Economic  Voting  and  the  National  Front:   Towards  a  Subregional  Understanding  of  the  Extreme-­Right   Vote  in  France  
  Senior  Politics  Honors  Thesis   New  York  University   Fall  2012  and  Spring  2013,  POL-­‐UA  950  and  POL-­‐UA  951     By  John  Amerling  Aldrich       (203)  948-­‐6107   521  East  14th  Street,  #12F   New  York,  NY,  10009           Acknowledgements    
The  author  would  like  to  thank  Professor  Nathaniel  Beck,  Professor  Oeindrila  Dube,  and  Omar  García-­‐Ponce   in  the  NYU  Politics  Department  for  their  assistance  and  guidance  throughout  the  academic  year,  and  Astrid   Parenty  for  her  tireless  help  translating  from  the  French.  

Aldrich 1               ABSTRACT       Since  its  electoral  breakthrough  in  the  mid-­‐1980s,  the  extreme-­‐right  Front  national  

has  been  a  controversial  yet  undeniably  influential  political  and  cultural  force  in  France.   Between  the  2007  and  2012  French  presidential  elections,  the  percentage  of  vote  share   received  by  the  party  increased  from  10.44%  to  17.9%  nationally,  a  record  high.  Despite   this  and  other  recent  extreme-­‐right  victories  across  Europe,  the  literature  on  extreme-­‐right   voting  is  empirically  contradictory  and  surprisingly  limited  in  both  breadth  and  scope.  In   order  to  form  a  more  complete  understanding  of  extreme-­‐right  voting,  this  paper  examines   the  contributions  of  unemployment,  immigration,  and  crime  to  the  change  in  vote  share   received  by  the  Front  national  between  the  last  two  presidential  elections.  I  conduct  the   analysis  at  the  subregional  level  of  the  French  département.  The  analysis  shows  that  the   change  in  the  départemental  unemployment  rate  has  a  positive,  statistically  significant   effect  on  the  change  in  the  Front  national  vote,  and  that  this  effect  is  even  larger  in  areas   that  have  high  percentages  of  immigrants  relative  to  the  rest  of  the  country.        

Aldrich 2   I.  INTRODUCTION     This  paper  seeks  to  explain  the  rise  in  electoral  support  for  the  French  extreme-­‐ right  on  the  subregional  level  of  the  département  between  the  2007  and  2012  presidential   elections.  The  aim  of  such  an  effort  is  to  further  and  deepen  the  extant  corpus  of  academic   literature  on  extreme-­‐right  voting  in  recognition  of  a)  the  resurgence  of  the  European   extreme-­‐right  in  recent  decades  and  b)  the  ability  of  extreme-­‐right  parties  to  shape  policy   and  the  national  political  agenda  in  their  favor  even  when  not  in  power  or  coalition.  While   significant  work  has  been  done  exploring  extreme-­‐right  voting  on  cross-­‐national  levels,   there  has  been  relatively  little  work  done  on  intranational,  subregional  levels,  particularly   in  France  since  the  1986  electoral  breakthrough  of  its  premier  extreme-­‐right  party,  the   Front  national  (henceforth  the  National  Front,  or  “FN”).  It  is  in  this  vacuum  of  literature   that  this  paper  steps  in,  employing  ordinary  least  squares  (OLS)  regression  analysis  to  the   task  of  assessing  what  changing  factors  between  the  2007  and  2012  presidential  elections   account  for  the  increase  of  FN  vote  share  expressed  by  the  96  départements  of  Metropolitan   France  (the  French  mainland  plus  Corsica).  Using  the  change  in  FN  electoral  support  as   measured  by  the  percentage  of  vote  share  received  in  each  French  département  as  the   dependent  variable  and  the  change  in  each  département’s  unemployment  rate  as  the   primary  independent  variable,  I  will  operationalize  the  change  in  départemental   unemployment  rates’  effect  on  the  dependent  variable  first  independently  and  then  in   consideration  of  other  control  variables  such  as  the  change  in  the  percentage  of  immigrants   in  each  département’s  région,  the  change  in  reported  crimes  in  each  département,  and   various  interaction  variables  constructed  in  consideration  of  hypotheses  present  in  the   reviewed  literature.  Reviewing  and  grounding  my  work  in  the  context  of  this  literature,  my  

Aldrich 3   paper  is  ultimately  valuable  insofar  as  it  contributes  to  an  academic  landscape  rife  with   debate  and  contradiction,  and  advances  the  understanding  of  extreme-­‐right  voting  on   intranational,  subregional  levels.  Ultimately,  I  ascertain  that  the  change  in  regional   unemployment  has  a  positive,  statistically  significant  effect  on  the  change  in  the  FN  vote,   and  that  the  variable’s  effect  is  magnified  even  further  by  its  interaction  with  high  levels  of   immigration.  Such  a  conclusion  is  consistent  with  other  scholars’  findings  and  lends   qualified  empirical  support  to  Matt  Golder’s  “materialist  hypothesis,”  part  of  which  asserts   that  unemployment  increases  the  vote  for  extreme-­‐right  parties  when  immigration  is  high.   My  analysis  aims  to  contribute  meaningfully  to  one  of  the  most  interesting  and  increasingly   topical  subfields  of  political  science,  that  of  extreme-­‐right  voting.  I  proceed  with  a   background  on  the  National  Front,  a  literature  review,  and  the  full  presentation  of  my  data,   research  design,  and  results,  followed  by  my  conclusion.         II.  BACKGROUND       Since  its  founding  in  1972  by  the  party’s  ideological  leader  and  former  president  

Jean-­‐Marie  Le  Pen,  the  National  Front  has  gone  from  receiving  0.75%  of  the  national  vote  in   the  primer  tour  (first  round)  of  its  first  presidential  election  in  1974  to  a  record  17.9%  in   the  first  round  of  the  April  2012  presidential  election,  the  party’s  most  recent.11  Now  under   the  leadership  of  Jean-­‐Marie  Le  Pen’s  daughter  Marine  Le  Pen,  the  National  Front  has   established  itself  as  one  of  Europe’s  flagship  extreme-­‐right  parties  and  a  force  not  to  be   trifled  with  in  the  French  electoral  arena.17  How  has  it  accomplished  this?  What  does  the   party  stand  for?  And  what  does  the  electoral  success  of  the  National  Front  mean  for  

65%  of  the  vote  in  the  1986  French  legislative  elections.7.  the  change  to   France’s  electoral  system  in  1986  removed  “barriers  to  entry”  for  startup  parties  like  the   National  Front  and  allowed  more  dynamicism  in  the  electoral  space.  burgeoning  popularity.  Pursuant  to  Duverger’s  law.Aldrich 4   France?  To  answer  these  questions  it  behooves  one  to  examine  the  party  before  and  after   1986.95%  of  the  vote  and  10  seats  in  the  1984  elections  to  the  Parliament  of   the  European  Union  and  then  9.  the  National  Front  “broke  out”  electorally  between  1983  and  1986.  Yet  by   leveraging  popular  discontent  with  the  economy—still  suffering  the  protracted  effects  of   the  previous  decade’s  global  oil  crisis—and  effectively  shoring  up  support  amongst  its   mostly  blue-­‐collar  base.8%  of  the  first  round  vote  in  the  1988  legislative  elections  (and  1  seat   .  or  “first-­‐past-­‐the-­‐post”  (FPTP)  system  to  one   of  party-­‐list  proportional  representation.8a  Acting  in  the  FN’s   favor  was  the  recent  change  in  the  French  electoral  system  imposed  by  then  President   François  Mitterrand  from  a  simple  plurality.  the   National  Front  appeared  positioned  to  languish  on  the  periphery  of  French  politics.  a  principle  in   political  science  that  postulates  the  establishment  of  a  two-­‐party  regime  in  a  system  of   plurality  voting  and  multipartism  in  a  system  of  proportional  representation.  the  culminating  year  of  its  electoral  breakthrough.  two-­‐ballot  system  in  the  1988  legislative  elections  cost   the  National  Front  34  of  its  seats  in  the  National  Assembly.   first  achieving  10.  and  infighting  amongst  France’s  mainstream  rightwing   parties  to  achieve  9.     Receiving  such  a  small  percentage  of  the  vote  in  its  first  election  and  failing  to   qualify  to  run  in  the  following  presidential  election  of  1981  due  to  not  receiving  the   recently  increased  minimums  of  mayoral  support  needed  by  an  aspirant  political  party.  the  party  exploited  its  past   success.  30  While  the   reinstatement  of  the  majoritarian.   which  placed  35  FN  party  members  in  the  French  National  Assembly.

