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Crossing Koreas Thirty-Eighth: Trumans Decision and the Intelligence Behind Chinese Intervention

Michael Davin PSC 8000: U.S. Intelligence June 28, 2012

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Introduction The date was September 27, 1950 and President Harry Truman was faced with the final question of invading North Korea. This meant going beyond the original aim of liberating South Korea in favor of actively pursuing the forced unification of the Korean peninsula.1 Truman did not come to the decision easily, particularly because he had to anticipate the reactions from the Soviet Union and Communist China. The fear was that if United Nations forces crossed the 38th parallel, then the Soviets and/or Chinese might enter the war and provoke a wider conflict. Truman and his National Security Council had this fear when they directed no ground operations were to take place north of the 38th parallel in the event of Soviet or Chinese Communist entry.2 As a result, the president and his top advisors needed to be provided with the best intelligence on possible Communist intervention so that the decision could be better informed. When I speak of intelligence, I am referring to Dr. David Barretts definition, stating that it is an information product that is derived from many sources; obtained through diverse means; and concerned with the activities, capabilities, and intentions of foreign governments and organizations.3 This paper will present and discuss the intelligence that Truman was provided with before September 27th, and whether or not it played a role in influencing his decision. Before I can look at the specific intelligence that informed the presidents decision, I first need to understand the context behind Trumans relationship with intelligence and the process he used with his advisors during the Korean War. It was during Trumans first term that the effort was made to create a mechanism for coordinating, planning, evaluating, and disseminating intelligence; this mechanism became the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), which was the predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).4 President Trumans relationship with

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CIA and how he incorporated the agencys information into his decision-making process will play a significant role in understanding the case before us. Besides CIA, the president looked in other directions for information and advice, including the military, the State Department, ambassadors, and Congress. Chief among these advisors was Secretary of State Dean Acheson, whom the president admired and liked personally.5 His voice and his understanding of the information on Korea proved to be very influential with the president. The intelligence that these advisors offered, in conjunction with CIAs analysis, will be discussed locate the basis for Trumans decision. By providing a historical perspective of Harry Trumans foreign policy process and the circumstances surrounding the lead up to September 1950, I hope to put the intelligence on Chinese intervention into context. Intelligence was provided to the NSC and the president from CIA, foreign ambassadors, informants, and military intelligence agencies. Did the intelligence point to Chinese or Soviet intervention? What kinds of intelligence did the president receive on the issue? Did Truman focus on, or ignore, intelligence from one source more than another? And finally, did the intelligence matter when Truman made the decision to allow MacArthur to cross the 38th parallel? These are the types of questions that will be answered so that there can be a greater understanding of the role of intelligence in presidential decisions. Harry Truman and Intelligence As was stated above, a concerted effort was made during Trumans presidency to establish a civilian agency that would be responsible for the coordination of intelligence within the federal government. This effort dates back several years before the Korean War, when in 1946 the president ordered the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy to join with

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another person to be named by me as my personal representative to plan, develop, and coordinate so as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to national security.6 The following year brought the debate over the National Security Act and the formation of the Central Intelligence Agency. Although he wanted a strong, independent civilian intelligence organization, Truman had to face the powerful interests within the military and Congress that sought to protect their own agencies. This resulted in the new NSC, including rivals in the Departments of State and Defense, having a voice in CIAs activities and productions.7 Although Truman believed in the necessity for a centralized intelligence effort, he also did not want to use the political capital to upset the established intelligence agencies within State and Defense. The National Security Act of 1947 also created a new leadership position. The personal representative that Truman wanted to lead the intelligence mission in 1946 now became the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). The two DCIs that were in office during the Korean War were Rear Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter (May 1947-October 1950) and General Walter Bedell Smith (October 1950-February 1953).8 Hillenkoetter is of particular importance because he was in charge during the debates over the possibility of Chinese intervention should U.N. forces cross the 38th parallel. As you look through the records on the meetings that discussed the Korean situation, the one name that is absent is that of DCI Hillenkoetter. During the summer of 1950 when the North Koreans were on the offensive, President Truman held four significant meetings with his national security team to discuss developments in Korea and what actions the United States needed to undertake; the DCI attended none of these meetings.9 This shows that the relationship between Truman and CIA was not as close as you would think it should have been, given the fact that

