This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
Lecture, Delivered by Prof Peter Marshall on 5 September 2007 in National University of Singapore
Offshore Technology: Lessons Learned the Hard Way
Peter W. Marshall Department of Civil Engineering and Centre for Offshore Research & Engineering National University Singapore
Peter Marshall is an original author of many parts of the RP 2A standard for offshore platforms, and a member of the API Hurricane Evaluation & Assessment Team (HEAT). When he received the OTC 2006 Distinguished Achievement Award for individuals, the five-minute acceptance speech did not allow a full expose' on how dealing with risk has been an essential part of the offshore industry in general, and his 45-year career in particular. See I-wasthere descriptions of oil spills, blowouts & fires, collisions, hurricane survivals, structural failures, and technological blunders. Hear how industry-consensus standards extracted valuable lessons from these events, and continue to do so today.
Seams are made by automatic submerged arc welding.
KEY WORDS: Offshore technology; fixed platforms; hurricanes; blowouts; fires; collisions; tubular joints. INTRODUCTION
The first figure shows an example of the permanent fixed offshore platform, in 40 m water depth. It supports wells, a drilling rig, and oil processing equipment. A tubular space frame extends from the sea floor to just above the surface. Steel pipe piles are driven through the legs to anchor it. A superstructure deck on top supports the equipment and keeps it out of reach of wave action. Now comes the tricky part – tube-to-tube structural T- Y- and Kconnections. Notice the saddle shaped cope and carefully maintained root gap. The weld geometry and position vary around the circumference. AWS D1.1 prescribes special welder qualification for this – the 6GR test.
Platform fabricators “roll their own,” making structural steel pipe from plate, according to API Spec 2B.
Tubular frames, or bents, are welded at ground level, then tilted up to make the space frame.
this technology was extended to 100m water depth… Piles are stabbed into the jacket legs. to complete the structure. In the late 1960s. and driven with a steam or hydraulic hammer which rides on top of the pile. Welded splices and shim connections at the top of the jacket are performed in the field. is loaded onto a barge for transport and launch at sea. Drilling and production modules are then placed on top. The deck is lifted on. 2 . …and to the icy waters of Alaska. or jacket. Delivered by Prof Peter Marshall on 5 September 2007 in National University of Singapore The completed space frame.CORE Report 2007-05 Offshore Technology: Lessons Learned the Hard Way Inaugural Lloyd’s Register Educational Trust Lecture. here in three pieces.
this picture was taken the next day. But the 1960s were also a time when most of the basic research was done on wave forces. and a staff of former military officers who knew how to take risks and deal with setbacks. ice loads. President Nixon signed the Environmental Protection Act into law. a well being drilled from this platform (visible from shore at Santa Barbara. and collisions These events are often beyond the control of structural designers. What happens when the roughneck goes to lunch and forgets to close the master valve on a live well? “Oops!” doesn’t quite cover it. There was a huge public outcry. The author’s open deck structure stood up well. albeit some with severe burns. laterally loaded piles. and tubular joints. Several men were killed in the initial explosion. Blowouts. LESSON: Public perception is very important. In 1969. … and a more visible mess on the beach. from outer space to something as mundane as the failed levees at New Orleans. but nevertheless interesting to talk about. fires. California) breached a fault plane which had previously been only an intermittent natural seep.e. but the rest got off safely. Human factors play a big role in technological disasters. Heavy crude from the undersea blowout made a big mess in the water… 3 .CORE Report 2007-05 Offshore Technology: Lessons Learned the Hard Way Inaugural Lloyd’s Register Educational Trust Lecture. from mistakes. Offshore pioneers had a revolutionary buccaneering spirit. and politically insensitive statements can be devastating. and a growing distrust of technology. Delivered by Prof Peter Marshall on 5 September 2007 in National University of Singapore It must be admitted that there was a lot of learning things the hard way – i.
More oil was released here at Bay Marchand. Here. Collisions WD 134A platform. stayed open at normal production rates. storm chokes. The second black dot is the world’s first semisubmersible. LESSON: Drifting semi-submersibles can do serious damage. briefly held the world record when completed in 1965. in the calm before the storm. Louisiana. Delivered by Prof Peter Marshall on 5 September 2007 in National University of Singapore LESSON #1: Teflon seals are not heat resistant. the upper brace buckled and severed well outside the connection. rigs in the background drill relief wells to intersect the burning ones and pump them full of cement. requiring three lifts to install. 4 . Most of the oil was allowed to burn up. still far offshore. Meanwhile. surface controlled safety valves) which fail shut. Hurricane Betsy flooded the eastern half of New Orleans that same year. allowing several other wells to begin leaking. in 285-ft water. spiraling high altitude clouds foretell her approach when she was Underwater inspection by the author in a mini-sub showed that heavily reinforced structural joints performed well. and a world-record single lift to remove. Here she comes. Skimmer booms collected much of the rest. yet there was no outcry.CORE Report 2007-05 Offshore Technology: Lessons Learned the Hard Way Inaugural Lloyd’s Register Educational Trust Lecture. than at Santa Barbara. Bluewater I. LESSON #3: Good Crisis management helps. We now use SSSCSVs (subsurface. “Too precious to waste” was not yet a slogan. This deck was the author’s first major project. moored nearby. LESSON #2: The safety devices of the day. Red Adair and his firefighting barge made good press tours.
