Can siitra mahiimudrii be justified on the basis

of MaitrIpa's
Klaus-Dieter Mathes, Hamburg
General remarks
The term satra mahiimudrii is a controversial one, suggesting as it does that the
practice and realization of mahiimudrii is possible outside the Tantras, namely
on the basis of the Siitras. Such an approach was propagated by sGam po pa
(1079-1153) but criticized by Sa skya (1182-1251), who maintained
that there is no conventional expression for mahiimudrii in the piiramitii tradi-
tion, and that the wisdom of mahiimudrii can only be a wisdom arisen from em-
powerment. 'Gos Lo tsa ba gZon nu dpal (1392-1481), however, defends
sGam po pa's mahiimudrii by pointing out that it has Indian origins, in the
persons of JfianakIrti and Maitrlpa (ca. 1007 - ca. 1085)2 (together with the
latter's disciple Sahajavajra, 11th cent.).3 Kon sprul Blo gros mtha' yas (1813-
1899) thus distinguishes in his Ses bya kun khyab mdzod (vol. 3, 375f.) besides
the generally accepted mantra mahiimudrii, a satra mahiimudrii and an essence
mahiimudrii. Mantra mahiimudrii is transmitted according to the methods
taught by the Mantrayana, and this involves Tantric empowerment. Essence
mahiimudrii leads to the sudden or instantaneous realization of one's natural
mind (tha mal gyi ses pa). Satra mahiimudrii is defined in the following way:
1 The present article was made possible through a research project financed by the
German Research Council (DFG). I am grateful to Prof. Harunaga Isaacson for having
read this paper before it was published. Improvements to my English by Philip H.
Pierce (Nepal Research Centre, Kathmandu) are gratefully acknowledged.
2 Tatz 1994: 65. On the life of MaitrIpa, see Tatz 1987: 695-711.
3 See Mathes in print a.
B. Kellner, H. Krasser, H. Lasic, M.T. Much, H. Tauscher (eds.), Papers dedi-
cated to Ernst Steinkellner on the occasion of his 70th birthday. Part 2. (Wiener Studien zur
Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 70.2) Wien 2007, pp. 545-566.
546 Klaus-Dieter Mathes
Vis-a-vis the objective part of and luminosity, which is in accordance
with the Sutra tradition, the subjective part enters into equipoise with the aid of
amanasikiira pith-instructions.
In other words, not to fabricate anything by "not becoming mentally engaged"
(amanasikara) is the only way mind can approach emptiness or reality, which
is characterized by "being free from mental fabrications" gZon
nu dpal finds this practice described in Sahajavajra's commentary on
MaitrIpa's Tattvadasaka and thus characterizes this commentary in his Blue
Annals as follows:
In essence it is the piiramitiis, it is in accordance with the [Way of] Mantras, and its
name is mahiimudrii.
In the Tattvadasakarfka, phenomena are not only ascertained as being empty,
but also experienced as luminosity in a samadhi which realizes reality as it is
(yathabhatasamadhi). The latter is made possible by pith-instructions, and
Tattvadasaka 2cd implies that this is supreme Madhyamaka adorned with pith-
instructions whose main purpose is to enable a direct experience of emptiness
as luminosity on a path that unites samatha with a particular form of
It is well known that Maitrlpa favours the Madhyamaka "tenet of
not abiding in any phenomena" over the inferior
Madhyamaka "tenet of non-duality [in the sense of everything being] like an
illusion" (Mayopamadvayavada).7 A literal translation of Skt. sarvadhar-
would be "not being grounded in all phenomena," which means
that phenomena should not be reified in any conceivable way. This is very clear
from the Sekanirdesapafijika of Ramapala (one of the four main disciples of
MaitrIpa),8 who glosses as "not to reify [anything]" and "not to
become mentally engaged.,,9 In the corresponding root text, Sekanirdesa, 10
4 Kon sprul Blo gros mtha' yas: Ses bya kun khyab mdzod, vol. 3, 375,18-20: mdo lugs
dan mthun pa'i spros bral 'od gsal gyi yulla / yul can yid la mi byed pa'i gdams pas
miiam par 'jog pa dan /
5 gZon nu dpal: Deb ther snon po 847, vol. 2, 18-19: no bo pha rol tu phyin pa / snags
dan rjes su mthun pa min phyag rgya chen po.
6 For a detailed discussion of the Tattvadasaka see Mathes 2006: 209-223.
7 See Tatz 1994: 67.
8 See Roerich 1949-53: 842.
9 SNPS(C)' fol. 18a4; SNPS(Pe), fol. 15b6-7: sarvasminn ... aamanasikiiro
'niiropa/:l a C omits.
The Tibetan translation (SNP
, fol. 334b4) differs slightly: [means] not
Can sutra mahiimudrii be justified on the basis of MaitrIpa's 547
stanza 29cd, MaitrIpa informs us that mahiimudrii is also known as "[the
practice of] not abiding in anything."ll In other words, the yogin
simply refrains from projecting wrong notions (such as an independent
existence or characteristic signs) onto anything arisen in dependence, whether
skandhas, dhiitus or iiyatanas.
Philosophically, this amounts to the PrasaIigika
attitude of not postulating any position of one's own, and in fact, for 'Ba' ra ba
rGyal mtshan dpal bzaIi (1310-1391), the is
identical with PrasaIigika.
The practice of not becoming mentally engaged (amanasikiira) is described
in such sutras as the Jiiiiniilokiila1flkiira (see below) and the Nirvikalpapravesa-
dhiira1Jf. In the latter, the Bodhisattva abandons all wrong projections onto re-
ality by not becoming mentally engaged. For Sahajavajra amanasikiira does not
mean that one does not see any objects as a result of having closed one's eyes.
It is rather that one does not focus on a putative own-being of entities as a re-
sult of analysis or the pith-instructions of one's guru.
In his Amanasikiiriidhii-
ra, MaitrIpa gives the following mahiimudrii-interpretation of amanasikiira:
The letter a stands for luminosity, and manasikiira for blessing from within (sviidhi-
It is both a and manasikiira, so we get amanasikiira.