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Truman bitterly fought for the creation of the agency years before. One explanation for the absence of CIA personnel during these meetings was that the agency was blamed for the failure to predict the North Korean invasion.10 Instead, CIA continued to provide written briefings and memorandum on the situation in Korea, including analysis about the possibility of Soviet or Chinese intervention. It would be left to other advisors to sway Truman on foreign policy, including Dean Acheson. The Presidents Man at State When it came to foreign policy, Secretary of State Dean Acheson held enormous influence with President Truman. The two men met regularly and had a mutual respect that helped during the decision-making process; as a result, Acheson enjoyed a great deal of discretionary power.11 As the North Koreans began their invasion of the south, Acheson was the first to inform and advise the president on the situation, where he immediately recommended an emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council.12 Truman trusted Acheson and approved his strategy to seek legitimacy within the U.N. It was also Achesons responsibility to bring together other national security leaders and formulate recommendations for the president to pursue in relation to Korea.13 Clearly, the Secretary of State emerged as Trumans point man on information and guidance as it pertained to the Korean War. Acheson always sought to limit the possibility of Chinese or Soviet intervention in Korea. After U.N. forces went on the offensive in September 1950, he believed that reunification of Korea was possible. Originally wanting only the South Koreans to pursue the Communists into the north, Acheson eventually signed on to crossing the 38th parallel as long as Chinese or Soviet forces did not occupy North Korea.14 He would be one of the many advisors that assured Truman that it was not in the interests of the two Communist powers to enter the fray against U.N. forces.

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The intelligence Acheson received, from the State Department, the U.N., meetings with Indian officials, and assessments from CIA, provided the basis for his advice to Truman. In the end, it was Achesons approval, along with the Defense Secretary and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which persuaded President Truman to approve sending MacArthur across the 38th parallel into North Korea.15 The Lead Up to September 27th On June 24, 1950, North Korea launched a massive invasion into South Korea, a clear indication that suck an attack was being planned for weeks. It was believed that the intelligence agencies, including CIA, had failed to anticipate the armed attack, leaving many of the presidents advisors wondering whether the event was a part of a worldwide Communist conspiracy.16 CIA, however, did keep the leaders informed on developments within North Korea. Five days before the invasion, the agency presented a report to the president and his advisors that based on human intelligence, the north had the capability to invade the south at any time.17 Nevertheless, in the wake of the invasion, it did not take long for someone to advocate the use of American forces. That someone was Dean Acheson, who first argued that naval and air support should be given to the South Koreans as long as it was limited to south of the 38th parallel.18 The plan to keep the conflict focused on the restoration of South Korea was agreed to by the president and his advisors. However, Trumans remarks seemed to foreshadow the reversal of this decision when he said that no action should be taken north of the 38th parallel. Not yet.19 With the approval of U.S. action in support of South Korea, the next step was acquiring the legitimacy and backing of the United Nations Security Council. Truman and his advisors got what they wished for when the U.N. adopted the resolution which would furnish such assistance

