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5 COUNTERINSURGENCY REVISION PREANALYSIS
MAJ Michael G. Murray II (USMC) Editor Richard J. Campbell Author
“This is another type of war new in its intensity, ancient in its origins — war by guerrillas, subversives insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him...it requires in those situations where we must counter it. ..a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training.” John F. Kennedy (FM 90-8, Counterguerrilla Operations, Preface, 1962, pg. iv) The legal and military features of each small war present distinctive characteristics which make the segregation of all of them into fixed classifications an extremely difficult problem. There are so many combinations of conditions that a simple classification of small wars is possible only when one is limited to specific features in his study, i. e ., according to their legal aspects, their military or naval features, whether active combat was engaged in or not, and many other considerations. (Small Wars Manual USMC, 1940, pg. 2)
The two quotes above represent a 72 year time span. They support the idea that the United States has had an interest in Irregular Warfare and Insurgencies, and Counterinsurgency doctrine, training, and operations for quite some time now. In a world that is continuing to be more complex, unpredictable, and dynamic, and in some cases more chaotic, antisocial and deadly one would think the countries in NATO will continue to have an interest in Irregular Warfare and Insurgencies. This project is based on this assumption.
FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5 COUNTERINSURGENCY REVISION PREANALYSIS
Disclaimer: The following observations, insights, opinions, recommendations, suggestions, and conclusions are that of the author and the author alone. They are not the observations, insights, opinions, recommendations, suggestions, and conclusions of any element or component of NATO, NTM-A, ISAF, CTC-A, the U.S. Government and it’s agencies, organizations, or representatives. Additionally, the following analysis does not express the observations, insights, opinions, recommendations, suggestions, and conclusions of any private contracting company affiliated with any of the above mentioned elements, components, agencies, offices, or organizations. You the reader and end user are responsible for determining the value and / or worth of the information and the relationship the written content has to your specific environment, position, job, and assigned tasks, duties, and responsibilities.
ABSTRACT Recently staff at the Combined Arms Center (CAC) Ft. Leavenworth announced the revision of FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency (COIN). http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/FM3-24Revision.asp The stated goals of the revision were; less theory and more application, globally applicable, capture enduring tactics, and the scope will be from platoon to division level. Two of these goals, applicability and scope, can be improved by providing definitions and expanded explanations for several specific, but related topics. The topics are, “information”, “information collection” the relationship between information and “intelligence”, and the importance of “partnering” and how “partnerships” help command and control, and intelligence. These deficiencies were noted during a pre-analysis of COIN references. Correcting these shortfalls would improve application, adaptability, C2, situational awareness (SA), and the commander’s Common Operating Picture (COP). KEYWORDS COIN, counterinsurgency, insurgency, command and control (C2), information, information collection, intelligence, intelligence synchronization, partnering, and partnerships.
INTRODUCTION FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5 was released in late 2006. It was the modernized version of FMI 3-07.22 Counterinsurgency Operations (Oct. 2004) which was an updated version of FM 90-8, Counterguerilla Operations (Aug. 1986). Since FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5 was published, FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency (Apr. 2009), the Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations (Oct. 2009), and the Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN) AJP-3.4.4 were published (Feb. 2011). Since U.S. involvement in COIN operations will continue to be a joint / combined effort there are a number of other associated irregular warfare documents that must be considered. This includes; JP 3-07 Stability Operations Sep. 2011 JP 3-0 Joint Operations Aug. 2011 JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning Aug. 2011 JP 3-08 Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations Jun. 2011 JP 3-05 Special Operations Apr. 2011 JP 3-22 Foreign Internal Defense Jul. 2010 TC 2-50.5 Intelligence Officer’s Handbook Jan. 2010 JP 3-29 Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Mar. 2009 JP 3-26 Counterterrorism Nov. 2009 JP 3-06 Joint Urban Operations Nov. 2009 JP 2-01.3 Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Jun. 2009
The references above demonstrate that the U.S. Government, particularly Department of Defense (DoD), has learned a lot about hybrid threats, insurgencies, and COIN since the release of FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5 in 2006. US allies have also endeavored to learn about insurgencies as evidenced by the degree to which allied government officials, politicians, and educated civilians talk publicly about current insurgencies with a degree of accuracy. This of course is due to the total number of recent insurgencies, the impact those insurgencies have had on the global economy, education and training of NATO armies, and international news and media outlets interest in the topic. The majority of senior NATO and U.S. military personnel agree that training for COIN operations is relevant since COIN will remain a predominate mission set in the foreseeable future. The emphasis on COIN in doctrine is clear and is derived from an expectation of more insurgencies to come. For example, the NATO Allied Joint Publication views COIN as a “predominate campaign theme” (AJP-3.4.4, pg. xiii). The U.S. Joint Forces Command and U.S. Special Operations Command are the DoD leads for Irregular Warfare. These commands agreed with the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO v. 3.0, Jan. 2009) which states, “U.S. Forces require the same level of expertise in irregular warfare that they developed for conventional warfare.” (IW JOC v. 2.0, May 2010, pg. C-1) Mathematically this equates to a 50 / 50 mix of COIN and combined arms training. Half of all current and future training should be intended for conventional warfare and the other half should be geared towards irregular warfare. A recent notice from the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff stated that the DoD envisioned 
