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First published Sat Jul 2, 2005; substantive revision Wed Feb 13, 2013
K ant's v iew s on aesthetics and teleology are giv en their f ullest presentation in his Critique of Judgment (Kritik der Urteilskraft, also translated Critique of the Power of Judgment), published in 1790. T his w ork is in tw o parts, preceded by a long introduction in w hich K ant ex plains and def ends the w ork 's im portance in his critical sy stem ov erall: in the f irst part, the “Critique of A esthetic Judgm ent,” K ant discusses aesthetic ex perience and judgm ent, in particular of the beautif ul and the sublim e, and also artistic creation; in the second part, the “Critique of T eleological Judgm ent,” he discusses the role of teleology (that is, appeal to ends, purposes or goals) in natural science and in our understanding of nature m ore generally . T he Critique of Judgment w as the third and last of K ant's three Critiques, the other tw o being the Critique of Pure Reason (1781, w ith a second edition in 1787), w hich deals w ith m etaphy sics and epistem ology , and the Critique of Practical Reason of 1788, w hich, alongside hisGroundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals of 1785, deals w ith ethics. T he Critique of Judgment has receiv ed less attention than the other tw o Critiques. One reason is that the areas of aesthetics and natural teleology hav e traditionally been considered less philosophically central than those of ethics, m etaphy sics and epistem ology . A nother is that it raises an interpretiv e problem w hich has no analogue in the case of the other Critiques: that is, how to m ak e sense of the w ork as a w hole giv en the seem ing disparity of the tw o parts, not only w ith each other, but also w ith the “f aculty of judgm ent” w hich is the w ork 's ostensible f ocus. How ev er, K ant's aesthetic theory has alw ay s been ex trem ely inf luential w ithin philosophical aesthetics and the philosophy of art, and since the late 1970s there has been a rapidly ex panding literature on K ant's aesthetics w ithin A nglo-A m erican K ant interpretation. K ant's v iew s on natural teleology , v ery m uch neglected in com parison to his aesthetics, started to receiv e m ore attention in the early 1990s, and there has been greatly increased interest, during the last ten y ears in particular, both in K ant's v iew of teleology in its ow n right, and in its potential relev ance to contem porary philosophy of biology . M oreov er, ov er the last tw enty y ears or so, m ore attention has been directed tow ards the project of interpreting the Critique of Judgment as a coherent w hole. W ith increased f ocus on its general philosophical underpinnings, it has com e to be seen not only as signif icant w ithin the disciplines of aesthetics and philosophy of biology , but also as play ing an im portant sy stem atic role w ith respect to K ant's epistem ology , m etaphy sics and ethics, and indeed, as relev ant to contem porary discussions in these, and related, areas.
K ant's aesthetics and teleology together com prise a v ery w ide f ield, and this article cannot cov er all the relev ant topics, nor tak e account of all the relev ant literature. T hree lim itations should be m entioned. First, although K ant w rote on aesthetics and teleology throughout his career, this article considers only K ant's Critique of Judgment(along w ith the so-called “First Introduction,” an earlier v ersion of the Introduction w hich w as not published during K ant's lif etim e but w hich is included w ith the m ost recent English translations of the Critique of Judgment). S econd, this article is concerned prim arily w ith the interpretiv e and philosophical issues raised by K ant's w ritings on these topics, as opposed to historical questions regarding their origin and reception. T hird, the article f ocusses prim arily on those issues w hich hav e attracted m ost attention in the A nglo-A m erican analy tic tradition; this is ref lected in the bibliography , w hich is prim arily restricted to w ork s in English, and m ore specif ically f rom an analy tic perspectiv e. For som e ref erences to K ant's w ritings on aesthetics and teleology other than the Critique of Judgment, see under Prim ary S ources in theB ibliography . S om e suggestions f or secondary literature dealing w ith the history and reception of K ant's aesthetics and teleology , and f or secondary literature in English f rom a less analy tic perspectiv e, are giv en under S econdary S ources in the B ibliography .
1. T he Faculty of Judgm ent 2. A esthetics o 2.1 W hat is a Judgm ent of B eauty ? o 2.2 How are Judgm ents of B eauty Possible? o 2.3 Judgm ents of B eauty : S om e Interpretativ e Issues 2.3.1 Pleasure and Judgm ent 2.3.2 T he Free Play of Im agination and Understanding 2.3.3 T he Intentionality of the Pleasure 2.3.4 T he Character of the Claim to A greem ent 2.3.5 Is B eauty Objectiv e? 2.3.6 N egativ e Judgm ents of B eauty o 2.4 Judgm ents of B eauty : S om e Criticism s o 2.5 Free and A dherent B eauty o 2.6 A rt, Genius and A esthetic Ideas o 2.7 T he S ublim e o 2.8 A esthetics and M orality o 2.9 T he B roader S ignif icance of K ant's A esthetics 3. T eleology o 3.1 T he N otion of Purposiv eness o 3.2 N ature's Purposiv eness f or our Cognitiv e Faculties o 3.3 Organism s as N atural Ends o 3.4 M echanism and T eleology
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3.5 N ature as a S y stem of Purposes 3.6 T eleology , M orality and R eligion o 3.7 R elev ance of K ant's N atural T eleology to Contem porary B iological T heory B ibliography o A . Prim ary S ources o B . S econdary S ources A cadem ic T ools Other Internet R esources R elated Entries
1. The Faculty of Judgment
K ant's account of aesthetics and teleology is ostensibly part of a broader discussion of the f aculty or pow er of judgm ent [Urteilskraft], w hich is the f aculty “f or think ing the particular under the univ ersal” (Introduction IV , 5:179). A lthough the Critique of Pure Reason includes som e discussion of the f aculty of judgm ent, def ined as “the capacity to subsum e under rules, that is, to distinguish w hether som ething f alls under a giv en rule” (k rV A 132/B 171), it is not until the Critique of Judgment that he treats judgm ent as a f ull-f ledged f aculty in its ow n right, w ith its ow n a priori principle, and, accordingly , requiring a “critique” to determ ine its scope and lim its. Judgm ent in the Critique of Judgment is described as hav ing tw o roles or aspects, “determ ining” [bestimmend] and “ref lecting” [reflektierend] (Introduction IV , 5:179 and FI V , 20:211). Judgm ent in its determ ining role subsum es giv en particulars under concepts or univ ersals w hich are them selv es already giv en. T his role coincides w ith the role assigned to the f aculty of judgm ent in the Critique of Pure Reason; it also appears to correspond to the activ ity of im agination in its “schem atism ” of concepts. Judgm ent in this role does not operate as an independent f aculty , but is instead gov erned by principles of the understanding. T he m ore distinctiv e role assigned to judgm ent in the Critique of Judgment is the ref lecting role, that of “f inding” the univ ersal f or the giv en particular (Introduction IV , 5:179). K ant's recognition of judgm ent as a f aculty in its ow n right, and hence of the need f or a Critique not just f or theoretical and practical reason but also f or judgm ent, appears to be connected w ith his ascription to judgm ent of a ref lecting, in addition to a m erely determ ining, role. Judgm ent as ref lecting, or ref lectiv e judgm ent [reflektierende Urteilskraft], is assigned v arious dif f erent roles w ithin K ant's sy stem . It is described as responsible f or v arious cognitiv e task s associated w ith em pirical scientif ic enquiry , in particular, the classif ication of natural things into a hierarchical tax onom y of genera and species, and
the construction of sy stem atic ex planatory scientif ic theories. K ant also suggests that it has a m ore f undam ental role to play in m ak ing cognition possible, in particular that it enables us to regard nature as em pirically law lik e (see especially Introduction V , 5:184), and, ev en m ore f undam entally , that it is responsible f or the f orm ation of all em pirical concepts (see especially FI V , 20:211–213). B ut ref lectiv e judgm ent is also described as responsible f or tw o specif ic k inds of judgm ents: aesthetic judgm ents (judgm ents about the beautif ul and the sublim e) and teleological judgm ents (judgm ents w hich ascribe ends or purposes to natural things, or w hich characteriz e them in purposiv e or f unctional term s). T hese, along w ith associated topics, are discussed respectiv ely in S ection I, the “Critique of A esthetic Judgm ent, ” and S ection II, the “Critique of T eleological Judgm ent. ” T he discussion of the role of judgm ent in em pirical scientif ic enquiry is conf ined to a f ew sections of the Introduction and First Introduction. A lthough ref lectiv e judgm ent is ex ercised in both aesthetic and teleological judgm ent, K ant assigns a special role to its ex ercise in the aesthetic case, and specif ically in judgm ents of beauty (Introduction V III, 193; FI X I, 243–244). M ore specif ically , he say s, it is in judgm ents of beauty (as opposed to the sublim e), and ev en m ore specif ically , judgm ents about the beauty of nature (as opposed to art), that “judgm ent rev eals itself as a f aculty that has its ow n special principle” (FI X I, 244). T he especially close connection betw een judgm ents of beauty and the f aculty of judgm ent is ref lected in K ant's v iew that the f eeling of pleasure in a beautif ul object is f elt in v irtue of an ex ercise of ref lectiv e judgm ent (Introduction V II, FI V III). M uch of K ant's aesthetics and theory of teleology is dev eloped w ithout any ex plicit ref erence to the f aculty of judgm ent, and the “Critique of A esthetic Judgm ent” m ak es no m ention of the role of ref lectiv e judgm ent in em pirical scientif ic enquiry (in f act, the term “ref lectiv e judgm ent” does not f igure in the “Critique of A esthetic Judgm ent” at all). T he only suggestion in the “Critique of A esthetic Judgm ent” of an im portant role f or the f aculty of judgm ent in K ant's aesthetics is in the Deduction of T aste, w here he describes the principle of taste as the “subjectiv e principle of judgm ent in general” (§35, 286) and suggests that the relation of aesthetic judgm ent specif ically to the f aculty of judgm ent in general is crucial f or the legitim acy of judgm ents of beauty (§38, 290). B ut it is possible on the f ace of it to m ak e sense of K ant's analy sis of judgm ents of beauty , and of his argum ent f or their legitim acy , w ithout appeal to the account of the f aculty of judgm ent of f ered in the Introductions to the Critique of Judgment. A ccordingly m uch of the secondary literature on K ant's aesthetics has treated it in isolation f rom the m ore general account of judgm ent in w hich it is em bedded, and the sam e is true, perhaps to an ev en greater ex tent, in the case of K ant's teleology . Conv ersely , discussions of K ant's “theory of judgm ent” hav e ty pically tak en little or no account of K ant's treatm ent of judgm ent in the
third Critique, suggesting thereby that K ant's v iew s on judgm ent are ex hausted by his account of cognitiv e (in particular non-aesthetic) judgm ents in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Logic. (T he article “K ant's T heory of Judgm ent” in the present Ency clopedia (Hanna 2009) is one recent ex am ple.) How ev er, recent interest in the sy stem atic role of the Critique of Judgment in K ant's philosophy ov erall has resulted in increased attention to the notion of judgm ent in the third Critique, and specif ically to the question of its bearing on K ant's theory of judgm ent in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Logic. B ell (1987) and Ginsborg (1990) both argue f or the centrality of the third Critique's notion of judgm ent in K ant's theory of cognitiv e judgm ents in the f irst Critique. T he im portance of the thirdCritique's notion of judgm ent f or K ant's account of cognition is also highlighted in B éatrice L onguenesse's im portant 1998 study of the “capacity to judge” in the f irstCritique. L onguenesse m aintains that there is a close connection betw een the “capacity to judge” [Vermögen zu urteilen] in that w ork and the f aculty of judgm ent in theCritique of Judgment, a connection w hich she sum m ariz es by describing the f aculty of judgm ent as the “actualiz ation” of the capacity to judge in relation to sensory perceptions (1998, 8). A ccording to L onguenesse, the activ ity of ref lectiv e judgm ent corresponds to the “com parison, ref lection and abstraction” w hich K ant describes in the Logic (§6, 9:94–95) as responsible f or the f orm ation of em pirical concepts, and w hich she understands as, in turn, a necessary condition of the application of the pure concepts of understanding to the m anif old of sensible intuition (1998, 163–166 and 195–197). L onguenesse's v iew on this point is endorsed and elaborated in A llison (2001, ch. 1); f or criticism , and an alternativ e approach, see Ginsborg (2006). In addition to its potential signif icance f or K ant's theory of cognition, the notion of judgm ent in the third Critique is also im portant f or addressing the interpetiv e problem of the unity of the Critique of Judgment, in particular, the question of w hy K ant addresses aesthetics and teleology together in a single w ork . M any com m entators hav e been sk eptical that K ant draw s any real philosophical connection betw een the tw o areas; see f or ex am ple S chopenhauer (1969, v ol. I, p. 531), M arc-W ogau (1938, p. 34n.), and B eck (1969, 497). B ut recently there hav e been increasing attem pts to understand K ant's v iew s on aesthetics and his v iew s on biological teleology as aspects of a unif ied philosophical project. Proposals f or connecting K ant's v iew s on aesthetics w ith his v iew s on natural teleology can be f ound, f or ex am ple, in Z um bach (1984, pp. 51–53), M ak k reel (1990, ch. 5), A quila (1991), and Ginsborg (1997a).; by f ar the m ost dev eloped account is to be f ound in Z uck ert (2007). For m ore on the question of the unity of the Critique of Judgment, see under 3.1 and 3.2 below .
5 Free and A dherent B eauty 2. but also w ith the production of objects about w hich such judgm ents are appropriately m ade. S ection 2.8 w ith the relation betw een aesthetics and m orality . w hile K ant m ostly f ocusses on the ones w hich are pure. to pure judgm ents of beauty .2 How are Judgm ents of B eauty Possible? 2.2. (Follow ing K ant's usage.6 A rt. S uch judgm ents can either be.4 are concerned.3 Judgm ents of B eauty : Interpretiv e Issues 2. is a judgm ent w hich is based on f eeling.7 T he S ublim e 2. m ore specif ically . and S ection 2. T he “Critique of A esthetic Judgm ent” is concerned not only w ith judgm ents of the beautif ul and the sublim e. there are reasons to think that m ost judgm ents about art (as opposed to nature) do not count as pure. the ex pression “judgm ent of beauty ” w ithout qualif ication w ill ref er.1 and 2. and w hich correspond roughly to the “A naly tic of the B eautif ul” and the “Deduction of Pure A esthetic Judgm ents” respectiv ely . How ev er. this topic is discussed under the headings of “f ine art” or “beautif ul art” [schöne Kunst] and “genius.” T he m ost distinctiv e part of K ant's aesthetic theory .A n aesthetic judgm ent. and in particular on the f eeling of pleasure or displeasure. in w hat f ollow s. judgm ents of taste). Other elem ents of K ant's theory are sk etched in the rem ainder of the section. K ant of ten uses the ex pression “aesthetic judgm ent” in a narrow er sense w hich ex cludes judgm ents of the agreeable. equiv alently . pure judgm ents of beauty . Genius and A esthetic Ideas 2. or f ail to be. S ection 2. A ccording to K ant's of f icial v iew there are three k inds of aesthetic judgm ent: judgm ents of the agreeable. is his account of judgm ents of beauty .4 Judgm ents of B eauty : S om e Criticism s 2.8 A esthetics and M orality .5 is concerned w ith judgm ents of beauty that are not pure. “pure”. so that it is im portant to understand K ant's v iew s on such judgm ents as w ell. and it is w ith aesthetic judgm ents in this narrow er sense that the “Critique of A esthetic Judgm ent” is prim arily concerned.9 w ith other im plications of K ant's aesthetic theory . S ections 2. in K ant's usage. respectiv ely . and judgm ents of the sublim e. w ith interpretativ e issues that hav e arisen in connection w ith the account. and. S ection 2.7 w ith judgm ents of the sublim e. � � � � � � � � 2.6 w ith beautif ul art and genius. S ection 2.3 and 2.) T he m ost im portant elem ents of this account are sk etched here in S ections 2. in particular judgm ents of “adherent” as opposed to “f ree” beauty .1 W hat is a Judgm ent of B eauty ? 2. and the part w hich has aroused m ost interest am ong com m entators. judgm ents of beauty (or. and w ith criticism s w hich hav e been m ade of it.