in which 130 or 4000 fixed platforms were lost. as the Star I got tangled up in the wreckage on the very next dive. Failures were easier to explain than sister platforms which survived. and Camille (1969) were my generation’s “terrible trio. reinforced by increasing the thickness of a joint can section of the jacket leg. Punching shear design criteria allowed the use of simple tubular joints. Swimming TV cameras send back excellent close-ups. Details were published at the first Offshore Technology Conference. Katrina. The previous “100-year” design wave was only 57 feet 5 . The first application was that 40m platform from the Introduction. LESSONS FROM STORM DAMAGE The offshore industry recently got a wake-up call from Hurricanes Ivan. Those old 25-year designs should have failed. Hurricanes Hilda (1964). The 100-Year Club is formed. Testing showed a surprising amount of reserve strength after first yielding at the hot spot. 1964 Circle below shows source of this “found art” sculpture. and Rita (2004-05). Putting engineers in mini-subs proved risky. Some of the early platforms simply disintegrated. Delivered by Prof Peter Marshall on 5 September 2007 in National University of Singapore Signature of a Hurricane Hilda. The SP 62 platform saw 80-ft (24m) waves in hurricane Camille two years later. The second was the 1967 world record platform at SP 62.CORE Report 2007-05 Offshore Technology: Lessons Learned the Hard Way Inaugural Lloyd’s Register Educational Trust Lecture. leaving holes in the jacket legs where the braces pulled out a plug. 1966. LESSON (1964): A 25-year design wave has a high likelihood of being exceeded. Research showed very high shell bending stresses at the “hot spot” adjacent to the connecting weld. LESSON: Do subsea inspections with ROVs (remotely operated vehicles) instead.” in which we lost 50 of 1500. Capacity at failure was represented by punching shear on the observed rupture surface. LESSON (2007): Déjà vu all over again. Betsy (1965).
Ultimate collapse analysis and survival/failure experience both showed a median load at failure of at least twice the design load. Platform “B” in the middle of the slide was destroyed. with plastic load redistribution giving about 40% more capacity than is accounted for by safety factors and known sources of bias. Camille was a watershed event. For a typical platform site in this region. API RP2A showed a reference level wave height of 70 feet. This increase was a hard sell. This defined the “modern era” of platform design. Changes is seafloor elevation reveal a massive mudslide. LESSON: A 70-ft wall of mud will take out a structure designed only for shallow mudflows. the 9th to 19th editions. Mudslides. The square is the 5000-acre South Pass Block 70 lease. Delivered by Prof Peter Marshall on 5 September 2007 in National University of Singapore (17m). with a guideline range of 58ft to 84-ft. 6 . undamaged. about 4 km on a side. 1969 Cost-risk economics were used to justify the criteria increase. to the API reference level used in 9th to 19th editions of RP2A. the 100-year wave was found to be 75 feet. and shoaling curves extending back into shallow water.CORE Report 2007-05 Offshore Technology: Lessons Learned the Hard Way Inaugural Lloyd’s Register Educational Trust Lecture. LESSON: Wave height is not the whole story. Camille. with literal results from a picket line of nine sites along the edge of the continental shelf shown here in black. The 100-year event for anywhere in the entire NW Gulf of Mexico region was found to be 85-feet (shown in red). LESSON: The old design wave was too low. Eventually. LESSON: Offshore platforms have considerable reserve strength. Camille also created massive mudslides. and Platform “A” on the edge moved several feet. Some 38 storms from 100 through 1969 were hindcast. Mud Slides Yet the supporting structure stood. Green water caused considerable damage to deck equipment. stimulating a new round of research. Unstable delta muds lie in an arc 50 km east and south of Venice.
failing by brittle fracture. API Spec 2H. or low sulfur steel for joint cans. but more vulnerable to shrinkage strains in the thru-thickness direction. Delivered by Prof Peter Marshall on 5 September 2007 in National University of Singapore After Camille. Some of the early field failures (shown at right) appeared to be by progressive tearing.CORE Report 2007-05 Offshore Technology: Lessons Learned the Hard Way Inaugural Lloyd’s Register Educational Trust Lecture.g. and subsequent finite element analysis showed the highest local strains to be on the outside surface. Nevertheless. Fatigue. Fix: specify Zdirection tensile tests. LESSON: Minimize stress concentrations and use tougher steel in the joint cans. They tested a 40%-size structural K-connection in both ungrouted and grouted condition (shown at left).. but not the notch effect of the weld itself. Post-mortem sectioning showed the connections to be surprisingly tolerant of weld root defects. LESSON: Alternative load paths – structural redundancy – saved the day. e. Cracks initiated at microscopic sulfide 7 . sulfide shape control. Cracks due to lamellar tearing were also found in the late 1960s. leading to an interest in low-cycle fatigue. Fatigue cracking and ultimate failure was correlated with “hot spot” strain gages adjacent to the weld toes. Materials Problems… This heavily reinforced structural connection fractured in hurricane Hilda. with lots of deformation. Southwest Research Institute was investigating similar problems of plastic fatigue in pressure vessels. Several authors at the first OTC showed examples of ordinary steels with their transition temperatures on the wrong side of Gulf of Mexico. These gages measure local shell bending and membranes stresses. yet the structurally redundant 8-pile platform stood up. LESSON: Ordinary steel is not isotropic. newcomers to the Gulf of Mexico were surprised to see their pipelines swept away. Bea’s obscure theory. and to route pipelines around the problem areas. after hurricane Ivan in 2004. during fabrication. a mini-industry grew up to define the problem and design slide-resistant platforms. inclusions. and the Wall Street Journal called it Prof.