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to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.20 This guidance gave the U.S. and its allies the cover to use military means to aid the South Koreans against Communist aggression. Although it was a U.N.-sanctioned action, the actual make up of the armed forces was largely American, with MacArthur as commander. He answered to the president and his advisors at Defense, State, and the JCS.21 While the north continued their advance through South Korea, the government of India began to play a role in the international diplomatic effort surrounding the war. Because the U.S. did not recognize the Communist Chinese government, India acted as a go-between between the two, providing assessments and intelligence on the situation. In the aftermath of the initial invasion, India offered its forthright support to the present U.N. action against North Korean aggression.22 Through their ambassador, K.M. Panikkar, and other officials in their government, India would continue to work towards a solution that avoided a global war. It was feared that if the U.N. had advanced beyond the 38th parallel, then there was a real danger that the Chinese would intervene and spark a new world war.23 The intelligence they offered on Chinese intentions would come in to play later as Truman and his advisors weighed the risks of sending MacArthurs forces north. In September, after suffering weeks of setbacks, General MacArthur finally wanted to move forward with his plan to go on the offensive. His plan, a massive amphibious landing at Inchon, was a bold move that aimed to bring the war to a favorable end within a few weeks at most.24 Even before the success of Inchon, Trumans national security team was holding discussions and considering the proposal to allow MacArthur to proceed past the 38th parallel in an effort to annihilate the possibility of future North Korean aggression. It was now believed that

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the original mission, to restore the South Korean government and push the North Koreans back across the 38th parallel, was insufficient politically or militarily because it would allow the north to regroup and recondition their troops for future aggression.25 If MacArthurs Inchon landing succeeded and U.N. forces were able to break out, Truman and his advisors thought that he should be unhampered by an arbitrary line in trying to pacify and unite Korea. The basis for Trumans final approval to cross the 38th parallel was made on September 9, 1950 by his National Security Council. The famous report, known as NSC 81/1, was compiled to offer the president an assessment of the situation and to provide a legal basis for operations north of the 38th parallel, should Truman decide to allow them. On the subject of Chinese or Soviet intervention, the report stated that, Although political unlikely, it is possible that Chinese Communist forces might be used to occupy North Korea, even though the Soviet Union probably regards Korea as being in its own direct sphere of interestit is also a possibility that Soviet or Chinese forces may be openly employed in the fighting, depending on whether they both are ready to engage in general war at this time for this objective.26 This shows that Trumans advisors were aware of the possibility of Communist opposition to U.N. military action, even if it was believed that it would be unlikely. In the event that the Communists did overtly enter the conflict and make their intentions known, MacArthur would be instructed to return to the 38th parallel and the matter would be put before the U.N. Security Council.27 Of course, all of this depended on the success of MacArthurs landing at Inchon and his ability to drive the North Koreans back. By late September, MacArthur was on the offensive, pushing the North Koreans back out of South Korea and reestablishing the Syngman Rhee government in Seoul. Now was the time for Truman to decide on the 38th parallel question. Believing he had the legal justification to unite Korea under the auspices of the resolutions passed by the United Nations, the only point

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standing in his way was the risk of general war with the Soviets or Chinese.28 To add caution to the proposed directive, the State Department added conditions to operations in North Korea. The conditions addressed the contingencies that MacArthur needed to follow should major Soviet or Chinese forces enter or announce their intentions to enter North Korea.29 With these conditions in place, and the approval of Dean Acheson, Secretary of Defense George Marshall, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, President Truman gave his approval on September 27, 1950 and ordered the instructions sent to General MacArthur in Korea as soon as possible.30 This signaled a shift for the president and his national security team, especially as it pertained to his policy of containment. One of the reasons that the U.S. supported military action against the North Korean invasion was as a result of the fear that inaction would lead allies to doubt American resolve and the belief that communism had to be contained to those areas that were already under its sphere of influence.31 Containment as official policy had been tested in Greece and Turkey, but now it was under attack in East Asia. For Truman to adopt a new policy of forced reunification over containment, he would have needed to have the best intelligence and advice on possible obstacles to that goal, especially the intervention of Chinese and/or Soviet forces. The idea of rolling back Communism instead of containing it would surely be in vain if it did not have a good chance of success.32 Whatever the president decided to do, he needed to also be aware of the political pressures and ramifications from Congress that would be placed on him. Throughout the early months of the Korean War, Truman was pressured by political officials to act. According to Gary Hess, conservative Republicans chastised the president and Secretary Acheson for losing China to the Communists and feared that the same would be the result in Korea; as a result, Truman had to avoid any signs of weakness if his political leadership was to be preserved.33 As a result of this pressure, some observed that the president made his

