGOTIATION AND ESCALATION STAGES

If the challenger decides to challenge the status quo either through a call for negotiations or a threat of force, our analysis shifts to examining the outcomes of these rounds of talks and military confrontations, respectively. Unlike the challenge the status quo stage, here we consider decisions made by both the challenger and the target. However, we do not analyze rounds of talks and militarized disputes dyadically or attempt to code or explain a joint outcome for a pair of states. Instead, we code a separate outcome (either degree of concessions or level of escalation) for both the challenger and target. This allows us to understand how particular variables affect the
14. As a general rule, for purposes of consistency, we use the estimated results from the acrossregimes version of the political accountability model to interpret the significance of the international political-military variables and calculate the impact of changes in these variables on the predicted probability of the various outcomes of interest.

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decision-making calculus of each state. The difficult task, however, is to find a way to consider challenger and target decisions separately, yet to incorporate the fact that the two states decisions are related (Signorino 1999; Smith 1999).15 We believe that a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model provides a useful way to estimate the separate but interrelated decisions of two states in a dispute.16 In fact, this version of the bivariate probit model provides a unique set of estimates for both the challenger and target, yet it incorporates the correlation between the disturbances of the two states equations and provides an estimate of the magnitude of this relationship.17 Therefore, we estimate a series of bivariate probit models to examine the behavior of both challengers and targets during rounds of talks or militarized disputes. We should note a few additional issues regarding the operationalization and estimation of the negotiation and escalation stages. Because conditions may change during the course of a lengthy round of negotiations or a protracted military conflict, the data for the observations used in the estimation of these two stages are drawn from the last month of each episode.18 This serves to update changes in the data from the beginning of the episode. In addition, the number of observations for the negotiation and escalation stages is slightly lower than the corresponding number of calls for talks and threats of force found in the challenge the status quo stage. This can be attributed to the fact that in some disputes, both states have territorial claims, and both can be considered challengers. In a handful of status quo stage cases, it is not possible to determine which state initiated the round of talks or military action, and therefore both states are coded as having challenged the territorial status quo. For the negotiation and escalation stage analysis, then, one of these two observations is randomly dropped from the data set. A final point is that the analysis of outcomes of talks and militarized disputes raises possible concerns with selection bias because a challengers decision to offer concessions or escalate force could be linked to its initial choice in the challenge the status quo stage. As a result, we also estimate a Heckman or censored probit model for the challenger to examine whether factors that affect a challengers decision to call for talks or threaten force are also related to its subsequent decision regarding whether to make concessions in talks or escalate force (Heckman 1979). In nearly all cases, there is little evidence of selection effects biasing our results. Nevertheless, we do note a few instances in which the impact of particular variables on challenger concession and escalation decisions is affected somewhat once we account for the impact of such variables on the selection equation.
15. The use of directed dyads is one way to analyze the behavior of two disputants, yet the two directional observations are not independent, and the disturbances across the two observations are likely to be correlated. 16. See Greene (1997, 906-11) for a general discussion of bivariate probit and Smith (1999) for a specific discussion of bivariate models and the interrelatedness of state decisions. 17. Bivariate probit is sometimes used as a method for estimating two potentially interrelated decisions of the same actor (see Reed 2000). Yet bivariate probit is also an appropriate method for modeling the related actions of two separate actors (see Zorn 2002). 18. Recall that the data used to explain challenger decisions to challenge the status quo are taken from the beginning month of the round of talks or militarized dispute, when the actual challenge was first made.

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RESULTS FOR THE NEGOTIATION STAGE

