COBB-PEREZ vs. LANTIN [1968] Facts: LEDESMA vs.

CLIMACO [1974] Personalities: Ponente : Fernando, J Facts: Prior to his appointment as election registrar for Cadiz, Negros Occ. on Oct 30, 1964, petitioner was counsel de parte as an accused in a pending case in the sala of the respondent. Citing the demands of his appointive post and the conflict that may arise between the discharge of his duties as election registrar and officer of the court, petitioner moved to withdraw as counsel. Respondent not only denied the motion, but appointed petitioner as counsel de oficio for the two other accused. Petitioner now comes before the SC to have the order of the respondent judge reversed on certiorari. Issue: WON respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion. NO The principal reason behind respondents denial of the motion to withdraw of petitioner is because of its effect to delay the case further. The criminal proceeding had already been postponed several times, and to grant the petitioners motion would have been tantamount to a denial the accuseds rights. The fact that the respondent already appointed the petitioner as counsel de oficio other than the de parte, renders the latters excuse of the demand of his job as registrar inutile. There is no reason for him to compromise the accused, defense for want of time with the demands on the time of counsel de oficio is less than that of de parte. It is thus, clear that petitioner is merely reluctant to represent the accused, membership in the Bar requires the responsibility to live up to its exacting standard, which includes assisting the state when called upon to administer justice, the law is not a trade or a craft, but a profession. As such, the facts that petitioner will not be compensated for his trouble should not hinder him from defending the accused to the best of his ability. The right of the accused to counsel is a constitutionally protected right, such that any frustration thereof by petitioner amounts to a serious affront to the profession. Decision: Petition is dismissed. Petitioner is admonished. WALTER T. YOUNG, complainant, vs. CEASAR BATUEGAS, MIGUELITO NAZARENO LLANTINO & FRANKLIN SUSA, respondents [2003] Young filed a complaint for disbarment against respondents for committing deliberate falsehood in court & violating the lawyers oath. Young is the private prosecutor in the murder case, P vs. Arana. Batuegas & Llantino were counsels for accused. 1. Dec. 13, 2000: counsels for accused filed a Manifestation w/Motion for Bail alleging that their client voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority. 2. NBI records show that accused only surrendered on Dec. 14, 2000. 3. Susa, branch clerk of court, calendared the motion on Dec. 15, 2000 despite irregularities & defects: lack of notice of hearing to private complainant, violation of the 3-day notice rule & failure to attach Certificate of Detention. Defense of counsels for accused: 1. They filed the Manifestation w/Motion for Bail on Dec. 13, 2000 upon learning that a warrant of arrest was issued against their client. They fetched accused in Cavite however, due to heavy traffic, they arrived at the NBI at 2 a.m. the following day, thus the Certificate of Detention indicated that accused surrendered on Dec. 14. They did not commit unethical conduct/falsehood since their client voluntarily surrendered & was detained.

A motion for reconsideration was filed in relation to the observation1 made by the court in its decision dated May 22, 1968. The court assessed treble costs against the petitioners to be paid by their counsels. Attys. Baizas and Bolinao seek reconsideration of the decision in so far as it reflects adversely upon their professional conduct and condemns them to pay the treble costs. November 5, 1962 - Court of Appeals rendered judgment sustaining Damaso Perez' position with respect to the extent of the levy, the subsequent proceedings interposed alternatingly by the petitioner spouses were obviously quixotic maneuvers expected to be overthrown by the courts but calculated to delay an execution long overdue. The petitioners and their counsel chose to attack the execution in a piecemeal fashion causing the postponement of the projected execution sale six times. Perez spouses as represented by their counsel sought the issuance of preliminary injunctions to restrain the execution of the final judgment in civil case 39407 from courts which did not have jurisdiction and which would, as expected, initially or ultimately deny their prayer.

Issue: WON Attys. Baizas and Bolinao used devices to delay the execution of the judgment? YES Ratio: Mrs. Perez and her counsel, knew or ought to have known beforehand that the Court of First Instance of Rizal did not have jurisdiction to issue the writ which Mrs. Perez herself sought, and, anticipating the recall of the writ improvidently issued, on September 3, 1963, a month before the said writ was actually lifted, filed in the basic civil case 39407 an urgent motion to lift the writ of execution issued on August 15, 1961, alleging as justification the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stock and the personal nature of Damaso Perez' judgment debt, the very same reasons advanced in civil case 7532 which was then still pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal The circumstances relative to the motion for reconsideration clearly negates the avowal of the movants that "in none of the various incidents in the case at bar has any particular counsel of petitioners acted with deliberate aforethought to delay the enforcement of the judgment in Civil Case No. 39407." The Perez spouses, coached by their counsels, had sallied forth on a strategem of "remedies" projected to foil the lawful execution of a simple money judgment. Attys. Baizas and Bolinao contends that if there was delay it was because they happened to be more assertive, a quality of lawyers which is not to be condemned. The court replied that a counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position. It is the duty of a counsel to advise his clients if he he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client's propensity to litigate. Decision: Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A.N. Bolinao, Jr. shall pay jointly and severally the treble costs assessed against the petitioners.
1

We feel compelled to observe that during the protracted litigation below, the petitioners resorted to a series of actions and petitions, at some stages alternatingly, abetted by their counsel, for the sole purpose of thwarting the execution of a simple money judgment which has long become final and executory. Some of the actions were filed, only to be abandoned or withdrawn. The petitioners and their counsel, far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice

2.

Complainant as private prosecutor was not entitled to any notice of hearing but they furnished the State & City prosecutors with copies of the motion w/notice of hearing. 3. ROC Rule 15, Sec. 4(2) allows hearing of a motion on shorter notice. Susas defense: He was no longer in court when counsels filed the Dec. 13 Motion. Another clerk received such. The presiding judge agreed to receive the Motion set for hearing on Dec. 15, 2000 subject to the presentation of the Certificate of Detention before hearing. Since this was allowed by the presiding judge, Susa was only faithfully performing his ministerial duty. IBP recommendation: Batuegas & Llantino be suspended for 6 mos for commission of deliberate falsehood while complaint against Susa was dismissed for lack of merit.

Issues & Ratio: 1. WON Batuegas & Llantino are guilty of deliberate falsehood. YES. A lawyer is a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court. Its his duty to inform the court upon the law & the facts of the case & to aid it in doing justice & arriving at the correct conclusion. In defending his clients cause, a lawyers conduct must never be at the expense of truth. Court may disbar/suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether professional/private, showing his want in moral character, honesty, probity & good demeanor proving him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. Counsels, anticipating that their motion for bail will be denied by the court if it found out that it had no jurisdiction over accused, they concealed the truth by alleging that their client voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority. This act was misleading & contemptuous, thereby contributing to injustice & is a violation of their oath. Even if they were able to present their client during the hearing, the fact remains that they falsely indicated that he surrendered on Dec. 13, 2000. As per Comia v. Antona, it is of no moment that the accused eventually surrendered on the same date tentatively scheduled for the hearing of the application for bail. Bail should have not been allowed considering that at that point, accused was still devoid of personality to ask for such relief. Reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor/fiscal or at least his recommendation must be asked. Motion may be heard on short notice. However, counsels failed to show any good cause to justify the non-observance of the 3-day notice rule. Rules of procedure must be observed & not misused to defeat the ends of justice. 2. WON Susa is liable. NO. His acts were authorized by the presiding judge. But he is obliged to inform the judge if he should find any act/conduct on the part of lawyers w/c are contrary to the established rules of procedure. Holding: Batuegas & Llantino guilty of committing deliberate falsehood. Theyre suspended from the practice of law for 6 mos. W/warning that repetition of same/similar act will be dealt w/more severely. AFURONG vs. AQUINO [1999] Administrative Matter in the SC. Malpractice Paraluman B. Afurong filed a complaint for ejectment against Victorino Flores for nonpayment of rentals and the court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner Paraluman Afurong and the court issued a writ of execution. Facing eviction, Flores sought help from Citizens Legal Assistance Office and they assigned Atty. Angel G Aquino to his case. He filed two petitions. When the court set a pre-trial, he filed an Urgent Motion for Postponement and signed his name as counsel for Flores and indicated the address of Citizens Legal Assistance Office as his office address notwithstanding the fact that he was separated from Citizens Legal Assistance Office at that time.