institutionalizing COIN, Stability Operations, and Counterterrorism (CT) and making them core competencies in the joint forces (CJCS Notice, Aug. 2011, pg. A-1). The notice further stated that COIN, Stability Operations, and CT were “High Interest Training Issues” (pg. A-1) and that mastering joint COIN doctrine and principles in theory and practice sustained joint training capacity that supported the U.S. Afghanistan Pakistan strategy. Most importantly it stated this strategy is the Department’s highest priority. COIN doctrine however is not without controversy and criticism. For instance, Sen. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) recommended to the Obama administration that it should end its counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. He criticized the strategy and said he believed the war was not winnable. He suggested that U.S. forces should focus more on counterterrorism instead of COIN (Capital Hill Publishing, 2011). Senator Menendez is not the only critic of COIN strategy. Reporters cited Vice President Biden as advocating for the abandonment of COIN. Vice President Biden recommended that the effort should focus more on killing or capturing al-Qaeda and members of other terrorist organizations (AOL News. 2011). Other critics include, Ph.D. David Ucko assistant professor at the National Defense University, Martin van Creveld military historian, and Michael Cohen who is affiliated with the New America Foundation. DESIGN When CAC, Ft. Leavenworth announced its FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5 revision guidance during their Webcast in October 2011 the staff at CTC-A participated in the webcast and noted the intent. CTC-A is located in Kabul Afghanistan and is a part of the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A). CTC-A is responsible for the COIN Leaders Course (CLC), District Stability Framework (DSF), 2-days of the Ministerial Advisors Course (MAC), AFPAK Hands training, and delivers basic and advanced COIN and DSF classes in each of the six regional commands in Afghanistan. CTC-A students are from each of the contributing NATO Nations. The staff at CTC-A is made up of Coalition Forces (CF), Afghanistan National Army (ANA), and civilian contractors. Since 1 Mar 2011 CTC-A instructors have trained over 57,000 Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) and multinational ISAF forces. There have only been four COIN schools established in countries with insurgency, i.e. Malaya, Viet Nam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. CTC-A is located in the current epicenter of insurgency. Because of this, in early 2011 staff at CTC-A had already started a preanalysis for the FM 3-24 revision while preparing for a Curriculum Review Board (CRB). To establish a starting point for the CRB and possible FM 3-24 revision, CTC-A staff designed a contrast and comparative analysis of specific words, combined words, or terms, and individual concepts. Precise lexicology plays a vital role while teaching COIN and while learning COIN. Certain words, terms, and concepts must be mastered in order to understand the complex abstract nature of COIN. An analysis of this type also validates the construct and facilities indexing and referencing in doctrinal publications. The contrast and comparative analysis had four goals. The first goal was to see if key words and their meanings were adequately explained and consistently used throughout doctrine, 2006 through 2011. 
Secondly, the intent was to determine whether, or not important concepts were embedded correctly in doctrine. The third goal was to see whether, or not the selected vocabulary was linked effectively to training doctrine; i.e. common tasks, warrior tasks, and the universal task list. The fourth goal was, to reveal any redundancies, or gaps, and show whether more or less detail in regards to key words and concepts was needed in the revision. During the first phase, the individual words and their meaning that were examined included: insurgency; COIN; information; intelligence; partnering; partnership; and stability. In the second phase the terms that were looked at were; oil spot; irregular warfare; irregular activities; information collection; information and intelligence; stability operations; information collection and partnering; and any guiding suggestions, principles, or recommendations for COIN. The third phase was contrasting and comparing COIN doctrine against basic training doctrine. The intent was to see if one supported the other. Lastly, all of the material was compiled and reviewed for repetitions and gaps. To summarize, the intent was to see if key words, terms, and concepts were adequately explained, consistently used, correctly embedded, and effectively linked, and whether there were redundancies, or gaps in both COIN and training doctrine. The DoD references examined during phase one, two, and phase four were: FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency; FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency; JP 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations; and the AJP-3.4.4 Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency. A concept paper, Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats, Joint Operating Concept, v.2.0 (2010) was also compared against the other documents in phase two. The publications that were examined during phase three were; FM 3-21.75 (FM 21-75) The Warrior Ethos and Soldier Combat Skills (2008); STP 21-1-SMCT Level 1 (2011); STP 21-24-SMCT Level 2, 3, and 4 (2008); and FM 7-15 The Army Universal Task List (2009 w / change 7). All of the documents were digitally stored on an office desk top computer in Adobe Reader format. Then each key word, term, or concept was researched separately. This was done by entering each word, term, or concept individually into the “Find” option on Adobe Reader. The results from the searches were then documented. RESULTS PHASE ONE Phase one was a contrast and comparative analysis of important key words and terms in COIN doctrine. Definitions for the selected words and terms were also examined. The key words, terms, and definitions play an important role in a teaching / learning environment for COIN. The results from the doctrine review were displayed graphically, so the details could be compared side-by-side.
