On That In Which Beauty Consists

(c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti § N.B. The reader will observe that on many pages where I have text in parallel columns, there is a wide gap of blank space. For whatever reason, this is the result of Scribd’s conversion process and not in my original. The program also does not support my SGreek font. For these and any other anomalies in the layout of the text I apologize in advance.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS I. A BRIEF CONSIDERATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF BEAUTY. II. THE BEAUTIFUL ACCORDING TO PLATO. III. THE BEAUTIFUL ACCORDING TO ARISTOTLE. IV. ON ‘DISPOSITION’. V. ON SYMMETRY. VI. ON BEAUTY AS CONSISTING IN A DUE PROPORTION OR ‘SYMMETRY’ OF THE PARTS TO THE WHOLE AND OF THE PARTS TO EACH OTHER. VII. THE BEAUTIFUL ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS AQUINAS.
VIII. ON THE PERFECT.

IX. SUMMARY STATEMENTS PERTAINING TO BEAUTY. X. SUPPLEMENT: II. ON CLARITAS OR ‘LUSTRE’ IN RELATION TO GLORIA. XI. ‘FORM’ AND ‘FIGURE’ IN RELATION TO CLARITAS. XII. THE PRINCIPAL MEANINGS OF TO KALON AND TO AISCHROS. §

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I. A BRIEF CONSIDERATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF BEAUTY. 1. Primary Texts. Cf. Plato, Laws II (668d–669e) (tr. Thomas Pangle, rev. B.A.M.):
Ath. What then, if someone doesn’t know what each of the bodies of the things imitated is? Would he ever know what is correctly executed in them? What I mean is something like this: [would he ever know,] for instance, whether [the statue] has the proportions of the body and the positions and arrangements of each of the parts, how many [parts] there are and how they fit next to one another in the appropriate order, and also the colors and shapes, or whether all the things have been put together in a confused way? Do you think someone can ever know these things if he is completely ignorant of what the living thing is that has been imitated? (emphasis added)

Cf. Aristotle, Metaph., XIII. 3 (1078a 31—1078b 6) (tr. W. D. Ross, rev. B.A.M.):
Now since the good and the beautiful are different (for the former always implies conduct as its subject, while the beautiful is found also in motionless things), those who assert that the mathematical sciences say nothing of the beautiful or the good are in error. For these sciences say and prove a great deal about them; if they do [35] not expressly mention them, but prove attributes which are their results or their definitions, it is not true to say that they tell us nothing about them. The chief forms of beauty are order and symmetry [1078b] and definiteness, which the mathematical sciences demonstrate in a special degree. And since these (e.g. order and definiteness) are obviously causes of many things, evidently these sciences must treat this sort of causative principle also (i.e. the beautiful) as in [5] some sense a cause. But we shall speak more plainly elsewhere about these matters.14
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Apparently an unfulfilled promise. (emphasis added)

Cf. Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals, I. 1 (641b 16-23; 642a 14- 30) (tr. William H Ogle):
And that the heaven, if it had an origin, was evolved and is maintained by such a cause, there is therefore even more reason to believe, than that mortal animals so originated. For order and definiteness are much more plainly manifest in the celestial bodies than in our own frame; while change and chance are characteristic of the perishable things of earth. [20] Yet there are some who, while they allow that every animal exists and was generated by nature, nevertheless hold that the heaven was constructed to be what it is by chance and spontaneity; the heaven, in which not the faintest sign of haphazard or of disorder is discernible! <…> It is plain then that there are two modes of causation, and that [15] both of these must, so far as possible, be taken into account in explaining the works of nature, or that at any rate an attempt must be made to include them both; and that those who fail in this tell us in reality nothing about nature. For primary cause constitutes the nature of an animal much more than does its matter. There are indeed passages in which even Empedocles hits upon this, and following the [20] guidance of fact, finds himself constrained to speak of the ratio (logos) as constituting the essence and real nature of things. Such, for instance, is the case when he explains what is a bone. For he does not merely describe its material, and say it is this one element, or those two or three elements, or a compound of all the elements, but states the ratio (logos) of their combination. As with a bone, so manifestly is it with the flesh and all other similar parts.

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and to the formula rather that to the matter of the thing. Aristotle. but was merely brought to it. (tr. also Aristotle. e. For what the Philosopher speaks of as the “primary cause”. things which are formed not by chance but for the sake of something exist in the works of nature [25] most of all. and also heat and cold and the other sensible contrarieties. (emphasis added) 2. Aristotle. 4 . [30] weight and lightness.e.1 Cf. The first who came near it was Democritus. sometimes in two. In V Meta. See further below. On the Parts of Animals I. cf. De An. and the commensurabilities and incommensurabilities of others. Ross): As the mathematician investigates abstractions (for before beginning his investigation he strips off all the sensible qualities.. as Aristotle states..B. 5 (645a 23-25): (tr. sometimes in three dimensions. In the time of Socrates a nearer approach was made to the method. [1061b] and the ratios of others. From the foregoing. St. But at this period men gave up inquiring into the works of nature. N. nor of any definition of substance.g. Comparison of texts. which in turn involves order. n. and examines the relative positions of some and the attributes of these. as is said in the second book of the De Anima [II. the “form of the beautiful” at issue here is that of taxis or ‘order’. Ogle) Absence of haphazard and conduciveness of everything to an end are to be found in nature’s works in the highest degree. and he was far from adopting it as a necessary method in natural science. 18. Hippocrates G. and these [i. W. that they were not in possession of the notion of essence. and leaves only the quantitative and continuous. sometimes in one. to kalos].M. Metaph. and the end for whose sake a thing is formed or came to be has the rank of nobility [or ‘beauty. lect. But. 4 (416a 15-20) (tr. Apostle) Indeed. 4. the possession of such orderliness importing an ‘absence of haphazard’. B. and the attributes of these qua quantitative and [35] continuous. Consequently. hardness and its contrary. but yet we posit one and the same science of all these things—geometry)—the same is true with regard to being. it will possess those forms of the beautiful called symmetry and order. D. Thomas Aquinas.A. so also any thing possesses a determinate quantity of its natural virtue”. and philosophers diverted their attention to political science and to the virtues which benefit mankind. 416a 15ff.. and the resultant end of her generations is a form of the beautiful. 1 Cf. the possession of a determinate quantity of magnitude is a function of the ratio of the elements composing the thing. 5 (tr. by constraint of facts. William H.): “For each thing is perfect when no part of the natural magnitude. 3 (1061a 29-b 3) (tr. inasmuch as a thing composed of elements is marked by a limit and a certain ratio with respect to those elements. Hippocrates G. and does not consider them in any other respect. As is clear from the mention of ‘disorder’ in the first passage from Aristotle cited above. spite of himself. one sees how definiteness arises from symmetry. which belongs to it according to the species of its proper virtue. Now just as any natural thing possesses a determinate measure of natural magnitude according to continuous quantity. XI.]. [30] (emphasis added) Cf.[25] The reason why our predecessors failed in hitting upon this method of treatment was. for a thing cannot have its species when the parts of an integral whole are put together in just any way. limit and ratio] belong to the soul and not to fire. Apostle): [B]ut a thing which is composed by nature of all [the elements] has a limit and a [certain] ratio [of elements] with respect to both size and growth. II. is lacking to it.

D. symmetry [or ‘commensurability’. unless it be increase by addition. cf. then. therefore. H. H. D. II. (And yet [20] the elements at all events are dissociated not by Strife. [1061b] definiteness [or ‘the limited’. XI. XIII. [the relation of ratio to limit being indicated by De Anima.e. II. and to the formula rather that to the matter of the thing”. are cases of addition: but it is not by addition that growing things are believed to increase. G. nothing comes. but only from their coming together in a certain proportion. and the ratios [tôn de tous logous] of others…. 19 for things can be combined as chance has it. On Generation and Corruption.’ These. Ross) The chief forms of beauty are order [taxis] and Aristotle.Aristotle. and these [i. What he says.. Meta. to horismenon]. Then what is the cause determining that man comes-to-be from man. of the coming-to-be of the things which owe their existence to nature is that they are in such-and-such a determinate condition: and it is this which constitutes the ‘nature’ of each thing—a ‘nature’ about which he says nothing. Apostle): “[B]ut a thing which is composed by nature of all [the elements] has a limit and a [certain] ratio [of elements] with respect to both size and growth. 7 (331 37-333b 22) (tr. But neither is it Love and Strife: for the former is a cause of ‘association’ only. 3 (1078a 37—1078b 1) (tr. No: the cause in question is the essential nature of each thing—not merely to quote his words) ‘a mingling and a [15] divorce of what has been combined’. Ross) …and [as the mathematician] examines the relative positions [tas pros allêla theseis] of some and the attributes of these. For the things which come-to-be by natural process all do so either [5] always or for the most part in a given way. is the cause of this [proportional coming together]? Presumably not Fire or Earth. that wheat (instead of an olive) comes-to-be from wheat.20 Moreover. 4 (416a 15-20) (tr. and they too are god. ‘is the name given to these occurrences’. For his Fire increases by Fire: ‘And [333b] Earth increases its own frame and Ether increases Ether.. What. either invariably or generally? Are we to say ‘Bone comes-to-be if the “elements” be put together in such-and such a manner’? For. and the latter only of ‘dissociation’. tells us nothing About Nature. which the mathematical sciences demonstrate in a special degree. And it is far more difficult for him to account for the coming-to-be which occurs in nature. however. limit and ratio] belong to the soul and not to fire. 3 (1061a 36-b 1) (tr. And chance. H. Aristotle. Meta. For an elaboration of Empedocles’s understanding of the ratio of the elements. therefore.) (emphasis added) 5 . W. not proportion. it is this which is both ‘the excellence’ of each thing and its ‘good’: whereas he assigns the whole credit to the combining. summetria] and the commensurabilities and incommen[1078b] and surabilities [tas summetrias kai asummetrias] of others. while any exceptions—any results which are in accordance neither with the invariable nor with the general rule—are products of chance and spontaneity [luck]. but by Love: since the elements are by nature prior to the god.[10] to-be from their coming together as chance has it. Joachim): A further objection to the theory of Empedocles is that it makes even growth impossible. according to his own statements. W. The cause.

not to fire. O. CHAPTER IV. which he deals with respectively in two sections. not in order to help them to walk. §§ 329-30 It is indeed a concomitant cause. at ‘Nor did he understand’ attacks it. § 324 Nor did he understand aright ‘up’ and ‘down’. He now proceeds to refute two errors on this subject. And this belongs to the soul. lect. Observing that living things increase their size in different directions. § 328 Now it seems to some that the nature of fire is the sole cause of growth and nutrition. But there are limitations to all things that subsist naturally. what holds fire and earth together if they tend in contrary directions? They must come apart if there is nothing to prevent this. Whence the notion that it is this that is operative in plants and animals.19 20 See Empedocles. Book II. adding that growth occurs in plants by their sending a root downwards. and be also the cause of growth and nourishment. whilst their upward growth was due to fire which. because earth is by nature below. for it certainly seems to be the only one of the bodies and elements that is self-nourishing and selfincreasing. In the first section he begins by stating the error. About Nature (peri\ fu/seoj) was the title of Empedocles’ scientific poem. which thrust their roots down and their branches up—he said that the downward growth of plants was due to the earth in their composition. but simply because the matter of that part of their bodies happened to be arranged in that sort of way. must tend upwards. and to a specific principle rather than to matter. Thomas Aquinas. so also the growth of living things he ascribed merely to the motion of light and heavy bodies. Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima translated by Kenelm Foster. but roots of plants correspond to the head. and then. being light. which is heavy and therefore necessarily tends downwards.P. and also upwards because of fire. 8 (in part): TEXT 415b28–416a18 BOOK II. the second of which begins at ‘Now it seems to some that the nature of fire’. we should note that just as Empedocles refused to explain other cases of purposeful arrangement in Nature by any natural finality—for example he said that animals had the sort of feet they have. §§ 325-7 Besides. Regarding the error itself. but rather the soul. if it is permissible to identify organs by their functions. e. For we reckon those organs to be the same which perform the same operations. <…> 6 .P. 8 Diels-Kranz. For the increase of fire is infinite so long as there is anything combustible. CONTINUED THE VEGETATIVE PRINCIPLE CONTINUED TWO ERRORS REFUTED Empedocles is mistaken here. frag. (New Haven. for these are not for all things the same as for the Universe. in animals. O. 1951). §§ 331-2 ST. but the cause absolutely is not fire. THOMAS’S COMMENTARY LECTIO EIGHT § 324. it must be the soul. Cf. & Sylvester Humphries. and some definite principle governs their dimensions and growth. St. up and down—as is evident in plants. The Philosopher has just shown that the activities we call vegetative have their origin in the soul. But if there is such a thing.g.

not indeed as the principal agent (which is the soul) but as a secondary. But whether fire really feeds itself and grows will be made clear later. as such. The principal agent in any action is that which imposes the term or natural limit upon what is done.): Although a body. St. at ‘It is indeed’ he then disproves. Now the soul of a living being is to the elements it contains as form is to matter. 7 (1450b 34—1451a 15 (tr. understood mathematically. is infinitely divisible. and in the same way earth is the cause of heaviness.. which put the causes of growth and nutrition in both earth and fire. though some margin must be left to material differences and other individual factors. based on Theodore Buckley): Further still. Wherefore quantity cannot be found under the species of flesh unless within certain determined limits. Poetics ch. And this is reasonable enough. But note its grain of truth. and if it cuts wood in this or that particular shape and quantity. should not only [35] have these things arranged. But there is a limit both to their largeness and their littleness. and this is done by fire.P. William Wallace. fire. Thomas Aquinas. lect. instrumental agent. For in a mathematical body all that is considered is quantity. Then he attacks the above opinion. n. as he goes on to show. Next. § 330. a natural body is not divisible to infinity. § 331. neither can any very small animal be beautiful. so it needs its own measure of quantity. this theory ascribes them only to fire. For as each species of thing requires its own accidental modifications. rather than fire. the soul. Aristotle. so that fire does play a part in nutrition. as such. then. each thing grows to a certain fixed pattern. sets the term and natural limit to size and growth. All food has to be cooked. § 332. at ‘Now it seems to some’. A saw. Clearly. for the contemplation of it is confused. 7 .A.M. can be used to cut wood for a door or a bench or a house. B. fire is not the chief cause of growth and nutrition. Now of the elements fire alone seems to ‘feed’ itself and to ‘grow’ . cf. but by the art itself. O. 9. Unlike the theory of Empedocles. just as it requires other accidents. In I Physic. thus in artificial things like boxes or houses the limit or term is fixed. Now in Nature each thing obviously has certain limits to its size and its increase. which. since that which is beautiful. and in any quantity you please. are quite indifferent as to whether they are used to produce a thing of this shape and quantity or of that. The instruments. and whatever determines this limit is the true principal cause of growth.1 Cf. being essentially hot. whether it be an animal or anything else which is composed of certain things. 9 (tr. he states another theory. then. and consequently in growth also. if we take these terms in a superficial sense. for the quantitative limits of material things are fixed by form—the specific principle—rather than matter. since it is effected in a 1 For the related notion that a natural body is not infinitely divisible with respect to quantity. whereas in a natural body there is a natural form that requires a determinate quantity. this is due to the man who uses it. and in this there is nothing that is repugnant to division. The reason given is that the cause of anything’s modifications or motion would appear to be whatever had such modifications or motions essentially—e. it would spread to infinity if an infinite amount of fuel were supplied to it. not by the instruments used in the work. but rather the soul.§ 329. To say then that fire is a sort of concurrent or instrumental cause of growth and nutrition is true. But it cannot be the principal cause or agent.g. because the growth of fire has no naturally fixed limits. Men are not all equal in size. but also not just any chance size—for the beautiful consists in size and order—hence. is the cause of heat in things that contain other elements as well. But this cannot be fire. Therefore fire alone would seem to cause growth and nutrition in plants and animals.

for things which please by being seen are called ‘beautiful’. But they differ in account. But the beautiful regards a knowing power. namely. if at the same time it is perspicuous. the performance would have to be regulated by a waterclock.. a certain movement toward a thing. For.1 3. ‘in whatever extent. For this reason beauty consists in a due proportion. but it pertains to the account of the beautiful that the appetite be brought to rest in the sight or knowledge of it. health is better than strength or beauty. or which is unsymmetrical [e] in some other respect. 1 (116b 19-23) (ed. a change from bad fortune to good fortune or from good fortune to bad fortune takes place. III. Aristotle. art. And so.nearly insensible time. as they are said to have been at one time. whereas the others are inherent in the secondary [constituents]. the form. Cf.M. that the plot is [10] always more beautiful the greater it is. ad 3 (tr. 1.A. According to St. B. in a word in all the primary constituents of the living creature. q.. art. since the good is what all things desire. Loeb): And that is better which is inherent in things which are better or prior or more highly honored. 27. namely. And 1 Cf. but its being one and a whole escapes the view of the onlookers. Plato. it belongs to the account of the good that the appetite be brought to rest in it. for strength is generally considered to reside in sinews and bones. for we call sights and sounds ‘beautiful’. St. as in bodies and in animals there should be size. & tr. B. For health is inherent in moisture and dryness and in heat and in cold. for the good is what all things desire. St. and for this reason the good is praised as beautiful. the servants of reason. for we do not call tastes or smells ‘beautiful’. Jowett): “Just as a body which has a leg too long. But the definition of the length with reference to contests and the senses does not fall under the consideration of art. so to speak. But the definition according to the nature of the thing is this. For the good properly regards the appetite. is a certain ratio. Summa Theol. Cf. But in the sensibles belonging to the other senses we do not use the name ‘beautiful’. in successive incidents in accordance with likelihood or necessity. as in things similar to itself. Thomas Aquinas. Top. Ia-IIae. sight and hearing. there should be length.2 since the sense is delighted in things that are duly proportioned. but such as can be easily seen. 4. [1451a] for it is not contemplated at once. so also in plots. so that that is called ‘good’ simply which is pleasing to the appetite—but that is called ‘beautiful’ the very apprehension of which pleases. is an unpleasant sight…. such as if there should be an animal of ten thousand stadia [in length]. is a [15] sufficient limit of the size’. but this such as can be [5] easily remembered. ad 1 (tr. for example. 8 . and indeed every knowing power. one may say.. Timaeus 87 d-e (tr.): To the third it must be said that the beautiful is the same as the good. for the appetite is. q. Thomas Aquinas.): To the first it must be said that the beautiful and the good are the same in subject because they are founded on the same thing.M. Thomas Aquinas. And for this reason those senses especially look to the beautiful that are the most knowing. And so it has the account of an end. For if it were necessary to perform a hundred tragedies.A. But in order to define it simply. Ia. For the sense. and beauty to be in a certain symmetry of the limbs. 5.” 2 Note that debita proportio primarily means having the membra or limbs of the body commensurate. Summa Theol. And so it is clear that the beautiful adds to the good a certain order to a knowing power. Cf. B. differing only in account. nor yet a very large animal.

145. 4. (tr. 31. Thomas Aquinas. and all that is defective supplied from resources the Creator knows of. IV. q. beauty properly pertains to the notion of a formal cause. 19 (tr. art.A.M. 2. Cf. B. consonance and lustre. Summa Theol. Nom. or his action. as may be gathered from the words of Dionysius ( De Div. And thus there shall be no deformity resulting from want of agreement in that state in which all that is wrong is corrected.. c.): …But according to Dionysius (De Div. that a man have the members of his body well-proportioned. consists in a certain lustre and due proportion. Tusc. 2. Disp.): I reply that it must be said that.M.. that a man’s conversation. either because there is something lacking. as has been said above. St. City of God. IIa-IIae. B. And likewise spiritual beauty consists in this. Now both of these are found in reason as in a root. And as for the pleasant color. Cf.6).A. 4). art 1. B..A. slightly rev.A. cap. (tr. 5 (tr. but not beautiful. c. and so small men can be called ‘commensurate’ [or ‘well-proportioned’] and ‘good-looking’. the eye is offended.. or too large. iv. 4. lect. Thomas Aquinas. together with a certain agreeableness of color.M. B. how conspicuous shall it be where “the just shall shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their Father!” Matthew 13:43 This brightness we must rather believe to have been concealed from the eyes of the disciples when Christ rose. or too small. be well proportioned according to the spiritual lustre of reason…. Summa Theol.): 9 . For this reason the beauty of the body consists in this. St. Where there is no agreement. In Dionysii de Div.because knowledge comes about by assimilation. Cf. On bodily beauty. c. two things come together in the account of beauty. Cf. iv). In I Sent. c. Cf. Augustine of Hippo. q. Thomas Aquinas. and all that is excessive removed without destroying the integrity of the substance. Cf. 180. than to have been lacking. namely. B. For he says that God is the cause of all beauty insofar as He is the cause of consonance and lustre.A. q.. ad 3 (tr. Nom. Ethic.. but similitude [likeness] regards the form.M.M. IIa-IIae.M.): To the third it must be said that beauty.): Of the body there is a certain fitting arrangement of the members accompanied by a certain agreeableness of color which is called beauty. 2.A.): For all bodily beauty consists in the agreement of the parts. To the these two the Philosopher adds a third where he says that beauty does not exist except in a sizable body (Nic. St. Nom. Thomas Aquinas. Cicero. St. XXII. in the account of the beautiful or becoming both lustre and due proportion come together—for he says that God is called beautiful as the cause of the consonance and lustre of the universe. B. art.. St. xiii (tr. to which pertains both a manifesting light and the ordering of a due proportion in other things…. dist. together with a certain due lustre of color. just as we say that men are beautiful who have proportionate members and a resplendent color..

. which shines out in our conduct.A. whereas St.” 10 . (tr. D. or situation [or ‘position’.. 44. St. appears to pertain to their mutual adaptation. art. and corresponds to a due disposition of parts in a whole.…For thus we call a man beautiful by reason of an appropriate proportion in quantity and in situation and by reason of his having lustre and a bright color. 5. and self-control it imposes upon every word and deed. Cicero presumably means the same as Plato. which pertains 1 Cf.1 and a due disposition in situation. xiii). In one way from the lack of any limb [or ‘member’. And deformity of this kind. 1913). 1a. engages the approbation of our fellow-men by the order. that a man have the members of his body well-proportioned. beginning. B. is an unpleasant sight…. 44). St. B. iv. dist. “For thus we call a man beautiful by reason of an appropriate proportion in quantity and in situation and by reason of his having lustre and a bright color”. Bodily beauty in sum. Likewise. or disposition simply. Marcus Tullius Cicero.): I reply that it must be said to the first question that in the human body there can be a twofold deformity. q. St. so this propriety. where the latter states that: “At any rate. Thomas Aquinas. Timaeus 87 d-e (tr. as physical beauty with harmonious symmetry of the limbs engages the attention and delights the eye. Phaedrus 264c. De Officiis. as was said above when the integrity of the resurrected body was treated of. 98: For. CXXII. Translated by Walter Miller. Augustine. Augustine says that “all bodily beauty consists in the agreement of the parts. there should be a middle. Cf. Augustine remained undecided and doubtful (Enchiridion xcii) as the Master in the text says (Sent. or which is unsymmetrical [e] in some other respect. for the very reason that all the parts combine in harmony and grace. xxii). membri]: thus we say that mutilated things are ugly. In IV Sent. 3. will not be in the bodies of the damned. In another way deformity arises from an undue disposition of the parts. B. situ]—which deformity is. According to Cicero. Concerning these kinds of deformities and like defects such as fevers and similar ailments which sometimes are the cause of deformity. moreover. for in them there is a lack of due proportion to the whole. Cf. c. In the same vein. or quality. together with a certain due lustre of color”. either an undue quantity. Thomas Aquinas states that “the beauty of the body consists in this. xix. Jowett): “Just as a body which has a leg too long. tr. iv. adapted to one another and to the whole?” (Plato. The “agreement of parts” spoken of by St. “of the body there is a certain fitting arrangement of the members accompanied by a certain agreeableness of color which is called beauty” (Cicero. But note that. since all bodies of both wicked and good will rise again whole. whether spiritual or bodily. without a doubt. Tusc. XI. Jowett) This species of beauty is that of ‘order’. together with a certain agreeableness of color” (De civitate Dei. on the other hand. Thomas speaks of a due disposition in quantity. I. and end. by a “fitting arrangement of the members.M. having a body of its own and a head and feet. And so proportionally in the rest of things it must be admitted that each thing is called beautiful insofar as it has its own kind of lustre. where a part is neither too big nor too small in reference to the whole. you will allow that every discourse ought to be a living creature. Disp. Loeb Edition (Cambridge. incompatible with a due proportion of the parts to the whole. and insofar as it has been established in a due proportion…. consistency.