We now examine the decisions of challenger and target states to offer concessions in negotiations over disputed territory. In total, there are 1,528 rounds of negotiations in our data set. Concessions are offered by challengers in 37% of the cases (568/1,528) and by targets in just under 36% of cases (545/1,528). Because the prevailing policy is to refrain from offering concessions, we are particularly interested to see when states actually become willing to offer concessions. Once again, we estimate three variants of the political accountability model. Our general conclusion is that control variables for international political-military conditions provide little explanation for the decisions that states make regarding negotiations over disputed territory. To understand why states make concessions during talks over disputed territory, we must examine leaders domestic political motivations for making concessions. In fact, many of the accountability-based hypotheses that focus on differences both across regimes and within democratic regimes receive considerable support as explanations for negotiation behavior. There is also considerable support for the use of the bivariate probit models. Each of the three accountability-based models produces a statistically significant rho of approximately .85, which indicates that the challenger and target escalation decisions are highly correlated.19 Furthermore, the three Heckman probit equations generate small and statistically insignificant estimates of rho, which allays our concerns with possible selection bias.20 In fact, none of the statistically significant estimated relationships from the bivariate probit models are called into question by coefficient estimates from the Heckman selection models. We present the challenger results from the three bivariate probit models in Tables 5 through 7. Table 8 contains predicted probability estimates of the impact of discrete changes in hypothesized independent variables. The hypothesis that democracies are typically more likely to make concessions (hypothesis 1a) receives some support. The coefficient on democracy level (in the target concession equation) is positive and statistically significant (see Table 5). In fact, strongly democratic targets are more than 67% more likely to make concessions in talks over disputed territory than are strongly nondemocratic targets (see Table 8). There is some suggestive evidence that democratic challengers also are more likely to make concessions, although the coefficient on level of democracy in the challenger equation is not statistically significant. Nevertheless, the impact of challenger democracy does appear positive and statistically significant when we estimate a Heckman probit model for the challenger to check for the existence of any selection effects.21
19. Formally, the large and statistically significant rho indicates that variables omitted from the equation to predict challenger concessions are highly correlated with those variables omitted from the equation to predict target concessions. 20. The estimated rho for the across, within, and dyadic models ranges from .16 to .21. None of the three Wald tests for dependence between the status quo stage disturbances and the negotiation stage disturbances are statistically significant. 21. In fact, in the Heckman model, the coefficient for the impact of challenger democracy on challenger concessions is positive, and the p value is .04. We are hesitant to place too much emphasis on this result because it does not account for challenger and target interdependence in any way, yet the finding is suggestive when placed in a broader context.

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TABLE 5

Results from Bivariate Probit Model of Challenger and Target Decisions to Offer Concessions in Negotiations over Disputed Territory: Political Accountability ModelComparing Differences across Regimes
Challenger Decision to Offer Concessions Political accountability across-regimes variables Democracy level Democracy Level Stalemate Democracy Level Ethnic Ties Target Democracy Signal of Resolve Control for recent stalemate Control for ethnic ties Control for signal of resolve International politics variables Common security ties Strategic value of territory Challenger involved in other dispute Target involved in other dispute Military balance Constant Target Decision to Offer Concessions

.003 (.005) .004 (.007) .014 (.007) .014 (.007) .095 (.067) .096 (.057) .017 (.079) .179 (.081) .049 (.063) .074 (.086) .035 (.078) .805*** (.140) .613*** (.105)

.023 (.005) .014 (.007) .013 (.007)

.013 (.070) .036 (.058)

.189 (.083) .053 (.062) .039 (.085) .071 (.078) .728 (.141) .016 (.102)

NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses. = .864. Wald test of : p = .00. Number of observations = 1,528. Log likelihood = 1629.04. ***p < .01, two-tailed. p < .10, one-tailed. p < .05, one-tailed. p < .01, one-tailed.

We also find solid support for the idea that democratic leaders become less likely to offer concessions when issues at stake are politically salient or when making concessions might be quite controversial domestically (hypotheses 2a and 2b). Both democratic challengers and targets are less likely to make concessions when they share ethnic ties with the population in the disputed territory (see Table 5). Democratic leaders in challenger states are 25% less likely to offer concessions when politically salient concerns with ethnic conationals are present. Democratic targets are nearly 30% less likely than their nondemocratic counterparts to make concessions under similar circumstances (see Table 8). There is also some support for the idea that democratic lead-

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TABLE 6

Results from Bivariate Probit Model of Challenger and Target Decisions to Offer Concessions in Negotiations over Disputed Territory: Political Accountability ModelComparing Differences within Regimes
Challenger Decision to Offer Concessions Political accountability within-regimes variables Strength of challenger ruling government Strength of target ruling government Time since elections in challenger Time since elections in target Control for challenger democracy Control for target democracy International politics variables Common security ties Strategic value of territory Challenger involved in other dispute Target involved in other dispute Military balance Constant Target Decision to Offer Concessions

