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IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner, vs. ISAGANI D. BOBIS, respondent. FACTS: On Oct.

21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with Maria Dulce Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled, respondent contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on Jan. 25, 1996 and a third marriage with Julia Hernandez. An information for bigamy was filed against respondent in the RTC of Quezon City. Thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for judicial declaration of absolute nullity of first marriage and filed a motion to suspend the criminal case for bigamy on the ground that the pending civil case of nullity of the first marriage is a prejudicial question to the criminal case. The trial judge granted said motion. ISSUE: WON filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is a prejudicial question in a criminal case for bigamy. HELD: No, respondent should be regarded as married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner because he did not file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his first marriage before he contracted his second marriage. Any decision that he would acquire now in the civil action would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge and is not a prejudicial question. NBI - MICROSOFT CORPORATION & LOTUS DEVELOPMENT CORP., petitioners, vs. JUDY C. HWANG, BENITO KEH & YVONNE K. CHUA/BELTRON COMPUTER PHILIPPINES INC., JONATHAN K. CHUA, EMILY K. CHUA, BENITO T. SANCHEZ, NANCY I. VELASCO, ALFONSO CHUA, ALBERTO CHUA, SOPHIA ONG, DEANNA CHUA/TAIWAN MACHINERY DISPLAY & TRADE CENTER, INC., and THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, respondents. In May 1993, Microsoft and Beltron Computer Philippines, Inc. entered into a Licensing Agreement. Under Section 2(a) of the Agreement Microsoft authorized Beltron, for a fee, to: 1. Reproduce and install no more than one copy of Windows on each Customer System hard disk; 2. Distribute directly or indirectly and license copies of Windows (reproduced as per Section 2 of the Agreement and/or acquired from an Authorized Replicator or Authorized Distributor. Their agreement allowed either party to terminate if one fails to comply with their respective obligations. Microsoft terminated th e Agreement in June 1995 by reason of Beltrons non-payment of royalties. Later, Microsoft learned that Beltron was illegally copying and selling copies of Windows. Microsoft then sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation. NBI agents made some purchase from Beltron where they acquired a computer unit pre-installed with Windows, 12 windows installer CDs packed as Microsoft products. The agents were not given the end-user license agreements, user manuals, and certificates of authenticity for the products purchased. They were given a receipt which has a header of T.M.T.C. (Phils) Inc. BELTRON COMPUTER. TMTC stands for Taiwan Machinery Display and Trade Center. A search warrant was subsequently issued where 2,831 CDs of Windows installers, among others, were seized. Based on the items seized from Beltron, Microsoft filed a case of copyright infringement against Beltron and TMTC as well as their officers (Hwang et al) before the Department of Justice (DOJ). Beltron, in its counter-affidavit, argued the following: 1.That Microsofts issue with Beltron was really just to have leverage in forcing Beltron to pay the unpaid royalties; and that Microsoft should have filed a collection suit. 2.That the computer unit allegedly purchased by the NBI agents from them cannot be decisively traced as coming from Beltron because the receipt issued to the agents did not list the computer unit as one of the items bought. 3.That the 12 installers purchased by the agents which are actually listed in the receipt were not manufactured by Beltron but rather they were genuine copies purchased by TMTC from an authorized Microsoft seller in Singapore. 4.That the 2,831 installers seized from them were not a property of Beltron but rather they were left to them by someone for safekeeping. The DOJ secretary agreed with Beltron and dismissed the case. The Secretary ruled that the issue of the authority of Beltron to copy and sell Microsoft products should first be resolved in a civil suit. Microsoft appealed the decision of the DOJ secretary before the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, Beltron filed a motion to quash the search warrant before the RTC that issued the same. The RTC partially granted the quashal. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC. Hwang et al did not appeal the CA decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the DOJ Secretary is correct. HELD: No. Section 5 of Presidential Decree 49 enumerates the rights vested exclusively on the copyright owner. Contrary to the DOJs ruling, the gravamen of copyright infringement is not merely the unauthorized manufacturing of intellectual works but rather the unauthorized performance of any of the acts covered by Section 5. Hence, any person who performs any of the acts under Section 5 without obtaining the copyright owners prior consent renders himself civ illy and criminally liable for copyright infringement. Infringement of a copyright is a trespass on a private domain owned and occupied by the owner of the copyright, and, therefore, protected by law, and infringement of copyright, or piracy, which is a synonymous term in this connection, consists in the doing by any person, without the consent of the owner of the copyright, of anything the sole right to do which is conferred by statute on the owner of the copyright. Being the copyright and trademark owner of Microsoft software, Microsoft acted well within its rights in filing the complaint before