.9 T he B roader S ignif icance of K ant's A esthetics 2. the judgm ent that a thing is green).6 below ).. w e can say that it is the m ental activ ity or content ty pically ex pressed by . T he f act that judgm ents of beauty are based on f eeling rather than “objectiv e sensation” (e. In particular. see S av ile 1993. and there is room f or controv ersy about w hat does and does not count as a judgm ent of beauty in K ant's sense..” as sk etched below : First Moment (§§1–5) Judgm ents of beauty are based on f eeling.3. f or K ant. B ut the disinterested character of the f eeling distinguishes them f rom other judgm ents based on f eeling. ch. and (ii) judgm ents of the good.” T here is also room f or debate about w hether the intuitiv e notion of a judgm ent of beauty .� 2. allow s f or negativ e judgm ents of beauty (see 2. see S ection 2. the sensation of a thing's colour) distinguishes them f rom cognitiv e judgm ents based on perception (e.” K ant is not ex plicit about the pretheoretical conception of judgm ents of beauty w hich is the subject of his analy sis. notably cognitiv e judgm ents (w hich include judgm ents ascribing goodness to things).g.” aim s to analy se the notion of a judgm ent of beauty or judgm ent of taste. is of a distinctiv e k ind: it is disinterested. T he pleasure.6 below ). K ant analy ses the notion of a judgm ent of beauty by considering it under f our headings. but this does not f igure prom inently in his account. describing the f eatures w hich distinguish judgm ents of beauty f rom judgm ents of other k inds. 1). and w hat he calls “judgm ents of the agreeable.1 What is a Judgment of Beauty? T he f irst section of the “Critique of A esthetic Judgm ent”. how ev er. the “A naly tic of the B eautif ul. at a f irst approx im ation. N ot ev ery predicativ e use of the w ord “beautif ul” signals the m ak ing of a judgm ent of beauty .g. including judgm ents both about the m oral goodness of som ething and about its goodness f or particular nonm oral purposes. f ood or drink ). a sincere utterance of “that's beautif ul” in ref erence to a perceptually presented object.3. in particular f eelings of pleasure (K ant also m entions displeasure. How ev er. or m anif ested in. For ex am ple. or “m om ents. nor does it generate such a desire. f or m ore on this point. at §8 K ant denies that the judgm ent that roses in general are beautif ul is a judgm ent of beauty or judgm ent of taste proper: it is not an “aesthetic” but an “aesthetically grounded logical judgm ent. w hich m eans that it does not depend on the subject's hav ing a desire f or the object. w hich are the k ind of judgm ent ex pressed by say ing sim ply that one lik es som ething or f inds it pleasing (f or ex am ple. it distinguishes them f rom (i) judgm ents of the agreeable. at least in the paradigm atic sense w ith w hich K ant is concerned (f or a usef ul discussion.
S till later. how ev er. this can be tak en as equiv alent to “univ ersal v alidity .”) T hat is. in the “A ntinom y of T aste. “univ ersality ” or “univ ersal v alidity . judgm ents of beauty are not to be understood as predicating the concept beauty of their objects: as he puts it later. be prov ed: there are no rules by w hich som eone can be com pelled to judge that som ething is beautif ul (K ant ex pands on this point in §§32–33). For in claim ing sim ply that one lik es som ething.” He describes it as perceiv ed both in the object itself and in the activ ity of im agination and understanding in their engagem ent w ith the object. M ore strongly . one's claim to agreem ent does not rest on the subsum ption of the object under a concept (in the w ay . and hence its subsum ption under the concept green).” K ant seem s to go back on this strong claim by say ing that a judgm ent of beauty rests on an “indeterm inate concept” (§57. How ev er. f or ex am ple. that the claim to agreem ent m ade by the judgm ent that som ething is green rests on the ascription to the object of the property of being green. relatedly . one tak es it that ev ery one else w ho perceiv es the object ought also to judge it to be beautif ul. B ut the univ ersality is not “based on concepts. “beauty is not a concept of the object” (§38. B ut the f act that their univ ersal v alidity is not based on concepts distinguishes judgm ents of beauty f rom non-ev aluativ e cognitiv e judgm ents and judgm ents of the good.Second Moment (§§6–9) Judgm ents of beauty hav e. 290). judgm ents of the beautif ul do not presuppose an end or purpose [Zweck] w hich the object is tak en to satisf y . 341). K ant calls the purposiv eness w hich is represented “m erely f orm al purposiv eness” or “the f orm of purposiv eness. they nonetheless inv olv e the representation of w hat K ant calls “purposiv eness” [Zweckmässigkeit]. to share one's pleasure in it.” T hat is. (T his is closely related to the point that their univ ersality is not based on concepts). in m ak ing a judgm ent of beauty about an object. both of w hich m ak e a claim to univ ersal v alidity that is based on concepts. (For m ore on this activ ity .” (K ant also uses the ex pression “univ ersal com m unicability ”. Third Moment (§§10–17) Unlik e judgm ents of the good. one does not claim that ev ery one else ought to lik e it too. f or m ore on the notion of purposiv eness. by “concept” here he div erges f rom the standard use of the term “concept” as ref erring to a k ind of representation w hich can f igure in cognition. despite their univ ersal v alidity . B ecause this representation of purposiv eness does not inv olv e the ascription of an purpose.2. It f ollow s f rom this that judgm ents of beauty cannot. see the discussion of the “f ree play of the f aculties” in S ection 2. and. . T he f act that judgm ents of beauty are univ ersally v alid constitutes a f urther f eature (in addition to the disinterestedness of the pleasure on w hich they are based) distinguishing them f rom judgm ents of agreeable. or m ak e a claim to.
as in the case of univ ersal v alidity . in the f ollow ing sense: in tak ing m y judgm ent of taste to be univ ersally v alid. On the one hand. of a k ind w hich f igure in cognition. they m ak e a norm ativ e claim to ev ery one's agreem ent. is probably the m ost distinctiv e aspect of his aesthetic theory . the concept of a purpose w hich such an object is supposed to satisf y ). and they cannot be prov ed. K ant describes it. On the other hand. f or m ore on K ant's f orm alism . instead. not that ev ery one w ho perceiv es the object will share m y pleasure in it and (relatedly ) agree w ith m y judgm ent. K ant can be seen as reacting equally against the tw o m ain opposing traditions in eighteenth-century aesthetics: the “em piricist” tradition of aesthetics represented by Hum e. but that ev ery one ought to do so.) T he T hird M om ent. Hutcheson and B urk e. not concepts or rules that are determ inate. and the “rationalist” tradition of aesthetics represented by B aum garten and M eier. T hese f eatures seem to suggest that they should be assim ilated. K ant's insistence that there is an alternativ e to these tw o v iew s. see S ection 2. then. in particular §14. to objectiv e cognitiv e judgm ents. that m y pleasure stands in a “necessary ” relation to the object w hich elicits it. the necessity is not based on concepts or rules (at least. that is.” in the sense that one's judgm ent itself serv es as an ex am ple of how ev ery one ought to judge (§18. judgm ents of beauty are unlik e judgm ents of the agreeable in not inv olv ing desire f or the object. in the A ntinom y of T aste. Fourth Moment (§18–22) Judgm ents of beauty inv olv e ref erence to the idea of necessity . K ant characteriz es the necessity m ore positiv ely by say ing that it is “ex em plary .1. T his com bination of f eatures seem s to suggest that judgm ents of beauty should be assim ilated to judgm ents of the agreeable. B ut . is the m ain ev idence f or K ant's supposed f orm alism in aesthetics. 237). judgm ents of beauty are based on f eeling. B ut. I tak e it. how ev er. on w hich a judgm ent of taste is an ex pression of f eeling w ithout cognitiv e content. I tak e it. on w hich a judgm ent of taste consists in the cognition of an object as hav ing an objectiv e property . He also say s that it is based on a “com m on sense. In claim ing that judgm ents of beauty hav e both sets of f eatures. m ore im portantly and centrally .4. they do not depend on subsum ing the object under a concept (in particular.seeS ection 3. as resting on an “indeterm inate concept”). 2. one on w hich judgm ents of beauty are both based on f eeling and m ak e a claim to univ ersal v alidity . as noted earlier in this section. w here the necessity here can be described (though K ant him self does not use the term ) as norm ativ e.” def ined as a subjectiv e principle w hich allow s us to judge by f eeling rather than concepts (§20).2 How are Judgments of Beauty Possible? R unning through K ant's v arious characteriz ations of judgm ents of beauty is a basic dichotom y betw een tw o apparently opposed sets of f eatures.
T he rules prescribed by the understanding. that a subject w ho f eels such a pleasure. 290). the f ree play of the f aculties m anif ests the subjectiv e condition of cognition in general (see f or ex am ple §9. are. and specif ically a f eeling of disinterested pleasure.e. For. For ex am ple. It is also pref igured in the “A naly tic of the B eautif ul. i. T he argum ent in all of its appearances relies on the claim . that is.this insistence conf ronts him w ith the obv ious problem of how the tw o f eatures. w ith the core of the argum ent giv en at §38. w ithout hav ing to w ait f or the assent of others?” (§36. K ant appeals to this account of pleasure in the beautif ul in order to argue f or its univ ersal v alidity or univ ersal com m unicability : to argue. §21. that pleasure in the beautif ul depends on the “f ree play ” or “f ree harm ony ” of the f aculties of im agination and understanding. and does so a priori. judges this pleasure as attached to the representation of the sam e object in every other subject. he claim s. A s K ant puts it: “how is a judgm ent possible w hich. if I .” in particular in sections §§31–39. 238. W e are entitled to claim that ev ery one ought to agree w ith our cognitions: f or ex am ple. im agination and understanding in ef f ect do w hat is ordinarily inv olv ed in the bringing of objects under concepts. It is this k ind of pleasure w hich is the basis f or a judgm ent of taste.” in particular at §9 and §22. particular concepts w hich are applied to the object. 218. or sets of f eatures. im agination is described as “sy nthesiz ing the m anif old of intuition” under the gov ernance of rules that are prescribed by the understanding: the outcom e of this is cognitiv e perceptual ex perience of objects as hav ing specif ic em pirical f eatures. introduced in §9. 288) T he argum ent constituting K ant's of f icial answ er to this question (the “Deduction of T aste”) is presented in the section entitled “Deduction of Pure A esthetic Judgm ents. although the argum ent of §22. and thus judges the object to be beautif ul. tak es a som ew hat dif f erent f orm f rom the presentation in the “Deduction of T aste” proper. S o rather than perceiv ing the object as green or square. K ant suggests that im agination and understanding can stand in a dif f erent k ind of relationship. and hence in the perception of objects as hav ing em pirical f eatures: but they do this w ithout bringing the object under any concept in particular. m erely f rom one's own f eeling of pleasure in an object. w hich appeals to the notion of a “com m on sense”. are to be reconciled. the subject w hose f aculties are in f ree play responds to it perceptually w ith a state of m ind w hich is non-conceptual. §38. In the Critique of Pure Reason. is entitled to dem and that ev ery one else f eel a corresponding pleasure and thus agree w ith her judgm ent of taste. w hen a m anif old is sy nthesiz ed in accordance w ith the conceptsgreen and square. B ut now in the Critique of Judgment.. one in w hich im agination's activ ity harm oniz es w ith the understanding but w ithout im agination's being constrained or gov erned by understanding. or correspond to. the outcom e is a perceptual ex perience in w hich the object is perceiv ed as green and square. independent of its concept. In this relationship.
it does not f ollow that I can dem and agreem ent f or a state in w hich m y f aculties are in f ree play . accepting that. I am entitled to claim that ev ery one else ought to cogniz e it as green and square.3. since the f ree play is no m ore than a m anif estation of w hat is in general required f or an object's being cogniz ed as green or square in the f irst place. or it is not. How ev er. Gracy k (1986) argues. then the central inf erence does not seem to go through. ev ery object can legitim ately be judged to be beautif ul. that ev ery object should be perceiv ed as beautif ul. of f ered by A llison. ch. A nother. say . then it w ould seem . R ind (2002). then I m ust also be entitled to tak e it that ev ery one ought to share a perception of the object in w hich m y f aculties are in f ree play . 297). rejects the objection as presupposing an ov erly strong interpretation of w hat the Deduction is intended to accom plish. but. A nother option f or def ending the argum ent w ould be to grasp the f irst horn. holding that the argum ent m ust establish not only a general entitlem ent to dem and agreem ent f or judgm ents of beauty . pp. on K ant's account. B ut in order f or this dem and f or agreem ent to be possible. counterintuitiv ely . If it is. From the f act that I can dem and agreem ent f or the state of m y f aculties in ex periencing an object as. T he m ost serious objection to the argum ent can be put in the f orm of a dilem m a. originally proposed by A m erik s in his 1982 (subsequently incorporated into A m erik s 2003). T he objection tells against the Deduction only if it is construed as entitling us to claim univ ersal agreem ent f or particular judgm ents of taste. 134). see especially 177–179). Chignell 2007). p. If I can tak e it that ev ery one ought to share m y cognition of an object as green or square.perceptually cogniz e an object as being green and square. 8. there can be no f eature of an object w hich rules it out as a candidate f or being . if judgm ents of beauty are not objectiv e.5). green or square. as A llison reads it. M eerbote (1982. A sim ilar position is tak en by K alar (2006. 184–192). som e com m entators hav e tak en this k ind of def ence to be inadequate. it m ust also be possible f or m e to dem and univ ersal agreem ent f or the subjectiv e condition of such cognitions. B ut if it is not. One such def ence. the Deduction is intended only to establish that such claim s can. and hence as m ak ing a claim to univ ersal agreem ent w hich is ak in to that m ade by cognitiv e judgm ents. see S ection 2. Either the f ree play of the f aculties is inv olv ed in all cognitiv e perceptual ex perience. independently of the argum ent of the Deduction. A llison (2001. (For m ore on the objectiv ity of taste. since the possibility of ex periencing the f ree play w ould seem to require som ething ov er and abov e w hat is required f or cognition alone. be legitim ate (A llison 2001. 81f f . M ost def enders of the argum ent hav e grasped the second horn of the dilem m a. but an entitlem ent in each particular case (S av ile 1987. he suggests.) . see f or ex am ple Guy er (1979. that this is K ant's v iew . pp. relies on an understanding of judgm ents of taste as objectiv e. in general. and it m ight also be noted that.