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national security policy based on domestic political conditions. In late September, when it seemed that the U.S. had achieved its aim of restoring the Seoul government, it was decided that the true goal should be a unified Korea. Any attempts to stop short at the 38th parallel were seen as timid and what amounted to appeasement in the eyes of right-wing Democrats and Republicans.34 In the face of this type of pressure during an election year, Richard Whelan believes that any warnings or signs of outside Communist intervention were downplayed or even dismissed.35 It is hard to believe that the same decision would not have been made under a different president, especially with these political pressures and with the persuasion of battlefield victories. Within this historical context, I will now aim to see if Truman and his advisors received the best intelligence and if it mattered in their decision-making process. CIA Reports on Chinese Intentions Although CIA under DCI Hillenkoetter was left out of the debate over the 38th parallel, it did not stop the agency from producing written reports and gathering intelligence on the situation in Korea and in Communist China. Even before the invasion in January 1950, CIA reported in its Weekly Summary that, although unlikely, the influx of Chinese Communist-trained troops into Manchuria could be used to support an eventual invasion of South Korea.36 This report was an early warning sign of the buildup in Manchuria and that the Chinese may have intentions to play a role in Korea. It was downplayed, along with other reports on Chinese readiness, because it was believed by CIA and the other military intelligence agencies of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force, that the Chinese would not risk general war with the United States.37 U.S. officials may have thought this on account of their own views towards the possibility of a world war. Loch Johnson believes that this kind of self-delusional thinking and mirror-imaging needs to be avoided if we are to avoid the problem of intelligence failure.38

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Several weeks after the invasion on July 19th, CIA produced a report reviewing the World Situation, which included possible action that could be undertaken by the Chinese and Soviets. Given to the heads of intelligence within State, Army, Navy, Air Force, and the JSC, the report stated that Chinese troops could be brought into the conflict without provoking a global war because the Soviets would not openly commit its own forces to the conflict.39 This indication seems to discount the prevailing theory that the Communists would avoid escalating the conflict onto the global stage. However, the memo does paint the Chinese as Soviet puppets, stating that they would not pursue operations outside of China on its own initiative but almost certainly would comply with a Soviet request for military action.40 An earlier report believed that the Soviets would not pursue this course of action. If they did then it would jeopardize Soviet control of Korean affairs and would enhance the prestige of Communist China.41 It does not address the reaction from the Communists were they to interpret the American military response as aggression. As U.S. officials began to plan the landing at Inchon and the offensive against North Korea, CIA was tasked with weighing the advantages and risks of invading the north. A successful invasion would bring about an enormous boost in prestige for the United States and would be a major blow to the Soviets. However, CIA believed that it would be difficult for the U.S. to justify to its allies the legal basis for continuing passed the 38th parallel, and if they did, then the there would be a good possibility that the Chinese would engage in hostilities.42 This report also continued to support the theory that the Soviets could use the Chinese to do the fighting for them, which would dissipate the possibility of a global war. The best assessment of the Chinese capabilities came on September 8, several weeks before Truman made his decision. The memorandum, titled Probability of Direct Chinese