Cf. and served to exhibit the penal condition in which we mortals are.—shall we not think as highly of the almighty Worker? Shall He not be able to remove and abolish all deformities of the human body. and this without suffering any part of the substance. it is at the same time understood that such things as would have produced a deformity by their excessive proportions shall be added to the total bulk of the body.” Luke 12:7 Nor would I say this because I suppose that any part naturally belonging to the body can perish. for they shall be changed into the same flesh. the natural substance shall suffer no diminution? And consequently overgrown and emaciated persons need not fear that they shall be in heaven of such a figure as they would not be even in this world if they could help it. 6. who has. which. Augustine of Hippo. And thus there shall be no deformity resulting from want of proportion in that state in which all that is wrong is corrected. or that what had formed the bottom should again do so.—if he can. But the Quality and Quantity of It Being Altered So as to Produce Beauty. while the natural but unseemly blemishes are put an end to. On deformity in the body. St. can recast it and make it very beautiful. but only the deformity to be lost.” might more suitably be interpreted of the number. Just as if. Where there is no proportion. the deformity shall perish. as we have already said. “Not a hair of your head shall perish. and that no part of it should be left unused. pertains to quality. “The hairs of your head are all numbered. made a deformed statue. are yet not to be thought of in connection with that future blessedness. and all that is excessive removed without destroying the integrity of the substance. but only that the whole clay should go to make up the whole new vessel. what our Lord said. while the substance is entirely preserved. as He elsewhere says. And as for the pleasant color. and yet no one will lose these parts at the resurrection. For all bodily beauty consists in the proportion of the parts. or too large. which. However. for example. for some reason. For if even a human workman. after making a vessel of clay. but that whatever deformity was in it. Wherefore. and all that is defective supplied from resources the Creator wots of. and shall He not be able so to remove them that. either because there is something awanting. though in keeping with this miserable life. whether common ones or rare and monstrous. how conspicuous shall it be where “the just shall shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their 11 . if the hair that has been cropped and the nails that have been cut would cause a deformity were they to be restored to their places. one wished to make it over again of the same clay. What am I to say now about the hair and nails? Once it is understood that no part of the body shall so perish as to produce deformity in the body. together with a certain agreeableness of color. City of God. it would not be necessary that the same portion of the clay which had formed the handle should again form the new handle. the Natural Substance of the Body Remaining. their substance being so altered as to preserve the proportion of the various parts of the body. the eye is offended. they shall not be restored. Unmentioned in the foregoing texts is the possession of a due disposition with respect to shape or figure. but by so breaking down and mixing up the whole as to get rid of the blemish without diminishing the quantity of his material. should be restored in such a way that. not by cutting off and separating this part from the whole.to the order among the parts.—That All Bodily Blemishes Which Mar Human Beauty in This Life Shall Be Removed in the Resurrection. remove some unbecoming or disproportionate part. like claritas. or too small. and not of the length of the hairs. not to parts in which the beauty of the proportion would thus be marred. Book XXII: Chapter 19.

the places where they have been wounded or mutilated shall retain the scars without any of the members being lost. and our Latin translators. when an object. quality. for in them there lacks due proportion of the parts to the whole.M. and it was necessary that they should so look upon Him as to be able to recognize Him. I know not how. 44. and a spiritual. but a mark of honor. One arises from the lack of a limb: thus we say In one way from the lack of a limb: thus we say that a mutilated person is deformed.. is invisible to persons who see other things which are present. q. for want of a better word. And yet we need not believe that they to whom it has been said.Father!” Matthew 13:43 This brightness we must rather believe to have been concealed from the eyes of the disciples when Christ rose. For weak human eyesight could not bear it. Now. or place—which deformity is. “Not a hair of your head shall perish. but because He could take it if He wished. moreover. then they would not have asked for the gate by which they might enter the house. c.—not because He needed nourishment. to desire to see in the heavenly kingdom the marks of the wounds which they received for the name of Christ. either an undue quantity. Cf.) I answer that. B. Augustine remained undecided and doubtful 12 . English Dominican Fathers) (tr. in the resurrection. it is quite true that no blemishes which the body has sustained shall appear in the resurrection. or situation—which deformity is. this is called in Greek ἀορασἀα . without a doubt. moreover. because he that mutilated things are ugly. Deformity in the human body is I reply that it must be said to the first question of two kinds. will not be in the bodies of the damned. though present. But if it had been blindness. For this will not be a deformity. want such of their members as they have been deprived of in their martyrdom. therefore. and will add lustre to their appearance. Another deformity arises from the undue disposition of the parts. than to have been awanting. 1a. that in the human body there can be a twofold deformity. In IV Sent. This blindness the men of Sodom suffered when they sought the just Lot’s gate and could not find it. Thomas Aquinas. Concerning these deformities and like defects such as fevers and similar ailments which sometimes result in deformity. as we say that that brightness was present but invisible by those who saw other things. In another way deformity arises from an undue disposition of the parts.A. But if it will be seemly in that new kingdom to have some marks of these wounds still visible in that immortal flesh. have rendered this cæcitas (blindness) in the book of Genesis.” shall.: Parallel translations: (tr. since all bodies of both wicked and good will rise again whole. yet we are not to reckon or name these marks of virtue blemishes. But the love we bear to the blessed martyrs causes us. by reason of undue quantity. but for guides who might lead them away. dist. and possibly we shall see them. that is to say. and also ate and drank. St. is a lack of due proportion to the whole. or quality. Augustine remained undecided and doubtful (Enchiridion And deformity of this kind. Concerning these kinds of deformities and like defects such as fevers and similar ailments which sometimes are the cause of deformity. incompatible with due proportion of parts to whole. without any doubt. 3. For this purpose also He allowed them to touch the marks of His wounds. as was said above when the integrity of the resurrected body was treated of. if they could see nothing. will not be in the bodies of the damned. Deformities of this kind. since all bodies of both wicked and good will rise again whole. incompatible with a due proportion of the parts to the whole. While. art. if not a bodily beauty.

moreover. one arises from the lack of a limb. quality. = lack of wholeness (defectus integritas) another deformity arises from the undue = lack of due proportion (defectus debita disposition of the parts proportio) deformity arising from the lack of a limb: thus = lack of due proportion of the parts to the we say that mutilated things are deformed. 44). iv. or situation (or position)— which deformity is. incompatible with due proportion of parts to whole Hence. moreover. iv. 44). D. 7.xcii) as the Master remarks (Sent.the whole formed. = possession of due proportion (debita another from the due disposition of the parts proportio) well-formedness arising from the possession of = possession of due proportion of the parts to all the limbs: thus we say that wholes are well. compatible with due proportion of parts to whole due = possession of due disposition in quantity = possession of due disposition in quality = possession of due disposition in situation or position = lack of due disposition in quantity = lack of due disposition in quality = lack of due disposition in situation or position § 13 . whole because in them there is a lack of due proportion to the whole deformity arising from the undue disposition of the parts: by reason of undue quantity. one may surmise that well-formedness in the human body will be of two kinds: one will arise from the possession of all the = possession of wholeness (integritas) limbs. being well-formed: Deformity in the human body is of two kinds. The principles of deformity and of its opposite. or situation (or position)— which loveliness is. quality. because in them there is a due proportion to the whole well-formedness arising from the disposition of the parts: by reason of due quantity. (Enchiridion xcii) as the Master in the text says (Sent. D.

8. § 14 . understood as commensurability) according to quality (= luster or brilliance [claritas]. Into its species or specific parts: (a) order (b) symmetry (c) the limited or definiteness 2. Into its constituents or quasi-integral parts: (a) wholeness or integrity (b) due proportion or consonance (c) lustre or brilliance (etc. Divisions of beauty. having to do with luminosity or intelligibility) in shape or figure (= the limited or definiteness) in color or coloring (which exists in a surface) 9. 1. beauty consists in a due proportion of the parts to the whole (= integrity or perfection) according to situation or position (= order) to each other (= consonance or due proportion) according to quantity (= symmetry. which is what symmetry consists in. On beauty in sum.) Note here that beauty regards commensuration and what is becoming inasmuch as it consists in a due proportion of the parts to the whole with respect to quantity.

legô de to toionde. Clearly of the want of symmetry”. Laws II (668d–669e) (tr. (tr. continually miss their aim and glance aside. Two principles of the beautiful according to Plato. and also the colors and shapes. how many [parts] there are and how they fit next to one another in the appropriate order.2 (ed. M Cornford): “Str. tr. rev. What then. and aiming at an appointed mark. Fowler). Augustine. whether [the statue] has the proportions of the body and the positions and arrangements of each of the parts. John Burnet. Jowett): “Just as a body which has a leg too long. F. Thomas Pangle. if someone doesn’t know what each of the bodies of the things imitated is? Would he ever know what is correctly executed in them? What I mean is something like this: [would he ever know. one must preserve • • the proportions of the original [kata tas tou paradeigmatos summetrias tis] in length. 4 Athênaios: ti oun ei tis kai en toutois agnooi tôn memimêmenôn hoti pot' estin hekaston tôn sômatôn. hoion tous arithmous tou sômatos kai 15 . 2 On the role of symmetry and color in bodily beauty. Ath. tên tou mimêmatos genesin apergazêtai. THE BEAUTIFUL ACCORDING TO PLATO.A. N. ar' an pote to ge orthôs autôn eirgasmenon gnoiê. shall we say that this is the effect of symmetry among them. or of the want of symmetry? Theaet.II. or whether all the things have been put together in a confused way? Do you think someone can ever know these things if he is completely ignorant of what the living thing is that has been imitated?4 1 For if the proper proportions are not preservered. The perfect example of this consists in creating a copy that conforms to the proportions of the original [kata tas tou paradeigmatos summetrias tis] in all three [e] dimensions1 and giving moreover the proper color to every part [eti chrômata apodidous ta prosêkonta hekastois]. H. 1. Timaeus 87 d-e (tr. and St.M. Soph.3 2. 235d-e.. 235d-e: In order to produce an accurate imitation. Cornford). as a rule. then the thing will be ugly: cf. whenever anyone produces the imitation by following the proportions of the original in length. breadth. And when things having motion. Hence symmetry in the parts of the body consists in having an appropriate size relative to the whole—which consists in “hitting the mark” aimed at by nature (in making a thing) or by art (in making a likeness of a thing).” Cf. Soph. This is met with.] for instance. see the texts of Cicero. The role of symmetry or proportion and color. Thomas Aquinas given below. Stranger I see the likeness-making art as one part of imitation. B. besides. and giving. [235e] the appropriate colors to each part. mian men tên eikastikên horôn en autêi technên. kai pros [235e] toutois eti chrômata apodidous ta prosêkonta hekastois. as well as give the appropriate colors to each part [chrômata apodidous ta prosêkonta hekastois]. and depth.). and depth. STRANGER: One art that I see contained in it is the making of likenesses (ei)kastikh/).. B. M. Plato. F. The three greatest forms of the beautiful as touched upon by Plato. 3. Cf. breadth. Plato. esti d' hautê malista hopotan kata tas tou paradeigmatos summetrias tis en mêkei kai platei kai bathei. also Sophist 228b-c (tr. 3 Xenos. or which is unsymmetrical [e] in some other respect. is an unpleasant sight….

Perhaps it would be clearer if put this way— Kl. how many there are and how they fit next to one another in the appropriate order. Laws II (668d – 669b) (tr. That would mean. if someone doesn’t know what each of the bodies of the things imitated is? Would he ever know what is correctly executed in them? What I mean is something like this: doesn’t he have to know whether the imitation captures the number and the arrangement [668e] of each of the parts. Yes. and rhythms are produced. in painting and music and in all the rest. would he? But I have not put this very clearly. colors. 16 . and also the colors and shapes. hekastôn tôn merôn [668e] tas theseis ei echei. • • • • “whether [the statue] has the proportions of the body [= symmetry] and the positions and arrangements of each of the parts” [= order] “how many [parts] there are and how they fit next to one another in the appropriate order” [also = order] “the colors and shapes” [= the limited] “or whether all the things have been put together in a confused way” [= lack of order] Cf. melodies. hosoi te eisin kai hopoia par' hopoia autôn keimena tên prosêkousan taxin apeilêphen—kai eti dê chrômata te kai schêmata—ê panta tauta tetaragmenôs eirgastai: môn dokei taut' an pote diagnônai tis to parapan agnoôn hoti pot' esti to memimêmenon zôion. the person who is going to be a prudent judge must have three kinds of knowledge? He must know [669b] first what the thing is. stranger. What if we were to know that the thing that has been painted or sculpted is a human being. What you say is very correct. Kl. know what is beautiful in any paint-ings of living things. Bury): Ath. Isn’t it the case. He who does not know what is done correctly would never be able to know what is done well or badly. that with regard to each image. Ath. In sum. Kl. Ath. anyway. How? Ath.4. There are of course myriad images which are visible to our eye. and that all his own parts [669a]. then. R. that all of us. and shapes have been captured by the art? Does it follow necessarily that whoever knows about these things also readily knows whether the work is beautiful or just where it is deficient in beauty? Kl. How could he? Ath. so to speak. Plato. any of the images of it in words. or whether all the things have been put together in a confused way? Do you think someone can ever know these things if he is completely ignorant of what the living thing is that has been imitated? Kl. and then—the third thing—how well. What then. That’s likely. G. and then know how correctly.

and strifes and con-troversies arise. and when in this compound there is an impassioned soul more powerful than the body. than that between soul and body. and stupid. and be healthy and well balanced. And therefore the mathematician or any one else whose thoughts are much absorbed in some intellectual pursuit. perfect and ageless and unailing. which of all shapes is the most perfect and the most self-similar. and forgetful. and practice gymnastic. wherefore He wrought it into a round. for it lacks the most important of all sym-metries. 5. with all its parts perfect. is much distressed and makes convulsive efforts..Cf. that it might be. who ascribe it to the opposite of the real cause.. Timaeus 32d-34b (Loeb tr. and the animal fair is not without proportion. and the nature of this phenomenon is not understood by most professors of medicine. And once more. I say. when a body large and too strong for the soul is united to a small and weak intelligence. but of the highest and greatest we take no heed. On being ‘perfect and whole’ according to Plato. or again. compounded of all wholes. when a little soul is encased in a large body. convulses and fills with disorders the whole inner nature of man. Plato. This however we do not perceive. the motions of the stronger. Cf. Just as a body which has a leg too long.. perfect and whole. and next. Timaeus 87c-88c (tr. inflames and dissolves the composite frame of man and introduces rheums. There is one protection against both kinds of disproportion—that we should not move the body without the soul or the soul without the body. about which it is meet and right that I should say a word in turn. or which is unsymmetrical [e] in some other respect. [34a] He spun it round uniformly in the 17 . when teaching or disputing in private or in public. if he would deserve to be called truly fair and truly good. is an unpleasant sight. Everything that is good is fair. for it is more our duty to speak of the good than of the evil. and that for many reasons. but the due proportion of mind and body is the fairest and loveliest of all sights to him who has the seeing eye. and when eager in the pursuit of some sort of learning or study. then the whole animal is not fair. then inasmuch as there are two desires natural to [b] man—one of food for the sake of the body. causes wasting. since He deemed that the similar is infinitely fairer than the dissimilar. and is the cause of infinite evil to its own self—in like manner we should conceive of the double nature which we call the living being. for there is no proportion or disproportion [d] more productive of health and disease. and should cultivate music and all philosophy. B. equidistant in all directions from the center to the extremities. which is the greatest of diseases.. that [88a] soul. in the shape of a sphere.) (excerpts): [32d] “. and also. engender ignorance. Now for that Living Creature which is designed to embrace within itself all living creatures the fitting shape will be that which comprises within itself all the shapes there are. and thus they will be on their guard [c] against each other. so far as possible. And on the outside round about. and virtue and vice. but making the soul dull. when doing its share of work. a Living Creature. must allow his body also to have due exercise. Plato. that it might be One. and one of wisdom for the sake of the diviner part of us—then. or conversely. nor do we reflect that when a weak or small frame is the vehicle of a great and mighty soul. should in turn impart to the soul its proper motions. it was all made smooth with great exactness. and often stumbles through awkwardness. I say. Jowett): There is a corresponding inquiry concerning the mode of treatment [c] by which the mind and the body are to be preserved..first. getting the better and increasing their own power. Now we perceive lesser symmetries or proportions and reason about them. and he who is careful to fashion the body. [33a] He fashioned it to be One single Whole. [33b] And he bestowed on it the shape which was befitting and akin. and the animal which is to be fair must have due proportion.

a whole and perfect body compounded of perfect bodies. leaving no part of any of them nor any power of them outside. SOCRATES: Then as to the other topics – are they not thrown down anyhow? Is there any principle in them? Why should the next topic follow next in order. and I maintain I ought not to fail in my suit because I am not your lover. they decompose them. bitter and sweet. B. but I dare say that you would recognize a rhetorical necessity in the succession of the several parts of the composition? PHAEDRUS: You have too good an opinion of me if you think that I have any such insight [c] into his principles of composition. as I conceive. Jowett): SOCRATES: Read. that it should be one.) Observations such as this lie at the root of traditional philosophy’s understanding of beauty as a hexis or disposition. cold and hot. And in the midst thereof He set Soul. . Considering that if heat and cold and other powerful forces which unite bodies surround and attack them from without when they are unprepared. III. 18 . Cf. Timaeus 32d-33b (tr. and being therefore perfect and [b] not liable to old age and disease. indeed. of Croton was a physician who flourished in the early fifth century. And illness comes about by an excess of heat or cold.. for the sole dominance of either one of them would be destructive [of the other].same spot and within itself and made it move revolving in a circle…. Plato. [34b] He made it smooth and even and equal on all sides from the center. [d] that the animal should be as far as possible a perfect whole and of [33] perfect parts: secondly.. and how. and in the blood or marrow of the brain . (Alcmaon. health is the proportionate mixture (symmetron krasin) of the qualities”. and by bringing diseases and old age upon them. when their love is over. Phaedrus 264a-e ff.1: “Health is conserved by equal balance (isonomia) among the powers —wet and dry. Am I not right. or Alcmeon. . from too much or too little food. and therewith He enveloped also the exterior of its body.” Cf. and is swimming on his back through the flood to the place of starting. that I may have his exact words. for lovers repent of the kindnesses which they have shown. Socrates. which He stretched throughout the whole of it. And he gave to the world the figure which was suitable and also natural.. Jowett): Now the creation took up the whole of each of the four elements. in the first place. etc. 4. disease being produced by the sole dominance (monarchia) of one among them. he does begin at the end. sweet Phaedrus? PHAEDRUS: [b] Yes. make them waste away1 —for this cause and on these grounds he made the world one whole. PHAEDRUS: “You know how matters stand with me. B.. (tr. they might be arranged for our common interest. leaving no remnants out of which another such world might be created: and also that it should be free from old age and unaffected by disease. and as a Circle revolving in a circle. from Aëtius V30. 1 Cf. 1 (116b 19-23) and associated texts. Plato. His address to the fair youth begins where the lover would have ended. Topics. See further Aristotle. His intention was. quoted below. having every part entire. Alcmaon Fr. for the Creator compounded the world out of all the fire and all the water and all the air and all the earth.” SOCRATES: Here he appears to have done just the reverse of what he ought. for he has begun at the end. or any other topic? I cannot help fancying in my ignorance that he wrote off boldly just what came into his head.

the following: 19 . makes no difference. In stricter use (approaching or passing into 3 b): Exact correspondence in size and position of opposite parts.) 3 b. plane. So long as water flows and tall trees grow. or of the parts composing it. equable distribution of parts about a dividing line or centre. N. 6. 2. and end. etc. They also show that symmetry pertains first of all to size and order. fitting. Fowler): Socrates gives the speaker specific instructions: “Every speech must be put together like a living creature. or balanced arrangement and relation of parts or elements. having a body of its own and a head and feet. harmony of parts with each other and the whole. you will allow that every discourse ought to be a living creature. proportion. adapted to one another and to the whole? PHAEDRUS: Certainly. Cf. PHAEDRUS: You are making fun of that oration of ours. there should be a middle. Mutual relation of the parts of something in respect of magnitude and position. (As an attribute either of the whole. it must be neither without head nor without legs. regular. with a body of its own. tr. Geom. PHAEDRUS: [d] What is there remarkable in the epitaph? SOCRATES: It is as follows: — “I am a maiden of bronze and lie on the tomb of Midas.” [e] Now in this rhyme whether a line comes first or comes last. I shall declare to passers-by that Midas sleeps below. So long here on this spot by his sad tomb abiding. Harold N. or point. plane. arrangement of all the points of a figure or system in pairs (or sets) so that those of each pair (or set) are at equal distances on opposite sides of such line. Exact correspondence in position of the several points or parts of a figure or body with reference to a dividing line. The first two definitions given here show the appropriateness of translating summetria by ‘proportion’. But for the way in which these attributes enter into the consideration of a work of art. the condition or quality of being wellproportioned or well-balanced. relative measurement and arrangement of parts. as you will perceive. cf. beginning.SOCRATES: At any rate. and it must have a middle and extremities that are fitting both to one another and to the whole work” (264C). SOCRATES: Can this be said of the discourse of Lysias? See whether you can find any more connexion in his words than in the epitaph which is said by some to have been inscribed on the grave of Midas the Phrygian. the following from a web site (quoting Plato. Due or just proportion. or point (or a number of lines or planes).B. The meaning of ‘symmetry’ according to The Oxford English Dictionary: Symmetry 1. Phaedrus 264c.

is the genesis of a work of art. This.. head. Emmer. 20 . 7. Aristotle. makes no difference. 1993: Now in every work of [visual] art the basis of its composition is geometry or in other words the means of determining the mutual relationship of its component parts either on plane or in space. and end) (parts adapted to one another and to the whole):1 “every discourse ought to be a living creature. there should be a middle. nevertheless hold that the heaven was constructed to be what it is by chance and spontaneity. And again. 1 Such a thing being a whole having size. and end. Plato on beauty in sum. while they allow that every animal exists and was generated by nature. the heaven. and is swimming on his back through the flood to the place of starting” “Then as to the other topics – are they not thrown down anyhow? Is there any principle in them? Why should the next topic follow next in order. ibid. M. such an orderliness importing an absence of haphazard. beginning. transposition of parts should make a difference to the nature): “for he has begun at the end. Bill. having a body of its own and a head and feet.. M. and the resultant end of her generations is a form of the beautiful”. cf.. in which not the faintest sign of haphazard or of disorder is discernible!” Cf. Cf. beginning.Cf. The Visual Mind: Art and Mathematics. Cambridge. it is only a natural step from having perceived them to desiring to portray them. Note: The “form of the beautiful” at issue here is that of taxis or order.” (b) a body. and feet (a middle.: “Absence of haphazard and conduciveness of everything to an end are to be found in nature’s works in the highest degree. Parts of Animals (641b 21-24) (tr. hence an order in its parts (= position as dispositio). for the parts of an integral whole cannot be put together in just any way. William Ogle): “Yet there are some who. adapted to one another and to the whole” (c) succession or connection (continuous and one): “but I dare say that you would recognize a rhetorical necessity in the succession of the several parts of the composition” “See whether you can find any more connexion in his words than in the epitaph which is said by some to have been inscribed on the grave of Midas the Phrygian” On these observations. “nature is not episodic. as you will perceive. since it is mathematics which lends significance to these relationships. Leonardo Books-MIT Press. (a) beginning and end (order as consisting in a before and after. The Mathematical Way of Thinking in the Visual Art of Our Time. in brief. or any other topic?” “Now in this rhyme whether a line comes first or comes last. editor.

and the likeness would be more truly said to resemble not them. so far as this was attainable. For which reason. Thomas Aquinas. and the good can never have any jealousy of anything. but let us suppose the world to be the very image of that whole of which all other animals both individually and in their tribes are portions. lect. when the mean is to the [32] first term as the last term is to the 21 . Wherefore. B. considering that this was in every way better than the other. [e] This being supposed. and also visible and tangible. found that no unintelligent creature taken as a whole was fairer than the intelligent taken as a whole. or that they are many and infinite? There must be one only. Wherefore also finding the whole visible sphere not at rest. Cf. For the Deity. but that other which included them. lect. For whenever in any three numbers. n.M. In V Meta. for nothing can be beautiful which is like any imperfect thing. the creator made not [b] two worlds or an infinite number of them.A. But two things cannot be rightly put together without a third. which is to the last term what the first term is to it. Now that which is created is of necessity corporeal.like a bad tragedy”. reflecting on the things which are by nature visible. And being free from jealousy.A. 3 (tr.. if the created copy is to accord with the original. but that which “consists in a certain totality requiring a determinate order of parts”. not in the sense of a homogeneous subject. as we shall do well in believing on the testimony of wise men: God desired that all things should be good and nothing bad. 21 (tr. and an end”. like the perfect animal. 8. let us proceed to the next stage: In the likeness of what animal did the Creator make the world? It would be an unworthy thing to liken it to any nature which exists as a part only. and again. In V Meta. using the language of probability. a middle.. he put intelligence in soul. Let me tell you then why the creator made this [e] world of generation. Wherefore also God in the beginning of creation made the body of the universe to consist of fire and earth. n. but moving in an irregular and disorderly fashion. Now the deeds of the best could never be or have been other than the fairest. [b] and the creator. In order then that the world might be solitary. Cf. Cf. This is in the truest sense the origin of creation and of the world. For that which includes all other intelligible creatures cannot have a second or companion. in which the account of ‘position’ consists. B. there must be some bond of union [e] between them. He was good. 21.): “For some things are called ‘one’ not by reason of “indivision” or “solely by reason of continuity”. intending to make this world like the fairest and most perfect of intelligible beings. because there is a beginning. out of disorder he brought order. when he was framing the universe. that he might be the creator of a work which was by nature fairest and best. or tangible which has no solidity. and of which they would be parts. [d] just as this world comprehends us and all other visible creatures. and nothing is solid without earth. framed one visible animal comprehending within itself all other animals of a kindred nature. “a whole is what has a beginning. For the original of the universe contains in itself all intelligible beings. Are we right in [31] saying that there is one world. and proportion is best adapted to effect such a union. a middle. also St. Jowett): Tim.M.): “For when it is so that in a quantity there is an order of parts. he desired that all [30] things should be as like himself as they could be.” Cf. B. Plato. And nothing is visible where there is no fire. every such continuous whole must have position in its parts. and that intelligence could not be present in anything which was devoid of soul. St. there is a mean. but there is and ever will be one only-begotten and created heaven. And the fairest bond is that which makes the most complete fusion of itself and the things which it combines. whether cube or square. we may say that the world became a living creature truly endowed with soul and intelligence by the providence of God. Thomas Aquinas. and an end there. but because they are whole and perfect insofar as they have “some one species”. in that case there would be need of another living being which would include both. and soul in body. Timaeus 29d-34a (tr.

[d] that the animal should be as far as possible a perfect whole and of [33] perfect parts: secondly. make them waste away—for this cause and on these grounds he made the world one whole. and by bringing diseases and old age upon them. and there was no surrounding atmosphere to be breathed. Now to the animal which was to comprehend all animals. And for these reasons. Having these purposes in view he created the world a blessed god. Such was the whole plan of the eternal God about the god that was to be. for the Creator compounded the world out of all the fire and all the water and all the air and all the earth. yet by reason of its excellence able to converse with itself. that it should be one. and he made the universe a circle moving in a circle. the most perfect and the most like itself of all figures. having a surface in every direction equidistant from the centre. and therefore has the spirit of friendship. as the [b] world must be solid. All the other six motions were taken away from him. the body of the world was created. but now. and he was made to move in the same manner and on the same spot. and the first and last both becoming means. a body entire and perfect. round as from a lathe. being of all the seven that which is most appropriate to mind and intelligence. but the movement suited to his spherical form was assigned to him. having its extremes in every direction equidistant from the centre. in the first place. nor would there have been any use of organs by the help of which he might receive his food or get rid of what he had already digested. that figure was suitable which comprehends within itself all other figures. Considering that if heat and cold and other powerful forces which unite bodies surround and attack them from without when they are unprepared. since there was nothing which went from him or came into him: for there was nothing beside him. and it was harmonised by proportion. Of design he was created thus. and thus he bound and put together a visible and [c] tangible heaven. because the living being had no need of eyes when there was nothing remaining outside him to be seen. His intention was. his own waste providing his own food. in the first place. a single mean would have sufficed to bind together itself and the other terms. one and solitary. and having become the same with one another will be all one. God placed water and air in the mean between fire and earth. For the Creator conceived that a being which was self-sufficient would be far more excellent than one which lacked anything. nor of the whole apparatus of walking. within his own limits revolving in a circle. and formed out of perfect bodies. And he gave to the world the figure which was suitable and also natural. and having been reconciled to itself. If the universal frame had been created a surface only and having no depth. and he was made not to partake of their deviations. This he finished off. and needing no other friendship or acquaintance. the universe was created without legs and without feet. as he had no need to take anything or defend himself against any one. the Creator did not think it necessary to bestow upon [34] him hands: nor had he any need of feet. and as air is to water so is water to earth). and being therefore perfect and [b] not liable to old age and disease. and. and made them to have the same proportion so far as was possible (as fire is to air so is air to water. and solid bodies are always compacted not by one mean but by two. they will all of them of necessity come to be the same. for he considered that the like is infinitely fairer than the unlike. 22 . Now the creation took up the whole of each of the four elements. And as this circular movement required no feet. which he diffused throughout the body. and all that he did or suffered taking [d] place in and by himself. it was indissoluble by the hand of any other than the framer. smooth and even. having every part entire. making it also to be the exterior environment of it.mean—then the mean becoming first and last. to whom for this reason he gave a body. making the [c] surface smooth all around for many reasons. nor of ears when there was nothing to be heard. leaving no remnants out of which another such world might be created: and also that it should be free from old age and unaffected by disease. and out of such elements which are in number four. And in the centre he put the soul. leaving no part of any of them nor any power of them outside. Wherefore he made the world in the form of a globe. they decompose them.

tr. Cf. § 23 . and those belonging to vice be entirely the opposite. On the other hand.” but one cannot correctly apply to either tune or posture and image “good color”—as the chorus teachers. with regard to the posture or tune of the coward and the courageous man. though. let’s simply let all the postures and tunes that belong to virtue of the soul or of the body (whether they belong to virtue itself or to an image of it) be beautiful. Thomas Pangle): It should be noted. speaking in images. Plato. that music includes postures and tunes. do. good rhythm. Perseus. and good color. now one can speak of “good rhythm” and “good harmony. it is correct to call what pertains to cowards “ugly.8. since music involves rhythm and harmony. On good harmony. Laws II (655a-b) (ed.” To avoid our getting involved in a very lengthy discussion of all these things.