Finally . w hich are discussed in the nex t section. w hich appeals to the notion of a “com m on sense.6).” is m ore ef f ectiv e. 5. ch. A num ber of com m entators hav e tak en the dilem m a. Craw f ord (1974). and as claim ing that ev ery one ought to share the subject's f eeling of pleasure. rather than his core theory of taste. 319– 324 (although Guy er of f ers a m ore positiv e assessm ent in his (2003a). that is. p. and the judgm ent that the object is beautif ul. T his seem s to im ply . 2. How ev er. som e com m entators. 2. and w hich are relev ant to the assessm ent of his argum ent f or the possibility of such judgm ents. Chignell's v iew dif f ers f rom S av ile's in that it does not m ak e any appeal to m oral considerations. to be f atal to K ant's v iew that judgm ents of beauty m ak e a legitim ate claim to univ ersal v alidity : see f or ex am ple M eerbote (1982. or. som e com m entators hav e held that w hile the argum ent of the of f icial Deduction at §38 is unsuccessf ul in av oiding the dilem m a.3. as claim ing the “univ ersal com m unicability ” of the pleasure. including Elliott (1968). A s noted below (S ection 2. A nother strategy draw ing on considerations outside the Deduction itself is to appeal to K ant's theory of aesthetic ideas (see S ection 2. T his strategy is adopted in S av ile (1987) and Chignell (2007). K em al (1986) and S av ile (1987).3 Judgments of Beauty: Interpretive Issues T his section describes six issues w hich hav e arisen in connection w ith K ant's account of pure judgm ents of taste. or considerations related to it. readers seek ing a m ore general surv ey of K ant's aesthetics can om it this section. is com plicated by a num ber of m ore f undam ental interpretiv e issues. cited abov e) and Guy er (1979). see in particular R ind (2002) and K alar (2006). A lthough these issues are central to understanding the core of K ant's v iew . K ant draw s a close connection betw een our capacity f or aesthetic judgm ent and our nature as m oral beings.1 Pleasure and Judgment W hat is the relation betw een the pleasure w hich is f elt in an object ex perienced as beautif ul. Others hav e argued that K ant's v iew can be sav ed by draw ing on considerations not m entioned in the of f icial argum ent of the Deduction.legitim ately f ound beautif ul. 60n15). approaches along these lines hav e not f igured prom inently in the literature on the Deduction. T he assessm ent of the objection. w hich is ostensibly part of his theory of art.8). the v ersion of the argum ent of f ered at §21. pp. and of K ant's Deduction of T aste m ore generally . and ev en though K ant him self does not appeal to this connection in the deduction of taste. as he puts it. the judgm ent of taste? K ant describes the judgm ent of taste as “based on” a f eeling of pleasure. hav e tak en m oral considerations to constitute the ultim ate ground of the legitim acy of judgm ents of beauty .
since he tak es it to indicate the intrusion of an earlier. especially pp. is of f ered in Ginsborg (1991). is that it conf licts w ith another passage at §9. w hich attem pts to accom m odate the problem atic passage w ithout em endation. according to §9. f or a detailed discussion. p. 5:217). 110–119 and pp. perhaps based on characteristics of the pleasure (such as its disinterestedness). f rom the judgm ent of taste proper. Guy er him self proposes disregarding the problem atic passage at 5:217. One v ery inf luential approach is that of Donald Craw f ord. (S ee his (1979). and then claim . T his requires addressing the tex tual dif f iculty just m entioned. T his im plies that the act of judging w hich precedes the pleasure m ust be one in w hich the subject tak es her state of m ind to be univ ersally com m unicable. the “m erely subjectiv e (aesthetic) judging of the object” both “precedes” and “is the ground of ” the pleasure (218). A llison suggests instead that the passage be am ended so that the pleasure is understood as consequent on a “univ ersally com m unicable” m ental state. K ant appears to reject that im plication: rather than the pleasure preceding the judging. com m entators hav e tak en v ery seriously the task of reconciling §9 w ith K ant's other characteriz ations of the judgm ent of taste. precedes the pleasure in it. the second an act of ref lection on the pleasure w hich results in the claim that the pleasure is univ ersally com m unicable. he say s.that the pleasure is distinct f rom the act of judging. 151– 160. that the pleasure is univ ersally v alid and hence that the object is beautif ul. pp. A n alternativ e approach to §9. recogniz ed by Guy er. M ost com m entators read the relev ant paragraphs of §9 as requiring som e k ind of “tw o-acts” v iew . On this “one-act” .) A dif f iculty w ith that approach. S ince §9 is specif ically addressed to the issue “w hether in a judgm ent of taste the f eeling of pleasure precedes the judging of the object or the judging precedes the pleasure. 139–140. 69–74). see Guy er 1982). as distinguishing the f ree play of the f aculties f rom the judgm ent of taste proper. w hich is based on the pleasure (1974. and m ore specif ically that the pleasure precedes the judging: w e f irst f eel pleasure. how ev er. incom patible theory (1979. at the v ery least. 115). w ho draw s on passages elsew here in the tex t to def end the v iew that a judgm ent of taste results f rom tw o distinct acts of ref lectiv e judgm ent. in w hich K ant describes the pleasure as consequent on the univ ersal com m unicability of the subject's m ental state in the giv en representation (§9. the f irst identif iable w ith the f ree play of the f aculties and resulting in a f eeling of pleasure. requiring us to identif y it w ith the judgm ent of taste proper rather than w ith an activ ity of the f aculty prior to that judgm ent. B ut in the crucial section §9 of the Critique of Judgment. and. rather than on the state's univ ersal com m unicability (2001. A n approach along these lines is dev eloped in detail by Paul Guy er. w ho addresses this apparent paradox by distinguishing the “judging” of the object w hich.” a problem w hose answ er is “the k ey to the critique of taste and hence deserv es f ull attention” (216).
Im agination in the f ree play . that the pleasure or judgm ent m ust inv olv e a claim to its ownuniv ersal com m unicability . f or m ore on K ant's v iew s on the ugly . 203–208). and independent. 115). rejects the self ref erential understanding of judgm ents of beauty as “inherently im plausible” (2001. although neither A quila nor W ick s ex plicitly endorses the apparent consequence. but rejects identif ication of the pleasure and the judgm ent (see e. and is “consequent” on it only in the sense that w e f eel pleasure “in v irtue” of the judgm ent. 43–45). lik e the one-act approach.6. Palm er (2008). A llison objects also that the one-act v iew f ails to accom m odate judgm ents of the ugly . B ut w hat is it f or the f aculties of im agination and understanding to be in “f ree play ”? K ant describes the im agination and understanding in this “f ree play ” as f reely harm oniz ing. L onguenesse tak es it to be aw areness of a prior. rather than understand the pleasure as aw areness of its ow n univ ersal com m unicability . w ho partly endorses Ginsborg's criticism s of Guy er. Criticism s of Ginsborg's one-act approach are also to be f ound in Pippin (1996). In its identif ication of the pleasure and the judgm ent the v iew is lik e that of R ichard A quila (1982. m ore recently . conf orm s to the general conditions f or the application of concepts to objects that are presented to our senses. in particular A llison. y et w ithout any particular concept being applied.2 The Free Play of Imagination and Understanding K ant's notion of the f ree play of the f aculties (som etim es ref erred to as the “harm ony of the f aculties”) is probably the m ost central notion of his aesthetic theory . Giv en K ant's v iew that . so that im agination conf orm s to the conditions of understanding w ithout the constraint of particular concepts. pp. 2006. Z uck ert (2007. requiring no em endation of §9). R obert W ick s (2007.3. §§1– 2 of ch. A m erik s (1998). he say s.approach the act of judging som ething to be beautif ul is a single. 2. self -ref erential act of judging w hich claim s its ow n univ ersal v alidity w ith respect to the object and w hich is phenom enologically m anif ested as a f eeling of pleasure. see especially 107) and. 113–115) and. 152–155.g. so that there are tw o distinct f eelings of pleasure inv olv ed in judging an object to be beautif ul (2003. 313n46 and 336n26). but raises dif f iculties f or her reading of §9 (2001. Objections to the one-act approach hav e been raised by a num ber of com m entators. How ev er. 8) def ends a one-act approach. see S ection 2. S w eet (2009) and M ak k ai (2010). w ithout the im agination's being constrained by the understanding as it is in cognition. 2007. in particular. V andenabeele (2008). f eeling of pleasure elicited by the f ree play of the f aculties. L onguenesse of f ers a v iew w hich is in partial agreem ent w ith Ginsborg's in that it understands pleasure in the beautif ul proper as f elt in v irtue of the subject's aw areness of the univ ersal com m unicability of her m ental state in the presented object (thus.3. T he f ree play of the f aculties on this approach is identical w ith the judging of the object to be beautif ul and in turn w ith the f eeling of pleasure: the pleasure does not precede the judging of the object to be beautif ul.
f or w hom the f ree play is an activ ity of schem atiz ing pure concepts w ithout the inv olv em ent of em pirical concepts. It is lef t to com m entators to try to ex plain how such an activ ity is intelligible and w hy . w ho identif ies the f ree play w ith the f irst tw o stages of the “three-f old sy nthesis” described by K ant in the f irst edition T ranscendental Deduction (Guy er 1979. in particular in the M etaphy sical . T he question of how to understand the f ree play is com plicated by a m ore general interpretiv e issue concerning the status of K ant's “transcendental psy chology ”: this issue af f ects not only the interpretation of the f ree play in the third Critique. in K ant's term s. and Chignell (2007). largely m etaphorical. and of M ak k reel (1990. K alar (2006). ex planations. f or ex am ple to the k ind of ex perience inv olv ed in appreciating an abstract painting. 56). T he f ree play thus m anif ests. a f eeling of pleasure. or at least correspond to. p. p. this am ounts to say ing that im agination f unctions in a rule-gov erned w ay but w ithout being gov erned by any rule in particular. T w o contrasting accounts along these lines are of f ered by Guy er. but also the appeal to activ ities of im agination and understanding in K ant's account of the conditions of cognition in the f irst Critique. A s w ith the deduction of taste (see S ection 2. 49– 58).3. or be ex perienced as. rules by w hich im agination “sy nthesiz es” or organiz es the data of sense-perception. on w hich w hat it is f or the im agination and understanding to be in f ree play just is f or the subject to be in a perceptual state of m ind w hich inv olv es a nonconceptual claim to its ow n univ ersal v alidity w ith respect to the object perceiv ed. w hich she understands as an intensiv e f orm of sensibility . Ginsborg (1997) criticiz es prev ious approaches and of f ers an alternativ e v iew of the f ree play deriv ed f rom her “one-act” reading of the judgm ent of taste (see S ection 2. 237) and Crow ther (1989. S om e com m entators try to m ak e sense of the f ree play by appealing to the phenom enology of aesthetic ex perience. Others try to f ind a place f or it in the contex t of K ant's theory of the im agination as presented in the Critique of Pure Reason. a num ber of com m entators hav e look ed to K ant's doctrine of aesthetic ideas (of f icially part of his account of f ine art) to m ak e sense of the f ree play of the f aculties. A particularly detailed and thorough treatm ent of this approach is of f ered in R ogerson (2008) (f or an earlier and brief er treatm ent. see f or ex am ple B ell (1987. pp.concepts are.1). if it is indeed intelligible. it should giv e rise to. pp. Z ink in (2006) ex plains the f ree play in term s of the sensus communis inv ok ed by K ant at §20. in contrast to the ex tensiv e f orm s of sensibility represented by space and tim e. “f ree law f ulness” or ”law f ulness w ithout a law . see R ogerson 2004). w here the subject m ight im aginativ ely relate the v arious elem ents of the painting to one another and perceiv e them as hav ing an order and unity w hich is non-conceptual. recent ex am ples include R ueger and Ev ren (2005).2).” B ut there is an apparent paradox in these characteriz ations w hich is lef t unaddressed by K ant's ow n. 85–86).
2. T he pleasure is “opaque”: w hile one can com e to recogniz e that one's f eeling of pleasure is due to the f ree play .Deduction and the T ranscendental Deduction. 69 and pp. 6). ch. that the f ree play of im agination and understanding represents a natural psy chological process. the answ er is no (see especially 1979. f rom his 1979 onw ards. w ho classif ies v arious accounts under three heads: “precognitiv e. opposing v iew s hav e been tak en by e. raising the question of how Guy er's conclusion is to be av oided. and thus a k ind of cognitiv e ex cess (f or ex am ple A llison 2001). “m ulticognitiv e. arguing that w e should reject K ant's claim to establish an a priorior transcendental principle justif y ing judgm ents of beauty . W hile this k ind of v iew is rarely ex plicitly endorsed. M any com m entators assum e. 99–119).” according to w hich the play of the f aculties is a preconceptual state. . Guy er's approach to the f ree play .. A usef ul surv ey is of f ered by Guy er (2006).. 122–123) and Z uck ert (2002. and m ore generally his claim to be of f ering a transcendental account of judgm ents of beauty . Guy er tak es the relation betw een the f ree play and the f eeling of pleasure to be m erely causal. and 1991).” in w hich the f ree play represents the play f ul application of a m ultiplicity of concepts. w hether tacitly or ex plicitly . p. one w hich show s such judgm ents to be f ounded on an a priori principle. m any com m entators do in f act of f er accounts of the f ree play w hich at least resem ble em pirical psy chological accounts.3. but rather because ref lection on the causal history of one's pleasure can lead one to conclude that it w as not sensory or due to the satisf action of a desire and hence (by elim ination) m ust hav e been due to the f ree play . pp. B ut it is hard to reconcile this understanding of the f ree play w ith K ant's appeal to it to justif y the legitim acy of judgm ents of beauty . W hile m any com m entors f ollow Guy er on this point. this is not because the pleasure m ak es one im m ediately aw are of it. T he v iew s touched on in this section represent only a sam pling of the v arious accounts of the f ree play w hich hav e been of f ered. Guy er's ow n (2006) v iew . A lthough K ant som etim es describes pleasure as aw areness of the f ree play of the f aculties. 1. and “m etacognitiv e. f alling short of cognition (f or ex am ple his ow n 1979 account). f av ours the latter approach. A quila (1982). 2007. ch. Ginsborg (1990. and instead regard K ant's theory of aesthetics as a contribution to the em pirical psy chology of taste.3 The Intentionality of the Pleasure Does the f eeling of pleasure in a judgm ent of taste hav e intentional content? A ccording to Guy er. 53– 54. A llison (2001. in contrast to his (1979). has been thoroughly naturalistic.” in w hich the m anif old is represented as hav ing a unity w hich goes bey ond w hat is required f or cognition.g. tak ing place in tim e and thus subject to natural causal law s. in particular pp. A v ariety of still m ore recent approaches to the f ree play are sum m ariz ed and discussed in Guy er (2009). in his 2008 he of f ers a v ery ex plicit def ence of this approach.
pp. 191 and §6. alternativ ely . 139–147 and pp. I tak e it that ev ery one else ought to share m y judgm ent that the object is green or square. so that the “ought” is to be understood as rational. or. w hile preserv ing the link K ant seem s to assert betw een the norm ativ ity of aesthetic judgm ent and that of cognitiv e judgm ent. raises a question: w hat k ind of norm ativ ity is this.g.. 5: 237]). I claim that all other perceiv ers of the object should f ind it beautif ul too. B ut this approach. as opposed to dem anding that they apply the sam e concept to the object. including A llison (2001. p. and K alar (2006.4 The Character of the Claim to Agreement W hat k ind of claim to agreem ent is m ade by a judgm ent of taste? K ant suggests that a judgm ent of taste dem ands agreem ent in the sam e w ay that an objectiv e cognitiv e judgm ent dem ands agreem ent (see e.2. Guy er (1979) argues that the claim should be understood as a rational ex pectation or ideal prediction: som eone w ho judges an object to be beautif ul is claim ing that under ideal circum stances ev ery one will share her pleasure (1979. Ginsborg (1990. T he other critics m entioned tak e the “ought”. practical rationality ? It is tem pting to assim ilate it to cognitiv e or epistem ic norm ativ ity . B ut one m ight still raise questions about the character of the dem and. 162–164). S av ile (1987) and Chignell (2007) f ollow Guy er in understanding the claim in this w ay . and m ore specif ically m oral. by a num ber of other com m entators. How ev er this appears to conf lict w ith K ant's com m itm ent to the subjectiv ity and (relatedly ) nonconceptuality of judgm ents of taste. so. w hich is perhaps closest to the letter of K ant's tex t. T o av oid the conf lict. either because there are in turn questions to be raised about w hat it is f or a cognitiv e judgm ent to claim agreem ent. a basic dif f iculty is that it f ails to do justice to the norm ativ e language used by K ant to describe the dem and (f or ex am ple that any one w ho declares som ething to be beautif ul holds that ev ery one ought to [sollen] giv e his approv al to the object and lik ew ise declare it beautif ul [§19. R ind (2002). Guy er's understanding of the claim has been criticiz ed by a num ber of com m entators. Introduction V II. in judging an object to be beautif ul. ch. or because it is not clear that the claim can in f act be the sam e. w here this in turn m ight be understood as the norm ativ ity inv olv ed in the putativ e principles that one ought to believ e w hat is true. m ore generally . giv en that in the aesthetic case one is claim ing that others share one's feeling. w hat is justif ied in light of the ev idence. 2006. y et still genuinely norm ativ e as opposed to predictiv e. in claim ing that a perceiv ed object is green or square. 1). rather than m erely predictiv e. including R ogerson (1982). R ogerson proposes instead that a judgm ent of beauty m ak es a m oral dem and on others to appreciate the object's beauty . if not that associated w ith m orality or.3. 211): just as. w ith v ary ing degrees of ex plicitness. 132). a v iew of this k ind is assum ed. and the corresponding claim to agreem ent to be non-m oral. 159 and pp. w e need an understanding of the norm ativ ity such that it is a necessary condition of cognition that . 2). 178–179. see especially p. ch.
