This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
ISSN: 1756-8757 print / 1756-8765 online DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-8765.2010.01090.x
Cognitive Neuroscience: The Troubled Marriage of Cognitive Science and Neuroscience
Richard P. Cooper,a Tim Shalliceb
b a Department of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck, University of London Cognitive Neuroscience Sector, SISSA, Trieste, and Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College, London
Received 16 March 2009; received in revised form 13 August 2009; accepted 18 August 2009
Abstract We discuss the development of cognitive neuroscience in terms of the tension between the greater sophistication in cognitive concepts and methods of the cognitive sciences and the increasing power of more standard biological approaches to understanding brain structure and function. There have been major technological developments in brain imaging and advances in simulation, but there have also been shifts in emphasis, with topics such as thinking, consciousness, and social cognition becoming fashionable within the brain sciences. The discipline has great promise in terms of applications to mental health and education, provided it does not abandon the cognitive perspective and succumb to reductionism. Keywords: Neuroscience; Cognitive neuropsychology; History; Brain imaging
1. The emergence of cognitive neuroscience Thirty years ago cognitive neuroscience was beginning to emerge as a new ﬁeld of research as the cognitive revolution began to interact with what were becoming the neurosciences. At the time, behavioral neuroscience was well established as physiological psychology and systems neuroscience was forming out of the interactions between physiology, anatomy, and psychology. The former focused on brain–behavior relations, whereas the latter was concerned with the neural circuits involved in speciﬁc structures (such as the hippocampus). Both subdisciplines would come to play key roles in cognitive neuroscience, yet their primary sources of evidence came from animal studies, and although there was
Correspondence should be sent to Dr. Richard P. Cooper, Department of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck, University of London, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HX, UK. E-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org
Each discipline brought to the emerging ﬁeld an established. for early use of ERP in a study of selective attention with humans). and this led O’Keefe together with Nadel (1978) to propose that the hippocampus carries a cognitive map of the environment. 1984). who had suggested that noradrenaline played a role in ignoring irrelevant stimuli and hence in selective attention. and by the time cognitive neuroscience emerged in the late 1970s. By the 1970s. it was being applied within the theoretical framework of the information-processing conception of . Cooper. whereas more explicitly cognitive concepts had been invoked by Mason and Lin (1980). 1957).g. systems neuroscience. however. some of which was directly inﬂuenced by contemporary cognitive psychology. in a revolution stimulated by the return of the single case study (e. three methodological approaches were standard within the ﬁeld: chemical studies. for example. Wise and colleagues.. 1966). and cognitive neuropsychology. 1977). P.R. However as this work primarily involved anaesthetized animals.. empirically the product of three approaches—physiological psychology. & Picton. lesion studies. Within systems neuroscience. Of these methods. In general. the information-processing conceptual framework was widely applied within cognitive neuropsychology. Scoville & Milner.g. Schwent. then. Head. Hink. Embryonic cognitive neuroscience was. One key early strand was the work of Fuster and Alexander (1971). largely due to Hubel and Weisel’s pioneering investigations of the receptive ﬁelds of cells in the primary visual cortex of cats and macaque monkeys (see Hubel & Wiesel. Shallice ⁄ Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (2010) 399 substantial interest in learning. Much of the cognitive strand of neuroscience-related work at the time was in neuropsychology. 1978. such as in the discovery of the semantic anomaly effect in the N (for negative) 400 (ms) wave form (Kutas & Hillyard. The deﬁcits of neuropsychological patients had begun to be related to emerging cognitive theories of normal function during the mid-1960s (Marshall & Newcombe. but at that time this method was not widely used to study cognitive processes (though see Hillyard. A critical development was the application of single-cell recording to behaving animals in research that spanned the behavioral and systems approaches. had proposed a role for dopamine in the reward system (Wise. O’Keefe and Dostrovsky (1971) discovered place cells in the hippocampus. These methods began to have a much greater inﬂuence in the 1980s and 1990s. 1926). it was not informed by cognitive concepts. Behavioral neuroscience brought with it an increasing knowledge of the functional roles of various subcortical structures and neurotransmitters. and recording of electrical potentials at the scalp. T. but now applied using more rigorous empirical methodology. & Gerberg. knowledge base. 1975). Spindler. At the same time. and expanding. who related the ﬁring of neurons in monkey prefrontal cortex during a delayed response task to the cognitive concept of short-term memory. signiﬁcant progress had been made in the 1960s and early 1970s in understanding early sensory processing. A major transmission route for such concepts into neuroscience was. Yokel & Wise. cognitive concepts were peripheral. only the last (in the form of electroencephalography—EEG—and event-related potentials—ERP) was suitable for general use with human subjects. De Wit. scathingly dismissed as unscientiﬁc in the early 20th century (e. when they also began to be applied to higher level cognitive topics. 1973. provided by cognitive neuropsychology.