Key Word Usage
AJP-3.4.4 Insurgency: COIN: Information: Intelligence: Partnering: Partnership: Stability: 287 40 130 110 7 0 ***36 JP 3-24 507 129 346 387 0 0 24 FM 3-24 322 123 271 398 *0 2 17 FM 3-24.2 307 223 230 196 **2 9 49
* Host Nation Partners 5 times; ** Host Nation Partners 3 times; *** Instability 18 times
Key Words Defined
AJP-3.4.4 Insurgency: COIN: Information: Intelligence: Partnering: Partnership: Stability: * Joint Definition Defined Defined Not defined Not defined Not defined Not defined Not defined JP 3-24 Defined *Defined Not defined Not defined Not defined Not defined Not defined FM 3-24 Defined *Defined Not defined Not defined Not defined Not defined Not defined FM 3-24.2 Defined *Defined Not defined Not defined Not defined Not defined Defined
Key Term Usage
AJP-3.4.4 Oil Spot: Irregular Warfare: Irregular Activities: Info Collection: *Once Not used 19 0 JP 3-24 Not used 9 Not used Once @ Not well defined 23 Not used FM 3-24 Not used 3 Not used Once 3 20 Not used FM 3-24.2 **Once 3 Not used Twice Not used 67 Not used
Info and Intelligence: ***Once Stability 0perations: @@ 0
Info Collection & Partnering: Not used
* ”Consists of two phases” AJP 3.4.4; ** This type of operation was used successfully in Algeria and Indochina by the French, who called it tache d’huile; in Malaysia by the British, who referred to it as "The Briggs Plan; and in Tal Afar by the Americans, who named it "clear-hold-build.“; ***”the successful collection and management and analysis of information to produce intelligence is complex” AJP 3.4.4; @ “During COIN operations actionable intelligence is often based on information gathered from people.” JP 3-24 ; @@ Stability Activities (Used but not defined) AJP 3.4.4
Key Terms Defined
AJP-3.4.4 Oil Spot: Irregular Warfare: Irregular Activities: Info Collection: Defined Not used Defined Not defined JP 3-24 Not defined Defined Not defined Not defined *Not defined Not defined Not defined FM 3-24 Not used Not defined Not used Not defined **Not defined Defined Not well defined FM 3-24.2 Defined Defined Not defined Not defined ***Not defined Defined Not well defined
Info & Intelligence: Not defined Stability 0perations: Defined
Info Collection & Partnering: @
* Information Operations and Intelligence Operations were in Glossary of JP 3-24 ** Information Environment and Information Operations were in the Glossary of FM 3-24 *** Information Engagement and Information Warfare were in the Glossary of FM 3-24.2 @ Not used but Information Activities and Intelligence Operations were in glossary of AJP 3.4.4
The results of the phase one exam showed that the explanations for the key words were incomplete. The results also illustrated that the definitions for several vital COIN terms and concepts that support the construct of COIN were inadequate. The interrelatedness of these concepts was not explained either. As a result the written construct for COIN in each document was insufficient. The following is an example. In a COIN environment it’s imperative to collect information about the overall situation i.e. political, economic, military, social, etc. This information can be broken down into a number of different categories and subcategories depending upon the insurgency and the situation. Collected information that is processed, analyzed, and verified produces intelligence that intelligence drives operations which produce more information. The most efficient method to gather information is by partnering with Host Nation partners. Who knows the situation better than the people that live there? Effective partnering and partnerships produce the best information. An explanation like this was generally missing in each of the documents that were examined. The intelligence aspects of COIN were mentioned over and over again, but they were not expressed in enough concise details to provide information about “how to” conduct COIN information engagements. PHASE TWO The second phase of the preanalysis was an extension of the contrast and comparative analysis of certain key concepts and their explanations. Again the Adobe Reader search option was used for this and the Glossary of the examined manuals. Sections or direct quotes were taken from the references and displayed side-by-side in a PowerPoint presentations. The intent was to see if the selected explanations or concepts were adequately explained, correctly embedded, used consistently, effectively linked, and whether there were gaps, or redundancies. The following PowerPoint slides were presented at a CRB (Aug. 27-29, 2011) by CTC-A staff at Camp Julien, Kabul Afghanistan. The Speaker notes are below each slide. All of the documents from the CRB were posted on the Joint International Center for Security Force Assistance (JICSFA) website. The posting included supporting documents and the complete list of participants. https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/Public/Index.aspx
Analysis of COIN Doctrine / Training Counterinsurgency Training Center – Afghanistan
Produced for CTC-A by DynCorp Intl.
Participants included the CTC-A Director and Deputy Director, Chief of Training, several CTC-A Region Chiefs, CTC-A Training Development staff, USMC SCETC personnel, and members of the COIN Advisory & Assistance Team (CAAT). Subject: CTC-A Curriculum Review Board (CRB) - Gaps in Doctrine (11/4/2011 2:55:52 PM) Observation: View O&R to see details https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/Members/Portal/ViewInsight.aspx?insight=963
Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept, v.2.0 (2010) JOC v.2.0 Is consistent with the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations v.3.0 which states “US Forces require the same level of expertise in irregular warfare that they developed for conventional warfare.” (C-1)
Allied Joint Doctrine for COIN, AJP - 3.4.4 (2011)
“AJP 3.4.4 has been developed for use at the operational and tactical levels and describes COIN as one of the predominate campaign themes. “ (xiii)
JP 3-24 COIN (2009)
“This publication provides joint doctrine for the planning, execution, and assessment of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations across the range of military operations. This will include the description of relationships between COIN, irregular warfare, counterterrorism, and foreign internal defense.” ( i)
FM 3-24.2 COIN (2009) This manual furthers FM 3-24’s theory that “in COIN, the side that learns faster and adapts more rapidly—the better learning organization—usually wins.” (ix) As the US Army continues its lengthy battles against insurgency around the world, tactical units must continue to focus on securing the support of the population, achieving unity of effort, and learning and adapting faster than the insurgents do. (ix)
The first quote illustrates the significant impact Irregular Warfare has had on US Policy. This particular reference also implied that there should be a major change in US training strategy. As implied, the shift should be towards more training intended for Irregular Warfare. The specific language said US Forces require the “same level of expertise in irregular warfare” as they have for conventional warfare. This further illustrated the role IW and COIN will have on future training. The second quote showed that NATO sees COIN as having a more meaningful and more important role today than ever before. NATO is apparently in the process of evaluating the status of COIN and attempting to elevate it to a “predominate campaign theme.” Again this showed the impact that various insurgencies and COIN OPs have had on the international community. The third quote from JP 3-24 explained the relationship between COIN, irregular warfare, counterterrorism, and foreign internal defense. Irregular warfare is a very complex type of war that has many subtopics and parts and pieces. The last quote needs no interpretation.
Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept, v.2.0 (2010) Insurgency: The organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself. (JP 3-24) Irregular Warfare: A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over relevant populations. Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. Also called IW. (JP 1 -02) Allied Joint Doctrine for COIN, AJP - 3.4.4 (2011) Insurgency: The actions of an organized, often ideology motivated, group or movement that seeks to effect or prevent political change of a governing authority within a region, focused on persuading or coercing the population through the use of violence and subversion. (Lexicon – 4) Irregular Activity: The use or threat of force by irregular forces, groups or individuals, frequently ideologically or criminally motivated, to effect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and authority. (Lexicon – 4) JP 3-24 COIN (2009) Insurgency: Same as JOC v.2.0 (GL-6) Irregular Warfare: Same as JOC v.2.0 (GL-7)
FM 3-24.2 COIN (2009) Insurgency: An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict (JP 1-02). Irregular warfare: A broad form of conflicts in which insurgency, counterinsurgency, and unconventional warfare are the principle activities (FM 3-0).