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Communist Intervention in Korea, indicated that the Chinese buildup in Manchuria, along with accusations against American aggression against their border, may be signs of an imminent overt move.43 An overt move, however, carried huge risks, to which the report states that it is more probable that the Chinese would pursue indirect measures, including so-call Manchurian volunteers.44 To back up its claims on Chinese intervention, CIA provided intelligence on force deployments and activity. According to CIA figures, 210,000 Communist regulars were deployed in the North China area, with another 100,000 combat veterans already in Manchuria.45 These figures should have prompted disquiet among Truman and his advisors as they weighed the decision to enter North Korea. CIA cites several reliable reports that said major elements of the 4th Field Army were committed to Manchuria, as well as the presence of military construction along the Yalu River at the border with Korea.46 A definitive answer is never given on what the buildup was really for, but CIA contends that the probabilities were against direct intervention. American officials could not believe that the Chinese or Soviets would risk global war over North Korea. These CIA reports represent the general thinking of the intelligence establishment on Communist China. While they did offer troop figures and observations on force deployments, there never appeared to be a smoking gun on Chinas overt entry into Korea. The Departments of State and Defense, as well as the White House, the JCS, and the intelligence agencies within Army, Navy, and the Air Force all received copies of these reports. Unfortunately, CIA was not consulted within the debates about the 38th parallel, as evidenced by the DCIs absence from these important meetings. As a result, CIA and the intelligence in its reports provided pieces of the overall picture, but were never considered the final word on what China would do and if that would affect Trumans decision.

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Other Sources of Intelligence Besides CIA reports, the president and his advisors received intelligence about the Chinese from other sources. Two of the most important sources were Indian diplomats and Chinese assets communicating with the Consulate in Hong Kong. These reports were run through the State Department, specifically Dean Acheson. As stated before, the Indians were seen as neutral go-betweens for the U.S. and China since the former did not diplomatically recognize the latter. However, the intelligence from the Chinese assets could have been planted for U.S. consumption, according to the American ambassador to The Netherlands, Selden Chapin.47 His source, a Chinese desk officer in the Netherlands Foreign Office, said that any reports of troop movement in China were unconfirmed. Nevertheless, these sources should be noted since they were given to Secretary Acheson, who held Trumans ear on foreign policy. Through two officials in the Indian government, Girja Bajpai and K.M. Panikkar, the U.S. received informal spoken intelligence on Chinese intentions towards Korea on September 21. In response to U.S. concerns that China should stay out of the conflict in order to foster peace, Foreign Minister Chou En-lai stated that direct participation of Chinese forces in Korea was beyond the range of possibility.48 Ambassador Panikkar also made note of Chinese defense preparations. He observed that no precautions were being taken against air raids on China, including in the cities of Peking, Tienstin, and Shanghai.49 Finally, he tries to dispel the military buildup in Manchuria as a natural defensive reaction to the geographical proximity to conflict.50 This informal intelligence provided by the Indians seemed to have left an impression within the State Department. A few days later, on September 23, during a discussion on the possibility of fighting the Chinese, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Dean Rusk, one of

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Achesons top staffers, stated that he believed they would not join the fight because of indications saying they were not preparing for civilian precautions in their cities.51 These Indian officials divulged another aspect of the intelligence on Chinese intentions. Up to this point, it was believed that the Soviets could use the Chinese almost as their puppets, meaning that the Soviets could send in Chinese forces to Korea or overrule the idea. Ambassador Panikkar stated that The turn of events in Korea has helped to bring home to Chinese [the] weakness of Soviet policy and their own unhappy experience in [the] past of direction of political strategyWhile China is desirous of obtaining technical assistance and capital goods from Soviets, [the] tendency has been not to accept political leadership.52 This information indicates to the U.S. that the Chinese are not Soviets puppets, and will proceed on a political course that they see as most favorable to them. If the Chinese felt threatened by the U.N. forces, they would not wait for Soviet approval to act in what they perceived as selfdefense. In hindsight, while the Indians may not have been correct in predicting that the Chinese were not preparing for war, they were correct in debunking the theory that the Chinese were Soviet puppets. Unfortunately, on the same date that Truman made his decision to allow MacArthur to cross the 38th parallel, the Indians sent word that the Chinese had grown bitter about U.S. incursions over Chinese soil and would follow a more aggressive policy.53 Indias Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, believed that any situation where U.N. forces crossed the 38th parallel would bring about a situation where world catastrophe is more than probable.54 This change in assessment was too late to impact Secretary Achesons support for the decision. The other foreign source of intelligence can be perceived in a more biased light than the informal intelligence provided by the Indians. The Chinese Nationalists provided intelligence to the United States through the Consul General in Hong Kong. On September 12, a Chinese American source believed reliable reported that his contacts within Communist China had