T he claim is challenged by Ginsborg (1998). f urther questions can be raised about its strength and character. R oughly . 2000) that in spite of K ant's claim that judgm ents of beauty are “subjectiv ely grounded. w ho def ends the subjectiv ity of taste on the grounds that K ant does not allow that w e can m ak e judgm ents of beauty on the basis of hearsay . judge it to be beautif ul. but m ust “subject the object to our ow n ey es” (§8. pace Guy er. but K alar understands that dem and as one of tw o distinct norm ativ e dem ands m ade in the judgm ent of beauty : a non-m oral dem and to f eel pleasure in the giv en object. but stronger than that present in the case of em pirical cognitiv e judgm ent. distinct f rom m oral obligation. it is the unconditional claim that others ought to perceiv e it and. on the v iew suggested by M oran and M ak k ai. in so doing. y et w ithout the norm ativ ity 's sim ply being identif ied w ith the cognitiv e or epistem ic norm ativ ity associated w ith truth and justif ication. 307n. 5:215–216). recognition as beautif ul. M oran (2012) understands the dem and as ref lecting a sense of obligation or requirem ent. if they perceiv e the object.3. 2. although he also tak es K ant's denial of the objectiv ity of taste to debar him f rom endorsing such a v iew . 1983. p. w here this im plies a claim on the v iew er w hich goes bey ond any claim im plicit in an objectiv e judgm ent.w e be able to m ak e such norm ativ e dem ands f or agreem ent. S im ilar v iew s are proposed by S av ile (1981) and K ulenk am pf f (1990). Ginsborg (2006) identif ies it w ith w hat she calls the “prim itiv e” norm ativ ity required f or em pirical conceptualiz ation: our grasp of em pirical concepts depends on the possibility of m ak ing such prim itiv ely norm ativ e claim s. and there is f urther discussion of aesthetic testim ony in Gorodeisk y (2009). that the claim is norm ativ e w ithout being m oral. see also the ref erences of f ered by A m erik s at (2003. but they do not in turn presuppose cognition. Granted. and a f urther m oral dem and to attend to the object (2006. or call f or. ought to judge it to be beautif ul. 1998. the claim im plicit in a judgm ent of beauty is not m erely the conditional claim that others. A m erik s responds to . A sim ilar suggestion is m ade in M ak k ai (2010): she tak es K ant to hint at the idea that the beauitf ul object is f ound to deserv e.1).5 Is Beauty Objective? S hould judgm ents of beauty be regarded as objectiv e? A m erik s has argued (1982.2). T he idea that K ant tak es us to be subject to a dem and to attend to beautif ul objects is also put f orw ard in K alar (2006). w hich leav es open the possibility that such a claim is im plicit in aesthetic ex perience and judgm ent.” they are nonetheless objectiv e in the sam e sense that judgm ents of colour and other secondary qualities are objectiv e. He reads K ant as draw n tow ards a v iew on w hich the beautif ul object itself m ak es an unconditional dem and on the v iew er's attention (of a k ind m ade v iv id in the narrator's v ow to the haw thorns in Proust's In Search of Lost Time). a sim ilar point is m ade in Hopk ins (2001).
222–226 and A llison (2001). correlativ ely a pure judgm ent of ugliness. either that an object is not beautif ul or that it is ugly ? S hier (1998) argues that it does not.3. see also pp. M ore generally . T he question of w hether K ant should be interpreted as com m itted to the objectiv ity of taste is closely related to the question of w hether there can be erroneous judgm ents of taste. on her v iew . 72. in considering this topic. w ho tak es it to be a criterion f or a satisf actory interpretation of K ant's theory of taste that it allow f or negativ e judgm ents of beauty (2001. 107–108. w e judge that som ething is ugly if it lack s beauty in a contex t w here beauty is ex pected.) Does his treatm ent allow f or negativ e judgm ents of beauty . rather. but this seem s to be a dif f erent k ind f rom the displeasure that m ight be inv olv ed in judging som ething to be ugly . f or ex am ple Ginsborg (2003. pp. 6).6 Negative Judgments of Beauty K ant's discussion of judgm ents of beauty f ocusses alm ost ex clusiv ely on the positiv e judgm ent that an object is beautif ul. f rom that of how w e can judge it to be ugly .Ginsborg's challenge in his (1998). this is ak in to w hat is of ten ref erred to as the Frege-Geach problem f or ex pressiv ism . Guy er argues that w hile there is displeasure in the ugly it alw ay s inv olv es an interest. (A s noted in S ection 2. 2. T he f orm er question can be seen an aspect of a m ore general problem about how w e can m ak e judgm ents in w hich ascriptions of beauty f igure in em bedded contex ts. f or K ant. is it sy m m etrical w ith pleasure in the beautif ul? S om e com m entators. 175–177) and Guy er (2005a. or about the displeasure associated w ith judging an object to be ugly . or. T he second question is m ore specif ic and can be f ram ed in term s of aesthetic ex perience: can K ant allow f or an ex perience of displeasure in the ugly . the objectiv ity of taste is def ended f urther in M ak k ai (2010). Ginsborg allow s also f or disinterested judgm ents of ugliness. pp. aside f rom cases w here the judgm ent is based on perception of an object as harm f ul or disgusting. 184–186). f or som e discussion see Cohen (1982).7 below . judgm ents of the ugly depend on recognition of the contex t in w hich the object is . f or ex am ple as the antecedents of conditionals. as pure displeasure in the ugly . but denies that these inv olv e a characteristic f eeling of displeasure. Others w ho hav e em phasiz ed the need to consider the role of the ugly in K ant's account of aesthetics include Hudson (1991) and W enz el (1999). but this has been challenged by A llison (2001). pp. He has v ery little to say about the judgm ent that an object is not beautif ul. and if he can. to distinguish the question of how w e can judge that som ething is not beautif ul. he does tak e the appreciation of the sublim e to inv olv e a k ind of displeasure. hav e denied that there is such a thing. p. It is usef ul. ch. of the f eeling of pleasure in a beautif ul object. and relatedly .
the w ay in w hich its elem ents are interrelated in space and/or tim e). 182–189). that is. f or recent discussion see K iv y (2009). K ant's f orm alism w as particularly inf luential. K ant's account of judgm ents of beauty has been criticiz ed on the grounds that the argum ent f or their univ ersal v alidity . K ant has also been criticiz ed f or a v iew that is tak en to be a consequence of the thesis that judgm ents of beauty are disinterested. it has been objected K ant does not allow room f or reason-giv ing. p. T his criticism is addressed in Janaw ay (1997). 4 and 5). R elatedly . that is the Deduction of Pure A esthetic Judgm ents. is m ade in Pillow (2006). based on an appeal to the cognitiv e role of aesthetic judging. nam ely the v iew that aesthetic ex perience requires a special attitude of “psy chical distance” or “detachm ent” f rom the object appreciated: this criticism is generally tak en to be im plicit in Dick ie's w ell-k now n (1964) discussion of the “m y th of the aesthetic attitude. 2. pp. and (partly draw ing on Gracy k 1986) prov ides a def ence of pure judgm ents of ugliness w hich appeals to K ant's theory of aesthetic ideas. 2. A dif f erent k ind of objection. 53).4 Judgments of Beauty: Some Criticisms A s noted at the end of S ection 2.presented. Guy er's v iew is criticiz ed in M cConnell (2008). K ant's v iew that the pleasure in a beautif ul object is non-conceptual has been tak en to com m it him to the objectionable v iew that the capacity to m ak e conceptual distinctions can play no role in the appreciation of beauty . chs. Z uck ert of f ers a sy m pathetic reading of K ant's f orm alism (2007. . see Guy er (1979. chs. 55) . w hich of f ers a usef ul surv ey of prev ious discussions of the issue. is unsuccessf ul. and A llison (2001. T y pically objections to K ant's v iew of pleasure as disinterested appeal to the apparently obv ious f act that w e do in f act tak e an interest in the preserv ation of beautif ul objects (see f or ex am ple Craw f ord 1974. Gracy k def ends a sim ilar point. Objections hav e been raised in particular to K ant's v iew that judgm ents of beauty are disinterested. 5 and 6).2. Criticism s hav e also been raised against v arious aspects of K ant's characteriz ation of judgm ents of beauty in the A naly tic of the B eautif ul. criticism in aesthetics. p. that objection is addressed in Craw f ord (1970) and (on lines suggested by Craw f ord) in W ilson (2007).” Z angw ill (1992) argues that this criticism is m isplaced. using it to argue that “ugly ” objects are those w hich resist unif ication and are thus less pleasurable to perceiv e than other objects (Gracy k 1986. For discussion of the questions of disinterestedness and f orm alism . and m ore generally . and to his supposed com m itm ent to aesthetic f orm alism (the v iew that all that m atters f or aesthetic appreciation is the abstract f orm al pattern m anif ested by the object. ch. in m usical theory . v ia the inf luence of Hanslick .
T his objection is challenged by S chaper (1979. 82–89. 4 and 5). A llison argues that judgm ents of adherent beauty contain. 229). ch. reprinted in Guy er 2003) and by Guy er (2005a. (a) T hey can be inf luenced by the object's sensory or em otional appeal. w hich w ould m ak e it largely irrelev ant to the concerns of contem porary aesthetics. For ex am ple. a pure judgm ent of beauty . pp. In the course of his treatm ent of beautif ul art in §§43–54 he discusses f ine art in relation to the production of hum an artif acts m ore . he also m ak es clear that judgm ents of beauty m ay be m ade also about “f ine” or “beautif ul” art [schöne Kunst]. K ant's suggestion that representational art has “adherent” rather than “f ree” beauty . that is. T he second k ind of im purity is discussed in §16 in connection w ith a distinction betw een “f ree” [frei] beauty and “adherent” or “dependent” [anhängend] beauty . Gam m on (1999). so that. say . so that the object is judged. 140–141). and hence that they are all im pure. pp. 4.” and indeed. not as beautif ul tout court. 202–212. B ut K ant also allow s f or judgm ents of beauty w hich f all short of being pure. chs. L orand (1989). m ight also inv ite the objection that K ant tak es nonrepresentational art to be superior to representational art.” the ex am ples K ant giv es are all of non-representational art: “designs a la grecque.2. K alar (2006). It m ight be supposed f rom this that K ant's core account of judgm ents of beauty is only peripherally applicable to art. W hile som e art w ork s can be “f ree beauties. this consequence is debatable. they can inv olv e “charm ” [Reiz] or em otion [Rührung] (§13). w allpaper designs are aesthetically m ore v aluable than the ceiling of the S istine Chapel. T he purity of this core judgm ent is not underm ined by its f iguring in a m ore com plex ev aluation w hich tak es into account the object's f alling under a concept (2001. (b) T hey can be contingent on a certain concept's apply ing to the object. 2. Further discussions of the distinction betw een f ree and adherent beauty include S carré (1981). Genius and Aesthetic Ideas W hile K ant attaches special im portance to the beauty of nature (see e. but as beautif ul quabelonging to this or that k ind. Judgm ents of beauty can f ail to be pure in tw o w ay s.5 Free and Adherent Beauty T his article so f ar has been concerned only w ith “pure” judgm ents of beauty . all m usic w ithout a tex t (§16. One reason to think that the distinction is im portant is that K ant seem s to suggest that all judgm ents of beauty about representational art are judgm ents of adherent rather than of f ree beauty . How ev er. as a com ponent.g. and Z uck ert (2007). pp. 20:244). f oliage f or borders or on w allpaper… f antasias in m usic. K ant adds. FI X I.. and that judgm ents about such art f ail to be pure.6 Art.
and then apply ing. f or no such rules can be specif ied (see the sk etch of the S econd M om ent inS ection 2. and this capacity does not require the artist him .e. in f act the artist him self does not k now . 307) and the objects of art m ust serv e as m odels or ex am ples. Of particular interest. 307). as opposed to m erely agreeable. i. rules w hich determ ine w hen som ething is beautif ul.). does not qualif y as hav ing genius. K ant m ak es clear. K ant describes an aesthetic idea as “a representation of the im agination that occasions m uch think ing. representations w hich cannot be ex em plif ied in ex perience or by m eans of im agination (ibid. because he w as capable of m ak ing clear. B ut. 314) or “ex pression” (§51. concept. K ant also of f ers a ty pology of the v arious f ine arts (§51) and a com parison of their respectiv e aesthetic v alue (§53). also translated “presentation”] (§49. 319) of aesthetic ideas. w ithin K ant's account of f ine art. prov iding back ground m usic) (§44). f or all his intellectual pow er. to be adequate to it” (§49. For ex am ple. w hich he calls “genius. 308–309).generally (§43).. 314). A n artist endow ed w ith genius has a natural capacity to produce objects w hich are appropriately judged as beautif ul. art. though w ithout it being possible f or any determ inate thought. the poet . are a “counterpart” to rational ideas. he say s. they m ust serv e as a “standard or rule by w hich to judge” (§46. how he or she w as able to bring them into being. since “ev ery art presupposes rules” (§46. it is clear that he sees the role of aesthetic ideas as m ediating betw een rational ideas on the one hand. K ant's solution to this apparent paradox is to postulate a capacity . com pares f ine art to the “arts” of entertaining (telling jok es. that is. S uch ideas. 5:229).” by w hich “nature giv es the rule to art” (§46. both to him self and others. T he artist cannot produce a beautif ul w ork by learning. that is. claim ing in particular that f ine art m ust “look to us lik e nature” in that it m ust seem f ree and unstudied (§45).or herself to consciously f ollow rules f or the production of such objects. N ew ton. “Genius” here m eans som ething dif f erent f rom brilliance of intellect. T hus aesthetic ideas “seek to approx im ate to an ex hibition” of rational ideas. w ith poetry at the top and m usic — at least as f ar as the “cultiv ation of the m ind” is concerned — at the bottom . the artist's activ ity m ust still be rulegov erned. A w ork of art ex presses or ex hibits an aesthetic idea in so f ar as it succeeds in giv ing sensible f orm to a rational idea. K ant's rem ark s about m usic in §§51–54 suggest that m usic m ight not ev en qualif y as beautif ul. 308). For ex am ple. T his is seem ingly in tension w ith K ant's ref erence to m usic w ithout w ords as an ex am ple of “f ree beauty ” (§16. and so cannot ex plain. A f urther point of interest in K ant's discussion of art is his claim that beauty is the “ex hibition” [Darstellung. and m ak es som e rem ark s about the relation betw een the beauty of art and that of nature. is his discussion of how beautif ul art objects can be produced (§§46–50). and sensibility and im agination on the other. the procedures through w hich he arriv ed at his scientif ic discov eries (§47. W hile part of K ant's point here is to contrast aesthetic and rational ideas. decorating a table.1 abov e).
