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Texts, Translations, and Commentaries
Bart A. Mazzetti
(c) 2013-2015 Bart A. Mazzetti
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Poetics ch. 20 complete.
II. The division of vocal sound into two and three.
III. The syllable as an intelligible vocal sound.
IV. On Ptosis or Case.
V. The principal and secondary parts of lexis: the forms of their definitions.
VI. Some observations on the name and speech.
VII. The name, the verb, and the participle with respect to signifying ‘time’.
VIII. The several accounts of ‘speech’ in relation to names, verbs, the definition, and the
IX. The principles of Aristotle’s treatment revealed by the foregoing investigation.
I. POETICS CH. 20 COMPLETE.
1. Text and translation:
Cf. Aristotle, Poetics ch. 20 (1456b 20-1457a 37) (ed. R. Kassel1 unchanged; tr. B.A.M.):
 th=j de\ le/cewj a(pa/shj ta/d’ e)sti\ ta\
me/rh, stoixei=on sullabh\ su/ndesmoj
o)/noma r(h=ma a)/rqron ptw=sij lo/goj.
 But of language as a whole these are the
parts: ‘element’, ‘syllable’, ‘conjunction’,
‘name’, ‘verb’, ‘article’, ‘case’, ‘speech’. 2
stoixei=on me\n ou)=n e)stin fwnh\
a)diai/retoj, ou) pa=sa de\ a)ll’ e)c h(=j
pe/fuke sunqeth\ gi/gnesqai fwnh/:
An element, therefore, is an indivisible vocal
sound, but not every one from which an intelligible vocal sound is naturally apt to result
kai\ ga\r tw=n qhri/wn ei)si\n a)diai/retoi
fwnai/, w(=n ou)demi/an le/gw 
(for there are indivisible vocal sounds belonging
to the beasts none of which I call  an element),
tau/thj de\ me/rh to/ te fwnh=en kai\ to\
h(mi/fwnon kai\ a)/fwnon.
but the parts of these are vowel and semivowel
and mute [= consonant].
e)/stin de\ tau=ta fwnh=en me\n <to\>
But a vowel is [an indivisible vocal sound]
having an audible sound without an addition, <
such as ‘a’ and ‘o’>;
h(mi/fwnon de\ to\ meta\ prosbolh=j
e)/xon fwnh\n a)kousth/n, oi(=on to\ S kai\
but a semivowel one having an audible sound
with an addition, such as ‘s’ and ‘b’ <‘r’>;
but a mute is that which with an addition has no
sound, but has some sound when  made
audible, like ‘g’ and ‘d’.
a)/fwnon de\ to\ meta\ prosbolh=j kaq’
au(to\ me\n ou)demi/an e)/xon fwnh/n,
meta\ de\  tw=n e)xo/ntwn tina\
fwnh\n gino/menon a)kousto/n, oi(=on to\
G kai\ to\ D.
tau=ta de\ diafe/rei sxh/masi/n te tou=
sto/matoj kai\ to/poij kai\ dasu/thti kai\
yilo/thti kai\ mh/kei kai\ braxu/thti e)/ti de\
o)cu/thti kai\ baru/thti kai\ tw=? me/sw?:
peri\ w(=n kaq’ e(/kaston e)n toi=j
metrikoi=j prosh/kei qewrei=n.
But these differ by both the shape and location
of the mouth, and by roughness or smoothness
[sc. of the breathing], and by length and shortness, but besides by acuteness, lowness and
[what is] intermediate [between these]; each of
which it is appropriate for those learned in
metrics to consider.
sullabh\  de/ e)stin fwnh\ a)/shmoj
sunqeth\ e)c a)fw/nou kai\ fwnh\n
But a syllable  is a non-significative vocal
sound composed from a mute and one having
kai\ ga\r to\ GR a)/neu tou= A ¤sullabh\
kai\¤ meta\ tou= A, oi(=on to\ GRA.
for ‘gr’ itself without ‘a’ itself is a syllable, and
also with ‘a’, for example, ‘gra’. [see below]
a)lla\ kai\ tou/twn qewrh=sai ta\j diafora\j
Aristotelis. De Arte Poetica Liber (Oxford Classical Texts). Rudolph Kassel (Editor) (Oxford: Clarendon
As I shall argue hereafter, this ordering is incorrect: I will give the corrected version below.
th=j metrikh=j e)stin.
But the differences belonging to these things
pertain to the metrical art.
su/ndesmoj de/ e)stin fwnh\ a)/shmoj
[1457a] h(\ ou)/te kwlu/ei ou)/te poiei=
fwnh\n mi/an shmantikh\n e)k pleio/nwn
fwnw=n pefukui=a sunti/qesqai kai\ e)pi\
tw=n a)/krwn kai\ e)pi\ tou= me/sou
But a conjunction1 is a non-significative [1457a]
vocal sound which neither impedes nor produces one significative vocal sound out of many
vocal sounds naturally apt to be composed at the
extremes as well as in the middle,
h(\n mh\ a(rmo/ttei e)n a)rxh=? lo/gou
tiqe/nai kaq’ au(th/n, oi(=on me/n h)/toi
which it does not suit to place at the beginning
of speech by itself, such as me/n [‘on the one
hand’] or de/ [‘on the other hand’].
h)\ fwnh\ a)/shmoj h(\ e)k pleio/nwn me\n
 fwnw=n mia=j shmantikw=n de\
poiei=n pe/fuken mi/an shmantikh\n
Or else a non-significative vocal sound which
 out of more than one significative vocal
sound is naturally apt to produce one significant
a)/rqron d’ e)sti\ fwnh\ a)/shmoj h(\ lo/gou
a)rxh\n h)\ te/loj h)\ diorismo\n dhloi=.
oi(=on to\ a)mfi/ kai\ to\ peri/ kai\ ta\
But an article is a non-significative vocal sound
which makes clear the beginning or end or
dividing-point of speech, such as a)mfi/
[‘about’] and peri/ [‘concerning’] and the rest.
h)\ fwnh\ a)/shmoj h(\ ou)/te kwlu/ei ou)/te
poiei= fwnh\n mi/an shmantikh\n e)k
pleio/nwn fwnw=n pefukui=a ti/qesqai kai\
 e)pi\ tw=n a)/krwn kai\ e)pi\ tou=
Or else a non-significative vocal sound which
neither impedes nor produces one significative
vocal sound out of many vocal sounds naturally
apt to be placed at the extremes as well as 
in the middle.
shmantikh\ a)/neu xro/nou h(=j me/roj
ou)de/n e)sti kaq’ au(to\ shmantiko/n:
But a name is a [simple or] composite vocal
sound significative without time, no part of
which is significative by itself;
e)n ga\r toi=j diploi=j ou) xrw/meqa w(j
kai\ au)to\ kaq’ au(to\ shmai=non, oi(=on
e)n tw=? Qeo/dwroj to\ dwroj ou)
for in double names we do not use [a part] as if
it signifies by itself, for example, in ‘Theodore’
‘doron’ [i.e. ‘gift’] does not signify.
r(h=ma de\ fwnh\ sunqeth\ shmantikh\
meta\  xro/nou h(=j ou)de\n me/roj
shmai/nei kaq’ au(to/, w(/sper kai\ e)pi\
But a verb is a [simple or] composite vocal
sound significative  with time no part of
which signifies by itself, as is the case in names;
to\ me\n ga\r a)/nqrwpoj h)\ leuko/n ou)
shmai/nei to\ po/te, to\ de\ badi/zei h)\
beba/diken prosshmai/nei to\ me\n to\n
For ‘man’, in fact, or ‘white’ do not signify
‘when’, but ‘[he] walks’ or ‘[he] has walked’
consignify, the one present, the other, past time.
ptw=sij d’ e)sti\n o)no/matoj h)\ r(h/matoj
h( me\n kata\ to\ tou/tou h)\ tou/tw? 
shmai=non kai\ o(/sa toiau=ta,
h( de\ kata\ to\ e(ni\ h)\ polloi=j, oi(=on
But case belongs to name or verb, the one
signifying according to ‘of this’  or ‘to that’
and whatever others [are] such,
As I argue below, the definitions of the connectives should come after the account of the unity of speech.
žou) ga\r  a(/paj lo/goj e)k r(hma/twn kai\ o)noma/twn su/gkeitai. 16b 27)> 5 . and an element which has sound [i. h( de\ kata\ ta\ u(pokritika/. oi(=on kat’ e)rw/thsin e)pi/tacin: to\ ga\r e)ba/disen. for example.a)/nqrwpoi h)\ a)/nqrwpoj. for example. with the last sentence tr. but the other according to ‘one’ or ‘many’. in ‘Cleon walks’. and also with ‘a’. oi(=on h( )Ilia\j me\n  sunde/smw? ei(=j. for ‘gr’ itself without ‘a’ itself is a syllable. for example. B. ‘Cleon’. the Iliad is one by conjunctions. as gra IT IS. But speech is one in two ways.A. The definition of the syllable corrected: Cf. ei(=j de/ e)sti lo/goj dixw=j. rev. Aristotle. ‘men’ or ‘man’. 2.) oi(=on e)n tw=? badi/zei Kle/wn o( Kle/wn. but there is speech which happens to be without verbs..M. De Int. Yet a part [of speech] will always have signifycance. lo/goj de\ fwnh\ sunqeth\ shmantikh\ h(=j e)/nia me/rh kaq’ au(ta\ shmai/nei ti But speech is composite significative vocal sound some of whose parts signify something by themselves. Poet. The definition of speech corrected: Cf.A. Theodore Buckley. B. for example. < I mean “as words but not as an affirmation or a negation” (cf. But a syllable is a non-significative vocal sound composed from a mute. Aristotle. the definition of man. But speech is composite significative vocal sound some of whose parts signify something by themselves. after Robert Zirin. h)\ o( e)k pleio/nwn sunde/smw?. but this according to delivery. oi(=on o( tou= a)nqrw/pou o(rismo/j. For ‘[he] has walked’ or ‘[he] walked’ are cases of the verb according to these species. For g r without a is NOT itself is a syllable. for example. commanding. for it is either that which signifies one thing or that which is one from many conjunctions. 20 (1457a 24-27) (tr. o( de\ tou= a)nqrw/pou tw=? e(\n shmai/nein. h)\ ba/dize ptw=sij r(h/matoj kata\ tau=ta ta\ ei)/dh e)sti/n. who follows the text as emended by Gudeman): But a syllable  is a non-significative vocal sound composed from a mute and one having sound. 20 (145634-35) (tr. 3. for example. h)\ ga\r o( e(\n shmai/nwn. a)ll’ e)nde/xetai a)/neu r(hma/twn ei)=nai lo/gon. but the definition of man one by signifying one thing.): But speech is composite significative vocal sound some of whose parts signify something by themselves. from a vowel or semivowel]. me/roj me/ntoi a)ei/ ti shmai=non e(/ceiŸ (for not  every speech is composed from names and verbs. Poet. ‘gra’.e.M. according to questioning. but with a.
it will be an affirmation or negation. the definition of man.) |for example. I take both of these corrections to be unproblematic and uncontroversial. for example.e.. but is only a vocal sound. In composite names. as words but not as an affirmation or a negation. 16b 28 Let me explain.” “owl” does not signify anything in itself. in ‘Cleon walks’. as Aristotle makes clear in the corresponding discussion in his work on interpretation. Jean T. but not in itself. however. Oesterle. [i. Note that the reason for moving the clause on definition is evident.| Yet a part [of speech] will always have signifycance.) Aristotle. similarly. 20 (1457a 24-28) (tr. 4. |for example. which is exemplified by an affirmation. 6 .) but there is speech which happens to be without verbs. if something is added. But the second passage as it has reached us fails to make clear the form of speech which is opposed to the definition. ‘Cleon’. as an affirmation or a negation] 16b 30 But one syllable of “animal” does not signify anything. ‘Cleon’. rev. (for not  every speech is composed from names and verbs <in which something is said of something else>. for example. the part does signify something. for not  every speech is composed from names and verbs verbs <in which something is said of something else>. since it comprises the explanation of Aristotle’s claim that “there is speech which happens to be without verbs”.(for not  every speech is composed from names and verbs. 16b 26 Speech” is significative vocal sound. the definition of man|.) But speech is composite significative vocal sound some of whose parts signify something by themselves. in ‘Cleon walks’. The word “animal” signifies something. 4 (16b 26-31) (tr. in the word “fowl. Aristotle. ‘Cleon’. however. i. but it does not signify that it is or that it is not. as has been said. but there is speech which happens to be without verbs. B.M. since G R without A is not a syllable. but GRA is. De Int. but the justification for the words I have inserted in angular braces will be evident from the following side-by-side comparison with the Philosopher’s account of speech in his work On Interpretation: . Note on the foregoing: The reader will note that. with respect to the definition of the syllable. Yet a part [of speech] will always have signifycance. …but there is speech which happens to be without verbs. I. in ‘Cleon walks’. for example. the definition of man. for example. Poet. Yet a part [of speech] will always have signifycance. the corrections are necessary to avoid a manifest contradiction. some parts of which are significative separately.e.A.
cases. articles. coniunctiones. inas-much as it introduces the word conjunction.The reader will also note how I have emended the definition of the name and verb. 1 In opere uero de poetica non eodem modo diuidit locutionem sed omnes omnino locutionis partes apposuit confirmans esse locutionis partes elementa. the elements and the syllables they enter into. then the parts which are themselves composed of the elements. right after element and syllable. articulos. verbs. the article being out of place. Hence. § I now proceed to treat more closely the division of vocal sound and the definition of ‘case’. the order given for parts of language does not agree with the order found in the text which follows. as being common to the two. inasmuch as either one may be both simple as well as composite. syllabas. then what makes speech one which. [and] speeches”. its composing parts. the name and the verb should have been treated. but he laid down all the parts of language in their entirety.1 Now it is my view that the parts of lexis ought to have been treated in the following order: First. syllables. then speech.M.): “But in the work about the poetic art he did not divide language in the same way. orationes 7 . nomina. B. conjunctions.A. casus. after which the article would have been treated. As many commentators note. 5. On the order of treatment of the parts of lexis. uerba. In this regard. compare the following from Boethius’ second edition of his commentary on the Peri Hermeneias (tr. I return to this subject in section V below. this part of language. then case. names. affirming them to be elements. as being composed of them.