Metaph. Cf. For these sciences say and prove a great deal about them. D. Metaph. and definiteness. 1. while the beautiful is found also in motionless things).. hoi phaskontes ouden legein tas mathêmatikas epistêmas peri kalou ê agathou pseudontai.): Now since the good and the beautiful are different (for the former always implies conduct as its subject.III. obviously they must also to some extent treat of the cause in this sense. the beautiful) as in [5] some sense a cause. ou legousi peri autôn. Aristotle.e.M. D. kai epei ge pollôn aitia phainetai tauta (legô d' hoion hê taxis kai to hôrismenon). the cause in the sense of the Beautiful. if they do [35] not expressly mention them. Aristotle. The three greatest forms of the beautiful. to de kalon kai en tois akinêtois). D. Metaph. THE BEAUTIFUL ACCORDING TO ARISTOTLE. XIII. XI. Ross. i. W. The chief forms of beauty are order and symmetry [1078b] and definiteness. tr.14 14 Apparently an unfulfilled promise. explicitly elsewhere. they are in error who assert that the mathematical sciences tell us nothing about beauty or goodness.g. it is not true to say that they tell us nothing about them. which the mathematical sciences demonstrate in a special degree. that they do not treat of these qualities. tou de kalou megista eidê taxis kai summetria kai to hôrismenon. And inasmuch as it is evident that these (I mean. but prove attributes which are their results or their definitions.. 3 (1078a 31—1078b 6) (ed. since it does not follow. Ross. W. because they manifest the effects and principles of beauty and goodness without naming them. dêlon hoti legoien an kai tên toiautên aitian tên [5] hôs to kalon aition tropon tina. e. 3 (1061a 29-b 3) (tr. Hugh Tredennick): epei de to agathon kai to kalon heteron (to men gar aei en praxei. [1078b][1] ha malista mathêmatikai epistêmai. deiknuousin The main species of beauty are orderly arrangement. mallon de gnôrimôs en allois peri autôn But we shall deal with this subject more eroumen.e..g. And since goodness is distinct from beauty (for it is always in actions that goodness is present. 3 (1078a 31—1078b 6) (tr. (emphasis added) Cf. XIII. W. B.A. Cf. whereas beauty is also in immovable things).. But we shall speak more plainly elsewhere about these matters. proportion. legousi gar kai deiknuousi malista: [35] ou gar for they describe and manifest these qualities in ei mê onomazousi ta d' erga kai tous logous the highest degree. orderly arrangement and definiteness) are causes of many things. Aristotle. Ross): 24 . those who assert that the mathematical sciences say nothing of the beautiful or the good are in error. deiknuousin. And since these (e. order and definiteness) are obviously causes of many things. evidently these sciences must treat this sort of causative principle also (i. rev. hai [1078b][1] and these are especially manifested by the mathematical sciences.

geometry). and does not consider them in any other respect. [1061b][1] tôn asummetrias. D. sometimes in three dimensions. leaving only quantity and continuity— sometimes in one. tôn men eph' hen tôn d' epi duo tôn d' epi tria.. kai ta pathê ta toutôn hêi posa esti [35] kai sunechê. hardness and its contrary. so it is the same with regard to Being.. kai tôn men tas pros allêla theseis skopei kai ta tautais huparchonta. such as weight and lightness. Ross. 2. and also heat and cold and the other sensible contrarieties. and in some cases investigates the relative positions of things and the properties of these. hold that there is one and the same science of all ton auton dê tropon echei kai peri to on. and does not study them with respect to any other thing. symmetry [or ‘commensurability’. W. D. but yet we posit one and the same science of all these things—geometry)—the same is true with regard to being. [30] weight and lightness. and the attributes of these qua quantitative and [35] continuous. 3 (1061a 29-b 3) (ed. Aristotle. XIII. all' homôs mian pantôn kai and in others their ratios. tr. XI. and examines the relative positions of some and the attributes of these.g. sometimes in two. yet nevertheless we tên autên tithemen epistêmên tên geômetrikên ). 3 (1078a 37—1078b 1) (tr. Ross) The chief forms of beauty are order [taxis] and Aristotle. viz. and the commensurabilities and incommensurabilities of others. hoion baros kai kouphotêta kai sklêrotêta kai tounantion. 3 (1061a 36-b 1) (tr. and leaves only the quantitative and continuous.As the mathematician investigates abstractions (for before beginning his investigation he strips off all the sensible qualities. Aristotle. tôn de tous logous. W. sometimes in two and sometimes in three dimensions— and their affections qua quantitative and continuous.. Cf. summetria] and the commensurabilities and incommensura[1078b] and bilities [tas summetrias kai asummetrias] of others. de tas summetrias (for in his investigations he first abstracts everything that is sensible. Meta. Comparison of texts. Meta. Hugh Tredennick): kathaper d' ho mathêmatikos peri ta ex And just as the mathematician makes a study of aphaireseôs tên theôrian poieitai abstractions (perielôn gar panta [30] ta aisthêta theôrei. these things. W. [1061b] 25 . and also heat and cold and all other sensible contrarieties. sometimes in one. [1061b] and the ratios of others. Ross) …and [as the mathematician] examines the relative positions [tas pros allêla theseis] of some and the attributes of these. D. e. XI. hardness and its contrary. monon de kataleipei to poson kai suneches. kai ou kath' heteron ti theôrei. kai [1061b][1] and in others their commensurability or incommensurability. Metaph. eti de kai thermotêta kai psuchrotêta kai tas allas aisthêtas enantiôseis.

and that for the sake of which it is. and what it is for each thing to be. Joe Sachs.e. the animal would be ill). the animal would be ugly (Cf.A. to horismenon]. which is also the form of a magnitude or of something that has magnitude. Tredennick. [the relation of ratio to limit being indicated by De Anima.M. and the ratios [tôn de tous logous] of others…. How does the notion of admitting (or not admitting) a common measure arise? Inasmuch as it is most proper to quantity to be either or equal or unequal. matical sciences especially show. 4 (416a 15-20) (tr. and in yet more ways. which the mathematical sciences demonstrate in a special degree. also of the thing. but not every limit is a beginning. and it means the end of each thing (and of this sort is that toward which its motion or action tends. ‘Symmetry’ has to do with the parts of an integral whole being commensurate— that is. tr. XIII. and to the formula rather that to the matter of the thing”. and if of [10] the knowledge. the analogy with health: just as there must be a proper balance of humours in a body for it is to be healthy (for if one humour were to be excessive. It is evident. the consideration of the relative sizes or ratios of magnitudes in geometry will necessarily make this notion manifest to the understanding. but not that from which it starts. V. Metaph. Cf. Plato. Apostle): “[B]ut a thing which is composed by nature of all [the elements] has a limit and a [certain] ratio [of elements] with respect to both size and growth. for if a limb were too large. [1078b][1] ha malista deik. though sometimes it is both and consists of that from which as well as that toward which). is an unpleasant sight…. In sum.): ‘Limit’ means the extremity of each thing. 4. (emphasis added) 26 . H. so also for a body to be beautiful there must be a proper measure of the parts with respect to quantity. G.definiteness [or ‘the limited’. possessing their due measure with respect to quantity.symmetry and the limited. Aristotle. and these [i. Duane Berquist): tou de kalou megista eidê taxis kai summetria The greatest forms of the beautiful are order and kai to hôrismenon. Metaph. rev. Note that color and lustre have no place in a consideration of the beauty pertaining to mathematicals. 3 (1078a 37-1078b 2) (ed. which the mathenuousin hai mathêmatikai epistêmai. 17 (1022a 5-14) (tr. ‘limit’ too is said.. that in however many ways ‘beginning’ is said. II. and so their ‘surfaces’ have no color. which are abstracted from sensible matter. for a beginning is a limit. limit and ratio] belong to the soul and not to fire. Cf. On the notion of ‘the limited’. 3. for the latter is a limit of knowledge. and the substance of each thing. Cf.”). or which is unsymmetrical [e] in some other respect. B. Aristotle. then.. understood as the first thing outside of which there is nothing to find and the first thing inside of which everything belonging to it is. Timaeus 87 d-e: “Just as a body which has a leg too long.

4 (416a 14-20) (tr.): “For each thing is perfect when no part of the natural magnitude. n. But.A. For the growth of fire proceeds indefinitely. but a thing which is composed by nature of all [the elements] has a limit and a [certain] ratio [of elements] with respect to both size and growth. consistence of things.5. From the foregoing. 20.. 5 (tr. e.g. which belongs to it according to the species of its proper virtue. 1 Cf. limit and ratio] belong to the soul and not to fire. The four ways in which ‘limit’ is said: • • • • the form [or end. Thomas Aquinas. a surface where a virtue or power comes to an end: coming to be where an intention comes to an end: that for the sake of which. as Aristotle states. and to the formula rather that to the matter of the thing. ad rationem but to be containing and limiting. or the shape or figure of a surface or body. 4. being as the limit of coming to be [the last thing taken in respect of virtue or power] that for the sake of which it is. B. De An.e. coming under the fourth species of quality [the last thing taken in respect of quantity] the end [or extreme] of a motion or operation. Aristotle. one sees how definiteness arises from symmetry. the end points of a line. Hippocrates G. which in turn involves order. and the limit [more honorable] than the limited. to the notion formae. 18. Now just as any natural thing possesses a determinate measure of natural magnitude according to continuous quantity. and these [i. Consequently.. however it is not the cause without qualification.1 Cf. which is also the form where knowledge comes to an end: the substance or what it is of a thing 6.]. lect. n.M. In II De Caelo. Thomas Aquinas. St. which is the substance of the whole rerum. as is said in the second book of the De Anima [II.-7 manifestum est autem quod continens est But it is obvious that the thing containing is honorabilius contento. e. quae est substantia totius consistentiae of form. a line. In V Meta. quia contentum et finitum pertinent ad rationem the reason being that the contained and the limimateriae.e. esse autem continens et finiens.g. the final cause (and form) [the last thing in intention] the substance of each thing [the essence or definition] [the last thing in knowledge] where a quantity comes to an end: a point. Apostle): Now fire is in some way a joint cause. inasmuch as a thing composed of elements is marked by a limit and a certain ratio with respect to those elements. is lacking to it. 7: LB2 LC20N. so also any thing possesses a determinate quantity of its natural virtue”. II. 27 . 416a 15ff. ted pertain to the notion of matter. et finis quam finitum: more honorable than the thing contained. Cf. or terminus] of a magnitude or of a thing having magnitude: i. lect. On limit and ratio. [15] Rather is it the soul which is the cause. St. as long as there is fuel to be burned. it will possess those forms of the beautiful called symmetry and order. the possession of a determinate quantity of magnitude is a function of the ratio of the elements composing the thing.

Thomas Aquinas. huiusmodi enim determinata dici possunt.M. qui secundum se calidus est. lib.A. Quia illud videtur esse principium alicuius passionis vel motus in aliquo.Cf. attaining its proper term. hoc autem concausa. 6 Deinde cum dicit videtur autem ponit aliam positionem. Necesse est enim omne alimentum decoqui: quod quidem fit per ignem: unde ignis aliquo modo operatur ad alimentum. Primo ponit eam. quod haec opinio differt in hoc a prima. that it attains an agreement with human nature — et ex hoc dicitur determinata. For things of this sort may be called ‘deterinquantum aliqualiter attingunt id ad quod mined’ insofar as they somehow attain to that to ordinantur. 8 Deinde cum dicit hoc autem improbat praedictam positionem. et cetera.): LB10LC-3N. nihil enim prohibet quin delectatio recipiens magis et minus sit determinata. quod prima attribuebat causam augmenti et alimenti diversis elementis. ibi. scilicet igni et terrae: haec autem attribuit eorum causam igni tantum. [80614] Sentencia De anima. hoc enim est animae. Thomas Aquinas. et terra. sed hoc modo causa est anima: quod sic probat. lect 3. which is it’proper term. Cf. 2 l. Solus igitur ignis videtur esse faciens augmentum et alimentum in plantis et animalibus. lib. Et circa hoc duo facit. 2 l. [80613] Sentencia De anima. 8 n. secundum quod se habet illam passionem vel motum: sicut ignis. si superficialiter de nutrimento et augmento loquamur. 7 Et movebantur ad hoc hac ratione. Cf. Utrum vero ignis nutriatur et augeatur. In II De Anima: [80612] Sentencia De anima. verum est. which they are ordained. quod ignis quodammodo concausa est augmenti et alimenti. quae secundum se est gravis. sed sicut agens secundarium et instrumentale. 8 n. Secundo improbat. quod praedicta positio aliquid habet veritatis. est causa caloris in rebus mixtis. oportet non esse determinatas. 8 n. Thomas: a thing is determinata when it has attained that to which it is ordained. Inter autem elementa videtur solus ignis nutriri et augeri. sicut et sanitas. 2 l. licet possent propinquius attingere. St. et per consequens ad augmentum: non quidem sicut agens principale. B. non tamen est principaliter causa ut principale agens. lib.-8 sed tamen neque etiam delectationes quae secundum se recipiunt magis et minus ratione suae mixtionis. sicut commixtio humorum habet rationem In the same way a mixing together of humours sanitatis ex eo quod attingit convenientiam has the character of health by reason of the fact humanae naturae. Et ideo dicere. Sciendum est autem. St. est causa gravitatis in eis. St. sicut instrumentum concausa est principalis agentis. 28 . n. quasi proprium for from this a thing is called ‘determined’ as terminum attingens. although they may get nearer to it. neque bonas. 8 (tr. Sciendum tamen est. inferius erit manifestum.. In X Ethic.

2 l. lib. which is the principle of the species. and there is another quantity so small beyond which a man cannot be found. the reason being that the determination of quantity in natural things comes from the form. et scamno. 3 (1078a 36—1078b 1) (tr. On order and definiteness. which is the cause of the determination of size and growth is the principal cause of growth. 9 Illud est principale in qualibet actione a quo imponitur terminus et ratio ei quod fit. [It is therefore obvious that fire is not the principle agent in growth and nutrition. est certus terminus. sed ab ipsa arte. B. et in quacumque quantitate.): The chief forms of beauty are order and symmetry [1078b] and definiteness . And this happens reasonably. licet cum aliqua latitudine propter diversitatem materiae. est ex virtute artis. Cf. Metaph. magis quam ex materia. On the Parts of Animals. Cf. there is therefore even more reason to believe.] Hoc autem non est ignis. sicut forma ad materiam. et alias causas individuales. Et hoc rationabiliter accidit. 1 (641b 16—642a 30) (tr. quod ignis non est principale agens in augmento et alimento. quod sit aptum ad talem formam et ad talem quantitatem. Magis igitur terminus et ratio magnitudinis et augmenti est ab anima. quod terminus vel ratio arcae vel domui non imponitur ab instrumentis. The greatest forms of the beautiful in sum. apta est ad secandum lignum.] 7. sed magis anima. But the soul is compared to the elements. Anima autem comparatur ad elementa. si in infinitum materia combustibilis inveniatur. Nam instrumenta se habent differenter ut cooperentur ad hanc formam vel quantitatem. quae sunt in corpore vivente. although there is some latitude by reason of a diversity of matter. as form to matter. Sed tamen est aliqua quantitas tam magna. [Now it is obvious that in all things that are according to nature there is a certain term. But there is nonetheless a certain quantity beyond which the human species cannot go. quod in omnibus quae sunt secundum naturam. sed quod sic secetur lignum.M. for just as in any species certain proper accidents are due. if it had an origin. Manifestum est igitur. but rather the soul. Illud igitur quod est causa determinationis magnitudinis et augmenti est principalis causa augmenti. et determinata ratio magnitudinis et augmenti: sicut enim cuilibet speciei debentur aliqua accidentia propria. ultra quam homo non invenitur. Manifestum est autem. so also proper quantities. quia determinatio quantitatis in rebus naturalibus est ex forma. et domui. et alia quantitas tam parva. Serra enim quantum est de se. Aristotle. therefore. sed in infinitum extenditur. Ross. I. For 29 . rev. XIII. Manifestum est enim. ultra quam species humana non porrigitur. 8. quod ignis augmentum non est usque ad determinatam quantitatem. sicut patet in artificialibus. ita et propria quantitas. and a determinate ratio of size and growth. W. was evolved and is maintained by such a cause.[80615] Sentencia De anima. which the mathematical sciences demonstrate in a special degree. non enim omnes homines sunt unius quantitatis. D. secundum quod competit et ostio. rather than from the matter. Aristotle. than that mortal animals so originated. 8 n. Therefore the limit and ratio of size and growth is more from the soul than from fire.. which are in the living body. That. quam ab igne. William H Ogle): And that the heaven. quae est principium speciei.A. vel aliam.

Such. nor spring from any chance one. is the case when he explains what is a bone. that they were not in possession of the notion of essence. It is plain then that there are two modes of causation. At the same time the offspring is anterior to the seed. There is. corresponding to what we call by the name of Nature. if it is to do its work. so far as possible. For a given seed does not give rise to any chance living being. For he does not merely describe its material. But at this period men gave up inquiring into the works of nature. or those two or three elements. but each seed springs from a definite parent and gives rise to a definite progeny. and that [15] both of these must. the seed is potentially that which will spring from it. It may. and that those who fail in this tell us in reality nothing about nature. finds himself constrained to speak of the ratio (logos) as constituting the essence and real nature of things. be asked. however. and the seed of the organism that will eventually arise from it. but was merely brought to it. As with a bone. which is developed from the seed of the horse. spite of himself. must of necessity be made of bronze or iron. the heaven. because an animal cannot possibly do without it. if hard. nevertheless hold that the heaven was constructed to be what it is by chance and spontaneity. must of necessity be of such and such a character. If a piece of wood is to be split with an axe. we always say that such final [25] end is the aim or purpose of the motion. in which not the faintest sign of haphazard or of disorder is discernible! Again. For it can be of neither of those two modes which are set forth in the philosophical treatises. to which a motion tends should nothing stand in the way. For primary cause constitutes the nature of an animal much more than does its matter. [25] The reason why our predecessors failed in hitting upon this method of treatment was. [20] Yet there are some who. namely. Now exactly in the same way the body. and made of such and such materials. and the relation of potentiality to actuality we know. be taken into account in explaining the works of nature. however. The same seed then is the seed both of the horse and of the mule. In the time of Socrates a nearer approach was made to the method. Here [10] is another example of it. And thus it is the seed that is the ruling influence and fabricator of the offspring. however. and from this it is evident that there must be a something or other really existing. Moreover. the third mode. which like the axe is an instrument—for both the body as a whole and its several parts individually have definite operations for which they are made—just in the same way. for example. For every seed implies two organisms. of what mode of necessity are we speaking when [5] we say this. The first who came near it was Democritus. For many things are produced. [30] 30 . from which it was derived.order and definiteness are much more plainly manifest in the celestial bodies than in our own frame. Anterior. while change and chance are characteristic of the perishable things of earth. and he was far from adopting it as a necessary method in natural science. This third mode is what may be called hypothetical necessity. and following the [20] guidance of fact. and. nor of any definition of substance. There are indeed passages in which even Empedocles hits upon this. and say it is this one element. necessity and the final end. the offspring being at [30] any rate that which in nature will spring from it. we say that food is necessary. but states the ratio (logos) of their combination. for instance. the parent and the progeny. in such things at any rate as are generated. the axe must of necessity be hard. For instance. though in different ways as here set forth. while they allow that every animal exists and was generated by nature. I say. whenever there is plainly some final end. and philosophers diverted their attention to political science and to the virtues which benefit mankind. [642a] There are then two causes. or a compound of all the elements. of the horse. for seed and perfected progeny are related as the developmental process and the result. For these it is by nature. for instance. the body. of the mule. For seed or seed is both the seed of the organism from which it came. or that at any rate an attempt must be made to include them both. so manifestly is it with the flesh and all other similar parts. by constraint of facts. simply as the results of necessity. to both seed and product is the organism from which the seed was [35] derived.

De An. 31 . D. 5 (tr. Hippocrates G. in fact. Thomas Aquinas. Aristotle.): “For it must be understood that sometimes one thing is of one matter simply. and the end for whose sake a thing is formed or came to be has the rank of nobility [or ‘beauty.): While in a sense we call anything one if it is a quantity and continuous. Cf. 10. but according as the species consists in a certain totality requiring a determinate order of parts. like the silver of a drinking vessel. slightly rev.. Aristotle. n. in a sense we do not unless it is a whole. e.1 which pertains to the second mode set forth earlier. Ross. On order and definiteness and the relation of ratio to definiteness or the limit.e.e.2 1 Cf. if we saw the parts of a shoe put together just any way we should not call them one all the same (unless because of their [15] continuity). except something be a whole and perfect. 3. like a work produced by art. Apostle) Indeed. 6 (1016b 13-17) (tr. W. Metaph. Thomas Aquinas. In V Meta. not indeed as a homogeneous subject is called ‘one species’ [like the silver of a drinking vessel]. when we observe the parts of a shoe composed in any way whatsoever. the “form of the beautiful” at issue here is that of taxis or ‘order’. Apostle): [B]ut a thing which is composed by nature of all [the elements] has a limit and a [certain] ratio [of elements] with respect to both size and growth. except perhaps according as ‘one’ is taken for the continuous. for a thing cannot have its species when the parts of an integral whole are put together in just any way..9. Cf. B.M. St. the possession of such orderliness importing an ‘absence of haphazard’. we do this only if they are put together so as to be a shoe and to have already a certain single form [which is to possess ‘order’]. (tr. n. things which are formed not by chance but for the sake of something exist in the works of nature [25] most of all. but sometimes not.M. On the Parts of Animals I. but we do say all the parts of a shoe are one when they are so composed that there is a shoe and it have some one species.B. 4 (416a 15-20) (tr. just as it is clear that we do not call something ‘one’. 5 (645a 23-25): (tr. namely. Cf. Hippocrates G. B.. St. of a shoe”. which. N. and these [i. This is why the circle is of all lines most truly one. Cf. happens when it has some one species.. unless it has unity of form. Ogle) Absence of haphazard and conduciveness of everything to an end are to be found in nature’s works in the highest degree. V. i. In V Meta. to kalos]. lect.M. limit and ratio] belong to the soul and not to fire. because it is whole and complete. lect. Aristotle.): And he says that sometimes some things are called ‘one’ solely by reason of continuity.A. and the resultant end of her generations is a form of the beautiful. As is clear from the mention of ‘disorder’ in the first text cited above. 8.A.g. William H. and then the form corresponding to such a matter can be called a ‘species’”. 3 (tr. Order in relation to the possession of unity. B.A. and to the formula rather that to the matter of the thing. II.

sed tunc dicimus esse unum omnes partes calceamenti.. just as in the other imitative arts. sed secundum quod species in quadam totalitate consistit requirens determinatum ordinem partium. for it is the first to indicate a whole that has a beginning. the beauty of a plot consists in size and order.. B. either [30] of necessity or for the most part. but nothing else after this.): But a whole is that which has a beginning. scilicet calceamenti. conversely. is that which naturally is after something else. because there is a beginning.): Accordingly. V.1 Cf. 32 . but whose form does not. Cf. quod quandoque aliqua dicuntur unum propter solam continuitatem. 21 (tr. must be of one thing. Aristotle.M. Iamblichus of Chalcis. D. Cf. Ross): Again (3) of quanta that have a beginning and a middle and an end. Theological Principles of Arithmetic (Theologumena Arithmeticae) (quoted from the Ancient Greek Scientists Web Site): …[T]he number three is the first odd number and is therefore perfect. 11. so also the plot.A. An end. and this a whole. Aristotle. Those which admit of both descriptions are both wholes and totals. 25 (1024a 1-5).M. and an end there. for what makes [35] no noticeable difference when it is present or not present is no part of the whole. quando videmus partes calceamenti qualitercumque compositas. V. 7 (1450b 34—1451a 15 (tr.Cf. non quidem sicut subiectum homogeneum dicitur unum specie quod pertinet ad secundum modum positum prius. one imitation must be of one thing. but something else naturally is or comes to be after it.A. a middle. B. These are the things whose nature remains the same after transposition.A. Aristotle. based on Buckley): 2 . ut artificiatum. In V Meta. quod sit calceamentum et habeat aliquam unam speciem. a middle. n. lect.M. Metaph. W.M. sicut patet quod non dicimus unum aliquid. quoted above. those to which the position does not make a difference are called totals. e. and an end.. Cf.et dicit. quod quidem contingit quando habet aliquam unam speciem. wax or a coat. should not begin or end just anywhere.. a middle. they are called both wholes and totals. Poetics ch. wholes. Thomas Aquinas.g. quando sic sunt compositae.. in which the account of ‘position’ consists. as with an animal.): For when it is so that in a quantity there is an order of parts. 25 (1024a 1-5) (tr. St. and the parts of the thing must be so constituted that when some one part is transposed or removed it makes a difference in the sense that the whole is changed. 8 (1451a 30-35) (tr. every such continuous whole must have position in its parts. quandoque vero non.A. and those to which it does. for they [5] have both characteristics. Poetics ch. but should use the species mentioned. B. 1 Cf. then. Metaph. since it is the imitation of an action. 7 (1450b 26-33) (tr. That. A well-constructed plot. B. and an end. nisi forte secundum quod accipitur unum pro continuo. 21. Aristotle. Poetics ch. nisi sit aliquod totum et perfectum. Cf. A beginning is that which itself is not of necessity after anything else. A middle is that which itself is after something else and another thing after it.