Subsequent large scale European tests with less desirable weld profiles showed lower results. This is the Shell-Esso North Sea Brent “A” platform.CORE Report 2007-05 Offshore Technology: Lessons Learned the Hard Way Inaugural Lloyd’s Register Educational Trust Lecture. The European interpretation. Bigger and better. lower S-N curve for this case. “cowboy technology. shown Cognac’s three piece installation was very complex. By the time the more exhaustive European fatigue research was concluded in 1987. External weld profiles merged smoothly with the adjoining base metal. the offshore boom was over. prompting API to draw a second. a new offshore platform was condemned because UT found “cracks” at the weld root. Prior to the adoption of RP 2X. and relaxed reject criteria for the weld root in tubular connections was incorporated into UT (ultrasonic testing) standards. and low cycle fatigue tests gave excellent results.1-1972. mockingly naming theirs Cerveza (beer) and Liguera (light beer). designed in 1974.” enabled the initial push into deeper water and harsher environments. Shell’s 1000-ft (300m) Cognac platform was also designed in 1974.g. A competitor subsequently built cheaper platforms in similar water depth. API now considers both effects. Acoustic transponders and a proprietary mooring adjustment algorithm allowed precise 8 . This provided full size specimens for fatigue testing at the University of California. e. is that it is all attributable to a thickness effect. and that weld profile notches do not matter. Delivered by Prof Peter Marshall on 5 September 2007 in National University of Singapore Failure in chord Crack in brace Hot spot Strain gage in red. Fatigue test post mortem The hot-spot S-N curve was incorporated into AWS D1. Two derrick barges in a common mooring system used special heave-compensated lowering devices. American fatigue criteria. API RP 2X. and never repeated.
CORE Report 2007-05 Offshore Technology: Lessons Learned the Hard Way Inaugural Lloyd’s Register Educational Trust Lecture. with the aid of shock-absorbing docking poles. 1000-ft long “pins” were lowered into the jacket legs and grouted. like this TLP (tension leg platform) at Auger. Delivered by Prof Peter Marshall on 5 September 2007 in National University of Singapore positioning. Large skirted mudmats provided initial stability on bottom. with no changes. Popeye was planned as a 40-well compliant tower in 2000-ft (600m) water depth. to join the three sections together. and was transported and launched by a purpose-build 850-ft barge. resulting in cost overruns. at Green Canyon block 65. However. installed at Green Canyon block 65 in 1988. and no steel was cut until all the engineering was done. Popeye 2000-ft water Bullwinkle was the last of the dinosaurs.000 tons. and connected to the base by grouting the annulus. Hydraylically adjustable mudmats were used for leveling. Subsea wells with tieback risers are more expensive than conventional ones. For Bullwinkle. was actually faster than most “fast track” fiascos. regulations and construction methods were being finalized during construction. 3-in wall. Deeper water mega-projects are being developed with floating platforms. and the field was ultimately developed with a few subsea wells tied back to a fixed platform. Six-ft diameter. while skirt piles were driven by a new generation of underwater hammers. For Brent and Cognac. The resulting project. The middle and top jacket sections were stacked on top. Skirt piles were driven through vertical sleeves with an underwater hydraulic hammer. Its one-piece jacket weighed 50. Bullwinkle is still making money as a processing and transportation hub for nearby subsea fields.with a topside identical to Bullwinkle. the engineers had learned their lesson. and still holding the fixed-base water depth record at 1350-ft (400m). #3 confirmation well ruined grand visions. but highly permeable turbidite formations and horizontal 9 .
A-2s do not make optimal economic risks. Cost-risk tradeoffs were re-examined in 1987. and give some slack for the different economics of dealing with existing structures. A-1 is for high-consequence economic exposure to the full hurricane population. Prof Marshall retired from Shell to take the Chair of Marine Design and Construction at the University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne (arrow). Auger’s 1989 design also considered the 1000-year whammy for survival conditions. some workers have been killed and 10 . L-1 design criteria is for highconsequence deep water projects like Bullwinkle in Green Canyon. they would be equally wasteful on the conservative side. Katrina & Rita In 1993. he enjoyed his view of the town moor. L-2 is the old 9th-19th edition optimum. Retirement also brought a second career designing tubular bridges. The new century found Marshall back in Houston. UPDATE Déjà vu all over again. Delivered by Prof Peter Marshall on 5 September 2007 in National University of Singapore completions make each one more productive. Today’s API consequence-based criteria are shown in black. due to the industry’s personnel evacuation policy. 2004-2005 – Ivan. to calibrate new random directional wave force (RDWF) technology. so fewer wells are required. still used for ordinary platforms in water depths up to 400-ft. Affirmative lessons from the recent hurricanes are listed here. A-2 is for human safety in sudden storms which spring up locally and do not have time to mature. As a transplanted Texan. with the Cow Hill desktop as background. In retrospect. again doing semi-volunteer API work. If ISO 19901-1 criteria were to be applied Gulf-wide. However.CORE Report 2007-05 Offshore Technology: Lessons Learned the Hard Way Inaugural Lloyd’s Register Educational Trust Lecture. The A’s are for re-assessment of existing platforms. NO LIVES LOST during the storms.