In the aforesaid motion, he stated that he could not attend the pre-trial conference because he had to attend the hearing of a Habeas Corpus Case before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court that same day and hour. But the Clerk of Court of the JDR Court certified that a decision had been rendered on the aforementioned special proceedings case and that there was no hearing. Thus, Afurong filed a verified letter-complaint for disbarment against Aquino, for filing frivolous harassment cases to delay the execution of a final decision, committing falsehood in an Urgent Motion for Postponement, and misrepresenting himself as an attorney for the Citizens Legal Assistance Office Atty. Aquino denied the charges against him and contended that such acts had been done without malice. In a Reply, complainant asserted that Atty. Aquino was declared guilty of contempt of court and correspondingly fined by this Court for making false allegations in his Urgent Motion for Postponement The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline submitted a Report finding that Aquino failed to perform his duties expected of an attorney as provided under the existing Canons of Professional Ethics and Sec. 20 of Rule 138 of the ROC in force at the time of the commission of the acts in question. They recommended that he be penalized with 6 months suspension Board of Gov. of the IBP resolved to adopt and approve the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner

Issue: WON Aquino failed to perform his duties expected of an attorney as provided under the existing Canons of Professional Ethics and Sec. 20 of Rule 138 of the ROC in force at the time of the commission of the acts in question The Revised Rules of Court provides that it is the duty of an attorney to counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. Respondent Atty. Aquino should not have filed a petition for certiorari considering that there was no apparent purpose for it than to delay the execution of a valid judgment. Aquino committed falsehood when he stated in his Urgent Motion for Postponement that he had to attend the hearing of a special proceedings case the same day as the pre-trial of the Civil Case. Such act violates the Canons of Professional Ethics which obliges an attorney to avoid the concealment of the truth from the court. A lawyer is mandated not to mislead the court in any manner. Lower court correctly declared respondent in contempt of court for conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice, in violation of Section 3 (d), Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court. Atty. Aquino purposely allowed the court to believe that he was still employed with the Citizens Legal Assistance Office when in fact he had been purged from said office. The Court hereby finds respondent Atty. Angel G. Aquino guilty of malpractice and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for six (6) months commencing upon receipt of notice hereof. INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO. LTD. EMPLOYMENT ASSOCIATION vs. INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO. LTD. [1971]

IN RE SOTTO [1949] Facts:

Atty. Vicente Sotto issued a written statement 2in connection with the decision of this Court in In re Angel Parazo the statement was published in the Manila Times and other daily newspapers of the locality. The court required Atty. Sotto to show cause why he should not be charged with contempt of court. Atty. Sotto does not deny having published the statement but he contends that under section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, which confers upon this Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, "this Court has no power to impose correctional penalties upon the citizens, and that the Supreme Court can only impose fines and imprisonment by virtue of a law, and has to be promulgated by Congress with the approval of the Chief Executive." And he also alleges in his answer that "in the exercise of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution, the respondent made his statement in the press with the utmost good faith and with no intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable members of this high Tribunal, who, in his opinion, erroneously decided the Parazo case; but he has not attacked, or intended to attack the honesty or integrity of any one.' The other arguments set forth by the respondent in his defenses observe no consideration.

his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. An attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts, he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct.

Decision: Atty. Sotto guilty of contempt. Fine of 1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. He is also required to show cause why he should not be disbarred. J. Perfecto concurring Atty. Sotto has not presented any evidence or offered any to support his slanderous imputations, and no single word can be found in his answer showing that he ever believed that the imputations are based on fact. He does not to deny his intimidating announcement to introduce in the coming sessions of Congress, among the first measures, one for the change of the members of the Supreme Court and for the latter's complete reorganization. He has not explained or justified why he has to intimidate the members of the Supreme Court with change and reorganization. Sotto claims that his statement was made with utmost good faith with no intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable members of the High Tribunal. This argument lacks sincerity in view of his commens that the majority of the members of the Supreme Court have committed many blunders and injustices deliberately. Sottos statement goes much further than mere criticism of our decision and the majority members of this Court. The statement is an attempt to interfere with the administration of justice, to miscarry and defeat justice, by trammelling the freedom of action of the members of the Supreme Court, by bullying them with the menace of change, reorganization, and removal, upon the false accusation that they have been committing "blunders and injustices deliberately," and the menacing action constitutes a flagrant violation of the Constitution. Such a thing is not covered by the freedom of the press or by the freedom to criticize judges and court proceedings, as no one in his senses has ever conceived that such freedom include any form of expressed gangterism, whether oral or written. KOMATSU INDUSTRIES vs. CA [1998] Facts: from lower court NDIC granted a loan to Komatsu for P8m, with a P2m guarantee from PNB. Komatsu then mortgaged his land and all its improvement for this. PNB also granted letter of credit deferments worth $1,564,826.00 in favor of Toyota for Komatsu. Now there came a time when Komatsu paid all his debts to NDIC the P8m and P2m, and the latter thus returned the land title to Komatsu with a deed of release and cancellation of mortgage. PNB suddenly discovered that there was still the granted letter of credits unpaid, so they asked the title to be returned. It was returned, then a petition for correction of entry or adverse claim was filed and PNB petitioned foreclosure and of sale through the sheriff. The trial court adjudged that the deed of release, released Komatsu from its obligation to PNB. The CA however decided that the deed of release did not cover the letter of credit mortgaged over the same property. PNB, which is a corporation separate and distinct

Issue: WON Atty. Sotto can be punished for contempt of court? Yes Ratio: Rules 64 of the rules promulgated by this court does not punish as for contempt of court an act which was not punishable as such under the law and the inherent powers of the court to punish for contempt That the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts of superior statue, is a doctrine or principle uniformly accepted and applied by the courts of last resort in the United States, which is applicable in this jurisdiction since our Constitution and courts of justice are patterned after those of that country. Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if it is not well taken and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in reversing or modifying its decision. Atty. Sotto does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was then and still is pending reconsideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the members of Justices from eleven to seven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who according to 2
As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53.) interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now has to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the source of a news published in his paper, I regret to say that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency of narrow mindedness o the majority of its members, In the wake of so many mindedness of the majority deliberately committed during these last years, I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court. To his effect, I announce that one of the first measures, which as its objects the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now constituted, a constant peril to liberty and democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf may hear: the Supreme Court very of today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary.