but its being one and a whole escapes the view of the onlookers.). But the definition according to the nature of the thing is this.Further still. Top. and beauty to be in a certain symmetry of the limbs. Plato. in which not the faintest sign of haphazard or of disorder is discernible!”. in a word in all the primary constituents of the living creature. as they are said to have been at one time. 645a 23-25).2 13. But the definition of the length with reference to contests and the senses does not fall under the consideration of art. [1451a] for it is not contemplated at once. a change from bad fortune to good fortune or from good fortune to bad fortune takes place. whereas “[a]bsence of haphazard and conduciveness of everything to an end are to be found in nature’s works in the highest degree. in the case of an animal. should not only [35] have these things arranged. for strength is generally considered to reside in sinews and bones. Timaeus 87 d-e (tr. and this a whole. & tr. such as if there should be an animal of ten thousand stadia [in length]. so also in plots. nevertheless hold that the heaven was constructed to be what it is by chance and spontaneity. and the resultant end of her generations is a form of the beautiful” (ibid. is an unpleasant sight…. as in bodies and in animals there should be size. And so. beauty consists in a certain symmetry of the limbs. so also the plot. just as in the other imitative arts. 12. see my paper ‘Perfect and Whole’: Aristotle’s Poetics on the Structure of the Plot (Papers In Poetics 1). “Beauty and The Beautiful”: 2 With respect to the order in which the beauty of a plot consists. James Mark Baldwin. is a [15] sufficient limit of the size’. 1451a 30-35. For health is inherent in moisture and dryness and in heat and in cold.2 but also not just any chance size—for the beautiful consists in size and order—hence. for the contemplation of it is confused. or which is unsymmetrical [e] in some other respect.v. B. ch. Loeb): And that is better which is inherent in things which are better or prior or more highly honored. 2 Cf.A. 1 (641b 21-24) (tr. Jowett): “Just as a body which has a leg too long. ‘in whatever extent. s.. that form being order.B. 8.M. For if it were necessary to perform a hundred tragedies. health is better than strength or beauty. and the parts of the thing must be so constituted that when some one part is transposed or removed it makes a difference in the sense that the whole is changed. that the plot is [10] always more beautiful the greater it is. nor yet a very large animal. On the foregoing matters. Beauty according to Aristotle. since it is the imitation of an action. whether it be an animal or anything else which is composed of certain things. also On the Parts of Animals I. whereas the others are inherent in the secondary [constituents]. since that which is beautiful. must be of one thing. William Ogle): “Yet there are some who. in successive incidents in accordance with likelihood or necessity. one imitation must be of one thing. but such as can be easily seen. one may say. But in order to define it simply. Cf. neither can any very small animal be beautiful.” 33 . if at the same time it is perspicuous. but this such as can be [5] easily remembered. there should be length. since it is effected in a nearly insensible time. That. for what makes [35] no noticeable difference when it is present or not present is no part of the whole” (Poet. Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (1902). the heaven. the performance would have to be regulated by a water-clock. Aristotle. N. 1 (116b 19-23) (ed.. for example. while they allow that every animal exists and was generated by nature. Cf.5.. III. Aristotle afterwards states that: “Accordingly. tr. B. Cf.

or in a creature of vast size . . especially in the human form. definite limitation. As I mentioned before. and definiteness.’ In the same sense it is emphasised by Aristotle (Part 645a23ff. as manifested in sexual preference. which primarily concerns us.’ and hence it is not alien to mathematics. are said to be beautiful. e. “What Is the Subject of Aesthetics?” (excerpt): (i) In his Poetics.) that no animal lacks beauty. say. Rhet. while keeping free from disease. I will come back to Ziff later. that is. 34 . not the beautiful.’ whereas Bolzano’s (1845: § 14) more complex definition is a combination of this definition with the one given in the Poetics. it is the whole figure and form of the house which concerns us. and these are especially manifested by the mathematical sciences. .’2 The virtues.one. 21. Its main characteristics are said to be ‘order. but cannot be called beautiful.000 miles long . which is defined as that which pleases upon being seen. 14. Freese in this context as ‘the noble. which are not found apart from the thing itself whose materials they are. Aristotle (Poet 1450b37ff. to have the use of our bodies. I.’ which I changed in the above quote to ‘beautiful’ for reasons of consistency.’ Similar attempts at defining the notion of ‘beauty’ can be found. 1 Notice how Baldwin treats ‘magnitude’ as an additional attribute of beauty.).).’[21] Notes. the thing as a whole. A certain magnitude is also a condition of beauty. the Greek expression ‘ tò kalón’ has originally been translated by J. so in Natural science. proportion. ‘that good which is pleasant because good. Beauty is a matter of size and order.Aristotle treats beauty only incidentally.H. This definition conforms to the one given by Aristotle (Meta 1078a36) where he states that ‘the main species of beauty are orderly arrangement. the unity and wholeness of it is lost to the beholder. is pleasant because it is good. 1 ‘Small men may be well proportioned. or. 2 Cf. a living creature. when it actually enters into symmetry. and this is so because of the way in which its parts form a whole: ‘Just as in discussing a house. 9) in his definition of ‘beauty. spells this out in greater detail: “The excellence of the body is health. it is the composite thing. since our perception becomes indistinct as it approaches instantaneity. 1. or which. but also be of a certain definite magnitude. Real beauty is also distinguished from a beauty which has reference only to desire. Aristotle (Rhet 1366a33f. Cf. it is this definition that has been taken up by Kant (1790: § § 6. a condition which allows us.’[20] (ii) Another perspective is chosen by Aristotle in his Rhetoric where he declares anything as beautiful ‘which. Otto Neumaier.’ Subjective definitions are also given: ‘the beautiful is chosen for itself and is worthy of praise (like the good)’. but this is the noble or honorable good.). Aristotle remarks that ‘to be beautiful. in Hospers (1967). [From a website]: But Aristotle. and every whole made up of parts. symmetry. must not only present a certain order in its arrangement of parts. 20.as in that case. and therefore impossible either in a very minute creature.’ which is a kind of lustre of beauty. In any case. Aristotle on the three goods of the body. Volkelt (1905) and Ziff (1953). not merely the bricks and mortar and timber.g. — especially the crowning quality of ‘nobility of soul. not the materials of it. being desirable in itself. 9 (1366a33ff. an early witness to this topic.. being good. instead of the object being seen all at once. or rather the excellences or admired qualities. is at the same time worthy of praise.

you must either pull. swiftness implying strength. which means that he is pleasant to look at. beauty = endurance and exertion in contests. beauty is fitness for the exertion of warfare. Excellence in size (stature) is to surpass ordinary people in height. while keeping free from disease. or grip him. push. a condition which allows us. thus you must be strong in all those ways or at least in some. lift. Such a person is able to do heroic deeds. I. strength = power to impose one’s will. you must either pull. and breadth by just as much as will not make one's movements slower in consequence. and these no one can congratulate on their “health. Aristotle describes a male warrior and/or athlete who embodies what is needed to be a public figure in his culture and gain public honor. In a young man beauty is the possession of a body fit to endure the exertions of running and of contests of strength. and breadth by just as much as will not make one's movements slower in consequence. being naturally adapted both for contests of strength and for speed also. In a young man beauty is the possession of a body fit to endure the exertion of running and of contests of strength. strength. to do this. thickness. to have the use of our bodies. strength. it is to be strong enough for such exertion as is necessary. thus you must be strong in all of those ways or at least in some. “Strength is the power of moving someone else at will. being naturally adapted both for contests of strength and for speed also. and move them fast and far. 15. III. while he who can do all is an “all-round” athlete.“Beauty varies with the time of life. —Beauty varies with the time of life. Carnes Lord) 35 . and to be free from all those deformities of old age which cause pain to others. Aristotle. he who can do both the last is a good pancratiast. For an old man. and swiftness. Pol. Cf. He who can fling forward his legs in a certain way. push. 5 (1366a33f. Rhet. is good at running. swiftness implying strength. For a man in his prime. which means that he is pleasant to look at. For an old man. Health = use of one's body. and move them fast and far. That the beautiful involves a combination of the best parts. together with a pleasant but at the same time formidable appearance. For a man in his prime.. beauty is fitness for the exertion of warfare. he who can drive an adversary from his ground with the right blow is a good boxer: he who can do both the last is a good pancratiast. to act assertively. Athletic excellence (athletic powers) of the body consists in size. lift. and to be free from all those deformities of old age which cause pain to others. Benjamin Jowett) (tr. W. and therefore all-round athletes are the most beautiful. and therefore all-round athletes are the most beautiful. for many people are “healthy” as we are told Herodicus was. and to claim honor and respect. Aristotle. while he who can do all is an 'all-round' athlete” (Rhet I. it is to be strong enough for such exertion as is necessary. he who can drive an adversary from his ground with the right blow is a good boxer. pin. and swiftness. he who can grip and hold down is good at wrestling. Cf.) (tr. Strength is the power of moving some one else at will. 11 (1281b 1-14): (tr.” for they have to abstain from everything or nearly everything that men do. pin or grip him. Athletic excellence of the body consists in size. Excellence in size is to surpass ordinary people in height. that is. He who can fling forward his legs in a certain way.1361b 3-27). he who can grip and hold down is good at wrestling. is good at running. Rhys Roberts): The excellence of the body is health. together with a pleasant but at the same time formidable appearance. to do this. thickness.

and having many senses. he considers the good disposition of the hands in another omitting the bad dispositions in the other members. 36 . And this is what he means when he says “artistically. And similarly in what has been proposed. But it is in this that the excellent men differ from each of the many individually. nevertheless can when joined together be better—not as individuals but all together—than those [who are best]. similarly. similarly. and works of art from realities. just as some assert beautiful persons differ from those who are not beautiful. for taken separately. and among them works of music and the poets. There is a similar combination of qualities in good men. and hands. just as dinners contributed [by many] can be better than those equipped from a single expenditure. B. And it is clear that any of those from which he takes something has something of beauty. of whom each individual is but an ordinary person. In III Politic. although in other things he would be lacking.” from the fact that those things indeed simply taken are gathered into one. although in other things he would be lacking. a certain part. [and] similarly in the other particulars. just as a feast to which many contribute is better than a dinner provided out of a single purse. as will another part of another person.For the many. each can have a part of virtue and prudence. when they meet together may very likely be better than the few good. omitting the bad dispositions of the other members. at any rate. who has many feet. Notes on the foregoing by Fr.A. VIII. Hence the many are better judges than a single man of music and poetry. n. by bringing together things scattered and separated into one. as the beautiful are said to differ from those who are not beautiful. for instance. lect. someone having a [more] beautiful hand than has been painted. For because they are many.. and on their joining together.M. this person’s eye will be more beautiful than the painted one. and that image which at the same time is composed from parts well disposed in diverse existing things. but in another a beautiful hand: For it happens well to find separately one having a more beautiful eye than in the painting. is more beautiful than anyone whatever of those in which a beautiful eye is found in one. and so he considers the better dispositions of the other members in diverse [men] and omits the ugly: then from all such things he has gathered. they become in a manner one man. because in them the scattered elements are combined. The many. if regarded not individually but collectively. an image of a man. and all of them all the parts. considers the good disposition of the eyes in such a one. the eye of one person or some other feature in another person would be fairer than in the picture. is virtuous simply. Cf.): About this I understand that the painter wishing to paint through art. and some another. but is not virtuous simply: but that which simply has been gathered from them. and so also with respect to character and mind. who differ from any individual of the many. with its many feet and hands. some [appreciate] they understand the whole. if taken separately. for some understand Thus the many are also better judges of the one part. and senses. and things painted by art from genuine things. but what has been taken from them is beautiful simply. Robert Sokolowski:1 1 Taken from the Internet. and when they meet together. of whom none is individually an excellent man. Cf. becomes like a single human being. but not simply. although. that is a figure of their mind and disposition. 425 (tr. Peter of Auvergne. the multitude. anyone whatever of such a multitude has something of virtue. For each individual among the many has a share of virtue and prudence. he makes an image more beautiful than any of those from which he takes something.

§ 37 ..] (2) the superiority of individuals is “by the gathering of those scattered outside into one. they have more virtue than a few. — note the interesting remark about a painting: that it collects the best from various real things and puts them together into one..” and one or the other might be superior to others when apart. So even in regard to ethics and thinking the multitude is better than individuals and spoudaious. The idealization of a painting.the multitude becomes “as one man with many feet and arms and having many perceptions.(1) when many come together.” [this is also true of the many with respect to ethos and dianoia. as a whole.

et ponit rationem communem huius nominis dispositio. significat enim positionem.2 n. He also shows that the name ‘disposition’ signifies ‘order’. 19 (1022 b 1-2) (ed. alia non habens.A. species]. ‘lying’. art.A. surface. 1-3 (tr. et sic dispositio sive situs est quoddam praedicamentum.M. ‘beautiful’. ‘strong’ = the first species of quality. 49.): 1 dia/qesij le/getai tou= e)/xontoj me/rh ta/cij h)\ kata\ to/pon h)\ kata\ du/namin h)\ kat' ei)=doj: qe/sin ga\r dei= tina\ ei)=nai. ‘disposition’. ut numerus et tempus ostendit etiam quod hoc nomen dispositio. In V Meta. For it must be a kind of position. or according to power.e. q.4 • • • according to the order of parts in place (e. St. corpus et locus. B. dicens. dicitur enim quod quantitas alia est habens positionem. Ia-IIae. Summa Theol. quod dispositio nihil est aliud quam ordo partium in habente partes.g. lect. utputa secundum sanitatem vel aegritudinem. dicitur enim aliquid hoc modo esse dispositum.. et sic dispositio sive situs ponitur differentia in genere quantitatis. For it is said that there is one quantity having position. ponit autem modos quibus dicitur dispositio: qui sunt tres. according to health or sickness. Aristotle. St. The second way is according as the order of parts is looked to according to power or virtue. nn. Thomas Aquinas. quorum primus est secundum ordinem partium in loco.. ‘before’. and in this way ‘disposition’ or ‘site’ is placed [as] a difference in the genus of quantity. a hexis) according as the order of parts is looked to according to the species and figure of the whole (e. saying that disposition is nothing other than the order of parts in a thing having parts. 38 . et sic dispositio ponitur in prima specie qualitatis. And he gives the ways in which ‘disposition’ is said. The first of these is according to the order of parts in place. ON ‘DISPOSITION’. or according to form [i.g.3 n. Since in one way ‘according to which’ signifies ‘position’.g. ‘healthy’. In the third way.M. either according to place. 1. 4 tertius modus est. For it signifies ‘position’.M. For something is said to be disposed in this way as. ordinem significet. ex eo quod partes eius habent ordinem in virtute activa vel passiva. W. ad 3 (tr. as number and time. according as the order of parts is looked to according to the species and figure of the whole.A. as the very imposition of the name demonstrates: but order belongs to the notion of position. which are three.. 20. prout ordo partium attenditur secundum potentiam sive virtutem. from the fact that its parts have an order in an active or passive virtue. w(/sper kai\ tou)/noma dhloi= h( dia/qesij. sicut ipsa nominis impositio demonstrat: de ratione autem positionis est ordo. 2. prout ordo partium attenditur secundum speciem et figuram totius. 3. as indeed is clear from the name. Cf. B. consequently the Philosopher proceeds to the name of ‘disposition’. 2 quia uno modo secundum quod positionem significat. Ross. ‘sitting’. and in this way ‘disposition’ is placed in the first species of quality. ‘after’ = a difference on the genus of quantity) Cf.): n.1 Cf. for instance. 1. but another not having it.): [1022b] ‘Disposition’ means the order belonging to a thing having parts. Thomas Aquinas. ideo consequenter philosophus prosequitur de nomine dispositionis. 3 secundus modus est. B. body and place. ut linea. D. Metaph. tr. ‘standing’ = the predicament situs) according as the order of parts is looked to according to power or virtue (e. superficies.IV. V. as line. And in this way ‘disposition’ or ‘site’ is a certain predicament. And he sets down the ratio communis of the name ‘disposition’.

indeed..) LB5LC20N. Philosopher goes on at once to say: namely. “either as to place.” such as inchoate science and virtue: “and when he says. comprehendit omnes dispositiones. which are three. ut statim ibidem philosophus subdit. or as to species”. (In V Meta.To the third it must be said that disposition does always. when he says ‘as to place. consequently the Philosopher proceeds to the name ‘disposition’. ‘in species. or in species”.’ parts in place. sicut scientia et virtus complete.” such as inchoate science and virtue: ad tertium dicendum quod dispositio quidem semper importat ordinem alicuius habentis partes.-1 Since in one way ‘according to which’ signifies ‘position’. text. “he includes all dispositions: bodily dispositions. ‘situation’ is a certain predicament.’ and this belongs to the predicament ‘site’. “In saying this. as the Philosopher goes on at once to say (Metaph. And he gives the ways in which ‘disposition’ is but this happens in three ways. Comparison of texts. quae dicuntur habitus. as the said. which are called ‘habits’”. but this happens in three ways. “he includes all dispositions: The first of these is according to the order of bodily dispositions. “In saying this. in eo quod dicit secundum locum. “either in place. indeed. or as to power.-2 The second way is according as the order of parts is looked to according to power or virtue. scilicet aut secundum locum. includit perfectas dispositiones. and in this way ‘disposition’ is placed in the first species of quality.’ he includes perfect dispositions. And he sets down the ratio communis of the To the third it must be said that ‘disposition’ name ‘disposition’. 39 . when he says ‘in place. or in power. sed hoc contingit tripliciter. et hoc pertinet ad praedicamentum situs. in quo. which is the order of parts in place: “when he says ‘in power. 25): namely. imply an order of that which has parts. And in this way ‘disposition’ or and this belongs to the predicament ‘position’. saying that disposition is does always. Ia-IIae) QU49 AR1 RA3 “when he says ‘as to power. qui est ordo partium in loco. For something is said to be disposed in this way 1 (Summa Theol. such as perfected science and virtue. quod autem dicit secundum potentiam. which is the order of parts in place: B5LC20N. having parts.” as Simplicius observes in his Commentary on the Predicaments. imply an order of that no-thing other than the order of parts in a thing which has parts. ut simplicius dicit in commento praedicamentorum. includit illas dispositiones quae sunt in praeparatione et idoneitate nondum perfecte.’ he includes all those dispositions which are in course of formation and not yet arrived at perfect usefulness. aut secundum speciem.’ he includes all those dispositions which are in course of formation and not yet arrived at perfect usefulness. sicut scientia et virtus inchoata. aut secundum potentiam. corporales quidem. v.1 1.” as Simplicius observes in his Commentary on the Predicaments. quod autem dicit secundum speciem.

as.) position.’ he includes perfect dispositions. as number and time. LB5LC20N.-3 In the third way. see further below. according as the order of parts is looked to according to the species and figure of the whole. but another not having it. For it is said that there is one quantity having (B. For it signifies ‘position’.B.-4 He also shows that the name ‘disposition’ signifies ‘order’. For a discussion attempting to reconcile placed (as) a difference in the genus of quantity. as line.M. surface. “and when he says. and in this way ‘disposition’ or ‘situation’ is N. for instance. LB5LC20N. ‘as to species. body and place. these two explanations. § 40 . which are called ‘habits’. according to health or sickness.” such as perfected science and virtue. as the very imposition of the name demonstrates: but order belongs to the notion of position. from the fact that its parts have an order in an active or passive virtue.A.

A. q. ‘position’ means an order of parts in a whole: and in this way ‘position’ is a difference of quantity. Ignotus Auctor.M. It should be noted that ‘position’ is the same thing as an order of parts in place. and this is one of the ten predicaments. eo quod unius subiecti possunt diversimode partes accipi. either to the nature. habits are certain dispositions of something existing in potency to something. Ia. earum dispositio naturae conveniens. I reply that it must be said that. si accipiantur humani corporis partes humores. necesse est quod formam habeat. (in part) (tr. c. et ea quae consequuntur ad ipsam. tr.M): 1 TR3 CP04 habet autem quantitas continua positionem. ad hoc quod aliquid sit perfectum et bonum. sicut.1 Cf. perfectum autem dicitur.Cf. per suam formam. 2 respondeo dicendum quod. St. for which reason it is said that a measure establishes beforehand a mode.M.A. art. 3. for thus it is the object of appetite. 4 (tr. et hoc significatur per modum. Thomas Aquinas. Now since each thing is what it is through its own form—but the form [necessarily] presupposes certain things. and this is signified by ‘mode’. et quaedam ad ipsam ex necessitate consequuntur. habitus sunt dispositiones quaedam alicuius in potentia existentis ad aliquid. et de illis quidem habitibus qui sunt dispositiones ad naturam. sive ad operationem vel finem naturae. 3 respondeo dicendum quod unumquodque dicitur bonum.. 41 . art 2. prout disponuntur secundum naturam humanam. q.2 Cf.): I reply that it must be said that each thing is called ‘good’ to the extent that it is perfect. q. with respect to those habits which are dispositions. B. and the things which follow on it. sive ad naturam. de quo infra dicetur. seu materialium. Ia-IIae. secundum quarum dispositionem habitus dicuntur. Now presupposed to the form is a determination or commensuration of its principles. Summa Theol. And. est habitus vel dispositio sanitatis. But that is called ‘perfect’ to which nothing is lacking according to the mode of its perfection. if the parts of the human body taken be the humours. according to the disposition of which they are called ‘habits’. est pulchritudo. ut manus et pes et huiusmodi. which will be discussed below. earum dispositio in ordine ad naturam. sicut supra dictum est. et sic sunt plures habitus vel dispositiones in eodem. as well as the things presupposed to it. et ea quae praeexiguntur ad eam. unde dicitur quod mensura modum praefigit. c. quae etiam dicitur situs. it is obvious that many can exist in one subject. But if the limbs are taken. bones. as was said above. art. ad 1 (tr. as the hand and foot and the like. 5. whether material or efficient. and certain things necessarily follow on it—in order for something to be perfect and good. inquantum est perfectum. ut supra dictum est. and flesh are taken.A. according as they are disposed in accordance with human nature there is the habit or disposition of health. alio modo dicitur positio ordo partium in toto: et sic positio est differentia quantitatis. their disposition in an order to the nature is strength or a good condition. B. forma autem praesupponit quaedam..). In another way. 5. licet non omnis. quod positio idem est quod ordo partium in loco. But if similar parts such as the nerves. sic enim est appetibile. as was said above.M. notandum. And in this way there are many habits and dispositions in the same thing. Thomas Aquinas. St. cum autem unumquodque sit id quod est. from the fact that the parts of one subject can be taken in diverse ways. their disposition agreeing with the nature is beauty.A. si vero accipiantur partes similes ut nervi et ossa et carnes.3 Cf. et haec est unum de decem praedicamentis. although not every one. manifestum est quod possunt plures esse in uno subiecto. or to an operation or an end of the nature. Ia-IIae. 49. si vero accipiantur membra.. 1 c. it is necessary that it have a form. 54. est fortitudo aut macies. Thomas Aquinas. praeexigitur autem ad formam determinatio sive commensuratio principiorum.): But a continuous quantity has position. B. which is also called ‘situation’. cui nihil deest secundum modum suae perfectionis. St. cap. Summa Theol.. in fact. seu efficientium ipsam. Summa Totius Logicae Aristotelis. Summa Theol. For instance. B. (tr.

which is habit and disposition. with respect to] our passions. quae est etiam quaedam differentia. quia motus et passiones non habent rationem finis. ita id secundum quod determinatur potentia subiecti secundum esse accidentale. And so in both is considered that something is done easily or with difficulty. by ‘of the perfect’. ad litteram). just as that according to which the potency of matter is determined according to substantial being is called a quality. 14. dicitur qualitas accidentalis. For when the mode is suitable to the nature of the thing. however. as is clear through the Philosopher in Metaphysics V (ch. loquens de habitibus animae et corporis. si autem accipiatur modus vel determinatio subiecti secundum quantitatem. and also movable with ease or with difficulty. that they are certain dispositions of the perfect for the best [i. 1105b 25) he says that habits are those things according to which we stand well or badly toward [i. And so. for which reason it implies a certain determination according to some measure. quod est dispositum secundum naturam. quality implies a certain mode of a substance. dicit enim philosophus. et ideo sicut id secundum quod determinatur potentia materiae secundum esse substantiale dicitur qualitas quae est differentia substantiae. it does not belong to the fourth species of quality that something be good or bad. super gen. good and bad. But in these things is not considered something pertaining to the ratios of good or bad. secundum sui rationem. attenditur in secunda et tertia specie qualitatis. an activity]. cito vel tarde transiens.e. thus. ad litteram. 5. properly. however. But the mode and determination of a subject in an order to the nature of the thing pertains to the first species of quality. passing swiftly or slowly. vel secundum actionem et passionem quae consequuntur principia naturae. in vii physic. quae est habitus et dispositio. vel secundum quantitatem. thus there is the fourth species of quality. And because the very form and nature of a thing is the end and that for the sake of which something comes to be. speaking of the habits of the soul and body. est sine motu. modus autem est. however. non autem consideratur in his aliquid pertinens ad rationem boni vel mali. et sine ratione boni et mali. is without motion. et quia quantitas.c. dico autem perfecti. ut patet per philosophum in v metaphys. or that it be passing swiftly or enduring. can be taken either in an order to the nature of the subject itself. If. 7. 1022b 10) the Philosopher defines habit as a disposition according to which something is well or badly disposed. 246b 23). the mode or determination of the subject be taken according to quantity. according as some nature is the end of a generation and a motion. Augustine says (Super gen. which are matter and form. quem mensura praefigit. ut dicit augustinus. potest accipi vel in ordine ad ipsam naturam subiecti. which is also a certain difference. The mode or determination of a subject according to accidental being. however. in the first species there is considered both good and bad. unde importat quandam determinationem secundum aliquam mensuram. And so in the fifth book of the Metaphysics (ch. ideo ad quartam speciem qualitatis non pertinet quod aliquid sit bene vel male. because motions and passions do not have the ratio of ends. And in the second book the Ethics (ch. I mean what is disposed according to nature. therefore. for the Philosopher says in Physics VII (ch. However. pertinet ad primam speciem qualitatis. And because nature is that which is considered first in a thing. et 42 .. sic est quarta species qualitatis. as is said in the second book of the Physics (ch. so habits are placed in the first species of quality. quod sunt dispositiones quaedam perfecti ad optimum.2 1 …proprie enim qualitas importat quendam modum substantiae.. bonum autem et malum dicitur per respectum ad finem. or according to the action and passion which follow on the principles of the nature. And because quantity. 20. modus autem sive determinatio subiecti secundum esse accidentale.1 But the mode or determination of a subject according to action and passion is considered in the second and third species of quality. sed modus et determinatio subiecti in ordine ad naturam rei. are said with respect to an end. 2 et ideo in utraque consideratur quod aliquid facile vel difficile fiat. then it has the ratio of the bad. as St. vel quod sit cito transiens aut diuturnum. or according to quantity. 3. however. quae sunt materia et forma. according to its ratio. a mode is what a measure establishes beforehand. when it is not suitable. then it has the ratio of the good. 1020a 33).e. 198b 3). and without the ratio of good and bad.modus autem sive determinatio subiecti secundum actionem et passionem. which is the difference of substance—so that according to which the potency of a subject is determined according to accidental being is called an accidental quality. …[F]or.