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information about a high-level conference in Peking, where the government determined that it could not stay neutral with respect to Korea or third world war as a result of their pact with the Soviets, and that China was prepared to send 250,000 troops into Korea dressed in North Korean uniforms.55 This number is close to the figures produced by CIA reports at the time, meaning that the source could have been a reliable intelligence asset. Over a week later, the Consul General received evidence deemed reliable that the Chinese Communists would not get involved in the Korean War to avoid action prejudicial to Chinas entry into UN and to permit concentration of all efforts on reconstruction.56 This seems to contradict the previous source as to what the Chinese intended to do. Several days later, another source sought to confirm the assertion that the Chinese would not join the war. This source had a colleague still in Peking, where he attended a speech given by the Commander in Chief of the Peoples Liberation Army, Chu The. During the speech, Chu indicated that China would not become involved in world war until fully preparedChinese troops would not be sent into Korea although Chinese people sympathetic with Korean people.57 The Consul General does indicate that the source may be unreliable, but also that the information did correspond with previous statements about the Chinese avoiding conflict in favor of preparation and reconstruction. After receiving informal intelligence from these two sources, it was left to Secretary Acheson to offer a recommendation to the president on what course of action he should adopt. The general consensus among the Indians and Chinese Nationals before September 27 was that the Chinese would not intervene in Korea. The first Chinese source ran contrary to this opinion, stating that Communist China was ready to send a quarter of a million troops into Korea. But with no threats conveyed by the Indians and through Hong Kong before the final decision, it

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appeared to Trumans advisors that the consensus was correct. With Achesons seal of approval on the directive authorizing ground operations north of the 38th parallel, Truman was ready to move forward with the plan to forcibly unite the Korean peninsula. Did Intelligence Matter? It is hard to answer this question directly as a result of Trumans actions during the months leading up to September 27th. The evidence shows that he did not consult directly with his DCI, Roscoe Hillenkoetter, about the intelligence on Chinese intentions. In fact, DCI Hillenkoetter was not even present during the debates between Trumans advisors on U.S. policy towards Korea. Instead, written reports were provided to the advisors, who reported to the president. It does seem to be clear that CIAs assessment of the Chinese resonated with the advisors and how they perceived the Communists would act: China would not intervene, even though the possibility was present; China would not risk a global war; and the Soviets controlled what the Chinese would do in Korea. These findings of those reports are the same conclusions that Acheson and the rest of the national security team were seen presenting to Truman. The intelligence provided by the Indians before September 27th also seemed to reinforce the idea that the Chinese would not intervene in Korea. The specific information about Chinese cities declining to prepare defenses against air raids particularly resonated with the State Department, including Assistant Secretary of State Rusk. Even though the Indians only provided spoken and informal intelligence, it still was respected because of their role as the neutral gobetween with China. The assessment about Chinese independence from Soviet policymaking seemed to be less important, since U.S. officials continued to link the actions of two Communist powers together.

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Nationalist Chinese intelligence capped off the idea that the Communists would not intervene. Aside from the source in early September, they believed that Communist China would focus on internal matters before concerning itself with Korea or other foreign affairs. These reports, sent to Secretary Acheson, proved his assumption was correct that China would not overtly intervene in Korea. On the other hand, the reports of Chinese troops in Manchuria were taken seriously and prompted Trumans advisors to proceed with caution. They decided that no non-Korean forces should be employed near the Chinese border and that if there was intervention by China, then MacArthur would only proceed as long as it offered a reasonable chance of success.58 This suggests that the decision was made in light of the possibility that China could intervene, as reported by the intelligence. Final Analysis and Conclusions President Truman made the decision to allow MacArthur to cross the 38th parallel based on the advice and consent of his closest advisors. It appears that intelligence played an indirect role in his decision, because the written and spoken products first passed through his advisors who then presented to the president their recommendations. The role of Dean Acheson and the DCIs absence suggests that Truman found the State Department more reliable, especially as a result of what was viewed as CIAs supposed failure to predict the North Korean invasion. Also, being a president focused on domestic concerns, the political pressure to avoid appeasement and present a strong front did not help Truman make a balanced decision. As soon as MacArthurs victories started to mount, it seemed irresistible to take the next step. As far as the actual intelligence is concerned, it did not have to be completely accurate to have an impact on the decision-making process. It proved to be correct until October 19th, when