DOJ on the incriminating evidence obtained from Beltron. Hence, it was highly irregular for the DOJ to hold that Microsoft sought the issuance of the search warrants and the filing of the complaint merely to pressure Beltron to pay its overdue royalties to Microsoft. There is no basis for the DOJ to rule that Microsoft must await a prior resolution from the proper court of whether or not the Agreement is still binding between the parties. Beltron has not filed any suit to question Microsofts termination of the Agreement. Microsoft can neither be expected nor compelled to wait until Beltron decides to sue before Microsoft can seek remedies for violation of its intellectual property rights. Furthermore, the articles seized from Beltron are counterfeit per se because Microsoft does not (and could not have authorized anyone to) produce such CD installers The copying of the genuine Microsoft software to produce these fake CDs and their distribution are illegal even if the copier or distributor is a Microsoft licensee. As far as these installer CD-

ROMs are concerned, the Agreement (and the alleged question on the validity of its termination) is immaterial to the determin ation of Beltrons liability for copyright infringement and unfair competition. Beltrons defense that the box of CD installers found in their possession was only left to them for safekeeping is not tenable. SALVADOR H. LAUREL vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO G.R. No. 145368. July 1, 2002 FACTS: Petitioner Salvador H. Laurel moves for a reconsideration of this C ourts decision declaring him, as Chair of the National Centennial Commission (NCC), a public officer. Petitioner also prays that the case be referred to the Court En Banc. ISSUE: Whether or not Laurel is a public officer as Chair of the NCC RULING: The issue in this case is whether petitioner, as Chair of the NCC, is a public officer under the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. Assuming, as petitioner proposes, that the designation of other members to the NCC runs counter to the Constitution, it does not mak e petitioner, as NCC Chair, less a public officer. Such serious constitutional repercussions do not reduce the force of the rationale behind this Courts decision. Second, petitioner invokes estoppel. He claims that the official acts of the President, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the Supreme Court, in designating Cabinet members, Senators, Congressmen and Justices to the NCC, led him to believe that the NCC is not a public office. The contention has no merit. In estoppel, the party representing material facts must have the intention that the other party would act upon the representation. It is preposterous to suppose that the President, the Senate President, the Speaker and the Supreme Court, by the designation of such officials to the NCC, intended to mislead petitioner just so he would accept the position of NCC Chair. Estoppel must be unequivocal and intentional. Moreover, petitioner himself admits that the principle of estoppel does not operate against the Government in the exercise of its sovereign powers. Third, as ground for the referral of the case to the Court En Banc, petitioner submits that our decision in this case modified or reversed doctrines rendered by this Court, which can only be done by the Court En Banc.It is argued that by designating three of its then incumbent members to the NCC, the Court took the position that the NCC was not a public office. The argument is a bit of a stretch. Section 4 (3), Article VIII of the Constitution provides that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc. In designating three of its incumben t members to the NCC, the Court did not render a decision, in the context of said constitutional provision, which contemplates an actual case. Much less did the Court, by such designation, articulate any doctrine or principle of law. Invoking the same provision, petitioner asserts that the decision in t his case reversed or modified Macalino vs. Sandiganbayan, holding that the Assistant Manager of the Treasury Division and the Head of the Loans Administration & Insurance Section of the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) is not a public officer under Republic Act No. 3019. This contention also has no merit. The rationale for the ruling in Macalino is that the PNCC has no o riginal charter as it was incorporated under the general law on corporations. However, as we pointed out in our decisi on, a conclusion that EXPOCORP is a government-owned or controlled corporation would not alter the outcome of this case because petitioners position and functions as Chief Executive Officer of EXPOCORP are by virtue of his being Chairman of the NCC. The other issues raised by petitioner are mere reiterations of his earlier arguments. The Court, however, remains unswayed thereby. Aquilino Q. Pimentel vs. Commission on Elections Facts: Congress passed RA 9165, Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and makes it mandatory for candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office with certai n offenses, among other personalities, to undergo a drug test. Hence, Senator Pimentel, who is a senatorial candidate for the 2004 synchronized elections, challenged Section 36(g) of the said law. Issue: is the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office an unconstitutional imposition of additional qualification on candidates for Senator? Held: Yes. Section 36 (g) of RA 9165, requiring all candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government undergo a mandatory drug test is UNCONSITUTIONAL. Under Sec.3, Art. VI of the Constitution, an aspiring candidate for Senator needs only to meet 5 qualifications: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.