from NDIC, was not one of the signatories over the deed and that mortgages are indivisible, even if you paid the partial, the debt is still ongoing. In short since PNB is not party to the contract of releasing the obligation of Komatsu, then it is not binding upon them. Thus, the questioned sale of the sheriff is therefore valid. ( important are petitioners assignment of errors and misconduct towards the courts.) Of course, the petitioner in this case, Komatsu then files certiorari against the CA. SC denied this for failure to show the CA committed any reversible error. This was done after considerable time had been sent to dissect issues and non-issues and multitudes of comments, reconsiderations and pleadings. Petitioner then filed a 24 page MFR, required the respondents to comment and this was admitted which granted respondents a joint rejoinder. But this too was later denied. Now petitioner insist that they should have been allowed to file memoranda. He filed a motion for leave to file an Incorporated Second Motion for Reconsideration. He says that irregularities and errors were committed by CA and SC, allusions to misconduct by respondents counsel, and imputations against retired Justice Teodoro Padilla. Issues WON the CA committed any errors. No, the petitioner assailed the time short spent by CA on the case, SC said that it is so because the evidence were merely documentary and the questions were answerable by applying well-settled doctrines. SC upheld the facts and findings and judgment of CA. The Sc reviewed these contentions and supported the CA: Contention on the deed of release was well supported by the civil code articles. Contention on the double mortgage was also supported and allowed by the civil code as long as the parties agree. Contentions on the damages for not foreclosing only the proportionate part of the mortgage, the civil code too is clear that mortgages are indivisible. Contentions on the validity of the sale and foreclosure basing it only on the petition for correction of entry or adverse claim which is not allowed, the CA ruled that since the mortgage was still subsisting, and petitioner was not able to controvert that PNB filed a verified petition for extrajudicial foreclosure under Act #3135, it is valid. SC says so too. Contentions on the damages becomes irrelevant since the foreclosure and sale is valid and therefore the damnum absque injuria rules that there is no need for it because there is no injury. As to the contention that the question of WON the petitioner is entitled to redeem the its foreclosed property from PNB if the foreclosure is invalid. SC said that when it was raised it wasnt proper as it wasnt on the pre-trial but only on the memorandum. Besides the one-year redemption period is not suspended by an action for nullification, the company even assigned a deed of assignment right to redeem to Atty. Norberto Quisimbing, and still docketed in a case. It seems that they only want to look for issues. WON the SC committed errors when they dismissed the case on a minute resolution. NO, the SC clarified that contrary to the belief of the petitioner that the SC had to determine the facts if the CA reversed the trial court, the SC has on its option only to determine the facts and since there is no conflict on the facts by the two courts then there is no need to determine it again. As to the contention that the SC violates 14, Art. VIII of the Consti by granting minute resolutions, the SC held that jurisprudence has long since settled that resolutions are not decisions within the requirements of the Consti, they merely hold that the resolution should not be entertained. The petition to review the decision of the CA is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion. In any case, the grant of minute resolution only means that the SC agrees and adopts the findings and conclusions of the CA, it is then correct. WON there is truth to the allegations against retired Judge Padilla.

No, the allegations were that Padilla deliberately sought out the assigned ponente and asked the PNB favored decision for A BIRTHDAY AND PARTING GIFT, ponente declined and it was then raffled to somebody who was a good friend of Padilla. The facts prove that there was never an assigned ponente as it was directly raffled to the 2nd division. And under the internal rules of this court, when a case is unloaded, there is no need for holding a 2nd raffle. The allegations are not proven, but the court said that this must be discussed in a different proceeding if the parties the CA (2nd division) and the Padilla law office(counsel for Padilla) on one side and on the other side the petitioner, wish to pursue this. Decision: (important*) Increasing practice of defeated litigants conjuring scenarios which they blame for their debacle instead of admitting the lack of merit of their cases displeases the court. These are unethical disregard of the canons for responsible advocacy with the warning that this insidious pattern of professional misconduct shall not hereafter be allowed to pass with impunity. This is a lamentable technique contrived by losing litigants of resorting to ascriptions of supposed irregularities in the courts as cause of defeat. The court however contents itself for the nonce of a stern admonition that petitioner refrain from conduct tending to create mistrust in our judicial system through innuendos on which no evidence is offered or indicated to be preferred. Responsible litigants need not be told that pleadings need to have intellectual honesty and facts to serve justice and dignify the cause of the pleader. 2nd MFR denied for lack of merit and EXPUNGED for unauthorized pleading. Final and executory, no more pleadings and motions will be entertained. SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD, et al., petitioners vs. HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL, etc., et al., respondents, In Re: Contempt Proceedings against Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto, Graciano Regala & Associates, Erlito Uy, Juanito Caling & Morton Meads [1970] CONTEMPT PROCEDINGS #1: (Incident #1) SC decided against Mac Arthur International Minerals Co., client of counsels involved in this case. Counsels Santiago, Uy, Regala & Sotto purportedly set forth a memoranda personally signed by Sotto claiming that: 1. petitioners in the case made false, ridiculous & wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against their client (Mac Arthur). They called it scattershot desperation. 2. proposition is corrupt on its face showing petitioners immoral & arrogant attitude. 3. petitioners opportunistically change their claims & stories from case to case & pleading to pleading in the same case.

(Incident #2) Mac Arthurs 3rd MFR signed by Santiago on his behalf & purportedly for Uy, Regala & Associate, & Sotto claimed that the SC overlooked the applicable law due to the misrepresentation & obfuscation of petitioners counsel & that never has any civilized democratic tribunal ruled that such gimmick can be used by vulturous executives to cover up & excuse losses to the public. (Incident #3) Santiago allegedly w/Uy, Regala & Associates, filed a motion to inhibit asking CJ Concepcion & Justice Castro to inhibit themselves since the latters brother is a VP of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the false, erroneous & illegal decision, while Concepcions son was given a significant appointment in the Phil. Govt by the President shortly before the decision was rendered. They enumerated certain incidents w/c according to them were proof of unjudicial prejudice, w/unjudicial favoritism in favor of petitioners. Incidents include violation of

the law, deprivation of respondents rt to due process, misstatements & misrepresentations in the decision, etc. (see p.7 for complete list). Santiagos defense (including Uy, Regala & Associates): statements in incident #1 were quoted out of context. He claims that he needed to make those statements lest his client be deprived of due process. He agreed to change CJ to Supreme Court & he voluntarily deleted par. 6 (see p.8) in incident #3. WRT incident #2 & 3, he claims that he alone should be responsible for they were of his exclusive making. Santiago filed an amended motion to inhibit by taking out dissertation on judicial ethics & comments attacking Courts decision. Sottos defense: early on in the case, he insisted in w/drawing his appearance. Statements in incident #1 were taken out of context & were necessary to defend his client. Taken out of context, they were violative of Rule 138, Sec. 20(f). He did not agree w/the motion to inhibit & such was against his upbringing & judicial conscience. He further averred that SC had no original jurisdiction over the civil contempt charge since such is originally cognizable w/the CFI. He also stressed that charge was not signed by an offended party/witness, the Sol Gen & his assistants did not qualify as offended parties/witnesses. Regalas defense: use of/reference to his law firm in this case was neither authorized nor consented to by him or any of his associates. He claimed that Meads, Mac Arthurs representative, offered to retain his services w/c he accepted. However, when this case arose, he informed Meads that this was outside his professional competence thus he referred him to another lawyer who also turned down the offer. They then agreed to terminate the retainer agreement. He did not participate in any preparation/authorship of any pleading in this case. Uy: denied participation. He claimed that he was on 6mos leave during this time as one of Mac Arthurs lawyers but he gave his permission to have his name included as counsel.

b.

CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS #2

th

Atty. Caling, entered a special appearance for Mac Arthur & filed a 4 MFR w/o express leave of court. Motion reiterated previous grounds & further claimed that the decision was illegal because it was penned by CJ Concepcion when in fact he was out of the country at the time the Oral Argument was heard. He claims the New ROC prohibits this. He further stressed that if Mac Arthur abandons its quest for justice in the RP, it will elevate the case to the World Court and/or to the US govt. Calings defense: 4th MFR was already finalized when Santiago came to his office & requested him to sign it. He turned down the request twice but after being assured that there was nothing wrong w/the motion, he was persuaded to sign it in good faith. He claims that he was misled. Santiagos defense: claimed that Meads went to his office & asking if he knew another lawyer who could help him file a 4th MFR. He accompanied Meads to Caling. He never prepared the motion nor has he read it. Meads version: He prepared the motion himself. He went to Santiago who then made changes to the motion in pencil. However, he informed Santiago that he wanted a new lawyer thus they went to Caling. Santiago left subsequently. Caling read the motion & gave Meads the go signal. He claims that ROC quotation was accurate & the xxx indicate that it was not a complete quotation as is common practice in court pleadings. World Court is not a threat. His answer included a notice of appeal to the World Court.

He made accusations of favoritism, justices are insensible to delicadeza, justices relationships affect their judgment and that loss of confidence for the tribunal has already begun. c. Deleted paragraph contained disrespectful language. Thus, even if it was included only because of mere inadvertence & was subsequently deleted, fact remains that it has been made. d. Accusations have no basis in fact & in law. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole court. Santiagos logic that anyone who receives favors/benefits directly/indirectly from any of the petitioners, the president included, should inhibit himself or herself, is an absurdity. Does this mean that justices who are all appointed by the president & thus can be considered to have received a favor from the president, should inhibit themselves everytime a case involving the Administration crops up? This would paralyze the machinery of the Court & wreak havoc on the tripartite system. He wants to create an atmosphere of distrust & disbelief. Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: Respect due to the courts of justice & judicial officers is necessary not merely for the sake of the incumbent officials but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. Its incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against unjust criticism & clamor. As an officer of the court, a lawyer is like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice. He cant promote distrust in the administration of justice. He should seek to preserve faith in the courts. He should help build & not destroy the high regard & esteem towards the court, essential to the proper administration of justice. A clients cause doesnt permit an atty. To cross the line between liberty & license. His first duty is to the administration of justice & to observe law & ethics. Considering that a judge from the nature of his position lacks the power to defend himself, it is the lawyer who can better/more appropriately support the judiciary. The court is not infallible. But discipline & self-restraint on the part of the bar even under adverse conditions are necessary for the orderly administration of justice. In this case, Santiagos language undermines & degrades the administration of justice. WON Sotto should be held in contempt of court. YES. Incident #1: language is not protected. Its the surfacing of a feeling of contempt towards a litigant & it offends the court before w/c it is made. A lawyers language should be dignified in keeping w/the dignity of the legal profession. He is to abstain from all offensive personality & from any act prejudicial to the honor/reputation of a party/witness. Courts can start proceedings w/the Sol Gen or his assistants as offended parties. Inherent in the courts is the power to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers & of all other persons in any manner connected w/a case before it. Sotto misbehaved w/improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice. WON Regala should be held in contempt. NO. Improper for Santiago to include Regalas firm w/o latters knowledge & consent. He did not participate nor did he even know that his name was included. WON Uy should be held in contempt. NO. He was not involved in the preparation of any of the pleadings. WON the 2nd contempt proceedings should prosper. YES. It was filed w/o express leave of court. No explanation was made on why this was done. ROC quote was misleading since only part of the provision was quoted (see p. 2021). No explanation was given by Caling. Meads explained that partial quotation was

2.

3. 4.

Issues & Ratio: 1. WON Santiago should be held in contempt. YES. Statements in incident #2 used language not expected of an officer of the courts. Incident #3: a. accuses in a reckless manner 2 justices of the SC of being interested in the decision of the case.

5.

6.

common practice. However, Canon 22 of the Canons of Legal Ethics specifically mentions that lawyers should not knowingly misquote as this would not be fair nor candid. A lawyer would easily see the deliberate deception w/c intentionally omitted the qualification attached to the provision. Threats to take the case to the World Court or US govt are unnecessary statements. This was an attempt to influence/bend the Courts mind to decide in their favor. The MFR was inconsistent w/the appeal to the World Court. Caling is liable for contempt since it was his duty to take care that his name should not be attached to pleadings contemptuous in character. Meads, as the person who prepared the motion, is likewise liable for contempt. Santiago is likewise liable for contempt. He convinced Caling to sign the document. He read it himself and was even making changes. Besides, as lawyer of record for Mac Arthur, he has control of the proceedings. Whatever steps his client takes should be w/in his knowledge & responsibility. He should restrain/prevent his clients from doing things w/c he himself ought not to do particularly w/reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses. If a client persists in such a wrongdoing, the lawyer should terminate their relation. To preserve its dignity, a court of justice should not yield to the assaults of disrespect. WON the decision against Mac Arthur was proper. YES. Mac Arthur did not adhere to the terms & conditions of the invitation to bid since its bid was accompanied by a bid bond, specifically prohibited by the invitation. Bid was submitted w/o the requisite bond.

derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional (check the case for whats written) He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the petition and some parts were published in some newspapers. The SC decided by resolution to withhold action on his petition until he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. But no word came from him. So he was reminded to turn over his certificate, w/c he had earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court could act on his petition. But he manifested that he has no pending petition in connection w/ Calero vs. Yaptinchay Case. SC require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why no disciplinary action should be taken against him." He denied the charges and asked for permission "to give reasons & cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him...in an open & public hearing" & later also asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has no time to hear him in person" w/c the court granted. But his written answer, as undignified & cynical as it is unchastened, offers no apology but instead unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo. (pls check case again for this)

*Decision would be the same even if Concepcion & Castro inhibited themselves. Holding: 1. Contempt proceedings #1: Santiago & Sotto held in contempt of court w/fines of P1,000.00 and P100.00 respectively. Regala & Associates and Uy not guilty. 2. Contempt proceedings #2: Santiago, Meads & Caling held in contempt of court. Santiago & Meads fined P1,000.00 each while Calings fine is P200.00. 3. Decision forwarded to Sec. Of Justice & Sol Gen for actions they may deem proper. IN RE ALMACAN [1970] In the civil case Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero, in w/c Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant, the TC rendered judgment against Almacens client. After Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision, he moved for its reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time & place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. TC denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his 1st MFR, he filed a 2nd MFR to w/c he attached the required registry return card. This 2nd MFR, however, was ordered withdrawn by the TC upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier had already perfected the appeal. TC elevated the case to the CA. CA, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co. dismissed the appeal for having failed to indicate notice of time and place of hearing. Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution he filed pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in Support of Motion for Reconsideration," citing RP vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza as the applicable case but the CA again denied MFR, stating that RP vs. Venturanza is no authority on the matter in issue. He then appealed to SC w/c was denied by a minute resolution. Likewise, his MFR and leave to file a 2nd MFR & for extension of time were denied. Entry of judgment was then made. Then, Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title" a pleading that is interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and

WON Atty. Almacens grievances are with merit NO. He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. But truth to tell, most petitions rejected by the SC are utterly frivolous & ought never to have been lodged at all. Besides, were the SC to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition they reject, theyd be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon them by the Constitution The Court underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the CA have had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to buttress such petitions if this Court is to be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the CA is not intended to give every losing party another hearing, as implied in sec. 4 of Rule 46 ROC. Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, the Court held that the CA had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from the "accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched by this Court in a number of decisions. There was, therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its supervisory power. Regarding the MFR, Atty. Almacen knew, or ought to have known, that for MFR to stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did not) as articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co. If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he has only himself to blame. It would thus appear that there is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts. WON Atty. Almacens actuations merit penalty YES. Every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation, because then the court's actuations are thrown open to public consumption. Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations. As citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges.