and Katrina) in the same deepwater region could no longer be dismissed as a fluke. Three more big wave-makers (Opel.CORE Report 2007-05 Offshore Technology: Lessons Learned the Hard Way Inaugural Lloyd’s Register Educational Trust Lecture. Strohbeck & Marshall for a 57-ft maximum wave and having only 41. with storm names at arrows. designed by Bea. A 1982 pushover analysis indicated its ultimate strength load factor was less than unity for hurricane Frederick. and all three have their true believers. the “Gap” region is still being questioned for shallow water in the shelf. and having an average age of nearly 40 years The biggest economic impact was caused by extensive production shutdowns from damage to topside facilities on the offshore platforms. which it survived with no damage. The solid lines are old hindcasts from the Bea-Marshall 1970 study. but this was attributable to randomness on the basis of Monte Carlo studies producing similar variations. Bob Bea gained notoriety by pointing out human failures in the design and maintenance of New Orleans levees. 11 . Ivan. and the government. some as noted here. sub-surface safety valves). LESSON: Lower deck beams should have robust lateral support. Below is a plot of historical maximum wave heights along the 400-ft (120m) contour off the Texas and Louisiana coasts.5-ft deck clearance. Waves higher than the general trend in a Central “hot spot” region could be seen in the older data. MINIMAL POLLUTION because to the use of SCSSSV (surface-controlled. Onshore devastation to people and infrastructure considerably slowed the recovery. N Ivan > 100 yr 3 kt current 91 kt wind 82 ft wave 60 ft 2D crest There are two other possible explanations. and got compensation. While market forces managed the shortage better than previous attempts at rationing and price control. to the pipelines linking them to shore. All this caused a sharp and sustained rise in energy prices. However. and overwhelmed the deck. and Berkeley Prof. One of nine sites exposed for 106 years would be expected to come close to the 1000-yr event. Most of the failures were among old “stripper” platforms designed to earlier. designed to the full 100-yr criteria of the 20th & 21st editions or API RP 2A failed. and only 2% of platform designed to the lower L-2 criteria (9th-19th editions) were lost. every taxpayer who claimed auto mileage was declared a hurricane victim. LESSON: Hubris isl always with us. and to coastal processing facilities. One of the more surprising survivals was this 1965 design at MP 290. there were subsequent spills due to tankers running into the wreckage of toppled platforms. Al Gore became a movie star by blaming global warming for the Katrina disaster. the press. which got the attention of the public. but we just did not see it until recently. However. Waves from Ivan were much larger. Degrees of Belief • Global warming – versus • Hurricane Alleys – versus • Random Clustering Yesterday’s 1000-yr criteria have become today’s 100-yr for Central. Yet most modern platforms survived. It should not be too surprising that extending the hindcast period by 50% produces higher historical maxima. and the dashed lines are more recent. This was there all along. However. still lower criteria. No L-1 platforms. the one most in favor with the met-ocean community is that persistent hot water in the Gulf Loop current energizes storms as they cross over it. and are still exceeded by Ivan. Delivered by Prof Peter Marshall on 5 September 2007 in National University of Singapore injured during the massive clean-up effort.
wave forces. and updated RP2A annually. tubular joints. Plastic hinges in compact sections do not keep yielding forever. Delivered by Prof Peter Marshall on 5 September 2007 in National University of Singapore Software for ultimate strength pushover analysis has been calibrated on destructive tubular frame tests.1% 15/949 1. the offshore oil industry might never have started. and sets a remarkable precedent for modern tubular structures to follow. Calibrations from several storms are combined at the top left. Some 120 platforms failed after experiencing wave-in-deck.7% Fixed Effects of ageing . and the “New Era” is what we will end up with after the lessons of recent storms are digested. and related technology developments. laterally loaded piles. and high assumed risks (from using 25-yr design criteria). Caissons are designed to be overwhelmed by waves. confirmatory tests can still provide surprises. and might be useful in the absence of detailed thickness measurements. and the men survived spending the storm in warm water. and did surprisingly well. However. We see in the lower right that the uncertainty is narrowed and the distribution is shifted to the right.Corrosion 0 2 4 age 155 yr 6 14/283 4. 12 . both survivals and failures are used to perform Bayesian updating of our prior estimate of platform fragility. Betsy. Fixed platforms show a steady decline in mortality as we progress through their evolutionary periods.CORE Report 2007-05 Offshore Technology: Lessons Learned the Hard Way Inaugural Lloyd’s Register Educational Trust Lecture. yet 80 survived such events. is now solar powered. No L-1s failed. Fortunately. Florida.and we did the basic research on storm hindcasting. we had lessons from Hilda. Platform Performance Fixed and Caissons 48/622 7. they show a bias of about 10% on the safe side – more if actual wave-in-deck events are considered. poor steel ductility. Struts lose capacity suddenly after reaching their column buckling load.9% CAS 24/450 5. with the protective gear provided.0% CAS Pre-RP 2A avg age 43 yr Early-RP 2A avg age 32 yr 20/954 2. and Camille -. like this one at Berkeley in the early 1980s. fatigue and fracture. This data comes from a 1966 survey of splash zone members in a large fleet of well jackets in the Gulf of Mexico. One platform failed while manned in 1984’s sudden hurricane Juan. There is a clear legacy of lessons learned. design standards. Using hindcast storm conditions and pushover analysis for each studied platform. under-estimated wave conditions. Many pre-RP2A platforms suffered from weak joints. without managers willing to take risks and proceed with limited knowledge. LESSON: When we think we know it all. due extensive “lace curtain” corrosion below water. although their old 100-year design criteria was exceeded in many cases. Time-based deterioration should not be neglected in examining the failure of old platforms. Failure rates in the recent storms are shown here. indication bias on the safe side.3% Fixed 2/210 1. but eventually form local buckles which fracture under subsequent cycling. The “Modern RP2A era” is reckoned to start with the 9th edition. During the early RP2A period. its condition was known. Together. but even a small amount of plasticity can be beneficial in load redistribution (hence the Marshall B-strut).6% A3/L3 8 10 mm loss 3468 Platforms East of NTL Line 123 Platforms Destroyed A2/L2 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Data as of 4/6/2007 Modern-RP 2A avg age 13 yr NO A1s failed ! years without maintenance The evolution of fixed platform design criteria in API RP 2A can be traced in the parallel histories of hurricanes. The 155-year old lighthouse platform at Carysfort Reef.