Through this,
namely by [operating with] the words amanasikiira and so forth,17 one arrives at the
expression "a blessing from within [that is] inconceivable luminosity" [i.e.,] an
awareness which is a non-dual continuity in which inseparable emptiness and com-
passion are united as a pair.
to reify [anything], in virtue of not becoming mentally engaged." (rab tu mi gnas pa ni
yid la byed pa med pas sgror gdags pa med pa' 0 /)
10 Or also Sekanin:taya, as it is referred to in the Tattvaratniivalf(TRA
11 SNs 36,11 (SN 29cd): sarvasminn mahiimudreti kfrtyate /
12 SNPS(C)' fol. 18a4; SNPS(Pe), fol. 15b6: sarvasminn iti pratftyasamutpaannaaskandha-
dhiitviiyataniidau... a Pe omits
13 Mimaki 1982: 34.
14 See Mathes 2005: 15 and 19-20.
15 For the meaning of in the Tattvadasaka and its tfkii, see Mathes 2006:
16 This means that a-manasikiira is taken here as a karmadhiiraya compound.
17 I.e., luminosity and blessing from within.
18 AMAs 142,17-20: a iti prabhiisvarapadarrt / manasikara iti as
eiisau manasikiiras eety amanasikiiraJ:t.f eteniimanasikiiriidipadair acintyaprabhiisva-
sunyatiikarw;iibhinnayuganaddhiidvayaviihisal?'tvedal'tam iipiidi-
Klaus-Dieter Mathes
In other words, the practice of (amanasikara) not
only consists of not reifying anything by not focusing on an own-being or the
like, but also enables a direct experience of mind's inconceivable luminosity,
just as phenomena are said to be experienced as luminosity in the Tattva-
in the Tattvaratnavalr 19
Maitrlpa begins his Tattvaratnavalf by pointing out that there are three yanas
(namely the Sravakayana, Pratyekayana, and Mahayana) and four tenets
(namely Sautdintika, Yogacara, and Madhyamaka). The Mahayana
is further divided into the Way (naya) of Paramitas and the Way of Mantras.
While the Way of Paramitas can be pursued either on the basis of Sautdintika
(sic!), Yogacara, or Madhyamaka, the Way of Mantras is explained in line with
the tenets of Yogacara and/or Madhyamaka. The latter is 'further divided into
the tenet of Mayopamadvaya and the one of 20 It is clear that
is considered the highest tenet within the Way of
Mantras. The latter is not taken as a yana different from Mahayana, but
explained in line with Yogacara and/or Madhyamaka. It should be noted,
however, that VajrapaIfi, another of the four main disciples of MaitrIpa,21
summarizes this part of the Tattvaratnavalf with the interesting comment that
the distinction among three yanas and four tenets is only made for the benefit
of gradualists, who are considered inferior:
In order that sentient beings of inferior intellect may realize them, I shall summarize
all [tenets on] reality, writing down just a little. [But] first of all, there are two types
ta1Jl bhavatfti ...
19 I may refer to Tatz (1994: 65-120), who has already translated (or paraphrased)
some of the passages quoted in the present paper. It is only for terminological reasons
that I present my own translation.
20 TRAs 14,5-14 (=NGMPP Reel No. B 22/24, fol. 9al-4) tatra trfl}i yiiniini / sriiva-
kayiina1Jl / pratyekayiina1Jl / mahiiyiina'!'l ceti / sthitayas /
tikayogiiciiramadhyamakabhedena / ... mahiiyiina1Jl ca dvividha1Jl / piiramitiinayo man-
tranayas ceti / tatra sauCtriintikayogiiciiramadhyamakasthityii
vyiikhyiiyate / mantranayas tu yogiiciiramadhyamakasthityii vyiikhyiiyate / ... eva1Jl
miidhyamiko 'pi dvividhal; /
a The ms. reads -srau- instead of -sau-.
b The ms. reads yii instead of
C The ms. reads sru- instead of sau-.
21 See Roerich 1949-53: 842.
Can sutra mahiilnudrii be justified on the basis of MaitrIpa's 549
of persons, the monkey-like and the crow-like. The monkey-like realizes [reality]
gradually, and the crow-like instantaneously. It is with those who realize [reality]
gradually in mind that the three yiinas [are presented] ... 22
In other words, there is only one reality, and it can be realized instantaneously.
Everything else is provisional presentations functioning as steps for those who
need a ladder. This passage from Vajrapa1).i' s commentary provides perfect
doctrinal support for Kon sprul's essence mahiimudrii. It should be further
noted that divides Mahayana - all this well within the system for the
gradualist - into a causal yiina of defining characteristics and the Vajrayana of
The presentation of in the Tattvaratniivalr starts
with an examination (viciira) of this tenet in six stanzas. This is followed by a
warning about the possible danger of the related samiidhi (described as adopt-
ing the view that nothing exists at all, being in a state of dull nothingness)24 and
a presentation of the fruit, namely the three kiiyas. In the following we shall
take a closer look at the first three of these six stanzas. The first one is identical
with Mahiiyiinavil?lSikii, stanza 4, the second is similar to Sekanirdesa, stanza
29, and the third is identical with Sekanirdesa, stanza 32.25
The Tibetan commentary on the Tattvaratniivalf (namely the Rin chen phren
ba'i bsad pa, probably by Ti pi 'bum la 'bar)26 starts its elucidation of these six
stanzas on by first explaining the introductory sentence in the
Tattvaratniivalf, which is as follows:
290b4-6: ... blo dman skye bos rtogs bya'i phyir II de iUd thaJns cad mdor
bsdus nas II cUli zad tsam zig bri bar bya II re zig gaJi zag ni giiis te I spre 'u Ita bu dan I
khva ta Ita bu' 01/ sp're 'u Ita bu ni riln gyis 'jug pa' 0 II khva ta Ita bu ni cig car du 'jug
pa'o II rim gyis 'jug pa'i dban du byas na theg pa ni gsum ste I ....
291a3: theg pa chen po la'an giiis te I rgyu mtshan iiid kyi theg pa daJi I
'bras bu rdo rje theg pa' 0 I
24 TRAs 20,21-22: sarviirthocchedo jacjfbhiivo viia sam.iidhilnalal?1. I; TRAT(p) 129b5:
don thams cad chad par Ita dan I bem (text: bems) po'i ran bzin du gyur pa ni tili ne
'dzin gyi dri ma'o I a The edition reads:jacjfbhava(1.
25 As already pointed out by Tatz (1994: 109, fn. 57).
26 The "Rin chen phren ba'i bsad pa" is contained in the collection Grub pa sde bdun
daJi siiin po skor gSU111, yid la mi byed pa 'i chos skor bzugs so. According to the present
Chetsang Rinpoche it was compiled under the direction of the 17th 'Bri gun abbot Kun
dga' rin chen (1475-1527). See also 'Bri gun gdan rabs, p. 183.
Klaus-Dieter Mathes
What now follows is an examination of the
The Rin chen phren ba'i bSad pa explains:
The object of comprehension is the [two] inseparable truth[s]. As for reality, it is all
appearances [namely] the mind, and what is simply beyond all mental fabrication.
The appearance aspect of it is what is called "apparent [truth]" and the aspect of it
that is free from [mental] fabrication is called "ultimate [truth]." And these two are
connected to the point of identity just as what is created and what is impermanent
In other words, the main stance of this Madhyamaka tenet is that the apparent
and ultimate must be taken as aspects of the same reality, and thus as sharing
an identity. Such a shared identity is also maintained by Zva dmar ehos grags
ye ses (1453-1524) on the basis of Bodhicittavivara1}a,29 stanza 68:
... This is because the apparent is explained as emptiness and emptiness alone is the
apparent, the one certainly not occurring without the other, as, for example, [two
properties] of a vase, namely [its having been] created and, as a consequence of
this, [its] impermanence [share] the bond of identity.3D
This finds also support in MaitrIpa's stanza 7:
The mere arising of phenomena is inconceivable [even] for original awareness.