To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts & judges is to seal the lips of those in the best position to give advice & who might consider it their duty, to speak disparagingly. But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. A lawyer vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity... to the courts (Sec. 3, Rule 138) and the ROC constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." (Sec. 20(b), Rule 138) The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations or communications or in the course of a political campaign, if couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action. An examination of relevant parallel precedents [State v. Calhoon, In Re Glenn, In Re Humphrey, People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, In Re Troy, In Re Rockmore, In Re Mitchell, State ex rel Dabney v. Breckenridge, Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, State Board of Examiners v. Hart, Cobb v. United States, In Re Graves, In Re Doss, State v. Grimes] imparts the lesson that post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian' of the morals & ethics of the legal fraternity. The cases Salcedo vs. Hernandez, In re Sotto, Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al., Medina vs. Rivera, In the matter of the Intestate Estate of Rosario Olba, Contempt proceedings against Antonio Franco, People vs. Carillo, People vs. Venturanza, et al., De Joya, et al. vs. CFI of Rizal, Sison vs. Sandejas, Parangas vs. Cruz, and Cornejo vs. Tan all involved contumacious statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. However, although the doctrinal rule is that protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not after the conclusion thereof, that rule cannot be availed of by Atty. Almacen (who made the comments after this Court had written finis to his appeal) because such rule has lost much of its vitality. Although for sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction, the first stir for a modification thereof, however, came when, in People vs. Alarcon, the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with the majority holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to. Then a complete disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes. Thus, Atty. Almacen could as much be liable for contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated during the pendency of the said appeal. Besides, pendancy or non-pendancy is here immaterial. The sole objective of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession, by removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to continue to be entrusted with duties & responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney. Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty. Almacen's part. But then, he went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. The integrated entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to drive home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its members. Although, like

any other Govt entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not above criticism, a critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court must possess the quality of judiciousness and must be informed by perspective and infused by philosophy. It is not accurate to say that, as Atty. Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants, prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. Disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generic. There is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. The nature & extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty. Almacen for his transgressions may range from mere suspension to total removal or disbarment (Sec. 27, Rule 138, ROC) and the discretion to assess under the circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be controlled by the imperative need that the purity and independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously maintained. The Court thus held that Atty. Almacen be suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the merit of this choice being best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for himself how long or how short that suspension shall last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law.

Holding: Suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately. SANGALANG vs. IAC [1989]

MANILA PEST CONTROL vs. WCC [1968] Facts: February 24, 1967 WCC considered a complaint filed against it by Mario Abitria for compensation. It was submitted for decision after he and a physician had testified. The counsel of Manila Pest Control failed to appear at the hearing. A motion for reconsideration was filed praying he be allowed to present evidence on his behalf. This MFR was denied. Arbitria was employed by the MPC since February 4, 1956, working six (6) days a week and receiving an average monthly wage of P180.00 as labourer. He was assigned in the Research Division which conducted research on rat traps and other matters regarding extermination of pests, animals and insects. In the place of his employment he was made to inhale dangerous fumes as the atmosphere was polluted with poisonous chemical dusts. The working condition of his place of work was also warm and humid in view of the products being manufactured by the respondent. He was not extended any protective device and he was also made to lift heavy objects in the painting and soldering. Sometime in July, 1966 while the claimant was soldering [he] began to experience symptoms of pulmonary tuberculosis. Because of his spitting of blood or hemoptysis, he went to consult Dr. Felix Tuazon of the Quezon Institute whose diagnosis was pulmonary tuberculosis. The doctor testified that the nature of work of the claimant involving strenuous physical exertion and other factors of work such as the lowering of his resistance in view of the enormous inhalation of chemical fumes. The decision of the WCC was sent to Attorney Manuel Camacho but care of petitioner's counsel, Attorney Manuel Corpuz. MPC contends that the one "officially furnished" with a copy of such decision was not its counsel, who was without any connection with Attorney Camacho. It would conclude, therefore, that it had not received a copy of a decision which could not thereafter reach the stage of finality calling for a writ of execution. WCC explained via the affidavit of Mr. Guzman that when he went to the office of Atty. Corpuz, on March 10, 1967 to deliver a copy of the decision ..., but Atty. Corpuz refused to receive the said decision alleging that he was no longer handling the case. Atty. Corpuz, instead instructed Mr. Guzman to deliver the said decision to Atty. Camacho since it was already Atty, Camacho who was handling the case, and Atty. Camacho, according to Atty. Corpuz, even had the records of the case. Atty. Corpuz is impugning the delivery of the decision to Atty. Camacho. It was then alleged in the petition that on April 11, 1967, a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order was filed with the averment that petitioner was not aware of any decision rendered in the case as no copy of the same had theretofore been furnished to its counsel. April 24, 1967 motion for reconsideration was denied June 14, 1967 - a plea for execution was granted on behalf of Arbiria and subsequently the City Sheriff of Manila levied on the petitioners properties. The petitioner contends that the infringement of procedural due process, the actuation of the Commission was either in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Issue: WON Atty. Corpuz misused the processes of the Court to delay the delivery of justice? YES Ratio: Atty. Corpuz refused to receive the copy of the decision of the WCC and he is now impugning the delivery of the decision to Atty. Camacho and denying the knowledge of it when in fact and in truth the delivery of the decision to Atty. Camacho was made per his instruction. An effort was made to serve petitioner with a copy of the decision; that such effort failed was attributable to the conduct of its own counsel.

There is no reason why the decision would have been served on some other counsel if there where no such misinformation, if there where no such attempt to mislead It is one thing to exert to the utmost one's ability to protect the interest of one's client. It is quite another thing, and this is to put it at its mildest, to take advantage of any unforeseen turn of events, if not to create one, to delay if not to defeat the recovery of what is justly due and demandable, especially so, when as in this case, the obligee is a necessitous and poverty-stricken man suffering from a dreaded disease, that unfortunately afflicts so many of our countrymen and even more unfortunately requires an outlay far beyond the means of our poverty stricken masses.

