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Chairman Richard Myers
Team 8 Questions

I. CINC NORAD, August 1998-February 2000

Air Sovereignty in Name Only:
Gen. Meyers, you assumed command of NORAD at a critical time in the history
of its air defense/air sovereignty mission. The number of alert sites had been
declining even prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the Quardrennial
Defense Review Report of 1997 recommended that the number of alert sites be
reduced to 4. We understand that there was sentiment in the regular Air Force to
eliminate the air defense mission entirely. At the same time, command of the
First Air Force and CONR was transferred to the Air National Guard from the
regular Air Force.

You are reported to have told the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs when you assumed
command that you could provide air sovereignty in name only.

• Was that your assessment? If so, what threats did you believe
NORAD would be unable to address? Did you share these views with
the Chairman?

• As CINC NORAD, did you resist the reduction of NORAD' s
capabilities to four alert sites? How many sites did you feel would
have been adequate to provide air sovereignty? On 9/11 there were 7
alert facilities. Did you feel that was a sufficient number?

Role and Mission ("RAM") Team
Our understanding is that in 1999 NORAD formed a "Role and Mission" (RAM)
team to study the efficacy of the air defense/sovereignty mission.

• What was your role in the formation and work of the RAM team? Are
you familiar with its findings? What was its impact on NORAD's air
defense mission and planning?

Osama Bin Laden is featured on the cover of the brief developed by the RAM
team, and he figures prominently in the study. In terms of the nature of the threat,
one member of the team we spoke with (Col. Scott - CONR on 9/11) stated, "As
we started talking about Osama Bin Laden, the examples we gave in our mission
brief were the first WTC bombing, the Tokyo subway, Oklahoma City bombing
and Atlanta Olympics. What we did was connect those dots. The conclusion we
drew was that we had a viable threat."

• Did you agree with this assessment? What was the nature of the air
threat posed by Osama Bin Laden, as you understood it during your
tenure at NORAD? 
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• Every example given by the RAM team — WTC, Tokyo, Oklahoma
City, the Atlanta Olympics -- involved an internal attack. Was there
any recognition that the old paradigm of "looking out" for threats
overseas - or merely assisting law enforcement in domestic cases -
may not be sufficient to combat the terrorist threat? What did you
envision NORAD's role to be in responding to such internal attacks?
What kind of force structure did you feel NORAD needed to respond
to the threat?

• Did NORAD's training and exercise regimen reflect the emerging
threat identified by the RAM team? How?

Hijackings Prior to 9/11

• How would you describe the relationship between NORAD and the
FAA prior to 9/11? Please describe the division of responsibility with
respect to hijackings.

• Prior to 9/11 did the leadership of NORAD ever consider the
possibility of a suicide hijacking as a threat to our nation?

We have heard from a number of DoD officials - including the
Secretary - that prior to 9/11 hijackings were considered a law
enforcement issue, and that DoD was only to play a supporting role if
called upon. My question is how could law enforcement - either state or
federal - ever effectively respond to a suicide hijacking? What assets are
available to law enforcement to shoot down an aircraft with a suicide
hijacker in control? Once one acknowledges the possibility of a suicide
hijacking, how can the tasking for that eventuality be assigned anywhere
but to the Air Force?

• To your knowledge, prior to 9/11 did NORAD ever conduct any
training exercises that involved a suicide hijacking scenario?

Homeland Defense - QDR Debate

During your confirmation hearing, on September 13, 2001, you stated that the
issue of homeland defense was debated in DoD's quadrennial defense review
(released on September 30, 2001), and that the September 11th tragedy put that
issue "center stage."

• Please describe the debate surrounding homeland defense prior to
9/11. Was the role and mission of NORAD a factor in that debate?
What threats were envisioned? 
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II. Day of 9/11

Command and Control on 9/11

Immediate Response: When did you first arrive in the NMCC? How
did you learn of the stakes in New York? What was your reaction to
the second hit on the World Trade Center? Specifically, what
actions/decisions were made between the second strike in NYC - at
approximately 0903 - and the time the Pentagon was hit - 0937?

Coordination with FAA: It appears that the FAA was not linked into
the NMCC until approximately 1015 — after Flight 93 had already
gone down in Pennsylvania. What was the coordination with the FAA
from the NMCC? Did you speak to anyone from the FAA or DOT on
the morning of 9/11 ? Did you view the link between NORAD and
FAA as critical to an effective air defense operation?

Control of Fighters Over DC: At one point a question was posed
about the Vice Chairman wanting to know who is controlling aircraft
over DC. The FAA answers Washington Center.

Was it your understanding that the FAA was controlling the
fighter aircraft? Were you or others in the NMCC in
contact with NEADS at this time? Did the FAA's response trigger
concerns in your mind about the level of coordination and
understanding between NORAD and the FAA that morning?

Shoot Down Order: Where and when did you first learn of the shoot
down order? How was it passed down the chain of command at DoD?

The first guidance ADD was at approximately ADD; it was
followed by similar instruction at approximately ADD.

Were you monitoring the ATCC when these instructions
were given? What actions were taken at the NMCC in
response to these requests? A representative from NORAD
was on the call at this time, do you know what actions the
PEOC requests triggered at NORAD?

Secretary Rumsfeld stated that by the time he got on the ATCC
and spoke to the Vice President - at approximately 1040 - his
understanding was that the Combatant Commander had already
been authorized by the Vice President to shoot down after the Vice
President talked to the President. 
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Is that consistent with your understanding? Is the authorization you and
Secretary Rumsfeld refer to the requests from the PEOC to the ATCC, that
were heard by NORAD? Was there a specific phone call between General
Eberhart and the Vice President?

• Development of ROE: What role did you play in the development of
rules of engagement for fighter aircraft involved in the CAPs on 9/11?
Please describe this process. When were the rules finalized and
distributed? What rules were in effect while this process was being
worked?

• Andrews Scramble: What involvement — if any—did you have with
the decision to scramble aircraft from Andrews Air Force Base on the
morning of 9/11?
Were you monitoring the Air Threat Conference Call
when the requests from the PEOC for air support from
Andrews were being made? To your knowledge, did the
NMCC take action on these requests?

• DefCon 3 Decision: According to the Air Threat Conference Call,
you ordered your forces to DefCon 3 at 1046. [add sentence -
classified]

Was the issue brought to the President before you gave the order?
Please describe.

• United Flight #93: Do you believe that NORAD assets would have
been able to shoot down Flight 93, had the passengers not brought the
plane down in Pennsylvania? If so, please describe your
understanding of NORAD's ability and readiness to shoot down Flight
93 at approximately 1025.

Post 9-11 Review and Assessment

• Have you seen an after-action report from NORAD regarding the air
defense operation on 9/11? Our understanding is one was not
produced, can you explain that decision? How would you assess
NORAD's performance that day?

• Have you reviewed the NMCC's After Action Report, drafted by
Winfield Montague? If so, what is your reaction to his report?