This very [arising] is called emptiness without falling into [the extreme of] nihil-
27 TRA.
20,6 : tv ayaY[l viciira!; I
28 Rin chen phren ba'i bSad pa 195bl-2: gial bya ni bden pa dbyer med do II de kho na
fiid ni snan ba thams cad sems yin la I sems kyis spros pa thams cad las' das pa tsam iig
ste I snan ba'i cha nas kun rdzob ies bya iinll spros pa dan bral ba'i cha nas don dam
ies bya ste I de gfiis kyan byas pa dan mi rtag pa [tar bdag cig pa'i 'breI pa'o II
29 For the role the Bodhicittavivara1}a plays in the mahiimudrii tradition of the bKa'
brgyud pas, see Mathes in print b.
30 Zva dmar Chos grags ye ses: Tshig don gsal ba 104,4-7: kun rdzob de yan ston pa
fiid du bSad la I ston fiid de kho na yan kun rdzob yin pas I gcig med na gcig mi 'byun
ba nes pa'i phyir I dper na bum pa'i byas pa dan I de rkyen gyi dban du gyur nas mi
rtag pa dag bdag gcig pa'i 'breI ba biin no I
31 APP
80,3-4: utpiida eva dharmii1}iim acintyo nijasaY[lvidii I sa eva sanyatii proktii
niinuacchediinugiiminf II
a According to the manuscript from the National Archives in Kathmandu (NGMPP,.
reel no. B 22/24, fol. 31a2) and the Tibetan (APPT(p) 122b3: chad pa'i rjes su 'gro
ma yin no). The Japanese edition has niinyo-.
Can sutra mahiilnudrii be justified on the basis of MaitrIpa's 551
The last piida "without falling into [the extreme of] nihilism" excludes the pos-
sibility that the arising of phenomena is simply being negated here. Calling it
emptiness allows it, rather, to be admitted as dependent arising.
In other
words, the equation of the apparent (i.e., dependent arising) with emptiness is
taken as implying that any reification or denial of the members of dependent
arising, that is, the mere appearances which are not abandoned in
vada (see below), result in saqlsaric experiences of the apparent (which is the
mere arising of phenomena in piida 7a), whereas the absence of reification and
denial - or "non-abiding" - reveals dependent arising for what it is, namely
Tattvaratniivalf, section, stanza 1
In the first stanza of the section Maitrlpa thus denies the four on-
tological possibilities of reifying or denying the phenomenal world on the basis
of a tetralemma formed with the pair "eternal" (siisvata) and "annihilated" (uc-
The manifold [world] is not taken to be eternal or said to be annihilated;
Nor is it a combination of both eternal and annihilated, nor can it be that neither is
the case.
(TRA. 1) (= Mahiiyiinavi1?'lsikii, stanza 4)
The Rin chen phren ba'i bsad pa does not go into detail, but simply explains
that "eternal" does not apply, for nothing is established in its own right (lio bos
gmi yan ma grub pa), whereas annihilation (ucchedin) is ruled out on the
ground that the appearances of the apparent truth have not been abandoned.
The refutation of the third and fourth possibility is not further commented
upon, but the third one (i.e., something is existent and non-existent at the same
32 See Mulamadhyamakakiirikii XXIV.18ab (MMKs 35,18): yab pratftyasamutpiida('l
sunyatiil?'l tiil?'l I
33 TRA.
20,7-8 (=MV 74,7-8): na matmpa sii§vatm?'l visva1?'l na cocchedi samfhitam I
siisvatocchedi no yugmal?'lb niinubhaya1?'l vinobhaym?'l II
a MVs 74,7: netalJ'l (corrected to nedalJ'l in the Japanese edition).
b According to NGMPP, B 22/24, fo1. 12b5-6a1; and MVs 74,8. Shastri reads yug-
34 Rin chen phreli ba'i bsad pa 195b3: "ucchedin" should not be taken as the mere
interruption of existence, but as a synonym of utter non-existence. "Is not said"
[means:] the appearances of the apparent have not been abandoned (chad pa ni yod pa
rgyun chad pa tsam la mi bya'i II med pa tsam gyi (text: gyis) mam grmis du bya'o II
khas mi len ces pa ni II kun rdzob kyi snmi ba mi spans pa'o II).
552 Klaus-Dieter Mathes
time) can be ruled out on the grounds that the combination of two impossible
positions is likewise impossible. The fourth extreme, namely a negation of this
combination ("nor can it be that neither is the case") must be suspended be-
cause the manifold world cannot be posited as something indeterminate,35'
namely as something in between the extremes, for this would be a mental fabri-
cation, of which type of construction reality is considered to be free. Being a
result fabricated by analytical activity, this fourth extreme should not be con-
founded with the realization of a reality beyond the four extremes of mental
fabrication. This is clear from the Mahiiyiinavirrtsikii, in which Maitripa intro-
duces his Mahayana presentation of the fruit or the union as a pair (yuganad-
dha) by repeating the first stanza from the section of the Tattva-
ratniivair (namely the one on the exclusion of the four extremes). In the stanza
which follows in the Mahiiyiinavirrtsikii .(in piidas 5ab) Maitrlpa adds the fol-
lowing explanation:
Knowers of reality know reality which is free from [these] four extremes.
What this reality precisely relates to, is explained in the three introductory
stanzas of the Mahiiyiinavirrtsikii. The first two define the goal as the "origi-
nal/natural kiiya" (nijakiiya), which is the nature of the three kiiyas (sometimes
equated with the sviibhiivikakiiya), and in the third stanza Maitrlpa declares:
The seeing of this [nijakliya] is deep insight (vipasyanli), given that no [thing] is rei-
This will be explained now in accordance with the Mantrayana.
(MV 3)
In other words, to see (without reification) the original kiiya is taken in MV 4a-
5b as knowing a reality which is beyond the ontological possibilities of the
tetralemma. The third introductory stanza is particularly noteworthy, for the
only thing Tantric about this general exposition of the Mahayana goal is a vi-
pasyanii practice of seeing without reification, that is realizing the possibility of
working with direct perceptions of reality or one's true nature of mind. This is
precisely what Kon sprul's sutra mahiimudrii, which is also taken as being in
accordance with Mantrayana (see above), is.
35 See Seyfort Ruegg 1981: 39.
36 MVs 74,9: tattvarrt tattvavido viduf:z /
37 MVs 74,5-6: darsanarrt ca bhaved asya anliroplid vipasyanli / mantraylinlinuslire1}a
tad idarrt 'dhunli II
Can sutra mahlimudrli be justified on the basis of MaitrIpa's 553
Tattvaratnlivalz, section, stanza 2
The second stanza continues the same line of thought:
The wise [come to] know the reality of things as not abiding in anything.
Now this is not just a thought because a [conceptual] mind does not know the nature
of mind.