As one can see, the references that were contrasted and compared in this slide set were; the Allied Joint Doctrine for COIN, AJP - 3.4.4 (2011) ; Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept, v.2 (2010) ; Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency (2009) ; FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency (2006) ; and FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency (2009). Above are the various definitions from the references for “insurgency”; “irregular warfare”; and “irregular activity”. The definitions are not the same. The main difference with these definitions are; the Allied Joint Doctrine for COIN, AJP - 3.4.4 (2011) sees irregular warfare as something that only the bad guys do. AJP - 3.4.4 basically states, coalition forces do not conduct irregular warfare or irregular activities. Other than this difference the references seem to be similar, but not exactly the same. It might be wise to utilize the definitions from JP 1-02 (2011) to ensure Standardization, Quality Assurance (QA), and Quality Control (QC).
Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept, v.2.0 (2010)
Foreign Internal Defense
Counter Subversion Military Political Economic
Security Civic Actions
Disrupt Insurgency & Network Information Actions Build HN Supporting FID
Allied Joint Doctrine for COIN, AJP - 3.4.4 (2011) COIN
JP 3-24 COIN (2009) Comprehensive civilian and military efforts to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievance. FM 3-24.2 COIN (2009) Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological & civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.
JOC, v.2.0 described COIN as one of the five ways or principal activities that are undertaken, in sequence, in parallel or blended form in a coherent campaign to address irregular threats. The other principle activities are; counterterrorism (CT), unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense (FID), and stability operations (SO). JOC, v.2.0 continued to explain that the primary focus of Joint Forces in COIN is to establish security, counter subversion, and disrupt the insurgency, and its external support network. It also said; The Joint Forces in conjunction with civilian agencies will conduct military, political, economic, and information related actions as well as civic actions to defeat an insurgency. Later on in COIN OPs, building HN capacity & capabilities and supporting FID are more important. The Allied Joint Doctrine AJP 3.4.4 defined COIN as; The set of political, economic, social, military, law enforcement, civil and psychological activities with the aim to defeat insurgency and address any core grievances. This is very similar in content in the previous definition. JP 3-24 referred to COIN as, comprehensive civilian and military efforts to defeat an insurgency and address core grievances. FM 324.2 also mentioned military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civil actions to defeat an insurgency. Again the definitions were not exactly the same.
IW: JOC, v.2.0
Guiding Principles Irregular Threat Understand complex political, economic, cultural, religious, & historical factors Use collaborative frameworks to plan, act, assess and adapt Persistent engagement and sustained effort given long-term nature of conflict Build partner capacity to increase legitimacy of host nation Prioritize the battle of the narrative Overcome institutional seams to address complex factors of conflict Enable scalable, integrated and distributed operations Balanced approach to the use of force Counter use of cyberspace as a safehaven and means of attack
AJP - 3.4.4 COIN
Attributes Political primacy Unity of effort (Coordinate Gov structure) Prepare for a protracted campaign Hand over responsibility to the local forces as soon as practicable It is a struggle for the population, not against the population Security under the rule of law is essential
JP 3-24 COIN
Principles Political factors are primary Unity of effort is essential Counterinsurgents should prepare for a long-term commitment Support the host Nation Must understand OP environment Manage information and expectations Legitimacy is the main objective
The relevance of legitimacy Intelligence drives operations Learn and adapt Neutralize the insurgency and isolate the insurgents from their support Security under the rule of law is essential Intelligence drives operations Use the appropriate level of force Learn and adapt Insurgents must be isolated from their cause and support Empower the lowest individual 5
Three of these four references provided guidance and/or recommendations in the form of “Guiding Principles” (JOC, v.2.0), “Attributes” (AJP-3.4.4), or “Principles” (JP 3-24). FM 3-24 did not contain any fundamentals, principles, imperatives, tenets, or attributes. Once again we see that many of these guiding suggestions and/or recommendations are very similar in each of the three documents. But we also see some of the Guiding Principles, Attributes, and Principles are not the same. Standardization, QC and QA come into question again in COIN doctrine.
Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept, v.2.0 (2010) joint force should adopt a layered/tiered approach to cultural awareness and language skills. Some personnel get all the requisite training/education, some personnel receive additional specialized training, and a third smaller tier receives the most highly specialized . incentivize and track personnel, both active duty and reserve, with critical IW skills and experience (e.g., trainer advisor billets; interagency assignments; foreign area officers; or civil affairs related specialties such as agricultural planning, water treatment, and public administration experience). Incentives could include career-level or re-enlistment bonuses, precepts to PME education, promotion, and command selection boards, as well as other career enhancing assignments. New training techniques and technologies can enhance the ability of the joint force to develop, increase, and maintain the proficiency required to address both irregular and regular threats. Allied Joint Doctrine for COIN, AJP - 3.4.4 (2011) training and competency required for precision strikes in COIN are more demanding than for traditional warfare. CI/HUMINT specialists who have not only extensive military training but also a detailed knowledge of the OP environment and its complexities in such areas as the theatre of operations, the relevant societies and cultures, and the opposing groups. Security sector Support: In the early (and preparatory) stages of a campaign this may demand a high level of investment in security training. demands very detailed preparation and requires special training for military forces to react spontaneously to ambushes, obstacles, IEDs and attacks with indirect fire assets.
To be effective, advising requires specially trained personnel.