e. ut dicitur in ii physic. In sum. nam figura. tunc habet rationem boni. And so. vel secundum calorem vel frigus. unde non dicitur aliquis disponi per qualitatem. For something is said to be disposed in this way as. And if ‘well’ or ‘badly’ be added. therefore. as it befits the nature of a thing. ‘to the left of’. ‘above’. ut dictum est. et hoc modo caliditas et frigiditas ponuntur a philosopho in prima specie qualitatis. et quia natura est id quod primum consideratur in re. hot and cold. according to figure [shape]. and this is one of the ten predicaments an order of parts in a whole: and in this way ‘position’ is a difference of quantity The ratio communis of the name ‘disposition’ is this: disposition is nothing other than the order of parts in a thing having parts. something is not said to be well or badly disposed. secundum quod considerantur ut convenientes vel non convenientes naturae rei. ‘standing’.1 2. or according to hot or cold. as has been said. quod est dispositio secundum quam aliquis disponitur bene vel male. quando autem non convenit. according as it is suitable or not suitable. et si addatur bene vel male. and the like. dicit quod habitus sunt secundum quos ad passiones nos habemus bene vel male. e. however. for figure. which is the end. nisi secundum ordinem ad naturam rei. 3. calor autem et frigus. ‘sitting’. for instance. On the three kinds of disposition. ‘be-hind’. pertain to beauty. And so. The second meaning is to be understood as a hexis. unde et ipsae figurae et passibiles qualitates. et in ii ethic. and so consists in the order of parts according to the species and figure of the whole.g. And in this way. which is a difference of continuous quantity. quando enim est modus conveniens naturae rei. which consists in the order of parts according to power or virtue. unde in v metaphys. 1 ad primum ergo dicendum quod dispositio ordinem quendam importat. ‘before’. nisi in ordine ad aliquid. from the fact that its parts have an order in an active or passive virtue”. The third meaning is that which enters into a schema. hotness and coldness are placed by the Philosopher in the first species of quality. ideo habitus ponitur prima species qualitatis. quia ipsa forma et natura rei est finis et cuius causa fit aliquid. The first meaning of disposition constitutes the predicament situs. ‘lying down’. unde secundum figuram. except according to an order to the nature of the thing. pertinent ad pulchritudinem. according as they suit the nature of the thing. ideo in prima specie consideratur et bonum et malum. quod pertinet ad rationem habitus. To the first. which consists in an order of parts according to (or in) place. oportet quod attendatur ordo ad naturam. et etiam facile et difficile mobile. non dicitur aliquis disponi bene vel male. and color. tunc habet rationem mali. secundum quod est conveniens vel non conveniens. secundum quod aliqua natura est finis generationis et motus. which belongs to the notion of habit.ad 1. et color. pertinent ad sanitatem. And so something is not said to be disposed by a quality except in an order to something. prout convenit naturae rei. it must be said that ‘disposition’ implies a certain order. ‘below’. this must be considered in the order to the nature. and the like. both figures themselves and passible qualities. secundum quod conveniunt naturae rei. ‘to the right of’. • • an order of parts in place. according to health or sickness. “and in this way ‘disposition’ is placed in the first species of quality. pertinent ad habitus vel dispositiones.g. according as they are considered as suitable or not suitable to the nature of the thing. belong to habits or dispositions. philosophus definit habitum. 43 . quae est finis. pertain to health.

which is a difference of continuous quantity. 2. sensible qualities. n. it may be manifested as follows: In the first text. Thus St.M. the Summa text). The third part of the division (quantity) gives rise to the fourth species of quality (figure or shape). ‘behind’. the order of parts according to form or species. or the very nature itself) gives rise to the first species of quality (habit and disposition). which is first because it regards the nature. one quantity differs from another in kind. For it is said that there is one quantity having position. Commentary. Although the agreement between the two explanations of Aristotle’s third meaning of diathesis is not readily apparent. which can follow upon either the parts of the essence of that substance (matter and form). The third part of the division (regards the substance. St. 2 (tr. The second way is according as the order of parts is looked to according to power or virtue.In his commentary on the Metaphysics. In V Meta. but in the second. Thomas first divides into three. ‘below’. ‘not having position’ (cf.II. in the discourse of reason (for which see my separate discussion of ‘before and after’). means ‘to the right of’. ‘above’. Cf. as line. For something is 44 . ‘having position’ vs. On the second meaning.” For example. or from the action and passion resulting from matter and form.): n. and in this way ‘disposition’ is placed in the first species of quality. But in the Summa. such as perfected science and virtue”. “Non enim cuilibet rationi est nomen impositum: et inde est quod multa sunt innominata tam in generibus quam in speciebus. 2: 2) SOME GENERA UNNAMED. ‘to the left of’. which are called ‘habits’. but another not having it. According to such differences. following the division of Simplicius. 20. B. Thomas divide that genus. Habit and disposition is the first species of quality. Thomas Aquinas. Scrapboo5. The meaning of “quality” in general is “an accidental mode of determination in a substance”. which does not act upon the senses. or from the quantity in the substance. In V Meta. then figure or shape. The second part of the division (action and passion) gives rise to the second and third species of quality (natural ability.. he exemplifies the second meaning of dispositio by the difference in the species of quantity. surface. Now to understand their equivalence. which do act upon the senses). n 535. Now just as there is a before and after in geometrical objects.XIII. Hence the first division under quality would be “pertaining to and immediately determining the nature itself” and “not so pertaining to the nature”. so there is a before and after in geometrical science. and in this way ‘disposition’ or ‘situation’ is placed [as] a difference in the genus of quantity.A. 4. that is. he gives as his example ‘perfected science and virtue’ (cf. there must be genera between “quality” and the four species into which Aristotle and St. l. lect. but they have no name (see I-II Q49 A2). St. ‘before’. body and place. n. Thomas explains the third meaning of dispositio as follows: “In the third way. Cf. L. then sensible qualities.). and the like. Posterior Analytics. since one never divides into four. according as the order of parts is looked to according to the species and figure of the whole. one must consider that the example of positio given in the first text. Michael Augros. on account of which one science or virtue will also differ from another in kind. then natural abilities. as number and time”. he explains “as to species” as meaning “perfect dispositions.

according as they are considered as suitable or not suitable to the nature of the thing. 22. inasmuch as from the remembrance of what is past and the understanding of what is present. according to health or sickness. 2 ad primum ergo dicendum quod dispositio ordinem quendam importat. art 2. On the third meaning. nisi in ordine ad aliquid. as is clear from what has gone before (Question [19]. 12). and thus it behooves that the type of every effect should pre-exist in Him. English Dominican Fathers): I answer that. et si addatur bene vel male. dicitur enim aliquid hoc modo esse dispositum. Since. hotness and cold-ness are placed by the Philosopher in the first species of quality. “a faithful and wise servant. ut dictum est. (tr. except according to an order to the nature of the thing. however. For it is the chief part of prudence. hot and cold. which. or according to hot or cold. et hoc modo caliditas et frigiditas ponuntur a philosopho in prima specie qualitatis. et color.. Article [4]). Cp. it is necessary that the type of the order of things towards their end should pre-exist in the divine mind: and the type of things ordered towards an end is. It is necessary to attribute providence to God. And so something is not said to be disposed by a quality except in an order to something. to direct other things towards an end whether in regard to oneself—as for instance. calor autem et frigus. city or kingdom. as has been said. accord-ing as they suit the nature of the thing. which belongs to the notion of habit. is the divine goodness (Question [21]. therefore. And in this way. And so. ad 1 (tr. according to the Philosopher (Ethic. pertinent ad habitus vel dispositiones. art. pertain to health. St. And so. 24:45). as was shown above (Question [6]. q.1 Cf.” 1 secundus modus est. unde secundum figuram. for figure.M): To the first.A. and color. quod pertinet ad rationem habitus. quae est finis. to which two other parts are directed—namely. unde et ipsae figurae et passibiles qualitates. Ia-IIae. for instance. we gather how to provide for the future. For all the good that is in created things has been created by God. non dicitur aliquis disponi bene vel male. This good of order existing in things created. q. secundum quod considerantur ut convenientes vel non convenientes naturae rei. Thomas Aquinas. belong to habits or dispositions. which is the end. in which sense it is said (Mt. Article [4]).said to be disposed in this way as. as it befits the nature of a thing. this must be considered in the order to the nature. unde non dicitur aliquis disponi per qualitatem. oportet quod attendatur ordo ad naturam. is itself created by God. pertinent ad pulchritudinem. God is the cause of things by His intellect. secundum quod est conveniens vel non conveniens. 2 5. as was said above. providence. nam figura. vi. utputa secundum sanitatem vel aegritudinem. who orders well his acts towards the end of life—or in regard to others subject to him. whom his lord hath appointed over his family. 49. 45 . Summa Theol. however. properly speaking. according as it is suitable or not suitable. and understanding of the present. c. pertain to beauty. something is not said to be well or badly disposed. 1. Ia. from the fact that its parts have an order in an active or passive virtue. both figures themselves and passible qualities. but also as regards their order towards an end and especially their last end. pertinent ad sanitatem.. And if ‘well’ or ‘badly’ be added. secundum quod conveniunt naturae rei. it must be said that disposition implies a certain order. In created things good is found not only as regards their substance. Summa Theol. in a family. St. et sic dispositio ponitur in prima specie qualitatis. Thomas Aquinas. vel secundum calorem vel frigus. prout convenit naturae rei. Now it belongs to prudence. nisi secundum ordinem ad naturam rei. B. Article [4]). prout ordo partium attenditur secundum potentiam sive virtutem. remem-brance of the past. according to figure [shape]. ex eo quod partes eius habent ordinem in virtute activa vel passiva. a man is said to be prudent.

M. of the limbs and colors.. seated in the Supreme Ruler. Secundum quem modum prudentia vel providentia Deo convenire potest. nervorum et ossium. 1 (116b 19-23) (ed. Cum autem Deus sit causa rerum per suum intellectum. the notion of harmony befits the qualities of the body rather than those of the soul: for health is a certain harmony of the humours. for example. in a word in all the primary constituents of the living creature. For health is inherent in moisture and dryness and in heat and in cold. Top. Hoc igitur bonum ordinis in rebus creatis existens. et praecipue in finem ultimum. 64. sicut dicitur homo prudens. Ipsa igitur ratio ordinis rerum in finem. fortitudo.1 (emphasis added) • • in one way. providentia in Deo nominatur. cum ipse sit finis ultimus. ut supra ostensum est.2 • • 1 health: a certain harmony of the humours strength: of the sinews and bones Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est ponere providentiam in Deo.e. qui bene ordinat actus suos ad finem vitae suae. Thomas Aquinas. strength. Whence Boethius says (De Consol. For in God Himself there can be nothing ordered towards an end. qui est bonitas divina. quam ratio ordinis partium in toto. Omne enim bonum quod est in rebus. This type of order in things towards an end is therefore in God called providence. sive respectu aliorum sibi subiectorum in familia vel civitate vel regno. which disposeth all things”: which disposition may refer either to the type of the order of things towards an end. 3 (tr. of the sinews and bones. et sic cuiuslibet sui effectus oportet rationem in ipso praeexistere. dicit quod providentia est ipsa divina ratio in summo omnium principe constituta. a Deo creatum est. In rebus autem invenitur bonum. ‘disposition’ means the order of things towards an end in another. Ratio autem ordinandorum in finem.. health is better than strength or beauty. n. proprie providentia est. Unde Boetius. iv. Loeb): And that is better which is inherent in things which are better or prior or more highly honored.): Furthermore. membrorum et colorum. sive respectu sui ipsius. non solum quantum ad substantiam rerum. fidelis servus et prudens. St. IV de Consol. quem constituit dominus super familiam suam. 2 adhuc. cp. it means the order of parts in the whole 6. Cf. sed etiam quantum ad ordinem earum in finem. nam in ipso Deo nihil est in finem ordinabile.. 6) that “Providence is the divine type itself. whereas the others are inherent in the secondary [constituents]. ratio harmoniae magis convenit qualitatibus corporis quam animae: nam sanitas est harmonia quaedam humorum. Dispositio autem potest dici tam ratio ordinis rerum in finem. Prudentiae autem proprium est. quae cuncta disponit. B. XXIV. III. ut supra habitum est. • • • health: inherent in moisture and dryness and in heat and in cold strength: in sinews and bones beauty: in a certain symmetry of the limbs (i. secundum quem modum dicitur Matt. ad quam aliae duae partes ordinantur. ordinare alia in finem. & tr. Est enim principalis pars prudentiae. ut ex superioribus patet. or to the type of the order of parts in the whole. et praesentibus intellectis.A. scilicet memoria praeteritorum. beauty. On beauty as a species of disposition. Summa Contra Gentes. a Deo creatum est. since He is the last end. II.In this way prudence or providence may suitably be attributed to God. necesse est quod ratio ordinis rerum in finem in mente divina praeexistat. a due disposition of the limbs) Cf. pulchritudo. prout ex praeteritis memoratis. 46 . et intelligentia praesentium. secundum philosophum in VI Ethic. coniectamus de futuris providendis. and beauty to be in a certain symmetry of the limbs. Aristotle. for strength is generally considered to reside in sinews and bones.

since to the attentive spectators all his gestures are signs of things. etc. Other senses however. although a certain rhythmic movement of his limbs may indeed afford delight by that same rhythm. the dance itself is called reasonable. (tr. 9. health is the proportionate mixture (symmetron krasin) of the qualities. The University of Chicago Press. from Aëtius V30. But we are not wont to pronounce it reasonable. unquestionably seems to inflict. bitter and sweet. In I De Anima. a proportion of parts that is faulty. Alcmaeon Fr. Robert Russell. St. In things constructed. when we say that a harmony is reasonable and that a rhythmic poem is reasonably composed. a kind of injury upon one’s gaze. 1964): In so far as we have been able to investigate. 47 . it pervades all the arts and creations of man. but not exactly in the middle. Who indeed does not see that in songs—and we likewise say that in them there is a sweetness that pertains to the ears —rhythm is the producer of all this sweetness? But when an actor is dancing. when the color in beautiful objects allures us or when a vibrant chord sounds pure and liquid. dicemus quod est complexio adaequata et contemperata humorum et qualitatum in corpore: et sic de aliis corporeis virtutibus. for a purposeful act is the characteristic of a rational animal… With regard to the eyes. without any compelling necessity. Thomas Aquinas. n.. is a thing already manifest. that is usually called beautiful. usually demand this attribute. And illness comes about by an excess of heat or cold. and need not be shown to you in many words. lect. And even if he should represent a winged Venus and a cloaked Cupid. 2 Taken from the Internet. 7. in which the harmony of parts is wont to be called reasonable. so that if we want to know health. we cannot but be displeased because we see one doorway towards the side and another situated almost. we now detect certain traces of reason in the senses. one in the middle and two at the sides. not because of the pleasure they afford. Supplement: St.1. we find it in pleasure itself. so to speak. from too much or too little food. disease being produced by the sole dominance (monarchia) of one among them. and with regard to sight and hearing. and in the blood or marrow of the brain . architects themselves call this design. 6 (tr. are without design. we would say that it is a balanced [equalized] and tempered [temperate] complexion [mixing together] of the humors and qualities in the body: and thus of the other bodily powers. This is very general.:2 Health is conserved by equal balance (isonomia) among the powers—wet and dry. and with regard to the ears. Wherefore considering carefully the parts of this very building. pour light at equal intervals on the bathing place—how much that delights and enraptures us as we gaze attentively. ed. how 1 sed per cognitionem harmoniae magis congruit venire in cognitionem accidentium corporum. because it aptly signifies and exhibits something over and above the delight of the senses. 4. yet.): But through a knowledge of harmony it is more fitting to arrive at knowledge of the accidents of the body. Philosophies of Art and Beauty. and they say that parts unsymmetrically placed.A. Augustine of Hippo: From De Ordine. in Hofstadter and Kuhns. for the sole dominance of either one of them would be destructive [of the other]. B. as it were.M. . We must therefore acknowledge that in the pleasure of those senses. . But the fact that three windows inside. but on account of something else.1 Cf. what pertains to reason is that in which there is a certain rhythmic measure. we properly call it sweet. ut si velimus cognoscere sanitatem. cold and hot.• beauty: of the limbs and colors Cf. In their own terminology.

and in design dimensions. in pleasure. And scanning the earth and the heavens. delight through the senses is something else…. design. Therefore delight of the sense is one thing. he does not seem to offend the eyes. the second. to teach correctly. the third. in which the soul perceives delight precisely because it is united with the body. for that pertains to the sense. The first admonishes us to do nothing without purpose. There are then three classes of things in which that “something reasonable” is to be seen. and in beauty. to find delight in contemplation. but through the eyes he would offend the mind. The eyes would be offended it the movements were not graceful. (180) § 48 . it realized that nothing pleased it but beauty. the second in discourse. reason advanced to the province of the eyes. to which those signs of things are exhibited. (175-6) From this stage. number. the last. One is in actions directed towards an end. and in dimensions.skillfully so ever he may depict it by a wonderful movement and posture of the body.

Liddell-Scott. summetria: I.V. History of Greek and Roman Art. supra note 31. 1973) (reprinting Dr. 3–40 (7th ed. Cf. Symmetria is a fundamental idea in Greek art. due proportion (LSJ) Cf.64 [64]. SYMMETRY.html [11/1/04]) 49 . uses the word. which is so conspicuous in the structure of the higher animals. Cf. Ebenmass is a good German equivalent for the Greek symmetry. [= HERMANN WEYL. philosophy. at 3–4.oneonta. WEYL. the synonym “harmony” points more toward its acoustical and musical than its geometric applications. 2003. especially the human body. It is directly connected to the desire to find an order behind the flux of experience. In this sense the idea is by no means restricted to spatial objects. Weyl’s 1952 lectures at Princeton)] Cf. suggesting the notion of commensurability…. 1998 MICRA. ON SYMMETRY.” the mean toward which the virtuous should strive in their actions according to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. 1. commensurability. the symmetry of left and right. A Greek-English Lexicon. Inc: Symmetry. who wrote a book on proportion and whom the ancients praised for the harmonious perfection of his sculptures. Fall. symmetry.. 7th ed.. Glossary of Terms. and Dürer follows him in setting down a canon of proportions for the human figure. wellbalanced. and symmetry denotes that sort of concordance of several parts by which they integrate into a whole.edu/farberas/arth/ARTH209/glossary. and which Galen in De temperamentis describes as that state of mind which is equally removed from both extremes. © 1996. the word symmetry is used in our everyday language in two meanings. A due proportion of the several parts of a body to each other. kalos is produced. Beauty is bound up with symmetry. In the one sense symmetric means something like well-proportioned. In achieving symmetria. Some definitions. ARTH 209. II. s. the following from a web site: [T]he word originally had a somewhat different meaning: symmetry = syn together + metron measure. p. Webster’s Revised Unabridged Dictionary.v. The image of the balance provides a natural link to the second sense in which the word symmetry is used in modern times: bilateral symmetry. 1973).1: Symmetria: the commensurability of all the parts of the statue to one another and to the whole. Symmetry (Princeton. The Oxford English Dictionary: 1 (http://employees. Cf. 3: If I am not mistaken. Thus Polykleitos. Hermann Weyl.. for like this it carries also the connotation of “middle measure. Cf. 1952. and science.

in vertebrates.. 3. (Biol. is that in which the body can be divided into symmetrical halves by a vertical plane passing through the middle. 1. Symmetry 1. This last is sometimes called metamerism. measurable by the same standard or scale of values. (Geom. fitting. Also. adaptation of the form or dimensions of the several parts of a thing to each other. plane. etc. or point (or a number of lines or planes). as in earthworms. proportion. Geom. or zonal symmetry.) 3 b. or balanced arrangement and relation of parts or elements. symmetria. Cf. Of corresponding extent. is that in which the segments or metameres of the body are disposed in a zonal manner one after the other in a longitudinal axis. Cf. is that in which the individual parts are arranged symmetrically around a central axis. as in echinoderms. or two-sidedness. and Meter rhythm. 2. In stricter use (approaching or passing into 3 b): Exact correspondence in size and position of opposite parts. repetition of exactly similar parts facing each other or a centre. n. or degree. 50 . etc. relative measurement and arrangement of parts. (b) Likeness in the form and size of floral organs of the same kind. plane. Axis of symmetry. in wider sense. or magnitude: coextensive. proportionate. Due or just proportion. regularity. equable distribution of parts about a dividing line or centre. Mutual relation of the parts of something in respect of magnitude and position. duration. harmony. of equal extent.] Cf. radial symmetry. (beauty resulting from) right proportion between the parts of the body or any whole. orderly and similar distribution of parts. The Concise Oxford Dictionary: Symmetry n. Note: Bilateral symmetry. (As an attribute either of the whole.) The law of likeness.] 1. 1. summetria: sum like + metron measure. arrangement of all the points of a figure or system in pairs (or sets) so that those of each pair (or set) are at equal distances on opposite sides of such line. congruity. such that an animal may be divided into parts which are structurally symmetrical. together + ? a measure: cf. adequate. 2. regular.Commensurable 1. A due proportion of the several parts of a body to each other. Having the same measure. harmony of parts with each other and the whole.): Symmetry. Webster’s Revised Unabridged Dictionary (© 1996. regularity in form and arrangement. Exact correspondence in position of the several points or parts of a figure or body with reference to a dividing line. Inc. 2. balance. [fr Gk. a common measure: divisible without remainder by the same quantity. the union and conformity of the members of a work to the whole.) (a) Equality in the number of parts of the successive circles in a flower. 4. serial symmetry. Commensurate 1. 2. or of the parts composing it. magnitude. ?. similarity of structure. A due proportion of the several parts of a body to each other.. Of numbers or magnitudes: Having. the following from a web site: Symmetry \Sym”me*try\. (Bot.) See under Axis. See Syn-. sym['e]trie. or point. Gr. sy`n with. the condition or quality of being wellproportioned or well-balanced. or reducible to. 1998 MICRA. F. such structure as allows of an object’s being divided by a point or line or plane or radiating lines or planes into two or more parts exactly the same in size and shape and similar in position relatively to the dividing point etc. Characterised by a common measure. [L.

A relationship of characteristic correspondence. [Latin symmetria. correspondence. © 2002 Merriam-Webster. and relative position of parts on opposite sides of a dividing line or median plane or about a center or axis —see BILATERAL SYMMETRY. Source: Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary. of like measure : sun-. All rights reserved. equivalence. or identity among constituents of an entity or between different entities: the narrative symmetry of the novel. having the same value when measured in different directions [syn: isotropy] [ant: anisotropy] 51 . of the sign of the electric charge. Fourth Edition Copyright © 2000 by Houghton Mifflin Company Published by Houghton Mifflin Company. exact correspondence of form on opposite sides of a dividing line or plane [syn: symmetricalness. shape. pl. measure. or of the direction of time flow) —used of physical phenomena and of equations describing them Source: Merriam-Webster Medical Dictionary. syn+ metron. © 1996. sym·me·tries Exact correspondence of form and constituent configuration on opposite sides of a dividing line or plane or about a center or an axis.] Source: The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language. Main Entry: sym·me·try Pronunciation: 'sim-&-trE Function: noun Inflected Form: plural –tries 1 : correspondence in size. see m -2 in Indo-European Roots. from summetros. Inc. of parity. Beauty as a result of balance or harmonious arrangement. See Synonyms at proportion.Respective symmetry. symmetry n 1: (mathematics) an attribute of a shape or relation. 1998 MICRA. sym·me·try P Pronunciation Key (s m -tr ) n. balance] [ant: asymmetry] 2: balance among the parts of something [syn: proportion] [ant: disproportion] 3: (physics) the property of being isotropic. RADIAL SYMMETRY 2 : the property of remaining invariant under certain changes (as of orientation in space. Inc. that disposition of parts in which only the opposite sides are equal to each other. from Greek summetri .

at the end of the period. this concept became prominent in aesthetics (Metaphysica.fa.ac. commensurability in squares and regular polyhedra. The third meaning: “bilateral symmetry” (Weyl): Cf.C:1 Symmetria in mathematics and in visual arts (and some difficulties with the sectio aurea) Let us see first the Greek concept symmetria. thick.0.Source: WordNet ® 2. B. Since Aristotle considered symmetria (proportion) as one of the three main species of beauty.b 1). Parallel.2 Hellenistic Age. contributed to the modern geometrical concept of symmetry.mi. and depth.yu/vismath/denes/den4. A canon of proportion is an established norm: deviations from that would be called tall. for example by .html [10/29/04]) 52 . the theoretical and the practical aspects of the same question. Then.proportio (art and aesthetics). Art and Science Electronic Journal of ISIS-Symmetry: Visual Mathematics: A Missing Link. Professor Franklin Toker. height. ‘due proportion’) in sum. the expression symmetria was adopted by the sculptor Polykleitos and later used by Plato and Aristotle in both senses: commensurability in geometry and good proportion in the visual arts. On the other hand. but by other expressions. With great probability this term was introduced by the Pythagoreans during the study of commensurable versus incommensurable lengths.commensuratio (mathematics and philosophy) . 2. 1078 a 35 . 3rd c. The second meaning: ‘due proportion’. together with order (taxis) and limitation (horismenon). or point (or a number of lines or planes).sanu. where a figure is analyzed in terms of its equivalent parts (from the 17th c. • • • The first meaning: ‘commensurability’. length. There were some interesting debates that helped to refine the aesthetical aspects of symmetria by extending its measurable elements with subjective ones. Greek Art:2 Proportion – the relation of one part to another in a work of art and of each part to the whole in size. both topics. Vitruvius made a slight distinction between symmetria and proportio. Their focus was the symmetria versus asymmetria dichotomy in the sense of commensurability versus incommensurability. Euclid and the mathematicians also dealt with symmetria. The study of regular and later semi-regular polyhedra had a climax in the works of Euclid and Archimedes although these figures were not linked to the Greek symmetria. OED: “Exact correspondence in position of the several points or parts of a figure or body with reference to a dividing line. Vitruvius used the Latinized symmetria and its derivatives 85 times in his book on architecture (here we consider the modern reconstruction of the text on the basis of the surviving medieval manuscripts).C.pitt. The original meanings of the Greek symmetria were usually described not by the Latinized term. thin. width.1st c. A Sourcebook for Introduction to the History of Western Art. . B. Then. At the end of the Hellenistic Age the term symmetria almost disappeared from the language of mathematics and aesthetics. They extended the topic of “linear symmetry” (commensurability in length) with “dynamic symmetry” (commensurability in squares). On summetria (‘symmetry’. arrangement of all the 1 2 (www. 2.edu/ftoker/tokerfile/0010sb01-10. Cf.htm [4/21/05]) (http://vrcoll. © 2003 Princeton University Cf. plane.). etc. short.