R ueger and Ev ren (2005). and Chignell (2007).” w hich deals w ith beauty m ore generally . but a num ber of com m entators hav e argued that it is necessary in order to m ak e sense of the core of K ant's v iew of pure judgm ents of taste. and criticiz es K em al's (1986) v iew that artistic beauty is the paradigm object of aesthetic ex perience f or K ant..7 The Sublime K ant distinguishes tw o notions of the sublim e: the m athem atically sublim e and the dy nam ically sublim e.. ch. e. the realm of the blessed. creation etc. env y . T here has been som e discussion of K ant's rank ing of the f ine arts. w ith a com pleteness w hich goes bey ond any thing of w hich there is an ex am ple in nature” (ibid. of a f eeling of reason's superiority to im agination. K ant's theory of aesthetic ideas has of ten been considered as peripheral to his aesthetic theory . including the apprehension of the m agnitudes of em pirically giv en things. R ogerson (2004) and (2008). K alar (2006). m ore specif ically . see f or ex am ple W eatherston (1996).g. the ex perience of the sublim e consists in a f eeling of the superiority of our ow n pow er of reason. W hile aesthetic ideas are discussed only in the sections of the Critique of Judgment w hich deal w ith artistic beauty . Parret (1998a) and K iv y (2009). pp. see f or ex am ple S av ile (1987). 261). In the case of both notions.. f or a response to this w orry . and not in the “A naly tic of the B eautif ul. death. the realm of hell. the f eeling of reason's superiority ov er nature tak es the f orm . T his claim has been thought by som e com m entators to be problem atic. etc.“v entures to m ak e sensible rational ideas of inv isible beings. A related question concerns the relativ e im portance f or K ant of natural as opposed to artistic beauty . 2. and particularly of the low rank ing he accords to m usic. S om e com m entators hav e also seen a tension betw een the “ex pressionistic” doctrine of aesthetic ideas and the supposedly “f orm alistic” v iew presented in the “A naly tic of the B eautif ul”. on the latter topic. 321). f am e. 2. ov er nature (§28. as a supersensible f aculty . conceiv ed of as the natural capacity required f or sensory apprehension. see A llison (2001. Guy er (1993. as w ell as lov e. 7) of f ers a def ence of the im portance of natural beauty . 288–290).). and all sorts of v ices. ch. K ant rem ark s parenthetically that natural as w ell as artistic beauty is the ex pression of aesthetic ideas (§51. sensible bey ond the lim its of ex perience. W e hav e this f eeling w hen w e are conf ronted w ith som ething that is so large that it ov erw helm s . In the case of the m athem atically sublim e. as w ell as to m ak e that of w hich there are ex am ples in ex perience. eternity .
e. K ant also describes the f eeling of the sublim e as a “pleasure w hich is possible only by m eans of a displeasure” (§27. thunder clouds. K ant say s that w e consider nature as “dy nam ically sublim e” w hen w e consider it as “a pow er that has no dom inion ov er us” (§28. but f ails to do so. K ant is not consistent in his descriptions of how the pleasure and the displeasure are related. In the case of the dy nam ically sublim e. as to a real idea. 250). 269). Peter's B asilica in R om e (§26. and K ant claim s ex plicitly that the m ost appropriate ex am ples are of things in nature. 261). He also appears . 258). it is not clear that these are intended as ex am ples of the sublim e.. the displeasure com es f rom the aw areness of the inadequacy of our im agination. i. 256). recogniz e our phy sical pow erlessness. the f eeling of reason's superiority to nature is m ore direct than in the m athem atical case. in the dy nam ical case it com es f rom the aw areness of our phy sical pow erlessness in the f ace of nature's m ight. but at the sam e tim e it rev eals a capacity f or judging ourselv es as independent of nature and a superiority ov er nature… w hereby the hum anity in our person rem ains undem eaned ev en though the hum an being m ust subm it to that dom inion” (§28. 260). but one characteriz ation describes them as alternating: the “m ov em ent of the m ind” in the representation of the sublim e “m ay be com pared to a v ibration. w hile in our reason there lies a claim to absolute totality . 252). W e hav e the f eeling of the dy nam ically sublim e w hen w e ex perience nature as f earf ul w hile k now ing ourselv es to be in a position of saf ety and hence w ithout in f act being af raid. W hile K ant's discussion of the m athem atically sublim e m entions the Py ram ids in Egy pt and S t. 252–253): this rules out anim als. 260) and as a “negativ e lik ing” (General R em ark f ollow ing §29. In such a situation im agination striv es to com prehend the object in accordance w ith a dem and of reason. 261–262). v olcanoes and hurricanes (§28. im agination] aw ak ens the f eeling of a supersensible f aculty in us” (§25. but it also inv olv es displeasure. M ore specif ically . the concept of w hich is connected w ith the idea of biological f unction. In this situation “the irresistibility of [nature's] pow er certainly m ak es us. through reason.im agination's capacity to com prehend it. 254). considered as natural beings. “Just because there is in our im agination a striv ing to adv ance to the inf inite. T he f eeling associated w ith the sublim e is a f eeling of pleasure in the superiority of our reason ov er nature. they m ust be natural things the concept of w hich does not inv olv e the idea of a purpose (§26. of think ing inf inity as a w hole. but it apparently includes m ountains and the sea (§26.. to a rapidly alternating repulsion f rom and attraction to one and the sam e object” (§27. K ant's ex am ples include ov erhanging clif f s. the v ery inadequacy of our f aculty f or estim ating the m agnitude of the things in the sensible w orld [v iz . T he f act that w e are capable. “indicates a f aculty of the m ind w hich surpasses ev ery standard of sense” (§26. In the case of the m athem atically sublim e.
m ore specif ically on pleasure or lik ing. the f aculties brought into relation in a judgm ent of the sublim e are im agination and reason (§29. K ant's v iew s about the sublim e also appear to be less historically distinctiv e than his v iew s about the beautif ul. (particularly em phasiz ed by K ant) In m ak ing a judgm ent of the sublim e. In the Introductions to the Critique of Judgm ent. T hey are also lik e judgm ents of beauty in claim ing the univ ersal v alidity of the pleasure. 264). W hile judgm ents of beauty inv olv e a relation betw een the f aculties of im agination and understanding. 245).” rather than purposiv e. w e regard the object as “contrapurposiv e. K ant's account of the sublim e has been inf luential in literary theory (see S ection 2. ii. 266). but only in our m ind” (§28. 246). and the sublim e also play s a signif icant role in K ant's account of the connection betw een aesthetic judgm ent and m orality (see S ection 2. . (a) It is not the object. w hich in his practical philosophy is associated w ith recognition of the m oral law (§27. W hile w e can correctly call objects beautif ul. not on the univ ersal v alidity of the conditions of cognition. the pleasure is dif f erent in that it inv olv es a negativ e elem ent. but rather on the univ ersal v alidity of m oral f eeling (§29.9 below ). Judgm ents of the sublim e are lik e judgm ents of beauty in being based on f eeling.to identif y it w ith the f eeling of respect. B ut as w e hav e seen. 249–250) and in the A naly tic of the S ublim e itself he notes that “the concept of the sublim e in nature is f ar f rom being as im portant and rich in consequences as that of its beauty ” and that the “theory of the sublim e is a m ere appendix to the aesthetic judging of the purposiv eness of nature” (§23. sublim ity strictly speak ing “is not contained in any thing in nature. 259). f or the f aculties of im agination and judgm ent (§23. show ing in particular the inf luence of B urk e. 257). w e cannot properly call them sublim e (§23. 260) or f or the “w hole v ocation of the m ind” (§27. (b) T he aesthetic judgm ent is represented as purposiv e not f or im agination or judgm ent. On the other hand. iv . 245). 255–256). but f or reason (§27. W hile judgm ents of the sublim e do inv olv e the representation of purposiv eness. but the aesthetic judgm ent itself w hich is represented as purposiv e. K ant has a great deal to say about the beautif ul. 266). the purposiv eness dif f ers f rom that inv olv ed in a judgm ent of beauty in tw o w ay s. T he im portance of the sublim e w ithin K ant's aesthetic theory is a m atter of dispute. but m entions the sublim e only f leetingly (FI X II. T he f ollow ing dif f erences should also be noted: i. T he claim to univ ersal v alidity m ade by a judgm ent of the sublim e rests. iii.5 below ). w here that claim is understood as inv olv ing necessity (ev ery one w ho perceiv es the object ought to share the f eeling) (§29.
other usef ul ex positions include Guy er (1993. so that K ant's argum ent f or the univ ersal v alidity of such judgm ents depends on an appeal to m orality . ch.8 Aesthetics and Morality T he connection betw een aesthetic judgm ent and m oral f eeling is a persistent them e in the Critique of Judgment.2 below ). A good ov erv iew of K ant's theory of the sublim e and its connection w ith K ant's aesthetic theory m ore generally is prov ided by Crow ther (1989). to esteem it. or w hether there can also be sublim e art. and hence of how m orality is possible f or hum an beings (f or a clear statem ent of the contrast betw een these v iew s. the sublim e. w ho attem pts to bring the notion of the sublim e to bear on a specif ic w ork of art. ch. ev en contrary to our (sensible) interest” (General R em ark f ollow ing §29.4 abov e. as contributing to an account of m oral f eeling. but also aesthetic judgm ent.3. w ithout interest. w ho def ends K ant's restriction of sublim ity to nature. A s noted in S ection 2. . B udd (1998) and A llison (2001. som e com m entators tak e the dem and f or univ ersal v alidity m ade by a judgm ent of beauty to am ount to a m oral dem and. is to see judgm ents of beauty not as grounded in m orality . ev en nature. S am uel B eck ett's Molloy.A nother f ocus of debate concerns the question of w hether sublim ity . including the f ollow ing: i. how ev er. in that “the beautif ul prepares us to lov e som ething. 267). W hile K ant say s that the concept or principle of judgm ent w hich m ediates the transition betw een nature and f reedom is that of the “purposiv eness of nature. 7). w hich play s this bridging role. A possible case study is of f ered by M y sk ja (2002). 2. w here K ant describes the f aculty of judgm ent as bridging “the great gulf ” betw eeen the concept of nature and that of f reedom (IX . m ak ing clear that it is not only judgm ent in the contex t of em pirical scientif ic enquiry . A esthetic ex perience serv es as a propadeutic f or m orality . according to K ant. Clew is (2010) def ends the opposite v iew . T he idea that aesthetic judgm ent play s a role in grounding the possibility of m orality f or hum an beings is suggested at a v ery general lev el in the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment. he also associates judgm ent in this contex t w ith the f eeling of pleasure and displeasure. see the introduction to Guy er 1993). T he “Critique of A esthetic Judgm ent” m entions a num ber of m ore specif ic connections betw een aesthetics and m orality . A m ore com m on v iew .” w hich could sim ply be understood as ref erring to nature's scientif ic com prehensibility (see S ection 3. 195). along w ith judgm ents of the sublim e. 13). but rather. T he question of the artistic sublim e in particular has been raised by A baci (2008). is restricted to objects of nature.
2. see the introduction to K uk la (2006). and to the v iew that beauty is the ex pression of aesthetic ideas (see 2. 356). relatedly . and in particular f or our understanding of biological phenom ena. (2003c). 215). has been em phasiz ed by Guy er. this is related both to the v iew that there is an analogy betw een the ex perience of beauty and m oral f eeling (see (ii) abov e). 482n. B ell (1987) and Ginsborg (1990. 354. A s noted inS ection 2. B eauty giv es sensible f orm to m oral ideas (§60. see also General Com m ent f ollow ing §91. and in particular the role of aesthetics in supporting the hum an m oral v ocation. T here is an inf luential discussion of beauty as the sy m bol of m orality in Cohen (1982). M ore recently . passim). see the introduction to his (1993). 1997 and 2006) hav e argued that K ant's account of em pirical cognition depends on his account of the ex perience of beauty . it is by no m eans uncontrov ersial that K ant's aesthetics m ak es a substantiv e contribution to his theory of cognition m ore generally . and. iii. there are also signif icant connections betw een K ant's v iew s on aesthetics and his v iew s on ethics. 298–299). Guy er em phasiz es the role play ed by the third Critique in supporting K ant's m oral theory .8 abov e. in addition. f eelings of pleasure in the beautif ul are analogous to m oral consciousness (§59. in ex plicit contrast to the suggestion that it w as intended to f ill an “im aginary gap in his epistem ology ” (2009. the connection betw een aesthetics and m orality . T he dem and f or univ ersal agreem ent in judgm ents of the sublim e rests on an appeal to m oral f eeling (§29.6). How ev er. in that a judgm ent of beauty “legislates f or itself ” rather than being “subjected to a heteronom y of law s of ex perience” (§59. 356). T he idea that a f ull understanding of K ant's v iew s on cognition depends on tak ing seriously his account of aesthetics is becom ing increasingly w idely accepted. v. laid special w eight on the connection betw een K ant's aesthetics and his v iew s on em pirical cognition. A num ber of com m entators hav e.). 265–266) T ak ing a direct interest in the beauty of nature indicates “a good soul” and a “m ental attunem ent f av orable to m oral f eeling” (§42. the dev elopm ent of m oral ideas is the “true propadeutic” f or taste (§60. a collection of essay s ex ploring the connection betw een aesthetics and cognition in K ant.9 The Broader Significance of Kant's Aesthetics K ant him self clearly tak es his aesthetic theory to be of central im portance f or the understanding of the so-called “f aculty of judgm ent” generally (see S ection 1 abov e): this im plies that he tak es it to be of im portance f or understanding em pirical scientif ic enquiry . 353).ii. iv . B eauty serv es as the “sy m bol” of m orality (§59. K ant's v iew that judgm ents of beauty m anif est the ex ercise of a m ore general f aculty of judgm ent hav e inspired a num ber of philosophers to v iew aesthetic judgm ent as a . B ecause of this. In particular. m ore recently .