oi(=on to\ G kai\ to\ D. II. such as a and o>. pi. such as ‘s’ and ‘‘r’. 2 (http://www. Poetics ch. vowels]. and chi). In Aristotle’s Poetics (1456b) the aphona (of which beta is a member) are described as “having contact” (= “meta prosboles”). Dionysius Thrax) divide consonants into two primary categories: the aphona (beta. but a semivowel one having an audible sound with application.II. ksi. theta.htm [11/23/07]) 8 .. but needs to be sounded with a vowel in order to be made audible: the mute or consonant Cf. and those other consonants that can be pronounced continuously. “Evidence for the pronunciation of Ancient Greek Β (beta) as [b]”:2 Greek grammarians (e. tau. nu. phi. pi. has of itself no sound. without the need for a following vowel. 16 (660a 3-10). delta. and the hemiphona (zeta. “On Sound and Voice”. phi. but a mute is that which. like ‘g’ and ‘d’. I have treated this subject at length in my preceding paper. gamma. THE DIVISION OF VOCAL SOUND INTO TWO AND THREE. h(mi/fwnon de\ to\ meta\ prosbolh=j e)/xon fwnh\n a)kousth/n. kappa.. as Aristotle makes clear elsewhere.g. Animal. On the division of voiced sound: Cf. while hemiphona are fricatives. but is made audible [when sounded together] with things having sound [i. lambda. The division of consonants in sum: the aphona (beta. 20 (1456b 34-37) (tr. it would be classified as one of the hemiphona. B. If beta were fricative. and closure of the lips”.A. 2. even with application. an indivisible vocal sound either (a) has an audible sound per se or not (b) involves prosbole or an ‘application’ or not (c) needs to be sounded with a vowel in order to be made audible or not has an audible sound per se without prosbole: the vowel has an audible sound with prosbole: the semi-vowel has no audible sound without prosbole. meta\ de\  tw=n e)xo/ntwn tina\ fwnh\n gino/menon a)kousto/n. sigma). Now a vowel indeed is [an indivisible vocal sound] having an audible sound without application1 <. De Part. mu. rho. a)/fwnon de\ to\ meta\ prosbolh=j kaq’ au(to\ me\n ou)demi/an e)/xon fwnh/n. cf.M. 1. but not being pronounceable without a vowel. In sum. Aristotle. delta. and chi): “having contact”: the plosives.foundalis. “of the tongue.): e)/stin de\ tau=ta fwnh=en me\n <to\> a)/neu prosbolh=j e)/xon fwnh\n a)kousth/n.com/lan/betapro. tau. In modern parlance we would say that aphona are the plosives. which require a following vowel 1 Sc.e. pronounced instantaneously. gamma. kappa. psi. theta. oi(=on to\ S kai\ to\ R.
however. they differ by acuteness and gravity. the theory respecting each of which pertains to the metrical art. no sound. the name. the case. tau=ta de\ diafe/rei sxh/masi/n te tou= sto/matoj kai\ to/poij kai\ dasu/thti kai\ yilo/thti kai\ mh/kei kai\ braxu/thti e)/ti de\ o)cu/thti kai\ baru/thti kai\ tw=? me/sw?: peri\ w(=n kaq’ e(/kaston e)n toi=j metrikoi=j prosh/kei qewrei=n. meta\ de\  tw=n e)xo/ntwn tina\ fwnh\n gino/menon a)kousto/n. the following are the parts. oi(=on to\ GRA. nu. ou)=n e)stin fwnh\ ou) pa=sa de\ a)ll’ e)c h(=j pe/fuke sunqeth\ gi/gnesqai fwnh/: For there are indivisible vocal sounds of brutes. and also with a.1 9 . kai\ ga\r to\ GR a)/neu tou= A ¤sullabh\ kai\¤ meta\ tou= A. sullabh\  de/ e)stin fwnh\ a)/shmoj sunqeth\ e)c a)fw/nou kai\ fwnh\n e)/xontoj: But a syllable is a sound without signification.e. h(mi/fwnon de\ to\ meta\ prosbolh=j e)/xon fwnh\n a)kousth/n. but that from which an intelligible sound is adapted to be produced. and the medium between both these. and an element which has sound [i. Poetics ch.e. or semivowel]. the letter [i. semivowel. without percussion. stoixei=on sullabh\ su/ndesmoj o)/noma r(h=ma a)/rqron ptw=sij lo/goj. as s and r. sigma): “not having contact”: the fricatives. ksi. And a mute is that which. is an indivisible [vocal] sound. but becomes audible in conjunction with the things which have a certain sound.e. indeed. mu. But these differ by the configurations of the mouth. the verb. w(=n ou)demi/an le/gw  stoixei=on. which do not require a following vowel 3. Aristotle. and mute. But a semivowel is that which has an audible sound. yet not every such sound. oi(=on to\ S kai\ to\ R. But the parts of this indivisible sound are. The letter. kai\ ga\r tw=n qhri/wn ei)si\n a)diai/retoi fwnai/. and the sentence [i. Of all diction. lambda. is that which has an audible sound. as g and d. viz. And a vowel. ‘element’]. rho. such as a and o. the hemiphona (zeta. even with the concurrence of the tongue. psi. from a vowel. indeed. indeed. with percussion. stoixei=on me\n a)diai/retoj. oi(=on to\ G kai\ to\ D. by length and shortness. no one of which I call a letter. therefore. ‘speech’]. a)/fwnon de\ to\ meta\ prosbolh=j kaq’ au(to\ me\n ou)demi/an e)/xon fwnh/n. the conjunction. Theodore Buckley):  th=j de\ le/cewj a(pa/shj ta/d’ e)sti\ ta\ me/rh. The Poetics on the element or ‘letter’ and the syllable as parts of language: Cf. e)/stin de\ tau=ta fwnh=en me\n <to\> a)/neu prosbolh=j e)/xon fwnh\n a)kousth/n. has of itself. the syllable. tau/thj de\ me/rh to/ te fwnh=en kai\ to\ h(mi/fwnon kai\ a)/fwnon. composed from a mute. and further still. 20 (1456b 20-37) (tr. in the parts [of the mouth] by density and tenuity of aspiration. as g r a. the article. vowel. For g r without a is a syllable.
nomen. and by length and shortness. et asperitate et lenitate. tr. autem aliquam vocem facta audibilis. 331). verbum. Cf. (for there are indivisible vocal sounds belonging to the beasts none of which I call an ‘element’). But these differ by both the shape and location of the mouth. But a syllable is a non-significant vocal sound composed from a non-vowel [i. ‘conjunction’. and by roughness or smoothness [sc. it is”. of the breathing]. ‘name’. The study. As noted above. Elementum quidem igitur vox indivisibilis. ‘element’. where he accepts Gudeman’s emendation of the text. 110. pertains also to the metrical art. but the parts of these are vowel and semivowel and mute [= ‘consonant’]. in order to avoid the contradiction. ‘verb’.e. adhuc autem acuitate et grauitate et medio. of the differences of these. and (is a syllable) with ‘a’. Now a vowel is [an indivisible vocal sound] having an audible sound without an addition. ‘speech’. but not every one from which an intellibilis vox gible vocal sound is naturally apt to result (et enim bestiarum sunt indivisibiles voces. casus. such as ‘s’ and ‘b’ <‘r’?>. William of Moerbeke. et longitudine et brevitate. Sillaba autem est vox non significativa composita ex non vocali et vocem habente. a mute] and [an element] having sound. But it pertains to the metrical art to consider the differences of these things. for ‘gr’ itself without ‘a’ itself <is not> a syllable. et enim ipsius ‘gr’ sine ipso ‘a’ sillaba et cum ‘a’. however. velut ‘g’ like ‘g’ and ‘d’. Hec autem differunt figurisque oris et locis. Aristotle. is an indivisible vocal omnis autem sed ex qua nata est fieri intelligi. Est autem vocalis quidem sine adiectione habens vocem audibilem. but has some sound when made audible.): Locutionis autem omnis hee sunt partes: But of language as a whole these are the parts: elementum. coniunctio. therefore. as it is translated by Ronald Zirin in his article “Aristotle’s Biology of Language” (in: TAPhA . non An element.A. Poetics ch. puta ‘gra’. ‘gra’. quarum nullam dico elementum). articulus. but with the a. ‘article’. B. oratio. lowness and [what is] intermediate [between these]. but besides by acuteness. et ‘d’. cum habentibus sound. semivocalis autem cum adiectione habens vocem audibilem. but a semivowel one having an audible sound with an addition. 20 (1456b 20-37) (Lat. velut ‘s’ et ‘b’. sillaba. 325–47. as gra. each of which it is appropriate for those learned in metrics to consider. ‘case’. ‘syllable’.M.a)lla\ kai\ tou/twn qewrh=sai ta\j diafora\j th=j metrikh=j e)stin. quibus per singula in metricis congruit speculari. huius autem partes vocalis et semivocalis et muta. muta autem que cum adiectione secundum but a mute is that which with an addition has no quidem nullam habet vocem. Sed horum considerare differentias metrice est. for example. 1 N. the text should read “For g r without a is not a syllable. 10 . p.sound.B.
§ 11 .
These elementary sounds are either vowels. the excepting clause ( ou) pa=sa de\ kte(). 16 a 29) [and see also Pol. But it has to be remembered on the other side that Aristotle often speaks of the stoixei=a fwnh=j (Bon. The indivisible sounds. 2. tau/thj de\ me/rh to/ te fwnh=en kai\ to\ h(mi/fwnon kai\ a)/fwnon. Vahlen. Bywater): stoixei=on me\n ou)=n e)stin fwnh\ a)diai/retoj.M. Ind. The main argument in favour of sunqeth\ is that. 1. Indivisible sounds are uttered by the brutes also. de/. 33). because they do not combine as elements to form a fwnh/ suneth\. Cf. though they have a certain significance in their place in intelligible human speech. Aristotle. Ind. Aristotle’s argument here seems to be something like this: In the utterances of the brutes there are indivisible sounds. And if we assume sunqeth\ to be the original reading. Poetics ch. ou) pa=sa de\ a)ll’ e)c h(=j pe/fuke suneth\ gi/gnesqai fwnh/: kai\ ga\r tw=n qhri/wn ei)si\n a)diai/retoi fwnai/. 702 b 39) as a synthesis of stoixei=a. and that the syllable is viewed in sundry Aristotelian passages (Bon. d. 253) and Diels (Elementum p. semivowels. is an indivisible vocal omnis autem sed ex qua nata est fieri sound. Eng. p. Texts and translations: Cf. w(=n ou)demi/an le/gw  stoixei=on. one that may become a factor in an intelligible sound. non An element. (Aristotle’s a(/qra and su/ndesmoi). Beitr. Cf. on the other hand. therefore. Sprachwissenschaft 2 I. 220). Ingram Bywater. but the parts of these are vowel and semivowel and mute [= ‘consonant’]. (for there are indivisible vocal sounds belonging to the brutes none of which I call an ‘element’).)]. This is true enough. but these ‘noises’ of theirs are directly significant in themselves (De interpr. they are not stoixei=a fwnh=j. is irrelevant. 2. in human speech exist as elements of speech. which puts the ‘indivisible sounds’ of the brutes in a different category. the meaning in human speech is in the words and propositions—not in the ‘elements’ which analysis reveals in them (comp.A. as also by Steinthal (Gesch. etc.A. The Letter is also an indivisible sound of a particular kind. or mutes. peri/ me/n. 1253a 7-19 (B. (ed & tr. Aristotle on the Art of Poetry. 12 .): Elementum quidem igitur vox indivisibilis. idem. but no one of these is a Letter in our sense of the term. tr. as defined in b 34. 702 b 35)—where fwnh/ means the same thing as fwnh/ suneth\ of the present passage. Commentary. 3 p. and they have no meaning in themselves. It may be taken as including not only the fwnh/ a)/shmoj—words like a)mfi. B. 20 (1456a 34-38) (tr. fwnh/ suneth\ is perhaps the nearest Aristotelian equivalent for our term ‘word’. quarum nullam dico elementum).III. but not every one from which an intelligibilis vox intelligible vocal sound is naturally apt to result (et enim bestiarum sunt indivisibiles voces. 262-263: b23 suneth\ The alternative reading sunqeth\ has been accepted by several editors.M. pp. huius autem partes vocalis et semivocalis et muta. THE SYLLABLE AS AN INTELLIGIBLE VOCAL SOUND. William of Moerbeke. the syllable is a fwnh/ sunqeth\. which stand for nothing by themselves. I.
Cf. 3. names and verbs. while there are some vocal sounds. significative. But. § IV. of course. The su/ndesmoi and a)/rqra. which (apart from certain interjections) signify only as entering into words. 1 2 And note that William of Moerbeke’s reading intelligibilis supports suneth\. at its upper limit lies the observation of Plato that speech consists of a verb intertwined with a name or noun by virtue of which a complete thought is expressed and the true or the false conveyed.1 the argument he makes being comprised of the following points: (1) That to read fwnh/ sunqeth\ (“composed vocal sound”) instead of fwnh/ suneth\ (“intelligible vocal sound”) makes the exception of the brutes pointless. 1. are said to be fwnai\ a)/shmoi. these latter being nouns and verbs in language. Again. pp. Excepting. 13 . And note that the difference between the cries of the beasts. in relation to which observation he explains that.e. there are others. significative. ON PTOSIS OR ‘CASE’. as we shall see from texts to be cited further below. i. 2) while the indivisible vocal sounds in human speech that are as elements in it have no meaning in themselves2—differing in this from the cries of beasts—they nevertheless have a certain significance in their place in intelligible human speech. the elements composing human speech are intelligible vocal sounds which signify nothing by themselves. which signify immediately and by themselves. which have a meaning of their own and stand for something even when uttered by themselves. interjections.. According to Aristotle: Texts and Translations. and he begins by noting this distinction: some words are fwnh\ a)/shmoj. vocal sounds. namely. but that 3) some non-significative vocal sounds. In sum. however. and which signify only in relation to other. which we call ‘particles’. which signify by themselves. 269-270: At this point Aristotle passes from the constituents of words (letters and syllables) to actual words. the essential point Bywater makes is that one should read suneth\ instead of sunqeth\ at b23. ibid. as with the aforementioned particles. into which such sounds enter. and the indivisible vocal sounds of men. and others fwnai\ shmantikai/. being the principal doctrine concerning its elements. they convey no meaning when uttered by themselves. In the first of these passages. lies at the root of Aristotle’s understanding of language. since they do not utter composed vocal sounds. signify only in relation to other. Note on the foregoing: The glosses just cited are so full of matter essential to our treatment of the whole question of the connective parts of speech in Aristotle that we must go through them part by part in order to apply their conclusions to those subjects where it provides confirmation or illumination. for which reason indivisible vocal sounds are to be understood as intelligible. vocal sounds.