JP 3-24 COIN (2009) Training of forces within the coalition for specific mission standards enhances unified action. The coalition should consider establishing common training modules or certification training to ensure assigned forces are trained for the missions assigned. MARSOF can support COIN operations by providing a foreign military training unit that provides tailored military combat skills training and advisor support for identified foreign forces. training and competency required for precision strikes in COIN are more demanding than for traditional warfare. 6
These are specific quotes from each of the references pertaining to COIN related training. More specifically each document in its own way suggests advanced training for COIN. For instance, here are some of the terms that are used; “enhanced” , “technical”, “specialized”, “detailed”, “tailored”, “special training”, and “precision training”. JOC v.2 goes a step further and suggests incentives like bonuses, promotions, and other career enhancing rewards for individuals that are knowledgeable about COIN. The answer is Tiered training similar to the Tiered training Special Operations Forces receive.
CTC-A Training Support Package Justification Memo (2011)
CTC-A MOD 1 (2011)
Define COIN Environment
Describe the OP Environment IOT Cultural
Describe COIN OPs
CTC-A MOD 2 (2011) Irregular Environment Populace Centric OPs Explain Insurgency Explain COIN OP level of COIN
CTC-A MOD 3 (2011) Irregular Warfare Environment Operating Environment Insurgency Counterinsurgents
Pop, INS, COIN
IPB (OP Environ)
This slide illustrates the various MODs that are being taught by CTC-A staff at CLC and by MTT staff in each of the regions of Afghanistan. It additionally shows the breakdown of each of the CTC-A COIN MODs. MOD 1 and 2 are taught in the Regions of Afghanistan and MOD 3 is used during the COIN Leaders course. The next slide was a side-by-side comparison of key concepts found in JP 3-24, FM 3-24.2, and FM 3-24. As one can see the concepts use different descriptive terms, different elements, and different definitions. There doesn’t seem to be a standardized set of descriptive terms for insurgencies, their strategies or approaches, prerequisites, grievances, root causes, and core grievances.
JP 3-24; Insurgency Ends, Scope, Core Grievances are 3 important aspects of insurgency 8 Dynamics Leadership Objectives Ideology Operational Environment External support Internal support Phasing & timing Organizational & OP approach Ends Political change Overthrow of government Resistance against outside actor Nullifying political control Scope Local Local-external support Local-global support Global Core Grievances Issues real of perceived , in view of some of the population 3 Prerequisites A vulnerable population Leadership available for direction Lack of government control
FM 3-24.2; Insurgency Components; 5 Elements, 8 Dynamics, Strategies 8 Dynamics; Define Insurgency Leadership Ideology Objectives Environment & geography External support Internal support Phasing & timing Organizational & operational patterns 3 Prerequisites A vulnerable population Leadership available for direction Lack of government control
FM 3-24; Insurgency Aspects of Insurgency 6 Dynamics Leadership Objectives Ideology and narrative Environment & geography External support & sanctuaries Phasing & timing Mobilization means Persuasion Coercion Reaction to abuse Foreign support Apolitical motivations Causes A cause is a principle or movement militarily defended or supported Grievances or Root causes Grievances may be real or perceived This FM has limited definitions for root cause and grievances Elements Movement leaders Combatants Political cadre Auxiliaries Mass base Insurgent approaches Conspiratorial Military-focused Urban Protracted popular war Identity-focused Composite & coalition Insurgent Vulnerabilities Need for security Inconsistent mobilization message Need to establish a base of OP Reliance on external support Need to obtain financial resources Internal divisions Need to maintain momentum Informants within insurgency
Root Causes are Grievances Identity Religion Occupation or exploitation Economic failure Corruption & repression
Elements; Groups of people Leaders Guerrillas Underground Auxiliary Mass base
Components Political Military
Elements Leaders Underground Guerrillas Auxiliary Strategies Conspiratorial Military-focused Terrorism Identity-focused Subversion Composite & coalition
Strategies Urban Military focused Protracted popular war Identity focused Conspiratorial Composite & coalition
Developed for CTC-A by DynCorp
PHASE THREE The next step of the preanalysis was to determine whether, or not current training doctrine supported COIN doctrine, in a general sense. For this purpose, the following publications were examined; FM 321.75 (FM 21-75) The Warrior Ethos and Soldier Combat Skills (2008) ; Soldiers Training Publication (STP) 21-1-Soldier’s Manual of Common Tasks (SMCT) Level 1 (2011) ; STP 21-24-SMCT Level 2, 3, and 4 (2008) ; and FM 7-15 The Army Universal Task List (2009, w / change 7 2011). Once again Adobe Reader was utilized to examine the documents for the intended goals. When FM 3-21.75 was examined, only incomplete explanations for “information”, “information collection”, and “intelligence” were discovered. There was no formal definition for the two words or the term in the content of the book, or Glossary. However, “information” was used 74 times and “intelligence” was used 20 times in FM 3-21.75. The manual did link “useful information” to “commanders achieving situational understanding” (pg. 9-1). In Chapter 9 “intelligence” was mentioned in a brief paragraph about tactical questioning and in a small section on direct questioning (pg. 9-3). “Intelligence” was also briefly mentioned in a section about captured document tagging and detainee operations (pg. 9-6). The singular words “insurgency” and “counterinsurgency” were not mentioned and neither was the term “irregular warfare”. FM 3-24 and FMI 3-07.222 were not referenced, or cited, and were not listed in the reference section. There were no COIN specific tasks listed in the FM. There were six “information” related terms. They were; CCIR: commander’s critical information Requirements (FM 3-21.75, pg Glossary-1) EEFI: Essential Elements of Friendly Information is critical aspects of a friendly operation that, if known by the enemy, would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limits success of the operation and therefore must be protected from detection (FM 3-21.75, pg 9-7) EEI: Essential elements of information (FM 3-21.75, pg. Glossary-1) PIR: Priority intelligence requirement (FM 3-21.75, pg. Glossary-3) Indicators: Are information on the intention or capability of a potential enemy that commanders need to make decisions (FM 3-21.75, pg. 9-1) Potential indicators: These indicators are information on the intention or capability of a potential enemy that commanders need to make decisions. (FM 3-21.75, pg. 9-1) In STP 21-1, SMCT Warrior Skills Level 1 (2011), the word “information” was used 96 times and the word “intelligence” was applied 12 times. Neither of the words were officially defined, referenced, or cited in the content, nor were they defined in the Glossary. No tasks were listed as COIN specific tasks, nor were there any tasks that were marked as being related to COIN. When STP 21-1-SMCT was further examined, there were only two “information”, or “intelligence” collection related tasks discovered. The 