Teleology W hile K ant's ethical theory m ak es f requent ref erence to the ends or purposes adopted by hum an beings.” that organism s m ust be regarded by hum an beings in teleological term s.4. Ginsborg (2011) uses K ant's aesthetic theory as the basis f or a response to the sk epticism about rules and m eaning w hich K ripk e attributes to W ittgenstein. it has been inf luential am ong literary theorists.e.3 and 3.7 .6 w ith the im plications of this teleological v iew of nature f or m orality and religion. respectiv ely . in the “Dialectic of T eleological Judgm ent.4 is f ollow ed by tw o sections dealing w ith f urther aspects of K ant's teleology : S ection 3. T hese are described here in S ection 3. Cav ell (1976. Prior to this..5 deals w ith K ant's v iew that nature as a w hole m ay be regarded as a sy stem of purposes.) A m ong the m ost strik ing elem ents of K ant's account of natural teleology are (i) his claim .” although the term “f inality ” has som etim es also been used. 1987). S ee f or ex am ple W eisk el (1976) and Hertz (1978). 3. “End” is the standard translation of Zweck in the m oral w ritings. so I use it here. the cognate Germ an term Zweckmässigkeit is generally translated as “purposiv eness. K ant's aesthetic theory m ore generally is discussed in Derrida (1981. its am enability to em pirical scientif ic enquiry .. S ection 3.1 outlines K ant's notions of purpose and purposiv eness in general and S ection 3. 3) draw s connections betw een judgm ents of beauty . both of w hom interpret K ant's account of the sublim e in psy choanaly tic term s.3 and 3.” i.” and (ii) his attem pt. and S ection 3. as w ell as the discussions of the K antian sublim e in de M an (1990) and L y otard (1994). T he discussion of biological teleology and its relation to m echanism in S ections 3.e. S ection 3. as described by K ant. A rendt (1982) applies K ant's theory of aesthetic judgm ent w ithin the sphere of political philosophy . and our intuitiv e judgm ents (ty pically associated w ith “ordinary language philosophy .m odel f or judgm ent generally in both the cognitiv e and the practical dom ain. the “Critique of T eleological Judgm ent” is concerned w ith the idea of ends or purposes in nature. relatedly . w here there has been particular em phasis on K ant's theory of the sublim e.” to reconcile this teleological conception of organism s w ith a m echanistic account of nature. i. as “natural purposes. w hile the w ork of Derrida and other deconstructionists has been largely ignored or dism issed by com m entators w ithin the analy tic tradition of philosophy . ch. in the “A naly tic of T eleological Judgm ent. Fleischack er (1999) sees connections betw een aesthetic judgm ent f or K ant and m oral and political judgm ent generally . but “purpose” has m ore currency in the literature on the Critique of Judgment. K ant's aesthetic theory has also been ex tensiv ely discussed w ithin literary theory .2 sk etches nature's “purposiv eness f or our cognitiv e f aculties. (T he term s “end” and “purpose” in translations of the Critique of Judgment both correspond to the Germ an term Zweck.” but prev alent in philosophy m ore generally ) about correct use of language.
In particular “purpose” is som etim es used to apply to the concept rather than the corresponding object (e.” in a section entitled “On Purposiv eness in General” (§10). Introduction IV . B ut K ant of ten uses the term s “purpose” and “purposiv e” in w ay s that are related to. but if w e can conceiv e its possibility only on the assum ption that it w as produced according to design: “an object or a state of m ind or ev en an action.2 N ature's Purposiv eness f or Our Cognitiv e Faculties 3. S uch an object is the result of design.1 T he N otion of Purposiv eness 3. K ant also characteriz es “purposiv eness” as the “law f ulness of the contingent as such” (FI V I. a concept w hich is thus causally ef f icacious in producing its object. 217. these def initions.g.. � � � � � � � 3.. 228. in so f ar as the concept as seen as the cause of the object.1 The Notion of Purposiveness T he notions of purpose or end [Zweck] and of purposiv eness [Zweckmässigkeit] are def ined by K ant in the “Critique of A esthetic Judgm ent. see also FI V III. but do not quite f it. but the property in v irtue of w hich an object counts as a purpose (e. B ut K ant goes on to claim that som ething can qualif y as a purpose. 404). since this ty pically com es into being as a result of the artisan's hav ing a concept of the object he or she plans to produce. not the causality of the concept. not only if it is in f act brought about as a result of design. considering brief ly its im plications f or contem porary biological thought. B ut the notion of purposiv eness also applies m ore broadly .6 T eleology .g. or as purposiv e. is called purposiv e m erely because its possibility can only be ex plained and conceiv ed by us in so f ar as w e assum e at its ground a causality in accordance w ith purposes” (§10. 220).” and purposiv eness is “the causality of a concept w ith respect to its object” (§10. and in so f ar as it is a sy stem of purposes standing in purposiv e relations to one another). 234). A purpose is “the object of a concept. to nature as a w hole (both in so f ar as it is com prehensible to hum an beings.5 N ature as a S y stem of Purposes 3.3 below ). w hich are “natural purposes” (see S ection 3. 220).. and “purposiv eness” is usually used to denote. K ant think s that this is the case in particular f or organism s. but also to beautif ul objects.3 Organism s as N atural Ends 3. and K ant distinguishes v arious dif f erent k inds of purposiv eness apply ing not only to organism s and artif acts. 184. to the f unctioning of our cognitiv e f aculties in aesthetic appreciation and . FI IX . and §76. K ant's initial def inition at §10 suggests that the paradigm of a purpose is a hum an artif act. 180). M orality and R eligion 3.7 R elev ance of K ant's T eleology to Contem porary B iological T heory 3.4 M echanism and T eleology 3.returns to K ant's biological teleology .. Introduction V .
. K ant also claim s in one passage (FI X II. B oth k inds of purposiv eness are in turn div ided into formal and material (or real). the f ollow ing sim plif ied schem e m ay serv e as a guide. one w hich pleases our senses (FI V III.3) and by arrangem ents of natural things or processes w hich stand to one another in m eans-end relations (see S ection 3. Objectiv e m aterial purposiv eness corresponds to the purposiv eness display ed both by organism s qua “natural purposes” (see S ection 3. Guy er tak es K ant to be operating w ith tw o dif f erent senses of “purposiv eness. How ev er. in particular. B ecause K ant's term inology is not alw ay s consistent. the notion of purposiv eness as it applies to beautif ul objects does not inv olv e the idea of real or apparent design.5). T he notion of purposiv eness is div ided in the f irst instance into subjective and objective purposiv eness. A f urther im portant distinction is that betw een objectiv e m aterial purposiv eness w hich is inner.e. w hich is the k ind of purposiv eness ex hibited by an agreeable object. presum ably . 224). and ev en to objects that are usef ul or agreeable to hum an beings. the other apply ing to objects of aesthetic appreciation. w hether the notion of purposiv eness w hich f igures in the aesthetic contex t is the sam e as that w hich f igures in K ant's account of organism s. T he distinctions am ong these v arious k inds of purposiv eness hav e been treated in detail by M arc-W ogau (1938) and T onelli (1958). w hich is ex hibited by geom etrical f igures in v irtue of their f ruitf ulness f or solv ing m athem atical problem s (§62). but sim ply that . to geom etrical f igures. T here has been disagreem ent am ong com m entators about w hether there is any underly ing philosophical unity to K ant's notion of purposiv eness. it is dif f icult to prov ide a def initiv e characteriz ation of the v arious ty pes of purposiv eness. T he m ost im portant k inds of purposiv eness f or the concerns of the Critique of Judgment are (i) subjectiv e f orm al purposiv eness and (ii) objectiv e m aterial purposiv eness.” one apply ing to artif acts (and. serv ing to separate the beautif ul f rom the sublim e. and.2). this distinguishes the k ind of purposiv eness possessed by organism s f rom that in v irtue of w hich one natural thing or process stands in a m eans-end relation to another. and f or objectiv e f orm al purposiv eness. B ut K ant also allow s f or subjectiv e m aterial purposiv eness. 249–250) that the distinction betw een inner and relativ e purposiv eness applies to subjectiv e as w ell as objectiv e purposiv eness. i.em pirical scientif ic enquiry . organism s). W hile purposiv eness in the f orm er sense corresponds to K ant's account of purposiv eness at §10 in term s of the notion of design. and objectiv e m aterial purposiv eness w hich is m erely outer or relative. S ubjectiv e f orm al purposiv eness corresponds both to the “aesthetic” purposiv eness display ed by beautif ul objects (or by the activ ity of our cognitiv e f aculties in the perception of them ) and to the “logical” purposiv eness display ed by nature as a w hole in so f ar as it is com prehensible to hum an beings (see S ection 3.
213–218. the construction of ex planatory scientif ic theories in .g. Introduction V III. on her v iew . purposiv e f or our cognitiv e f aculties.of the satisf action of an aim or objectiv e (1979. w hich draw s on K ant's characteriz ation of purposiv eness as the “law f ulness of the contingent as such” (FI V I. T he assum ption that nature is purposiv e f or our cognitiv e f aculties is not. p.. since our entitlem ent to ascribe objectiv e purposiv eness to natural things. 20:218. 3. and teleological judgm ents are concerned only w ith objectiv e purposiv eness (see e. see also FI V III.39). pp. part of teleology . 84n28). Introduction V . W e cannot assert that nature is. 20:221). 20:217. 20:228. T he v ariety of characteriz ations stem s in part f rom the v ariety of dif f erent task s he seem s to ascribe to ref lecting judgm ent itself . 5:404) to argue f or a univ ocal conception on w hich purposiv eness is understood as norm ativ e law f ulness. as a m atter of objectiv e f act. Z uck ert also lay s em phasis on K ant's identif ication of purposiv eness as the “law f ulness of the contingent” (2007. 5–7). deriv es f rom our m ore f undam ental entitlem ent to regard nature as (subjectiv ely ) purposiv e f or our cognitiv e f aculties (FI V I. pp.2 Nature's Purposiveness for Our Cognitive Faculties K ant claim s in the Introductions to the Critique of Judgment that it is an a priori principle of ref lecting judgm ent that nature is “purposiv e f or our cognitiv e f aculties” or “purposiv e f or judgm ent. In addition to being responsible f or aesthetic judgm ents. 5) or the “f orm of unity of div ersity as such” (2007. since the purposiv eness at issue is subjectiv e. regulativ e rather than constitutiv e. 417n. the law f ulness of the contingent is to be understood as “the unity of the div erse” (2007. on the f ace of it. conceptually guided process. but rejects Ginsborg's v iew that this in turn am ounts to norm ativ e law f ulness as such (2007. 15). B ut it is nonetheless relev ant to K ant's teleology . T he norm ativ e conception of purposiv eness is also criticiz ed by T euf el (2011). p. K ant characteriz es the principle of nature's purposiv eness in a v ariety of dif f erent w ay s w hich he seem s to treat as interchangeable ev en though they do not. A n opposing v iew is def ended in Ginsborg 1997a. strictly speak ing. an ascription of purposiv eness to an object m ak es an ontological claim to the ef f ect that the object is the outcom e of a rational. in the term inology of the Critique of Pure Reason. com e to the sam e thing. and to supply ing the concept of purposiv eness w hich is required f or teleological judgm ents. 5:184. ref lecting judgm ent seem s to be ascribed the f ollow ing cognitiv e task s: the classif ication of natural things into a hierarchy of genera and species. p. w ho argues that K ant held an etiological and non-teleological conception of purposiv eness: on T euf el's v iew . 5:193–194). and §76. but it is a condition of the ex ercise of ref lecting judgm ent that w e assum e nature's purposiv eness f or our cognitiv e f aculties. see also 1993. in particular to organism s. FI V II.” T his principle is.
as a principle of nature's tax onom ic sy stem aticity . w ithout assum ing in adv ance that nature w ill f av our our ef f orts? (3) If the principle is indeed required. K ant's discussion of the principle has been thought to pose a num ber of serious interpretativ e and philosophical dif f iculties. it also seem s conceiv able that w e could apply such concepts to natural things w ithout being able to detect any law lik e connections am ong the corresponding properties. w hy is it a condition of the successf ul ex ercise of ref lecting judgm ent that w e assum e that nature is suitable f or ref lecting judgm ent? W hy can't w e pursue our attem pts. let alone connections w hich in turn allow of being incorporated into an ov erarching sy stem of em pirical law s. w e m ust also recogniz e the em pirical regularities it m anif ests as law lik e. and the f orm ation of em pirical concepts überhaupt. How ev er. B ut it is not clear how such a v iew is to be justif ied. B ecause the principle of nature's purposiv eness is. under f am iliar concepts lik e dog or granite) w ithout those concepts in turn f iguring in a sy stem atic hierarchy . and the content of the corresponding principle. and thus to be com m itted to the v iew that if nature is em pirically conceptualiz able at all. hav e. (2) R egardless of how one understands the task of ref lecting judgm ent. to arriv e at a sy stem atic hierarchy of natural concepts and law s. of its ex planatory sy stem aticity . the representation of nature as em pirically law lik e überhaupt. say . the principle that nature is am enable to the activ ity of ref lecting judgm ent itself . R elatedly . together. and his related earlier discussion (in the A ppendix to the T ranscendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason) of the regulativ e principle of nature's sy stem aticity . in ef f ect. and of its em pirical conceptualiz ability . but also f or the recognition of nature's em pirical law lik eness or (ev en m ore f undam entally ) f or the possibility of any em pirical concept-f orm ation at all. that is. of its em pirical law lik eness. it seem s to allow of being f orm ulated in a corresponding v ariety of w ay s. to the ex tent that the principle is seen as required not only f or the construction of sy stem atic scientif ic theories. been seen as v ery im portant f or the understanding of K ant's v iew s on em pirical science. It seem s quite conceiv able that natural things could be conceptualiz able (say . as K ant suggests it is.w hich m ore specif ic natural law s are represented as f alling under higher and m ore general law s. then it w ould seem to be a condition of the possibility of ex perience. M oreov er. and the corresponding concepts and law s m ust f all under a sy stem atic hierarchy . K ant's discussion of the principle of nature's purposiv eness f or our cognitiv e f aculties. including the f ollow ing: (1) How are the v arious f orm ulations of the principle related? K ant seem s to regard them as am ounting to the sam e. f or the em pirical conceptualiz ation of nature and f or the recognition of nature as em pirically law lik e. it tak es on great im portance f or an understanding of K ant's v iew s on em pirical cognition generally . B ut then w hy is .
5). ch. ch. B utts (1990). 2). ch. 4. that K ant of f ers his f ullest argum ent f or its necessity . how are w e to reconcile the respectiv e roles of the pure concepts of the understanding (in particular the concept of causality ) on the one hand. Caranti (2005) and Hughes (2006.3 Organisms as Natural Ends In §§64–65 of the A naly tic of T eleological Judgm ent. but argues that it is in the Critique of T eleological Judgm ent. 8). w hich he sees as required in turn f or the possibility of any objectdirected representation. that nature is subject to causal law s. 7). f or a som ew hat rev ised v iew . Friedm an (1991 and 1992. Guy er (1990a) f ollow s M cFarland (1970) in ascribing less cognitiv e signif icance to the principle of nature's purposiv eness f or our cognitiv e f aculties. Guy er (2003a). in the A naly tic of the Critique of Pure Reason. B rittan (1992). 2007. (1979. B randt (1989). Floy d (1998) and A llison (2001. in addition. 1969a) that the principle of causality in the A naly tic of the Critique of Pure Reason is insuf f icient to account f or nature's subordination to particular causal law s and that. 1990a) tak es it to be a condition of em pirical conceptualiz ation and hence of all em pirical judgm ent. Patricia K itcher (1990 ch. a principle of sy stem aticity is required to account f or nature's em pirical law lik eness. see also Guy er (1990b). Pippin (1996). ch. holding that it is required only to prov ide us w ith rational m otiv ation f or attem pts at sy stem atiz ing nature. see f or ex am ple Ginsborg (1990a). 1) claim that the principle represents K ant's answ er to Hum e's problem of induction. w ith the principle of nature's purposiv eness f or our cognitiv e f aculties on the other? If K ant has already show n. not just of judgm ents based on inductiv e inf erence. Geiger (2009) also holds that the principle is required f or all em pirical cognition (see also Geiger 2003). Other usef ul discussions of K ant's v iew s on the sy stem aticity of nature are to be f ound in Horstm ann (1989). 2) and (2003b). W alk er (1990). and not in the Introductions to the Critique of Judgment (nor in the A ppendix to the Dialectic of the f irst Critique). w ho tak es it to be required as a condition f or em pirical truth. K ant introduces the notion of a “natural purpose” or “natural end” [Naturzweck] and argues both that “organiz ed . T here has been considerable discussion of the relation betw een the principle of nature's sy stem aticity in K ant's theoretical philosophy and the activ ity of ref lecting judgm ent in aesthetic ex perience. see his (1994). 3. w ho argues (1969. then w hy is there any need f or a f urther principle to account f or the recognition of nature as em pirically law lik e? M uch of the discussion of these and related questions w as stim ulated by B uchdahl. A llison (2001. A sim ilar v iew is dev eloped by Philip K itcher (1986).it regulativ e rather than constitutiv e? R elatedly . ch. A n ev en stronger v iew is suggested by A bela (2006). Ginsborg (1990. ch. B az (2005).