 final  round  of  a  presidential   election  (in  2002  before  suffering  the  landslide  82.”  over  the  course  of  its  history  the  National   Front  has  expanded  from  urban  to  rural  areas.  has  been  the  emergence  of   more  restrictive  policies  throughout  France  on  an  abundance  of  these  issues.  and  obligated  parties  on  both  the  right  and  left  to   adjust  their  policies  in  order  to  undermine  the  FN’s  ostensible  monopoly  on  “portraying   and  defining”  contentious  national  issues  like  those  pertaining  to  immigration.  points  out.  including   many  passed  by  governments  on  the  left.”31  The  result.  a  scholar  of  immigration  and  politics  in   Western  Europe.  acquired   voters  from  other  right-­‐wing  factions.  in  decision-­‐making  on  immigration.Aldrich 5   in  parliament)  and  14.   Through  the  process  of  “partisan  realignment.   Since  1988  it  has  subsequently  enjoyed  electoral  support  in  the  first  round  of  French   presidential  elections  in  the  range  of  a  “normalized”  10%  -­‐  15%.4%  of  the  vote  in  the  first  round  of  the  1988  presidential  election.  as  its  rise   between  2007  and  2012  foreshadows.  looks  poised  to  even  further  entrench  itself  therein.  the  National  Front  has  been  able  to  do  this  with   .  embedded  itself  in  local  politics.  such  as   asylum.  “the  electoral  breakthrough  of  the  National  Front…  ensured   that.  he  continues  to  explain.  the  electoral  context  could  not  be  ignored  [by   other  political  parties].  naturalization.2%  victory  of  Jacques  Chirac’s   Rassemblement  pour  la  République  [Rally  for  the  Republic]  party).30  As  Martin  Schain.  At  various  times  in  its  history.  the  National  Front  has   nevertheless  become  a  dominant  presence  in  French  politics  and  society  and.  and   the  issuance  of  tourist  visas.30   While  it  has  only  once  passed  through  to  the  second.  In  this  way.  the  rights  of  family  unification  and  marriage  for  immigrants.  the  sheer  presence  of  the  FN  since  its   breakout  in  the  mid-­‐1980s  has  been  sufficient  to  color  the  ideological  agenda  of  the  nation   and  the  tangible  policies  through  which  such  an  agenda  has—and  continues  to  be— expressed.

 the  FN  nonetheless   staunchly  defended  its  core  positions  in  the  first  round  of  the  2012  presidential  election.  enjoy  a  gravitational  pull  in  public  and  political  discourse   disproportionate  to  their  actual  legislative  agency.   consolidate.  exactly?  What  does  the  National  Front  stand  for?     Broadly.  the  German  Occupation  wasn’t  particularly  inhumane.  and  has  been  embroiled  in  controversy  for  much  of  its  existence  due  to   the  polemical  policies  it  promotes  and  the  provocative  statements  that  continue  to  be   issued  by  party  figureheads.  and  anti-­‐Semitic  platform—Jean-­‐Marie  Le  Pen  has  been  found  guilty  twice  of   denying  the  Holocaust.   where  it  placed  third  after  the  ultimate  victor  François  Hollande’s  Parti  socialiste  (Socialist   Party)  and  then-­‐incumbent  president  Nicolas  Sarkozy’s  Union  pour  un  mouvement                                                                                                                   †  In  February  2012  a  Paris  court  upheld  its  2008  ruling  that  Jean-­‐Marie  Le  Pen  was  guilty  of  “‘the  contestation  of  crimes  against   humanity.’”  He  was  fined  and  given  a  three  month  suspended  sentence.†.23.  the  FN  of  today  is  regarded  as  a  more  moderate   incarnation  of  the  party  once  known  for  its  unabashedly  xenophobic.  13  The  party  advocates  a  “zero  tolerance”  platform  with  respect  to  law   and  order  issues.  economic  protectionist.  eurosceptic.  and  grow.  even  if  there  were  some   excesses—inevitable  in  a  country  of  550.’”  having  said  in  2005  that  “‘in  France.  souverainist.  at  least.000  square  kilometers.  even  when   they  remain  electorally  as  such.Aldrich 6   little  to  no  official  representation  in  government.  the  National  Front—like  many  other  extreme-­‐right  parties  in  Europe—is   socially  conservative.  World  War  II   revisionist.  16  Despite  downplaying  the  most   inflammatory  components  of  its  rhetoric  and  engaging  in  a  “a  self-­‐conscious  process  of   dédiabolisation  (decontamination)”  under  the  aegis  of  Marine  Le  Pen.  nationalist.  such  is  their  political  clout.13a  Indeed.30   But  what  are  these  policies.  As  extremist  parties  emerge.  and   anti-­‐immigrant.  9.  first  in  1991  and  then  in  2008.16     .  they  are  capable  of  leveraging  more  mainstream  parties’  fear  of   losing  voters  in  order  to  shift  national  policy  formation  closer  to  their  preferential  lines.  The  principle   that  obtains  not  only  in  France  but  throughout  Europe  is  that  “fringe”  parties.

 These  parties.  32.27.  upon   which  it  blames  the  economic  and  political  union  for  the  “unemployment.  For  the  most  part  of  the  post-­‐World  War  II   era…support  for  extreme  right-­‐wing  parties  has  been  marginal.   Propelled  forth  by  the  European  Sovereign-­‐Debt  Crisis  and  its  attendant  economic  woes.  if  existent  at   all.   Geert  Wilders’  anti-­‐immigrant  and  anti-­‐Islam  Dutch  Freedom  Party.  “Right-­‐wing  extremism  in  Western   Europe  is.  the  anti-­‐immigrant  and  Flemish-­‐secessionist  Belgian  Vlaams  Blok.  33.Aldrich 7   populaire  (Union  for  a  Popular  Movement).  immigration.  remained  largely  outside  the  political  arena.  fanned  by  ‘extremist  movements.  a  new  pattern  or   trend  appeared  to  manifest  itself  in  this  regard.  26   Contextualizing  the  National  Front’s  unprecedented  electoral  success  has  been  a   larger  wave  of  extreme-­‐right  victories  breaking  upon  the  shores  of  the  European  continent.  starting  in  the  1980s.  not  a  new  phenomenon.20.  and  Greece’s  ostensibly  neo-­‐Nazi  Golden   Dawn  party  are  only  a  handful  of  the  influential  extreme-­‐right  parties  that  have   commanded  public  and  political  attention  in  Europe  in  recent  years  and  decades.”  and  its  anti-­‐European  Union  platform.  of  course.   the  radically  nationalist  Hungarian  Jobbik  party.   29.  Yet.  30.’”20  Indeed.   European  Union  President  Herman  Van  Rompuy  has  recently  “criticized  what  he  calls  the   ‘winds  of  populism’  blowing  across  Europe.28  As  political  scientist  Pia  Knigge  wrote  in  1998.10  Media  coverage  of  the  run-­‐up  to  the  election   details  support  being  found  in  the  FN’s  mantra  “a  France  for  the  French.  the  upstart  British  Freedom  Party  and  the  associated   English  Defence  League.”  its  anti-­‐immigrant   stance  in  a  republic  where  many  are  “fearful  [of]  ‘foreigners’…  overrunning  the  country  and   straining  France's  generous  social  model.  the  Austrian  Freedom   Party  (FPÖ)  under  Jörg  Haider.  New  extreme  right-­‐wing  parties  emerged   rather  systematically  throughout  the  major  Western  European  countries.”17  All  virulent  in   .  and   insecurity”  plaguing  the  country.

 these  parties   nevertheless  represent  a  clear  trend  in  European  politics  and  a  cause  for  concern  amongst   mainstream  parties  forced  to  respond  to  their  contributions  to  the  national  and  continental   conversation.  Like  many  other  parties   across  Europe.  30  Quoting  Christopher  Husbands.  “‘flash’”   .  immigrants.  working-­‐.  Third  World   asylum-­‐seekers.  scholars  such  as  Matt  Golder  have  categorized  the  FN  as  a  populist  extreme-­‐ right  party.  not  a  sectional  interest   such  as  an  economic  class.  and  similar  out-­‐groups—as  well  as  aggressive  nationalism  or  localism.  Quoting  Canovan  (1994).  Jackman  and  Karin  Volpert   (1996)  specify  that  “‘What  unites  all  of  these  parties  is  their  particular  commitment  to   some  sort  of  ethnic  exclusionism—a  hostility  to  foreigners.  extreme-­‐right  parties  have  and  share  a   willingness  to  work  within  extant  political  frameworks  in  order  to  achieve  their  goals.   and  middle-­‐class.  Golder  asserts  that  these  parties  are  differentiated   from  parties  of  the  mainstream  right  insofar  as  their  popularism  makes  them  “advocates  of   direct  democracy  [that]  ‘claim  legitimacy  on  the  grounds  that  they  speak  for  the  people:   that  is  to  say.3.  they  claim  to  represent  the  democratic  sovereign.”14   Finally.  and  most  crucially  for  this  paper.30   Parties  like  the  National  Front  are  neither  revolutionary  nor  are  they  ephemeral.’”12  Other  characteristics  agreed  upon  by  scholars  that  separate   the  extreme-­‐right  from  the  mainstream  right  include  distinguishing  factors  such  as   embedded  notions  of  inequality  and  social  hierarchy  (often  expressed  in  terms  of  ethnic   and  cultural  nationalism)  and  a  base  of  support  drawn  mostly  from  the  lower-­‐.  Robert  W.Aldrich 8   rhetoric  yet  electorally  and  legislatively  successful  to  varying  degrees.  As  there  exist  some  institutions—such  as  the  guerrilla  English  Defence   League—that  are  not  actually  designed  to  be  functioning  political  parties  as  much  as   vehicles  of  political  agency  and  activism.  it  should  be  noted  that  in  contrast  the  French   National  Front  is  an  established  and  legitimate  political  party.