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massive numbers of Chinese Peoples Volunteers (CPV) began crossing the Yalu River into North Korea, three weeks after Truman approved ground operations north of the 38th parallel.59 Perhaps Truman and his advisors would have examined the possibility of Chinese intervention more carefully if the reports had used clear words of Estimative Probability, which came into consideration after 1951.60 In any case, it looks as if Truman and his advisors saw what they wanted to see in the intelligence and bowed to pressure in an effort to deal the Communists a blow in Korea. Intelligence did play a role in the decision-making process, but only to the extent that some products were used to reinforce existing assumptions and others were downplayed or ignored by Trumans advisors altogether.

Barton J. Bernstein, The Truman Administration and the Korean War, in The Truman Presidency, ed. Michael J. Lacey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 411. 2 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Volume Two: Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1956), 359. 3 Class notes, May 30, 2012. 4 William M. Leary, ed., The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents (University: University of Alabama Press, 1984), 20-21. 5 Richard Whelan, Drawing the Line: The Korean War, 1950-1953 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990), 133. 6 Harry S. Truman, Harry S. Truman to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, 22 January 1946, in Central Intelligence: Origin and Evolution, ed. Michael Warner (Washington, D.C.: CIA History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2001), 19. 7 Truman on CIA, CIA Historical Review Program, accessed on June 6, 2012 (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1993), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kentcsi/vol20no1/html/v20i1a02p_0001.htm. 8 William M. Leary, ed., The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents (University: University of Alabama Press, 1984), 23. 9 United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950 Vol VII Korea, ed. John P. Glennon (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), 157, 178, 200, 286. 10 Clayton Laurie, The Korean War and the Central Intelligence Agency, Baptism by Fire: CIA Analysis of the Korean War (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2010): 10, http://www.foia.cia.gov/KoreanWar/EstimatesMisc/CSI/2010-05-01.pdf. 11 nd Gary R. Hess, Presidential Decisions for War: Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, and Iraq, 2 ed. (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2009), 17. 12 Bert Cochran, Harry Truman and the Crisis Presidency (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1973), 311. 13 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Volume Two: Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1956), 332. 14 David S. McLellan, Dean Acheson and the Korean War, Political Science Quarterly 83, no. 1 (1968): 17.