in producing of f spring w hich resem ble it.”) B ut they are. and som etim es only that they m ust be “regarded” or “considered” as natural purposes. the v arious parts of a tree m utually m aintain one another in ex istence and hence m aintain the w hole tree in ex istence. not only a natural purpose. as products of nature rather than products of conscious design. w here he specif ies tw o conditions som ething m ust m eet in order to be a natural purpose. (In the term s introduced in S ection 3. and is thus in a sense there only on account of its relation to the w hole. (K ant som etim es say s that they are natural purposes. w hich applies only to purposes w hich are natural. in w hich each part is there f or the sak e of its relation to the w hole. a tree preserv es itself as an indiv idual by tak ing in nourishm ent f rom outside and conv erting it into the k ind of organic substance of w hich it. f or ex am ple the trunk and roots. w hose parts.) T his condition is not m et by artif acts. is a condition on som ething's being. a point w hich K ant illustrates by appeal to the ex am ple of a w atch. w hile the leav es are produced by the tree as a w hole and depend on it f or their grow th and m aintenance. T hird. First.). 371). purposes because w e can conceiv e of their possibility only on the assum ption that they w ere produced in accordance w ith design. is that “the parts of the thing… are reciprocally cause and ef f ect of their f orm ” (ibid. a tree “produces itself as f ar as its species is concerned. unlik e the parts of a plant or anim al. plants and anim als. . but a purpose tout court. W hat m ak es an organism qualif y as a natural purpose is that it is “both cause and ef f ect of itself ” (§64. or m ust be considered. 376).) Organiz ed beings (or. in particular the capacity of certain organism s to regenerate m issing parts. For ex am ple.1. stands in a causal relation to its ow n ex istence. itself . S econd. T he f irst. T he second condition. (T his corresponds to the third of the f eatures to w hich K ant drew our attention in the ex am ple of the tree at §64.” that is. or m ust be considered as. K ant goes into m ore detail about the notion of a natural purpose in §65. “organism s”) are. and m ost im portant. such as a tree. do not produce one another or m aintain one another in ex istence. to use the m ore m odern term . K ant giv es a prelim inary ex planation of this idea at §64 by calling attention to three respects in w hich an organism . It thus applies not only to liv ing things but also to artif acts. instantiate the concept of a natural purpose and also that they are the only beings in nature that do so (§65. such as w atches. that the “parts are possible… only through their relation to the w hole” (§65.beings. 373). they are in turn necessary f or the grow th and m aintenance of the other parts of the tree.” so that the species of the tree m aintains itself in ex istence. they display “inner objectiv e m aterial purposiv eness. K ant also m entions a num ber of f urther phenom ena illustrating the w ay in w hich an organism is “cause and ef f ect” of itself . T hey thus m eet the def inition of “purpose” giv en at §10. and m ore generally the capacity of organism s to repair dam age to them selv es. is m ade.
How is it possible to regard one and the sam e object both as a purpose (hence as som ething w hich has been produced as a result of conscious design).g. w e can m ak e sense of organism s (that is.K ant is concerned. T he question of how the natural character of organism s can be reconciled w ith their status as purposes. to em phasiz e both an analogy and a disanalogy betw een organism s and artif acts. capacity f or self -repair) w hich K ant illustrates w ith the ex am ple of the tree. W hile m uch discussion of K ant's biological teleology has f ocussed on the Dialectic of T eleological Judgm ent. capacity to nourish them selv es. then in w hat respect can w e can coherently regard them as sim ilar to artif acts? Ginsborg (2001) attem pts to resolv e the problem of coherence by appeal to a conception of purposiv eness as norm ativ ity (see S ection 3.. arguing that organism s can be regarded as subject to norm ativ e standards w ithout supposing that they w ere designed to accord w ith those standards. reciprocal dependence of parts. since w e can conceiv e of a natural object as artef act-lik e by conceiv ing of its parts as produced reciprocally by one another and by the w hole (in the w ay illustrated by K ant through the ex am ple of the tree at §64). f or it is not clear w hat it is to regard som ething that is not designed “as if ” it w ere designed: if w e are not ascribing to organism s the property of being artif acts.” is indirectly addressed by K ant in the Dialectic of T eleological Judgm ent in the f orm of a question about how w e are to reconcile the apparently conf licting dem ands of m echanistic and teleological ex planation w ith regard to liv ing things (see S ection 3. W e m ak e sense of an organism by com ing to understand w hat the f unctions of its v arious parts are (e. and hence of the v ery coherence of the notion of a “natural purpose. and by B eisbart (2009). understand their structure and w ork ings) only by appeal to teleological notions. by com ing to understand that the f unction of the heart is to pum p blood round the body . B ut it can also be raised in a m ore direct f orm .g. w ho argues that the appeal to norm ativ ity is unnecessary f or m ak ing sense of organism s as natural purposes. rather than the A naly tic. then. w ho agrees that the notion of a purpose has norm ativ e content but denies that organism s f or K ant are in f act purposes. B ut organism s are unlik e artif acts in that they are not produced or m aintained by an ex ternal cause. there is an ex cellent discussion of the .1 abov e). that a particular w heel is there in order to turn the hour hand). and as natural (hence — on the f ace of it — som ething w hich has not been produced as a result of conscious design)? T o say that w e regard it only as if it w ere designed does not on its ow n dispose of the question.4 below ). or that the heart is there “in order to” pum p blood round the body ) just as w e m ak e sense of an artif act such as a w atch by com ing to understand the f unctions of its parts (e. A s in the case of artif acts.. A lternativ e solutions are of f ered by K reines (2005). but instead hav e the self -producing and self m aintaining character that is rev ealed in the k inds of v ital properties (reproduction of y oung.
ch. Guy er (2001) discusses the w ay in w hich K ant's notion of organism s as purposes creates a problem f or his conception of science as unif ied. Guy er (2003a) and S teigerw ald (2006) relate K ant's v iew of organism s as natural purposes to his v iew s about ref lectiv e judgm ent m ore generally . Illetterati (f orthcom ing). organism s) in teleological term s. that w e m ust regard organism s as purposes. A t least part of K ant's solution consists in the claim that both principles are m erely “regulativ e” rather than “constitutiv e. T he m echanical inex plicability of organism s leads to an apparent conf lict. Other discussions of the A naly tic's treatm ent of organism s as natural purposes include Z um bach (1984).4 Mechanism and Teleology T he sam e considerations w hich lead K ant to claim . In a w ell-k now n passage he declares that it is “absurd f or hum an beings… to hope that there m ay y et arise a N ew ton w ho could m ak e conceiv able ev en so m uch as the production of a blade of grass according to natural law s w hich no intention has ordered” (§75. W hile a being w ith a discursiv e understanding cannot understand how an organism could com e about in w ay s that do not inv olv e teleological causation. and a contrasting “intuitiv e” understanding w hich (although K ant does not say so ex plicitly ) m ight be ascribed to God. the “discursiv e” understanding of hum an beings. but only present principles w hich w e m ust f ollow in inv estigating nature. and the specif ic need to regard som e products of nature (specif ically . som e objects in nature resist m echanical ex planation and w e need to appeal to teleology in order to understand them (§70. w hich sets K ant's v iew of organism s in the contex t of eighteenth-century biology . T he question of how K ant resolv es the A ntinom y is controv ersial. K ant dev elops this solution in detail by arguing that both the need f or m echanistic ex planation f or nature as a w hole. are due to peculiarities of our hum an cognitiv e f aculties. 387). on the other. T he core of this argum ent is giv en in §77. Frick e (1990). 3. that their production cannot be m echanically ex plained and that they m ust instead be accounted f or in term s w hich ultim ately m ak e ref erence to teleology .” that is. that they do not state how nature really is. w e m ust seek to ex plain ev ery thing in nature in m echanical term s. w here K ant dif f erentiates tw o k inds of understanding. 1). and hence that the production of organism s is im possible w ithout such causation. Š ustar (f orthcom ing) and Goy (f orthcom ing a). 400). in the Dialectic. w hich K ant ref ers to as an “antinom y of judgm ent. B reitenbach (f orthcom ing) argues that the ascription of purposiv eness to organism s is a m atter of our regarding organic natural processes as analogous to reason's intentional activ ity . this does not m ean this could not be understood by an intuitiv e understanding. in the A naly tic. lead him to claim . On the one hand.” betw een tw o principles gov erning em pirical scientif ic enquiry . .A naly tic of T eleological Judgm ent in M cL aughlin (1990.
how w e are to seek a m echanical ex planation of organism s (as required by the f irst principle) w hile still ack now ledging that w e cannot understand them ex cept by appeal to purposes. It is dif f icult to understand the im plications of K ant's discussion of m echanism and teleology w ithout k now ing w hat he m eans by “m echanism . lik e an artif act.” and unf ortunately this is v ery hard to determ ine f rom the tex t. he denies that a liv ing thing can com e to be out of non-liv ing m atter: the m atter f rom w hich the em bry o dev elops m ust already be teleologically organiz ed. and allow s instead that once m atter is endow ed w ith lif e and organiz ation it has the pow er to produce other liv ing things. then K ant's solution to the antinom y of teleological judgm ent is radically at odds w ith his v iew s in the Critique of Pure Reason. T he subordination of m echanism to teleology is clarif ied in §§80–81. but the m echanism is “subordinated to teleology ” in the sense that the starting-point of the process. A t the sam e tim e. since it inv olv es the claim that the principle of m echanism is m erely . but a natural process w hereby a new liv ing thing com es into being. and the origin of indiv idual plants and anim als belonging to already ex isting species. this “m echanism ” depends on liv ing m atter. nam ely m atter w hich itself has organiz ation and lif e. in the “M ethodology of T eleological Judgm ent. that is. 414). If the notion of m echanism is understood in this w ay .” w here K ant connects his v iew s to som e of the biological controv ersies of the day . K ant tentativ ely endorses a v iew w hich allow s the natural dev elopm ent of higher species out of low er ones. B ut again. is intelligible only by appeal to purposes (§80). M any com m entators hav e tak en the notion of m echanism to be equiv alent to the notion of causality in tim e w hich f igures in the Critique of Pure Reason. w e m ust pursue the search f or m echanical ex planation as f ar as possible. regarding both the origin of the v arious species of plants and anim als. T he v iew is “m echanical” in the sense that it denies that each liv ing thing w as produced.T his argum ent on its ow n is not suf f icient to address the question of how the principles are to be reconciled in scientif ic enquiry . In the case of the origin of particular organism s. T he v iew is “m echanical” to the ex tent that it understands the dev elopm ent of one species f rom another as a natural law -gov erned process w hich does not require special appeal to an purpose in the case of each new species. but w hich denies the possibility that the low er species in turn could dev elop out of unorganiz ed m atter as such. K ant's ostensible answ er to this question is that w e m ust “subordinate” m echanism to teleology (§78. K ant endorses a v iew (epigenesis) on w hich the em ergence of an apparently new plant or anim al is not just the ex pansion or unf olding of one w hich already ex isted in m iniature (as on the pref orm ationist v iew ). as in the case of the origin of species. so that the principle of m echanism is equiv alent to the causal principle w hich K ant tak es him self to hav e prov ed in the S econd A nalogy . y et w hile still recogniz ing the need f or an ultim ate appeal to purposes. Ev en in the case of organism s. w hose possibility w e can understand only in teleological term s. in accordance w ith a specif ic intention. In the case of the origin of species.
but also of other natural things and processes. they are not to be ex plained in term s of a designer's intentions. Ex perience presents us w ith m any cases in w hich f eatures of a liv ing thing's env ironm ent. 367). M ore recent discussions of the A ntinom y include. and hence need to be understood teleologically . as natural objects rather than artef acts. organism s hav e to be ex plained teleologically because.3). On this approach. and thus indirectly to hum an beings. but on the contrary to show that. M any com m entators. Ginsborg (2001) of f ers a third proposal. in contrast to m achines. K ant's point in em phasiz ing the contrast betw een organism s and m achines is not to show that organism s require teleological ex planation (since m achines such as clock s are no less in need of such ex planation).5 Nature as a System of Purposes K ant is concerned w ith the role of teleology in our understanding not only of indiv idual organism s. 1990). are benef icial or indeed necessary to it: f or ex am ple riv ers are helpf ul to the grow th of plants. reject this reading. on w hich a thing can be ex plained “m echanically ” if its ex istence can be accounted f or in term s of the intrinsic pow ers of the m atter out of w hich it com es to be. M cL aughlin (1989. w hich in turn prov ide f ood f or . Quarf ood (2006). 2003a). A llison (1991) and Guy er (2001. nam ely the causality by w hich the parts of a thing determ ine the w hole rather than the w hole's determ ining the parts. T here is a v ery helpf ul ov erv iew of the A ntinom y in chapter 4 of Quarf ood (2004) w hich includes m any ref erences to relev ant secondary literature. instead tak ing the notion of m echanism in the relev ant sense to correspond to a m ore specif ic ty pe of causality . both organic and inorganic. tak e organism s to be m echanically inex plicable in v irtue of the self m aintaining and self -producing character w hich distinguishes them f rom artif acts (see S ection 3. their parts cannot ex ist independently of the w hole to w hich they belong.regulativ e as opposed to constitutiv e. B reitenbach (2008). including M cL aughlin (1990). and f ollow ing him A llison (1991). Ginsborg (2004) argues that the self -m aintaining character of organism s is irrelev ant to their m echanical inex plicability in the relev ant sense. this v iew is also tak en by Z anetti (1993). A gainst this. all of w hich engage w ith the m ore general issue of how the A ntinom y is resolv ed. 3. N uz z o (2009) and Hunem an (f orthcom ing): the latter tw o articles deal specif ically w ith K ant's distinction betw een discursiv e and intuitiv e understanding in §§76–77. and of nature as a w hole. W atk ins (2009) and M cL aughlin (f orthcom ing). grass is necessary f or cattle and other herbiv orous anim als. because they deposit soil and thus create f ertile land (§63. in addition to the articles m entioned in the prev ious paragraph. Quarf ood (f orthcom ing). T he disagreem ent is discussed f urther in B reitenbach (2006). A related interpretativ e issue concerns the grounds on w hich organism s resist m echanical ex planation.