first was “301-371-1000 Report Intelligence Information” (pg. 3-173) and the second was “301-348-1050 Report Information of Potential Intelligence” (pg. 3-180). Both of these tasks utilized the SALUTE format. So within FM 3-21.75 and SMCT STP 21-1 there were six information / intelligence related words, or terms and two information / intelligence related tasks. The individual words “insurgency”, and “counterinsurgency” and the term “irregular warfare” were not used in STP 21-1 Level 1, and were not listed in the Glossary. STP 21-1 mentioned FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5 one time. FM 3-24 was listed as a reference for task “301-CAT-1001 See Yourself Culturally” (pg. 323). FM 3-21.75 and STP 21-1, did not reference, cite, or list FM 3-24.2, FMI 3-07.22, or FM 90-8. There were however, several tasks that could have been, or more appropriately, should have been listed as COIN specific tasks. The following tasks appeared to be designed more for a COIN environment rather than a conventional environment. 052-192-1270 React to Possible Improvised Explosive Device (IED) (pg. 3-172) https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/23838478 052-192-1271 Identify Visual Indicators of an Implosive Devise (IED) (pg. 3-172) https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/23838510 093-89D-1264 Search Suspect Vehicle for Improvised Device (IED)” (pg. 3-173) 171-300-0011 Employ Progressive Levels of Individual Force When Confronting Civilians (pg. 3191) 301-CAT-1001 See Yourself Culturally (pg. 3-222) 301-CAT-1002 Learn and Understand the Culture of Other Societies Where You Are Deployed or Assigned (pg. 3-223) 191-376-5140 Search a Vehicle for Explosive Devices or Prohibited Items at an Installation Access Control Point (pg. 3-240) 511-001-1040 Perform 5 / 25 / 200 Meter Scan (pg. 3-259) STP 21-24-SMCT Level 2, 3, and 4 (2008) was next. The words “insurgency” and “counterinsurgency” were not used in the STP. There were no definitions for the words either. There were three information related tasks. They were, “031-503-2053 Report CBRN Information Using NBC 4 Reports” (pg. 3-38), “805C-PAD-3594 Store Classified Information and Materials” (pg. 3-172), and “301-371-1052 Protect Classified Information and Materials” (pg. 3-172). There were no “intelligence” tasks, or COIN specific tasks listed. “Information” and “intelligence” were not defined, cited, or referenced. There were no specific “stability” tasks listed, but there were three “security” tasks noted. Nether “stability” or “stability operations” were defined, cited, or referenced. FM 7-15 The Army Universal Task List (2009, w / change 7 2011) was examined last. As the manual explained, FM 7-15 sets forth the structure and content of the current Army Universal Task List (AUTL). The AUTL is a wide-ranging, “all-inclusive”, but not too inclusive “listing of Army tasks, missions, and operations.” (pg. ix) For each task listed in the AUTL there was a number, a title, a description, a doctrine reference, or references, and typically a scale and task performance measures. The FM also explained, “As a catalog, the AUTL captures doctrine as it existed on the date of its publication.” (pg. ix) 
Change 7 for the publication was dated May 2011, so the content should be relatively up-to-date. The following are the results of the examination. The word “Information” was utilized 997 times in FM 7-15, yet it was not defined in the content, or Glossary. “Intelligence” was applied 878 times in the manual. There were 4 intelligence related definitions in the Glossary. The relationship between “collected information” and “intelligence” was not explained, nor, cited, or referenced. There were 16 “intelligence” related tasks in the FM. Ten of these tasks were related to “intelligence support” and “support to situational understanding”. As noted, the individual word “Insurgency” was mentioned 5 times and “counterinsurgency” was utilized 8 times. “Counterinsurgency” was defined in the glossary of the FM, but “insurgency” was not. “Stability” was mentioned 15 times and “stability operations” was used 25 times. Neither was defined. The term “irregular warfare” was mentioned 4 times and the definition from FM 3-0 was used to define the term. There were no COIN specific tasks listed in the publication at all. JP 3-24 and FM 3-24.2 were not listed as references either. An interesting observation was the majority of references listed in the “References” area of the FM were dated either 2008 or earlier. For some reason, as change 1 (2009) through change 7 (2011) were implemented few if any new references were added to further update the manual. SUMMARY As previously stated, the intent of this project was to see if specific words and their meanings were adequately explained and referenced in COIN doctrine. The results indicated that they weren’t since it looked like several had changed. The changes, adaptations, or revisions were not explained, or referenced. Examples were; “insurgency”, “COIN”, “stability”, “partnering”, “information”, and “intelligence”. Secondly, the intent was to determine whether, or not important terms or concepts were used consistently. The results suggested that they were not. It appeared that several key concepts had been modified, or changed. Perhaps this was due to a lack of official explanations, or lack of official dentitions. This indicated that the selected concepts were not well embedded in doctrine. Examples were; “oil spot”, “irregular warfare”, or “irregular activity”, “information collection”, “information and intelligence”, “stability operations”, and “information collection and partnering”. During this research RAND Corporation released a technical report titled; Assessing Freedom of Movement for Counterinsurgency Campaigns (Rand National Defense Research Institute, 2012). The authors stated, in COIN doctrine freedom of movement (FoM) “is an important consideration for COIN tactics, operations, and strategy.” (Connable et.al, 2012, pg. ix) However, during an examination of COIN doctrine FoM is not defined and “is mentioned only occasionally in COIN literature and in U.S military doctrine.” (Connable et.al., 2012, pg. ix) They conclude by recommending definitions for five categories of FoM.