.012 (.004) .001 (.003) .008 (.004) .005 (.003) .584** (.246) .433 (.190)

.010 (.004) .000 (.003) .002 (.003) .003 (.003) .547** (.237) .313 (.192)

.183 (.082) .032 (.064) .074 (.087) .073 (.079) .849*** (.143) .744*** (.088)

.190 (.082) .034 (.062) .029 (.086) .049 (.078) .718 (.143) .083 (.101)

NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses. = .854. Wald test of : p = .00. Number of observations = 1,528. Log likelihood = 1628.47. **p < .05, two-tailed. ***p < .01, two-tailed. p < .10, one-tailed. p < .05, one-tailed. p < .01, one-tailed.

ers find it more difficult to break stalemates by offering concessions. Compared to nondemocratic targets, democratic targets are 30% less likely to make concessions in a current round of talks when there has been a stalemate in talks within the past 2 years (see Table 8). The corresponding relationship for challengers is also negative yet not statistically significant. However, the estimated result for a Heckman model once again bolsters support for this hypothesis.22 The idea that democratic signals of intransigence are particularly credible receives strong support (hypothesis 1b). Challengers are more likely to make concessions when a democratic target signals an initial unwillingness to make concessions compared to when a similar signal is sent by a very non22. The coefficient for Challenger Democracy Recent Stalemate is negative, with a p value of .10 for a Heckman model of challenger concessions that accounts for the selection into the negotiation stage.

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TABLE 7

Results from Bivariate Probit Model of Challenger and Target Decisions to Offer Concessions in Negotiations over Disputed Territory: Political Accountability ModelComparing Differences across Dyads
Challenger Decision to Offer Concessions Political accountability dyadic variable Democratic dyad International politics variables Common security ties Strategic value of territory Challenger involved in other dispute Target involved in other dispute Military balance Constant Target Decision to Offer Concessions

.096 (.091) .195 (.080) .037 (.063) .067 (.086) .021 (.078) .723*** (.133) .638*** (.073)

.183 (.091)

.193 (.082) .034 (.062) .042 (.085) .102 (.077) .578 (.132) .099 (.095)

NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses. = .856. Wald test of : p = .00. Number of observations = 1,528. Log likelihood = 1641.93. ***p < .01, two-tailed. p < .10, one-tailed. p < .05, one-tailed. p < .01, one-tailed.

democratic target (see Table 5). In fact, challengers are more than 30% more likely to offer concessions to highly resolved democratic targets compared to highly resolved nondemocratic targets (see Table 8). Differences within democratic regimes also exert a significant impact on challenger and, to a lesser extent, target decisions to offer concessions (see Table 6). Democratic leaders who possess strong support domestically are much more likely to offer territorial concessions to their adversaries (hypothesis 3a). Leaders in challenger states whose governing coalition holds 80% of seats in the legislature or parliament are 68% more likely to offer concessions than are democratic leaders whose coalition holds only 40% of seats (see Tables 6 and 8). Similarly, there is some support for the idea that leaders make concessions to opponents who are strong domestically (hypothesis 3b), that is, who are well placed to offer reciprocal concessions (see Table 6). Targets are nearly 60% more likely to offer concessions to a democratic adversary who is in a very strong domestic position as opposed to an adversary who heads a minority government (see Table 8). We also find evidence in Table 6 to support the claim that challengers are hesitant to make concessions as an election approaches in either state (hypotheses 4a and 4b). Leaders in challenger states are 31% less likely to offer concessions when elections are proximate as opposed to when they were held a mere 6 months ago (see Table 8). Similarly, challengers are 16% less likely to make concessions in a round of talks when the target faces the prospect of upcoming elections (see Table 8). Finally,