(TRA 2)
The Rin chen phreil ba'i bsad pa explains: "the wise [come to] know the reality
of things which is not grounded in any of these [extremes].,,39 The reality of
things can only be known by not falling into the extremes of the tetralemma
formulated in the preceding stanza, and this is not achieved by only thinking
about it. The realization of reality by not abiding in any extreme, rather, recalls
Sekanirdesa, stanza 29 (see below), where such a practice (i.e., is
called mahlimudrli. This raises the question whether such an approach is then
Tantric,40 all the more so since Maitrlpa introduces mahlimudrli first in its
classical Tantric context of the four mudrlis in, stanza 26:
Having approached a karmamudrli, one should meditate on the dharmamudrli.
Hereafter [follows] Inahlimudrli, from which the samaya[mudrli] arises.
In his Sekanirdesa, MaitrIpa presents Tantric empowerment on the basis of the
four moments (i.e., the moments of enjoying manifold appearances, maturation,
freedom from defining characteristics, and relaxation) which correspond to the
four joys (i.e., joy, supreme joy, co-emergent joy, and [joy of] no joy). The four
38 TRAs 20,9-10: sarvasminn vastutattva7?1. vidur budhli(7 I
kalpanli naiva yac cid vetti na cittatlim II
a NGMPP, B 22/24, fol. 12b6, reads sarvasmin with one
missing in the first plida. Shastri proposes sarvasmin ca, which does not
make any sense.
TRAT (DK, 181a2; P, 129bl) reads: I 'di ni thams cad mi gnas pas (DK: pa) II dfws po
de iiid mkhas pas rig II de nas (P: des na /) 'di lta bu'i mam rtog gis II sems ni sems kyis
rig ma yin I. The third rkan pa is not metrical.
39 Rin chen phren ba'i bsad pa 195b4: "The reality which is not grounded in any
extreme ... is the experiential object of the knowledge of the wise" (mtha' thams cad .
du mi gnas pa 'i de kho na iiid de ... mkhas pa 'i ses pa 'i spyod yullo I).
40 Sahajavajra thus asks in his Sthitisamuccaya (SS V.7cd): "[One's practice] may be
free from investigation, but how can it be free from the tradition of mantras?" (SSs
11 b4: vinaiva sylit katha7J1. mantranaYa7?1. vinli //).
41 SNs 56,5-6: kannamudrlilJ1. samlislidya dharmamudrlil?1. vibhlivayet I tasyli urdhval?1.
mahlimudrli yasyli(7 samayasalJ1.bhava(7 II
554 Klaus-Dieter Mathes
moments (and thus the four joys) are also linked with the four mudriis in
Sekanirdesa, stanza 38, the moment of enjoying manifold apperances (in this
context, the sight of a beautiful woman) being related to the karmamudrii, the
moment of maturation to dharmamudrii, the moment of freedom from defining
characteristics to mahiimudrii, and the moment of relaxation to samayamudrii.
It should be noted that Maitripa also explains the four moments and joys on
the level of each mudrii (except mahiimudrii). Thus the four joys are first en-
joyed physically with the help of a karmamudrii
and then on the level of dhar-
mamudrii, based on the realization that the sights and sounds of the manifold
world are one's own mind and so forth. Being the immediate cause of
mahiimudrii and excellent maturation on the path, dharmamudrii is also the
fruit of maturation.
Having realized mahiimudrii, one displays form-kiiyas
(i.e., the samayamudrii) for the sake of others. The four joys of the samaya-
mudrii are explained as the ones of the manifested deities.
Only the third moment (freedom from defining characteristics) and the cor-
responding co-emergent joy are considered to be pure.
Thus mahiimudrii is
not explained in terms of the four joys, it being beyond, and thus independent
of, the impurities of the other joYS.46 In other words, Sekanirdesa, stanza 26
means that mahiimudrii can be cultivated on the basis of a karmamudrii and the
42 SNs 60,3-4: viGitraf!l karmamudraiva dharmamudrii vipiikajii / mahti-
mudrii vimardaft samayo bhavet / /
43 In the commentary on the Caturmudriinvaya (CMATn fol. 267al) karmamudrii is
defined in the following way: "Karma- is bliss, and mudrii the recognition [of this
bliss]. the very moment [it appears]" (las ni bde ba ste / / phyag rgya ni dus kyi sna rtse
tshad du 'dzin pa).
44 SNPS(C)' fol. 16b4-5; SNPS(Pe)' fol. 14a9-bl: ... dharmamudrii / iyaf!l ca mahiimu-
driiyiift miiCrgatayii vipiikaphalaf!l /
a CPe san- b C illegible, Pe -1}atvana C C mii- inserted by another hand.
319a5-6: "Such a mahiimudrii is the fruit without stains .... It is the co-
emergent joy at the moment of freedom from defining characteristics" (de Ita bu'i
phyag rgya chen po ni dri ma dan bral ba'i 'bras bu'o / ... mtshan fiid dan bral ba'i
skad Gig ma la lhan cig skyes pa'i dga ' ba'o I).
46 See SN 27ab (SN
56,7): "The [four] joys can be [maintained] with regard to each of
the mudriis, except mahiimudrii" (iinandiift pratimudraf!l syuft mahiimudriif!l vinii
Can sutra mahiimudrii be justified on the basis of Maitrlpa's 555
dharmamudrii, but it does not need to be.
It is against this background that
Maitrlpa maintains in his Sekanirdesa (stanza 29):
Not to abide in anything is known as mahiimudrii.
Because self-awareness [i.e., mahiimudrii] is stainless, [the moments of enjoying]
manifold [appearances] and so forth do not arise.
RamapaJa comments in his paiijikii:
"In anything" means in the dependently arisen skandhas, dhiitus, iiyatanas and so
forth. "Not to abide" means not to reify, not to become mentally engaged. This is
also stated [in the JiiiiniilokiilaTllkiira]:
The mental factors of not becoming mentally engaged are virtuous. Those of be-
coming mentally engaged are not virtuous.
Likewise it has been said [in the JiiiiniilokiilaTllkiira]:
Homage to You, who is without imagined thoughts, whose intellect is not based
[on anything], who is without recollection, who does not become mentally en-
gaged, and who is without any cognitive object.
... One should not think that this cannot be practised because thanks to the kindness
of [one's] venerable guru, Inahiimudrii, which has the defining characteristic of
being endowed with all supreme qualities, can certainly be made directly manifest.
How is it then that [mahiimudrii] does not have the nature of the four moments? [In
29c] it is stated: "Because self-awareness [i.e., mahiimudrii] is stainless." Being
stainless, the three stained moments of the manifold and so forth do not occur in it.
Therefore the three [impure] joys do not arise in it either.