w hich is som ething w ithin nature f or w hose sak e all other things w ithin nature ex ist (§82.carniv ores (§63. to set them selv es purposes and to use nature to f ulf il them . but it does allow us to think of them as standing not only in a m echanical. and the idea of the final purpose [Endzweck] of nature. T his does not m ean that w e are entitled. in turn m ak es possible the idea of nature as a sy stem of purposes. and hence has inner purposiv eness (this condition is stated m ost clearly at §82.). but he also puts the point m ore w eak ly by say ing that the step f rom the idea of a natural purpose to that of nature as a w hole as a sy stem of purposes is one w hich w e “m ay ” [dürfen] m ak e (§67. §84. w e do not need to appeal to its usef ulness to other liv ing things in order to com prehend it. but also in a teleological order. T he thought of such a teleological order in turn leads to tw o f urther ideas: the idea of theultimate purpose [letzter Zweck] of nature. he does hold that the natural objects f iguring in these usef ul arrangem ents hav e a ty pe of purposiv eness. 434f f . w hich is som ething outside of nature f or w hose sak e nature as a w hole ex ists (§67. still less required. W e can account f or the origin of riv ers m echanically . T hey can be counted as purposiv e in this relativ e sense as long as the thing to w hose ex istence they contribute is a liv ing thing. to ascribe an intentional cause to purposiv e arrangem ents in nature. 431). rather than as part of nature. K ant puts this by say ing that the concept of a natural purpose “necessarily leads to the idea of all of nature as a sy stem in accordance w ith the rule of purposes” (§67. T he idea of the outer or relativ e purposiv eness of one natural thing f or another. Culture is the ultim ate purpose of nature because it prepares m an f or w hat he m ust do in order to be the f inal purpose of nature (§83. 378f . K ant m ak es the negativ e point (a v ersion of w hich he had earlier argued at length in the Only Possible Argument for the Existence of God of 1763) that w e can understand these arrangem ents w ithout appeal to purposes. 368). nam ely outer or relativ e purposiv eness. considered as hav ing the supersensible ability to choose purposes f reely (§84. 379). . B ut hum an beings are capable of realiz ing their noum enal f reedom only in v irtue of their capacity . 426f f ). How ev er. W hile ex perience does not allow us to identif y either nature's ultim ate purpose or its f inal purpose. and ev en though grass m ust be regarded as an purpose on account of its internal organiz ation. 380). 435). that is. w hich is m ade possible by the idea of a natural purpose. 425).. w here ev ery thing in nature is teleologically connected to ev ery thing else through relations of outer purposiv eness. T o consider m an in this w ay is to conceiv e him as noum enon. K ant calls the dev elopm ent of this capacity “culture. as natural beings. K ant argues on a priori grounds that the f inal purpose of nature can only be m an considered as a m oral subject.” and tak es it to require the acquisition both of specif ic abilities (“culture of sk ill”) and of the ability to m ak e choices w ithout being inf luenced by the inclinations to enjoy m ent stem m ing f rom our anim al nature (“culture of discipline”).
and thus serv es as a preparation or “propadeutic” to theology (§85. 456). in that it leads us to ask w hat the f inal purpose of nature is. but also has the other atttibutes associated w ith the traditional idea of God.6 Teleology. and relatedly . 2002). T hus. 3. 442). at A 620/B 648f f . om nipotence and w isdom (w hich includes om nibenif icence and justice) (§86. For this w e need to appeal. and of f ers a m ore f ar-reaching criticism of phy sicotheology in the Critique of Pure Reason. 441). (T he topic of phy sicotheology w as of concern to K ant throughout his career: K ant proposes a “rev ised phy sicotheology ” in the Only Possible Argument for the Existence of God (1763). as K ant puts it. not to natural. but to m oral teleology ) of m an as f inal purpose of nature. T he idea of nature as purposiv ely directed tow ards the ex istence of rational beings under m oral law s allow s us to conceiv e of an author of nature w ho is not m erely intelligent. . 440). and in particular to the idea (itself belonging not to natural. f or ex am ple om niscience. let alone that it is inf inite in ev ery respect. S ee also Cohen's (2006) discussion of the relation betw een K ant's v iew s on the generation of organism s and his conception of the f inal purpose of nature. A lthough natural teleology cannot prov e the ex istence of God.For K ant's v iew s about the teleology of nature as a w hole. it “driv es us to seek a theology ” (§85.” that is. a purpose w hich K ant calls the “highest good” and w hich is discussed in his m oral w ritings. 2001a. 444). to inquire into the attributes of God as author of nature. it nonetheless has a positiv e role to play w ith respect to religion and m orality . W e hav e to assum e the ex istence of a being w ith these attributes if w e ourselv es are to adopt the purpose required by the m oral law . but it cannot justif y the assum ption that this cause has w isdom . but to m oral. see Guy er (2001a and f orthcom ing) and W atk ins (f orthcom ing). T he positiv e role of natural teleology in establishing religion and m orality has been em phasiz ed by Guy er (see especially 2000. w ho tak es the “Critique of T eleological Judgm ent” to prov ide an im portant argum ent f rom natural teleology to m orality . the attem pt to use natural teleology to prov e the ex istence of God.) A ppeal to natural teleology m ay justif y the assum ption of an intelligent cause of nature. Morality and Religion Part of K ant's aim in the “Critique of T eleological Judgm ent” is to clarif y the relation of natural teleology to religion. and to argue in particular against “phy sicoteleology . the latter of f ers a v ery helpf ul discussion of K ant's justif ication f or the ex tension of his v iew s about teleology in indiv idual organism s to nature as a w hole. teleology . K ant also claim s that “if the cognition of natural purposes is connected w ith that of the m oral purpose” then “it is of great signif icance f or assisting the practical reality of the idea [of God]” (§88. and in particular suprem ely w ise (§85.
there are reasons to think that contem porary biological theory is no less com m itted to teleology than its eighteenth-century counterpart. nor of M endel's law s of inheritance. W hile theorists at the tim e that K ant w as w riting w ere prepared to consider the possibility that present-day species ev olv ed out of earlier and m ore prim itiv e f orm s of lif e — and ev en out of m ere m atter as such — they had no ink ling of Darw in's theory of natural selection. w hile not ex plicitly proposing a K antian approach. 3 of Quarf ood (2004). no ex perim ental ev idence against it. M cL aughlin's (2001) book on f unctional ex planation. 3.7 Relevance of Kant's Natural Teleology to Contemporary Biological Theory K ant's w ritings on natural teleology tak e f or granted the biological theories of his tim e. it w as w idely assum ed that liv ing beings w ere m ade of a dif f erent k ind of m atter f rom that f ound elsew here in the univ erse. K ant him self f ollow s B lum enbach in assum ing a distinctiv e k ind of liv ing m atter w hich can be understood only in teleological term s. and w hile som e biological theorists rejected this “v italist” assum ption there w as. as y et. A num ber of interpreters hav e recently draw n on K ant to propose a solution to the problem . It m ight seem im plausible. Bibliography . M oreov er. draw s on K ant at sev eral points. W alsh (2006). in particular through biologists' use of f unctional language in their characteriz ations of the parts and behav iour of organism s. Cohen (2007). although w ithout necessarily agreeing on w hat a K antian solution am ounts to. then. w hich w ere v ery dif f erent f rom those of the present day . A dif f erent suggestion regarding the relev ance of K ant's v iew s to contem porary biology is of f ered by R oth (f orthcom ing). T he v iew that K ant's theory is relev ant to the contem porary debate about biological f unctions is challenged f orcef ully by Z am m ito (2006). w hich interprets K ant's biological theories as supporting his v iew that all m em bers of the hum an species (including inf ants and the sev erely disabled) hav e m oral status. Ex am ples of ex plicitly “K antian” approaches to teleology include ch. that K ant's v iew s could hav e any relev ance to contem porary biological thought. How ev er. K ant can thus be seen as addressing a problem w hich is also of concern to present-day philosophers of biology : how to m ak e sense of the idea that biological entities and processes can hav e purposes or f unctions w ithout presupposing the ex istence of a div ine designer. B reitenbach (2009) and Ginsborg (f orthcom ing). w ho argues that K ant's antireductionism regarding organism s — that they cannot be understood as com posed out of pre-ex isting parts — of f ers a m odel f or contem porary m olecular biology .A dif f erent k ind of connection betw een K ant's natural teleology and his v iew s about m orality is suggested in K ain (2009).
B ernard (L ondon: M acm illan. and includes copious ref erences to other relev ant w ritings by K ant. ed. T he tw o m ost recent English-language editions of the Critique of Judgment are to be pref erred ov er earlier translations. W erner Pluhar. Page ref erences giv en in this article f ollow the pagination of the A cadem y edition. in particular in the translation of certain f requently occurring term s. 2000. 1952). and contains ex planatory notes w hich w ill be usef ul to the less specializ ed reader. T he earlier translations are those of J. and these dif f erences are ref lected in v ariations in the term inology used in the secondary . Kants gesammelte Schriften. Critique of the Power of Judgment (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant). 1902–. T he Hack ett edition is m ore readable.” Quotations f ollow the Cam bridge translation (see below ). T he Cam bridge edition contains ex cellent editorial notes aim ed at a m ore specializ ed readership. V olum e 20. 1902–. Paul Guy er.Primary Sources T he tw o m ost im portant sources f or K ant's v iew s on aesthetics and teleology . Kants gesammelte Schriften. V olum e 5. Critique of Judgment and ‘First Introduction‘. the edition just cited is a com bination of translations of the tw o m ain sections of the w ork that w ere published separately in 1911 and 1928 respectiv ely . 1892. w hich is indicated in the m argins of the tw o m ost recent English-language editions (see below ). w ith occasional div ergences. “Erste Einleitung”. Indianapolis: Hack ett. trans. T he recent translations are: � � Critique of Judgment. R ef erences to the First Introduction are introduced by the abbrev iation “FI.H. are both published in the standard Germ an edition of K ant's w ork s. trans. B oth the Hack ett and the Cam bridge editions include the First Introduction.C. and both prov ide f urther bibliographical ref erences (the Hack ett edition has a good bibliography of secondary literature up to 1987). T here are substantial dif f erences am ong the v arious av ailable English-language editions. Cam bridge: Cam bridge Univ ersity Press. Unless otherw ise stated. 1987. the so-called A cadem y edition: � � Kritik der Urteilskraft. Paul Guy er and Eric M atthew s. B erlin: W alter de Gruy ter. rev ised edition 1914) and J. M eredith (Ox f ord: Clarendon Press. B erlin: W alter de Gruy ter. all ref erences are to the Critique of Judgment.
and is m ore a w ork in popular anthropology . Secondary Sources T here is a large and ev er-increasing secondary literature on K ant's aesthetics and teleology . edited by Gunter Z öller and R obert B . History. R ecent w ork on the historical origins of K ant's aesthetics m ore specif ically includes Z uck ert (2007a) and R ueger (2009). v ery little bearing on K ant's aesthetic theory .literature. included in Theoretical Philosophy 1755– 1770 (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant). L ouden. is a usef ul source of f urther ref erences. K ant's early w ork . translated and edited by Dav id W alf ord and R alf M eerbote (Cam bridge: Cam bridge Univ ersity Press. 1992). For m ore details on relev ant m aterial f rom these tex ts. w hich ex plores the inf luence on K ant of earlier w riters on aesthetics in the em piricist tradition. Observations on the Sublime and the Beautiful (1764). K ant also discusses teleology in tw o essay s about race. . f or K ant's teleology the reader is ref erred to Henning's (2009) annotated bibliography . so I m ention here som e readings w hich m ight serv e as points of departure f or the reader interested in these areas. w hich prov ides an ov erv iew of recent w ork in K ant's aesthetics. S om e issues regarding the translation of the tex t are discussed in section IV of the Editor's Introduction to the Cam bridge edition and in Ginsborg (2002). For a m ore ex tended account. in spite of its title. T he introduction to the Cam bridge edition of the Critique of Judgment prov ides a usef ul discussion of the historical sources of the w ork as a w hole. the reader is ref erred to the endnotes of the Cam bridge edition of the Critique of Judgment. T urning now to other prim ary sources: there is a considerable am ount of m aterial on aesthetics. see Z am m ito's (1992) book on the origin of the Critique of Judgment. in the lectures and ref lections on logic and anthropology . ref lecting K ant's v iew s at v arious stages of his philosophical dev elopm ent. and Education (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant). W enz el (2009). T his article has not addressed the historical origin or reception of K ant's v iew s on aesthetics and teleology . and Guy er (2008). T he list of ref erences below is not intended as a com prehensiv e bibliography . “Determ ination of the Concept of a Hum an R ace” (1785) and “On the Use of T eleological Principles in Philosophy ” (1788). both of w hich em phasiz e K ant's relation to his rationalist predecessors. has. W hile K ant's m ost sy stem atic and m ature discussion of teleology is in the Critique of Judgment. both are included in Anthropology. there is also ex tensiv e discussion of the topic in the Only Possible Argument for the Existence of God (1763).
T he reception of K ant's biological w ork is discussed in L enoir's inf luential (1980). w hich is also a usef ul source of ref erences to recent literature on the topic. L enoir's v iew is challenged in R ichards (2000) and. H. Unity of T hought. R eprinted as chapter 14 of A m erik s (2003). including its inf luence on Germ an idealist v iew s of nature and in turn on the thought of B ergson and M erleau-Ponty . “N ew V iew s on K ant's Judgm ent of T aste. R eprinted as part of chapter 12 of A m erik s (2003). G. and Gasché (2003). “K ant and the Objectiv ity of T aste. specif ically regarding the biology of his tim e.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (S upplem ent): 139–155.” In Parret (1998). Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy. Cam bridge Univ ersity Press. A m erik s.” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 66(3): 237–251. H. “Unity of Organism . “K ant's A ntinom y of T eleological Judgm ent. M cL aughlin (1990) rem ains an ex cellent guide. (1982). ––– (2001). his (2006a) of f ers a discussion of the w ider ram if ications of K ant's natural teleology . Duscheneau. and the Unity of the Critique of Judgm ent. ––– (2000). and m uch of the literature ref erred to.R egarding the historical back ground to K ant's v iew s on natural teleology .” In Cohen and Guy er (1982). Kant's Theory of Taste. A quila. Ox f ord. (1982). m ore recently in Z am m ito (2012). (1991). “K ant's Justif ied Dism issal of A rtistic S ublim ity . Univ ersity of Chicago Press. K . F. ––– (2003). Conceptuality and Objectiv ity . “A N ew L ook at K ant's A esthetic Judgm ents. ––– (1998). (1982). A rendt. T his article. U. Piché eds.” Kant Actuel. “R eply to the Com m ents of L onguenesse and Ginsborg. . w hich argues that K ant's ideas play ed a m ajor role in shaping Germ an biology in the 1790s.” Journal of Value Inquiry 16: 295–302. R . Z uck ert (f orthcom ing a). English-language treatm ents of K ant's aesthetics w hich accom m odate m ore of a “continental” perspectiv e include M ak k reel (1990). m ore recent w ork on this topic includes Fisher (f orthcom ing). � � � � � � � � � � � � A baci.9. B ellarm in/V rin. S ee also the ref erences giv en in the f inal paragraph of section 2. Chicago.” Inquiry 46(2): 182–194.” British Journal of Aesthetics 23: 3–17. “T aste. “How to S av e K ant's Deduction of T aste. Interpreting Kant's Critiques. Goy (f orthcom ing). ––– (2003). (2008). M ontréal/Paris. approaches K ant's v iew s largely f rom the perspectiv e of the analy tic tradition in philosophy . ––– (1991). R eprinted as part of chapter 12 of A m erik s (2003). R eprinted as chapter 13 of A m erik s 2003. Cam bridge. Hunem an (2006) discusses the inf luence of K ant's v iew s on French biology in the nineteenth century . A llison. L aFrance and C. ––– (1983). Ox f ord Univ ersity Press.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (S upplem ent): 25–42. Pillow (2000).
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Other Internet Resources [Please contact author w ith suggestions] Related Entries aesthetics: aesthetic judgm ent | K ant. Im m anuel: critique of m etaphy sics | K ant.edu> Copyright © 2013 by . T he author is v ery gratef ul to Janum S ethi f or her help w ith the 2012 rev ision. Hannah Ginsborg <ginsborg@berkeley.L ook up this entry topic at the Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). W ork on the 2012 rev ision w as carried out in part w ith the help of a f ellow ship at the W issenschaf tsk olleg z u B erlin. Im m anuel: philosophy of science | K ant. Im m anuel: theory of judgm ent | teleology : teleological notions in biology Acknowledgments W ork on the original (2005) v ersion of this article w as supported by the A m erican Council of L earned S ocieties and by the M ax Planck Institute f or the History of S cience. w ith link s to its database. Im m anuel | K ant. Im m anuel: philosophical dev elopm ent | K ant. Enhanced bibliography f or this entry at PhilPapers.
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