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TABLE 8

The Impact of Selected Significant Variables on Challenger and Target Decisions to Offer Concessions in Negotiations over Disputed Territory (in percentages)
Initial Postchange Probability Probability Probability of challenger concessions Challenger Democracy Ethnic Ties (very nondemocratic very democratic) Target Democracy Signal of Resolve (very nondemocratic very democratic) Strength of challenger ruling coalition (40% of seats 80% of seats) Time since elections in challenger (elections 6 months ago elections 4 years ago) Time since elections in target (elections 6 months ago elections 4 years ago) Common security ties (no alliance alliance) Probability of target concessions Target democracy (very nondemocratic very democratic) Target Democracy Recent Stalemate (very nondemocratic very democratic) Target Democracy Ethnic Ties (very nondemocratic very democratic) Strength of challenger ruling coalition (40% of seats 80% of seats) Democratic dyad (change from a nondemocratic dyad) Common security ties (no alliance alliance) Military balance (1 to 10 disadvantage 10 to 1 advantage) Change in % Change in Probabilities Probabilities

41.1 35.6 25.3

30.6 46.3 42.5

10.5 +10.7 +17.2

25.5 +30.1 +68.0

36.4 48.1 40.2

25.1 40.4 47.3

11.3 7.7 +7.1

31.0 16.0 +17.7

24.1 29.3 27.2 22.5 31.6 31.8 45.9

40.3 20.2 19.2 35.8 38.3 38.8 24.2

+16.2 9.1 8.0 +13.3 +6.7 +7.0 21.7

+67.2 31.1 29.4 +59.1 +21.2 +22.0 47.3

NOTE: The predicted probabilities represent the marginal probability of challenger (target) concessions, regardless of whether the target (challenger) also offers concessions. Unless specified otherwise, the territory is considered to be of strategic value to both states, the military balance is 3:2 in favor of the target, and democratic governments are assumed to hold a 55% legislative majority and to have won an election 2 years ago. All other variables are set to median values.

there is some support for the idea that concessions are more likely between pairs of democracies (see Table 7). Target states in democratic dyads are 21% more likely to offer concessions in talks over disputed territory than are targets in nondemocratic dyads (see Table 8). The result for challengers in democratic dyads is similarly positive but is not quite statistically significant, with a p value of .15 for a one-tailed test. Only one of the control variables, common security ties between challenger and target, receives strong support. Challengers and targets are more likely to make concessions to one another when they share common security ties (see Table 5 and also

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Tables 6 and 7). In particular, the presence of an alliance between the two states makes challengers and targets about 18% and 22% more likely to make concessions, respectively (see Table 8). The only other significant finding is that targets with a sizable military advantage are 47% less likely to make concessions than targets with a sizable military disadvantage.
RESULTS FOR THE MILITARY ESCALATION STAGE

Now we examine the performance of the three variants of the political accountability model as explanations for challenger and target decisions to escalate force. The data we analyze in the escalation stage consist of 374 military confrontations that were initiated by challenger states. For both parties, the decision to risk war by engaging in high levels of escalation is relatively rare. Challengers escalate to high levels in about 24% of the military confrontations (89/374), and targets escalate to such levels in about 18% of confrontations (67/374). A mutual decision to escalate to high levels occurs in 40 cases where a war was fought over disputed territory. Once again, the use of the bivariate probit specification receives considerable support. The estimated correlation between the challenger and target disturbances ranges between .93 and .95 for the three variants of the accountability model. There is also some evidence that a few conclusions we might draw from the escalation stage results may deserve further scrutiny due to possible selection bias.23 Nevertheless, the results for the challenger escalation equation are considerably stronger than those for the target equation. We think the relative strength of the challenger results reflects the fact that targets often follow a policy of reciprocating the military behavior of challengers. As a result, the following discussion of results draws almost exclusively on the estimated challenger behavior. The results for the across-regimes accountability variables are relatively weak. The only hypothesis that receives support (hypothesis 1b) is the idea that democratic targets are able to compel challengers to back down from escalating to higher levels of military force because their signals of resolve are particularly credible (see Table 9). In fact, challengers are 62% less likely to escalate force when democratic states signal an initial willingness to escalate force as opposed to when nondemocratic targets send a similar signal (see Table 12). One very interesting result is that we find no support for the monadic hypothesis (hypothesis 1a) that democracies are less likely to escalate to high levels of force (see Table 9). There is no evidence that democratic challengers and targets are either more or less inclined to escalate than are nondemocratic challengers and targets. This finding of no difference across regimes is very robust to a variety of specifications.24 This
23. The estimated rho for the Heckman probit versions of the three accountability models ranges from .53 to .57. Wald tests for the independence of challenger status quo and escalation decisions approach standard levels of statistical significance, as p values range from .10 to .12. 24. This finding also holds when we run a model that includes solely the international politics variables and the single variable for challenger (target) democracy, without any of the democracy-based interaction terms. Furthermore, according to the Heckman probit model, democratic challengers appear to be somewhat more likely to escalate. In this model, the coefficient for the challenger level of democracy variable is positive, and the p value is .18.