47 Oral explanation from Thrangu Rinpoche (Kathmandu, April 2006).
48 SNs 56,11-12: sarvasminn mahiimudreti kfrtyate I vimalatviit svasa1Jl-
vitter vicitriider na SaTllbhavaJ:t II
49 The same quotation is identified in AMAs 136,10-11 as being from the Jiiiiniilokii-
1aTllkiira: amanasikiirii dharmiiJ:t kusalii(z I manasikiirii dharmii In the Jiiiinii-
lokiilaT?lkiira itself I could locate only the following (JAAs 94,14-15):
sarve akusalii manaskiirii(z saTJ1klefasya hetu(z I sarve kusalii
(?) vyava-
diinasya I
a The Japanese edition reads -lii(z.
50 See JAAs 146,1-2: avikalpi
taSaT?lkalpa I asmrty amanasikiira
niriilamba namo stu te II
a The Japanese edition reads -pa-.
b The Japanese edition reads -a(1.
51 S
PNs(C), fol. 18a4-5; SPNs(Pe), fol. 15b6-9: sarvas11'linn
skandhadhiitviiyataniidau la abmanasikiiro
iti pratftyasamutpaannaa-
'niiropa(z ;c tad uktam
Klaus-Dieter Mathes
The commentary is more than clear here. The mahamudra practice of aprati-
sthana which does not involve becoming mentally engaged, is not only de-
. ,
in a satra, namely the lfianalokala1'[lkara, but can be also performed
through the kindness of one's guru without the occurrence of the defiled joys
and moments of Tantric practice.
Ramapala continues by calling aprati$?hana inconceivable wisdom which
does not arise from analysis. This kind of wisdom, rather, is without effort,
evolving as it does within its own sphere.
Tattvaratnavalf, section, stanza 3
All reification, whatever there is - all this does not exist in any respect;
In Madhyamaka [everything] is without reification. Where is then denial or the
establishing [of anything]?53 (TRA. 3) (= Sekanirdesa, stanza 32)
In his Sekanirdesapafijika, Ramapala works through the differences between
Vijfiaptimatravada and Mayopamadvayavada on the one side and his guru's
on the other:
[Maitrlpa taught the stanza] beginning with "[all reification,] whatever there is" for
the following reason: Here in Madhyamaka any reification, i.e., determination,
whatever there is - all this does not exist. [Objection:] Such a non-existence of
reification is also maintained in the tradition of VijiHina[ v ada] . Therefore he said "in
any respect." There [i.e., in Vijiianavada] is a trace of reification [by maintaining]
the real existence of consciousness. Therefore reification is not entirely absent in
pravaeane la amanasikara
dharma/:t kusala/:t I manasikara edharma akusala/:te I tatha
eaf Ig aavikalpitasal!lkalpa I asmrty amanasikara niralamba namo
stu te iti II .. , ea naa mantavya I sadgurupadaprasadenavasya1Jl
sakyatvat ;c nan v atra ka-
tha1Jl na ;c aha ;C vimalatvat svasa1Jl
vitter< nirmalataya ;a vieitrade/:t
samalasya natra sambhava/:t ;C tato nanandatrayasambhava/:t
a Pe omits b C omits C Pe II d C -ra- e Pe dharma/:t kusala/:t f C omits g CPe omit h
Pe -defaka- i Pe -kartur j Pe -san- k C -vitti Pe -vitter
52 SPNs(C), fol. l8b3-4; SPNS(Pe)' fol. 16a4-5: tae aeintyajfiana1Jl na tad
viearagata1Jl Ib cki1Jl tarhi
Id anabhoga1Jl svarasabhyagata1Jle Id
a C -am b Pe II C Pe kin tu hi d C omits, Pe II e Pe -ta
53 TRAs 20,11-12 (=SN
58,6): yavan
sarvasamaropa/:t sa sarva/:t sarvatha na hi I
madhyamarthe niraropas tatrapobhavidhf kuta/:t II
a According to the Sekanirdefapafijika (see below).
b Shastri reads -ro-. Corrected according to NGMPP, B 22/24, fol. 13al.
Can siUra mahiilnudrii be justified on the basis of MaitrIpa's ApratWhanavada? 557
[Vijfianavada]. By this [clause "in any respect"] even the tenet of the
Mayopam[advayavadin] has been refuted. 54
The Rin chen phren ba'i bsad pa provides the additional information that it is
the appearance as such which is taken to be free from reification for MaitrIpa
and his followers, whereas the proponents of Cittamatra, be they Sakara or Nir-
akara, equate reification with the imagined nature. 55
The difference to Cittamatra and Mayopamadvayavada is also delineated in
Maitrlpa's PancatathiigatamudriivivaraIJa, where the five skandhas (equated
with the five Tathagatas) are said to be sealed by in order to make
one realize that all skandhas are only mind. in tum, is sealed by
Vajrasattva in order to exclude the ultimate existence of non-dual mind. Freed
from the thorn of ultimate existence, the result, namely
maka, is proclaimed as being superior. MaitrIpa quickly proceeds to rule out
the possible objection that this is not but Mayopamadvaya
awareness still being maintained:
This is not the case, [for it has been said in stanza 19]:
What has arisen dependently has not arisen in terms of its own-being.
What has not arisen in tenns of its own-being - how can it be called arisen?
Awareness has arisen in dependence; therefore it is not grounded.
In other words, awareness may be taken as non-dual (Cittamatra), or even as not
existent on the ultimate level (Mayopamadvayavada); in
maka it holds no privileged status at all. Arising in dependence, it is not
grounded any more than anything else is.
54 SNPS(Pe), fol. 16b3-6 (missing in SPNs(C)): yiiviin ityiidi II yatas tatra madhymniirthe
yiiviin samiiropo 'dhyavasiiyalJ saa sarvo niisti II evm?'lvidhabsamiibropiibhiivo vijfiii-
nanaye lata iiha I sarvathaiveti II tatra hi vijiiiinasya vastusattvasamiiropasya
padam asti II ato na tatra sarvathii samiiropiibhiivab II etena miiyopamasiddhiinto 'pi
pratyuktalJ I
a Pe sa b Pe -sasii- C Pe -piisya
55 Rin chen phreli ba'i Mad pa 195b5-6: kho bo cag ltar na dbu ma'i don ni snmi ba
sgro btags dan bral ba zig la bya'o II gal te de Ita na rnam bcas dan rnam med pa'i
sems tsam pa dag na re Isgro btags ni kun btags yin pas de med par kho bo cag 'dod
ces rtsod pa dmi I . ...
50,17-51,1: tan na I yat pratftyasamutpannan notpannan tat svabhiivatalJ I
svabhiivena yan notpannam utpannm?'l niima tat katham II iti II sm?'lvedanm?'l ca pra-
tftyasamutpanna111 tasmiit samvedanam ....
558 Klaus-Dieter Mathes
The last plida of the third stanza in the Tattvaratnlivalr
("Where is then denial or the establishing [of anything]?") is consequently
taken in the following way:
Appearances not having been abandoned, there is no denial, and given the absence
of reification there is no establishing of anything either.
This raises the question whether such statements are not already reifications on
their own, and the answer in the commentary is:
This [state of] intellect which is free from reification must be realized by an incon-
ceivable intellect.