 utilizing  a  variety  of  research  designs  on  cross-­‐national.  as  well  as  incomplete.  Diverse  in  terms  of  methodology.  LITERATURE  REVIEW     As  previously  mentioned.         III.   .  regional  focus.  Before  introducing  my  own   work  and  findings  I  will  review  and  comment  upon  relevant  literature  with  respect  to  the   following:         Methodology/regional  focus/level  of  analysis  of  the  literature:     Although  the  particular  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  my  research  design  will  be   described  in  more  detail  in  Section  V.  subregional  level.22  These  last   characteristics  are  of  paramount  importance  because  it  is  only  within  the  confines  of  an   electoral  infrastructure  both  utilized  and  considered  legitimate  that  we  can  thoroughly   examine  the  factors  that  contributed  to  the  rise  in  FN  vote  share  between  the  2007  and   2012  presidential  elections.  and   level  of  analysis.Aldrich 9   parties.  Instead.  rather  than  participate  in  the  political  process  over  the  long-­‐term.  the  literature  on  extreme-­‐right  voting  is  diverse  and   contradictory.  and  incomplete  in  the  sense  that  there  is  always   more  work  to  be  done  in  order  to  clarify  the  aforementioned.  contradictory  with  respect  to  what  it  concludes  upon  tackling  some  of  the   most  fundamental  questions  of  the  field.  which  is  to  say  as  a  model  designed  to   detect  meaningful  relationships  between  the  changes  in  the  dependent  and  independent   variables  over  time.  as  Michael  S.  as  we  will  do  after  reviewing  a  selection  of  relevant  literature.  Lewis-­‐Beck  describes  short-­‐lived  parties  that  aim  to  disrupt  and   disband.  it  is  worth  stating  at  this  juncture  that  no  scholars  in   the  reviewed  literature  structured  their  work  as  I  structured  mine:  as  a  “first  differences   regression”  on  an  intranational.

 like  all  academic  work.  and  political  trends  (public’s  dissatisfaction  with  the  political   regime).  authors  explored  the  effects  of  economic   factors  like  unemployment  and  inflation  rates.  while  a  literature  review  is  useful  in  contextualizing  the  work  of   this  paper.  All  work  in  the   reviewed  literature  deals  exclusively  across  and  within  the  countries  of  Europe.Aldrich 10   subregional.  Pia  Knigge  employs  a  pooled  time-­‐series  cross-­‐sectional  research   design  across  six  Western  European  countries  between  1984  and  1993  in  order  to  examine   “the  relative  strength  of  three  popular  explanations  of  contemporary  right-­‐wing   extremism:  the  impact  of  economic  conditions  (unemployment  and  inflation).  In  “The  ecological  correlates  of  right-­‐wing  extremism  in   Western  Europe”  (1998).  and  all   results  are  the  products  of  the  each  author’s  unique  analytical  models.  Therefore.  data.  social  factors  like  the  presence  of   immigrants.  the  reader  should  keep  in  mind  the  aforementioned  qualifications  and  recognize   that  the  literature  on  extreme-­‐right  voting  in  Europe  is.  and  individual  (survey)  levels.”  Using  “latent  public  support  for  parties  of  the  extreme-­‐right  rather  than  actual   electoral  outcomes”  (i.  neither   complete  nor  definitively  conclusive.  and  political  factors  like  electoral  district  magnitude  and  people’s  satisfaction   with  the  current  political  regime  on  support  for  extreme-­‐right  parties.  Knigge  finds  that  “rising  levels  of  immigration  and  public  dissatisfaction  with  the   .  and  set  of   assumptions.  social   developments  (immigration).e.  intention  to  vote  for  an  extreme-­‐right  party)  as  her  dependent   variable.  most   scholars  working  on  any  level  of  aggregate  data  choose  at  least  the  unemployment  rate  as   an  operationalizable  variable.         Theoretical  backgrounds  and  results  of  the  literature:     When  analyzing  the  effects  of  economic  factors  on  extreme-­‐right  voting.

 however:  would  an  incumbent  extreme-­‐right   party  face  the  same  threat  of  getting  voted  out  when  the  economy  is  underperforming?   While  not  answered  directly.  specifically.  A  question  can  be  raised  here.  Because  people   are  not  very  likely  to  blame  their  own  group  (in-­‐group)  for  these  increasingly  competitive   .  1984—1993).  the  intention  to  support  the   extreme-­‐right)  is  an  act  of  “protest”  against  mainstream  parties  seen  to  have  mismanaged   the  economy.”  Basing  her   hypothesis  that  “as  economic  conditions  worsen.  writing  in  “Extreme-­‐right   voting  in  Western  Europe”  (2002).  Knigge  assumes  that  if  conditions  of  “stable  prices   and  low  unemployment”  are  met.  a  vote  for  the  extreme-­‐right  (or.e.  embodied  by  “extreme-­‐right  parties  in  Western   Europe…[that]  have  been  excluded  from  participation  in  government—at  least  for  the  time   frame  considered  in  the  present  case  (i.  both  Knigge  and  Marcel  Lubbers.  and  not  just  a  nominal  one.  Western  European  citizens  are  more   likely  to  lend  their  support  to  extreme  right-­‐wing  parties”  on  the  work  of  Lewis-­‐Beck   (1988)  and  Powell  and  Whitten  (1993).  Going  on  and   drawing  upon  theories  of  economic  interests  covered  in  Blalock  (1967)  and  Olzak  (1992).  “contrary  to  the   initial  hypothesis…results  suggest  that  a  declining  national  economy  (unemployment  in   particular)  diminishes  the  electoral  appeal  of  extreme  right-­‐wing  parties.  social  groups  are   more  likely  to  perceive  stronger  competition  over  these  scarce  resources.  the  incumbent  party  or  candidate  is  rewarded.  suggest  that  voters  treat  extreme-­‐right  parties   differently  than  mainstream  parties  insofar  as  extreme-­‐right  parties  are  viewed  as   representative  of  an  institutionalized  opposition.   Lubbers  writes  that  “in  countries  where  competition  for  scarce  resources  intensifies  due  to   worsening  economic  conditions  or  an  increasing  number  of  immigrants.”17   For  Knigge.  If  they  are   not.Aldrich 11   political  regime  significantly  facilitate  right-­‐wing  extremism”  and  that..  voters  instead  support  the  opposition.

e.  leading  Lubbers  to  encapsulate  such  sentiment  in  the  dual   hypothesis  that  “In  countries  where  the  unemployment  level  is  higher  and  the  number  of   immigrants  is  larger.  being—or  simply  perceiving  to  be—threatened   by  an  [ethnically  distinct]  “other”  is  reason  to  support  the  extreme-­‐right.”  Going  on  to  analyze  both  individual  level  and  “contextual”  (i.  out-­‐groups).Aldrich 12   circumstances…  they  blame  others  (i.”24  Lubbers  expands   upon  this  logic  in  another  2002  paper.  support  for  extreme  right-­wing  parties  is  greater.  a  stronger  identification  with  France  and  a   stronger  authoritarian  attitude.”  While  also  finding  that  “the  number  of  ethnic  immigrants  does  have  a   .  Lubbers  supports   Knigge  in  finding  “no  direct  effect  of  unemployment”  on  the  regional  level.”  “manual   workers  are  more  likely  to  vote  for  the  Front  National  because  manual  workers  may   perceive  a  stronger  competitive  threat  from  ethnic  minorities  than  other  occupational   categories.  although  he  does   find  “small  indirect  effects  such  that  higher  unemployment  levels  evoke  a  more   unfavorable  attitude  towards  ethnic  out-­‐groups.”  where  he  writes  that.  as  immigrants  first  and  foremost  operate  in  the  same  labor  market  segment  as   manual  workers  do  (Thave  2000).  we  expect  again  that  in  regions  where  the  unemployment   level  is  higher…or  where  unemployment  increases  strongly…people  are  more  likely  to  vote  for   the  Front  National.”  Here.  and  thus  Lubbers  once  again   ultimately  hypothesizes  that  “as  the  unemployment  level  is  an  indicator  of  the  economic   situation  in  a  region  (Olzak  1992).  the  party  that   categorically  blames  national  out-­‐groups  for  a  country’s  woes.e.  regional   on  the  level  of  the  département)  predictors  of  National  Front  voting.  which  in  turn  increases  the  likelihood  of  a  vote  for  the   Front  National.  on  the  basis  of  “Realistic  Conflict  Theory.”  It  is  precisely  this  notion  of  blaming   “out-­‐groups”—which  immigrants  compose  and  are  placed  into—that  forms  the  basis  of   extreme-­‐right  party  platforms..  “French  Front  National  voting:  a  micro  and  macro   perspective.

