Chairman Richard Myers / Captain Charles Joseph Leidig 1) In its investigation, Commission staff has found that the

FAA was not a participant on the notification list for Significant Events Conference or Air Threat Conference calls. • • Do you view this fact as a serious impediment to communications that day? Given the fact that FAA is charged with monitoring the national air space, would it have been prudent to add them to the list of conferees for these calls?

2) On 9/11, were you aware an unknown target was in the vicinity of Washington DC or heading in that direction prior to the airplane that hit the Pentagon? Following the attack on the Pentagon, what steps were taken by those in your command and/or the NMCC to identify other potential hijacked airplanes in the system? 3) Upon arriving at the NMCC DDO Shack following the attack on the Pentagon, was the air threat conference call operating? Do you recall what information was being reported on the air threat conference call? Did you make any or were you privy to decisions made on the air threat conference call in response to the hijack events at that time? What was your understanding of communications with the FAA from the NMCC? 4) Were you aware that the FAA hijack protocol was modified in the summer of 2001 to include notification to the Secretary of Defense? If so, was that modification in response to the heightened threat environment? 5) One of the first places the NMCC turned to for information that morning, before the second tower was struck, was FAA. There was no further effective interaction with FAA until much later in the day. • Why didn't the NMCC take positive action to ensure that its key source of information, FAA, was on the Significant Events Conference and the Air Threat Conference?

6) On 9/11 there existed within the FAA a military infrastructure that did not have a role in crisis function. • • Was the NMCC, and in fact NORAD and DoD, aware that there was military representation within FAA, at the Headquarters, at the Command Center, and at the Regions? Further, did NORAD and the national level know that the FAA had civilian personnel who were military operations specialists at most en route centers?

Was there any thought to utilize this infrastructure in response to the hijackings?