In other words, a mind which does not reify cannot be totally understood by
discursive and analytical mind, but only by an inconceivable intellect, or as the
fourth stanza of our section in the Tattvaratnlivalr puts it, effort-
less wisdom. 59
VajrapaI}.i's commentary on Maitrlpa's
In his Guruparamparlikramopadesa, Vajrapfu).i introduces his commentary on
the first three stanzas
in the Tattvaratnlivalr by quoting one of
the most famous stanzas in Mahayana literature:
There is nothing removed from it
and nothing to be added.
The real should be seen as real, and seeing the real, one becomes liberated.
57 Rin chen phren ba'i bsad pa 196a3-4: de ltar na snan ba mi spans pas dgag du med
pa la Isgro mi 'dogs pas bsgrubs du yan med do I .
58 Rin chen phren ba'i Mad pa 196a4: sgro btags dan bral ba'i blo de bsam gyis mi
khyab pa'i bIos rtogs par bya ba yin Ia I
59 TRAs 20,13 (=SN
58,1): "Effortless wisdom [can] be taken as inconceivable."
anlibhogaf!la hi yad jfilinaf!l tac clicintyaf!l I
a NGMPP, B 22/24, fol. 13al-2, reads in both texts (Tattvaratnlivalf 13al and
Sekanirdesa 19a1) anlibhoge.
60 Tatz (1994: 92-3) not only did not recognize the initial quotation as being from the
Abhisamaylilaf!lklira, but also misunderstood bsal bya as "clear light," and translated
"There is no clear light here" instead of "There is nothing to be removed."
61 For a list of texts in which it occurs, see Takasaki 1966: 300.
62 Tib. 'di la should be corrected into 'di las on the basis ofthe Sanskrit.
298a2: 'di la bsal bya ci yan med II giag par bya ba gan yan med II yan dag
Can sutra mahiimudrii be justified on the basis of MaitIipa's 559
Based on this, Vajrapat:li advises readers to neither reify or superimpose exis-
tence, nor deny in the sense of claiming non-existence.
The question is, of
course, what it precisely is from which nothing needs to be removed and to
what nothing should be added, or rather what it is that should not be reified as
existent or denied as non-existent. The standard Madhyamaka answer is "phe-
nomena," which are neither reified into something possessing an independent
existence nor denied as something that has arisen in dependence on the level of
apparent truth. The second answer, representative of the teachings of the third
dharmacakra, is "the ultimate reality of a Buddha-element or Buddha-nature,"
to which no qualities need to be added and from which no adventitious stains
(which constitute the phenomenal world) must be removed, for the latter do not
impair the Buddha-element. It is these adventitious stains which are not reified
here, while the Buddha-element is not denied. In the first case, one would think
of Abhisamayalar!lkara, stanza V.21, and in the second of Ratnagotravibhaga,
stanza 1.154. The Tibetan giag par bya in pada b of Vajrapat:li's quote suggests
that the latter took the stanza from the Ratnagotravibhaga,65 but Vajrapat:li's
commentary is closer to Haribhadra's Abhisam.ayala1J1karavrtti on V.21, which
is as follows:
Since, then, liberation is not possible with an obstinate clinging to entities, one
should ascertain that forms and so forth, as things dependently arisen, in fact exist
[only] conventionally and that they lack an own-being and so forth. In doing so, one
has not, with regard to any phenomenon, either removed or added anything by way
of [wrong] denial or reification.
fiid la yan dag blta II yan dag mth01i na mam par grol I
The stanza in the Ratnagotravibhiigavyiikhyii (RGVV
76,1-2) is as follows: niipane-
yam ataJ:t ki1?1.cid na I bhutato bhutadarsf
vimucyate II
In the (AAs 32,15-16) the reading is as follows: niipaneyam ata/:t
kiiicit na kiiicana I bhutato bhuta1!l bhutadarsfvimucyate II
298a2-3: "Therefore one abides neither in the reification of the existent nor
in the denial of the non-existent" ( ies bya bas I yod pa 'i sgro 'dogs pa dali I med pa 'i
skur 'debs pa la mi gnas pa ste I).
65 Skt. is normally rendered as bsnan par bya in Tibetan; Skt.
as giag par bya. Based on this, it would seem that Vajrapa:Q.i quoted from the Ratna-
66 AA V Sphu!arthas 72,1-3: yasmiid bhiiviibhiniveiena mukter anupapattir ato
apaviidasamiiroparupam kasyacid dharmasyiikrtvii idam eva
pratftyasamutpanna1!l tathyarupa1!l rupiidi niJ:tsvabhiiviidirupato nirupa1J,f-
yam I
560 Klaus-Dieter Mathes
In line with this understanding, Vajrapa1).i first takes the manifold appearances
of dependent arising and their emptiness as being inseparably connected, just as,
the "non-existence of water" and the "appearance of water" in a mirage:
The appearance of water in a mirage has no water; it is empty of water. It is the
non-existence of water which appears as water. The appearance of water and its
non-existence are not separate.
Such a presentation harbours the danger of reifying emptiness. Vajrapa1).i warns
us that the latter does not subsist independently of the appearance, just as there
is no more fire when the fuel has been exhausted:
An appearance and [its] emptiness in terms of an own-being are not separate. When
various [logs] of firewood are burning, for example, [they all have] the same nature
of fire. Eventually the firewood will be exhausted, but no "fire-ness" will remain.
Likewise, when the state of manifold appearances has been established as emptiness
by reasoning, [the appearances] are neither established as entities, nor does empti-
ness remain.
Appearances are thus only provisionally called empty. In terms of definitive
meaning they even do not abide as this emptiness. summarizes his
analysis of in the following way:
In order to refute the conceptual adherence of [followers of] other [tenets] or [in
other words] terminate reification and denial, [appearances] are called empty, with-
out arising and non-dual in a provisional sense. But these [attributions] do not re-
main in a definitive sense for those who are expert.
