Draft
6/9/2004
Chairman Richard Myers
Team 8 Questions
You are reported to have told the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs when you assumed
command that you could provide air sovereignty in name only.
• Was that your assessment? If so, what threats did you believe
NORAD would be unable to address? Did you share these views with
the Chairman?
• What was your role in the formation and work of the RAM team? Are
you familiar with its findings? What was its impact on NORAD's air
defense mission and planning?
Osama Bin Laden is featured on the cover of the brief developed by the RAM
team, and he figures prominently in the study. In terms of the nature of the threat,
one member of the team we spoke with (Col. Scott - CONR on 9/11) stated, "As
we started talking about Osama Bin Laden, the examples we gave in our mission
brief were the first WTC bombing, the Tokyo subway, Oklahoma City bombing
and Atlanta Olympics. What we did was connect those dots. The conclusion we
drew was that we had a viable threat."
• Did you agree with this assessment? What was the nature of the air
threat posed by Osama Bin Laden, as you understood it during your
tenure at NORAD?
Commission Sensitive
Draft
6/9/2004
• How would you describe the relationship between NORAD and the
FAA prior to 9/11? Please describe the division of responsibility with
respect to hijackings.
During your confirmation hearing, on September 13, 2001, you stated that the
issue of homeland defense was debated in DoD's quadrennial defense review
(released on September 30, 2001), and that the September 11th tragedy put that
issue "center stage."
Immediate Response: When did you first arrive in the NMCC? How
did you learn of the stakes in New York? What was your reaction to
the second hit on the World Trade Center? Specifically, what
actions/decisions were made between the second strike in NYC - at
approximately 0903 - and the time the Pentagon was hit - 0937?
Coordination with FAA: It appears that the FAA was not linked into
the NMCC until approximately 1015 — after Flight 93 had already
gone down in Pennsylvania. What was the coordination with the FAA
from the NMCC? Did you speak to anyone from the FAA or DOT on
the morning of 9/11 ? Did you view the link between NORAD and
FAA as critical to an effective air defense operation?
Shoot Down Order: Where and when did you first learn of the shoot
down order? How was it passed down the chain of command at DoD?
Was the issue brought to the President before you gave the order?
Please describe.
• United Flight #93: Do you believe that NORAD assets would have
been able to shoot down Flight 93, had the passengers not brought the
plane down in Pennsylvania? If so, please describe your
understanding of NORAD's ability and readiness to shoot down Flight
93 at approximately 1025.
• Have you seen an after-action report from NORAD regarding the air
defense operation on 9/11? Our understanding is one was not
produced, can you explain that decision? How would you assess
NORAD's performance that day?