<…> Proportion The notion of proportion is often used together with ratio. Definition 3: Ratio (or rate) is the mutual habitude or respect of two magnitudes of the same kind each to other. 9. Math 4005: Geometry.edu/~madden/M4005s2004/Similarity/ratio-proportion. The Greek word for ratio is “logos”. An equality of ratios. the following: From an internet article: Symmetry is the cornerstone of modern physics. or point. Cf. LSU Baton Rouge. Book V.E.points of a figure or system in pairs (or sets) so that those of each pair (or set) are at equal distances on opposite sides of such line. This connection between symmetry and beauty is also present in Physics.lsu. ‘symmetry’ means “having the same measure”. and the beauty resulting from this. In Heath’s translation of Euclid. and so is synonymous with commensurable. esp. Definition V. balance. a. plane. It is a concept that is familiar to many. harmony” and “beauty resulting from this”. the correct proportion of the parts of a thing. Clearly symmetry and beauty seem to be naturally connected. …. Department of Mathematics. …. according to quantity. The Oxford English Dictionary includes the following under the entry for “proportion”: II.htm [4/21/08]) 53 . In technical senses.3 reads: A ratio is a sort of relation in respect of size between two magnitudes of the same kind. Math. a relation among quantities such that the quotient of the first divided by the second is equal to that of the third divided by the fourth. In Heath’s translation of Euclid. The relation between two similar magnitudes in respect of quantity. Math. In fact. Addendum: Ratio and Proportion Ratio Numerous definitions of the word “ratio” can be found. The Canadian Oxford Dictionary defines it as a “correct proportion of the parts of a thing. of geometrical ratios. 1 II. properly speaking. the term “proportional” is defined in Definition V. determined by the number of times one contains the other (integrally or fractionally). The Oxford English Dictionary itself includes the following under the entry for “ratio”: 2. it is “a due proportion of the several parts of a body to each other” (Webster’s Revised Unabridged Dictionary)— that is.6: 1 (https://www. as I will argue towards the end.” According to its first imposition. Theories with the greatest amount of symmetry are considered to be the most beautiful or desirable. aesthetics based on symmetry seems to be taking an increasingly (and perhaps disproportionately) important role in determining the course of modern physics.The earliest use of the word “ratio” cited in the Oxford English Dictionary is from Barrow's 1660 translation of Euclid's Elements.math.

He did not have any conception of a/b as a number. In this respect.b. a/b > n/m iff c/d >n/m. this is identical in meaning to the two-word phrase “ana logon”. In Euclid’s mathematics. Euclid. The latter condition has the same meaning as: for any positive integers m and n. and accordingly a/b and c/d would also be numbers. Definition V. a proportions are sometimes written: “a is to b as c is to d” (or “a:b::c:d”). the comparison of ratios is not such a simple process .5 into modern terminology as follows: “a is to b as c is to d” means: for any positive integers m and n.5 gives conditions for two ratios to be the same. could not have phrased his definition this way. Euclid and Real Numbers In modern mathematics.Let magnitudes which have the same ratio be called proportional. his fundamental conceptual framework differed from ours. Euclid’s definition seems consistent with the idea expressed in the dictionary definition above. Thus. above. Euclid's definition implies that we should call the ratios a:b and c:d the same if a/b and c/d exceed exactly the same rational numbers. This involves an indefinite number of comparisons. which may be translated “in proportion”. “Proportion” is clearly used in this sense in Proposition VI:2. however. The proportion is true if the two numbers a/b and c/d are equal. [omitted here]) § 54 . (See the quotation from Wu. He did not think of the process of dividing one magnitude by another as yielding a number. ma > nb iff mc > nd. According to Heath. The Greek word translated as “proportional” is “analogon”. a. He would have viewed it as a comparison. Here.c and d might be any positive numbers. <…> We can translate Definition V.

94 .6.. Id. Robert Grosseteste. hê. .2p..6. 62) Cf.. A Greek-English Lexicon: summetr-ia . in a fixed proportion. also. hê nuktos pros hêmeran s. captivates you.228c. In their eyes. 236a. Ennead I. of exercise to food. b. Arist. Heisenberg’s 15-word remark smacks of such precision that one could imagine less eloquent thinkers writing entire books without ever arriving at the core truth Heisenberg lighted upon”.VI.’Like the Sonnets or the Bill of Rights. (B.Sph. “Heisenberg crystallizes the notion remarkably when he notes. 235d.Vict.1308b12. Comm.9.. cf. Pl. symmetry. Pl. due proportion. 1. II.66d. Cf. that beauty in visible things as in everything else consists of symmetry and proportion. .925a: pl. and fills you with joy? The general opinion. Arist.R. According to Werner Heisenberg: The following refers to an essay by Werner Karl Heisenberg in “Across the Frontier. Democr. I may say. sitiôn te kai pomatôn Gal. attracts you. PMonac.87d. porôn Id.).272. opp. convenient size. out of proportion.Pol. in other words. Id. 1004b11. pros ti. – Mark K. which constitutes beauty as perceived by the eye.6. tôn lambanomenôn Sor. porôn Epicur. hê tou tôn gamôn chronou s. trophês kai aeros Thphr.2. nothing simple and devoid of parts can be beautiful. proportion calculated to produce . commensurability.15.” originally published in the Shakespeare Oxford Newsletter. tôn kath' hêmas anthrôpôn in comparison with. s.pitt.Metaph.fa. cf. with the added element of good color. p. G. ‘Beauty is the proper conformity of the parts to one another and to the whole.. hê pros allêla s.edu/ftoker/tokerfile/0010sb01-10. kata mian s.39 (vi A.D. 191. 183.Phlb. s.1.13. Id. only a composite. kai harmoniai tôn . 1974. Anderson.13. .6. . tôn pharmakôn Id. suitable relation. biou summetriêi by harmony of life. in Div.235e.Ph.Sph. after H. the proportions. cf.1061b1.Fr.1. vi. 1:1 What is it that impresses you when you look at something. Aristotle’s Philosophy of Mathematics.530a. Henry George Liddell. : pl. Sph.html [10/29/04]) 55 . is that it is the interrelation of parts toward one another and toward the whole.246b5 . thermôn kai psuchrôn tithemen Arist.” published by Harper.988 .. Hp.7 . (quoted in Umberto Eco. one of the characteristics of beauty and goodness.CP2.250 . Id. asummetria.49U. Art and Beauty in the Middle Ages. Robert Scott. Gal. 48): For beauty is a concordance and fittingness of a thing to itself and of all its individual parts to themselves and to each other and to the whole. 1 (http://vrcoll.A. hai s. para tên s. hugieian en . s. Cf. EN1133b18. ON BEAUTY AS CONSISTING IN A DUE PROPORTION OR ‘SYMMETRY’ OF THE PARTS TO THE WHOLE AND OF THE PARTS TO EACH OTHER.Ti. Apostle. Nom. Pl. Summer 1997 and Fall 1997/Winter 1998 I say: Those things are ‘commensurate’ which are measurable by the same magnitude as a unit. hê tôn kalôn s. . pros tên s. Plotinus. suitability.64e sq. and of that whole to all things. p. al. “Beauty and the Paradigm.13 .Ti. Ep. measured by the standard of . Id.M. p. but s.Lg.

. Thomas Aquinas explains in the Summa Theologica.): To the third. Now that which is ordered to him is said to be his own. It is due to God that there should be fulfilled in creatures what His will and wisdom require. the right to chose his own vocation. q. Thomas Aquinas: due “To each one is due what is his own”.1 Now a twofold order has to be considered in things: the one. Ia. whereby all created things are ordered to God. Summa Theol.54. According to St. 213: As St. that is. (Q. 21. belonging to] the one to which it [sc.. and what manifests His goodness. or to creatures. 1. therefore.e. In the name of ‘debt’. as the parts of the whole. William Sockey.M. art.” Now whatever is ordered to man as belonging to his human nature is his by right. for that is free which exists for its own sake. the other.).. God’s justice regards what befits Him. slightly rev. thus it is due to man to have hands. ad 3 (tr. Hsch. In this respect. and in either way God pays what is due.. as due either to God. accident to substance..2. “. B. and on the highest plane. St. 56 . It is also due to a created thing that it should possess what is ordered to it. 12. “what is due to each thing is due to it according to the divine wisdom. 21. English Dominican Fathers. whereby one created thing is ordered to another. and not conversely. each one has a right to that which belongs to him. 21. c. 1): “To each one is due what is his own”. art. On debitum. and that other animals should serve him. In nomine ergo debiti. E. q. importatur quidam ordo exigentiae vel necessitatis alicuius ad quod ordinatur. A.. Ia. the right to liberty (rightly understood). art. 3.7 (iii B. Poll. p. St. quod ad ipsum ordinatur.341. This debt however 1 Ad tertium dicendum quod unicuique debetur quod suum est. of one thing to another)” (Summa Theol. the right to worship God. when He gives to each thing what is due to it by its nature and condition. the debt] is ordered. just as the servant to the master.” And he explains that where we are considering the works of God.7. inasmuch as He renders to Himself what is due to Himself. nam liberum est quod sui causa est. q. We thus say that every man has the right to life. Thus in the divine operations debt may be regarded in two ways. 1.. or again.) proportion “the habitude or relation of one quantity to another (or generally. In the same Question and Article of the Summa. PSI4.it is due to a created thing that it should possess what is ordered to it.A. ad 4) Cf. sicut servus est domini. is implied a certain order of exigency or necessity of [i. it must be said that to each one is due what is his own.C. Thus also God exercises justice. or what is due. Thomas Aquinas. and all things whatsoever to their end.it is due to a created thing that it should possess what is ordered to it.” (Summa Theol. This is especially evident in the case of those things without which man could not achieve the purpose for which he was made. a woman's robe without a train. 1. Dicitur autem esse suum alicuius. Thomas says: “. Cf. “Religious Freedom and Human Rights”. Ia. et non e converso. 2.

Hence. Thomas. pertain to beauty as coming under the first species of disposition (cp. the purpose of which is to make it good. et quod suam bonitatem manifestat. quia illorum meritis convenit. Anselm touches on either view where he says (Prosolog. and with the right size and shape. a due proportion = summetria what is due to a thing what is owed to it by nature Cf. quando dat unicuique quod ei debetur secundum rationem suae naturae et conditionis. et quod ei alia animalia serviant.g. dicens. Thomas. sicut partes ordinantur ad totum. quod est ordinatum ad ipsum secundum ordinem divinae sapientiae.) N. Et licet Deus hoc modo debitum alicui det. quo aliquid creatum ordinatur ad aliud creatum. iustum est. Sed hoc debitum dependet ex primo. Unus. And although God in this way pays each thing its due. that proportion is ‘due’ which is ordered to the thing possessing it by its final and agent cause. Et utrumque modum tangit Anselmus. and when Thou dost spare the wicked. Thomas-Lexikon. um: 1 Est autem duplex ordo considerandus in rebus. it is just. figure or shape and color. non tamen ipse est debitor. Et sic etiam Deus operatur iustitiam. quod habeat id quod ad ipsam ordinatur. sicut homini.v.is derived from the former. a middle. sometimes as the reward of merit. Et utroque modo Deus debitum reddit. aut secundum quod aliquid debetur Deo. Justice. quandoque vero retributio pro meritis. ut impleatur in rebus id quod eius sapientia et voluntas habet. iustum est. Debitum enim est Deo. et unaquaeque res ad suum finem.B.g. but rather other things to Him. quia bonitati tuae condecens est. and an end) and size (being neither too big nor too small with respect to the whole) also pertains to beauty in this sense. quo omnia creata ordinantur in Deum. when it has all its parts. since what is due to each thing is due to it as ordered to it according to the divine wisdom. secundum quam reddit sibi quod sibi debetur.e. In sum. since He is not ordered to other things. (Note that what is ordered to a thing pertains either to its essence or to its operation. Sic igitur et debitum attendi potest dupliciter in operatione divina. To the foregoing I add: a due disposition of the parts according to order (or before and after. a. sed potius alia in ipsum. it is due to a man that he have hands and that other animals should serve him because these things are ordered to him Hence a proportion will be ‘due’ when it consists in what is ordered to a thing: e. Alius ordo. 57 . • • • • to each one is due (debetur) what is his own (quod suum est) (i. aut secundum quod aliquid debetur rei creatae. et accidentia ad substantias. quod habeat manus.”1 4. insofar as they befit the nature of the thing. St. in God is sometimes spoken of as the fitting accompaniment of His goodness. and with the appropriate coloring and brilliance. therefore. quia hoc unicuique debetur. Debitum etiam est alicui rei creatae. According to St. since it agrees with their deserts. quia ipse ad alia non ordinatur. cum punis malos. in those things where there is a beginning. et secundum hoc iustitia Dei respicit decentiam ipsius. yet He Himself is not the debtor. debituus. and in the right order. since it befits Thy goodness. what belongs to him) what is ordered to him is said to be his own (dicitur esse suum alicuius) therefore to each one is due what is ordered to him e. Et ideo iustitia quandoque dicitur in Deo condecentia suae bonitatis. s. it is also just. cum vero parcis malis. 10): “When Thou dost punish the wicked. SCG II: the members and the colors).

zu commensuratio d. → d. quae ad humanam pertinent naturam. d. und dasjenige. causae finalis. → finis sub b. II. videtur debitum et necessarium. II. sich gehörend. 6 ad 6) = schuldiger. 4 ad 4. zu movere per modum d. d. necessitatis sive secundum necessitatem (th. 16 c. → d. II. II. → complexio sub b. 2. 23. ib. 29) = das bedingt Notwendige. d. synonym mit iustus und necessarius (←). zu operatio d. 28. cg. quod ipse exhibet & d. secundum condicionem naturae) bzw. der Gegensatz zu indebitus (←): in nomine ergo debiti importatur quidam ordo exigentiae vel necessitatis alicuius. weil er es notwendig hat. ib.). causae formalis. zu finis d. → commensuratio. 5. quod habeat rationem et alia. II. 3. I. cg. congruitatis sive convenientiae sive per modum condecentiae sive secundum quandam decentiam & d. 98. 187. → d. 64. → forma sub b. 1 ad 3 & 4 ob. ib. zu ordo d. → petitio sub a. was jemand auf Grund eines Verdienstes. secundum se) gebührt (puta si dicamus. II. quodl. 28. zu dispositio d. cg. 93. II. caritatis & d. 2. → movere. ad quod ordinatur. quod est • • 1 “But what is required for the perfection of something is due to each thing. 11. 111. → oppositio sub a. d. 1) = die eheliche Pflicht. II. → circumstantia. condicionis. quod autem ad perfectionem alicuius requiritur. Arten des debitum in diesem Sinne sind: 1. 10. 1 ad 1) = das Sich-Gebührende der Angemessenheit oder Schicklichkeit und das der Notwendigkeit. was ihm als solchem oder gemäß seiner selbst gebührt (vgl. und dasjenige. II. → ordo sub a. 9. schuldig. pflichtmäßig. condicionale. 78. zu proportio d.” 58 . → praeparatio sub a. 8. causae formalis (pot. d. debitum amicabile sive amicitiae (th. d. II. 4 c) = dasjenige.oder pflichtmäßigerweise. zu forma d. 7. amicabile. d. 4 ad 8. d. 3 ad 1. condicionale sive condicionatum sive condicionis (cg. → materia sub c. → perfectio sub b. zu tun obliegt (per se quidem debitum est in unoquoque negotio id. notwendig. → operatio sub b. 2. 2. zu actus d. zu modus d. debitum esse homini. 4. I. I. → quantitas. I. was einem Dinge zufolge seiner Hinordnung zu etwas Anderm oder wegen eines andern. d. 99. III. • Zu actio debita → actio sub a. causae finalis & d. convenientiae. 6. 4 ad 2. zu perfectio d. II. d. → modus sub b. 1 c. ib. 23.). 5 ad 3. amicitiae. was ihm gemäß der Beschaffenheit seiner Natur (vgl.a) sein sollend. 1 ad 3. cg. 5. ib. vgl. 29. 2 ad 2. 5. 44. d. 188. und dasjenige. d. 78. was ihm gebührt. zu quantitas d. 32. est debitum unicuique1. cg. secundum condicionem naturae (ib. iuris sive iustitiae (ib. 21. d. coniugii sive matrimonii (4 sent. 44. sich gebührend. propter necessitatem (th. zu circumstantia d. zu mensura d. II. zu petitio d. zu oppositio d. 14. d. ex merito proveniens & d. essendi (pot. → mensura. Ex debito (th. 16 c) = das der Zweckursache und das der formalen Ursache Gebührende. was jemand gebührt. ex ordine alicuius ad aliquem sive propter aliud & d. zu praeparatio d. 10. 1. 28) = die Pflicht der Liebe und die der Gerechtigkeit. 5 c. quod debitum sive necessitas sumatur. → proportio. → actus sub b. → dispositio sub d. verit. 19 c) = dasjenige. zu complexio d. th. debitum quandam subiectionem et obligationem importat. pot. 1 ad 2) = dasjenige. 2 ad 2) = die Pflicht der Freundschaft. 3. II. congruitatis. 16 c) = die Notwendigkeit des Seins. per se sive secundum se (ib. I. d. 10. weil er etwas gibt (sive sit aliquid temporale sive spirituale. 12. 4 sent. ex eo. II. erforderlich. 3. II. → d. zu materia d. 3. 13.

secundum regulam legis determinantis. 1 c. the triple. q. d. St. matrimonii. 29. secundum quandam decentiam. 23. secundum regulam rationis (ib. 5. secundum necessitatem. d. d. ad quod reddendum aliquis lege adstringitur. d. oboedientiae (quodl.A.M. II. 1. II. 99. d. ex merito proveniens. 11 ad 1) = die Notwendigkeit. art. 23. 34. congruitatis. 22. → d. 35. 10. ex ordine alicuius ad aliquem. per modum condecentiae. II. 15. W. propter aliud autem. b) eheliche Pflicht (= debitum coniugii sive matrimonii. congruitatis. → d. d. itude of one thing to another. 11 c. That ‘proportion’ is said in two ways. [‘proportion’ means] a certain alteram. II. 106. d. honestatis. 27. propter necessitatem. W. And in this way there can be a proportion of the 59 . 31. d. II. 18. 20. zu sterben. honestatis. a. secundum regulam rationis. II. said in two ways. 3 c. 117. 4 sent. alio modo. 2 ad 2. 1 c. 5. th. 87. servitutis (4 sent. poenae (th. multitudinis & d. triplum et habitude [or state of being related. d. ut medicinam det ad sanandum. congruitatis. sicut medico per se debitum est ut sanet. quia habet rationem per se boni. secundum regulam legis determinantis & d. sub a): uterque coniugum alteri debitum reddere tenetur. 12. 1 c). propter aliud autem est debitum id. vgl. d. III.. d. 77. coniugii. → d. 2. vgl. secundum condicionem naturae. Summa Theol. → d. 21. secundum quod duplum. mortis (ib. 99. 102. d. propter aliud. quod ordinatur ad finem. Thomas Aquinas. 5 c. d. morale. → d. d. 19. unius. 6 c) = die Pflicht (zur Ableistung) der Strafe. 33. 109. uno modo. 107. a. → d. legale. caritatis. 25. → d. d. II. tionship] of one quantity to another. 1. B. et sic potest esse proportio creaturae ad deum. 3. d. quod ipse exhibet. 5. multitudinis. 16. legale (ib. d. d. m. 9 c) = die Pflicht des Gehorsams. die moralische und die gesetzliche Pflicht (debitum quidem legale est. ≈ . → d. 32. 28. debitum autem morale est. . 44. → d. 24. secundum se. . I. d. 32 div.finis. ad 4 (tr. 152. 3 ad 1. or relaaequale sunt species proportionis. per se. 17. → d. 46. and the equal are species of proportion. Ia. ≈ . 36. d. quaelibet habitudo unius ad alterum In another way. d. 5 c) = die Pflicht gemäß der Regel des bestimmenden Gesetzes und die gemäß der Regel der Vernunft. 37. II. honestatis. iustitiae. in the way in which the double. quod aliquis debet ex honestate virtutis. secundum regulam legis determinantis. ex ordine alicuius ad aliquem. I. d. 2 ad 1) = die Pflicht der Mehrheit oder Menge als solcher und die des Einzelnen. honestatis sive morale & d..): QU12 AR1 RA4 ad quartum dicendum quod proportio dicitur To the fourth it must be said that ‘proportion’ is dupliciter. 80. m. 5 ad 1) = das gemäß der Schicklichkeit oder Sittlichkeit und das gemäß einem positiven Gesetze sein Sollende. 80. . 1 ob. ex eo. ‘proportion’ means any habproportio dicitur. II. 2. quodl. → d. ib. → d. ex ordine alicuius ad aliquem. Cf. iuris. 32. d. unius (ib. 4 ad 1. 26. necessitatis. d. certa habitudo unius quantitatis ad In one way. → d. 1 ad 3) = die aus der Knechtschaft entspringende Pflicht. → d. die gesetzliche und die moralische Pflicht. vgl. 30. 1 c). quantum ad redditionem debiti omnes conveniunt. II. d.

B. Cf. n. quae applicantur sonis. For they considered the passions of harmonies. in the consonances of music.M. second motive. to cause. Cf. B. 9.A. 6. St. intellectus creatus proportion. cui applicantur proportiones numerales: thing one according to genus to which numeral proportions are applied: ut scilicet eorum. et per hunc modum numeri sunt causae way numbers are causes of these sensibles. 16. St. In I De Anima. can be proportioned to knowing God. Cf.10 deinde cum dicit amplius autem hic ponit Then when he says. sicut praeter proportiones numerales in consonantiis inveniuntur soni. idest in musicis consonantiis. inquantum proportiones numerales. consonantiarum musicalium et earum rationes. and in this orum. since numbers are said to be the causes of consonances.inquantum se habet ad ipsum ut effectus ad creature to God.. Thomas Aquinas.e. proportions.): LB1LC16N. just as in addition to the numeral proportions in consonances sounds are found. lect. idest proportiones numer. inasmuch as numeral proportions which are applied to sounds give back consonances: palam est quod oportebat praeter ipsos numeros it is clear that beyond the numbers themselves it in sensibilibus ponere aliquod unum secundum will be necessary to place in sensibles somegenus.-9 nec etiam potest dici harmonia secundum Nor can it even be called a harmony according proportionem corporum commixtorum ex to the proportion of bodies mixed from concontrariis.A. quia numeri dicuntur esse causae consonantiarum. and as potency to act. inasmuch as it stands as effect causam. 60 . of musical consonances and their ratios. Furthermore. Proportio used as a synonym for ratio. 7. et secundum hoc. quae sunt illius generis proportiones.-4 si autem dicatur quod haec sensibilia sunt But if it is said that these sensibles are certain quaedam rationes. B. In I Meta. proportions of numbers. 9 (tr. Thomas Aquinas. lect. n. In I Meta. sicut videmus in symphoniis. so that. St. namely. n. the proportions of those things which belong to that genus constitute sensibles.M. consonantias reddunt: just as we see in symphoniae. 10 (tr.): LB1LC-7N. sensibilia constituant. i. traries. Thomas Aquinas. horum sensibilium.M. lect. to say.And in this respect the created understanding natus esse potest ad cognoscendum deum. i. he gives the secundum motivum.): LB1 LC-9N..A.ratios. 4 (tr. ex natura numerorum. considerabant enim passiones harmoniarum. that is scilicet proportiones. et ut potentia ad actum.e. from the nature of numbers.

nam commixtio elementorum non habet eamdem rationem. secundum quam est caro. proportion—according to which it is flesh. et secundum quam est os: For a mixture of elements does not have the same ratio—that is. § 61 . quia diversa proportio invenitur in One reason is that a different proportion is diversis partibus corporis: found in different parts of the body. And this for two reasons. idest proportionem. una ratio est. and according to which it is bone. ergo in diversis partibus erunt diversae animae Therefore in different parts there will be secundum diversam proportionem et different souls according to a different promultiplicationem partium animalis. portion and the multiplication of the parts of the animal.et hoc duplici ratione.

permutata ergo proportio est quando A proportion. B. as eight is to four. habet quatuor terminos. patet autem quod in proportione duo termini se Now it is clear that in a proportion two terms habent ut antecedentia. sex et quatuor sunt antecedentia: tria vero et duo six and four are antecedents. as six stands to three in the duple proportion. ut hic: follows: sicut se habent quatuor ad duo..M. lect. so is two to three. are consequents. St. In I Post. as follows: sicut se habent octo ad quatuor. each of which import a proportion agreeing with the nature of that which is called ‘beautiful’ or ‘healthy’. vero est collatio duarum But a proportionality is a bringing together of two proportions. 5 (tr. ita four is to six. On proportionalitas (proportionality): a bringing together of two proportions. This is clear in health and in beauty. se habent duo ad tria. it has three terms: for we use one as uno utitur ut duobus. n. to another. B. so is six to three: but if it is si vero sit coniuncta. ergo sicut se habent quatuor ad sex. 12.7. it has four hic: terms. for this reason the very beauty or health considered in itself is said according to more and less. n. ita se habent sex as four is to two. ad tria. ita quatuor ad duo. then. In X Ethic. so is six to three. ut si dicam: likewise the consequents. duo vero ut stand as antecedents. and consequentia similiter.): Now when there is some form which implies in its own account a certain proportion of many things ordered to one. 3. as follows: sicut se habent quatuor ad duo. so is six to three. proportionalitas proportionum. therefore. 8 (tr. it must be understood habitudo unius quantitatis ad alteram. Cf. ita se habent sex as four is to two. as consequentia. And because a proportion of this kind can be more or less in agreement [or ‘suitable’. et antecedents are exchanged for each other. quae. but three and two sunt consequentia. sicut sex that a proportion is the habitude of one quantity ad tria se habent in proportione dupla. is changed when the antecedentia invicem conferuntur.-8 circa primum sciendum est quod proportio est With respect to the first.. ut hic: two.A. 62 . lect. Thomas Aquinas. ita sex ad tria: as four is to two. as if I were to say sicut se habent quatuor ad duo.M. habet tres terminos: nam conjunct. An. as ad tria.A. Thomas Aquinas. Cf. St. so is four to two. And from this it is clear that unity insofar as something is determinate is the reason why something does not admit of more and less. conveniens]. si sit disiuncta. such a form also according to its proper account admits of more and less. ut If such a proportion is disjunct.): LB1 LC12N. but two as consequents.