9% to 3.7%. depending on age. but this useful information was not reported. Bolt re-tensioning may be neglected in the rush to evacuate before a storm. For A-2 platforms just barely passing the sudden storm safety check. Uplift loads nominally balanced by gravity will increase disproportionately when the design overturning load is exceeded. BOSS-76 is the earlier calibration of Marshall & Bea. LESSONS: Wind conditions specified for combination with waves for global platform analysis understate the local extremes for topside elements. Some prolific fields have subsided as much 12 feet.E. Under-design or neglect of such a small element can have huge consequences. Bea and others argue that too much attention to the epistemic diverts attention from humaninstitutional factors. Katrina and Rita 6 Cases Trying for 10-15 Cases Individual and Combined Bias Factor 5 4 3 2 1 0 0. Friction tie-down clamps proved to be unreliable.1% to 7.CORE Report 2007-05 Offshore Technology: Lessons Learned the Hard Way Inaugural Lloyd’s Register Educational Trust Lecture. Dry friction was assumed for skids that might get greasy. LESSON: The 5-ft air gap does not cover this. Many of the affected platforms were stronger than the A2 minimum by an unknown amount.5 Bias Factor The HEAT 2006 calibration is expressed here as a platform fragility curve – percent failing versus degree of overload (bottom scale) or versus the reserve strength factor (RSF) in 50-yr met-ocean conditions. P. the underlying physics were well understood. Actuarial failure rates for L2s and A2s in 2004 and 2005 ranged from 2. This is now based on ultimate strength rather than design load. yielding an average annual risk rate (AARR) of 1. Probability of Failure Platform A Platform B Platform C Platform D Combined Prior Platform F Platform E A study by OTRC at Texas A&M indicated that the joke was on the rest of us. While vessel motions have always been accounted for in designing derricks and substructures on drillships and semi-submersibles.2%. In retrospect. The API Bull-EX example of an A-2E-85% platform can be extended to the ten worst storms over a century. Bea would have described this as a preventable failure.3 1.1 1.000 BOE/day of production from a deepwater hub for 8 months.6 0. or the ignorance factor. where we might eventually get to with perfect knowledge. exposure to the full hurricane population of the Central region yields AARR estimates of 6% to 13%. and overstates the failure rate of the underlying technology itself.7 0.2 1. the Central Gulf region also experiences slow regional subsidence due to a huge load of recently deposited Mississippi River sediments. The “POE” curve retains only the aleatory uncertainty of random wave maxima within a given seastate – i.8 0. WG3 calibration expressed as fragility curve for A-2 Economic Recent storms drove home the importance of subsidence in exacerbating the wave-in-deck problem. Delivered by Prof Peter Marshall on 5 September 2007 in National University of Singapore This rig substructure walked off its skid beams and shut down 150. but not applied. this was overlooked for rigs on compliant platforms which nominally remain level.e. showing more uncertainty thirty years ago. We see a progressive reduction in the spread due to epistemic uncertainty.5 0.4 1. 13 . In addition. (pass on epistemic) is also consistent with the way North Sea safety targets were derived. used for rating API A-2 Economic (top scale).9 1 1.O. despite dynamic lateral accelerations comparable to earthquakes.
69’ crest GZ Forristall’s area-based crest statistics Deck lateral resistance weld rupture at 46% of brace capacity . with 16-feet of green water impacting the deck.to 5fold reduction in applied load. and not used up for other purposes like subsidence. Wave-In-Deck Lateral load capacity at damage to a deck brace on SP8X allows this to be used as a full-scale wave-in deck experiment. 54’ crest Chappelear. and not all the A summary of estimated applied wave-in-deck loads and platform resistances are shown here. Wave-in-deck: over-estimating forces? Wave-in Deck. Delivered by Prof Peter Marshall on 5 September 2007 in National University of Singapore way across the deck. it is not unreasonable to 14 . and be designed for local wave impact. There was minor damage to the deck structure.at total lateral load on deck of 4643 kips - SP8X in Katrina Features of the suspected 3-D wave are shown here. and jack-up rig designers find it advantageous to account for this. 2-D Stokes versus 3-D New Wave The observed crest elevation is itself remarkable and instructive. but none to the supporting jacket structure. The boarding wave can be treated as an impulse-momentum event with a short time duration. A potentially contentious issue will be dealing with existing platforms with low decks. SP8X in Katrina NU wave. It represents the one-sigma extreme of Forristall’s area-based estimate of extreme crests. as shown in the scaled comparison with model tests. rather than a 2-D longcrested one like we use for design checks. LESSONS: Areas within 15% of the traditional crest elevation should expect to get wet. the damage was largely confined to a 90-ft section of the 160-ft long structure. the pressures also taper off laterally. At lower elevations.CORE Report 2007-05 Offshore Technology: Lessons Learned the Hard Way Inaugural Lloyd’s Register Educational Trust Lecture. indicating that this was a 3D (three dimensional) short-crested wave. further decreasing the effect on dynamic base shear in the jacket by a factor of up to two. Extremes of applied load are represented by a wheeler-stretched NU wave at the nominal hindcast crest elevation. The peak dynamic wave pressure occurs over a very small area.5-ft wave crest. and a higher nonlinear Chappelear wave at the observed crest. The new Central “hot spot” met-ocean criteria raise recommended deck heights by 24 feet. However. Together. which is in turn larger then the traditional point estimate used with design waves. The 5-ft air gap should be reserved for this statistical variation. these effects can account for a 3. LESSONS: For traditional static wave force calculation of global jacket loads. This SP8X “Mystery” platform suffered extensive topside equipment damage from a 68.