 however.  the  more  Leftist  votes  are  expected.  decide  to  blame  others  instead  of  elected  officials).  but   also  the  amount  of  contradiction  present  throughout  the  literature  on  extreme-­‐right   voting.  “the  more  economic  malcontents  there  are.”25   In  “Economics  and  the  French  Voter:  A  Microanalysis”  (1983).  his  1983  work  concludes  that  on  an  individual   level.  even  if  they  do.”  such  as  if  they  “fail  to  perceive  their  deteriorating  economic   circumstance.  “If  one  thinks  about  it.  voters  may  believe   that  the  Left.  Lewis-­‐Beck   reveals  that  an  aggregate  level  regression  model  examining  the  effects  of  economic   conditions  on  voting  in  legislative  elections  in  a  previous  paper  of  his  (Lewis-­‐Beck  and   Bellucci  [1982])  “[indicated]  that  increases  in  the  unemployment  rate…significantly   [enhanced]  the  vote  share  of  the  Left.  Michael  S.  “The   .   because  such  a  vote  might  be  made  “on  strict  policy  grounds…that  is.  perhaps  because  of  its  working  class  base.  Such  a   contradiction  reveals  not  only  the  underdeveloped  causal  scenario  within  Lewis-­‐Beck’s   own  work  (wherein  he  admits  that.”  and  that  “…when  there  is  no  control  for   compositional  effects.”  This   is  at  odds.  he   asserts  that  it  is  “not  really  surprising”  that  the  unemployed  should  vote  for  the  left.”  he  concedes  that  “breaking  down  the  regional  level  of   analysis  has  sometimes  led  to  different  outcomes.   the  stronger  the  support  for  Le  Pen.Aldrich 13   direct  effect  [on  support  for  the  FN]”  insofar  as  “the  more  immigrants  [that]  live  in  a  region.21  What  are  we  to  make  of  these  varying  conclusions?  As  Matt  Golder  writes.  there  are  many  reasons  why   French  citizens  might  not  take  their  personal  economic  situation  into  account  when   deciding  how  to  vote.  with  the  previously  discussed  literature  that  predicts  an  increase  in   vote  share  for  the  right—specifically  the  extreme-­‐right—in  bad  economic  times.  is  more  likely  to  initiate  programs   that  will  reduce  unemployment.”  Ultimately.”  Inserting  these  findings  into  a  larger  discussion.  [the]  findings  are  not  very  valid.”  and.

 This  speaks  to  the  fact  that.  and   overwhelmingly  the  literature  suggests  that  higher  immigration  is  associated  with  higher   levels  of  support  for  extreme-­‐right  parties.  in  the  words  of  Paul   Hainsworth.  They  do  not  explain  why  voters   who  wish  to  punish  incumbent  parties  should  vote  for  extreme-­‐right  parties  over  any  other   opposition  party.  such  as  theories  of  economic  interest  and  conflict  theory.14  Hilde  Coffé.  agrees.”  Coffé  supports   such  a  statement  by  reviewing  some  of  the  same  theoretical  justification  covered  by   Lubbers.     Throughout  the  literature.  immigration  is  the  extreme-­‐right’s  “issue  par  excellence.  theoretical  scenario  that  predicts  where  on  the   ideological  party  spectrum  we  should  expect  voters  to  turn  in  rejection  of  an  incumbent   party’s  handling  of  the  economy.  then  it  is  certainly  the  issue  of  immigration.Aldrich 14   problem  is  that  economic  voting  theories  focus  on  how  incumbent  political  parties  are   rewarded  or  punished  for  their  economic  performance.”12  Despite  the  educated  guesses  of  some  scholars.   author  of  “Fertile  grounds  for  extreme  right-­‐wing  parties:  Explaining  the  Vlaams  Blok’s   electoral  success”  (2007).  adding  that  “if  any  single  issue  dominates  today’s   extreme  right-­‐wing  platforms.”  or  the  issue  through   which  all  other  measures  of  support  for  extreme-­‐right  parties  are  channeled.  recall  that  Lubbers  put  the  two  together  in  one   hypothesis  when  he  claimed  that  support  for  extreme-­‐right  parties  is  higher  in  countries   with  high  unemployment  and  a  high  number  of  immigrants.  Many  authors  concur.  Golder  is  correct  in   saying  that  we  have  no  unambiguous.  Illustrating  the   inconclusiveness  of  all  aspects  of  the  literature  on  extreme-­‐right  voting.  one  can  observe  the  conflating  of  economic  tensions  with  social  ones   such  as  the  presence  of  immigrants.  Indeed.  and  particularly  with  an  eye  trained  on  the  postulated   effects  of  the  economy  (through  the  avatar  of  unemployment)  on  extreme-­‐right  voting  as   we  have  had  so  far.  Coffé  ultimately   .

 which  claim  that  people  who  live  in  close  contact  with  immigrants  may   actually  develop  more  positive  feelings  towards  them  than  those  who  do  not.  is  that  immigrants  are  seen  as  repositories— the  ultimate  “out-­‐groups”—for  the  woes  of  a  voting  community  willing  to  scapegoat  them   in  lieu  of  blaming  members  of  their  own  “in-­‐group.  which  is   one  of  the  reasons  why  political  science  that  tries  to  break  down  such  a  phenomenon  into   smaller.  however.  Citing  P.Aldrich 15   claims  only  that  “the  presence  of  immigrants  may  facilitate  [extreme-­‐right  parties’]   electoral  growth”  (italics  mine).  then.  citing  opposing  theories  to  the  “higher  immigration.  it  is  more  widely  accepted  that  immigrants  do  contribute  to  higher  levels  of   support  for  extreme-­‐right  parties.  visible  foundation  upon  which  a  great   deal  of  their  platform  is  erected.  quantifiable  pieces  is  so  valuable.  are  the  more  nuanced.”4a   If.  by  saying  such   theories  have  “limited  empirical  support.  however.  higher   extreme-­‐right  vote”  scenario  like  those  discussed  by  W.  immigration   dominates.  Chapin  (1997)  and  Pascal   Perrineau  (1997).  On  a  rhetorical  level.  as  immigrant  issues  provide  an  easy.  causal  explanations  of  extreme-­‐right  voting.   Martin  (1998).D.”  Extreme-­‐right  parties  play  into  this  in   obvious  ways.  Lost  in  the  “immigration  as  the  extreme-­‐right  issue  ‘par  excellence’”   mix.  however.  and  let  us  not  be  mistaken  that  indeed  immigration  is  a  significant  component   .   according  to  scholars  like  Schain  and  Lubbers.  One  only  needs  to  read  media  coverage  of  an  extreme-­‐ right  party’s  campaign  or  attend  a  rally  in  order  to  see  the  co-­‐option  and  propagation  of   such  an  issue  in  action.  Coffé  also  describes  a  dissenting  theory  wherein  “a  negative  relation   between  the  presence  of  immigrants  and  extreme  right  voting  may  also  occur  if  people  who   are  hostile  towards  foreigners  leave  places  where  many  immigrants  live  and  concentrate  in   jurisdictions  with  fewer  foreigners.”  She  couches  both  claims.  what  is  the  nature  of  such  a  relationship?  The  situation.

 pursuant  to  theories  like  Perrineau’s  aforementioned  “contact   hypothesis?”4a.  Among  the  author’s   .  is  it  always  the   case  that  higher  levels  of  immigration  produce  higher  levels  of  support  for  the  extreme-­‐ right.  15  While  it  is  outside  the  scope  of  this  paper’s  research  to  pursue  these   questions  in  detail.  culture.  the  causal  story  remains  ambiguous.  19.  Matt  Golder  writes.  and  certainly  merit  further  study.  “Although  the   success  of  [extreme-­‐right]  parties  is  commonly  associated…with  high  levels  of   unemployment  and  immigration.  whereas  Jackman  and  Volpert  [1996]  conclude  the  opposite”).  does  there  exist  some  “immigrant  threshold”  wherein   “immigrant  size  turns  into  immigrant  rejection.  they  nevertheless  serve  to  inform  and  fill  out  the  complexities  of  issues   such  as  immigration.”  as  Gallya  Lahav  questions  in  “Opposition   to  Immigration:  Self-­‐Interest  or  Public  Interest?”  (2003)?19  To  that  point.  But  what  is  really  going  on  here?  In  “Explaining  Variation  in  the   Success  of  Extreme  Right  Parties  in  Europe”  (2003).Aldrich 16   of  extreme-­‐right  voting.  or  could  it  be—as  Coffé  and  Lahav  write  of  some  suggesting—that  proximity  to   immigrants  actually  decreases  extreme-­‐right  voting  because  immigrants  are  humanized   and  stereotypes  eroded.  and  way  of  life  more   generally?”12  Furthermore.     Critiquing  many  of  the  authors  hitherto  discussed  in  methodological  terms  and   recognizing  the  inconsistencies  in  much  of  the  same  literature  that  we  have  reviewed  (such   as  the  fact  that  “Knigge  [1998]  claims  that  unemployment  reduces  the  support  for  extreme-­‐ right  parties.  and  immigration”  on  the  success  of   extreme-­‐right  parties  across  19  countries  and  over  165  elections.  Do  voters  support   extreme-­‐right  parties  because  immigrants  negatively  affect  their  material  well-­‐being  or   because  immigrants  pose  a  threat  to  their  national  identity.  Matt  Golder’s   “Explaining  Variation  in  the  Success  of  Extreme  Right  Parties  in  Europe”  (2003)  examines   the  “effect  of  electoral  institutions.  unemployment.