1980). Much was known about the different levels of process involved in object recognition and how they might break down (Warrington & Taylor. the single-case study approach. however. 1992. Within cognitive neuropsychology progress was rather slower. These techniques were . … Such approaches … make it impossible for the neuroscientist to attack the central integrative questions of mind-brain research. The group study approach has also seen a resurgence (see e. 2003). p. several systems involved in memory processes. Shallice & Warrington. the approach of the biologist wishing to understand the behavior of inanimate matter in living systems] in the absence of the cognitive context limited the fashionable neuroscientist to pursuing answers to biologic questions in a manner not unlike that of the kidney physiologist. In behavioral neuroscience. auditoryverbal short-term memory. Patterson. 2009).g. ‘‘neuroscience needed cognitive science … because … the molecular approach [i.. It is clear then that by the 1980s cognitive concepts had taken hold within cognitive neuropsychology.400 R. 2006. 1974). however. Similarly. and the effects of speciﬁc genes on brain function (Holmes. with cognitive neuropsychological studies also leading to major theoretical developments within more mainstream cognitive psychology (e. visual short-term memory. in understanding the role and function of subcortical structures (e. Shallice ⁄ Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (2010) mental processes (e. Coltheart. but also Patterson & Plaut.’’ Very rapid advances have continued to be made at the cellular and systems levels. there has been much progress. & Marshall. e.. for example. had been isolated (see. Caramazza & Coltheart.g. As Gazzaniga (2000. Stuss & Alexander. relating the amygdala to anxiety and the processing of emotional events: Phillips & LeDoux. 13) puts it. The development of cognitive neuroscience Not all neuroscientists shared Gazzaniga’s interest in ‘‘the central integrative questions of mind-brain research. Warrington. 2005). Cooper.g. 2007) and new structural imaging methodologies have brought the brain back into neuropsychology (Rorden. 2007).g. By the end of that decade. combined with developing theory within cognitive psychology. and that the transfer of those concepts into neuroscience had begun. & Bonilha. 1970).. However. relating to episodic memory. Karnath. too. 2001). to list just three broad areas. e. Within cognitive neuroscience proper. The reading system had been fractionated into a set of component processes (see.’’ 2.g. Kinsbourne & Wood. considerable progress had been made on a variety of fronts.. The neurosciences needed cognitive concepts if they were to address what some neuroscientists saw as the most interesting questions. 1975... but the transfer of ideas was bidirectional. the mechanisms that support neural plasticity and their consequences (Kolb. Phelps & LeDoux. only a few would dispute that the single most inﬂuential advance for its potential for understanding cognition has been the advent and development of brain-imaging techniques and methodologies. & Robinson. 2001. P. Baddeley & Hitch. T. The process was not just one of osmosis. Gibb. 1978). 1975).e. and priming. Much of this work was inﬂuenced by the conceptual frameworks being developed by Marr within cognitive science and Tulving within cognitive psychology. semantic memory.g. has yielded a more detailed understanding of the functional architecture underlying a range of cognitive processes (see Rapp..