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result suggests that monadic findings of a democratic peace are attributable largely to the fact that democracies tend to avoid the initiation of military conflict with all states, a finding we discussed earlier in the discussion of status quo stage results. There is some modest evidence that particular democratic regimes are associated with decisions to escalate to higher levels of force (see Table 10). Challenger leaders who are in a position of strength domestically (hypothesis 3a) are more than twice as likely to escalate force than are leaders who are in a weak domestic position (see Table 12). We also find that challengers are more than twice as likely to escalate when targets face upcoming elections (hypothesis 4b) as opposed to when targets have recently held elections (see Table 12). Similarly, challengers are less likely to escalate force against leaders of democratic target states who are in a strong position domestically (hypothesis 3b). The predicted probability of challenger escalation drops from nearly 19% to about 12% when target leaders command a clear majority of parliamentary or legislative seats as opposed to when the target leaders party holds only a 30% minority of seats. Our final result for the escalation stage is that democratic dyads are very unlikely to see their military confrontations escalate to high levels of force. In fact, we find zero cases in which challengers in democratic dyads escalate to higher levels of force and only one case in which a democratic target escalates against a democratic challenger. Recall from our earlier findings that territorial dispute challengers in democratic dyads are less likely to choose the route of military coercion in the first place, as only 16 of the 374 military confrontations are between pairs of democratic states. But here we find that democratic dyads are also less likely to escalate in the rare event of a democratic dyad military confrontation. The Heckman probit model for the challenger also confirms this result.25 Finally, there is some support for the idea (hypothesis 6b) that nondemocratic states in mixed dyads are more likely to escalate than are democratic states in mixed dyads (see Table 11). Nondemocratic targets in mixed dyads are more than 83% more likely to escalate force than are democratic targets in mixed dyads (see Table 12). However, we find no discernible difference between the behavior of democratic and nondemocratic challengers in mixed dyads (see Table 11). In general, international political and military variables provide quite strong results for escalation decisions, especially compared to their relatively weak performance in the negotiation stage. Five of the six control variables receive strong support, and four of these five supported variables push challengers toward higher levels of escalation (see Table 9 and also Tables 10 and 11). For example, when the territory is of strategic value, the predicted probability of challenger and target escalation increases by more than 150% and 70%, respectively (see Table 12).26 Similarly, the presence of a military advantage makes the challenger more likely to escalate military confrontations to higher levels of force.27 Also, both the short-term
25. According to the results of the Heckman model, challengers in democratic dyads are less likely to challenge the status quo through threats of military coercion (p < .01) and are then less likely to escalate force in military confrontations (p < .01). 26. This substantively large effect remains when we estimate a Heckman probit model. 27. In the Heckman model, the relationship between challenger local balance of forces advantage and escalation remains very strong (p < .001), whereas the results for the short-term balance are only slightly weaker (p value of .12).

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TABLE 9

Results from Bivariate Probit Model of Challenger and Target Decisions to Escalate with Force in Militarized Disputes over Contested Territory: Political Accountability ModelComparing Differences across Regimes
Challenger Decision to Escalate with Force Political accountability across-regimes variables Democracy level Democracy Level Stalemate Democracy Level Ethnic Ties Target Democracy Signal of Resolve Control for recent stalemate Control for ethnic ties Control for signal of resolve International politics variables Common security ties Strategic value of territory Challenger involved in other dispute Target involved in other dispute Military balance Local balance of forces advantage Constant Target Decision to Escalate with Force

.004 (.015) .028 (.024) .015 (.018) .031 (.014) .392** (.192) .357 (.147) .097 (.118) .403 (.186) .543 (.150) .272* (.164) .345 (.172) 1.03 (.310) .489 (.148) 1.92*** (.256)