In his analysis, Vajrapa1).i fails to address the second part of our famous Maha-
yana stanza of not adding or removing anything (i.e., the real should be seen as
real, and seeing the real, one becomes liberated), but in his explanation of the
view (defined as working for the sake of sentient beings after purifying the first
five piiramitiis with the help of a prajfiiipiiramitii which is without reification
298a5: ... smig rgyu la chur snan ba fiid la chu med de chus ston la / chu
med pa fiid chur snan ste / chur snan ba dan chu med pa gfiis tha mi dad pa yin no /
298a6-bl: snan ba ran biin med pa'i ston pa fiid ni tha mi dad do / dper na
bud sin du ma mes bsregs na me'i no bor gcig ste / de nas bud sin zad pa dan me fiid mi
gnas so / de biin du sna tshogs su snan ba fiid rig pas ston pa fiid du byas na dnos por
ma grub pa dan / ston pa fiid kyan mi gnas so /
298b2: ... gian gyi ien pa bzlog pa' am / sgro skur gcad pa' am / dran ba'i
don du ston pa dan skye ba med pa gfiis su med pa ies brjod kyi / mkhas pas gial
pa' am / nes pa 'i don du de fiid mi gnas te- /
Can sutra Inahamudra be justified on the basis of Maimpa's 561
and denial?O it is the non-abiding in any reification or denial which is taken as
the knowledge of reality:
Given that it is the nature of all phenomena not to have arisen in terms of an own-
being, they do not abide in any [extreme of] existence or non-existence. Therefore,
not to abide in any reification and denial [by calling them] existent or non-existent
is the knowledge ofreality.71
Vajrapa1).i does not say anything about reality itself. This would be counter-
productive in the context of describing a practice which strictly avoids reifica-
tion and denial. Still, when Maitrlpa maintains in Mahiiyiinavi1!1Sikii, stanza 3,
that the original nature of the three kiiyas (i.e., the nijakiiya) is seen in vi-
pasyanii by avoiding any reification, an interpretation along the lines of the
Ratnagotravibhiiga (i.e., the third dharmacakra) is required. The Buddha-ele-
ment with its inseparable qualities as reality corresponds to the nijakiiya, and to
deny or reify the experience of any of the latter would lead the yogin astray,
just as denying or reifying the appearances of the ordinary world would. Vajra-
pa1).i does in fact follow such an interpretation when he explains in his pre-
sentation of mahiimudrii that the latter is not different from conceptual thought,
just as a rope and its wrong appearance as a snake:
As long as one fails to realize that it is a rope, it appears to be a snake, but once one
realizes [the truth, it is clear] that its nature of appearing to be a snake is [shared
with that of being] a rope. The very rope is the snake. The snake does not need to be
removed, nor does anything of the rope need to be added. Likewise, as long as one
fails to realize mahamudra ... , it appears to be a conceptual variety.72 When it is
properly realized, its nature of [appearing to be] a conceptual variety is united as a
pair with its nature of [being] the non-conceptual. It is the non-conceptual (i.e.,
mahamudra) which appears to be a conceptual variety. No thought whatsoever
needs to be removed here, nor does anything non-conceptual need to be added.
298b4-5: sgro skur med pa dali ien pa med pa'i ses rab kyi pha rol tu phyin
pas pha rol tu phyin pa bia m,i dmigs pa gsum gyis 'khor gSUln po yolis su dag par byas
nas / sems can gyi don byed pa ni Ita ba' 0 /
298b6-299a1: ... chos thams cad rali biin gyis ma skyes pa'i lio bo iiid kyis
yod med gali ymi mi gnas pas / yod med kyi sgro skur gali du' ali mi gnas pa ni de kho
na iiid kyi ses pa' 0 /
72 I.e., the manifold appearances of the world produced by false imagining.
73 GPKUT 315b5-316a1: ... thag par ma rtogs nas sbrul du snali gi / rtogs na sbrul du
snali ba'i rali biin iiid thag pa yin la / thag pa iiid sbrullo / sbrul bsal bar bya' am / thag
pa giag par bya ba ci'ali med do / de biin du phyag rgya chen po ... ma rtogs nas rtog
,pa sna tshogs su SlJ.ali ste / ymi dag par rtogs na rtog pa sna tshogs kyi rali biin iiid m,i
562 Klaus-Dieter Mathes
Mahtimudrti is here taken as the true nature of mind, which is non-conceptual.
Until one realizes this original state, it appears as a conceptual variety. In terms
of these two categories, our stanza of neither removing nor adding anything can
be taken as being in line with the Ratnagotravibhtiga (stanza 1.154), and just as
the rope is empty of its mistaken appearance as a snake, or the original mind of
the conceptual variety, the Buddha-element is taken to be empty of adventitious
stains. This is clear from Ratnagotravibhtiga, stanza 1.155, against the back-
ground of which stanza 1.154 must be understood:
The [Buddha]-element is empty of adventitious [stains], which have the defining
characteristic of being separable; but it is not empty of unsurpassable qualities,
which have the defining characteristic of not being separable.
The Ratnagotravibhtigavytikhyti on stanzas 1.154 and 1.155 is as follows:
What is taught by that? There is no characteristic sign of any of the defilements
(sa1'(lkle§a) whatsoever to be removed from this naturally pure Buddha-element, for
it is naturally devoid of adventitious stains. Nor does anything need to be added to it
as the characteristic sign (nimitta) of purification, for it is of the nature to have pure
properties which are inseparable [from it] .... Thus one truly sees that something is
empty of that which does not exist in it, and one truly realizes that that which
remains in place is present, [and] hence exists there. Having [thus] abandoned the
extremes of reification and denial, these two stanzas (RGV 1.154-5» correctly
elucidate the defining characteristic of emptiness.
It could be shown that the practice of mahtimudrti does not need to be Tantric,
but can be performed by not abiding in any extreme of reification or denial.
rtog pa'i ran biin du zun du 'jug pa yin la I mi rtog pa iiid rtog pa sna tshogs su snan
ste I 'dir rtog pa bsal bar bya'am I mi rtog pa giag par bya ba d'an med do I
76,3-4: sanya ligantukair dhlituJ;, asanyo 'nuttarair
76,5-11: kim anena paridfpitam I yato na ki1'(lcid apaneyam asty ataJ;, pra-
krtiparisuddhlit tathligatadhlitoJ;, sa1'(lklesanimittam ligantukamalasanyatliprakrtitvlid
asya I nlipy atra ki1'(lcid upaneyam asti vyavadlinanimittam avinirbhligasuddhadharma-
tliaprakrtitvlit I ... eva1'(l yad yatra nlisti tat tena sanyam iti samanupasyati I yat punar
bhavati tat sad ihlistzti yathlibhata1'(l prajlinliti I samliroplipavlidlinta-
parivarjanlid aviparzta1'(lb anena slokadvayena paridfpitam I
a See A 19a4 and B 39b3. Johnston omits, probably inadvertently, -tli-.
b Corrected according to A (19a4) and B (39b5).
Can siitra mahiimudrii be justified on the basis of Maitrlpa's 563
This can be achieved by not becoming mentally engaged (amanasikara). "Non-
abiding" or is the favoured Madhyamaka tenet among Maitrlpa
and his disciples, and can be combined with the Way of Mantras. This means
that while it is the favoured view during formal Tantric practice, the simple
practice of not abiding by not becoming mentally engaged can likewise lead to
initial direct realizations of the true nature of the three kayas (nijakaya), then it
is called "in accordance with Mantrayana" for being a yana of fruition (as
VajrapaI).i would have it). It should be noted that mahamudra explanations on
the level of the fruit can be also doctrinally supported by the Ratnagotravibha-
gao In other words, Kon sprul has a good case for advancing his sutra nwha-
mudra. In it is, of course, also possible to maintain a sudden
enlightenment. Reality is free from mental fabrications, and there is no reason
why a fortunate yogin (VajrapaI).i's crow-like practitioner) should not
experience a total interruption of all reification and denial, and fully awaken to
reality in one instant.