”  It  should  be  noted  here  that  Golder  is  careful  to  distinguish   populist  extreme-­‐right  parties  from  neo-­‐fascist  ones  in  his  work.  “Unemployment  only   increases  the  vote  share  of  populist  [extreme-­‐right]  parties  when  there  are  large  numbers   of  foreigners  in  the  country.  for  the  interaction  term  is   .Aldrich 17   various  findings  is  that  “immigration  has  a  positive  effect  on  [extreme-­‐right]  parties   irrespective  of  the  unemployment  level.  [and]  unemployment  only  matters  when   immigration  his  high.  for  to  not  do  so  is  to  “…assume  that  unemployment   causes  individuals  to  vote  for  extreme-­‐right  parties  in  an  unconditional  way.  which—he  is  correct  in  saying—is  present  neither  here  nor   in  the  literature  reviewed  in  his  work.”  Highly   emphasizing  this  interaction  variable.”  which  states  that.”  which  he   views  as  fallacious  due  to  the  fact  that  “the  economic  voting  literature  provides  no  evidence   why  higher  levels  of  unemployment  would  cause  people  to  vote  for  extreme-­‐right  parties   over  any  other.         In  his  paper.”12  As  we  have  discussed  only  various  theoretical  reasons  that  could—or  do   not—compel  a  person  to  vote  for  either  the  right  or  left  under  conditions  of  high   unemployment  (without  concluding  anything  substantive).”  Procedurally  enabling  the  latter  finding  is  the  construction  of  an   interaction  variable  between  immigration  and  unemployment  designed  to  analyze  what  he   calls  the  “materialist  hypothesis.  “Unemployment  increases  the  vote  for   extreme-­‐right  parties  when  immigration  is  high.  Golder  finds  empirical  support  for  the  synthesis  of  unemployment  and   immigration  (in  the  form  of  an  interaction  term  based  on  his  “materialist  hypothesis”)   increasing  the  vote  share  for  extreme-­‐right  parties.  Unemployment  does  not  affect  (or  lowers)   the  vote  share  received  by  extreme-­‐right  parties  when  immigration  is  low.  Golder  criticizes  authors  like  Jackman  and  Volpert   for  not  including  it  in  their  models.  it  should  be  noted  here  that   Golder  uses  the  word  evidence.  observing  that.

 however.  which  often  blames  negative  economic  condition  on  foreign  migrants.  it  is  pointed  out.  Discussing  Golder’s  “materialist  hypothesis”  as  well  as  its  inverse  in  the   form  of  Perrineau’s  “contact  hypothesis”  (more  immigrants.  “Of   the  relatively  few  empirical  studies  that  have  been  conducted  at  the  regional  level.”  The   authors  cite  the  example  of  Terri  Givens  in  “The  Role  of  Socio-­‐Economic  Factors  in  the   Success  of  Extreme  Right  Parties”  (2002)  finding  a  link  between  a  high  number  of   immigrants  and  support  for  the  extreme-­‐right  in  Austrian  and  French  regions  but  not  in   German  states  before  additionally  citing  Cass  Mudde’s  observation  that  there  is  an   “‘absence  of  a  clear  cut  relation  between  the  number  of  immigrants  and  the  electoral   success  of  [extreme-­‐right  parties]  in  certain  territorial  units.  David  Jesuit  and  Vincent  Mahler  write  in  “Electoral  Support  for  Extreme  Right-­‐Wing   Parties:  A  Subnational  Analysis  of  Western  European  Elections  in  the  1990s”  that  most   work  pursuing  either  hypothesis  has  been  “based  on  national-­‐level  studies”  and  note.  because   although  he  may  have  been  the  one  to  formalize  and  popularize  the  ideas  encapsulated  in   .  less  support  for  the  extreme-­‐ right).  “have  always   been  the  parties  of  full  employment”).”15   To  singularly  credit  Golder  with  this  insight  would  be  to  err.  none   has  found  an  unambiguous  link  between  immigration  and  [extreme-­‐right  voting].12  As  Golder  and  others  designate   the  National  Front  a  populist  extreme-­‐right  party.Aldrich 18   only  statistically  significant  with  respect  to  the  former.  Jesuit  and  Mahler  deem  Golder’s  “materialist   hypothesis”  the  approach  that  is  most  “consistent  with  the  political  rhetoric  of  the  extreme   right.’”  Reviewing  well-­‐worn   components  of  economic  voting  literature  such  as  the  theory  of  incumbent  punishment   during  economic  downturns  and  the  question  of  why  voters  would  then  turn  to  the   extreme-­‐right  over  the  left  (whose  social  democratic  parties.  no  further  discussion  on  the  distinction   suits  our  purposes.

’”  “Thus.”  strengthening  his  argument.  In  “French  Electoral  Theory”  (1993).’”  it  was  Michael  S.  In  other  words.  the  département).”  Claiming   that  “the  psychological  mechanism  for  such  an  ‘interaction  effect’  seems  straightforward.”  He  further  credits  Perrineau  (1988)   for  “survey  evidence  that  FN  voters  do  indeed  overwhelmingly  make  this  psychological   attribution.  does  not  yield  significantly  more  FN  voting…  It  is   unemployment  coupled  with  immigration  that  motivates  National  Front  support.  religion.”  he  continues.  the  impact  from  unemployment  intensifies.  which  proposes  harsh  immigration  controls.  Measuring  these  issues   .  ‘two  million  unemployed  =  two  million  immigrants….  “the  unemployment  problem  is  ‘solved’  by  a  ballot  for  the  National   Front.  as  the  number   of  immigrants  increases.  for  these   voters.  Lewis-­‐Beck  who   continued  on  to  state  in  “French  Electoral  Theory”  (1993)  that  “unemployment  appears  to   depend  for  its  effect  upon  the  level  of  immigration.  Citing  the   “well  chosen  words  of  Nonna  Meyer”  who  said  that  “‘behind  the  very  real  “crispation”  over   immigration  is  hidden  the  drama  of  unemployment.  an  attribution  encouraged  by  a  popular  [Jean-­‐Marie]   Le  Pen  slogan.  the   presence  of  unemployment.  and  ideology  (basing  his  first  of  two   research  designs  on  individual  level  survey  data)  and  then  seeks  to  evaluate  the  “issue-­‐base   of  FN  support”  by  analyzing  immigration.  and  unemployment—the  issues  he  says   are  consistently  judged  très  important  by  both  surveys  and  journalistic  accounts—on  the   aggregate  level  of  the  French  district  (in  his  case.  However.   [a]  high  unemployment  rate  does  not  really  increase  FN  support.  Lewis-­‐Beck   looks  at  the  three  social  cleavages  of  class.Aldrich 19   his  “materialist  hypothesis”  he  is  not  the  first  to  highlight  a  nexus  between  extreme-­‐right   voting  and  the  conditional  presence  of  immigrants  and  high  unemployment.  crime.”   Lewis-­‐Beck  asserts  that  voters  in  regions  with  a  high  number  of  immigrants  believe  that   immigrants  “‘cause’  unemployment.  In  [départements]  with  few  immigrants.  by  itself.

 and  the  unemployment  rate  (all  per  département)  on  the  dependent   variable  and  including  an  interaction  term  unemployment  X  immigration.  positive  correlations  for  immigration  and  crime.  he  says  his  aggregate  level  work  is  designed  to   avoid  survey  data’s  inherent  problem  of  only  revealing  “…what  voters  said.  whose  positive  coefficient  is  highly  statistically   significant.  are   fertile  ground  for  National  Front  recruiters.  he  says  his  model  reveals  that.  not  what  they   did.  and  a  pronounced  immigrant  presence  in  the  midst  of  elevated  unemployment.   however.  “Constituencies  with  high  crime   rates.”  Operationalizing  the  effects  of  the  number  of  immigrants.  Coffé  hypothesizes  that   “crime  has  a  significant  effect  on  the  success  of  the  extreme  right  parties.   the  Belgian  Vlaams  Blok.  crimes  against  persons  per   1.  and  strong  support  for  the  interaction  of   unemployment  and  immigration.  a  “surprisingly  weak”  but  still   positive  correlation  for  unemployment.000  inhabitants.  Hilde  Coffé  agrees  that  “the  relationship   between  crime  and  extreme  right  performance  has  rarely  been  studied  empirically.  Ultimately.Aldrich 20   up  against  the  dependent  variable  of  FN  vote  share  received  in  the  1986  French   parliamentary  elections  per  département.  Lewis-­‐Beck’s  inclusion  of  the  variable  speaks  to  its  relevance  to  the   issue  of  extreme-­‐right  voting.  Despite  its  relative  lack  of  scholarship.”22   While  crime  has  been  largely  absent  from  the  literature  and  research  designs  we   have  reviewed  thus  far.  Lewis-­‐Beck  finds   strong.  particularly  for  the  party  of  her  focus.”  yet   calls  crime  a  “central  topic”  of  extreme  right-­‐parties.”  Interestingly.4a  Although  the  two  aforementioned  authors  examine  it.  In  “Fertile  grounds  for  extreme  right-­‐wing  parties:  Explaining   the  Vlaams  Blok’s  electoral  success”  (2007).  in  her  study  she  finds  that  crime  does  not  determine  the  electoral  success  of  the   Vlaams  Blok  on  a  municipal  level.   further  study  of  crime’s  effect  on  electoral  support  for  extreme-­‐right  parties  merits  the   .