‘Did he go?’ and ‘go’ are verbal inflections of this kind. And one case. etc. Cf.): ptw=sij d’ e)sti\n o)no/matoj h)\ r(h/matoj h( me\n kata\ to\ tou/tou h)\ tou/tw?  shmai=non kai\ o(/sa toiau=ta. 20 (1457a 19-23) (ed. hoion anthrôpoi ê anthrôpos. Aristotle. W. e. Poetics ch. for example. Kassel. H. or it may consist merely in the mode of an utterance.. tr. 20 (1457a 19-23): (tr. according to questioning. and expresses either the relation ‘of. to gar ebadisen. oi(=on kat’ e)rw/thsin e)pi/tacin: to\ ga\r e)ba/disen. or the modes or tones in actual delivery. 14 . but this according to delivery.M.’ ‘to. oi(=on a)/nqrwpoi h)\ a)/nqrwpoj. for example. 20 (1457a 19-23) (tr. Poetics ch. hê de kata ta hupokritika. h( de\ kata\ to\ e(ni\ h)\ polloi=j.A. Cf. R. indeed. but another is that which pertains to one thing or many things. S. For ‘[he] has walked’ or ‘[he] walked’ are cases of the verb according to these species. tr.’ or the like. Cf. Aristotle. ‘Walked?’ and ‘Walk!’ are cases of the Verb ‘to walk’ of this last kind. [in nouns] signifies that something is said of this thing.g. and so forth. ‘man’ and ‘men’). Kassel. Poetics ch. in question. Ingram Bywater) (tr. Butcher) (7) A Case of a Noun or Verb is when the word means ‘of’ or ‘to’ a thing. Aristotle. as ‘man’ or ‘men’. hoion kat’ erôtêsin epitaxin: And another case pertains to acting. B. hê de kata to heni ê pollois.Cf. For did he walk? Or walk is a case of a verb according to these species. h)\ ba/dize ptw=sij r(h/matoj kata\ tau=ta ta\ ei)/dh e)sti/n. H. ê badize ptôsis rhêmatos kata tauta ta eidê estin. R. But case belongs to name or verb. h( de\ kata\ ta\ u(pokritika/. Poetics ch.g. 20 (1457a 19-23) (ed. commanding. Inflection belongs both to the noun and verb. whether one or many.g. or that of number. such as what relates to interrogation or demand. a question or a command. the one signifying according to ‘of this’  or ‘to that’ and whatever others [are] such. Aristotle. Fyfe). or is attributed to this thing. ‘men’ or ‘man’. but the other according to ‘one’ or ‘many’. command. and the like. or for one or many (e. e. Theodore Buckley): ptôsis d’ estin onomatos ê rhêmatos But case pertains to noun or verb. as men or man. hê men kata to toutou ê toutôi  sêmainon kai hosa toiauta.
the definitions cited below. tr. Oesterle): LESSON 5 On the Nature of the Verb and Its Conformity with the Name 1 On these matters. if “is” or “was” or aut ‘fuit’ aut aliquid huiusmodi addatur.. 17a 5 Let us therefore consider enunciative speech. “Walked?” and “Walk!” are verbal “cases” of this kind. has already been exemplified in the definition of the verb. Aristotle. Oesterle): Et caeterae quidem relinquantur (rhetoricae enim vel poeticae convenientior consideratio est. tr. of course. De Int. hominis rationi si non aut ‘est’ aut ‘erit’ for the definition of man. Jean T. person. 3 (16b 5-17) (tr. Jean T. for the study of these belongs rather to rhetoric and poetics. passive.B. either active. cf. where ‘case’ clearly means a tense]. either plural or singular (common to the name and the verb. either past. De Int. which belongs to our present inquiry. Eng.. Aristotle. either genitive or dative (proper to the name) number. est oratio enuntiativa. 2. Thomas on the adverbs tantum and solus. is not yet enunciative speech. The recognized species that are passed over in the definition.g. either first. however. I. 15 . question and command. or third (common to the name and the verb) voice. (proper to the verb) Tense. case. Necesse est autem omnem orationem enuntiativam ex verbo esse vel casu. or future. treated elsewhere in my papers. also St. which differences we are accustomed to call ‘tenses’. et enim. N. either interrogative or imperative (proper to the verb) 3. 17a 9 Every enunciative speech. second. 7 (17a 5-10) (Lat. men and man. the ptosis or ‘case’ of a verb is exemplified by the past or the future. Boethius. The species of what grammarians call ‘inflection’ comprising Aristotle’s examples. cf. According to this excerpt. then negation. but exemplified by the name) mood. to which instances we may add the following: Cf. present. aliae vero coniunctione unae. for example..1 Cf. must contain a verb or a mode of the verb [lit.A case (or inflection) of a noun or verb is that which signifies either “of” or “to” a thing and the like. the others are one by conjunction. is enunciative speech that is one. and omit the other kinds. enuntiativa vero praesentis considerationis est).  Est autem una prima oratio enuntiativa affirmatio.. or middle (proper to the verb) tense. or else it may depend on the delivery..  or gives the sense of “one or many” e. I. or a case. 17a 8 First affirmation. deinde negatio. nondum “will be” or something of the kind is not added. etc. Note that ptosis is defined as a sign.
et differunt in hoc a verbo. the reason being that such variation is on the part of the subject. recte autem ea quae consignificant tempus praeteritum vel futurum. nor passion. but “matures” is a verb. number. hoc est proprie verbum quod significat agere vel pati in actu. ne intelligatur praesens indivisibile. but modes of verbs.” for example.e.” which is of future time. Present time is to be taken as the time that measures action which has begun and has not yet been terminated in act.. the future. et nondum est determinata per actum. They differ from the verb in that the verb signifies with present time.16b 5 The verb is that which signifies with time. sed oportet accipere praesens tempus quod mensurat actionem. whereas the modes signify time outside of the present. for it connotes the present existence of maturity. 16b 10 Moreover. They signify with time and always belong to something but they differ from the verb and no name has been established for the difference. Thomas Aquinas. sed sunt casus verbi. etc.” of past time. so “will mature. ita etiam curret. verbs that signify with past or future time are not verbs in the proper sense of the term. not on the part of the action. “has matured” and “will mature” are not verbs but modes of the verb. illa vero significant tempus hinc et inde circumstans. Aristotle: On Interpretation. i. quia verbum consignificat praesens tempus. a verb is always a sign of something that belongs to something. St. quae incepit. nor action. 14. since they belong equally to anything whatever. excludit a verbo verba praeteriti et futuri temporis. 16b 16 Likewise. and person. They are cases of the verb and differ from the verb—which signifies with present time—by signifying time before and after the present. dicit autem signanter praesens tempus. Let us call them infinite verbs. Although the inflection of the verb is varied by mode. Commentary by St. For just as infinite verbs are not verbs absolutely. 16b 12 “Non-matures” and “non-declines” I do not call verbs. for past or future are said with respect to the present. whereas to act or to be acted upon in past or future time is relative... Accordingly. quod est instans: quia in instanti non est motus. nec actio aut passio. and “has matured. for in the instant there is neither movement. quod est praeteriti temporis. “has matured” and “will mature” are not verbs. 12-14): 12. are not verbs. the variations that are made in number and person do not constitute cases of the verb. is a name. that which will be present. which is to act or to be acted upon simply. the past being that which was present. Aristotle expressly says “present time” and not just “present” because he does not mean here the indivisible present which is the instant. quod est futuri temporis. no part of it signifies separately. et dicit quod sicut verba infinita non sunt simpliciter verba. When he says. time. Translated from the Latin with an Introduction by Jean T. Cf. 16b 8 1 mean by “signifies with time” that “maturity. for the verb is that which signifies to act or to be acted upon and therefore strictly speaking signifies to act or to be acted upon in act. quod est agere vel pati simpliciter: sed agere vel pati in praeterito vel futuro est secundum quid. Likewise. et non simpliciter praesens. he excludes verbs of past and future time from the definition. 16 . Oesterle (Milwaukee 1962) (nn. and it is a sign of something said of something else. It is with reason that verbs of past or future time are called cases of the verb signifying with present time.1 13. non sunt verba. to both what is and what is not. non sunt verba proprie dicta: cum enim verbum proprie sit quod significat agere vel pati. But 1 deinde cum dicit: similiter autem curret etc. vel currebat. Thomas and Cajetan. of something present in a subject.
proceed from the interior conception of the mind. are not called cases. I. n. not on the part of the action 5. nam verba imperativi vel optativi modi casus dicuntur. Thomas’ dependence on Ammonius here will be clear from an excerpt given below. et ideo utraque constituit casus verbi. then. sed ex parte subiecti. numeros et personas. without time. is a vocal sound significant by convention. futurum autem quod erit praesens. et dicitur rectus. qui dicitur rectus eo quod non cadit. est enim praeteritum quod fuit praesens. The nominative alone is principally called a name.1 4. Verbs of the indicative mode in present time.” as such signifies nothing. i. Aristotle: On Interpretation. 4 (16a 19-21. sed verba indicativi modi praesentis temporis non dicuntur casus. sicut et verba praeteriti vel futuri temporis. ‘Case’ with respect to names.M. tempora. Aristotle.. for the imposition of a name was made in order to signify something. because they fall. Cf. On the other hand. sed solus nominatives dicitur principaliter nomen. cuiuscumque sint personae vel numeri. as when a pen falls and is fixed in wood. “Of Philo” and “to Philo” and all such expressions are not names but modes of names. quia praeteritum vel futurum dicitur per respectum ad praesens. lect. J.. excludit casus nominis. et dicit quod catonis vel catoni et alia huiusmodi non sunt nomina. slightly rev. 4. quod consignificat praesens tempus. Oesterle): 16a 19 A name.A. however. the nominative. cum autem declinatio verbi varietur per modos. time. huiusmodi autem obliqui vocantur casus nominis: quia quasi cadunt per quamdam declinationis originem a nominativo. and person but the variations that are made in number and person do not constitute cases of the verb. sicut stilus qui cadens ligno infigitur. 2 1 dicuntur etiam verba praeteriti vel futuri temporis rationabiliter casus verbi. number. whatever their person and number... is said to be erect [upright]. ut rectum stet. because it does not fall away. 17 . the reason being that such variation is on the part of the subject. The Stoics held that even the nominatives were cases (with which the grammarians agree).): 14. Oblique expressions of the kind cited are called cases of the name because they fall away from the nominative as a kind of source of their declension. eo quod nihil prohibit aliquid cadens sic cadere. When he says. 32) (tr. 2 deinde cum dicit: catonis autem vel catoni etc. idest procedunt ab interiori conceptione mentis. B. Cf. per quem facta est impositio nominis ad aliquid significandum. Jean T. stoici autem dixerunt etiam nominativos dici casus: quos grammatici sequuntur. sed variatio quae est per modos et tempora respicit ipsam actionem. he excludes the cases of names from the nature of the name.variation in mode and time refers to the action itself and hence both of these constitute cases of the verb. although in the expression “camp bell” it does. St. De Int. 12 (tr.e. <…> 16a 32 “Of Philo” and “to Philo” and all such expressions are not names but modes of names. St. no part of which is significant separately. 16a 21 for in the name “Campbell” the part “bell. In sum. For verbs of the imperative or optative modes are called cases as well as verbs of past or future time. and they said they were also called erect [upright] because nothing prevents a thing from falling in such a way that it stands erect. Oesterle. Thomas Aquinas. the inflection of the verb is varied by mode [= mood]. variatio quae fit per numerum et personam non constituit casus verbi: quia talis variatio non est ex parte actionis. eo quod cadunt.
e. such as nouns (O. 2). A. e.g. genitive. 1. 7. 37Q 4). p. Cf. we utter the name Socrates [i.24-8 If the nominative is upright. On Aristotle’s De interpretatione 43. ‘writes’ with no indication of whom. the further addition of the oblique case (cf. Vol. and fanciful explanations were given to justify this terminology (K. 18 . The ‘case’ of a noun in Aristotle’s usage. inflections of the nominative form.g. pronouns. The Stoics extended the term ‘case’ (literally ‘falling’) to the nominative. L). What completes a sayable is its being attached to ‘a nominative case’ (G) (or a dative of the person. ‘a case’ simply means ‘a word in some case’.g. 230. Socrates in the nominative case]. e.6. ‘Case’ (ptôsis) picks out the syntactical relation of a noun to the other constituents of a sentence. verbs. that is active. nominative. indicating that they are the items standardly designated by nouns and pronouns. But it is upright because it has not yet been altered into an oblique [case]. the latter ‘incomplete’. In its standard usage. In the ‘complete sayable’ this syntactical relation seems to have been regarded as a component of the sentence’s meaning. it designates not the inflection itself but the inflected word. with impersonal verbs) and.g. A. q in vol.g. In his usage all the cases are oblique. The former type is called ‘complete’. Notes by Long and Sedley. 1987). when not specified as e. Just as a pen is said both to have fallen and to have its fall upright if it is released from above and sticks upright. Sedley. A consequence of this is that. they are the meanings of ‘finished’ sentences like ‘Socrates writes’ (F3). in the usage of transitive verbs. pp. however. Behind them probably lies the notion that predication is most fundamentally exemplified by attributing an activity to a subject. so we claim that the nominative case [literally ‘the direct case’] [197-198] falls from the thought. e. ‘Socrates strikes’. or because it is the foundation of what the Stoics call upright. the Greek word thus translated (tunchanonta) strictly stands for ‘case-bearers’.e. Translations of the Principal Sources with Philosophical Commentary (Cambridge. in the case of transitive verbs). N. A ‘nominative case’ is a word inflected in the nominative. Long & D. why is it a case? Because it has fallen from what is incorporeal and generic into what is specific. or of verbs without a specified subject (and/or object. nominative. but is upright because it is the archetype of linguistic utterance. 201: A word of warning must added about ‘case’.9-15 The Stoics reply that the nominative case itself has fallen from the thought which is in the soul. which in Greek decline through the cases.). When subjects are called ‘name-bearers’ (B). 30A e. ‘Socrates writes’. and even noun-clauses (55C). p. For when we wish to exhibit the thought of Socrates which we have within ourselves. Its most familiar modern meaning is the inflection of a noun or other substantival form. The Hellenistic Philosophers. 197-198: K Ammonius. 199: Lekta are explained in various ways. or ‘a substantival form’ – a generic term for those grammatical items. Aristotle had excluded the nominative from the ‘cases’ of nouns (De interpretatione 1632 ff. Linguistically. L Scholia on Dionysius Thrax.
24): “The Greek word kineisthai is used in the sense of ‘to be declined. 3-4. Cf. C. then.T. 12…. we shall occasionally refer to the other four as the oblique cases.M. from kli/nw) toward other elements within the sentence. 2 N. 383. 9.’ 29 and the word akinētos sometimes has the meaning of ‘undeclined’.). from its ‘upright’ or ‘straight’ form) is called is its ‘case’ (hence the ‘nominative’ is not a ‘case’) its ‘declension’ is the ‘roster’ of such ‘fallings off’ In light of the foregoing observations. 1977). means ‘the change that happens at the end of a noun’ (tr. I: Grammar (Annapolis. 16: Note. According to certain Greek grammarians. some modern grammarians have developed an account which goes back to Aristotle (On Interpretation.” In other words.” 19 . The roster of such fallings off is called a declension. Ptosis or ‘case’. p. Alfred Mollin and Robert Williamson. Greek Elements in Arabic Linguistic Thinking (Leiden: Brill. XXII. as the ‘s’ in the following example: ‘The dog is barking. Latin casus. from whence English case) or “inclination” (kli/sij. with no indication of a relation to other elements in the sentence.) Note how the change from singular to plural in the verb alters the construction of the sentence. We have followed general practice in referring to the nominative form as a “case” among four other cases.). XLI.28 28 Scholia D. for the imposition of a name was made in order to signify something. the ‘case’ of a name could be defined as the way in which it ‘falls’ or ‘leans toward’ another word or words in the construction of a sentence allowing it to perform its function therein. p. eu)qei=a) form and function. 23: …and a text in the scholia on Dionysios Thrax where a grammatical case is defined as ‘a movement that occurs at the end of a noun’ (onômatos kata tô têlos ginomênê kinêsis). John’s College. IV. ‘The dogs are barking. is that which is called (the) nominative or ‘naming’ word par excellence.A. 2.H. the nominative form of the name is called a ‘noun’ the noun is the ‘upright’ or ‘straight’ form from which a name may undergo a ‘fall’1 the ‘fall’ or ‘inclination’ which a name may undergo (sc. Compare the following accounts: 1 Compare St. Versteegh. 8.B. also praefatio. However. 2 Versteegh goes on to remark (p. 1994). cf. being that which has been imposed upon a thing in order to signify it. MD: St. such change being an example of what we call an ‘inflection’. Hence. and Grammatici Graeci.’ (sg. Oblique expressions of the kind cited are called cases of the name because they fall away from the nominative as a kind of source of their declension. a noun may undergo a “fall” (ptw=sij. B. we may translate the scholion as follows: “Case is a declining (or declension) that occurs at the end of a noun. Mollin and Williamson on case in sum. which names ( o)noma/zein) simply. Thomas’ remarks excerpted above: “The nominative alone is principally called a name. 2) and according to which the term “noun” (o)/noma) should be reserved for the nominative form. Vol.’ (pl. Although it is convenient to include the nominative form among the “cases”.Cf. An Introduction to Ancient Greek. 30” (footnotes omitted). From its base (or “upright” or “straight” -or)qh/.M. the form of name in question here.