Prescott. 1982) and Fox and Raichle (1984) used positron emission tomography (PET) to measure differences in regional cerebral blood ﬂow (rCBF) during cognitive processing. they were only able to image the brain structure. Roland.R. fMRI detects differences in blood oxygenation. Rastle. connectionism has made far less contact with fMRI than with neuropsychology. overcame some of the problems arising from this dependence. 2006) and circuits within the prefrontal cortex (e. focused.. Barch. & Redgrave. O’Reilly & Frank.g. & Ziegler. Many reﬁnements in fMRI analysis and experimental design—the latter often inﬂuenced by experimental psychology—over the past 20 years greatly extended the utility of brain imaging.g. developed in the early 1990s. Yamamoto. & Thompson..’’ which were on the fringes . and in the development of a range of further imaging techniques (e. More critically.. without the need for a radioactive tracer. Seidenberg. in areas such as ‘‘thinking. Rolls & Kesner. 2008). T. Critical were the adoption of statistically standardized methods of analysis and reporting. Modeling also played an important role in both systems neuroscience and behavioral neuroscience. Cooper. functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). 2001). So far. magnetic ﬁeld).. Critically. Initially. Perry. Langdon. P. 1995). Braver. such as ones that allow recording to be made from many neurons simultaneously. 1993. which allows safe temporary brain lesions to be created in normal subjects through the use of a strong. The existence of this range of techniques is valuable because each has different properties with respect to the degree of temporal and spatial localization of neural activity. where they were being developed to image a variety of internal organs. though see Coltheart. Connectionism found a natural home in cognitive neuropsychology.. near infrared spectroscopy—NIRS). & Patterson. Shibasaki. and modelers with a concern for neurobiological data have developed increasingly complex computational accounts of subcortical structures (e. Gurney. the adoption of standardized brain templates beginning with the Talairach atlas (Talairach & Tournoux. Plaut. 2001. connectionist models generally do not naturally have a correspondence to anatomical localizations. At the same time. progress appears to be very much faster. & Cohen. in the development of transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS. A further development that has had a large impact on part of the ﬁeld is the rise of computational modeling. though. Meyer. A second imaging technique. How have these methodological developments affected the ﬁeld? In some ways. 1999. The range of techniques available in fMRI escalates exponentially each year. and the use of event-related designs that have made it possible to track neural activity over similar trials within a block. where early success was had in modeling deﬁcits in reading typical of some acquired dyslexias (Plaut & Shallice. McClelland. Most critically. the range and costs of techniques now available has greatly affected the sociology of cognitive neuroscience—a point we return to below. 1996. but in the 1980s Roland and colleagues (e. a variable that relates in a complex and as yet not well understood way to neural activity (Goense & Logothetis. There have been many other signiﬁcant technological advances.g. in the use of magnetoencephalography (the magnetic equivalent of EEG) and high-density ERP.g. it was argued that rCBF changes in brain regions mirrored the functioning of those regions during cognitive tasks. 1988). Shallice ⁄ Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (2010) 401 borrowed from medicine. in particular statistical parametric mapping (Friston et al. 2006). PET was dependent on the use of radioactive tracers.