 my  work  employs  a  “first  differences”  design  in  order  to  capture  the  effects  of   changing  variables  within  a  specific  period  of  time.     .  there  is  more  work  to  be  done  on  the  unresolved  issue  of  why  voters   would  choose  one  party  over  another  given  a  poor  economy.  either   alone  or  in  conjunction  with  high  immigration.”15  Whilst  incomplete.  Unlike  the  two  authors’  cross-­‐sectional  research  designs.  The  advantages  of  this  model  will  be   elucidated  in  Section  V.  for  example.  although  my  research  draws   theoretically  on  all  of  the  reviewed  literature.  Jesuit  and  Mahler.  In  addition  to  completing  more  research  on  crime’s  effect  on  support   for  the  extreme-­‐right.  It  is  with  all  of  the  aforementioned  in  mind  that  we  move  on  to  a   review  of  the  incorporated  data.   however.  as  well  as  in  forming  a  more   complete  understanding  of  what  we  mean  when  we  discuss  “the  economy’s”  effect  on   extreme-­‐right  voting.  both   of  whom  have  particularly  contributed  to  our  understanding  of  the  interactive  effects  of   unemployment  and  immigration.         My  contribution  to  the  literature:   Clearly.  To  this  end.  there  are  significant  gaps  to  fill  across  the  entirety  of  the  scholarship  on   extreme-­‐right  voting.Aldrich 21   consideration  of  all  scholars  due  to  the  variable’s  rhetorical  centrality  amongst  such   factions.  the  sum   of  the  extant  literature  is  enough  to  aid  and  inform  additional  studies  of  extreme-­‐right   voting  across  any  levels  and  regions  of  analysis.  are  associated  with  support  for  [extreme-­‐ right  parties]…such  as  higher  poverty  or  income  inequality.  admit  that  “there  has  been  little  effort   to  determine  whether  negative  economic  conditions  other  than  unemployment.  Lewis-­‐Beck  in  France  and  the  cross-­‐national  work  of  Matt  Golder.  it  specifically  relies  upon  the  subregional   work  of  Michael  S.

Aldrich 22   IV.  and  various   interaction  variables.  which  are  also  known  as  overseas   régions  and  have  the  same  legal  status  as  both  metropolitan  equivalents.  between  the  région  and  the  commune.  as  mentioned  previously.8  The  French  département  is  one  of  three   levels  of  government  below  the  national  level.  Due  to  the  unavailability  of  immigration  data  on  the  départemental   level.  Martinique.  and  Mayotte.  1  associated  with  a  “very  low”   percentage  of  immigrants  in  that  département‘s  région  (less  than  3%).  Mainland  France   (which.  Excluded  are  the  five  overseas  départements  of  French   Guiana.  the  percentage  of  immigrants  (étrangers.  Other  independent  control   variables  involve  the  regional  presence  of  immigrants.   Régions  contains  départements  and  départements  contain  communes.  DATA     Dependent  variables:  My  dependent  variable  is  the  change  in  vote  share  received  by  the   National  Front  between  the  2007  and  2012  presidential  elections  (FNchange0712  =  %   vote  share  2012  –  %  vote  share  2007)  per  département.  or  non-­‐French  nationals)  per  département   was  coded  as  a  variable  ranging  between  1  and  5.  2  with  a  “low”   percentage  of  immigrants  (3%  to  4%).   all  of  which  are  included  in  my  data.  includes  the  island  of  Corsica)  contains  96  départements.  3  with  “medium”  percentage  of  immigrants  (4%  to   .  which  were  in  turn  sourced  from  the  Centre  de  données  socio-­politiques  at  the   Institut  d'études  politiques  de  Paris  (Sciences  Po).  Guadeloupe.  Réunion.       Independent  variables:  My  primary  independent  variable  of  interest  is  the  change  in  the   unemployment  rate  per  département  between  2007  and  2012  (Unempchange0712  =  %   unemployment  rate  2012  –  %  unemployment  rate  2007).  incidents  of  crime.  Data  for  both  years  were  collected   from  the  Norwegian  Social  Science  Data  Services’  European  Election  and  Referendum   Database.

 a   trend  corroborated  by  journalistic  accounts  of  immigration  in  France  that  reference  the   time  period  at  hand.  the  former  if  the  département’s  [régional]  immigration  level  was   previously  categorized  as  3  or  below  (“low”  immigration)  and  the  latter  if  the  immigration   level  was  4  or  5  (“high”  immigration).  This  dummy   variable  is  the  only  measure  of  high  immigration  in  the  data  set.Aldrich 23   5%).  The  actual   variable.     In  addition  to  these  variables.  As  evident  in  the  summary  statistics  below.  three  interaction  terms  were  created  along  with  a   dummy  variable.  then.  and  5  with  a  “very  high”   percentage  of  immigrants  (more  than  8%)  for  the  years  2007  and  2012.  the  first  two  include  the   aforementioned  dummy  variable:  ImmdummyXunempchange  operationalizes  the  effect   of  changing  unemployment  on  the  change  in  FN  vote  share  in  départements  with  high   immigration.  The  third   .  36%  of   French  départements  in  2007  were  classified  as  having  high  immigration.  The  dummy  variable.  Each  département  was   coded  either  0  or  1.  is  the  categorical  change  in  the  percentage  of  immigrants  represented  by   each  département’s  coded  régional  variable  (Immchange0712  =  coded  immigration   variable  2012  –  coded  immigration  variable  2007).  represents  départements  with  a  high   percentage  of  immigrants  relative  to  others  in  the  base  year  of  2007.  and  ImmdummyXcrimechange  operationalizes  the  effect  of  changing  crime   on  the  change  in  FN  vote  share  in  départements  with  high  immigration.  4  with  “high”  percentage  of  immigrants  (5%  to  8%).  Immdummy.  the  years  for  which  data  were  available  (Crimechange0712  =   crime  per  département  2011  –  crime  per  département  2007).5  With  respect  to  the  interactions.  The  crime  variable  is  the  change  in   reported  assault  crimes  (atteintes  volontaires  à  l'intégrité  physique)  per  département   between  2007  and  2011.  for  the  summary  statistics   show  that  the  régional  presence  of  immigrants  only  went  down  between  2007  and  2012.

  4.   96   96   96   96   96   96   96   96   96   96   96   96   96   96   96   96   Mean   11.2   237   234   1.441674   1.     3.115   4875.   17.2999992   -­‐1   0   0.895   1.83125   -­‐0.  All  immigration  data.4   33670   35750   10.1666667   0.280377   1.2   1   1   4.  measures  the  effect  of  changing  unemployment  in   départements  with  changing  levels  of  immigration.115   7.2   1.     Unemployment  and  immigration  data  were  collected  from  INSEE.  Dev.3645833   1.04792   18.71875   7.  2.144272   4.572506   0.3979343   Std.900001   0   0   Max.  ImmXunemp.  are   measured  on  the  level  of  each  département’s  région.  18       Table  1:  Summary  and  Descriptive  Statistics   Variable     VoteforFN2007   VoteforFN2012   Imm2007   Imm2012   Unemp2007   Unemp2012   Crime07   Crime12   FNchange0712   Unempchange0712   Immchange0712   Immdummy   Crimechange0712   ImmXunemp   ImmdummyXunempchange   ImmdummyXcrimechange           Obs.62   0.  a   subsidiary  of  DILA.58   6.28   27.3711569   .891667   9.1.885417   2.8725787   0.816154   5999.09207   -­‐0.  4.6207488   0.371169   0   3.44   1.335374   1.4838397   0.5864583   0.8   6.  6.  and  crime  data  were  collected  from  La  Documentation  française.  the  French  Directorate  of  Legal  and  Administrative  Information   (Direction  de  l'information  légale  et  administrative).  the  French   National  Institute  of  Statistics  and  Economic  Studies  (Institut  national  de  la  statistique  et   des  études  économiques).3746343   0.92   3.5313959   Min.3302084   0.0992172   0.03   5   5   11.8   14.7695686   0.926   6547.94292   2.7   0   1   1.600899   1.  to  reiterate.Aldrich 24   interaction  term.9008572   -­‐2.722917   4513.