.016 (.013) .020 (.020) .012 (.015)

.393** (.161) .111 (.127)

.128 (.179) .350 (.148) .088 (.166) .395** (.166) .116 (.310) .030 (.200) 1.12*** (.233)

NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses. = .941. Wald test of : p = .00. Number of observations = 374. Log likelihood = 247.69. *p < .10, two-tailed. **p < .05, two-tailed. ***p < .01, two-tailed. p < .05, one-tailed. p < .01, one-tailed.

military balance and local balance of forces variables are positive and statistically significant (see Table 9).28 Challengers who possess a local balance of forces advantage are nearly twice as likely to escalate, whereas challengers with a significant short-term military balance advantage are more than three times more likely to escalate to high levels (see Table 12). On the other hand, states with common security ties are once again less likely to antagonize one another (see Table 9). Challengers have a 17% pre28. There is little evidence of collinearity between the short-term military balance variable and the local balance of forces variable.

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TABLE 10

Results from Bivariate Probit Model of Challenger and Target Decisions to Escalate with Force in Militarized Disputes over Contested Territory: Political Accountability ModelComparing Differences within Regimes
Challenger Decision to Escalate with Force Political accountability within-regimes variables Strength of challenger ruling government Strength of target ruling government Time since elections in challenger Time since elections in target Control for challenger democracy Control for target democracy International politics variables Common security ties Strategic value of territory Challenger involved in other dispute Target involved in other dispute Military balance Local balance of forces advantage Constant Target Decision to Escalate with Force

.012 (.005) .007 (.005) .010 (.011) .011 (.007) 1.18* (.512) .193 (.305)

.006 (.009) .004 (.006) .006 (.010) .001 (.007) .028 (.492) .610 (.476) .138 (.170) .403 (.142) .128 (.165) .480** (.167) .141 (.296) .028 (.161) 1.09*** (.206)

.440 (.181) .535 (.140) .298* (.167) .353 (.177) .848 (.295) .527 (.140) 1.63*** (.215)

NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses. = .944. Wald test of : p = .00. Number of observations = 374. Log likelihood = 251.35. *p < .10, two-tailed. **p < .05, two-tailed. ***p < .01, two-tailed. p < .10, one-tailed. p < .05, one-tailed. p < .01, one-tailed.

dicted probability of escalating force when no such security ties exist, but this probability drops to less than 9% when the two states share common security ties (see Table 12).

CONCLUSION In this study, we tested hypotheses from a domestic politics model intended to explain the diplomatic and military policies adopted by state leaders in territorial disputes. We identified three general stages associated with territorial disputes and then

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TABLE 11

Results from Bivariate Probit Model of Challenger and Target Decisions to Escalate with Force in Militarized Disputes over Contested Territory: Political Accountability ModelComparing Differences across Dyads
Challenger Decision to Escalate with Force Political accountability dyadic variables Democratic dyad Nondemocratic state in mixed dyad Control for mixed dyad International politics variables Common security ties Strategic value of territory Challenger involved in other dispute Target involved in other dispute Military balance Local balance of forces advantage Constant Target Decision to Escalate with Force

6.60 (.164) .014 (.287) .089 (.263)

.838 (.593) .422 (.288) .305 (.191) .158 (.177) .400 (.145) .107 (.165) .493*** (.167) .160 (.300) .079 (.165) 1.11*** (.208)

.415 (.185) .525 (.145) .284* (.165) .383 (.176) .850 (.301) .555 (.142) 1.67*** (.218)

NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses. = .934. Wald test of : p = .00. Number of observations = 374. Log likelihood = 255.14. *p < .10, two-tailed. ***p < .01, two-tailed. p < .10, one-tailed. p < .05, one-tailed. p < .01, one-tailed.

assessed the explanatory power of the model across each of the stages. For the challenge the status quo stage, we found that the statistical results were quite supportive of the hypotheses from the political accountability model. For example, domestic politics provided insights into decisions by leaders to challenge the status quo by threats of force. In particular, we found that the timing of military confrontations by democratic leaders is linked to electoral cycles and that democratic leaders are willing to risk war over issues of self-determination for ethnic conationals located in disputed territory. The strongest contribution of the accountability model in the status quo stage, however, is the ability to explain why some territorial disputes follow the course of reliance on negotiations and conflict resolution through negotiated settlements. Although international political-military conditions are quite powerful in explaining why disputes follow a pathway of military conflict, they do not explain why the alternative choice of relying on negotiations is selected. The strength of the accountability model is that it helps to explain not only why military confrontations emerge, but also why