However. both the traditional point estimate and the most probable maximum from Forristall’s areabased statistics. For local equipment hardening. .CORE Report 2007-05 Offshore Technology: Lessons Learned the Hard Way Inaugural Lloyd’s Register Educational Trust Lecture. as shown in green. . . which is more severe The benefit of upgrading a platform from its current state to A-1 condition is estimated above. . Consider our example platform with 1% AARR. e. . Economically critical A1 hubs must demonstrate ultimate strength survival at 120% if the new 100-yr force level. Hindcast crest… Wheeler Stokes Puskar’s ultimate strength push-over example Central A1 with RSR = 1.000-million would be justified. which actually survived hurricane Katrina. SP8X Wave-in-Deck Forces • . pushover results consistent with survival are found. underwater replacement and joint repair clamps up to $10-million. L-1 is for new-builds in the central and more westerly regions. . Its working-stress assessment (in green) meets A-2. 15 . but did not quite meet the old A-1. the black bands represent hindcast crest elevations from the recent storms. At 30.000 BOE/day $0.000 BOE/day $33 MM $100 MM $200 MM $500 MM Consider re-assessment of this example platform.000 BOE. However. If one accounts for the bias factors suggested by Bea. . than Katrina. API 2-D wave.5% 1% 2% 5% Central Central Hub – Full Pop Exposure • BOE/day shows benefit of upgrade to A-1 benefit = $50 x BOE x 365 x PV years x Δ risk As is AARR 0. . With a throughput of 3000 BOE. . grouting the leg-pile annulus. Note the huge gap between A-1 and A-2. The A’s are for re-assessment in the Central region. . The red lines are the new API Interim criteria.000 kips Tromans 3-D linear PWM dynamic base shear for impulsive load Short Long Graff 2-D Airy API 2-D nonlinear at observed crest old A1 WSD PWM nonlinear 3-D at observed crest FF FF + bottom A2 sudden storm Applied Resistance GLOBAL 10% 20% 40% LOCAL Deck bracing min over weld weld Jacket reserve strength beyond first damage This information can be used with the new platform fragility curve (POE) to assess average annual risk rates (AARR) and perform economic cost-benefit analysis. Manned platforms are assessed at working stress design levels for the 100-yr sudden hurricane. the platform still does not satisfy A-1 criteria. .000 BOE. for which A-2 Economic sliding scale assessment is suggested. upgrades costing under $1-million would be justified.g. complete platform replacement costing $100.3 MM $1 MM $2 MM $5 MM 30. to use a very steep 2-D nonlinear wave matching the local extreme crest elevation would be extreme. AT 300. which is based on using forces from the new 50-yr met-ocean conditions. Daily throughput in barrels of oil equivalent per day (BOE) is a good measure of economic importance to the public. .g. and other stakeholders. . Pushover analysis suggests that it should not have survived Katrina. and is not recommended. . .5% 1% 2% 5% 3. However. Delivered by Prof Peter Marshall on 5 September 2007 in National University of Singapore ignore local crests above the nominal estimate. local wave forces in the 15% + 5-ft zone should be considered. Platform Re-Assessment. . Sliding scale assessment vs AARR • • • • • • L1 (newbuild) A1 ╬ A2 E 120% A2 E 100% A2 E 85% A2 safety 0. Formal protocols for doing this are still being debated.000 BOE/day $3.1% 0. e. and may be used with caution for assessing the deck structure. the calibrated pushover also demonstrates ultimate capacity of 100% of A2E.000 20. Here. more substantial upgrades would be justified.2 A2 Economic 500 1000 2000 5000 10. . platform owners. .3 MM $10 MM $20 MM $50 MM 300. based on low pile strengths coming from the original soil sampling and geotechnical design methods.25% 0. and should be able to survive the 1000-yr unexpected event.
PW. "Limitations on the Strength of Welded Tubular Connections". "Allowable Stresses for Fatigue Design". "The Cognac Fatigue Experiment". PW. Inspection. PW. Keynote lecture. "Fatigue Analysis of the Cognac Platform". March 1980 Marshall. 1969 (with Carter. June and July-August. ASCE preprint 2638. ASCE Preprint 2008. However. translated from invited paper at plenary session on safety. Offshore Tech. PW. "An Overview of Recent Work on Cyclic Inelastic Behavior and System Reliability". 1984) Marshall.H. R. 1976 (with RG Bea) Marshall.E. "Connections for Welded Tubular Structures". 2nd Int'1. Proc. PW. OTC 2908. National Academy Press. "Materials Problems in Offshore Platforms". Section 10. and Redundancy in Marine Structural Reliability. "Experience-Based. Larrabee. PW. PW. Paris 1979 Marshall. Burk. royalty owners. Boston. upstream & downstream infrastructure dependencies… • …all with the ethic of "fearless pursuit of truth. 1969. "Failure Modes for Offshore Structure" Proceedings BOSS-76. Aug 1976 Marshall. Boston. PW. OTC 4522. proceedings of ASCE conference. "Strategy of Monitoring. PW. Mahin) Marshall. "Analytical Methods for Determining the Ultimate Earthquake Resistance of Fixed Offshore Structures". April 1973. Conference. Conference. and Repair for Fixed Offshore Platforms". D. 1984 Cost-Risk Economics New-Build 1987 Existing 2007 CONCLUSIONS A brief summary of results should be included in this section toward the end of the paper. 1982 Marshall. "Les Comprosmis entre Cout et Risque dans le Projet et le Controle de Fracture des Plates-formes Offshore". Structural Integrity Technology. Gates and S.E. ASME conf. also STJ Dec. "The Design-Inspection-Redundancy Triangle". Luyties) Marshall. 