 my  immigration   data  are  particularly  coarse.  This  design  measures  the  changes   .  for  while  summary  statistics  show   that  no  région’s  coded  1-­‐5  variable  increased  between  2007  and  2012  it  could  very  well  be   that  the  percentage  of  resident  immigrants  in  certain  départements  did  increase.  Future  research  would  benefit  from  utilizing  data  measured  as   continuous  variables  on  the  level  of  the  département.  Future  research  could   benefit  from  distinguishing  the  effects  of  different  types  of  crimes  on  electoral  support  for   the  extreme-­‐right.  In  advance  of  presenting  and  analyzing  my  results.  the  change  in  FN   vote  share  per  département  between  2007  and  2012.  which  was  also  due  to  a  lack  of  other  available  data.  An   additional  limitation  to  my  research  design  is  the  use  of  assault  crime  as  a  proxy  for  crime   in  general.  measured  (once  again)  as  ordinal  variables  on  the  aggregate   level  of  the  région.  RESEARCH  DESIGN     As  mentioned  in  the  literature  review  (Section  III).  Conceding  these  limitations.  my  research  is  structured  around   a  series  of  “first  differences”  OLS  regressions  designed  to  assess  the  effects  of  the  changes   in  my  independent  variables  on  the  change  in  my  dependent  variable.  it  should  be   mentioned  that  they  are  constrained  by  the  power  and  refinement  of  their  underpinning   data.  embodied  and   emphasized  in  the  estimating  equation  [∆FNvotesharedr  =  α  +  β1∆Unempdr  +   β2Immdummy07r  +  β3∆Unempdr  x  Immdummy07r  +  β4∆Crimedr  +  β5∆Crimedr  x   Immdummy07r  +  εdr].  embodied  in  the  estimating   equation  [∆FNvotesharedr  =  α  +  β1∆Unempdr  +  εdr].Aldrich 25   V.  Although  principally  interested  in  the   effect  of  the  change  in  unemployment  on  FN  vote  share.  Due  to  a  lack  of  available  data  on  the  départemental  level  or  lower.  my  research  design  is  nonetheless   strengthened  by  its  “first-­‐differences”  configuration.  I  will  control  for  the  other   “confounding”  independent  variables  mentioned  above  in  Section  IV.

 i.     H4:  The  effects  of  unemployment  and  crime  on  FN  vote  share  are  greater  in  départements   with  high  percentages  of  immigrants.     H2:  FN  vote  share  and  immigration  are  positively  correlated.”  or  the   characteristics  of  each  département  that  do  not  change.  thus  the  change  in  FN  vote   share  will  increase  in  départements  with  higher  percentages  of  immigrants.e.  thus  netting  out  problematic  “compositional  effects.  thus  the  change  in  FN  vote  share  will   increase  in  départements  with  rising  crime.  I  hypothesize  the  following:         H1:  FN  vote  share  and  unemployment  are  positively  correlated.     H3:  FN  vote  share  and  crime  are  positively  correlated.  the  interaction  of  immigration  with  these  variables   leads  to  larger  FN  vote  share.  thus  the  change  in  FN  vote   share  will  increase  in  départements  with  rising  unemployment.Aldrich 26   between  each  variable.                         .

05.192           (3)   FNchange0712         1.309)   -­‐0.351   (0.897***       (0.67  increase  in  FN  vote  share.489   1.001.Aldrich 27   VI.791**   (0.319)   -­‐0.539)     96   0.119***   (1.62)(1.514)     96   0.647)     96   0.394)       96   0.328   (1.  **  p<.411)       5.083***   (0.336   (0.  the  change  in  unemployment  retains  its   high  statistical  significance  and  positive  effect  on  FN  vote  share.644)         N   96   r²   0.001     (2)   FNchange0712         1.62)   implies  a  (.056***   (0.241               In  column  1  of  table  2.   column  3  shows  that  the  change  in  unemployment  retains  its  high  statistical  significance   .  the  change  in  unemployment  (Unempchange0712)  has  the   hypothesized  positive  and  highly  significant  effect  on  electoral  support  for  the  FN   (expressed  by  FNchange0712).186           (4)   FNchange0712         1.069***   (0.319)       0.193           (5)   FNchange0712           1.274)   0.  A  1  standard  deviation  increase  in  unemployment  (.369***   (1.272)   0.  RESULTS     Table  2:  Ordinary  Least  Squares  (OLS)  Regressions           (1)   FNchange0712   VARIABLES             Unempchange0712   1.091)  =  .554***   (1.  Similar   to  column  2  except  now  controlling  for  the  change  in  crime  between  2007  and  2012.174   (1.186         Standard  errors  in  parentheses   *    p<.  Since  the  change  in   immigration  is  not  significantly  different  than  0  it  cannot  be  said  to  have  an  effect.  Controlling  for  the  change  in   immigration  between  2007  and  2012  in  column  2.  ***  p<0.301)           0.255***   (0.429       5.091***       (.881***   (0.288)   5.270)           5.310)   Immchange0712           Crimechange0712           Immdummy           Constant   5.

 Since  the  change  in  crime  is  not  significantly  different   than  0  it  cannot  be  said  to  have  an  effect.Aldrich 28   and  positive  effect  on  FN  vote  share.                     .  Since  the  change  in  immigration  and  the  change  in   crime  are  not  significantly  different  than  0.  The  significance.  the  variables  cannot  be  said  to  have  an  effect.  however.  as  opposed  to  the  fluctuation  of  immigrants  found  to  be  insignificant  in   regression  models  2  and  4.  Controlling  for  both  the  change  in  immigration   and  the  change  in  crime  in  column  4.  has   fallen  from  the  1%  level  to  the  5%  level.   statistically  significant  effect  on  the  change  in  FN  vote  share.791   (79%)  increase  in  FN  vote  share  and  is  significant  at  the  1%  level.  and  the  départements  with   regionally  high  percentages  of  immigrants  (expressed  by  the  dummy  variable  Immdummy)   in  column  5.  both  the  change  in  unemployment  and  the  immigration  level  dummy  are   found  to  be  significant.  The  change  in  unemployment  is  once  again  highly  statistically   significant  at  the  1%  level.  the  change  in  crime.  the  latter  result  which  suggests  that  it  is  a  large  percentage  of   immigrants  per  région  per  se  that  meaningfully  influences  electoral  support  for  the   extreme-­‐right.  The  immigration  dummy  variable  is  associated  with  a  .   Examining  the  change  in  unemployment.  the  change  in  unemployment  still  exerts  a  positive.

 I  examine  the  regressions  that  include  constructed  interaction  terms.001.  ***  p<0.  Both  the  change  in  unemployment  and  the   interaction  demonstrate  positive  coefficients  and  achieve  statistical  significance.210***       (0.897***   6.383*           (2.688**   1.089         (1.  the  change  in  crime.495   -­‐5.612)   96   0.   Unempchange0712  at  the  5%  level  and  ImmdummyXunempchange  at  the  1%  level.225)   (0.297*           (0.001             (4)   FNchange0712           1.105)   0.132**   (0.933)   ImmdummyXunempchange   1.1777***   7.3   0.105)   5.308)   (1.644)   (1.777   (1.338)   ImmdummyXcrimechange       5.248***       (0.128***   (1.267                   Standard  errors  in  parentheses       *    p<.600)     Crimechange0712     0.  and  the  interaction  between  high  immigration  and   unemployment  (ImmdummyXunempchange).310)   (0.091***   0.725   (1.  Column   2  of  table  3  reveals  the  effect  of  a  change  in  unemployment  controlling  for  high   immigration.628)   Immchange0712                   ImmXunemp                   Constant   5.584   (1.   Note  that  column  1  is  included  as  reference  and  is  identical  to  column  1  in  table  2.  **  p<.729         (1.05.223   -­‐1.Aldrich 29   Table  3:  Interaction  Effects             (1)   (2)   (3)   FNchange0712   FNchange0712   FNchange0712   VARIABLES                         Unempchange0712   1.186   0.  The   significance  of  the  interaction  indicates  that  rising  unemployment  rates  result  in  larger   .373)   (1.201               In  table  3.454)           -­‐1.421)   N   96   96   96   r²   0.293)   Immdummy     -­‐1.350)                   0.163)   (2.

361  effect  on  FN  vote  share  is  about   53.  the   interaction’s  (.   compared  to  those  within  relatively  low  immigrant  régions  (reflected  in   Unempchange0712).171.68   (Unempchange0712)  –  1.2  +  .  capturing  départements  with  a  high  percentage  of   immigrants  not  experiencing  a  change  in  unemployment.3)(1)(.729)(.  (.4  (Immdummy)  +  1.  ImmdummyXcrimechange.62)  =  1.729  (Crimechange0712)  –  5.62).  where   6.  The  coefficient  in   column  2  suggests  that.2  is  the  constant  term.2%  larger  in  magnitude  than  the  observed  effect  in  areas  of  low  immigration   (represented  by  Crimechange0712).  fails  to  achieve  statistical   significance.  (-­‐1.62)  =  .     Like  column  2.099).  Given  a  1  standard  deviation  change  in  crime  (.  given  a  1  standard  deviation  change  in  unemployment  (.383  (Immdummy)  (Crimechange0712)]  where  7.23  effect  on  FN  vote  share  is  81%  larger  in   magnitude  than  the  observed  effect  in  areas  of  low  immigration.099)  +  (5.   Immdummy.2  is  the  constant  term.  The  coefficients  of   .  The  above  is  pursuant  to  the   following  equation:  [FN  vote  share  =  7.2  –  1.  We  can   think  of  the  coefficient  as  stemming  from  the  equation:  [FN  vote  share  =  6.  This  supports  the  interaction  component  of  Matt  Golder's  "materialist   hypothesis"  on  a  subregional  level.  Both  this   interaction  and  Unempchange0712  were  found  to  have  positive  coefficients  and  be   statistically  significant.729)(.62)  +  (1.099)  =  .  the  model  in  column  3  of  table  3  includes  Unempchange0712.383)(1)(.42.3  (Immdummy)  (Unempchange0712)].  the   interaction’s  (-­‐1.  as  does  Crimechange0712.68)(.089  (Immdummy)  +   5.  but  instead  of  the  interaction  between  high   immigration  and  the  change  in  unemployment  it  contains  an  interaction  between  the   dummy  for  high  immigration  and  the  change  in  crime.68)(.  and  is  the  main  finding  of  my  analysis.099)  =  -­‐.Aldrich 30   increases  in  electoral  support  for  the  FN  in  départements  within  high  immigrant  régions.  and  Crimechange0712.  Immdummy.