and the rate of progress is not obviously slowing. but extending through various forms of agnosia and alexia (see Farah. a group of cognitive neuropsychologists have argued that functional imaging for all its technical sophistication has failed to lead to any increased understanding at the cognitive level of analysis (Coltheart. Warrington. Neuropsychological studies have revealed numerous dissociations between stimulus-dependent behavior and awareness of a stimulus. However. Coltheart has posed a challenge to cognitive neuroscientists to provide examples where deﬁnitive answers to open theoretical questions have been given by functional imaging evidence.. Sanders. We believe that intellectually this perspective on functional imaging is too limited. 2006). Further progress is likely to involve the integration of developments in additional ﬁelds. the relative lack of power of behavioral data means that any development based on a single result or method is likely to be open to multiple interpretations. Rushworth. blindsight (Po 1974). & Sergent. 2007) and multivariate pattern recognition (Haxby et al. And in many respects. Behrens. a possibility that was hardly conceivable 10 years ago. for a review). including TMS (Sack et al. P. and the relation between the two means that approaching any research question from a single perspective limits the inferences that may be made. 1973. 2003) to establish effective connectivity within the brain. and NIRS (Strangman.g. 2006) and dynamic causal modeling (Friston. 2001. however. Sackur. we believe that there are also grave sociological dangers. & Boas. which threaten to derail progress.. for instance. These techniques are essential if we are to go beyond localization of speciﬁc putative functions and understand interactions within and between brain systems. new areas such as executive functions ⁄ cognitive control. 2004). The complexity of the mind. Culver. 2007). 2001) is beginning to enable us to explain the innards of modules. Thus.. Cooper.402 R. and neuroeconomics have proliferated. & Johansen. & Penny. Indeed. beginning with ¨ ppel. 2006). Harley. Consider consciousness. cognitive neuroscience methods have become standard. Jobert. At the same time. social cognition. Changeux. & Marshall. which has now become almost a hackneyed topic. EEG (Ritter & VIllringer. Harrison. as cellular and genetic advances get linked into our understanding of brain and cognitive processes. T. with other methods.g. Thompson. Technically. Naccache. So far. The future of cognitive neuroscience Cognitive neuroscience has made great progress over the last 30 years. it is now possible to combine fMRI. 2006. Results from these studies have been combined with computational insights (concerning so-called blackboard architectures for sharing information between subsystems) and perspectives from systems neuroscience to produce empirically testable computational models of consciousness (e. Weiskrantz. the brain. There are dangers. this represents genuine progress. & Le Bihan. Dehaene. There is also increasing use of techniques such as diffusion weighted imaging (e. not just fashion.. & Frost. It is this . More generally. Shallice ⁄ Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (2010) of interest as far as brain processes were concerned. and the application of priming (Kouider. possibly exempliﬁed by the division between the Cognitive Science and the Cognitive Neuroscience Societies. there has been no conclusive response. 2002). Held. 3. Dehaene.
Thus. ethical. In physics. prejudice. Cognitive neuroscience. The ﬁeld risks being driven too much by the technically sweet possibilities that arise from new and improved technologies. there is still no single area of cognition for which we have a standardly accepted theoretical account. From this would ﬂow a variety of theoretical possibilities and socially important applications.R. or political purposes otherwise private mental phenomena (including mental health conditions. 1999).’’ As research becomes more resource intensive. Despite these concerns. functional imaging is likely to provide only one of a set of converging lines of evidence necessary to resolve open theoretical issues.g. 2006). questions are raised by the increasing possibility of using neuroimaging techniques to detect for business. but also it will be unable to make sense of the increasing masses of brain-based data now being generated. Tovino.) continues the push toward ‘‘big science. Take as an example a simple domain like working memory. and legal issues that need to be confronted. Lawrence Barsolou. forensic. P. Thus. as functional imaging relies on appropriate behavioral tasks. see.. resulting in the ﬁrst generation for 200 years where there has been no major breakthrough (Smolin. even 60 years after the beginning of the component disciplines of cognitive science. e. In our view. and deception. Acknowledgments We are grateful to Max Coltheart. There are also sociological. 2007). just as do any other cognitive investigations. despite its dangers. and one anonymous reviewer for constructive comments on an earlier version of this study. offers the potential to enable cognitive science to achieve the status of a Kuhnian normal science by establishing a generally agreed theoretical framework. if applied in a nonreductionist style. etc. if cognitive neuroscience focuses too much on the ‘‘neuroscience’’ at the expense of the ‘‘cognitive’’ then not only will its contribution to cognitive science be marginalized. On the sociological front. the rise of combined methods (simultaneous fMRI and EEG. Cooper. it becomes more centralized and as a consequence probably less cognitive. This threat is compounded by a reductionist risk. 2008). which has a variety of different theoretical conceptions (Miyake & Shah. The use of welldesigned cognitive tasks based on cognitive theory will be critical (see Bechtel. it has been argued that this centralization of one dominant view has led to an environment where novel ideas are discouraged. Shallice ⁄ Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (2010) 403 weak power of behavioral evidence that gives Coltheart’s arguments their apparent force. On the ethical and legal side. T. The biological roots of neuroscience mean that it tends not to view the mind from the perspective of Marr’s (1982) most critical level—how it functions as a generative informationprocessing and knowledge-producing machine. . namely that the concepts and theoretical progress of the cognitive revolution are forgotten as teams with different types of empirical expertise attempt to reverse engineer the brain through increasingly sophisticated techniques. there remains a host of scientiﬁc questions that a genuinely cognitive neuroscience is well placed to answer over the coming decades. rather than by scientiﬁc questions aimed at teasing apart different cognitive theories or extending our cognitive understanding of speciﬁc processes.
. I. Gazzaniga (Ed. D. Changeux.. M. T. (2000). Biological Psychiatry. (1974). (2008). Cognitive Neuropsychology. (1971). Fox. M. J. W. Current Directions in Psychological Science. D. In M. M. A new functional anatomy. 46. 312–328... & Robinson.. 161–163. Dehaene. Biological Cybernetics. England: Psychology Press. H. R. L.. T. C. 401–410. & Pietrini. D. & Wood. (2001). & Hitch. CA: W.. Shallice ⁄ Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (2010) References Baddeley. & Ziegler. M. San Francisco. S. (pp. Consciousness. Current Biology. (2008). T. J. D. Frith. (1926). Bechtel. & Raichle. Goense. C. (1982). M. (2001). (Eds.. Caramazza. 2425–2430. Electrical signs of selective attention in the human brain. M. (1977). 18. 198. Hubel. S. J. 293.-B. Short-term memory (pp. volume 8: Advances in research and theory. T. Jobert. Holmes. Nature. Short-term memory and the amnesic syndrome. (2001).. R. 307. G. P. Human Brain Mapping... & Alexander. T. Life with George: The birth of cognitive neuroscience... Science. J. Perry. 652– 654. 