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United States Department of State, The Secretary of Defense to the President, September 27, 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950 Vol VII Korea, ed. John P. Glennon (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), 793. 16 Harold F. Gosnell, Trumans Crises: A Political Biography of Harry S. Truman (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1980), 463-464. 17 P.K. Rose, Perceptions and Reality: Two Strategic Intelligence Mistakes in Korea, 1950, Baptism by Fire: CIA Analysis of the Korean War (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2001): 3, http://www.foia.cia.gov/KoreanWar/EstimatesMisc/CSI/2001-09-01.pdf. 18 Harold F. Gosnell, Trumans Crises: A Political Biography of Harry S. Truman (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1980), 465. 19 United States Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large, June 26, 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950 Vol VII Korea, ed. John P. Glennon (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), 179. 20 Ibid., Resolution Adopted by the United Nations Security Council, June 27, 1950, 211. 21 Bert Cochran, Harry Truman and the Crisis Presidency (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1973), 316. 22 United States Department of State, The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State, June 29, 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950 Vol VII Korea, ed. John P. Glennon (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), 241. 23 Ibid., The Ambassador in India to the Secretary of State, 791. 24 Richard Whelan, Drawing the Line: The Korean War, 1950-1953 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990), 185. 25 United States Department of State, Draft Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State for National Security Council Staff Consideration Only, August 30, 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950 Vol VII Korea, ed. John P. Glennon (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), 662. 26 Ibid., Report by the National Security Council to the President, September 9, 1950, 714. 27 Ibid., 716. 28 James I. Matray, Trumans Plan for Victory: National Self-Determination and the Thirty-Eighth Parallel Decision in Korea, The Journal of American History 66, no. 2 (1979): 327. 29 United States Department of State, The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations, September 26, 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950 Vol VII Korea, ed. John P. Glennon (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), 781. 30 Ibid., The Secretary of Defense to the President, 793. 31 Priscilla Roberts, New Light on a Forgotten War: The Diplomacy of the Korean Conflict, OAH Magazine of History 14, no. 3, The Korean War (2000): 11. 32 Dennis D. Wainstock, Truman, MacArthur, and the Korean War (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1999), 60. 33 nd Gary R. Hess, Presidential Decisions for War: Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, and Iraq, 2 ed. (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2009), 14. 34 Richard Whelan, Drawing the Line: The Korean War, 1950-1953 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990), 196. 35 Ibid. 36 Weekly Summary January 13, 1950: Korea, Baptism by Fire: CIA Analysis of the Korean War (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1950), http://www.foia.cia.gov/KoreanWar/DailyReports/1950/1950-0113.pdf. 37 P.K. Rose, Perceptions and Reality: Two Strategic Intelligence Mistakes in Korea, 1950, Baptism by Fire: CIA Analysis of the Korean War (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2001): 3-4, http://www.foia.cia.gov/KoreanWar/EstimatesMisc/CSI/2001-09-01.pdf. 38 Loch K. Johnson, National Security Intelligence: Secret Operations in Defense of the Democracies (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), 6. 39 Review of the World Situation, July 19, 1950, Baptism by Fire: CIA Analysis of the Korean War (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1950), 3, http://www.foia.cia.gov/KoreanWar/IntelligenceMemos/19481950/1950-07-19a.pdf. 40 Ibid., 4.

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Communist Chinas Role, July 14, 1950, Baptism by Fire CIA Analysis of the Korean War (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1950), 9, http://www.foia.cia.gov/KoreanWar/DailyReports/1950/1950-0714a.pdf. 42 United States Department of State, Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, August 18, 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950 Vol VII Korea, ed. John P. Glennon (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), 601. 43 Probability of Direct Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea, September 8, 1950, Baptism by Fire CIA Analysis of the Korean War (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1950), 1, http://www.foia.cia.gov/KoreanWar/IntelligenceMemos/1948-1950/1950-09-08b.pdf. 44 Ibid., 2. 45 Ibid., 3. 46 Ibid. 47 United States Department of State, The Ambassador in The Netherlands to the Secretary of State, September 12, 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950 Vol VII Korea, ed. John P. Glennon (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), 723-24. 48 Ibid., The Ambassador in India to the Secretary of State, September 20, 1950, 742. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid., Memorandum of Conversations, by the Direct of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, 760. 52 Ibid., The Ambassador in India to the Secretary of State, September 20, 1950, 743. 53 Ibid., Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, September 27, 1950, 794. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid., The Consul General at Hong Kong to the Secretary of State, September 12, 1950, 725. 56 Ibid., September 23, 1950, 765. 57 Ibid., September 25, 1950, 768. 58 nd Gary R. Hess, Presidential Decisions for War: Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, and Iraq, 2 ed. (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2009), 47. 59 Chen Jian, Chinas Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino- American Confrontation (New York: Colombia University Press, 1994), 209. 60 Sherman Kent, Words of Estimative Probability, Board of National Estimates: Collected Essays, accessed on June 28, 2012 (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1964), https://www.cia.gov/library/centerfor-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/sherman-kent-and-the-board-of-nationalestimates-collected-essays/6words.html.

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