The third goal was to see whether, or not the selected vocabulary was linked effectively to selected training doctrine i.e. common tasks, warrior tasks, and the universal task list. COIN doctrine did not seem to be linked very well to the examined training documents, at any level. Then fourth goal was to determine whether, or not there were redundancies, or gaps. There were no redundancies, but there did seem to be tremendous gaps between COIN doctrine and the examined training doctrine. RECOMMENDATIONS 1. Staff at the US Army CAC should use commonly accepted words, terms, and concepts, and their official definitions for the FM 3-24 revision. They should not use any unfamiliar words or terms that do not have an established history in COIN doctrine. Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (2011) does have definitions for most of the researched words and terms. Each of the COIN references that were reviewed could have been improved with official definitions. For instance; collection – In intelligence usage, the acquisition of information and the provision of this information to processing elements. See also intelligence process. (JP 2-01) (JP 1-02, pg. 55) counterinsurgency — Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances. Also called COIN. (JP 3-24) (JP 1-02, pg. 79) information – 1. Facts, data, or instructions in any medium, or form. 2. The meaning that a human assigns to data by means of known convention used in their representation. (JP 3-13.1) (JP 1-02, pg. 164) information-based processes — Processes that collect, analyze, and disseminate information using any medium or form. These processes may be stand-alone processes or sub-processes that, taken together, comprise a larger system or systems of processes. See information system. (JP 3-13) (JP 1-02, pg, 164) information requirements — In intelligence usage, those items of information regarding the adversary and other relevant aspects of the operational environment that need to be collected and processed in order to meet the intelligence requirements of a commander. See also priority intelligence requirement. (JP 2-0) (JP 1-02, pg. 165) insurgency — The organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself. (JP 324) (JP 1-02, pg. 167) intelligence – The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity which results in the product and to the organizations engaged in such activities. See also acoustic 
intelligence; all-source intelligence; basic intelligence; combat intelligence; communications intelligence; critical intelligence; current intelligence; departmental intelligence; domestic intelligence; electronic intelligence; electro-optical intelligence; foreign intelligence; signals intelligence; general military intelligence; imagery intelligence; joint intelligence; laser intelligence; measurement and signature intelligence; medical intelligence; military intelligence; national intelligence; nuclear intelligence; opensource intelligence; operational intelligence; political intelligence; radar intelligence; scientific and technical intelligence; strategic intelligence; tactical intelligence; target intelligence; technical intelligence; technical operational intelligence; terrain intelligence. (JP 2-0) (JP 1-02, pg. 168) irregular warfare — A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. Also called IW. (JP 1) (JP 1-02, pg. 177) partner nation — Those nations that the United States works with to disrupt the production, transportation, distribution, and sale of illicit drugs, as well as the money involved with this illicit activity. Also called PN. (JP 3-07.4) (JP 1-02, pg. 259) stability operations — An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 3-0) (JP 1-02, pg. 320) 2. CAC staff should consider examining the written conceptual framework of COIN. Currently there is an absence of clarity. This is supported by the fact that there appeared to be a lack of research, cross-referencing, and synchronization with established COIN lexicology and a clear lack of expansiveness in the details about COIN. Important words, terms, and concepts and important aspects of COIN were ill defined, not defined, or simply left out of the verbiage, glossaries, and indexes of the examined manuals. Some primary examples were; intelligence, information, and partnering, and their relationship. Plus the diplomatic, stability, cognitive, psychological, and joint multinational interagency, and international legal aspects of COIN were often glossed over or omitted. 3. For the revision, more comprehensive research and coordination should be conducted. The apparent lack of synchronization of COIN doctrine with the examined training doctrine supports this suggestion. There was an enormous amount of COIN related information, explanations, definitions, processes, and procedures missing in the examined documents. In fact, COIN tasks were completely absent in the examined training documents. This was perhaps the most surprising discovery of the preanalysis. 4. Staff at CAC should conduct more deliberate research specifically into the intelligence aspects of COIN and document and cross reference tasks in the revised edition of FM 3-24. The following are some of the topics that should be considered; the collection of information, its relationship with intelligence, and the intelligence war fighting functions. More preciously at the lower level; rapport building, elicitation and counter-elicitation techniques, basic and systematic questioning, cross cultural and non-verbal communication, direct questing, field negotiations, 
screening, tactical questioning, tactical debriefing, surveillance, reconnaissance, and the categorization of information and its synchronization with the commander’s intent. At the upper levels; strategic debriefings, interrogation, HUMINT, Atmospherics, targeting, surveillance detection, psychological profiling, source management, multiagency capabilities and coordination, running estimate, intelligence estimate, intelligence preparation of the operational environment, and intelligence tools and matrixes used to analyze, sort, and present intelligence products. 5. More research should be conducted on the primary subtopics within COIN. For example, there was a lot of missing information, definitions, and explanations about stability operations, COIN enablers, partnering, partnerships, advising, Security Assistance and Security Cooperation in the reviewed COIN publications. 6. Soldiers are being told they are “responsible for detecting and reporting threat activities, dispositions, and capabilities.” (FM 2-0, para. 3-3) They are also told Soldiers are Sensors (ES2) and information gathering and collection is accomplished through Soldier surveillance and reconnaissance. The ES2 concept is not new. The US Army stands behind this program and explains the task is critical because the environment Soldiers operate in is characterized by violence, uncertainty, complexity, and asymmetric threats. However, these sensors need to be programmed correctly. Therefore a number of information / intelligence connected words, terms, and definitions must be added to every soldier’s vocabulary. The following are some examples that should be added to STP 21-1-SMCT and STP 21-24-SMCT; All-source intelligence: 1. Intelligence products and/or organizations and activities that incorporate all sources of information, most frequently including human resources intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, signals intelligence, and open-source data in the production of finished intelligence. 2. In intelligence collection, a phase that indicates that in the satisfaction of intelligence requirements, all collection, processing, exploitation, and reporting systems and resources are identified for possible use and those most capable ate tasked. (JP 2-0) Collection management: In intelligence usage, the process of converting intelligence requirements into collection requirements, establishing priorities, tasking or coordinating with appropriate collection sources or agencies, monitoring results, and re-tasking, as required. (JP 2-0) Collection planning: A continuous process that coordinates and integrates the efforts of all collection units and agencies. (JP 2-0) Combat intelligence: That knowledge of the enemy, weather, and geographical features required by a commander in the planning and conduct of combat operations. (JP 2-0) Confirmation of information (intelligence): An information item is said to be confirmed when it is reported for the second time, preferably by another independent source whose reliability is considered when confirming information. (JP 2-0) FFIR: Friendly force information requirement. 