passive and intransitive verbs were recognized and their different syntax was taken to be closely linked with differences of case with which they constructed. 2 deadjectival adverbs. the passages to cited infra from Long and Sedley. “The Development of the Word Class System of the European Grammatical Tradition”.2. number. verbal categories required separate terminology.6 One consequence of taking case to be the basis for distinguishing nouns from verbs was that adjectives in Greek (and.pdf.. 4 Cf. tense.Cf. 7 E. H. the notion of ‘ptosis’ applied to oblique nominal cases. suffix. 2 E. or element involved in such variation. the group of invariant prepositions and conjunctions. Merriam Webster Online Dictionary.. mood. the Stoics made case the fundamental distinction between nouns and verbs and between.. the distinction between the substantival and the adjectival name. . H. Aristotle’s treatment of adjectives like ‘pale’ or ‘white’ as predicates.3. [02/05/06]) (no author given) “This section is a synopsis based mostly on Robins (1966.19. 10.. Latin) were treated as a subclass of nouns (and continued to be treated so until the eighteenth century). later. or voice b : a form. s. Cf. Plato and Aristotle. transitive. R. the group of case inflected pronouns and articles and. Miriam Webster Online Dictionary: 1 (http://www.1 0. ‘swiftly’ as said from ‘swift’. 1990) and. 20 . “inflection”. The Stoics The inflectional criterion for deriving word class distinctions was brought into play by the Stoic grammarians. swiftest’. on the other. and hence rhemata. 3 a : the change of form that words undergo to mark such distinctions as those of case. Some grammatical terms pertaining to case. ‘swifter.8 After ptosis was restricted to nominal words. Lyons (1968) and Kodukhov (1974). 8 Cf. In: Foundations of Language 2: 3 . cf. and from Mollin and Williamson on Aristotle’s (divergent) practice in this regard. 5 Stoic case covered all the forms of case-inflected words (basic non-inflected and inflected) and so a division was made between nominative and oblique cases.g. gender. 5 For an argument that this is actually Aristotle’s division. Thus. Robins (1966). irrespective of whether it was an ‘onoma-noun’ or a ‘rheme-verb’.3 non-present verbal tenses and other verbal inflections.lotpublications.v. In: Foundations of Language 2: 3 . Robins (1966).. By restricting ptosis to case and case to nouns.. in addition. person.4 0. “The Development of the Word Class System of the European Grammatical Tradition”. cited above. Historical Prelude. all morphological differences between basic and inflected word shapes. p. 7 In grouping adjectives together with nouns the Stoics differed from Plato and Aristotle who grouped adjectives together with verbs. comparative and superlative forms of adjectives. see further below.19. the examples of the cases of a verb. 2. were covered by the same category of ‘ptosis’. 3 E.g. Cf. Interestingly. 6 On the treatment of the ‘nominative’ as a ‘case’. Their major theoretical achievement was to restrict the meaning of the term ‘ptosis’ to that of English case. such as ‘matures’ etc. The reader will note that this outline is indebted to R. on the one hand. the divisions in the verbal domain were also case-motivated: active.nl/publish/articles/001178/bookpart.Second.” Cf.g.
Derivation is the process of forming words from other words or roots by the addition of affixes that in themselves either have meaning or denote word function. a change from singular to plural in the noun tree/trees requires a concomitant change in the verb form from singular to plural: “the tree is green. 1 a : a schematic arrangement of the inflectional forms of a verb b : verb inflection c : a class of verbs having the same type of inflectional forms <the weak conjugation> d : a set of the simple or derivative inflectional forms of a verb especially in Sanskrit or the Semitic languages <the causative conjugation> 2 : the act of conjugating : the state of being conjugated declension. conjugation. An isolating language is one in which there are only roots.. or pronoun inflection especially in some prescribed order of the forms b : a class of nouns or adjectives having the same type of inflectional forms Cf. and affixes. e. in grammar. adjective. Aristotle on ‘composite’ names: the process under discussion giving rise to such names. An inflectional affix carries certain grammatical restrictions with it. the modification of a root or base by the amount of inflection or derivation in a language was used as a basis for classification. or voice b : a form. inflected languages. walks. The name stem is given to a root together with its derivational affixes. de-press. retire-ment. : a part of grammar that deals with inflections. -s. To be distinguished from inflectional affixes are those of derivation.. cf.. and the inflection of verbs is called conjugation. walker have in common the root walk and the affixes -ing.” “the trees are green. pronoun. and -er. 1 Derivational affixes in English may be either prefixes—e.g.” Other examples of English inflectional suffixes are the verb tenses. but the amount of inflection is not as great as in agglutinative languages where roots and affixes are readily identifiable. number. which I give next.” babama “to 1 Cf. nonessential qualities. plural of accident-.g. stems. 1 a : noun. use roots. from Middle French.g. Turkish baba “father.. with the plural inflection -s. Book X.. words or parts of words are arranged in formally similar sets consisting of a root. or base. racketeer the stem. Arabic. thus in racket-eer-s. inflection. 21 . a : an inflectional form of a noun. In many languages. accidens. for example. work-er. mood. Many languages have far more extensive inflection than English. Etymology: Middle English. gender. or adjective indicating its grammatical relation to other words b : such a relation whether indicated by inflection or not. suffix. e. tense. and number. n. racket is the root. and the adjective is additionally inflected for the gender of the noun. voice. Encyclopedia (Columbia University Press): inflection. such as Chinese. person. un-common—or suffixes—e. and -s the plural inflection.g. for the classical foundation of the distinction between inflectional and derivational morphology. e. Also. 3 a : the change of form that words undergo to mark such distinctions as those of case. or element involved in such variation c : ACCIDENCE case. Latin. In Latin grammar the typical noun and adjective are inflected for case and number. English and Latin. Beginning in the 19th cent. Latin verbs have overlapping categories of inflection: mood. Noun inflection is called declension. person. with no derivation or inflection. De Lingua Latina.g. On the other hand..accidence. and various affixes. from Latin accidentia inflections of words. happi-ness.” babam “my father. tense. Eskimo. Thus walking. Marcus Varro.
supra).M. name and verb: the basic form the variation (or variations) of that form the basic form of the name: the nominative the basic form of the verb: ?? Cf. 3-4. also praefatio. ‘men’ or ‘man’. allowing it to performs its function therein” (worded by B. IV. the one signifying according to ‘of this’  or ‘to that’ and whatever others [are] such. but the other according to ‘one’ or ‘many’.” The old belief that agglutinative languages were the most primitive and isolating languages the most civilized is no longer held. that is to say. 12). and Infinitive”: VERBS: THE BASICS OF CONJUGATION …You can see that the verb “to see” has a basic form. Grote.my father. For ‘[he] has walked’ or ‘[he] walked’ are cases of the verb according to these species” (Aristotle.T. English language. which is being modified slightly to show that the verb is being used in a different way. the change occurs in one or more letters at the end of the word The notion of ‘case’ presupposes an understanding that there is a ‘basic form’ of a name or verb of which the several ‘cases’ are variations governed by the function they are meant to perform in a phrase or sentence. (Scholia D. in a more restricted sense. (1) that which “belongs to name or verb. Some definitions. grammar.v. umlaut. according to questioning. hence. Latin Grammar and Syntax. inflection in grammar may be defined as “3 a : the change of form that words undergo to mark such distinctions as those of case. commanding. number. See ablaut. Dale A. CASUS): In logic. person.A. according to Aristotle. mood. (4) generally speaking. cf. gender. Additionaly remarks on case: the case of a name or verb is the modification or change it undergoes allowing it to perform a given function in speech in Greek and Latin. tense. after Mollin and Williamson. s. XXII. (Commentary on Wheelock. 2. 20. or element involved in such variation” (Merriam Webster Online Dictionary. Chapter 1). for example. 1457a 19-23). Poet. (2) “‘a movement (or declining or declension) that occurs at the end of a noun’ (onômatos kata tô têlos ginomênê kinêsis). or again. (3) “the way in which a noun or name ‘falls’ or ‘leans toward’ another word or words in the construction of a sentence. in grammar. “First and Second Conjugation Verbs: Indicative. and Grammatici Graeci. This modification of a verb to show different aspects or conditions of the action is called “conjugation” (kahn juh GAY 22 . CASE (PTOSIS. XLI. 383. but this according to delivery. for example. Imperative. “inflection”). suffix. 12. or voice b : a form. 11. it being recognized that every language is just as expressive as any other and can develop new vocabulary to fit new situations.
and a verb is said to “conjugate” (KAHN juh gate) when it’s modified to exhibit these different conditions.shun). seen = three stems comprising the principal parts of the verb “to see” § 23 . which then conjugate in order to change the way its meaning is to be understood in a particular context. saw. A verb. These basic forms contain the core meaning of the verb. therefore. has a basic form or set of forms. but the way the action is being applied and the circumstances under which the action is changing. (emphasis added) On root and stem: The root is the basic form. the stem is a principal part: see.
15. alterum ut in materiae figura. 1 That is.9. B. I name it ‘by will’ when one imposes on a thing a name from another name. ut haec vix mox. which are signaled by differences in letters).M. ut Romulus Romae. Secunda divisio est de his verbis quae declinari possunt. being universally received from the one who imposed it. whoever says mox is similar to nox goes astray. cum unus quivis a nomine aliae rei imponit nomen. but mox neither ought to nor can. cum universi acceptum nomen ab eo qui imposuit non requirimus quemadmodum is velit declinari. quod alia verba nusquam declinantur. others by nature. since nox ought to come under the notion of cases. 63 (tr. the remainder tr. as this example of Romae.B. I. Cf. If the basis of these grammatical similarities had been correctly understood and if their systematic arrangement had originated from there. Romam. naturam dico. Daniel J. quae ex declinatione fit. and the like). Varro: De Lingua Latina X. 24 . N. a fero ferebam. Roma. hac Roma.e. A morphological division of Latin words according to Varro. But I call it ‘by nature’ when the name. quod alia sunt a voluntate. as it were. Varro: De Lingua Latina X. hanc Romam. ut huius Romae. ut ab lima limae. mox neque debeat neque possit. Quarum ego principia prima duum generum I maintain that insofar as declensions are consola arbitror esse. § 11 [In: Daniel J. sed ipsi declinamus. the other. another in the figure or form of the matter (as with case endings or inflections. et cum nisi in his verbis quae declinantur non possit esse analogia. 11.. in the phonological configuration of that substance. both words not being of the same genus. but others are declined. alia declinantur. and since there cannot be analogy except in those words which are declined. but we decline it ourselves. quod non est eiusdem generis utrumque verbum. like from lima limae.M. B. alia a natura. Taylor): Prima divisio in oratione.1 Cf. ad quae similitudines exigi cerned there are only two types of essential eleoporteat: ments involved in the determination of similarities: e quis unum positum in verborum materia. Varro – De Lingua Latina X (John Benjamins. minus erraretur in declinationibus verborum. Voluntatem appello. from fero ferebam. 14. I. like vix. (§ 14-16 tr.A.: the Latin has been taken from The Latin Library but it is identical to Taylor’s text): Quarum similitudinum si esset origo recte capta et inde orsa ratio. Taylor.A. one of these is represented in the morphological substance of words. there would now be fewer misconceptions in the declensions of words. cum nox succedere debeat sub casuum rationem. The first division in speech is that that some words are never declined. ‘case’ or ‘tense’.. 1996). p. we do not require from him how he wishes it to be declined. The second division is among those words which can be declined. mox. one in the matter of the words (i. which is a product of declentional variation. that there are some (declined) by an act of will. slightly rev. as Romulus on Rome. qui dicit simile esse mox et nox errat.
1) that which has cases but not tenses. By virtue of this division the individual parts are unlike the remaining three. sed. ut dixi. when custom has received the names from them. as docens faciens. turbulenta necesse est dicere. 2) another which has tenses but not cases. 5: 25 . ea dividuntur in partis quattuor: 17 . in quartam quae neutra. ut docens faciens.De his duabus partibus voluntaria declinatio refertur ad consuetudinem. one ought not to even posit a comparative similarity and claim that Capuanus ought to be derived from Capua just as Romanus is from Roma. Itaque neque Aristarchei neque alii in analogiis defendendam eius susceperunt causam. quod declinantes imperite rebus nomina imponunt. 16. Quare proinde ac simile conferre non oportet ac dicere. but rather as I have said. For that reason. Tertia divisio est: quae verba declinata natura. accordingly. § Cf. as docilis and facilis. morphological variation of this kind in the popular usage of words is weakly motivated. disorderly speech necessarily obtains. non erit ita simile. they will not be so far similar as would make them the same. as docte and facete. ut docilis et facilis. 4) into a fourth which has neither. ut docte et facete. because it has its source in the arbitrary determination of the speech community: itaque in hoc genere in loquendo magis anomalia quam analogia. quod in consuetudine vehementer natat. naturalis ad rationem. Ex hac divisione singulis partibus tres reliquae dissimiles. one is referred to custom [or usage (Taylor)]. the other to natural reason. ut debeat facere idem. even if they do agree. ut sit ab Roma Romanus.The third division consists of those words which are declined by nature. sic ex Capua dici oportere Capuanus. Historical Prelude. because in usage things are very much in flux inasmuch as these neologists who impose names on things do so without any skill: a quibus cum accepit consuetudo. in tertiam quae utraque. 3) into a third which has both. hoc genere declinatio in communi consuetudine verborum aegrotat. as docet facit. si conveniunt. p. Wherefore unless words are compared among themselves in their own part. quod oritur e populo multiplici et imperito: Therefore neither the followers of Aristarchus nor any of the others have seen fit to defend the cause of derivational morphology in analogies. therefore in this process in speaking there is more anomaly than analogy. in alteram quae tempora neque casus. But of these two parts of voluntary declension. ut docet facit. Quare nisi in sua parte inter se collata erunt verba. and it is divided into four parts: in unam quae habet casus neque tempora.