20: “As radiance comes from form. Thomas Aquinas. q. Cf. c. § 63 . and lacking due order to that end. since a thing is said to be good through being ordered to an end.) Cf. 1. Summa Theol. Maurer. as also is good than right. art. while evil implies lack of this order. so proportion or harmony comes from the ordering of a thing to an end. 13. Thomas Aquinas.IIae. this rule is the natural force that inclines them to that end. Ia.M. To which I add. C. In things that act according to nature. c. 19. IIa.IIae. where there is a proportion of many things ordered to one. 21. art. Now the due order to an end is measured by some rule. then the action is said to be right: since the mean does not exceed its limits. St.. and such is the evil of fault”. For every privation of good. viz.: “I answer that. it comes under the notion of sin”.. the action does not swerve from the order of its active principle to the end.: “Because. agreeing with the nature of a thing. St. is an evil: whereas sin consists properly in an action done for a certain end.B. p.” Cf.B. n. in whatever subject. When therefore an action proceeds from a natural force.S. (B. Armand A. in accord with the natural inclination to an end. there is ‘symmetry’. Evil is more comprehensive than sin. But when an action strays from this rectitude. 1. q.A.. that which excludes the order to the last end is altogether evil.N. Summa Theol. in the sense of ‘due proportion’ ( debita proportio). About Beauty: A Thomistic Interpretation.

8. Note on habit. Recall that for there to be a habit, it is necessary (1) ‘that that which is disposed be other than that to which it is disposed; and thus hold itself to it as potency to act’ [i.e. the limbs and colors are disposed to an accidental form called a ‘harmony’ or ‘consonance’]; (2) ‘that that which is in potency to another be determinable in many ways, and to diverse things’; and (3) ‘that many things concur [= come together] for the sake of disposing the subject to one of those things to which it is in potency, which can be made commensurate to it in diverse ways, so that it is thus disposed well or badly to a form or an operation’. (St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 49, art. 4, c., tr. B.A.M.) what is disposed are a thing’s composing parts of an animal, its limbs and colors of a statue or sculpture, the same of a painting, its colors and configurations of an imitation of an action, things done or suffered the subject is one species, not as a homogeneous subject, but as a totality consisting in a determinate order of parts Re: the many things composing an integral whole must be made ‘commensurate’ to ‘one of those things to which it is in potency’, the most important of which is the thing’s nature. In this requirement lies the seed of the notion of summetria. §

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9. Summary on disposition. (a) That a disposition is a certain order of parts: “Disposition’ means the order belonging to a thing having parts, either according to place, or according to power, or according to form [i.e. species]. For it must be a kind of position, as indeed is clear from the name, ‘disposition’.” (Aristotle, Metaph., V. 19, 1022 b 1-2, tr. B.A.M.) (b) That the kind of totality in which beauty consists requires a determinate order of parts with respect to the species and figure of the whole: “While in a sense we call anything one if it is a quantity and continuous, in a sense we do not unless it is a whole, i.e. unless it has unity of form [or ‘species’]; e.g. if we saw the parts of a shoe put together in just any way we should not call them one all the same (unless because of their continuity); we do this only if they are put together so as to be a shoe and to have already a certain single form [or ‘species’]”. (Aristotle, Metaph., V. 6, 1016b 11-17, tr. W. D. Ross; slightly rev. B.A.M.) But “…the species consists in a certain totality requiring a determinate order of parts; just as it is clear that we do not say something is one, like a work of art, when we observe the parts of a shoe composed in any way whatsoever….” (St. Thomas Aquinas, In V Meta., lect. 8, n. 3, tr. B.A.M.) (c) That where there is a beginning, a middle, and an end, every such continuous whole must have position in its parts: “For when it is so that in a quantity there is an order of parts, because there is a beginning, a middle, and an end there, in which the account of ‘position’ consists, every such continuous whole must have position in its parts.” (St. Thomas Aquinas, In V Meta., lect. 21, n. 21, tr. B.A.M.) (d) That harmony (which is essential to beauty) is not a form but a but a disposition of the matter for a form (cf. the teaching that beauty is a kind of disposition, from which it follows that beauty is an accidental rather than a substantial form): “But this does not follow, since a proportion of this sort [sc. constituting a harmony] is not a form, as they believed, but rather a disposition of the matter for a form.” (St. Thomas Aquinas, In I De Anima, lect. 9, n. 13, tr. B.A.M.) (e) In works of art: that the form of the whole in which beauty consists is an accidental form (and this is a form which is composition and order): “For when a whole consists of parts, the form of the whole which does not give being to the individual parts is a form which is composition and order, like the form of a house, and such a form is accidental.” (St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 76, art. 8, c., tr. B.A.M.) § 65

VII. THE BEAUTIFUL ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS AQUINAS. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 27, art. 1, ad 3 (tr. B.A.M.):
QU27 AR1 RA3 ad tertium dicendum quod pulchrum est idem To the third it must be said that the beautiful is bono, sola ratione differens. the same as the good, differing only in account. cum enim bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, de ratione boni est quod in eo quietetur appetitus, sed ad rationem pulchri pertinet quod in eius aspectu seu cognitione quietetur appetitus. unde et illi sensus praecipue respiciunt pulchrum, qui maxime cognoscitivi sunt, scilicet visus et auditus rationi deservientes, dicimus enim pulchra visibilia et pulchros sonos. For, since the good is what all things desire, it belongs to the account of the good that the appetite be brought to rest in it; but it pertains to the account of the beautiful that the appetite be brought to rest in the sight or knowledge of it. And for this reason those senses especially look to the beautiful that are the most knowing, namely, sight and hearing, the servants of reason, for we call sights and sounds ‘beautiful’.

in sensibilibus autem aliorum sensuum, non But in the sensibles belonging to the other utimur nomine pulchritudinis, non enim dicimus senses we do not use the name ‘beautiful’, for pulchros sapores aut odores. we do not call tastes or smells ‘beautiful’. et sic patet quod pulchrum addit supra bonum, quendam ordinem ad vim cognoscitivam, ita quod bonum dicatur id quod simpliciter complacet appetitui; And so it is clear that the beautiful adds to the good a certain order to a knowing power, so that that is called ‘good’ simply which is pleasing to the appetite—

pulchrum autem dicatur id cuius ipsa appre- but that is called ‘beautiful’ the very apprehensio placet. hension of which pleases.

• •

the beautiful adds to the good a certain order to a knowing power beauty is that the very apprehension of which pleases

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 5, art. 4, ad 1 (tr. B.A.M.):
QU5 AR4 RA1 ad primum ergo dicendum quod pulchrum et bonum in subiecto quidem sunt idem, quia super eandem rem fundantur, scilicet super formam, et propter hoc, bonum laudatur ut pulchrum. To the first it must be said that the beautiful and the good are the same in subject because they are founded on the same thing, namely, the form, and for this reason the good is praised as beautiful.

sed ratione differunt. nam bonum proprie But they differ in account. For the good respicit appetitum, est enim bonum quod omnia properly regards the appetite; for the good is appetunt. what all things desire. et ideo habet rationem finis, nam appetitus est And so it has the account of an end, for the quasi quidam motus ad rem. appetite is, so to speak, a certain movement toward a thing.

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A. secundum dionysium. B. but similitude [or likeness] regards proprie pertinet ad rationem causae formalis. ad 3 (tr. et proportionem debitam in aliis and the ordering of a due proportion in other ordinare….M. But the beautiful regards a knowing power. 180. sicut in sibi similibus.): DS31QU2 AR1. pulchrum assimilation. since the sense is delighted in things proportionatis.pulchrum autem respicit vim cognoscitivam. quod deus est causa omnis pulchritudinis inquantum est causa consonantiae et claritatis. utrumque autem horum radicaliter in ratione Now both of these are found in reason as in a invenitur. as has supra dictum est. St.. sicut To the third it must be said that beauty. unde pulchrum in debita proportione consistit. nam et sensus ratio quaedam est. that are duly proportioned. • beauty consists in a due proportion (as elsewhere explained. Thomas Aquinas. of knowing. beauty properly pertains to the account of a formal cause. to which pertains both a manifesting light manifestans. the form. et omnis virtus For the sense... scilicet 4). namely. 67 . et quia cognitio fit per assimilationem. art 1. 2. as in things similar to itself. dicit enim.M. things which please by being seen are called ‘beautiful’. consonance and lustre. just as we say that men are beautiful who have proportionate members and a resplendent color. two things come together in the account of consonantia et claritas. this primarily means having the membra or limbs of the body well-proportioned) Cf. Summa Theol. Thomas Aquinas. 2.CO …ad rationem autem pulchritudinis duo con. for pulchra enim dicuntur quae visa placent.…But according to Dionysius (De Div. ad quam pertinet et lumen root. B. sicut dicimus homines pulchros qui habent membra proportionata et splendentem colorem. c. 31. consistit in quadam claritate et been said above. c.): QU180 AR2 RA3 ad tertium dicendum quod pulchritudo. due proportion. q. St.A. currunt. consists in a certain lustre and debita proportione. (tr. beauty. is a certain ratio. For he says that God is the cause of all beauty insofar as He is the cause of consonance and lustre. For this reason beauty consists in a due quia sensus delectatur in rebus debite proportion. IIa-IIae. things…. dist. In I Sent. q. and indeed every power capable cognoscitiva. • • • • lustre due proportion a manifesting light the ordering of due proportion Cf. And because knowledge comes about by similitudo autem respicit formam. art. Nom.

-738 (ed.A. quod pulchritudo non est nisi in magno corpore. To the these two the Philosopher adds a third where he says that beauty does not exist except in a sizable body (Nic. • • • consonance (= proportionate members or a due commensuration of members. • • • a sizable body a due commensuration of the limbs or members certain things cannot be called ‘beautiful’ by reason of a lack of size Cf. in the case of the plot. and makes himself worthy of them.A..): LB4LC-8N.M. Ethic. art. non tamen possunt dici magnitudinis defectum. 8. can be called ‘temperate’. St. prout termperantia sumitur pro quaecumque moderatione. potest dici temperatus. (tr. Cf. by reason of a due commensuration of the limbs [or ‘members’].e. IV. 738 (tr. unde illi qui sunt parvi. and so small men can be called ‘commensurate’ [or ‘well-proportioned’] and ‘good-looking’. c. but not beautiful. i. according as ‘temperance’ is taken for any sort of moderation. B. Aristotle considers a due disposition in quantity with respect to an upper limit. Thomas Aquinas. St.. = a due disposition according to quantity) lustre (= a resplendent color. Marietti) tertio ibi qui enim ostendit quod magnanamitas dignificet seipsum magnis. possunt dicit formosi And so those who are small can be called ‘goodpropter decentiam coloris et propter debitam looking’ by reason of an appropriate color and commensurationem membrorum. size]. et his seipsum dignificat.his duobus addit tertium philosophus ubi dicit. lect. or a bright color. = a due disposition according to quality) a sizable body (= a due disposition in quantity according to a lower limit) Note that. n.): QU145 AR2 CO 68 . 145. q. He who is worthy of small things. Thomas Aquinas.6). 2. IIa-IIae. which must be of such size as to be taken in at a glance. ille enim qui est dignus parvis. For he who is worthy of small things. just as beauty properly in corpore magno. sed non pulchri. Summa Theol. consists in a sizable body.. In IV Ethic. pulchri propter yet they cannot be called ‘beautiful’ by reason of a lack of size. sicut pulchritudo proprie consistit [or greatness. But he cannot be called ‘magnanimous’: quia magnanimitas consistit in quadam for magnanimity consists in a certain magnitude magnitudine. where he says. B. non tamen potest dici magnanimus: Third.M. unde parvi homines possunt dici commensurati et formosi. he shows that magnanimity makes itself worthy of great things.

. integritas sive perfectio. 4.A. nom. hoc ipso turpia sunt. that a man have the limbs [or ‘members’] of his body well-proportioned. 8. primo quidem. Nom. Thomas Aquinas. unde pulchritudo corporis in hoc consistit quod homo habeat membra corporis bene proportionata. 5 (tr. whether spiritual or bodily.M.M. cp.): CP4LC-5 …sic enim hominem pulchrum dicimus. B. de div.. Nom. 39. et similiter pulchritudo spiritualis in hoc consistit quod conversatio hominis. St. dicit enim quod deus dicitur pulcher sicut universorum consonantiae et claritatis causa. concurrit et claritas et debita proportio.. iv cap. unde proportionaliter est in caeteris accipiendum. or his action. iv). c. In Dionysii de Div. …For thus we call a man beautiful by reason of an appropriate proportion in quantity and in situation and by reason of his having lustre and a bright color. together with a certain due lustre of color. ad rationem pulchri. • • each thing is called beautiful insofar as it has its own kind of lustre whether spiritual or bodily and insofar as it has been established in a due proportion Cf. Thomas Aquinas. sit bene proportionata secundum spiritualem rationis claritatem…. be well proportioned according to the spiritual lustre of reason….A. cum quadam debiti coloris claritate. 69 . propter decentem proportionem in quantitate et situ et propter hoc quod habet clarum et nitidum colorem. Ia.. c. …For three things are required for beauty. B. sive decori. lect. sive actio eius. art. • • • lustre due proportion (having the limbs or members of the body well-proportioned) spritual beauty consists in a man’s conversation or action being proportioned according to the spiritual lustre of reason Cf. I reply that it must be said that. And likewise spiritual beauty consists in this. wholeness or perfection—for those things enim diminuta sunt. quod unumquodque dicitur pulchrum.respondeo dicendum quod. and insofar as it has been established in a due proportion…. And so proportionally in the rest of things it must be admitted that each thing is called beautiful insofar as it has its own kind of lustre. that are truncated are ugly by this very fact. Summa Theol. secundum quod habet claritatem sui generis vel spiritualem vel corporalem et secundum quod est in debita proportione constitutum…. For this reason the beauty of the body consists in this. St. as may be gathered from the words of Dionysius (De Div.): QU39 AR8 CO …nam ad pulchritudinem tria requiruntur. sicut accipi potest ex verbis dionysii. q. in the account of the beautiful or becoming both lustre and due proportion come together—for he says that God is called beautiful as the cause of the consonance and lustre of the universe. quae First. that a man’s conversation. (tr.

et iterum claritas. Marietti) deinde cum dicit quinimmo et ostendit And then when he says. doing them to whom they belong by virtue of a proper habit. Thomas Aquinas.M. quae consistit in operatione…. 26.A. 2.A. art. per quam in una tantum specie est. 1. In III Sent. as the heavy [is inclined and ordered] to the center. q. which consists in the very essence of a thing. lect. quae consistit in ipso esse rei. 70 . the other which is looked to according to second perfection. 159 (tr.M. (tr.CO respondeo dicendum. sicut grave ad centrum. Cf. • • • wholeness or perfection due proportion or consonance lustre (a bright color) Cf. sed etiam pulchrae et bonae..et debita proportio sive consonantia. c. una quae attenditur secundum perfectionem primam. Thomas Aquinas.): LB1LC-1N. et etiam per determinatam virtutem ad res and also through a determinate power it has an quasdam sibi proportionatas inclinationem habet inclination and order to certain things proporet ordinem. which it is ordered to other things. quia et formam unam determinatam habet. which consists in an activity.A. Nay. unde quae habent colorem And again lustre. since it also has one determinate form through which it exists in one species. q. quod duplex est integritas. And a due proportion or consonance. B.): DS26 QU2 AR4. Thomas Aquinas. another by ordinatur..… Cf. pulchra esse dicuntur. pleasing. but also beautiful and good. B. St. una qua in se subsistit. dist. a. St. n.-159 (ed. St.M. …In all things a twofold perfection is found. he shows operationes secundum virtutem non solum sunt that activities in accord with virtue are not only delectabiles. 1. B. 4. and so those things that have nitidum. delectabiles quidem sunt in ordine ad operantem For they are pleasing in an order to the one cui conveniunt secundum proprium habitum. a bright color are said to be beautiful. tionate to it. d. I reply that it must be said that there is a twofold wholeness: one which is looked to according to first perfection.. et utraque perfectio in rebus materialibus terminata et finita est. (tr. In IV Sent.): DS27 QU1 AR4-CO …in rebus omnibus duplex perfectio invenitur. 27. alia quae attenditur secundum perfectionem secundam. alia qua ad res alias one by which it subsists in itself. In I Ethic. 4. c. rather. and in material things each perfection is terminated and finite.

health.pulchrae autem secundum ordinem debitum But they are beautiful by virtue of a due order of circumstantiarum quasi quarumdam partium. nervorum et ossium. 44. Thomas Aquinas. pulchritudo. partium. n. For beauty consists in a due commensuration of parts. dicuntur quodammodo per and the like are said in some way through a respectum ad aliquid: respect to something: quia aliqua contemperatio humorum facit since a certain contemperation [or ‘mutual sanitatem in puero.): respondeo. nam sanitas est harmonia quaedam humorum. dicendum. B..): adhuc. bonae autem sunt secundum ordinem ad finem. alia alterius. And so the beauty of one thing is other that that of another thing. n. quod pulchritudo... 64. But they are good by virtue of an order to an end.A. In Psalm. et similiter pulchritudo consistit in proportione And likewise beauty consists in a proportion of membrorum et colorum. which it does not do in an old man: aliqua est enim sanitas leoni. • beauty is said in some way through a respect to something • beauty consists in a proportion of the limbs or members and of colors 71 . in And so health is a proportion of humours in comparison to some nature. death to a man. • • activities in accord with virtue are beautiful by virtue of a due order of circumstances for beauty consists in a due commensuration of parts Cf. of the sinews and bones. St.M. ps. unde sanitas est proportio humorum comparatione ad talem naturam. 2 (tr. of the limbs [or ‘members’] and colors. beauty. quae est mors for there is a certain health of the lion. Thomas Aquinas. • beauty consists in a certain harmony of the limbs [or members] and colors Cf. et ideo alia est pulchritudo unius. strength. St. the limbs [or ‘members’] and of colors. sanitas. circumstances as it were of certain parts. quae non facit in sene: tempering’] of humours produces health in a boy. nam in debita commensuratione pulchritudo consistit. c. Summa Contra Gentes.A.M.. membrorum et colorum. 3 (tr. which is homini.. the notion of harmony befits the qualities of the body rather than those of the soul: for health is a certain harmony of the humours. fortitudo. II. B. ratio harmoniae magis qualitatibus corporis quam animae: convenit Furthermore... I reply that it must be said that beauty. et hujusmodi.

talis forma etiam secundum propriam rationem recipit magis et minus. et but the form (necessarily) presupposes certain quaedam ad ipsam ex necessitate consequuntur. own form— forma autem praesupponit quaedam. consequently not to belong to the genus of the good. Now when there is some form which implies in its own account a certain proportion of many things ordered to one. 3. sicut patet de sanitate et pulchritudine. ut supra dictum est. pleasure admits of more and less. called ‘good’ to the extent that it is perfect. it is necessary that it have a form. q.): QU5 AR5 CO respondeo dicendum quod unumquodque I reply that it must be said that each thing is dicitur bonum. Ia. In X Ethic. et ea quae praeexiguntur ad eam.): LB10LC-3N. St. art. per Now since each thing is what it is through its suam formam. B. nature of that which is called ‘beautiful’ or ‘healthy’.-5 quando autem est aliqua forma quae in sui ratione importat quamdam proportionem multorum ordinatorum ad unum. such a form also according to its proper account admits of more and less. necesse est quod formam habeat. 5. then. lacking according to the mode of its perfection. (tr. 72 . perfectum autem dicitur. Summa Theol. Since. for this reason the very beauty or health considered in itself is said according to more and less. inde est quod ipsa pulchritudo vel sanitas in se considerata dicitur secundum magis et minus.Cf. in order for something to be perfect and good. Thomas Aquinas. quia ergo delectatio recipit magis et minus. B. Cf. each of utrumque importat proportionem convenientem which imply a proportion agreeing with the naturae eius quod dicitur pulchrum vel sanum. cum autem unumquodque sit id quod est. as well as the things presupposed to it. Thomas Aquinas. and the things which follow on it. sic enim est appetibile. et ex hoc patet quod unitas secundum quam And from this it is clear that unity insofar as aliquid est determinatum est causa quod aliquid something is determinate is the reason why non recipiat magis et minus. inquantum est perfectum.A. c.A. quorum This is clear in health and in beauty. things. it videbatur non esse aliquid determinatum et per will not appear to be something determinate and consequens non esse de genere bonorum. as was said above. et quia huiusmodi proportio potest esse vel magis vel minus conveniens. 5. And because a proportion of this kind can be more or less suitable. 5 (tr. something does not admit of more and less. St.. for thus it is the object of appetite. lect. and certain things necessarily follow on it— ad hoc quod aliquid sit perfectum et bonum.. n.M. cui nihil deest But that is called ‘perfect’ to which nothing is secundum modum suae perfectionis.M. et ea quae consequuntur ad ipsam.

for which reason it is said that ‘a mode is what a measure establishes beforehand’. et hoc signifycatur per modum. unde dicitur quod mensura modum praefigit.praeexigitur autem ad formam determinatio sive commensuratio principiorum. seu efficientium ipsam. Now presupposed to the form is a determination or commensuration of its principles. whether material or efficient. seu materialium. and this is signified by ‘mode’. § 73 .

lect. lect.. it does not belong to the fourth quod aliquid sit bene vel male. however. est And because quantity. modus autem est. quae sunt follow on the principles of the nature. so that according to which the potency of a subject is determined according to accidental being is called an accidental quality. the mode or determination of the subiecti secundum quantitatem. which is also a certain difference. art. modus autem sive determinatio subiecti But the mode or determination of a subject secundum actionem et passionem. ut patet per philosophum in v metaphys. for which reason it implies a certain determination according to some measure. modus autem sive determinatio subiecti The mode or determination of a subject secundum esse accidentale. vel secundum quantitatem. is sine motu. super gen. ad litteram. which are materia et forma. Summa Theol. properly. Ia-IIae. as St. the second and third species of quality. without motion. et sine ratione boni et mali. 14. matter and form.. secundum sui rationem. unde importat quandam determinationem secundum aliquam mensuram. n. just as that according to which the potentia materiae secundum esse substantiale potency of matter is determined according to dicitur qualitas quae est differentia substantiae. potest accipi vel in according to accidental being. ad litteram). 5. 1020a 33). quae est etiam quaedam differentia. ideo ad quartam speciem qualitatis non pertinet therefore. passing swiftly or slowly.. (tr. quality implies a certain modum substantiae. can be ordine ad ipsam naturam subiecti. 2. c. B. thus species qualitatis. In VII Physic.. a mode is what a measure establishes beforehand. Thomas Aquinas. or according to quantity. according to its ratio. sic est quarta subject be taken according to quantity. n. However. 2 1 This is figura. 74 . vel secundum actionem et passionem quae or according to the action and passion which consequuntur principia naturae. 49. and so which “implies the termination of a quantity” (importat terminationem quantitatis) (ibid. 5. St. ut dicit augustinus. and without the ratio of good and bad. = St. Augustine says (Super gen. ‘figure’ or ‘shape’. there is the fourth species of quality. 2). bad. cito vel tarde species of quality that something be good or transiens. taken either in an order to the nature of the subject itself. substantial being is called a quality. mode of a substance.M. as is clear through the Philosopher in Metaphysics V (ch. however. attenditur in according to action and passion is considered in secunda et tertia specie qualitatis.A. which is the difference of substance— ita id secundum quod determinatur potentia subiecti secundum esse accidentale. 3). which is “a quality around a quantity” (qualitas circa quantitatem. si autem accipiatur modus vel determinatio If.): QU49 AR2 C …proprie enim qualitas importat quendam …[F]or. quem mensura praefigit. Thomas Aquinas.Cf. dicitur qualitas accidentalis. q. et ideo sicut id secundum quod determinatur And so.1 et quia quantitas.

1022b 15-17. habitum. in vii physic. dicit enim philosophus. with respect to] our passions. non autem consideratur in his aliquid pertinens But in these things is not considered something ad rationem boni vel mali. 21. disposed according to nature. also called impotence) (second species) and passible or affective quality and passion or affection (third species). 1022b 10) the Philosopher defines habit as a aliquis disponitur bene vel male. quia motus et pertaining to the ratios of good or bad. as is said in the second book of the Physics (ch. the latter being “a quality in virtue of which a thing can be altered. pertinet ad primam speciem an order to the nature of the thing pertains to the qualitatis. Metaph. quaedam perfecti ad they are certain dispositions of the perfect for the best [i. H. et quia ipsa forma et natura rei est finis et cuius causa fit aliquid. which is habit and disposition. because passiones non habent rationem finis. according as some nature is the end of a generation and a motion. unde in v metaphys. whiteness and blackness.et ideo in utraque consideratur quod aliquid And so in both is considered that something is facile vel difficile fiat. et in ii ethic. in the first species there is considered both good and bad. et etiam facile et difficile mobile. and also movable with ease or with difficulty.” (Aristotle. first species of quality. disposition according to which something is well or badly disposed. 1105b quos ad passiones nos habemus bene vel male. ut dicitur in ii physic. 5. 75 . philosophus definit And so in the fifth book of the Metaphysics (ch. 3. are said with respect to finem. an activity]. 25) he says that habits are those things according to which we stand well or badly toward [i. thus. tr. sweetness and bitterness. I mean what is secundum naturam. 7. bonum autem et malum dicitur per respectum ad good and bad.. and all the others of this sort…. quod est dispositum by ‘of the perfect’. however. sed modus et determinatio subiecti in ordine ad But the mode and determination of a subject in naturam rei. motions and passions do not have the ratio of ends. dico autem perfecti. V. passing swiftly or enduring. Apostle). 198b 3).e. 2 These are natural ability and inability (natural capacity or power and natural incapacity or lack of power. G. ideo in prima specie consideratur et bonum et malum.e. And because the very form and nature of a thing is the end and that for the sake of which something comes to be. speaking of the habits of the soul and body. for example. de habitibus animae et corporis. loquens for the Philosopher says in Physics VII (ch. quod est dispositio secundum quam 20. that sunt dispositiones optimum. quae est habitus et dispositio. quod 246b 23). however. secundum quod aliqua natura est finis generationis et motus.. or that it be aut diuturnum. an end. heaviness and lightness. vel quod sit cito transiens done easily or with difficulty. dicit quod habitus sunt secundum And in the second book the Ethics (ch.

calor autem et frigus. And so. then it has the ratio of the good. the nature of the thing. both figures themselves and passible qualities. except according to an order to the nature of the thing. QU49 AR2 RA1 ad primum ergo dicendum quod dispositio To the first. quod pertinet ad And if ‘well’ or ‘badly’ be added. et quia natura est id quod primum consideratur And because nature is that which is considered in re. then it has the ratio of the bad. et color. pertain to beauty. quando autem non the thing. disposition implies a certain order. For when the mode is suitable to the nature of tunc habet rationem boni. pertinent ad habitus vel dispositiones. oportet quod attendatur ordo belongs to the notion of habit. prout convenit naturae rei. ut dictum est. this must be ad naturam. And so. secundum quod est conveniens vel non conveniens. vel secundum calorem vel frigus. placed by the Philosopher in the first species of quality. nam figura. pertain to beauty 76 . secundum quod considerantur ut convenientes vel non convenientes naturae rei. according as it is suitable or not suitable. hotness and coldness are philosopho in prima specie qualitatis. And so something is not said to be disposed by a quality except in an order to something.quando enim est modus conveniens naturae rei. and color. species of quality. nisi in ordine ad aliquid. according as they suit conveniunt naturae rei. secundum quod hot and cold. ideo habitus ponitur prima species first in a thing. considered in the order to the nature. and color. unde secundum figuram. however. according to figure [or shape]. pertinent ad sanitatem. something is not said to be well or badly disposed. which rationem habitus. as it befits the nature of a thing. which is the end. pertain to health. • • disposition implies a certain order figure. as it befits the nature of a thing. according as they are considered as suitable or not suitable to the nature of the thing. convenit. pertinent ad pulchritudinem. for figure. so habits are placed in the first qualitatis. when it is not suitable. belong to habits or dispositions. et si addatur bene vel male. as has been said. quae est finis. nisi secundum ordinem ad naturam rei. however. therefore. unde et ipsae figurae et passibiles qualitates. tunc habet rationem mali. unde non dicitur aliquis disponi per qualitatem. it must be said that ordinem quendam importat. or according to hot or cold. non dicitur aliquis disponi bene vel male. et hoc modo caliditas et frigiditas ponuntur a And in this way.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 54, art. 1 c. (in part) (tr. B.A.M.):
QU54 AR1 CO respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus sunt dispositiones quaedam alicuius in potentia existentis ad aliquid, sive ad naturam, sive ad operationem vel finem naturae. et de illis quidem habitibus qui sunt dispositiones ad naturam, manifestum est quod possunt plures esse in uno subiecto, eo quod unius subiecti possunt diversimode partes accipi, secundum quarum dispositionem habitus dicuntur. I reply that it must be said that, as was said above, habits are certain dispositions of something existing in potency to something, either to the nature, or to an operation or an end of the nature. And, in fact, with respect to those habits which are dispositions, it is obvious that many can exist in one subject, from the fact that the parts of one subject can be taken in diverse ways, according to the disposition of which they are called ‘habits’.

sicut, si accipiantur humani corporis partes For instance, if the humours are taken [as] parts humores, prout disponuntur secundum naturam of the human body, according as they are humanam, est habitus vel dispositio sanitatis, disposed in accordance with human nature, there is the habit or disposition of health— si vero accipiantur partes similes ut nervi et ossa et carnes, earum dispositio in ordine ad naturam, est fortitudo aut macies, si vero accipiantur membra, ut manus et pes et huiusmodi, earum dispositio naturae conveniens, est pulchritudo. et sic sunt plures habitus vel dispositiones in eodem. But if similar parts such as the nerves, bones, and flesh are taken, their disposition in an order to the nature is strength or a good condition, but if the limbs are taken, as the hand and foot and the like, their disposition agreeing with the nature is beauty. And in this way there are many habits and dispositions in the same thing.