Abbreviations and bibliography
General abbreviations
Annual of the Institute for Comprehensive Studies of Buddhism,
Taisho University
'Bri gun bka' brgyud chos mdzod, vol. ka. No place, no date.
Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project
Peking Tanjur
Primary sources (Indian)
AAs: Abhisamayiila1?lkiira
Ed. by Ramshankar Tripathi (together with the Abhisamayiila1?lkiiravrtti/:t Sphutii-
rthii) (Bibliotheca Indo-Tibetica Series 2). Sarnath: Central Institute of Higher
Tibetan Studies 1993.
AA V Sphu!artha
: Abhisamayiila1?lkiiravrttib Sphutiirthii
See AAs
AMAs: Amanasikiiriidhiira
In AdvayavajraSa1?lgraha. Ed. by the Study Group on Sacred Tantric Texts. AICSB
11 (March 1989), pp. 209-202 (=136-143).
564 Klaus-Dieter Mathes
Ed. by the Study Group on Sacred Tantric Texts. (Mikkyo-seiten kenkyukai): "The
Results of a Joint Study on the Buddhist Tantric Texts: Advayavajrasrupgraha - A
New Critical Edition with Japanese Translation." AICSB 13 (March 1991), pp.
259-256 (=78-81).
: (Tibetan translation)
Rab tu mi gnas pa gsal bar ston pa. Peking Tanjur, rgyud 'grel, vol. mi, fol. 122a-b.
CMAs: Caturmudriinvaya
In Advayavajrasarrtgraha. Ed. by the Study Group on Sacred Tantric Texts. AICSB
11 (March 1989), pp. 253-238 (=92-107).
CMA r T: Caturmudriinvayatfkii (Tibetan translation)
"Phyag rgya bzi'i rgya cher 'grel pa rin po che'i suing po". Phyag rgya chen po'i
rgya giwi, vol. Orrt, fols. 255a-317a.
: Caturmudrii-Upadesa (Tibetan translation)
"Phyag rgya bzi'i man nag." Phyag rgya chen po'i rgya giwi, vol. hurrt, fols. 9a-
13b. dPal spuns block print.
: Guruparampariikrama- Upadesa (Tibetan translation)
"Bla rna brgyud pa'i rim pa'i man nag." Phyag rgya chen po'i rgya giwi, vol. hurrt,
fols. 290b-320b. dPal spuns block print.
: lfiiiniilokiilarrtkiira
Ed. by the Study Group on Buddhist Sanskrit Literature, The Institute for Compre-
hensive Studies of Buddhism, Taisho University. Tokyo: Taisho University Press
MMKs: Malamadhyamakakiirikii
Ed. by J.W. de Jong (The Adyar Library Series 109). Madras: The Adyar Library
and Research Centre 1977.
MV s: Mahiiyiinavirrtsikii
In Advayavajrasarrtgraha. Ed. by the Study Group on Sacred Tantric Texts. AICSB
12 (March 1990), pp. 291-286 (=74-79).
PTMV s: PaficatathiigatamudriivivaralJa
In Advayavajrasarrtgraha. Ed. by the Study Group on Sacred Tantric Texts. AICSB
10 (March 1988) pp. 189-178 (=44-57).
RGV s: Ratnagotravibhiiga Mahiiyiinottaratantrasiistra
Ed. by Edward H. Johnston. Patna: Bihar Research Society 1950. (Includes the
RGVV s: Ratnagotravibhiigavyiikhyii. See Ratnagotravibhiiga
[The manuscripts A and B on which Johnston's edition is based are described in
Johnston 1950: vi-vii. See also Bandurski et al. 1994: 12-3].
SNs: Sekanirdesa (also: SekanirlJaya)
In Advayavajrasarrtgraha. Ed. by the Study Group on Sacred Tantric Texts. AICSB
13 (March 1991), pp. 289-271 (=48-66).
Can sutra mahtim.udrti be justified on the basis of Maimpa's 565
: Sekanirdda (Tibetan translation)
- "dBan bskur (text: skur) ties par bstan pa." Grub pa sde bdun dan siiin po skor
gsum yid la mi byed pa 'i chos skor biugs so. DK fols. 214b-216b.
- dBan bskur ba nes par bstan pa. P rgyud 'grel, vol. mi, fols. 154b-156b.
SNPS(C): Sekanirddapaiijikti
Sanskrit manuscript from Cambridge, Cambridge University Library, MS Or. 149.
SNPS(Pe): Sekanirddapaiijikti
Sanskrit manuscript from St. Petersburg, Gosvdarstvennaja Publicnaja Biblioteka
im. M.E. Saltykova-Sccedrina, MS. 283.
: Sekanirddapaiijika (Tibetan translation)
"dBan bskur ties par bstan pa'i dka' 'grel bzugs so," Phyag rgya chen po'i rgya
giun, vol. O,?l, fols. 317a-343a, dPal spuns block print.
SSs: Sthitisamuccaya
- NGMPP reel nos. B 24/4 and B 25/15.
- See also Matsuda 1995.
TRAs: Tattvaratnavalf
- In Advayavajrasarrtgraha. Ed. by Haraprasad Shastri (Gaekwad's Oriental Series
40), pp. 14-22. Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1927.
- See also NGMPP reel no. B 22/24.
: Tattvaratnavalf (Tibetan translation)
- "De kho na i'iid rin po che'i phren ba." Grub pa sde bdun dan siiin po skor gsum
yid la mi byed pa 'i chos skor biugs so. DK, fols. 178a-182b.
- De kho na iiid rin po che'i phren ba. P rgyud 'grel, vol. mi, fols. 126b-130b.
Primary sources (Tibetan)
Author unknown (Ti pi 'bum la 'bar?)
"Rin chen phreti ba'i bsad pa." Grub pa sde bdun da1i siiili po skor gsum yid la mi
byed pa 'i chos skor biugs so. DK, fols. 182b-199b.
Koti sprul Blo gros mtha' yas
Ses bya kun khyab mdzod. 3 vols. Beijing: Mi rigs dpe skrun khan 1982.
'Gos Lo tsa ba gZon nu dpal
Deb ther snon po, 2 vols., Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khan 1984.
bsTan 'dzin padma'i rgyal mtshan (sKyabs mgon Che tshan sku phreti bzi pa)
'Bri gun gdan rabs: Nes don bstan pa'i sliin po mgon po 'bri gun pa chen po'i gdan
rabs chos kyi byun tshul gser gyi phreli ba ies bya ba biugs so (,Bri gun bka' brgyud
6). Dehra Dun: Drikung Kagyu Institute 2000.
Zva dmar Chos grags ye ses (The Fourth Zva dmar pa)
Tshig don gsal ba: "Byan chub sems 'grel gyi mam par bsad pa tshig don gsal ba
zes bya ba bfugs so." Yid biin gyi za ma tog 1, pp. 62-123. Dharamsala: 'Gro mgon
gts'ug lag dpe skrun khan 2001.
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Mimaki, Katsumi
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