Particles are the four Parts of Speech that do not admit of inflection.0.) and phonological form. ibid. 1996). 20-21: In general.. Adverbs. case.C. Charles E. by which Varro means grammatical substance (e. Daniel J. 11]. Prolegomena. number. and this is the basis of language science in any age.D.B. As Hill (1958:59-60 [= Introduction to Linguistic Structures]). and of course Varro discusses issues in terms of the prevailing intellectual atmosphere of our time. Prolegomena. there are many differences. Latin grammarians: Varro. etc.g.. pp. Taylor.. Cf. 11. Nonetheless Varro is able to relate successfully sound and meaning formally. Varro – De Lingua Latina X (John Benjamins. cf. These criteria are materia and figura. Conjunctions. On Varro’s originality. the assumptions about language that constitute a structural approach to linguistic science and the principles that direct the formal observation.. description. To be sure. and the late 20 th century A. The four inflectionally contrasting classes were: Those with case inflection Nouns (including adjectives) Those with tense inflection Verbs Those with [both] case and tense inflection Participles Those with neither Adverbs The inflectional abilities correlated with particular syntactic and semantic functions: nouns named. explains: 26 . verbs made statements.5. 10. viz. Cf. New Latin Grammar (New York. Varro proposed a quadripartite morphological classification of Latin inflected words based on the categories of case and tense. But the particles which do admit of inflection are (in Greek) the articles. In sum. and explanation of grammatical phenomenon are much the same for us as Varro. 1908): 139. Varro makes it clear that two and only two criteria are necessary and sufficient for the purpose of comparing the inflectional affiliations of inflected words. Prepositions. p. adverbs supported and participles joined. On the uninflected parts of the Latin language. having case but not tense: nouns (including adjectives and articles) having tense but not case: verbs having both case and tense: participles having neither case nor tense: adverbs [= the uninflected parts of language] N. 17: [I]n the next chapter [sc. there are also vast differences in the climate of opinion. Interjections. tense. Bennet. naturally between the 1 st century B.
for that is Varro.” That too is Varro.. The passage reads almost as if it were a translation of some no longer extant Varronian text. As Hill (1958:5) puts it. conclusions which he reaches as a result of a lifetime devoted to the study of language... but with one significant exception.Language is a predominantly regular structure on all its levels.35. § 27 . into declensions and conjugations.. If it were not.. predictions can be made about the whole of it. instead. Language is also characterized by irregularity on all its levels.. general issues of linguistic theory are as fundamental to [20-21] Varro as they are to us. These broad.but in the overall pattern. those issues are not assumptions as they are for us but are. If it were not. language would be so rigid that its patterns could not be applied to new situations. language entities are arranged in recurrent designs. and in sec.51 and elsewhere in X. as elsewhere in language. the regularities must outnumber the irregularities.. and the simplest way of describing more explicitly what Varro intends to do in book 10 is to describe it as an attempt to formulate formally the linguistic principles and procedures by means of which the grammarian can classify Latin words into sets of paradigmatically identical and related members. like the other meaningful utterances of a language. For Varro. Yet it is also an axiom of modern linguistics that words. Consequently it is Varro’s major task in LL X to demonstrate that the nature of language is indeed characterized predominantly by regularity but is also characterized by irregularity and to show where each obtains in language. that is. Varro in LL IX. can be analyzed into a limited number of recurrent patterns.. “As in any system. it would be so chaotic that we could not master it. so that if a part of the design is seen.
conjunction. article. but there is speech which happens to be without verbs. or ‘white’ do not signify ‘when’. II. past time. Aristotle introduces the notion of ‘conjunction’. Verb: For ‘man’. I believe the parts of language ought to have been treated in the following order: element. according to and whatever others [are] such. That is to say. Speech: for not  every speech is composed from names and verbs <in which something is said of something else>. inasmuch as the former are the principal parts of speech.) < I mean “as words but not as an affirmation or for example. for example. As noted above (cf. as is explained at length in the Appendix to this paper. the Iliad is one by  conjunctions. For ‘[he] has walked’ or ‘[he] walked’ are cases of the verb according to these species. the other. 28 . but the definition of man (one) by signifying one thing. in ‘Theodore’ ‘doron’ [i. syllable. verb. commanding. as is the case in names.. n. the text reveals an otherwise hidden continuity: [1456b 29-30] But speech is one in two ways. ‘men’ or ‘man’. But case belongs to name or verb. [1456b 37-1457a 1] But a conjunction is a non-significative [1457a] vocal sound. In explaining the two ways in which speech is one. making it natural for him to proceed to explain in the next place what he means by that term. the one present. according to ‘one’ or ‘many’. But when one puts the definitions in their proper order. sec. for example. but ‘[he] walks’ or ‘[he] has walked’ consignify. in fact. If this change is made. it becomes obvious that those given for the conjunction (and likewise the article) as found in the received text do not have the same form as the others. An argument for re-ordering of the text of Poetics Chapter 20 on the parts of lexis. THE PRINCIPAL AND SECONDARY PARTS OF LEXIS: THE FORMS OF THEIR DEFINITIONS. 5). as one may observe by laying out the definitions with their explanations and examples in parallel columns: Definitions: Explanations and examples: But a name is a [simple or]* composite vocal sound significative without time. noun. 1.V. speech.. Name: for in double names we do not use [a part] as if it signifies by itself. But a verb is a [simple or]* composite vocal sound significative  with time no part of which signifies by itself. but another signifying according to ‘of this’  or ‘to that’ according to delivery. the latter its bonds. the one Case: for example. together with ptosis and logos. should come before those of the sundesmos and the arthron. case. etc.. the definition of man. the definitions of the onoma and the rhema.e. no part of which is significative by itself. ‘gift’] does not signify. But speech is composite significative vocal sound some of whose parts signify something by themselves. for it is either that which signifies one thing or that which (is one) from many conjunctions. for example. but the other questioning.
but which signifies (1) [when conjoined to names or verbs]: the conjunction 1 Inasmuch as it is an objective of this paper to prove that. [not found] For example.. [but (missing)]:1 the conjunction (b) The differences determining the foregoing parts of lexis taken in order: (1) Either significative without time or with it: (a) significative without time: the name (b) significative with time: the verb (2) Either no part of which is significative by itself or a part of which is: (a) no part of which is significative by itself: the name and the verb (b) part of which is significative by itself: speech (3) Either significative by itself or not significative by itself: (a) significative by itself (as a whole or in part): the name. in ‘Cleon walks’. The definition of the conjunction: But a conjunction is a vocal sound which.. [remainder of definition garbled]. and speech (b) not significative by itself. [not found] * As Aristotle explains in the De Interpretatione. Now inasmuch as the surviving definitions of the sundesmos and arthron manifestly do not conform to this template. 16b 27)> But speech is one in two ways. Conjunction: for [not].. ‘Cleon’. the Iliad is one by  conjunctions. I will proceed to argue that the missing clause is “which signifies when conjoined to the others”. Yet a part [of speech] will always have significance. there is a need to restore the definition to a comparable form. See the Appendix to this paper.. The elements of the definitions (a) The principal parts of the foregoing definitions: (1) significative without time... for it is either that which signifies one thing or that which (is one) from many conjunctions. let us consider the elements out of which the sur-viving definitions are composed: 1. necessitating a further emendation of the text here. for example. .. while the generic part of the definition is manifest.. 29 . no part of which is significative by itself: the name (2) significative with time no part of which signifies by itself: the verb (3) some of whose parts signify something by themselves: speech (4) which is not significative by itself. the verb. its difference has been lost from the text and so must be restored. as with bird and blackbird in English. De Int. names may be either simple or composite. for example.a negation” (cf.. but the definition of man (one) by signifying one thing. In support of this emendation.
but are the commencement of an independent bifurcation. 5 (17a 13-14) (tr.A. But (b) if they do take the differentia of the differentia. De Int. we must define at the outset by Therefore. Jean T. in dividing we must disting- 1 While it is not possible to determine whether such an explanation originally occurred in the Poetics but has since been lost from the text. a new differential character be introduced at any stage into the division. is something one and not many—for clearly it will not be one by signifying one thing. 30 . “Cleon walks. As we said then. the following supplement is nevertheless consistent with it. By dichotomy (a) either these groups cannot be arrived at all (because the same group falls under several divisions and contrary groups under the same division) or it only furnishes a single ultimate differentia for each species. again. as I say. which either alone or with its series of antecedents has to constitute the ultimate species. or else there will be one differentia only. but Socrates sits”.) 17a 13 (but then the question arises as to why the definition “terrestrial biped animal” is something one and not many—for clearly it will not be one by reason of the words being said in juxtaposition—but this belongs to another subject of inquiry). Supplement: On the two ways in which a logos may be one. William Ogle) (tr. or into White and Black. suppose we have the bifurcation  Feathered and Featherless. Cf. Suppose they make the division into “wingless” and “winged. On the Parts of Animals. S. the necessary result is that the continuity of the division becomes merely a unity and continuity of agglomeration. the following text. Here is an example to show what happens. For instance. and can come in here only by accident. and are foreign to the series at the end of which they are introduced. neither “tame” nor “pale” is a differentiation of “winged.M. 2 Cf.” but the beginning of another line of differentiation. like the unity and continuity of a series of sentences coupled together by conjunctive particles.1 By signifying one thing: By conjunctions: Aristotle. and then divide Feathered into Wild and Tame. Aristotle. Tame and White are not a differentiation of Feathered. I. but by reason of the words being said in juxtaposeition.” and then divide “winged” into “tame” and “wild” or into “pale” and “dark”. and this either singly or in combination will constitute the ultimate species. Forster) The method of dichotomy is either impossible (for it would put a single group under different divisions or contrary groups under the same  division). they are forced to follow the example of those people who try to give unity to their prose by a free use of conjunctions: there is little continuity about their division. 2 But then the question arises as to why the speech. If.(2) secundum quid as part of a ‘double’ or ‘composite’ name: the syllable 5. Oesterle): Version on the conjunction (assembled by B. E. 3 (643b 13-26): (tr.
Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics by Thomas Aquinas (translated by John P.] Note. a)nagkai=on. this must not be understood to mean that such discourse lacks any unity at all. Second he proves the solution which was given. but discontinuous when it is not. like those persons who make their discourse one by means of connective particles. however. making their discourse one by means of connectives. tr. and this”. But if they do take the differentia of the differentia. But as Aristotle explains. Now it is evident (584). I. non enim omnis ratio. Hence. privative terms will be available.M. of one that signifies one thing. Aristotle says that if the adherents of the method of dichotomy take the differentia of the differentia. except perhaps accidentally. B. there being no essential connection between the members of the division.B. primo et simpliciter est substantiarum.M.A. nec nomen expositum per quamcumque rationem. conversely. then into ‘Conservative’ and ‘Liberal’. If we do so. nor is the word explained by each logos always something defined. they must. and this. if one were to take a group of persons and first divide them into ‘male’ and ‘female’. Aristotle. For example.]). In the foregoing text. or prior to. Loeb. On this subject see also my subsequent paper on sundesmos and arthron. make their division without continuity. sed alicui determinatae rationi competit quod sit definitio. non tamen solum et substantiarum. like those persons who. Cf. arriving at. 1339-1341: 1339. is made continuous by the use of conjunctions. nn. 3 (643b 16-19) (ed. [N. qua nomen per rationem exponitur. his division would have only an accidental unity insofar as he would be saying “they are this. see further below).1 1 deinde cum dicit illud autem probat secundo positam solutionem dicens. illud palam esse quod definitio et quod quid erat esse. Now a division is continuous when it is made according to the same principle (for which reason it is per se). Rowan. But the same is true of a nominal definition. idem est quod definitio. non tamen primum. and this when it is taken with respect to the differences of things insofar as they are such things. He says that it is evident that definition and essence belong primarily and unqualifiedly to substances. et hoc sic patet. but only a certain kind. namely. the foregoing text is saying that the unity given to discourse by the use of connective particles is something other than the essential unity manifested by a definition. 1961 [slightly rev. This is made clear as follows: not every logos by which a word is explained is the same as a definition. semper est definitum. the following accounts: Cf. Cf. which they will never do in the system of dichotomy. this logos does not signify one thing. For if I say that Socrates is white and musical and curly-headed. though not in the first way. yet not to substances alone since in a sense accidents also have a definition and essence. is per accidens rather than per se. but signifies many.A. inasmuch as one composes names for a thing which have no essential connection to one another in order to make it known in the absence of. B. cum etiam accidentia aliquo modo habeant definitionem et quod quid erat esse.a multiplicity of  differentia. On the Parts of Animals. and therefore such a logos is not a definition. which are unavailable to the dichotomist. but it is proper that there should be a definition of any determinate logos. and then too the privative terms will make valid differentiae. ou(/tw kai\ th\n diai/resin sunexh= poie=n.): e)a\n de\ mh\ diafora=j lamba/n$ tij diafora/n. they must make their division without continuity. w(/sper sunde/sm % to\n lo/gon e(/na poiou=ntaj. Speech. then into ‘old’ and ‘young’. uish the one original group forthwith by numerous differentiae. the unity of which. its real defin-ition (on this point. illi 31 . Chicago.
this logos would not be a definition of a house. But a logos that signifies one thing will be a defini-tion if it signifies in some one of those senses in which the term one is predicated ess-entially. c. it is not enough that the thing signified by a logos should be one thing from the viewpoint of continuity in order that there may be a definition of it. for example. art. 2 non tamen sufficit quod sit unum in continuitate illud quod per rationem significatur. Cf. And in one sense being signifies this particular thing.” (Summa Theol. But the logos of white will be a definition in a different sense than the logos of substance. because white man is in a sense one thing. necesse est huius unionis causam esse aliquam: non enim diversa secundum se uniuntur. On the notion of ‘unity’. sed tunc ratio significans unum erit definitio. quod domus est lapides et cementum et ligna. and not a bundle of units. It is also important for understanding how a number is one number. then..2 1341. p 323 De Potentia): “Ex pluribus enim actu existentibus non fit unum simpliciter.). quantity. “Si enim diversa in aliquo uniantur. From De Anima (Q1 A11 C. because the logos of substance will be a definition in a primary sense. idest poema de bello troiano esset definitio. Michael Augros.1340. si dicerem. c. quia illud bellum in quadam continuitate temporis est peractum. sicut unum per prius et posterius de utroque dicitur. Also. Ch 18: “In every composed thing there must be act and ability. Ia. tr. However. unless there be something uniting and in some way binding them to each other. 1 Nor again is it enough that the thing should be one by connection. sed alio modo erit definitio ratio albi. et sic de aliis. ratio albi per posterius. Scrapboo. sed multa. and in another. sequitur quod erit ratio albi hominis definitio.. because that war was waged over a continuous period of time. sic enim ilias. aut etiam non sufficit quod sit unum per colligationem. quia albus homo est quodammodo unum. For scilicet quae significat unum.” 4 Summa I Q65 A1 C. et tamen per prius substantiam et consequenter alia. q. ista ratio non significat unum. q. 11. quorum quoties unum per se dicitur. there must be some cause of this union: for diverse things are not united by themselves. ens autem hoc quidem significat hoc aliquid. 1. et per posterius in aliis. ergo simpliciter unum per prius erit in substantia. B.. 5 “For from many things existing in act one thing does not come to be simply. it follows that there will be a definition of white man. If.” (De Pot.. if I were to say that a house is stones and mortar and wood. aliud quantitatem.” i. 65. Therefore the term one in an unqualified sense will apply primarily to substance and secondarily to the other categories.M.e.A. unum enim dicitur multipliciter sicut et ens. art.5” 35) CAUSE OF UNITY. and in another. 1 In truth. sicut haec ratio non esset definitio domus. it is characteristic of the notion of definition that it should signify one thing. like the wax candle and its shape. for then the “Iliad. si significet unum aliquod illorum modorum.A. tr. et ideo talis ratio non est definitio. 1. nisi forte per accidens. 36) UNITY OF MANY. 3 si igitur ad rationem definitionis pertinet quod significet unum. Yet it is predicated primarily of substance and secondarily of the other categories. quia ratio substantiae erit definitio per prius.). ad hoc quod sit definitio. B. nisi sit aliquid uniens et aliquo modo ligans ea ad invicem.. and the logos of white will be a definition in a secondary sense. and so on for the other categories. quality. 32 . from SCG BK I. 3 A.”5 This is an important principle for understanding how the soul and the body are one.M. the poem about the Trojan war. si enim dicam quod socrates est albus et musicus et crispus. et ratio substantiae. for the term one is used in as many senses as being is. just as the term one is predicated of each in a primary and in a secondary sense. the Iliad is one by the words of which it consists being joined by conjunctions. 4 “For if diverse things be united in something. aliud qualitatem. would be a definition.