Holding: With treble costs against petitioner to be paid by his counsel, Attorney Manuel A. Corpuz PNB vs. UY TENG PIAO [1932] Facts: Sept. 9, 1924, the CFI Manila rendered a judgment in favor of the PNB and against Uy Teng Piao for the sum of P17,232.42 with interest at 7% per annum from June 1, 1924 plus 10% of the sum amount for attys fees and costs. The court ordered the dfendant to deposit said amount with the clerk of the court within 3 months from the date of the judgment, and in case of his failure to do so that the mortgaged properties described in transfer certificates of tile # 7264 and 8274 should be sold at public auction in accordance with the law and the proceeds applied to the payment of the judgment. Uy faild to comply with the order of the court and the sheriff of the city of /manila sold the two parcels of land at public auction to the Philippine National Bank on Oct. 14, 1924 for P300 and P1000 respectively. Feb. 11,1925, the PNB secured from Uy a waiver of his right to redeem the property described in TCT 8274 and on the same date the bank sold the property to Mariano Santos for P8,600. Evidently the other parcel, TCT 7264 was subsequently resold by the bank for P2700 because the account of the defendant was credited with the sum of P11,300. In other words, the bank credited the defendant with the full amount realized by it when it resold the 2 parcels of land. The bank brought the present action to revive the judgment for the balance of P11,574.38 with interest at 7% per annum from Aug. 1, 1930. In his amended answer the defendant alleged as a special defense that he waived his right to redeem the land described in TCT# 8274 in consideration of an understanding between him and the bank , through a certain employee named Mr. Pecson, that the bank would not collect from him the balance of the judgment. It was on this ground that the trial court absolved the defendant from the complaint. One of the attys for the plaintiff testified that the defendant renounced his right to redeem the parcel of land in Calle Ronquillo, because a friend of the defendant was interested in buying it. The defendant has failed to prove any valid agreement on the part of the bank not to collect from him the remainder of the judgment. The alleged agreement rests upon the uncorroborated testimony of the defendant if Pecson was not in Iloilo at the time of the execution of the defendants waiver of his right to redeem, the defendant answered that he did not know; asked when Pecson had spoken to him about the matter the defendant replied that he did not remember. Issues WON Uy Teng Piao had waived his right to redeem the property in question in consideration of an understanding between him and an employee of the bank that the latter would not collect from the defendant the remainder of a prior jjudgment. No, Even conceding that there was such an agreement, it was not shown that said employee was authorized to make it, and that only the board of directors or the persons empowered by it could bind the bank. If Pecson had may any such agreement as the

defendant claims, it is reasonable to suppose that he would have required the defendant to waive his right to redeem both parcels of land, and that the defendant, a Chinese businessman, would have insisted upon some evidence of the agreement in writing. Furthermore, the evidence shows that the defendant waived his right to redeem the land in question because a friend his wished to purchase it, and the bank agreed to credit the defendant with the full amount of the sale. WON the counsel for the defendant could be a witness and at the same time an atty in a cause. Although the law does not forbid an atty to be a witness at the same time an atty in a cause, the courts prefer that counsel should not testify as a witness unless it is necessary, and that they should withdraw from the active mgt. Of the case. (Malcolm: legal ethics,p 148) Canon 19, when a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely formal matters, such as the attestation or custody of an instrument and the like, he should leave the trial of the case to other counsel. Except when essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer should avoid testifying in court in behalf of his client. Judgment The decision appealed from is reversed and the defendant is condemned to pay the plaintiff the sum of P11,574.38 with interest thereon at the rate of 7% per annum from august 1, 1930, and the costs for both instance. In Re: Published Alleged Threats against Members of the Court in the Plunder Law Case Hurled by Atty. Leonard De Vera [2002] Questioned here are alleged contemptuous statements uttered by Atty. Leonard de Vera regarding the case involving the constitutionality of the Plunder Law. 1. PDI, Nov. 6, 2001: De Vera asked SC to dispel rumors that it would decide in favor of Estradas lawyers declaring the law unconstitutional for its supposed vagueness. 2. PDI, Nov. 19, 2001: People are getting dangerously passionateemotionally charged. Declaring the law unconstitutional would trigger mass actions probably more massive than those that led to People Power II. Holding the law unconstitutional would lead to a crisis far worse than jueteng. People wont just swallow an SC decision w/c is basically wrong. Sovereignty must prevail. De Veras defense: 1. He had to make those statements since the integrity of the Court, including its Honorable members, was being viciously attacked. 2. He & his group (Equal Justice for All Movement) were greatly disturbed by such rumors. 3. His statements were factually accurate. He was merely exercising his constitutionally guaranteed rt to freedom of speech. It was an expression of his opinion & was historically correct. 4. He did not make those statements to degrade the Court, destroy public confidence in it & to bring it into disrepute. Issue: WON de Vera should be held in contempt of court. YES. Ratio: 1. The judiciary must be allowed to decide cases independently, free of outside influence or pressure. Such is essential in maintaining democracy as well as peace & order in society. Maintaining the dignity of courts & enforcing the duty of citizens to respect them are necessary to the administration of justice. 2. ROC, Rule 71, Sec. 3 (d) allows the court to hold liable for contempt anyone whos guilty of conduct directed against the dignity/authority of the court or of an act obstructing the administration of justice w/c tends to bring the court into disrepute/disrespect. 3. Freedom of speech includes the rt to know & discuss judicial proceedings but it does not include statements w/c aim to undermine the Courts integrity & authority and

4. 5.

6.

interfere w/the admin of justice. Freedom of speech is not absolute & such should be balanced w/the requirements of equally impt pub interests. Making contemptuous statements is an abuse of this right. Courts should be immune from every extraneous influence as they resolve the issues presented before them. Its an act of preserving the unprejudiced tribunal. People v. Godoy: citizens are allowed to comment on judicial proceedings, decisions & the fitness of the justices, but he has no rt to attempt to degrade the court, destroy public confidence in it & encourage people to disregard & set naught its orders, judgments & decrees. Such would be an abuse of the liberty of speech & of the press. De Veras statements are threats aimed to force the SC to decide in a particular manner or risk earning the ire of the public. These show disrespect for the Court & the judicial system tending to promote distrust & undermine public confidence in the judiciary by creating an impression that it cant be trusted. Such is contrary to De Veras duty to uphold the dignity & authority of the courts & to promote confidence in the fair admin of justice & in the SC as the last bulwark of justice & democracy.

Holding: De Vera is guilty of indirect contempt of court & fined P20,000.00 to be paid w/in 10 days from receipt of decision. NESTLE PHIL. vs. SANCHEZ [1987] From July 8-10, 1987, Union of Filipro Employees and Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia intensified the intermittent pickets they had been conducting in front of the Padre Faura gate of the SC building. Pickets continued even after their leaders had been received by Justices Pedro L. Yap & Marcelo B. Fernan as Chairmen of the Divisions where their cases are pending. It also continued even after Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro Employees, had been called in order that the pickets might be informed that the demonstration must cease immediately for the same constitutes direct contempt of court and that the Court would not entertain their petitions for as long as the pickets were maintained. Then, the Court en banc issued a resolution giving the said unions the opportunity to withdraw graciously and requiring the union leaders of Union of Filipro Employees in the Nestle case and their counsel of record, Atty. Jose C. Espinas and the union leaders of petitioner Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia in the Kimberly case to appear before the Court show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court. Atty. Jose C. Espinas was further required to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with. Those required to appear complied with the same on the appointed date and time. Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders concerned, apologized to the Court for the above described acts, together with an assurance that they will not be repeated. He likewise manifested to the Court that he had explained to the picketers why their actions were wrong and that the cited persons were willing to suffer such penalty as may be warranted under the circumstances. He further stated that he had explained to the picketers that any delay in the resolution of their cases is usually for causes beyond the control of the Court and that the SC has always remained steadfast in its role as the guardian of the Constitution. To confirm this, the Court required the respondents to submit a written manifestation to this effect, which they complied with

Issue: WON such apology may be accepted and the imposition of the sanction warranted by the contemptuous acts described earlier be foregone. The SC accepted the apology and the sanction was foregone. It however warned that it will not hesitate in future similar situations to apply the full force of the law

and punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure the Court into acting one way or the other in any case pending before it. Grievances, if any, must be ventilated through the proper channels, i.e., through appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the Courts as impartial administrators of justice entitled to "proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice." The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the citizen under all free governments. But, such right has never been invoked to shatter the standards of propriety entertained for the conduct of courts. Moreover, "parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publication or public clamor. The aforecited acts of the respondents are therefore not only an affront to the dignity of this Court, but equally a violation of the above-stated right of the adverse parties and the citizenry at large. We realize that the individuals herein cited who are non-lawyers are not knowledgeable in her intricacies of substantive and adjective laws. The duty and responsibility of advising them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of record. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when his attention was called by this Court, did his best to demonstrate to the pickets the untenability of their acts and posture. Let this incident therefore serve as a reminder to all members of the legal profession that it is their duty as officers of the court to properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice, and to labor leaders of the importance of a continuing educational program for their members.