2. Fitness-for-Purpose Ultrasonic Reject Criteria for Tubular Structures. IIW. also published in Welding Journal May 1974. May 1979 Marshall. IIW Houdremont Lecture. also in Proc. D. May 1982 (also Proc.A. PW. PW. First ASCE conference on Civil Engineering in the Oceans. Thomas & Swanson) Marshall. Runner--up for Arthur Lubinski award Marshall. Washington DC. Conference on Behavior of Off-Shore Structures. Marshall. AWS/WRC/WI Conference. "Stability Problems in Offshore Structures". "Failure Modes for Offshore Structures . "Problems in Long-Life Fatigue Assessment for Fixed Offshore Structures". PW." Fitness for Purpose in Welded Construction. March 1970 Marshall. 2nd Intl. "Inelastic Dynamic Analysis of Tubular Offshore Structures". SSRC. Boston. 1980 (in French). 1984. ISSC. 16 .Part II Fatigue". also Journal of Petroleum Technology. AWS D1. Madison.1-72 (revised 1984 to include multi-planar joints. PW. also revised 1990) Marshall. with platforms whose criticality justified using true 100year criteria easily justifying the update. Conference on Welding of Tubular Structures. Proc. 3rd Int'1. Inspection. Proceedings of the Int'1. PW. 1982 (with W. May 1977 (with W. San Francisco.CORE Report 2007-05 Offshore Technology: Lessons Learned the Hard Way Inaugural Lloyd’s Register Educational Trust Lecture. Marshall.5. Delivered by Prof Peter Marshall on 5 September 2007 in National University of Singapore A graphical presentation of these same results is given here. PW. first Offshore Technology Conference. Conference on Welding of Tubular Structures. May 1977 (with W. re-assessment of an existing platform involves making the best of a bad situation. Proc. OTC 2751. Structural Welding Code. • All costs and consequences should be examined from various viewpoints -platform owners. Methods of Structural Analysis. proc. Newbuild can be optimized as described earlier in the blue “belly curves”. PW. "Preliminary Dynamic and Fatigue analysis using Directional Spectra". Column Research Council. also Journal of Petroleum Technology. 1967. Bulletin Technique de Bureau Veritas. in The Role of Design. PW. So here goes… Cost-risk Tradeoffs – not a dirty little secret • Necessary for the avoidance of wasteful extremes. "Basis for Tubular Joint Design Codes". Vol." REFERENCES Marshall. April 1976 Marshall. PW. Atlanta. OTC 2537 May 1976. San Diego. OTC 3378. May 1983 (with J. Egan). June 1977 Marshall. with commentary. Proceedings. and G. San Francisco. and the curves take a “belly-up” form. Gates and Stavros Anagnostopoulos) Marshall. Pergamon Press. paper OTC 1042. "Risk Factors for Offshore Structures" Proceedings. PW. May 1979.
Proc Offshore Tech Conf.Welding and Inspection (with Crick and Marks) Marshall. Civil Engrg in the Oceans V. OTC 6006. London. May 1998 (with R. September 1986 (with R. McClelland and M. Design & Operation of Bulk Carriers. H. S-N. American Soc. June 1990. Zhu) Marshall.S. PW. 1989 Marshall. PW. UC Berkeley. 19 . May 1989 Marshall. PW. and Elsevier Science Publishers. June 1993 Marshall. Anaheim CA. Sept. Texas A&M. Clarke. PW. PW. White. van Nostrand Reinhold.Miller.CORE Report 2007-05 Offshore Technology: Lessons Learned the Hard Way Inaugural Lloyd’s Register Educational Trust Lecture. Aug. Comp Mech Pub. Intl Conf on Behaviour of Off-Shore Structures. D. revised for 2nd edition. 27 . PRADS-98 Hague. Kubo. 1993 Marshall. Melbourne. incl Marshall. Feb. Boston. B." Proc. "State of the Art in the U. 18 . London. July 1994 Marshall. plenary session paper #1 Marshall. Sept 1998 (with Braidwood. Civil Engrg in the Oceans V. Texas A&M. January 1986 Marshall. Constructional Steel Design: an International Guide. of Houston. May 1993 Marshall. Gulf of Mexico". Marine Engg. "100 mm Thick API 2W Grade 60 Steel Plate Produced by TMCP and its Applicability to Offshore Structures". October 1992 Marshall. July 1997 Marshall. PW. "Offshore Concepts for 3000-ft Water depth. October 1992. PW. January 1990. PW. and UC Berkeley Marshall. New York. PW. London.B.E. DESIGN OF WELDED TUBULAR CONNECTIONS: Basis and Use of AWS Code Provisions. PW. in Fatigue Aspects in Structural Design. "Advanced Fracture Control Procedures for Deepwater Offshore Towers". Srirengen) Marshall. 3rd Intl Conference on Steel In Marine Structures (SIMS '87).Tubular Joint Design Ch.Johnson) Marshall. OTC 7155. April 1990. Elsevier. Offshore Australia conf. PW. Proc. in Bjorhovde. "Offshore Structures" in Beskos & Anagnostopoulos. Zhu) Marshall. Natl Inst of Stds & Tech. Computer Analysis and Design of Earthquake Resistant Structures. Proc. also presented at AWS Annual Meeting. PW. Univ. Offshore Tech Conf. Marshall. and Univ. "Forces on the Cognac Platform in Combined Storm Waves and Currents" (with Forristall et al) Proc. 1984-93 Marshall. "Adaptive Standards for Structural Integrity". Kumamoto University.Tanigawa.Steel Selection for Fracture Control Ch. New Orleans.S. PW.L. et al. "Earthquake Considerations for Structural Design". U. also presented at Texas A&M. IMarE Offshore Technology.Sheppard. OMAE 2000 S&R paper 6136. Proc. "Overview of Tubular Connection Issues in Offshore Platform Requalification". PW. OTC 6049. G.8. May 1990. Reifel.D. PW. Proc BOSS-97. Welding Journal. Dowling. "Wave Kinematics and Force Coefficients".G. Texas. 