47–89). B. Mental mechanisms: Philosophical perspectives on cognitive neuroscience.). A. A. What has functional neuroimaging told us about the mind (so far)? Cortex. Braver. K. K.. 12.. S. 3–12. N. J.. P. Gurney. A. (1999). E.. Cooper. Coltheart. (pp. Naccache. L. Barch.404 R. V. Science.. J. Stimulus rate dependence of regional cerebral blood ﬂow in human striate cortex. London: Academic Press. Ishai.. In B.. J. A. V.. (1975).). A. Harrison. & Coltheart. Deep dyslexia. Bower (Ed. .. Brain plasticity and behaviour.. The psychology of learning and motivation. J. A. J. D. 19. (2007). 25. & Picton. Ferrier lecture: Functional architecture of macaque monkey visual cortex. Schouten.. London: Routledge. S. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Hink. S. & Marshall. R.. Working memory. Psychological Review. Cognitive neuroscience: A reader. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews. L. Science. F. (2003). Does cognitive neuropsychology have a future? Cognitive Neuropsychology. M. demonstrated by positron emission tomography. (2001). 51. Distributed and overlapping representations of faces and objects in ventral temporal cortex. H. Targeted gene mutation approaches to the study of anxiety-like behaviour in mice. S. Sackur. 2019–2029. Gibb. & Le Bihan. Deutsch & J. M. L. Series B: Biological Sciences. (1984).. Holmes. 204–256.. (1995). 84. M. & Penny... K. Journal of Neurophysiology.. S. Harley. P. 257–291). & Wiesel. 173. A. C. (2006). preconscious. M. D. 177–180. Kinsbourne.. 10. 159–182). Brain potentials during reading reﬂect word expectancy and semantic association. Cerebral Cortex. J. Coltheart. K. Statistical parametric maps in functional imaging: A general approach. 204–211. 17. Hillyard. Conscious. Friston. 3–16. Rastle. J. E. In D.. P. Deutsch (Eds.). Cognition and control in schizophrenia: A computational model of dopamine and prefrontal function..H. Farah. and subliminal processing: A testable taxonomy. Haxby.. Hove... T. T. Neurophysiology of the BOLD fMRI signal in awake monkeys. 21. New York: Academic Press. A. J.. I. Dehaene. London: Taylor & Francis. (2006).. (1984). & Hillyard. Gazzaniga. P. D. A. Cognitive neuropsychology twenty years on.. 631–640.). & Sergent. J. 42. Kolb.. Poline. Kutas. pp. Patterson. Oxford. (2003). Furey. 4–13. Neuroimage.. N. P. Head. G. J. T. 323–331. 2. Rapp (Ed. Cambridge. & Cohen. 189–210. 108. Prescott. Worsley. H. Gobbini. Kouider. K. A. W. M. The handbook of cognitive neuropsychology. F. 182. England: Cambridge University Press. (2001).) (1980). 1109–1120. L. Freeman. 1273–1302. A. M. Dynamic causal modelling. Cerebral bases of subliminal and supraliminal priming during reading. 1–5. W. M. (2004). Aphasia and kindred disorders of speech. 23.. & Redgrave. (2006). Trends in Cognitive Sciences. J. Fuster. S. Friston. England: Blackwell. C. A computational model of action selection in the basal ganglia. DRC: A dual route cascaded model of visual word recognition and reading aloud. Coltheart. Marr. K. & Frackowiak. Schwent. Langdon. R. Neuron activity related to short-term memory. E. 261–273. (1973). In G. Vision. S. & Logothetis. 1–59.
E. J. The hippocampus as a cognitive map. 1081–1088. Mason. E.. 103. & Shallice. (2007). 261–273. 4. Stuss. P. J. Journal of Neurology. Seidenberg. Cambridge.) (1999). C. & Alexander. & Dostrovsky. F.. T. & Frank. TMS. M. (2007).. A. J. Loss of recent memory after bilateral hippocampal lesions. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience. 22. (2007). M.. (1992). (1988). 79. E... Psychological Review. Simultaneous EEG-fMRI. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews. Behavioral Neuroscience. J. O’Reilly... (1993). J. L. S. Miyake. L.. P. 30. & Shah. 1. Bestmann. J. 901–915.. (1980). H. (2006). Goebel. ¨ ppel. Karnath. A computational theory of hippocampal function. D. (2002). 169– 176.. T. M.) (2001). E. McClelland. Rushworth. & Baudewig. P. Differential contribution of amygdala and hippocampus to cued and contextual fear condition. Regional cerebral blood ﬂow changes in cortex and basal ganglia during voluntary movements in normal human volunteers. J. Neural Computation. D. 11–21. E. Cerebral Cortex. 17. The hippocampus as a spatial map. Held. J. 19. J... A quantitative comparison of simultaneous BOLD fMRI and NIRS recordings during functional brain activation. Series B: Biological Sciences. 