 Crimechange0712.22  correlation  coefficient  between  the  two   variables.  separate  regressions  show  that  the   interactions  between  changing  unemployment  and  high  immigration   (ImmdummyXunempchange)  and  changing  crime  and  high  immigration   (ImmdummyXcrimechange)  each  achieve  statistical  significance  and  contribute  to  rising   FN  vote  share  independent  of  one  another.     As  we  have  seen  in  columns  2  and  3  of  table  3.  I  nonetheless  maintain  that  the  change  in   unemployment  (Unempchange0712)  and  the  change  in  crime  (Crimechange0712)   represent  two  distinct  effects.   Despite  such  insufficient  variation.  and  a  constructed  interaction  variable  between  the  change  in   immigration  and  the  change  in  unemployment  (ImmXunemp)  reveals  that  only  the  change   in  unemployment  attained  significance  (at  the  5%  level).     In  column  4  of  table  3  a  regression  including  Unempchange0712.  the  data  does  not  have  sufficient  variation  for  both  interactions  to  be  estimated.Aldrich 31   Immdummy  (representing  départements  within  high  immigrant  régions  not  experiencing   changing  crime)  and  Crimechange0712  (representing  départements  with  changing  crime   within  low  immigrant  régions)  are  not  statistically  significant  and  thus  cannot  be  said  to  be   different  than  0.  This  finding  may  reflect  the   .  the   statistically  significant  interaction  between  high  immigration  and  the  change  in   unemployment  uncovered  in  column  2  of  table  3.  Thus  an  additional  regression  model.   yet  nonetheless  complementary  finding  with  respect  to  our  primary  result  of  interest.   Immchange0712.   However.  was  designed  to  test  these  two  statistically  significant  interactions  together.  as  there  exists  a  -­‐.  not  shown   above.  we  can  view  the  statistical  significance  of  the  interaction   between  high  immigration  and  the  change  in  crime  in  column  3  of  table  3  as  an  interesting.  Given  the  above.

23  per  1  standard  deviation  increase  in   unemployment.  To  lesser   degrees  the  change  in  unemployment  in  general.  H2.  and  H4   were  correct.  The  amendment  we  must   make  refers  to  the  fact  that  while  Golder  concludes  that  “immigration  has  a  positive  effect   on  [extreme-­‐right]  parties  irrespective  of  the  unemployment  level.  interactions  matter.  which  postulated  that  rising  crime  by  itself  would  contribute  to  the   French  extreme-­‐right  vote.  and  high  immigration  in  general  also  contributed  to  the  rise  in  FN  vote  share.  which  does  not  vary  much.  statistically  effect  on  electoral  support  for  the  National  Front.”  our  data  show  that  unemployment  does  not  only   matter  when  immigration  is  high.  Such  a  conclusion  builds  upon  the  work  of   Michael  S.  The  variable  ImmdummyXunempchange  captures  this  effect.  the  interaction  of  changing  crime  with  high  régional  immigration  did  have  a   positive.  As  previously  stated.   The  variables  Unempchange0712.  and  instead  exerts  a  positive  and  statistically  significant   .   however.  Thus  again  I  view   column  2  of  table  3  as  the  main  specification.  H3.  and  particularly  supports  an  amended  version  of   Golder’s  2003  “materialist  hypothesis”  on  a  subregional  level.       VII.  was  not  corroborated  by  the  data.  [and]  unemployment   only  matters  when  immigration  his  high.  ImmdummyXcrimechange.  the  data  show  that  the  interaction  between  changing   unemployment  and  high  regional  levels  of  immigrants  exerts  the  highest  effect  on  FN  vote   share.Aldrich 32   coarse  nature  of  the  immigration  variable.     Principally.  and  in  summation.  Lewis-­‐Beck  and  Matt  Golder.  and  Immdummy  capture   these  effects.  A  review  of  the  stated  hypotheses  in  Section  V  reveals  that  H1.  causing  it  to  rise  by  a  vector  of  1.  CONCLUSION     As  the  data  show.  the  interaction  between  high  immigration   and  crime.

 What  continues  to  elude  scholars.  by  approximately  81%  over   départements  within  low  immigrant  régions.  “surprisingly  weak.  was  not  ours.  to  those   observed  on  the  cross-­‐national  aggregate  level  in  Europe.  Lewis-­‐Beck  to  affect  FN  vote  share  in  1986.  authors  such  as  Pia  Knigge  still  maintain  that  unemployment  does  not   matter.15   However.  is  not  a  more   varied  picture  of  extreme-­‐right  voting  across  different  tiers  of  analysis.  my  findings  ultimately  come  up  against  the  more  intractable  and  permanent   problems  of  the  theoretical  and  empirical  contradiction  found  rife  throughout  the   literature  on  extreme-­‐right  voting.  and  others  maintain  that  even  if  it  does.12  Its  effect  is  simply   enhanced  by  an  interaction  with  high  immigration.Aldrich 33   effect  on  FN  vote  share  regardless  of  the  régional  level  of  immigration.  it  is  a  more   universal  consensus  as  to  what  drives  the  phenomenon  in  the  first  place.  the  interaction  between  high  immigration   and  unemployment.  the  most  salient  interaction  term   discovered  by  Michael  S.  for  example.  This  was  at  least  the  case  in   France  between  2007  and  2012.  it  appears  that   subregional  motivators  of  extreme-­‐right  voting  largely  conform.  the  interaction  between  immigration  and   unemployment.  and—while  still  positively  correlated—he  called  the   effect  of  our  strongest  motivating  force.  in  microcosm.  and  the  interaction  between  high  immigration  and  crime  increase  the   extreme-­‐right  vote.  there  is  no  acceptable   .  Interestingly.  there  is   work  to  be  done  to  improve  the  former:  as  Jesuit  and  Mahler  observed  that  most  work  in   the  field  has  been  “based  on  national-­‐level  studies.”22   Considering  our  results  in  the  light  of  the  reviewed  literature.  that  between   immigration  and  crime.  While  I  contribute  the  fact  that  unemployment.”  it  has  been  my  goal  to  progress   subregional  studies  through  the  analysis  of  France  between  its  past  two  election  cycles.  however.  Certainly.  a   relatively  high  regional  presence  of  immigrants.

"  INED.  Additionally.  Nicole.  and  private  citizens  alike.  As  France’s   economic  and  demographic  geography  continue  to  evolve.  REFERENCES     1Cadenel.  My  work   would  specifically  benefit  from  being  redone  with  more  refined  immigration  data.  18  Feb.pdf>.  such  future  work   would  not  only  serve  to  advance  the  scholarly  community’s  comprehension  of  extreme-­‐ right  voting.  it  would  illuminate  extreme-­‐right  parties’  channels  of  electoral  support  for  the   edification  of  all  who  are  affected  by  their  policies.   <http://www.  ed.Aldrich 34   theoretical  justification  for  why  voters  should  turn  to  the  extreme-­‐right  over  any  other   party  in  times  of  economic m20022011.  policymakers.  that  future  research  and  analysis  is  necessary.ined.  Feb.  "Infos  migrations:  La  population  étrangère  en  2007.17     It  goes  without  saying.   2"Chômage  par  commune.  Web.  2011.  Web.  so  as  to   more  accurately  represent  the  départemental  electoral  reaction  to  changing  levels  of   immigrants.   ."  INSEE.  Institut   national  d'études  démographiques.  the  effects  of  different  expressions  of  crime  and  declining   economic  conditions  (such  as  property  crime  and  levels  of  poverty)  could  be  tested  so  as  to   achieve  a  more  nuanced  understanding  of  those  two  phenomena.  région.  zone  d'emploi  de  2001  à  2012.  both  directly  and  indirectly.  Overall.   Institut  national  de  la  statistique  et  des  études  économiques.  18  Feb.  then.  2012.  further  scrutiny  of  the  regional   motivators  of  the  National  Front  vote  and  the  electoral  successes  they  portend  would   benefit  politicians.  département.     VIII.  2013.

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