Holding: Contempt charges are DISMISSED. Henceforth, no demonstrations or pickets intended to pressure or influence courts of justice into acting one way or the other on pending cases shall be allowed in the vicinity and/or within the premises of any and all courts. CRUZ vs. SALVA [1959]

MARTELINO vs. ALEJANDRO [1970] Facts: Major Eduardo Martelino is charged with the violation of the 94th and 97th Articles of War, as a result of the alleged shooting on March 18, 1968 of some Muslim recruits then undergoing commando training on the island of Corregidor. On August 12, 1969 Martelino sought the disqualification of the President of the general court-martial, following the latter's admission that he read newspaper stories of the Corregidor incident. Martelino contended that the case had received such an amount of publicity in the press and other news media and in fact was being exploited for political purposes in connection with the presidential election on November 11, 1969 as to imperil his right to a fair trial. After deliberating, the military court denied the challenge. Respondents assert that despite the publicity which the case had received, no proof has been presented showing that the court-martial's president's fairness and impartiality have been impaired. On the contrary, they claim, the petitioner's own counsel expressed confidence in the "integrity, experience and background" of the members of the court. Issue: WON the publicity given to the case against the petitioners was such as to prejudice their right to a fair trial? NO Ratio: The spate of publicity in this case did not focus on the guilt of the petitioners but rather on the responsibility of the Government for what was claimed to be a "massacre" of Muslim trainees. If there was a "trial by newspaper" at all, it was not of the petitioners but of the Government. Absent here is a showing of failure of the court-martial to protect the accused from massive publicity encouraged by those connected with the conduct of the trial either by a failure to control the release of information or to remove the trial to another venue or to postpone it until the deluge of prejudicial publicity shall have subsided. Indeed we cannot say that the trial of the petitioners was being held under circumstances which did not permit the observance of those imperative decencies of procedure which have come to be identified with due process. Granting the existence of "massive" and "prejudicial" publicity, since the petitioners here do not contend that the respondents have been unduly influenced but simply that they might be by the "barrage" of publicity, we think that the suspension of the court-martial proceedings has accomplished the purpose sought by the petitioners' challenge for cause, by postponing the trial of the petitioner until calmer times have returned. The atmosphere has since been cleared and the publicity surrounding the Corregidor incident has so far abated that we believe the trial may now be resumed in tranquillity. IN RE REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF TRIAL, PEREZ vs. ESTRADA [2001] Facts: 3-13-01The Kapisanan ng Brodkaster ng Pilipinas(KBP) petitioned the courts to allow them live coverage of the trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against Erap before the SB. It is to assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecendented case in our history. Seconded by Mr. Cesar Sarino, Sen. Renato Cayetano, and Atty. Ricardo Romulo. 4-17-01Then Sec of justice, Hernando Perez formally filed the instant petition, w/ following exegesis: it is public concern and interest(about highest official of the land), consti right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern, ensuring transparency preventing the railroading of the instant case. This reexamines the 1991 resolution of this court in a case for libel filed by Cory. Here they said that the live broadcasting of trials and even taking photographs while in progress are still forbidden in the US by Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure. Dignity and serious order is required and mustnt be treated as entertainment. There is no discrimination as even news reporter cant bring their typewriter and printing press inside. In Estes v Texas, they said live tv broadcast is inherently a denial of the due process rights of a defendant. A prejudicial effect on a witness may happen, from frightening them. The judges too are human and can be affected. The constitutional Judicial decorum needed inside the court must not give way to a reporters consti right which is not greater than an other member of the public. And live broadcast really does have a prejudicial effect, so also to protect due process, live broadcast shall not be allowed. WON the press may be allowed. No, although judicial notice is given to how big a social catalyst the press is; the fundamental rights of the accused, the consti gurantees of freedom of the press, the right to public information, and the consti power of the court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial must be weighed. And the rights of the accused must be prioritized to be protected. And the precious life and liberty of an accused that receives a verdict that would come only after the presentation of credible evidence testified to by unbiased witnesses unswayed by any kind of pressure whether open or subtle, in proceedings devoid of histrionics that might influence and decreed by a judge with an unprejudiced mind, unbridled by running emotions or passions, must take priority. DUE PROCESS must be protected for the accused. Although the effect of television is not yet proven but it is not far fetched that it gradually erodes our basal conception of a trial such as we know of it. The court does not take away the accuseds right to a public trial, but a public trial is not the same things as publicized trial. Because a public trial ensures that he is fairly dealt and wouldnt be unjustly condemned, unlike in secret conclaves of the old. The court must provide for adequate facilities for an adequate number of public to watch and listen to the proceedings with decorum to report later on. Using Estes v Texas, the prejudice from a live telecast is admitted. Recognition of the same effects as above with additional effect on defendant. Where it is considered to be a form of physical/mental harassment affecting dignity, concentration etc. The IBP expressed their comment. Saying that the a fair trial may not be assured because the hooting throng may arrogate themselves the task of judging the guilt. And there are also issues of the popular verdict subserving the ends of justice, pandered to by grandstanding lawyers. So even if the ConCom was silent on this matter, until 1991, the court had no established case law yet. The court prohibited it before as not they do again. WON the US cases cited by the minority really in pt. NO, Although the Nebraska Press case struck down the order prohibiting the publish of confessions or admissions strongly implicating the accused; the Richmond Newspaper case where the judge closed the courtroom except to witnesses when they testified was reversed; and the Globe Newspaper case voided the Massachusetts law that prohibited the presence of the press when a sexually molested child testified; the Chandler case on the burglary conviction of 2 policemen who said it was unfair as it was covered by television, the court said the consti violation perceived in Estes did not stem from physical disruption that might one day disappear with technological advances in television equipment but inhered in the hypothesis that the mere presence of cameras and recording devices might have an effect on the trial participants prejudicial to the accused SO. Parenthetically, the US courts still do not allow live television and radio coverage. The court said that a change in the 1991 decision is not propitious risking a relatively stable nation slowly recovering from EDSA II and III. Unlike other