the nominal sort. Cf. and not simply.1 1 Praeterea. 1) Accidental connection. Therefore. i. sed duo. Ergo cum dicitur. Christus est Deus et homo.. Jason West): Objection 10: Further. c. non fit aliquid unum. sed multa. The nominal definition signifies but does not demonstrate the quod quid. which gives the meaning of the name and does not say what the thing is. ex hoc contingit. and thus Socrates insofar as he is white and musical is many. obj. one of which is in potency and the other is not. praedicatur de homine aliquid unum. But something that is a being is called one or many simply. Quod enim animal bipes. which is predicated of Socrates. . Unde cum dico: homo est animal bipes. but many things. when it is said Christ is God and man there is not one thing posited. Thomas Aquinas. ut dicitur in viii Metaph. On the two kinds of unity.2 This is because it is according to accidents that something is said to be in a certain respect. quia unum eorum comparatur ad alterum ut potentia ad actum.e. ex pluribus quorum unum est in potentia et aliud non. art. sit unum et non multa. but many things. Cf. This is the unity found in a real definition.e. Album autem et musicum non 33 . The real definition demonstrates the quid est. (Note: the definition of definition makes “definition” both a defining thing and a thing defined. nor vice versa. 2) Non-accidental connection. Socrates est albus musicus. does not come one thing. although “risible” and “tool-making” both belong to the same thing and each of necessity. secundum Philosophum. but in a certain respect. c. as is said in VIII Metaphys. is one and not many. “coplanar straight lines not meeting because they make equal angles with a third cutting line”. sed multa. non ponitur unum. But there is a third way of defining. E.) P 194 There are two kinds of unity to speech. quod praedicatur de Socrate. This definition signifies not just an accidents of parallels. indeed not simply. (excerpt) (tr. Notes on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle. 15-6. Chap. 3. “parallels” are “coplanar nonmeeting straight lines”. Book II. though without manifesting the causes of parallels which make them possible. and differs from the propter quid demonstration by position only (p 194). Hence when I say “man is a two-footed animal”. and this is the type of unity in the nominal definition (name all kinds of things that happen to be in one subject. St.However. in viii Metaph. 15-6]1 Now white and musical are not related to each other in this way. but not when it is said “Socrates is a white musician”.” B.e.g. yet they do not make something one per se. i. non autem cum dicitur. a two-footed animal. but through the thing to which they belong—“risible” is not a way of being “tool-making”. Concerning the Union of the Word Incarnate. e. et ita Christus non est unum. since one of them is compared to the other as potency is to act. according to substance. i.g. But humanity and divinity are not related as potency and act. from many things.g. 10: Aristotle first lays down that definition is speech of what something is (93b29) (horismos d’epeide legetai einai logos tou ti esti). none of which is found with the other of necessity or which perfects the others).several things cannot become one simply speaking unless among them something is act and something is ability. although there is another meaning of “definition”. something one is predicated of man. And thus Christ is not one but two. according to the Philosopher in 10 Metaphys. through manifesting the propter quid. Michael Augros. E. the Iliad is one speech in this way. 10... [text. Sed humanitas et divinitas non se habent ut potentia et actus. but in some way what they are.
8. scilicet: suppositum. one must be related to the other as potency to act. obj. since it conjoins in a manner similar to a conjunction. Sicut et secundum accidentia dicitur aliquid esse secundum quid. 1 Anneli Luhtala. non quidem simpliciter. lect. ‘Socrates flourishes’ (GG I. Swkra/thj u(giai/nei ‘Socrates [walks]’.1 (i. vel natura speciei.1 § sic se habent ad invicem. 2004). Secundum substantiam autem dicitur aliquid unum et multa simpliciter sicut ens. primum autem est singulare in tribus personis divinis. 10). sed secundum quid. 134. whereas being white is not a way of being musical. Sed secundum Philosophum. 2 (Cf. this is why they do not need binding”. There is a certain natural union between the noun and the verb. et non simpliciter. ‘animal’ is in potency to the determination ‘two-footed’.. Note how I have had to change Luhtala’s “is walking” to “walks” in order to avoid the inconsistency of including the copula. rather than founding a division on the way in which things differ precisely insofar as they are such things. et forma. In sum: For two things to be one simply. p. it is claimed. Grammar and Philosophy in Late Antiquity (Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Co.ys). as a passage we have met with above explains. nec iterum invenitur in creaturis puris aliquod unum suppositum habens duas naturales substantias. “[j]ust as there are ships made of one piece of wood only. with the result that their composition produces one thing. quia est unum supposito. Sed hoc singulare est in Christo. Et haec quidem in creaturis puris non sunt simul unum et multa. results in an accidental combination of names having no more unity than a string of words joined by nothing more than connectives.g. Marietti. Cf. vel duo. being two-footed is a way of being an animal. 515. such things being “one by conjunctions”. e. …similarly there are [speeches] which need no binding. quia est habens duas naturas.e. Multo amplius quam Socrates. est multa. And note that the unity of a verb intertwined or combined with a name is like that of the genus and differentia composing a definition. in quantum est albus et musicus. 10. nor is one perfective of the other. in quantum est unum subiecto. in v Metaph. quae de supposito praedicatur. Aquinas. 28-29). In Metaph. But when it is said of Socrates that he is “white and musical” no such unity arises inasmuch as ‘white’ is not a way of being ‘musical’. as in the definition “two-footed animal” as applied to man. 34 . for. de quo praedicatur unum. Non est enim una numero essentia diversorum suppositorum. comparable to that between form and matter.3. quod de alio non praedicatur. et ideo Socrates. substantia secundum duos modos dicitur. 5. Manifestum est ergo quod Christus potest dici aliqualiter unum. et aliqualiter multa. obj.. in quantum est album et musicum. 1755 A. multa. Cf. Hence we observe the root of the distinction Aristotle makes between speech that is one “by conjunctions” and speech that is one by signifying one thing: For to take the differentia of the differentia. Swkra/thj peripatei=. such a definition being a unity per se.
no part of and of which no part is significant apart from which is significant separately. like many Massalian expressions. ‘dirt’]—but some double [diploun].A. Averroes’ description of the name and the verb as being “composed from many vocal sounds. in the present text. etc. some are either composed of things signifying and things not signifying (although within the name there is no ‘signifying’ and ‘not signifying’). 16a 19 A name.1 or of both signifying.) But a name is a [simple or] composite vocal sound significative without time. Oesterle) By a noun we mean a sound significant by 16a 19 A name. Cf. as “fast” in “breakfast. B.3 e. the rest. He goes on to remark that if the capitalized letters are omitted. 2 16b 19-25) (tr. See the next text cited for a parallel to this exception. as parts of the name they are not significant since the name as a whole has been imposed in order to signify that upon which the name has been placed. aim at. 3 The translation follows Kassel’s reading. however. Aristotle. for example.” as such signifies nothing. without time. Oesterle. cant by convention. is a vocal sound signifyconvention.” [following text moved from above:] [N. Jean T.): But of the forms of ‘name’ [onomatos eide]. are fond of.) (De Int. for in the former the part is in no way significant. Engl. in ‘Theodore’ ‘doron’ [i. like ge [= ‘earth’.B. ch. Comparison of texts: (Poet. is a vocal sound signifycative by convention [kata\ sunth/khn]. but the text may be corrupt here. 35 . rev. 1.” etc. M. and a multiple.] 16a 21 for in the name “Campbell” the part “bell.M.e. ‘Hermo-caico-xanthus’. B. no part of which is significative by itself.VI. Of the latter. as we say”. those who affect. who love hard words. <…> for in double names we do not use [a part] as if it signifies by itself. and  a multiple [pollaploun]. without time. In the noun ‘Fairsteed.. Cf.’ the part ‘steed’ has no 16a 21 for in the name “Campbell” the part 1 That is. 2 Note that in a text to be cited below. Poetics ch. 16a 22 However the case is not exactly the same in simple names and composite names. De Int. 20. although in the expression “camp bell” it does. SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE NAME AND SPEECH. which has  no reference to time. grandeur and pomp of expression. “But there may be a triple and a quadruple name. cp. E. whether two or three or four”. 21 (1457a 32—1457b 36) (tr. Aristotle.g. but in the latter the part has meaning but of nothing apart from the word.A. then..M.e. ‘gift’] does not signify. then. Jean T. one is left with the reading of the manuscripts: me/gal**iw***twn. “i. 2 (16b 19-25): (tr. 1457a 11-13) (tr. some in fact are single [haploun]—and by ‘single’ I mean what is not composed from things signifying. no part of which is significative separately. Edghill) (tr.2 But there may be a triple [triploun] and a quadruple [tetraploun] name. Twining proposes tw=n me/galA DiwKONtwn. anticipates Aristotle’s.
When he says. they have not an independent meaning. some parts of which are significant separately. as an utterance. 36 . that is. either positive or negative. Jean T. But if we separate one syllable of the word ‘human’ from the other.significance in and by itself. nn. as words but not as an affirmation. as in the phrase ‘fair steed. indeed. Edghill) (tr. etc. St. De Int. but does not constitute a proposition. i. Let me explain. 16b 28 Let me explain. however. Thomas Aquinas. The fifth part is the fourth difference. as has been said. lect.” 9. Thus in the word ‘pirate-boat’ the word ‘boat’ has no meaning except as part of the whole word.e.1 The word ‘human’ has meaning. 4 (16b 26-32): (tr. the part ‘ouse’ has no meaning in itself. although in the expression “camp bell” it does. The word “animal” signifies something.’ “bell. In composite names. the parts contribute to the meaning of the whole.” as such signifies nothing. but it is related to the signification of the name according as it is in the whole. Oesterle) A sentence is a significant portion of speech. 16b 26 Speech” is significant vocal sound. some parts of which signify separately. as has been pointed out. although it has not an independent meaning. for in the name “Campbell” the part “bell” as such signifies nothing. E. just as the hand separated from the man does not have the human form. Cf. it has no meaning. separated from the whole name. Oesterle): 8.. ch. though not as the expression of any positive judgement. 4. First he explains the last part of the definition. however.” Cf. the third 1 Cf. in the latter it contributes to the meaning of the whole. but it does not signify that it is or that it is not. 16a 22 However the case is not exactly the same in simple names and composite names. he explains the definition. but is only a vocal sound [and so is a simple name]. that is to say. Jean T. as for example in “just man. but not in itself. yet. here our additions to the definition of speech in the text of the Poetics given above. it will be an affirmation or negation. some parts of which have an independent meaning. secondly.” “owl” does not signify anything in itself. similarly in the word ‘mouse’. This difference distinguishes the name from speech. M. but in the latter the part has meaning but of nothing apart from the word. In composite words. But no separated part has the form of the whole. In I Peri Herm. the part does signify something. The reason for this is that signification is a quasi-form of the name. for in the former the part is in no way signifycant. It is only when other words are added that the whole will form an affirmation or denial. for in the former the part is in no way signifycant. if something is added. but is merely a sound.. similarly. 16b 30 But one syllable of “animal” does not signify anything. Aristotle. in the word “fowl. as “fast” in “breakfast.. no part of which is significant separately. Yet there is a difference between simple and composite nouns. 8-10 (tr.
but in composite names the part has meaning. First. Hence. sicut hoc nomen lapis imponitur a laesione pedis. et primo. and the like.. etc. by convention. then he shows what the difference is between simple and composite names where he says. cuius pars significat separata. nulla autem pars separata habet formam totius. For example. i. but that from which a name is imposed to signify is different from that which a name signifies. and hence has the appearance that a part of it signifies. ut cum dicitur. comparatur tamen ad significationem nominis secundum quod est in toto. 1 Speech.. cuius ratio est quod unum nomen imponitur ad significandum unum simplicem intellectum. etc. quantum ad ultimam particulam. neque secundum apparentiam. secundo. he shows that there is a difference between simple and composite names in regard to their parts not signifying separately. or the genitive or accusative cases. idest apparentiam habet significandi. does signify a composite conception. yet a part of it signifies nothing. Simple names are not the same as composite names in this respect because in simple names a part is in no way significant. The first two parts were explained in what preceded. he shows that a part separated from a name signifies nothing. is imposed from pedis and grus [crane’s foot] which it does not signify.. See further below. haec autem ratio differentiae est. nam primae duae particulae manifestae sunt ex praemissis. quod imponitur ad significandum conceptum simplicem. then. as being indicative of something. either according to truth or according to appearance. neque secundum veritatem.part.” The reason for this is that one name is imposed to signify one simple conception.. scilicet a toto nomine. on the other hand. a part of speech signifies a part of the composite conception. manifestabitur in sequentibus in tractatu de verbo. sicut et in compositis: quia in simplicibus pars nullo modo est significativa. a part of the composite name—which composite name is imposed to signify a simple concept—does not signify a part of the composite conception from which the name is imposed to signify. ostendit circa hoc differentiam inter nomina simplicia et composita. will be explained later in the section on the verb. as is said of the name “breakfast.” The reason for this difference is that the simple name is imposed to signify a simple concept and is also imposed from a simple concept.. deinde cum dicit: in nomine enim quod est etc. in hoc enim nomine quod est equiferus. tertia autem particula. et per hoc distinguitur nomen ab oratione. quia nomen simplex sicut imponitur ad significandum 37 . sed oratio significat ipsam conceptionem compositam: unde pars orationis significat partem conceptionis compositae. manifestat praemissam definitionem. Hence. ostendit quantum ad hoc differentiam inter nomina simplicia et composita. sicut manus separata ab homine non habet formam humanam. as certain sounds of voice as parts of names signify the plural. per se nihil significat sicut significat in hac oratione. haec pars ferus. aliud autem est id a quo imponitur nomen ad significandum.e. to signify the concept of a certain thing. quam non significat: quod tamen imponitur ad significandum conceptum cuiusdam rei. nihil tamen pars eius significat. ibi: at vero non quemadmodum etc. manifestat propositum per nomina composita. quia significatio est quasi forma nominis. ibi: secundum vero placitum etc. scilicet sine tempore. sed in compositis vult quidem. ponit quartam differentiam cum subdit: cuius nulla pars est significativa separata. ut dictum est de nomine equiferus. When he says. non significat partem conceptionis compositae. manifestat ergo primo quod pars nominis separata nihil significat.2 10. ab eo quod nomen significat. et dicit quod non ita se habet in nominibus simplicibus. quod ideo est. et inde est quod pars nominis compositi. To do this he uses a composite name because the point is more striking there. However the case is not exactly the same in simple names and composite names. homo iustus. secundo. and the fourth part. in quibus hoc magis videtur.. And first he explains the last part by means of a composite name. the case is not exactly the same in simple names and composite names. quae est equus ferus. without time. 2 quinto. a qua imponitur nomen ad significandum. per nomina composita. However. circa primum duo facit: primo. but the composite name is imposed from a composite conception. 3 deinde cum dicit: at vero non etc. quantum ad tertiam. the name “pedigree”. has the appearance of signifying. although it does signify something in the phrase “camp bell. 3 1 Note that these arguments leave untouched the fact that parts of words are nonetheless meaningful. For in the name “Campbell” the part “bell” per se signifies nothing.