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TABLE 12

The Impact of Selected Significant Variables on Challenger and Target Decisions to Escalate with Force in Militarized Disputes over Contested Territory (in percentages)
Initial Postchange Probability Probability Probability of challenger escalation Target Democracy Signal of Resolve (very nondemocratic very democratic) Strength of challenger ruling coalition (40% of seats 80% of seats) Strength of target government (30% of seats 70% of seats) Time since elections in target (elections 6 months ago elections 4 years ago) Democratic dyad (change from a nondemocratic dyad) Common security ties (no common opponent common TD opponent) Strategic value of territory (no yes) Military balance (1 to 10 disadvantage 10 to 1 advantage) Local balance of forces (no advantage advantage) Probability of target escalation Democratic dyad (compared to a nondemocratic dyad) Nondemocratic state in mixed dyad (change from democratic state in mixed dyad) Strategic value of territory (no yes) Change in % Change in Probabilities Probabilities

22.9 11.1 18.6 10.4 20.9 16.9 6.7 10.1 16.9

8.6 22.4 12.2 21.1 0 8.7 16.9 33.2 32.0

14.3 +11.3 6.4 +10.7 20.9 8.2 +10.2 +23.1 +15.1

62.4 +101.8 34.4 +102.9 100 48.5 +152.2 +228.7 +89.3

21.1

5.0

16.1

76.3

13.4 11.8

24.6 20.1

+11.2 +8.3

+83.6 +70.3

NOTE: The predicted probabilities represent the marginal probability of challenger (target) escalation, regardless of whether the target (challenger) also escalates. Unless specified otherwise, the territory is considered to be of strategic value to both states, the military balance is 3:2 in favor of the target, and democratic governments are assumed to hold a 55% legislative majority and to have won an election 2 years ago. All other variables are set to median values. TD = territorial dispute.

very different choices are made by state leaders to pursue negotiations and refrain from using force as bargaining leverage in possible future negotiations over disputed territory. In the second part of our analysis, we tested how well each of the models accounted for decisions by leaders to offer concessions in negotiations. Although realist variables produced weak results, the findings for the political accountability model were quite supportive. For example, democratic leaders in challenger states are quite sensitive to electoral cycles and prefer to offer concessions in periods shortly after national elections have been held in their own country or in democratic targets. Another finding was that democratic leaders in challenger states are keenly aware of the domestic politics of treaty ratification and therefore are unlikely to bring back home territorial agreements

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containing concessions unless they command strong party support in their national legislature. In the final part of our analysis, we evaluated the power of the two models to explain the decisions of leaders to escalate military confrontations over disputed territory to high levels and risk war. Domestic-level variables were found to have an impact on the escalation of military confrontations in several ways. For instance, state leaders are generally wary of risking war against other countries when the adversarys leadership is politically secure from domestic political opposition. Furthermore, the greater domestic political costs of retreating in a crisis for democratic leaders can be used to their strategic advantagenamely, to bolster the credibility of their deterrent policies by signaling earlier on in a crisis their intention to escalate if necessary. In sum, the results of our empirical analyses clarify and advance the democratic peace literature in several areas. By shifting to an alternative research design that focuses on the different stages of international disputes, new and more specific hypotheses about the initiation and outcome of military confrontations and negotiations could be developed. Furthermore, empirical tests of hypotheses could be carried out for each stage of a dispute, allowing for more careful and systematic comparisons of theoretical models. This type of analysis enabled us to identify differences in the explanatory power of domestic and international variables across the different stages of a dispute. Finally, our research provides strong evidence that there is substantial variation in the diplomatic and military behavior of democratic states that can be explained by reference to electoral cycles, the strength of opposition parties in legislatures, and what types of issues are at stake in international disputes.