Fusion: In intelligence usage, the process of examining all sources of intelligence and information to derive a complete assessment of activity. (JP 2-0) Human intelligence: A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. (JP 2-0) Information requirements: In intelligence usage, those items of information regarding the adversary and other relevant aspects of the operational environment that needs to be collected and processed in order to meet the intelligence requirements of a commander. (JP 1-02.) Intelligence process: The process by which information is converted into intelligence and made available to users. The process consists of six interrelated intelligence operations: planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination and integration, and evaluation and feedback. (JP 2-0) ISR: Intelligence Surveillance & Reconnaissance Joint intelligence: Intelligence produced by elements of more than one Service of the same nation (JP 20) Operational intelligence: Intelligence that is required for planning and conducting campaigns and major operations to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or operational areas. (JP 2-0) Processing and exploitation: In intelligence usage, the conversion of collected information into forms suitable to the production of intelligence. (JP 2-0) Request for information (RFI): 1. Any specific time-sensitive ad hoc requirement for intelligence information or products to support an ongoing crisis or operation not necessarily related to standing requirements or scheduled intelligence production. A request for information can be initiated to respond to operational requirements and will be validated in accordance with the combatant command’s procedures. 2. The National Security Agency/Central Security Service uses this term to state ad hoc signals Intelligence requirements. (JP 1-02.) SIR: specific information requirement. Tactical intelligence: Intelligence required for the planning and conduct of tactical operations (JP 2-0) Additionally, coalition and other friendly forces should be knowledgeable about Host Nation information requirements like; HNPIR, HNCCIR, HNEEFI, HNEEI, HNRFI, HNFFIR, and HNSIR. Coalition and friendly forces should also know about certain enablers and technical capabilities that are available too. For instance; BAT: Biometric Automated Tool Set CEXC: Combined Explosive Exploitation Cell 
LEP: Law Enforcement Professionals SSE: Sensitive Site Exploitation HIIDE: Handheld Interagency Identification Equipment WIT: Weapons Intelligence Team 7. Once CAC has successfully standardized COIN definitions, term, and concepts in doctrine they need to look at standardizing COIN training. Each of the various DoD COIN training centers, courses, and classes around the world need to fall under one directorate. They also need to be provided standardized POIs and course wear. COIN instructors need to be vetted and certified. 8. The last suggestion that might help the revision would be the utilization of a technical writer, or writers. COIN is a technical form of warfare and requires technical definitions, explanations, and more importantly a technical form of training. Task training, or training designed on a vocational approach is inadequate.
Capital Hill Publishing (2011), Sen. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) The Hill’s Floor Action blog.
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Chicago Tribune (2011), Two general’s tales; McChrystal missteps gives Petraeus opportunity. email@example.com
Connable B., J. Campbell , B. Loidolt, & G. Fisher, (2012). Assessing Freedom of Movement for Counterinsurgency Campaigns. Rand National Defense Research Institute, Santa Monica CA.
HQ Department of the Army (2008), FM 3-21.75 (FM 21-75) The Warrior Ethos and Soldier Combat Skills. HQ Department of the Army, Washington D.C., Jan.
HQ Department of the Army (2006), FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency. HQ Department of the Army, Washington D.C., Dec.
HQ Department of the Army (2009), FM 3-24.2 (FM 90-8, FM 7-98) Tactics in Counterinsurgency. HQ Department of the Army, Washington D.C., Apr.
HQ Department of the Army (2004), FMI 3-07.22 Counterinsurgency Operations. HQ Department of the Army, Washington D.C., Oct. 2004 Expires Oct. 2006.
HQ Department of the Army (2009), FM 7-15 The Army Universal Task List (w / change 7). HQ Department of the Army, Washington D.C., Feb.
HQ Department of the Army (1986), FM 90-8 Counterguerilla Operations. HQ Department of the Army, Washington D.C., Aug.
Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats, Joint Operating Concept, v.2.0. (2010) Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, Washington D.C., May.
Directorate Joint Staff, (2009), Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations. Directorate Joint Staff, Washington D.C., Oct.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (2011), AJP-3.4.4, Counterinsurgency (COIN). NATO Standarisation Agency, Allied Joint Doctrine, (Feb.)
Soldiers Training Publication (2011), STP 21-1-SMCT Soldiers Manual of Common Tasks Level 1. HQ Department of the Army, Washington D.C., May.
Soldiers Training Publication (2008), STP 21-24 Soldiers Manual of Common Tasks Level 2, 3, and 4. HQ Department of the Army, Washington D.C., May.
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