1997. "Designing Tubular Connections with AWS Dl. "Re-Assessmant of Criteria for Requalification". Offshore Tech. T. C. PW. PW. Marshall. Japan. December 1992 Marshall.Pijfers. "Screening Old Offshore Platforms: Previous Approaches and Further Thoughts". OTC 8737. PW.M. June 1987. May 1989. of Toronto. Offshore Tech. PW. PW. Proc. Proc. J. and at Offshore Technology Conference (OTC 6387). Delft. Amsterdam.". "Improved Marshall Strut Element to Predict the Ultimate Strength of Braced Tubular Steel Offshore Structures. PW. Inst. "API Provisions for SCF.Edwards. “Offshore Industry Perspective on Ocean Engineering Education"." IMPLAST 2000. Amsterdam. 1997 Marshall. "Structural Design Considerations". PW.Webb). "Offshore Structures". PW. Proc. PW. also presented at Intl Conference on CSD. Handbook of Structural Engineering.". Offshore '94. Australia (with K. "The Development of a Fatigue Centered Safety Strategy for Bulk Carriers". Stock) Marshall. "Design of Tubular Joints for Fracture and Fatigue". S. OTC 8107. "Yield Interaction Surface of an Enhanced LeTourneau 116C Chord. L. OTC 7258. "Fatigue Reassessment of the Cerveza and Cerveza Liguera Platfforms for Use in New Deepwater Developments".Nakano. Inglis) Marshall. University of Texas short course on Design of Fixed Offshore Platforms. Delft Univ.Ishii) Marshall. RINA Conf.l". New Orleans 17 . 1994 Marshall. PW. BOSS-94. "Strategies for Fatigue Design of Deepwater Platforms". Proc.M. editors. earthquake session. Buxton. "Deepwater Development Concepts". 1994 Marshall. Eng'g Education. Press. PW. March 1989 Marshall. Offshore Tech Conf. PW. London.CHS Trusses" chapter in Chen. PW. Stevens. Acapulco. New Orleans. OMAE'94 (with T.A. "Bulk Carrier Structural Integrity: Predicting Fatigue Life with Influence Functions". July 1986 Marshall. also at Rice. PW. Welding Journal. "Design of Internally Stiffened Tubular Joints". and Size-Profile Effects". Proc Offshore Tech Conf. Conf. 1992 ISBN: 0 444 88201 4 Marshall. Proc. Lewis and D. "Back-Span Stress-Joint" (with C. 2122 Sept 1999 (with D. Chapter 6. NIST IR 5877. April 1998 (with Braidwood. 7th Intl Conf on The Jack-Up Platform. Buxton. 1986. "The Mother of All Resilient Structures: Fixed-Base Tower in 3000-ft Water and Some Outstanding Issues" (with S. Tokyo. ASCE Structures Congress. "Weld Integrity for Single Pile Tendon Foundations". Conf. 1995 Marshall. 2003 Marshall. "Recent Developments in Fatigue Design Rules in the U. PW. "The Design of the Bullwinkle Platform" (with Digre and Brasted) Proc. Smolinski). May 1993 Marshall. May 1996 (with Ben Chang) Marshall. Y. Proc. PW. Workshop on Requalification of Tubular Steel Joints in Offshore Structures. Proceedings 1986 OMAE Specialty Symposium. PW. Melbourne. Elsevier Applied Science Publishers. PW… Ch. PW. Delft. A. "Welded Tubular Connections . CRC Press. Nov. IIW-AIJ International Meeting on Safety Criteria in Design of Tubular Structures. Delivered by Prof Peter Marshall on 5 September 2007 in National University of Singapore Design of Fixed Offshore Structures.
PW. Dusseldorf. MTS-IEEE Oceans ’06. June 2001 (with Banon. Crouse. Offshore Tech Conf. May 2005 (with Bucknell & Mohr) Marshall. "Enhanced Strain-based Design of Tubular Piling and Pipelines". MTS Journal. 2006 Marshall. Many SmallProjects. OTC 17295. PW. "Capacity of Singly Symmetric Beam Columns Using Modified Stress Strain Curve. “Material Selection and Fracture Control for Offshore Structures”. Houston. June 2004 Marshall. PW. Assessing Risk and Reliability for Large vs. May 2005 Marshall. Sept 2001 (with Rupert Hunt) Marshall. Cornell. Sept. Offshore Tech Conf. "ISO Seismic Guidelines for Offshore Platforms. Younan) Marshall. "Applications for High Performance Large Diameter Pipe. Rio de Janerio. Tubular Joint Design Practice”. Kaula Lumpur. OTC 17310.Calif. Proc. API HEAT June 2006 Marshall. New Orleans (with H. Jan. AISC-ECCS Connections Workshop. “The New API RP2A 22nd Ed. Proc. Pecknold & Bucknell) Marshall. April 2003 (extended version dist by internet) Marshall. “Interdisciplinary Aspects of Offshore Platforms”. Boston. PW. Fall 2005 Marshall." OMAE 2000 S&R paper 6137. PW. PW. paper 391-JW-02 (with Wardenier). PW. Amsterdam. Houston. Baltimore. Offshore Tech Conf. April 2001 (with Bernd Berg) Marshall. OTC 17236. "Reliability Aspects of Proposed Changes to SNAME 55A". “Background to New API Fatigue Provisions”. ISOPE-2006. PW. PW. July 2000 Marshall. Berkeley lecture Feb 2006. PW. May 2005 (with Pecknold & Bucknell) Marshall.2007 (with YS Choo) 18 . PW. “Tubular versus Non-Tubular Hot Spot Stress Methods. Seoul. PW. Proc. Delivered by Prof Peter Marshall on 5 September 2007 in National University of Singapore (with Karsan. Proc Offshore Asia. Banon) revised Aug 2003 Marshall. “New API RP 2A Tubular Joint Strength Design Provisions”. PW. "Code Alternatives for ISO Earthquake Design. “Cost-Risk Tradeoffs – a Dirty Little Secret?” U. Memphis. Proc. "Review of Tubular Joint Criteria”. PW. PW. Houston. PW. Proc SSRC Annual Tech Session. May 2006 Marshall. London." Proc 20th OMAE. Nadim.CORE Report 2007-05 Offshore Technology: Lessons Learned the Hard Way Inaugural Lloyd’s Register Educational Trust Lecture. June 2005 Marshall." SSRC theme conference on material properties and stability issues.” Proc." 9th Intl Symposium on Tubular Structures. San Francisco. “Interdisciplinary Aspects of Cost-Risk Trade-offs. Proc ISOPE-2005. presented at 8th Intl Jack-Up Platform Conference.