Thomas Aquinas. that some part of it be significative separately. such a name] is conjoined from two parts. n. it does not signify something per se. 6. sed solum habitudinem unius ad alterum. which sometimes is one expression signifying per se.1 Cf. non autem pars 38 . and according to this they are expressions. But one syllable of ‘hominis [anthropos]’. but they do not signify something according to themselves. but only that it [i. sed quia pars alicuius totius dicitur proprie illud. Thomas Aquinas (In I Peri Herm. syllables which can be expressions. soricis. sed solum quod est coniunctum ex duabus partibus. tr. therefore. one must refer it to that which was said before in the definition of speech. namely. signanter autem non dicit: cuius pars est significativa aliquid separata. But since this sense does not fit with the following words. such a part which is one syllable of a name. 1 secundo autem ponit id. but of which some part is significative. oportet quod referatur ad id. which are syllables or ‘letters’.. scilicet quod aliquid partium eius sit significativum separatim. nevertheless. But he significantly does not say: whose part when separated is significative of something. n.2 conceptum simplicem. namely. lect. lect. sed non si addatur ei una nominis syllaba. he excludes a false understanding. inasmuch as they are parts of this kind of name. nomen vero compositum imponitur a composita conceptione. 2 deinde cum dicit: sed non una hominis etc. inasmuch as vocal sound is composed. And therefore.A. inasmuch as this is simple in signifying.e. In I Peri. not. in quo oratio differt a nomine et verbo. this must be understood about the parts from which speech is immediately constituted. he puts down that in which speech differs from the name [or ‘noun’] and the verb. And therefore he says that a part of speech is significative when separate.M. propter negationes et alia syncategoremata. but in another way. on account of negations and other syncategorematic terms. however. which in and of themselves do not signify something absolute. as was said above. ex qua habet apparentiam quod pars eius significet. some parts of which are significative separately. Afterward when he says. rex. but they are not vocal sounds signifying per se. quae secundum se non significant aliquid absolutum. And so syllables are vocal sounds. For he said above that a part of a name does not signify something separate by itself. 6 (tr. ut sit sensus quod nomen erit affirmatio vel negatio. 6. namely.). but not about the parts of the name or the verb. sed cuius aliquid partium est significativum. But because that is properly called a part of some whole which immediately enters into the constitution of the whole. Et posset hoc referri ad immediate dictum. from the name and the verb. Herm. namely. signify something. St. it can have a part which is a vocal sound. And this can be referred to what he has just said. Nevertheless.. B. ita etiam imponitur ad significandum ab aliquo simplici conceptu. quod supra dictum est in definitione orationis. one must know that in composed names. B. quod immediate venit ad constitutionem totius. St. but is only a vocal sound.A. but not if one syllable of a name is added to it. excludit falsum intellectum.. inasmuch. But inasmuch as it is taken as one certain syllable of this name sorex. so that the sense is that a name is an affirmation or a denial if something is added to it. the composed thing in itself. 3. si quid ei addatur. supra enim dictum est quod pars nominis non significat aliquid per se separatum. as it signifies a simple understanding. And he manifests this in syllables which sometimes can be expressions [dictiones] signifying per se: just as this word I say. but not the part of a part. sed quia huic sensui non conveniunt verba sequentia. cum dicit: cuius partium aliquid significativum est separatim.. but only the relationship of one thing to another. For a certain expression [quaedam dictio] is composed from many vocal sounds. when he says. etc. coming to the composition of a name. it cannot have a significative part.): But second.Cf. nevertheless it has a simplicity in signifying.M.
is what is measured first and principally by time. prout sunt huiusmodi nominis partes. quorum nihil est suum nominis.. scilicet de nomine et verbo. ch. 39 . that which is measured by time. time itself.VII.) and that it does not signify time through its declensional forms. insofar as it is measured by time. Aristotle. participles do not express time as such but rather action or undergoing action as occurring at different times. 20 (1457a 20) (tr. ‘hodiernus’ ‘hesternus’. principia vero actionem vel passionem aliquam in diverso fieri tempore demonstrant. inquantum autem est simplex in significando. we will answer that the difference between the participle and the temporal noun is such that the latter signifies nothing but time by itself. non significat aliquid per se. idest in nominibus compositis. seems to be false. 21-550. sicut supra dictum est. significant aliquid. which differentiates the name from the verb. They have the significations of verbs and are used instead of verbs. or ‘white’ do not signify ‘when’. the other. 549.. in quantum scilicet significat simplicem intellectum.. et quod eos. et ideo in quantum est vox composita.e. Inst. B. sequuntur casus. first.): For ‘man’. In contrast. non tempus ipsum per se. past time. quae est una nominis syllaba. Grammar and Philosophy in Late Antiquity. et ideo dicitur quod pars orationis est significativa separata. the one present. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Co. ex quibus nascuntur. ideo hoc intelligendum est de partibus ex quibus immediate constituitur oratio. sed non sunt voces per se significantes. et quod verborum significationes habent et quod pro verbo ponuntur. 3 (In: Anneli Luhtala. ‘dies’. Sed si quid dicat. non autem de partibus nominis vel verbi. ‘month’. Priscian. soricis. respondebimus. quae imponuntur ad significandum rem simplicem ex aliquo intellectu composito. dictio enim quaedam est composita ex pluribus vocibus. in quantum vero accipitur ut una quaedam syllaba huius nominis sorex. quae sunt syllabae vel litterae. AND THE PARTICIPLE WITH RESPECT TO SIGNIFYING ‘TIME’.. Cf. mensis’. ‘year’. et hoc manifestat in syllabis. scilicet in ipso composito et secundum quod sunt dictiones. 1 Sed rursus prohibet ea esse nomina temporum diversorum assumptio. THE NAME. however. quandoque est una dictio per se significans.M. for the name “day” or “year” signifies time. Poet. in fact. and then it can be signified by a name just like any other thing.g. (= Book I. from which they derive. St. The fourth part is the third difference. none of which is a property of the noun. Thomas Aquinas. and they are [131-132] construed with the same cases as verbs. p. quod nomina qupque multa inveniuntur tempus significantia. Cf. licet non secundum veritatem. gramm. sed est vox sola. i. 131: They (i. quod nomina illa nihil aliud significant nisi ipsum tempus per se. But if someone should say that even many nouns signify time. ut ‘annus’. the participles) are in turn prevented from being nouns by the fact that they show tense distinctions by means of similar forms such as verbs have.. non autem significant aliquid secundum se. as it is a certain kind of thing or reality. sciendum tamen quod in nominibus compositis. Unde syllabae quidem sunt voces. 2004). and partis. Oesterle): 7. nec in propriis sunt transfigurationibus. ‘day’. GL II. without time.e. et ideo subdit quod in duplicibus. Lesson 4) (tr.A. quae quandoque possunt esse dictiones per se significantes: sicut hoc quod dico rex. In I Peri Herm. syllabae quae possunt esse dictiones. non potest habere partem significantem. tamen in significando habet simplicitatem.1 Cf. in compositione nominis venientes.. ‘crastinus’. ‘noon’. e. secondly. non tamen talis pars. which consists of action and passion. quos et verba. Motion. ‘meridies’. Jean T. but ‘[he] walks’ or ‘[he] has walked’ consignify. This. quae fit in propriis transfigurationibus ad similitudinem verborum. quod hoc interest inter participia et nomina temporalia. potest habere partem quae sit vox. (. THE VERB. But there are three things that can be considered with respect to time. sed eo modo. partes secundum apparentiam aliquid significant.
but only insofar as it is subjected to motion. heri et huiusmodi. substantia autem secundum se considerata. alio modo. et sic potest significari a nomine. in quo consistit actio et passio. Books xiii to xviii are edited by Martin Hertz (Leipzig: B.therefore the verb. From this it is clear that a verb and a participle do not differ so far as the signified is concerned because each signifies an act conjoined with an intrinsic substance. primo quidem. 1 [N. tertio modo. The verb and the participle.” Whence “who” affirms substance. prout significatur per nomen et pronomen. quod significatur per adverbia temporis. Ph.B. by virtue of which it signifies in the mode of predicable of another and it implies an act in a mode of being distinct from an exterior substance and for this reason it implies the composition which belongs to a proposition. sed videtur hoc esse falsum: quia hoc nomen dies vel annus significat tempus. However. 1859). sicut quaelibet alia res. VERBS. potest considerari id. A participle signifies an act in a mode implying substance. non habet in quantum huiusmodi ut tempore mensuretur.] Supplement: Peter of Spain on the mode of signifying of the participle. and that his explanation much more detailed than Priscian’s.” “yesterday. 1 quarto. non autem nomen et pronomen. scilicet sine tempore. which a name or a pronoun signify. Institutiones Grammaticae. 1855). 20): Similarly in the case of a participle there is a composition of a united act with a united substance. p. All references are to these editions of Priscian. Teubner. Tractatus Syncategorematum and Selected Anonymous Treatises. significat cum tempore. ix. but not in the sense of going into a substance or of going out of a substance. AND THE SYLLABLE. sed solum secundum quod subiicitur motui. This is signified by adverbs of time such as “tomorrow. The third thing that can be considered is the very relationship of time as it measures. prout per participium significatur. in quantum huiusmodi: et quia id quod primo et principaliter tempore mensuratur est motus. Teubner. therefore.” and others of this kind. Peter of Spain. 9. et ideo verbum et participium significant cum tempore. volume I. which signifies action and passion. ponit tertiam differentiam. THE SEVERAL ACCOUNTS OF ‘SPEECH’ IN RELATION TO NAMES. Tractatus Syncategorematum (ap. G. G. secundum quod est res quaedam. it affirms indefinite substance and “reads” affirms a determinate act. Note here that St. verb and participle differ in the mode of signifying. signify with time. and this the participle signifies. Translated by Joseph P. but not the name and pronoun. sed dicendum quod circa tempus tria possunt considerari. Peter of Spain. signifies with time. Therefore Priscian 3 says that a participle has reference to that which is signified by a verb under the accidents of a noun. THE DEFINITION. quod tempore mensuratur. “reading” only signifies the same as “who reads. I. Books I to xiii are edited by Henry Keil from an edition by Martin Hertz (Leipzig: B. ut cras. ideo verbum quod significat actionem vel passionem. potest considerari ipsa habitudo temporis mensurantis. § VIII. as for example. Cf. A verb signifies an act or movement in the manner of going out of a substance in the case of action or in the manner of going into a substance in the case of passion. ipsum tempus.D. 40 . volume II. per quod differt nomen a verbo. Substance considered in itself. is not as such measured by time. 3 Priscian. Mullaley. Thomas’ examples are much more informative than Aristotle’s.
17a 13) —is ‘speech’.1 although it may. if something is added. Likewise the verb uttered by itself does not say anything of anything. It then remains to distinguish the name as word from a smaller whole. however. like conjuncttions. And note that such parts are syllables.e. the syllable. namely. 2 41 . in ‘Cleon walks’. But one syllable of “animal” does not signify anything. namely. but there is speech which happens to be without verbs. certain syllables are found to signify in a certain respect. But of the forms of ‘name’ [onomatos eide]. cp. but as part of the bigger word it does not signify. its parts are ‘things signifying’. or of both signifying.1.e. as we shall hereafter see. for example. 20 1457a 24-28) I. the definition of man. 16b 29) I. in a name like ‘blackbird’.. Speech in relation to names and verbs. but whole words. but it has no verb. some are either composed of things signifying and things not signifying (although within the name there is no ‘signifying’ and ‘not signifying’). 4. ‘dirt’]—but some double [diploun]. But some names are like ‘fowl’ where a part of it. in the word “fowl. (De Int. but it is not the same as saying “An animal is”. for example. as the next excerpt explains. 21 1457a 32-35) I. Things which signify something: 1 Which is also distinguished from speech as being what we call a ‘phrase’. namely.) Yet a part [of speech] will always have significance. The name in relation to a smaller whole: the syllable. (Poet. to say “animal” is to say something significant. 16b 30) I. 4. whereas those of men signify only insofar as they enter into words understood as names. is found to be a word by itself. is significant when it occurs by itself.e. And note that “things signifying” are what contemporary linguists call ‘morphemes’.2 4. but it does not signify that it is or that it is not. 3.” “owl” does not signify anything in itself. ‘black’ and ‘bird’. similarly. 2. as with a definition. as with a statement: …(for not  every speech is composed from names and verbs. “A terrestrial biped animal is” (or “exists”). (De Int. which are therefore seen to be non-significative vocal sounds. which Aristotle does next. such that no part. some in fact are single [haploun]—and by ‘single’ I mean what is not composed from things signifying. (Poet. manifesting that it does not necessarily involve a verb. the latter being an affirmation in virtue of the verb being added. as when one says. Engl. The word “animal” signifies something. ‘owl’. ‘lexemes’. Of the latter. some names are like ‘animal’ (in English). albeit not in the same respect as conjunctions. but is only a vocal sound. were it to occur by itself. De Int. like ge [= ‘earth’. The name in relation to a larger whole: ‘speech’ in the form of an enunciation.e. the definition of man—let us say it is “terrestrial biped animal” (cf. Hence. however. Bywater’s observation that the indivisible vocal sounds of the beasts signify by themselves. but they do not signify anything as parts of the name. And cf. ‘Cleon’. it will be an affirmation or negation.
consists solely in articulate vocal sounds signifying by themselves. although that part could signify were it to occur by itself. it signifies when conjoined to the others] 7. Things which signify something. that signifies. Seu Majora Commentaria (ed. tr. or. Aristotle would have brought them together. Neither is every locution interpretation because. like conjunctions. but not by themselves: the syllable [or syllables] : e. Interpretation.M. and whatever signifies is named by the word ‘interpretation’. called ‘composite’) (b) the conjunction (signifies [when conjoined to the other parts of speech]) Hence. as with ‘husbandman’. have distinguished them. that they both signify only in relation to other words. as the following passage from Boethius makes clear: Cf. ‘owl’. That is 3 Names that are not simple being composed of two or more parts. But not every vocal sound is ‘interpretation’. perforce. In Librum Aristotelis De Interpretatione Libri Sex Editio Secunda. for there are vocal sounds belonging to the rest of the animals which are not included under the word ‘interpretation’.g. a doctrine which we know to have once belonged to the text of the Poetics. but not by itself the conjunction: it does not signify by itself. since syllables agree with conjunctions in this. Migne. B. The syllable in comparison to the conjunction: not significative by itself (a) the syllable (either not at all. ‘owl’ in fowl’.A. Things which do not signify something: the parts of a word like ‘dirt’ a part of the name ‘fowl’. us. out of which one could distinguish the significant words husband. the elements or syllables composing such a name) it does not signify 6. but inasmuch as they differ in the way in which they (dependently) signify. although they do not signify anything by themselves. ‘black’ and ‘bird’. man. ‘animal’ (a [simple] name)3 ‘an animal is’ (a statement) ‘fowl’ (a [simple] name) ‘owl’ (a [simple] name) ‘terrestrial biped animal’ (a definition) ‘Cleon walks’ (a statement) ‘Cleon’ (a [simple] name) 5. he would. but [in some other way: according to Peripatetic tradition.): For interpretation is articulate vocal sound signifying by itself. PL 64. i. 42 .e. and band. nevertheless when they are joined with the others do signify. there are certain utterances which lack signification and. still. however. Wherefore the following conversion of statements holds good. as has been said.e. in ‘double’ names. in ‘blackbird’: the part signifies. as a part of that word (i. that whatever is an interprettation. or else secundum quid as part of certain names.