1418–1430.. (1982). & Nadel. Co-planar stereotaxic atlas of the human brain: 3-Dimensional proportional system: An approach to cerebral imaging. England: Cambridge University Press. R. J. B. R.. Shallice. P. S. & Johansen. Nature. Rapp.. Is there a dysexecutive syndrome? Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Deep dyslexia: A case study of connectionist neuropsychology. 377–500. Yamamoto.. & Newcombe. & Bonilha. Roland. 295–296. Kohler. 106. J. Shibasaki.. C. Syntactic and semantic errors in paralexia. C. F. Hove.. 175–187. E. Scoville. B. T. 148. (1978). M. 48... 34. 467–480. (2009). & LeDoux. & Milner. Cognitive Neuropsychology. Cerebral Cortex. O’Keefe. (1973). A. New York: Penguin. Neuropsychologia. England: Psychology Press.. Brain Research.. C. Sack. (2006). 16.. A. P. (1970). Understanding normal and impaired word reading: Computational principles in quasi-regular domains. H. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. J. T. Neurosurgery and Psychiatry. G. 819–832.. F. (1971). A. O’Keefe. & Lin. 20. Ritter. Topics in Cognitive Science. K. & Boas. (1996). Connection patterns distinguish three regions of human parietal cortex. E. G.. Progress in Neurobiology. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology. Neuroimage. Imaging the brain activity changes underlying impaired visuospatial judgments: Simultaneous FMRI. 243. T. Phillips. D. Contributions of the amygdale to emotion processing: From animal models to human behaviour. Behrens. Cooper. D. C... 17. C. & Plaut. 362. E. Residual visual function after brain wounds involving the central visual Po pathways in man. R. E. (2006). L. Plaut. P. & Thompson. Meyer. Rolls. Culver. J. K. Smolin. . D. and empirical tests of the theory.. Making working memory work: A computational model of learning in the prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia. Journal of Neurophysiology. 283–328. W. England: Clarendon Press. & Patterson. 719–731. 2841–2852. The trouble with physics. Strangman. 56–115. (2006). T. (1966). P. A. A. C. Phelps. (Ed. ‘‘Shallow draughts intoxicate the brain’’: Lessons from cognitive science for cognitive neuropsychology. T. Linden. J. D. 39–58. L. T. S. T. 1–48. (1957). E. Plaut. New York: Thieme Medical Publishers. & LeDoux. H. P. Neuron.R.. E. & Kesner. R. Oxford. Thompson... 823– 838. D.-O. 5. Patterson. Models of working memory: Mechanisms of active maintenance and executive control. Rorden. Improving symptom-lesion mapping. The handbook of cognitive neuropsychology. & Tournoux. Talairach.. Independent functioning of verbal memory stores: A neuropsychological study. & Frost. Y. 18.. B. (Eds. P. R. 10.. S. 274–285. Doral noradrenergic bundle and selective attention in the rat. & VIllringer.. Dechent.. 171–175. (2005). and behavioral studies. Shallice ⁄ Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (2010) 405 Marshall.. & Warrington. (2006). D. Preliminary evidence from unit activity in the freely-moving rat.
Spindler. K. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology.. 27. Neuroleptic-induced ‘‘anhedonia’’ in rats: Pimozide blocks reward quality of food. (1978). The selective impairment of semantic memory. M. Warrington. H.. G. Brain. Warrington. P. A. & Gerberg. (1974). 415–489. Cooper. E. Functional neuroimaging information: A case for neuro exceptionalism? Florida State University Law Review. Sanders. 34. Perception. K. (1975). 547–549. R.. 7. R. J. Science. S. A. . & Marshall. Weiskrantz. E. 695– 705. De Wit. J. K. (1978). A. (2007).. Visual capacity in the hemianopic ﬁeld following a restricted occipital ablation. 97. 635–657. E. M. Increased lever pressing for amphetamine after pimozide in rats: Implications for a dopamine theory of reward. & Wise..406 R. 262–264.. J. Warrington. Wise. (1975). 709–728. Yokel. D. Science. & Taylor. Shallice ⁄ Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (2010) Tovino. Two categorical stages of object perception. T. 187. R. 201. A.. L..
This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
We've moved you to where you read on your other device.
Get the full title to continue reading from where you left off, or restart the preview.