APPENDIX Measurement of Independent Variables


Note: Additional details on all sources relied on for the operationalization of variables are provided in Huth and Allee (2002, chaps. 3-4). Short-term military balance. This is measured as the ratio of military capabilities between each state and its adversary and ranges along a continuous scale from 0 to 1. The measure is an average ratio of three separate indicators of military capabilities: (1) total military personnel, (2) military expenditures, and (3) expenditures per soldier. The primary source for data on these indicators is the Correlates of War (COW) data set on national capabilities (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996). Local balance of military forces. This measures the forces that each side has mobilized during a militarized dispute and therefore can be committed at the outset of an armed conflict. The local balance is coded as a dummy variable, and a value of 1 is recorded if a state enjoys a military advantage of roughly greater than two to one. Other military dispute involvement of challenger or target. A dummy variable is coded with a value of 1 when a state is currently involved in another military conflict. The primary data

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sources are the COW data set on militarized interstate disputes from 1816 to 1992, as well as our data on military confrontations over disputed territory. Common security ties. Two measures are constructed. The first measure is an alliance dummy variable for which a value of 1 is recorded if there is a defense pact or entente military alliance between the challenger and target. The second measure is a dummy variable that indicates whether the challenger and target currently share a common territorial dispute adversary. Strategic value of disputed territory. A dummy variable is coded as equal to 1 if the territory is strategically located or if it contained (or was believed to contain) natural resources that were used by the state in the production of military weapon systems. Institutional accountability of democratic and nondemocratic leaders. The POLITY III (Jaggers and Gurr 2000) and POLITY 98 (Gurr and Jaggers 1999) data sets are used to create an accountability-based net democracy variable for each country. This 21-point net democracy variable (ranging from 10 to 10) is created by subtracting each states autocracy score (which ranges from 0 to 10) from its democracy score (which also ranges from 0 to 10). We use a variety of additional country-specific sources to identify the month in which major regime changes occur and update our data set accordingly. At times, we rescale this variable for operational purposes so that all values are positive. Dummy variable for democratic status of challenger and target. We also code and use a control variable that indicates whether a country is democratic based on the democratic accountability variable (see above). We consider a country to be democratic if its POLITY net democracy score is +6 or higher. We assign a value of 1 to these cases and assign a 0 to all other cases. Democratic leaders and signals of resolve. We generate this interaction term by multiplying the target democratic accountability variable (see above) and a dummy variable that indicates whether a target state signals resolve in its initial response to a challengers threat of force or call for negotiations. A signal of resolve in negotiations is coded as the refusal of the target negotiators to offer any concessions at the outset of talks. For military confrontations, a signal of resolve occurs when the targets initial response to the challengers threat was to respond with an equal or greater level of force and to refuse any concessions. Democratic response to stalemate. This interaction term is created by multiplying the democratic accountability variable (see above) and a second dummy variable that is coded with a value of 1 if a recent round of talks had ended in a stalemate. A recent stalemate has occurred when a round of talks within the past 2 years resulted in one side offering only limited or no concessions, whereas its opponent offered no concessions at all. Democracy and ethnic conationals. This is another interaction term created by multiplying the democratic accountability variable (see above) and a dummy variable to indicate whether ethnic conationals are located in disputed territory. Strength of ruling coalition in legislature. In presidential or mixed systems where the president is responsible for foreign policy decisions, we collect data on the percentage of seats held by the presidents party (and its coalition allies) in the lower house of the legislature, as well as the corresponding percentage in the upper house if the upper chamber has effective treaty ratification powers (for use in the negotiation stage analysis). In parliamentary or mixed systems in

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which the prime minister is in charge of foreign policy, we assemble data on the ruling coalitions percentage of seats in the lower house. Timing of elections for challenger and target. This variable measures the number of months since the previous election for each state based on the dates of all national elections either for presidents or for national legislatures (depending on the states type of political system). For operational purposes, we also create and sometimes substitute a dummy variable to indicate that an election has been held within the past year. Democratic dyads. A dummy variable is given a value of 1 when the POLITY net democracy scores of both challenger and target are +6 or higher. Mixed dyads and nondemocratic states in mixed dyads. A dyad is considered mixed if the net democracy score for one of the two states is +6 or higher, and the net democracy score for the other state is +5 or lower. We also create a dummy variable to indicate that a state is the nondemocratic state in a mixed dyad.

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