but also of the name and the verb. Nec omnis locutio interpretatio est. sunt enim caeterorum animalium voces. Nihilominus quoque orationem interpretationem esse constat. 4 “The Peripatetic Tradition on the Place of the Conjunction Among the Parts of Speech”. 2 For a suggestion of the what the missing explanation might have looked like. locutionis partes esse syllabas et conjunctiones etiam tradit. which is interpretation. I have accordingly reserved their treatment for a separate paper. The definition of the conjunction: a conjectural reconstruction. Conjunctiones vero consignificare quidem possunt. But conjunctions in fact can consignify. Et quidquid significat. nec vero de sola locutione.why Aristotle in the books he wrote about the poetic art also taught that syllables and conjunctions are parts of language [cf. but signifies when conjoined to the others”. 1456b 20ff. and significative utterances as well. a communi nomine eorum de quibus in hoc libro tractatur.1 Evidently Boethius knew the Poetics in a version which taught the following: that whereas the syllable agrees with the conjunction in being a non-signicative component of language. Cf. the latter differs from the former by signifying when joined to the other.2 As for the definitions of sundesmos and arthron which are thereby supplanted.]. Quare quoniam non de oratione sola. but signify nothing by themselves. nihil omnino significant.3 but the Peripatetic tradition preserving Aristotle’s teaching on the conjunction in relation to the other so-called parts of speech will be given as an Appendix to this one. see the next section. illud significet. however. which. significatione non caret. interpretation…. since it is vocal sound joined from parts which are significative. Interpretatio autem in solis per se significativis et articulatis vocibus permanent (?). And nevertheless it cannot be denied that speech is interpretation which. ipse quoque de Interpretatione liber inscriptus est…. significative parts of speech. ut conjunctiones. 20. are treated by Aristotle in this book. Wherefore not of speech alone. idcirco quoniam verbis atque nominibus. juncta tamen cum aliis significant. does not lack signification. Poetics ch. but also of significative locution. Quare convertitur. of which the syllables as syllables signify nothing at all. he has established the name and verb as parts of an interpretation. 43 . ut quidquid sit intepretatio. in hoc libro ab Aristotele tractatur. id est interpretatione. quarum syllabae. We may therefore conclude with a fair degree of confidence that a definition of the conjunction along the following lines once belonged to the text: “But a conjunction is a vocal sound which is not significative by itself. idcirco quia (ut dictum est) sunt locutiones quaedam. per se vero nihil designant. interpretationis vocabulo nuncupetur. I believe those which survive in the text to be (garbled) versions of definitions treated in a subsequent section of the Poetics. names. in eo quod sunt syllabae. quae interpretationis vocabulo non tenentur. Unde etiam ipse quoque Aristoteles in libris quos de Arte poetica scripsit.4 8. signify by themselves. Quocirca non omnis vox interpretatio est. of course. quae scilicet per seipsa significant. our schematization of the text: Definitions: Explanations and examples: 1 Interpretatio namque est vox articulata per seipsam signifcans. sed etiam de significativa locutione. sed etiam de nomine et verbo. quae est interprettatio. the name and verb. and as the name ‘interpretation’ designates verbs. that is. and not of locution alone. quae significatione carent et cum per se quaedam non significent. Interpretationis vero partes hoc libro constituit nomen et verbum. In this book. et significativis locutionibus nomen interpretationis aptatur. this book is entitled On Interpretation from the common name of the things which are treated in this book. 3 “Sundesmos and Arthron: Aristotle On the Connective Parts of Speech”. quae et ipsa cum vox sit et significativis partibus juncta.
in fact.But a name is a [simple or] composite vocal sound significative without time. But a conjunction is a [simple or composite] vocal sound < which signifies when conjoined to the others. but ‘[he] walks’ or ‘[he] has walked’ consignify. the one [Case] for example. Plutarch. according to ‘one’ or ‘many’. and not without them.1 [Conjunction] for < if one were to pronounce kai and te or men and de2 and nothing more. none can conceive any notion of a body or matter. Priscian. articles. [Speech] for not  every speech is composed from names and verbs <in which something is said of something else>.e. for example. But if a man pronounce INDEED <me/n> or FOR <ga/r> or ABOUT <peri/> and no more. but is not significative by itself >. the definition of man.3 > For example. and prepositions. Yet a part [of speech] will always have significance. for example. which is the species-making difference. For ‘[he] has walked’ or ‘[he] walked’ are cases of the verb according to these species. for it is either that which signifies one thing or that which (is one) from many conjunctions. as is the case in names. But speech is composite significative vocal sound some of whose parts signify something by themselves. 3 Cf. the Iliad is one by  conjuncttions. ‘Cleon’. commanding.) 44 . yet you will be taken to babble. But case belongs to name or verb. supposing you would make something of them. William Watson Goodwin): For speech is not composed of these. past time. in ‘Theodore’ ‘doron’ [i. (emphasis added) (See here the following section. But a verb is a [simple or] composite vocal sound significative  with time no part of which signifies by itself. and unless such words as these be uttered with verbs and nouns. Platonic Questions X (tr. they are but empty noise and chattering. [Name] for in double names we do not use [a part] as if it signifies by itself. but there is speech which happens to be without verbs. the other. for example. speech must be composed. As. 2 Note that I have taken the third. and adds Socrates and Pythagoras to the same. and Averroes. but the definition of man (one) by signifying one thing. the one present. as I endeavor to establish in the Appendix to this paper. But speech is one in two ways. in ‘Cleon walks’. but signifying according to ‘of this’  or ‘to that’ another according to delivery. and fourth examples from the definition of sundesmos in this chapter. and not to speak sense. if a man says BEATS or IS BEATEN. yet by their means. is recoverable from the witnesses furnished by Boethius. nothing will be understood by the hearer unless they be conjoined to names or verbs. And join and confound together conjunctions. ‘men’ or ‘man’. [Verb] For ‘man’. no part of which is significative by itself. for example. ‘gift’] does not signify. the part stating the way in which it signifies. or ‘white’ do not signify ‘when’. he gives us something to conceive and understand. For neither alone nor joined one with another do they signify anything. for example. but the other according to questioning. < “Cleon and Alcibiades were walking and talking together”. and whatever others [are] such.4 > 1 While the greater part of this definition is taken from both the existing account of sundesmos as well as the preceding definitions.
one would have expected “‘is’ or ‘is not’” to be repeated here..): “A conjunction is an indeclinable part of speech.B.A.>6 for the one who speaks1  establishes the understanding [sc. 20 (1447a 24-26) (tr.): “.  however. Now just as bonds are useless if there are no things to conjoin.5 it consignifies. it does not yet signify.). X. which cannot be understood without the things composed. the saying of something of something is required: e. |for example. of the hearer] and he who hears [sc. for this. consider the evidence of the following: (Aristotle. in fact.M.M. 3 Rather than the participles ‘being’ and ‘not-being’. Hertz.for not  every speech is composed from names and verbs.A.9 N. 4 That is. so conjunctions cannot convey any meaning without the substance of these words. a name. 93 (pp.. gramm. n.. But a better reading would be ‘By itself the verb does not signify that something is so”. in what is said]. the one who utters a verb by itself ‘says something’.2 for neither is ‘to be’ or ‘not to be’ 3 a sign of [the present existence of] a thing (nor if you say simply4 ‘that which is’). I. B. . to say “walks” does not yet signify that anyone walks. On Syntax (tr.A. ‘nothing’ here must mean something like “not the sign of the existence of a thing”. conjunctive of the other parts of speech. 28. verbs are names and signify something. I. Priscian. I have added the last statement in order to show the correspondence of the Peripatetic doctrine on conjunctions (for which. a certain composition.g.] if a man pronounce indeed or for or about and nothing more. 6 Cf. it does not yet signify whether the action or passion it signifies is “the case” or not. [for example. Poet. when a verb is uttered by itself. [By] itself.” 7 Note that I have reworded this part of Plutarch in view of this very text. displaying a force or an order”. That is. 5 For this statement to be intelligible. B. or something of the sort..but there is speech which happens to be without verbs. p. Bk. as the occurrence of the latter would make the argument more unified. ‘by itself’ or ‘without intertwining’. it is nothing.. B. what is said] rests [sc. for this. B.8 But whether it is or is not (the case).M. 9 Worded by B. 1009 E – 1010 A (tr. one must form an enunciation such as “Socrates walks” or “A man walks”.In justification of the foregoing reconstruction. <for not every speech is composed of parts which signify something by themselves..7 for neither alone nor conjoined to one another do they signify anything. making their agreement here patent. 3 (16b 19-26) (tr. in the present case. Inst.M after Apollonius Dyscolus. 2 That is.M. 1 45 .. which [conjunction] it consignifies. see my Appendix) and the Philosopher’s teaching on the verb.A. [nothing is understood by the hearer unless they are joined to names and verbs]. the definition of man|. Householder). Cf. exemplifying both possibilities.A. 8 Plutarch. 2-3) (ed.. Quaest. De Int.) (The definition of the conjunction) But in themselves. 28. tr. William Watson Goodwin. plat. xvi 1. slightly rev. § 4 The foregoing sentence.. p. is of my own devising. said by themselves.
It can be a root 1 or a whole word. generally. as with Aristotle’s examples of a single letter or a syllable signifying a relation such as ‘of’ or ‘to’ something. “Understand”: A morpheme is a single unit of meaning. its parts are unmeaning) a root or a whole word (conveying its “basic unit of meaning”). as in the plural -s that carries the meaning ‘more than one date’. Under is an unbound morpheme. that do not mean anything on their own when separated from the root they are modifying.3 English example: The word “unbelievable” has three morphemes “un-“. the free encyclopedia:2 In morpheme-based morphology. In sum: morpheme (a single unit of meaning) (if a word is like ge. as in date.9. such as] the bound form -s of pins) having no smaller meaningful members. 1 “Each word contains at least one morpheme that denotes its basic meaning or function—that morpheme is called the root.g. (negatory) a bound morpheme. and hence the ptosis or case of noun or name. Both are affixes. (‘date’) a letter (‘s’) (carries a meaning like ‘more than one x’ = plural) two or more letters that change the part of speech (the suffix ‘-ing’ in ‘dating’) change the meaning altogether (the prefix ‘ante-’ in ‘antedating’) morphemes unbound (with independent meaning. “-able” is a suffix. like ‘-ing’. = most prefixes) bound (without independent meaning. a letter. 2 (http://en.A. Morpheme. From Wikipedia. that indicates something meaningful.wikipedia. and “-able”. 9.org/wiki/Morphology_(linguistics) [12/21/07]) 3 That is to say. or “free”. = most suffixes) affixes prefixes suffixes Cf.) 46 .M. like ‘under’. a distinctive collocation of phonemes (as the free form pin or [a single phoneme. or an affix of two or more letters that changes the part of speech (the -ing in dating) or that changes the meaning altogether (the ante. by Wendalyn. Cf. (B. Types of morphemes [either ‘free’ or ‘bound’] Free morphemes like town.” (“Classification of Signs/Morphology: Day One” by Edward Vajda) ) Hence the morpheme (or morphemes) every word contains denoting its basic meaning or function is its ‘root’. Allomorphs are variants of a morpheme. “un-“ is also a prefix. The Maven’s Word of the Day. because it carries meaning on its own. Most prefixes are unbound morphemes. Most suffixes are bound morphemes. a morpheme is the smallest language unit that carries a semantic interpretation. a morpheme is the smallest unit of language that carries meaning—in other words. dog can appear with other lexemes (as in town-hall or doghouse) or they can stand alone. “-believe-“ a free morpheme. Supplement: On “things signifying” and “things not signifying” in the perspective of contemporary linguistics. e. with meanings that are independent of their context. Morphemes are.in antedating).
(as in the dog morpheme if written with the plural marker morpheme s becomes dogs). Aristotle’s principles are compatible with. of which the part –own is unmeaning as part) own (a lexeme. un-common—or suffixes—e. no part of which conveys a meaning apart from the word to which it belongs.g. a root being the basic meaning or function a word possesses. for which reason I prefer ‘dirt’) One must therefore distinguish the parts of simple and composite words as exemplified in the following words or parts of words: sing (-ing not a morpheme and hence unmeaning) singing (-ing a morpheme and hence meaningful. Hence to the foregoing list we must add the term stem as meaning “a root together with its derivational affixes”. for example. de-press. [a ‘bound’ morpheme is a constituent of a lexeme] Inflectional morphemes modify a word’s tense. whereas a morpheme is the smallest segment of language conveying a meaning—that is to say. thus in racket-eer-s. [‘free’ morphemes are ‘lexemes’] Bound morphemes like “un-” appear only together with other morphemes to form a lexeme. and hence open to. that are neither morphemes nor lexemes (the English translation of which. ‘earth’.v.g. in grammar”: To be distinguished from inflectional affixes are those of derivation. but bound) Downtown (-town a morpheme and hence meaningful. /-s/ or /-ɪz/. the plural marker in English is sometimes realized as /-z/. 21 1457a 32-35): composite name (words consisting of a ‘lexeme’ and one or more ‘parts’): parts that are ‘things signifying’: ‘bound’ and ‘unbound’ morphemes parts that are ‘things not signifying’: like the parts of the word ge. aspect. Bound morphemes in general tend to be prefixes and suffixes.. § 47 . And note here how Aristotle’s account of composite names relates to the foregoing distinctions (cf. Derivation is the process of forming words from other words or roots by the addition of affixes that in themselves either have meaning or denote word function. number.. N. Poet. retire-ment. Derivational affixes in English may be either prefixes—e. cf. happi-ness. and so on. from the “cran” in that very word. s. work-er. and -s the plural inflection. Derivational morphemes can be added to a word to create (derive) another word: the addition of “-ness” to “happy”. but unbound) town (a lexeme. does not work here since its part ‘ear’ is found meaningful separately. the further specifications brought to light by advances in the modern study of language.B Hence morphemes may be ‘inflectional’ or ‘derivational’. racketeer the stem. Morphemes existing in only one bound form are known as “cranberry” ones. are unmeaning simply) As the reader will observe. “inflection. to give “happiness”. racket is the root. like the parts of ge. whose parts. The name stem is given to a root together with its derivational affixes. The Columbia University Press Encyclopedia.
the following organizing principles become evident: First. i. the conjunction and the article. Aristotle treats the most elementary parts of language according as they are either indivisible or composite. With respect to its ultimate composing parts: being either indivisible or composite: (a) indivisible (also intelligible): element1 (b) composite: syllable II. i. He treats case after the name and the verb as being common to both. 48 . If the text is ordered in the way I have argued for above. then. 1. he first treats those parts which signify something by themselves. semivowel and mute or consonant.e. For a treatment of the definitions of the sundesmos and arthron surviving in the text.e.. THE PRINCIPLES OF ARISTOTLE’S TREATMENT REVEALED BY THE FOREGOING INVESTIGATION. before turning to those which do not. As signifying in relation to another: (g) conjunction (h) article2 (embracing prepositions and adverbs) 1 2 For the division of the element into vowel. then treats speech as being composed of the name and the verb. as well as what makes speech one 2. With respect to its proximate composing parts in relation to the whole: either signifying by itself or not: 1. before concluding with those parts of language which are connective of its principal parts. see my separate paper. the name and the verb.IX. see above. A brief division of the text: On lexis or ‘language’ as a whole: I. As signifying by itself (A) as parts: (1) the parts themselves (c) name (d) verb (2) what is common to the parts themselves: (e) case (B) as a whole: (f) speech. introducing a new principle.
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