govt offices the courts do not express the popular will. They must only adjudicate what are justiciable controversies on the basis of what is submitted before them. A trial is not a free trade of ideas, nor is a competing market of thoughts the known test for the truth. The court recognizes the modern techonologial and scientific advances but is NOT TAKING THE CHANCE ON THE LIFE OR LIBERTY OF ANY PERSON in a hasty bid to apply these advancements before safety nets are there. Petition is DENIED. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs. JAIME SOLIS, ARSENIO MANCHOS & BERNARDITO KINTANAR, accused-appellants [1984] July 28, 1968: Matea Hona came upon the body of Herminio Corsita in the yard of latters house in Sorsogon. She reported the case to the brgy captain who then reported the case to the police. Wounds were found at the back of victims ears & some marks were seen at the back of his body. Also found were 2 pcs of bloodstained wound, a bolo, and other belongings of Corsita w/c were scattered at the scene of the crime. A dead chicken was also found. Signs of struggle both inside & outside the house of the victim were observed. Two suspects were arrested but were later on released. Local police authorities received 3 anonymous letters 2mos after the crime was committed. 1. Letter#1: threat against Sgt. Guban & other members of the local police force 2. Letter#2: tip re perpetrators who were allegedly living in Nasohi, Inararan, Bulan, Sorsogon. Police informants were sent to said place. They later on reported that the accused were Solis, Manchos & Kintanar and that Solis killed Corsita. The police decided to pick up Kintanar first since he was the least experienced. True enough, Kintanar admitted his participation & confessed that Solis & Manchos were w/him when he committed the crime. Solis & Manchos were arrested & they likewise admitted their roles in the heinous crime. Accused charged w/robbery w/homicide aggravated by superior strength, nighttime, disregard of the age of the victim (70 yrs. old). Since there was no eyewitness, facts were established by the info gathered during the investigation, circumstances leading to the arrest of the accused & the extrajudicial statements executed by the accused. Accused pleaded not guilty. 1. Their counsel de oficio moved for postponement of trial on the ground that they were considering the possibility of changing their plea. However, counsel Ginete failed to appear on trial date. 2. Solis informed the Court that their counsel de parte, Atty. Carranza would appear the following day. However, Carranza did not appear either. 3. By virtue of the accuseds manifestation that they already hired the services of Carranza, Court granted w/drawal of Ginete as counsel de oficio. Trial was moved to another date. 4. However, on the date of the trial, accused informed the court that their friends & families were still raising money to pay for the services of the counsel of their choice. Hearing was postponed again. But this time, court appointed Attys. Paps, Dugan & Dino as attys. De oficio to avoid further delay. 5. Paps informed the court that only Dino would handle the case for all 3 accused. Court granted w/drawal of Paps & Dugan. 6. Dino manifested that his clients were waiving their rt to adduce evidence then asked for dismissal of the charge on ground of gross inadequacy of the evidence to justify conviction. RTC: accused convicted as charged sentenced w/death penalty. Issues & Ratio:

1.

WON conviction was proper. YES. Theres no question that Corsita was robbed of 7 chickens, 1 bolo, 2 pairs of pants & 2 shirts with the total value of P19.20 & that he died on the occasion of said robbery. Though there was no eyewitness, accused executed their individual affidavits admitting their respective roles & participation. (see p.225 for details) None of the accused took the witness stand to repudiate their extra-judicial statements. Thus, theyre presumed to be given voluntarily & w/o compulsion/inducement. Accuseds confessions + evidence of corpus delicti are sufficient to support their conviction. Their conduct before, during & after the crime was committed likewise reveal the coordination of their efforts & community of design to commit the crime. There was conspiracy in this case thus, it should be treated applying the rule the act of one, is the act of all, making all of them liable for each others acts. WON the accused were deprived of due process for failure of the trial court to afford them the rt to be defended by a lawyer of their choice. NO. They were given the chance to secure the services of the lawyer of their choice. Frequent postponements were actually caused by their failure to secure the services of a lawyer of their choice. They did not inform the trial court of their desire to be defended by a lawyer of their choice. They did not object to the appointment of a counsel de oficio. Its a wellsettled rule that where a counsel has been assigned to a person on trial & counsel acted w/o objection from the accused, the latters conviction cant be set aside on the sole ground that counsel was not of his own choice. WON accused needed to testify to ensure the veracity & voluntariness of their confessions. NO. None of them intimated that their confessions were extracted through violence or coercion. They even executed an express waiver to present evidence thus the court had no choice but to decide based on the evidence adduced by the prosecution. By executing the waiver, accused ran the risk of an inference of guilt especially if the mass of evidentiary details point to the gen. conclusion of his guilt. Court cant imagine/surmise possible circumstances w/c might justify rejection of the factual conclusions.

2.

3.

Holding: All accused are guilty as charged of robbery w/homicide. Lower court decision affirmed. LEDESMA vs. CLIMACO [SUPRA] QUILBAN vs. ROBINOL [1989]

RICONADA TELEPHONE CO. vs. BUENVIAJE [1990] Facts: July 30, 1971 Francisco Imperial orally conveyed to Riconada a certificate of public convenience and necessity to operate a telephone company in Iriga for the consideration of P12,500 (125 shares of stocks at 100 per share) Riconada started to operate but it was only on October 14, 1971 that Imperial executed the deed of sale. September 21, 1972 Imperial again sold the same certificate to Iriga telephone Company (ITELCO). As a result of the sale Imperial was charged with Estafa and 2 actions was also filed against Imperial (contract of breach with damages and annulment of the Deed of Sale) Imperial was absolved in the criminal case and as such he moved for the dismissal of the civil case filed against him. This motion was granted by the court and the MFR filed by the petitioner thru its counsel, Atty Benjamin Santos, was also denied. With the same counsel Riconada filed a notice of appeal and appeal bond. Imperial opposed the appeal because it was filed out of time. The court denied the notice of appeal. In the decision of the court it stated that Atty. Maggay was the counsel on record and as such the orders of the court were received by him. Petitioner went to the SC claiming that Judge Buenviaje gravely abused his discretion in denying their appeal. Petitioner contends that it received court processes thru Atty. Santos when the latter entered his appearance in both cases by his filing of a notice of appearance and a motion for reconsideration of the orders of dismissal which he furnished the counsel of respondent Imperial. Specifically, it mentioned the order of respondent judge sent to Atty. Benjamin Santos considering the motion for reconsideration submitted for resolution. It expressed amazement over the act of respondent judge in not sending to Atty. Santos a copy of the order denying the motion for reconsideration knowing fully well that the period to appeal therefrom would lapse without the knowledge of Atty. Santos, its new counsel. While admitting that its notice of appeal and appeal bond was filed out of time; petitioner considers such fact as the result of the collusion between respondent judge and respondent Imperial.

in case the consent of attorney to be substituted cannot be obtained there must be at least a proof of notice that the motion for substitution has been served upon him in the manner prescribed by the rules In the present case there was no valid substitution. Neither can it be said that Atty. Maggay formally withdrew as counsel for petitioner in the cases. Therefore, he continued to represent petitioner and he remained the counsel of record and was for all legal purposes, petitioners' attorney upon whom respondent court's processes may be served. Despite the filing of Atty. Santos of a motion for reconsideration, copy of which he furnished the opposing counsel, Atty. Maggay is still considered counsel of record. Not having formally withdrawn as counsel, the order denying the notice of appeal and appeal bond was deemed properly served upon Atty. Maggay. Notice of the order to him was notice to petitioner and for all legal intents and purposes, the date of his receipt is considered the starting point from which the period to appeal prescribed by law starts to run. Some facts warrants a relaxation of the rule of the court because Judge Buenviaje recognized Atty. Santos as the new counsel and as such there is a clear case of negligence when Atty. Santos was nor furnished a copy of the order denying the reconsideration. Respondent judge's sudden change of posture in insisting that Atty. Maggay is the counsel of record is, therefore, a whimsical and capricious exercise of discretion that prevented petitioner and Atty. Santos from taking a timely appeal from said order. Clearly, respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying petitioner's notice of appeal. o

Holding: the writs prayed for are GRANTED. Respondent trial court is hereby ordered to allow the appeal of petitioner from the orders dismissing Civil Cases No. IR-265 and IR-578.

Issue: WON the Judge Buenviaje committed grave abuse of discretion? YES Ratio: The right of a client to terminate the authority of his counsel includes the right to make a change or substitution at any stage of the proceedings. Requisite for a valid substitution: o upon written application o with written consent of the client o upon written consent of the attorney to be substituted

LEDESMA vs. CLIMACO [SUPRA]