§

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Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I De Anima, lect. 9, n. 6 (tr. B.A.M.):
LB1 LC-9N.-6 sed per cognitionem harmoniae magis congruit venire in cognitionem accidentium corporum; ut si velimus cognoscere sanitatem, dicemus quod est complexio adaequata et contemperata humorum et qualitatum in corpore: et sic de aliis corporeis virtutibus. But through a knowledge of harmony it is more fitting to arrive at knowledge of the accidents of the body; so that if we want to know health, we would say that it is a balanced [equalized] and tempered [temperate] complexion [mixing together] of the humors and qualities in the body: and thus of the other bodily powers.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I De Anima, lect. 9, nn. 3-9 (tr. B.A.M.):
LB1 LC-9N.-3 secundo cum dicit etenim harmoniam ponit rationem huiusmodi opinionis; dicens, quod harmonia est complexio et proportio et temperamentum contrariorum in compositis et mixtis. et haec proportio, quae est inter ista contraria, dicitur harmonia, et forma illius compositi. Secondly, when he says, For a harmony, he gives the reason for opinions of this sort, saying that a harmony is a complexion and a proportion and a temperament of contraries in composed and mixed things. And this proportion which exists among these contraries is called a harmony and the form of the composite.

unde, cum anima sit quaedam forma, dicebant And so, since the soul is a certain form, they ipsam esse harmoniam. said it is a harmony. dicitur autem haec opinio fuisse cuiusdam This opinion is said to have belonged to a dynarchi et simiatis et empedoclis. certain Dinarchus, to Simiatus, and to Empedocles. LB1 LC-9N.-4 consequenter cum dicit et quidem disputat Consequently when he says, And indeed, he contra opinionem praedictam. disputes against the aforesaid opinion. Et circa hoc duo facit. And about this he does three things.

primo enim disputat generaliter ad positionem First, he disputes generally against the position dictorum philosophorum. of the philosophers mentioned. secundo vero in speciali ad ponentem, scilicet But second, (he disputes) in particular against contra empedoclem, ibi, investigabit autem hoc the one holding it, namely, against Empedoetc.. cles, at But this will be investigated, etc. ad positionem autem obiicit quatuor rationibus: quarum prima talis est. constat quod harmonia proprie dicta est consonantia in sonis: sed isti transumpserunt istud nomen ad omnem debitam proportionem, tam in rebus compositis ex diversis partibus quam in commixtis ex contrariis. Now he objects to this position by four arguments, of which the first goes like this: It cannot be doubted that harmony properly so called is a consonance in sounds, but they have transferred this name to every due proportion, in things composed from different parts as well as in those mixed from contraries.

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secundum hoc ergo harmonia duo potest dicere: quia vel ipsam compositionem aut commixtionem, vel proportionem illius compositionis seu commixtionis. sed constat quod neutrum istorum est anima; ergo anima non est harmonia. quod autem anima non sit compositio sive proportio compo-sitionis, patet.

According to this [position], then, one can call two things a ‘harmony’: either the composition or mixture itself, or the proportion of that composition or mixture. But it cannot be denied that the soul is neither of these; so the soul is not a harmony. But that the soul is not the composition or the proportion of a composition is clear.

isti enim accipiunt animam, ut substantiam For these men take the soul as a certain subquamdam; sed illa duo sunt accidentia; non stance; but those two things are accidents; so ergo idem sunt. they are not the same. LB1 LC-9N.-5 secundam rationem ponit cum dicit amplius He gives the second reason when he says, But autem quae talis est. rather, which is of this sort. constat quod omnes philosophi dicunt quod anima movet: sed harmonia non movet, immo relinquitur ex movente, et sequitur: sicut ex motu chordarum, qui est per musicam, relinquitur harmonia quaedam in sono. It is certain that all the philosophers say that the soul moves [another] [and so comes before a motion]; but a harmony does not move [another], rather it remains from the thing moving it, and follows upon it; as from the motion of strings, which is [caused] by a musician, a certain harmony in sound remains.

et ex applicatione et contemperatione partium a Also, from the adjustment and contemperation componente relinquitur proportio quaedam in [or mutual tempering] of the parts by the one composito. composing [them], a certain proportion remains in the thing composed. ergo si anima est harmonia, et haec relinquitur So if the soul is a harmony, and this remains ex harmonizatore, oportebit ponere aliam from the harmonizer, it will be necessary to animam, quae harmonizet. posit another soul that harmonizes. LB1 LC-9N.-6 tertiam rationem ponit cum dicit congruit He gives the third argument when he says But autem quae talis est. it agrees, which goes like this. philosophus dicit in quarto physicorum. quicumque assignat definitionem seu naturam rei, oportet quod illa assignatio, si sufficiens est, conveniat operationibus et passionibus illius rei: tunc enim definitur optime quid est res, quoniam non solum cognoscimus substantiam et naturam ipsius rei, sed etiam passiones et accidentia eius. The Philosopher says in the fourth book of the Physics: whoever assigns the definition or nature of a thing, it is necessary that that assignation, if it is adequate, agree with the activities and passions [or ‘properties’] of that thing: for then what the thing is is best defined, since we will not only know the substance and nature of the thing itself, but also its passions and accidents.

si ergo anima est harmonia quaedam, oportet If, then, the soul is a sort of harmony, it is quod per cognitionem harmoniae deveniamus necessary that through the knowledge of har-

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if we wish to compare the activities of the soul to a harmony. 4): harmony properly so called is a consonance in sounds .e. ut puta si velimus operationes animae in harmoniam referre. But. But through the knowledge of harmony it is fitting rather to arrive at knowledge of the accidents of bodies. are called well harmonized. so that from them a consonance of sounds result. which are called homogeneous because they are things furthest apart in the same genus. According to the different sequences of intervals it make take. idest ut nullus defectus eiusdem generis ibi sit. quia quando haec sic invicem simul ponuntur et ordinantur. or intonation). I. i. et alia corpora naturalia. 32. for instance. when they are well ordered. so that it lack none of its parts the same in kind. Thomas has already noted (ibid. because when these1 are so placed and ordered to each other at the same time “that nothing homogeneous be omitted”.3 I. which is of this sort: harmonia invenitur aliquando in compositis et habentibus compositionem et motum. and in this way harmony is said properly. sic etiam et chordae.. In this sense. et cuius For what of harmony will it be to sense. And thus harmony is to be attributed to the body rather than to the soul. so that no lack of things the same in genus2 be there. quando bene ordinatae sunt. et accidentium mony we arrive at knowledge of both the animae. the definition given above (lect. as St.e. or to hate. 80 . further.e. autem quae talis est. Thomas customarily refers to them as consonantiae musicae. Sometimes harmony is found in composed things and in things having both composition and motion. and other natural bodies. and a harmony of this sort is called ‘consonance’. 9. as in ligna et lapides. ut nullum congeneum praetermittatur. and of amare aut odire. 5). sed hoc est valde difficile. Such. et intelligere? what to love. or Lydian modes. et compositio ipsarum vocatur harmonia. harmony can also be said of the proportion that remains in the parts when these are so placed and ordered to one another that they produce such a sound.-7 quartam rationem ponit cum dicit amplius He gives the fourth reason when he says. or to understand? sed per cognitionem harmoniae magis congruit venire in cognitionem accidentium corporum. are the contraries in mixed bodies. then those parts are called ‘well-harmonized’. n. ut si velimus cognoscere sanitatem. like the Dorian. But. such a harmony may also be called a mode or scale. tunc illae partes dicuntur bene harmonizatae. n. et huius consonantia dicitur harmonia. as at In Psalm.in cognitionem et operationum. for example. et sic harmonia magis esse attribuenda corpori quam animae. LB1 LC-9N. dicuntur bene harmonizatae. St. cuius enim harmoniae erit sentire. 1 2 So also strings. Phrygian. n. sicut and their composition is called a harmony. in addition to being said of a composite. activities and the accidents of the soul. wood and stones. we shall say that it is a balanced and mutually tempered complexion of humours and of qualities in the body: and thus about the other bodily powers. ut ex inde consonantia sonorum resultet. a harmony is a tuning or attunement (or temperament. the parts of things having composition. so that if we wish to know health. But this is very difficult as. or the major and minor scales of modern musical theory. vel fistulae. or flutes. 2 where the phrase names the Phrygian and other modes of this sort. 3 Cf. et hoc modo proprie dicitur harmonia. dicemus quod est complexio adaequata et contemperata humorum et qualitatum in corpore: et sic de aliis corporeis virtutibus.

n. 81 . v. Thomas: Consonantia est ratio. idest. lect. 1 n.. Compare also In II Physic.§ 4 Cf. Anal. proportio in numerum secundum acutum et grave (In II Post.. 4: Nam proportiones numerales applicatae ad sonos sicut materiam. the definition of consonance given by Aristotle and St. 8). consonantias musicales constituunt. lect.

Cf. In II De Caelo. quia contentum et finitum pertinent ad rationem the reason being that the contained and the materiae. In X Ethic. Litzinger/B. Thomas Aquinas. ad rationem but to be containing and limiting. B.): LB2 LC20N. 8 (tr. 7 (tr. oportet non esse determinatas. lect. which is the substance of the whole rerum. attaining its proper term. sicut commixtio humorum habet rationem In the same way a mixing together of humours sanitatis ex eo quod attingit convenientiam has the character of health by reason of the fact humanae naturae. n. Cf. lect 3. esse autem continens et finiens.M. nihil enim prohibet quin delectatio recipiens For nothing prevents pleasure. that to which they are ordered. et finis quam finitum: more honorable than the thing contained. Nevertheless. huiusmodi enim determinata dici possunt.. n. that it attains an agreement with human nature — et ex hoc dicitur determinata. and the limit [more honorable] than the limited. which in themselves admit of more and less by reason of their admixture. § 82 . licet possent propinquius attingere. quae est substantia totius consistentiae of form. quasi proprium for from this a thing is called ‘determined’ as terminum attingens. sicut et sanitas.M.-8 sed tamen neque etiam delectationes quae secundum se recipiunt magis et minus ratione suae mixtionis. neque bonas. St. For things of this sort may be called inquantum aliqualiter attingunt id ad quod ‘determined’ insofar as they somehow attain to ordinantur. although they may get nearer to it. to the notion formae.): LB10LC-3N. 20. St.A.-7 manifestum est autem quod continens est But it is obvious that the thing containing is honorabilius contento. from being determinate—as health is in fact. more and less. Thomas Aquinas. consistence of things. which allows of magis et minus sit determinata.A. limited pertain to the notion of matter. neither is it necessary that pleasures. are not determinate or good.

Cf. Simply perfect is that which attains to the end which belongs to it according to its proper notion.. Glen Coughlin): [30] Indeed. For something is perfect simply [simpliciter]. I call the best. and these [25] are not comings to be [generations]. but something is called ‘perfect’ in a certain respect [secundum quid]. just as an animal is said to be perfect simply when it attains to its end. when nothing of the number and disposition of its limbs is lacking to it. c. 49. B. quod perfectum multipliciter dicitur. On virtue as a ‘disposition of the perfect for the best’.. Simpliciter quidem perfectum est quod attingit ad finem eius quod ei competit secundum propriam rationem. St. nor.. et virtutibus quibus operationes animalis vitae perficiuntur. and every virtue and vice is among the relatives. nor is there coming to be from these. neither is [alteration] in habits. 3 (246a 30-246b 27) (tr. puta si sit perfectum in albedine. ad 1 (tr. 1 (tr. Thomas Aquinas. however. Cf. B. quando ad hunc finem perducitur ut nihil ei desit ex his quae integritatem animalis vitae constituunt: puta cum nihil ei deficit ex numero et dispositione membrorum.. Since. aut in aliquo huiusmodi. or in any other thing of the sort. ON THE PERFECT. aut in odore. Phys. for example. et debita corporis quantitate. an animal can be called ‘perfect’ in a certain respect if it be perfect in anything concomitant. either of things within [the body] or in relation to what contains.. what saves and is disposed in regard to nature. For they are certain dispositions of the best [thing] to the finest [action]. art 2. just as health is a certain [246b 20] balance of the hot and the cold. On the other hand. when nothing of the number and disposition of its limbs is lacking to it.just as an animal is said to be perfect simply when it attains to its end. Est enim aliquid simpliciter perfectum. On the Perfection of the Spiritual Life. secundum quid autem perfectum animal potest dici si sit perfectum in aliquo concomitanti. Summa Theol.): First therefore it is necessary to consider that “perfect” is said in many ways. is there alteration of these. R.. such that nothing is lacking to it of those things which constitute the integrity of animal life. or in any other thing of the sort 1.VIII. or in odour.. For the habits are virtues and vices.A. or in odour. Ia-IIae. if it be perfect in whiteness. cap. secundum quid autem perfectum dici potest quod attingit ad finem alicuius eorum quae concomitantur propriam rationem: sicut animal simpliciter dicitur esse perfectum. therefore. for example. Thomas Aquinas. St. Aristotle. if it be perfect in whiteness.(just as) an animal can be called ‘perfect’ in a certain respect if it be perfect in anything concomitant. for example. and the powers by which the operations of animal life are perfected. Cf. generally. the virtues and the vices are among [those things that are] related to something.M): 1 Primum igitur considerare oportet. That however can be called ‘perfect’ in a certain respect which attains to the end of any of those things which are concomitant to its proper notion. VII. and the powers by which the operations of animal life are perfected that can be called ‘perfect’ in a certain respect which attains to the end of any of those things which are concomitant to its proper notion. 83 . it is apparent that there is no alteration at all in the case of habits. q. aliquid vero dicitur perfectum secundum quid.1 • • simply perfect is that which attains to the end which belongs to it according to its proper notion. such that nothing is lacking to it of those things which constitute the integrity of animal life.M. for example. So too good and strength are in relation to something.A.

and also movable with ease or with difficulty.M. is referred to the same thing as virtue. the state of honor. not in the sense of that which has attained its end.e. dicit quod habitus sunt secundum quos ad passiones nos habemus bene vel male. as is said in the Physics (VII. n. 1 Cf. IIa-IIae. proprie loquendo.2 And so the honorable. 198b 3). in the first species there is considered both good and bad. we call it ‘perfect’”. ‘Honorable’ [honestas] expresses. Et ideo honestum. then it has the account of the bad. philosophus definit habitum. And so in the fifth book of the Metaphysics (ch. as was said above. bonum autem et malum dicitur per respectum ad finem. In sum. 1. B. loquens de habitibus animae et corporis. 145. quae est habitus et dispositio.e. ut dicitur in VII Physic. et etiam facile et difficile mobile. Unde ex hoc videtur aliquid dici honestum. 1022b 10) the Philosopher defines habit as a disposition according to which something is well or badly disposed. 7. quod sunt dispositiones quaedam perfecti ad optimum. quando autem non convenit. St. excellentiae debetur. Honor autem. sed modus et determinatio subiecti in ordine ad naturam rei. pertinet ad primam speciem qualitatis. in idem refertur cum virtute. ut dicitur in ii physic. non autem consideratur in his aliquid pertinens ad rationem boni vel mali. For when the mode is suitable to the nature of the thing. “for when anything acquires its proper excellence. so to speak. as Isidore says. And because the very form and nature of a thing is the end and that for the sake of which something comes to be. A thing is called ‘perfect’ when it has acquired or attained its proper excellence or virtue. Summa Theol. as is said in the second book of the Physics (ch. c. and ‘the best’ is its proper activity.3 2. But the excellence of man is chiefly considered with regard to virtue. quando enim est modus conveniens naturae rei.): I reply that it must be said that. quod est honore dignum..But the mode and determination of a subject in an order to the nature of the thing pertains to the first species of quality. art. as St. quod est dispositum secundum naturam. sicut Isidorus dicit. 1105b 25) he says that habits are those things according to which we stand well or badly toward [i. 3 Respondeo dicendum quod. by ‘of the perfect’. ut supra dictum est. Wherefore from this it appears that something is called honestum or ‘honorable’ which is worthy of honor. but of that which is disposed according to nature. But honor. in vii physic. quod est dispositio secundum quam aliquis disponitur bene vel male. so habits are placed in the first species of quality. speaking of the habits of the soul and body. lect. however. et quia ipsa forma et natura rei est finis et cuius causa fit aliquid.. then it has the account of the good. 5. honestas dicitur quasi honoris status. dico autem perfecti. 3. since it is the disposition of the perfect for the best. I mean what is disposed according to nature. which is habit and disposition. tunc habet rationem mali. according as some nature is the end of a generation and a motion. et ideo in utraque consideratur quod aliquid facile vel difficile fiat. an activity]. properly speaking. q. And because nature is that which is considered first in a thing. quia motus et passiones non habent rationem finis. quia est dispositio perfecti ad optimum. et in ii ethic. unde in v metaphys. And in the second book of the Ethics (ch. dicit enim philosophus. (tr. thus. Excellentia autem hominis maxime consideratur secundum virtutem. when it is not suitable. 20. 5. In VII Physic.. et quia natura est id quod primum consideratur in re. is owed to excellence. 1 84 . for the Philosopher says in Physics VII (ch. 3.A. 246b 23). that they are certain dispositions of the perfect for the best [i. 246b 23). however. it is ‘the disposition of the perfect’. ideo in prima specie consideratur et bonum et malum. 6). ideo habitus ponitur prima species qualitatis. tunc habet rationem boni. secundum quod aliqua natura est finis generationis et motus. Thomas Aquinas. 2 That is. vel quod sit cito transiens aut diuturnum. with respect to] our passions. Thomas elsewhere explains (cf.

evil from any defect If a virtue of the body is a bodily excellence. § 85 . to virtue. ‘the disposition of the perfect for the best’ is virtue the thing disposed according to nature the best activity in accordance with that nature the opposites of these pertain to defect or vice when a thing is disposed contrary to nature for the worst activity in accordance with that depravity it is vicious good is from a whole cause. (2) that which is disposed according to nature.‘The perfect’ can mean (1) that which has attained its nature. then a vice of the body will be a bodily defect. the former has reference to the form and the what it was to be. the latter.

Further.1 2. with respect to the fourth. it must have the appropriate boundary. of power or ‘excellence’. the whole will be changed. easily retained in the memory. it must attain the limit of its quantity. 1. as well as with respect to situation. and hence exhibit a before and after. to take an example. both dimensive and ‘virtual’—that is. to quantity. it must have the appropriate coloring. SUMMARY STATEMENTS PERTAINING TO BEAUTY. and so on.IX. and to quality. it must also so possess them as to make up a unity between them. in which case it will be perfect and whole. a part being taken away or transposed. rather than to kalos or beauty. 86 . with the result that. Note that when the thing in question has a characteristic work or operation. being neither too big nor too small. ‘To be perfect’ and ‘to be well disposed with respect to quality’ come together in this: the possession of the form which produces the ‘what it was to be’ of the thing—that is. whole: that of which nothing is outside nothing is absent perfect: that outside of which it is not possible to find any. a middle. even one. for a drawing to be the image of a horse. but such as to be taken in at a glance and. thereby constituting the species of the beautiful called ‘the limited’ or ‘determinate’. For something like an animal to be beautiful. but this pertains to arête or excellence. in which case it will be one. (b) A due disposition with respect to order: its parts must be so arranged as to allow the whole to possess its proper species. On ‘whole’ and ‘perfect’ and ‘limit’. and an end there. as with the plot of tragedy. both of which pertain to quality. it must be contained by a circular line. (c) A due disposition with respect to quantity: its parts must be of such size that they will be commensurate both with respect to each other and the whole. of its parts limit (the extremity of each thing) the first thing outside of which there is nothing to be found and the first thing inside of which everything belonging to it is 1 N. (a) A due disposition with respect to perfection and wholeness or integrity : it must so possess all of its parts that none of them are outside of it or missing. On beauty in a living thing.B. such that there is a beginning. (d) A due disposition with respect to quality: its parts must be of the appropriate sort: with respect to the third and fourth species of quality: with respect to the third species. and hence unity. for a geometrical object to be a circle. it must possess a due disposition with respect to perfection and wholeness or integrity. which makes the thing to be the sort of thing it was meant to be. it must be well disposed with respect to power. it must have the shape of that animal.

Ia-IIae. c. cit. 14. to power. I mean what is disposed according to nature.. For when the mode is suitable to the nature of the thing. which is also a certain difference. by ‘of the perfect’. art 2. for the Philosopher says in Physics VII (ch. 5. according as some nature is the end of a generation and a motion. And because nature is that which is considered first in a thing. so habits are placed in the first species of quality.” (In X Ethic. ad 1) Again. lect. § 87 .3. 1022 b 1-2) But “…that according to which the potency of a subject is determined according to accidental being is called an accidental quality. however. Thomas Aquinas.B.. which is habit and disposition. 5. or to form or species”. and also movable with ease or with difficulty.. which is habit and disposition. Some brief observations on beauty taken from St.” (Summa Theol. 3. “Beauty consists in a due proportion.” ( Summa Theol. 1105b 25) he says that habits are those things according to which we stand well or badly toward [i.e. beauty consists in a form implying “a certain proportion of many things ordered to one. then it has the ratio of the bad. when it is not suitable. or the form or figure of the whole. 1020a 33). speaking of the habits of the soul and body. with respect to] our passions. n. then it has the ratio of the good.. according to place. 49. thus. q. art. an order of parts according to form or species. I say: in one way symmetry may be understood as the due proportion or habitude of one thing to another according as this is suitable to the form or nature of the thing taken as its end. V.) N.” (St. 246b 23). Ia. Ia-IIae. 7.) But “…the mode and determination of a subject in an order to the nature of the thing pertains to the first species of quality. op. as is clear through the Philosopher in Metaphysics V (ch. art 2. as is said in the second book of the Physics (ch. Metaph. 198b 3). that they are certain dispositions of the perfect for the best [i. 1022b 10) the Philosopher defines habit as a disposition according to which something is well or badly disposed. 49. in the first species there is considered both good and bad.. c. And in the second book the Ethics (ch. however. 5) Now beauty is “the mode and determination of a subject in an order to the nature of the thing” with respect to the members and colors. And because the very form and nature of a thing is the end and that for the sake of which something comes to be. 20.e. 4. Thomas Aquinas. and this “pertains to the first species of quality. q. 3.” (Summa Theol.. 19. an activity]. with beauty being an instance of the last kind. And so in the fifth book of the Metaphysics (ch. (Aristotle. ad 1) But a disposition is “an order of parts in a thing having parts. q.

in a thing having parts. which makes them the sort of thing they are.e. and of the parts composing the whole to each other: 1. cf.) 88 . which pertains to ‘limitation’ or ‘definiteness’. or ‘splendor’. pertains to the notion of ‘the limited’ or ‘definiteness’ (to hôrismenon. (c) and according to quality: (a) according to position. ‘integrity’. a boundary which. which pertains to a due disposition of the ‘members’ or ‘limbs’—that is. which pertains to integritas. (b) according to quantity. its intelligibility. of certain secondary constituents—(a) according to place or situation. embracing the shape or figure of the thing as well as its color: (1) the shape or figure (morphe. 2. i. being where a thing comes to an end.4. and perfect when it is not missing any of its parts). Divisions of beauty. Beauty consists in a ‘due proportion’ (debita proportio) of the parts to the whole. Into its constituents or quasi-integral parts: (a) wholeness or integrity (b) due proportion or consonance (c) lustre or brilliance (etc. the third meaning of ‘disposition’ as ‘an order of parts. ordo. of the parts composing the whole to each other. and so which has to do with the relative positions of the parts of a whole. or perfectio. (b) according to quantity. and hence with their admissibility of a common measure or not). 5. which consists in the before and after of things. Into its species or specific parts: (a) order (b) symmetry (c) the limited or definiteness 4. and (c) according to quality. e. schema) of the thing (in things perceptible to sense) or what is analogous to this in intelligible things. ‘being bounded’). also ‘brilliance’. according to the species or figure of the whole’). ‘perfection’ (a thing being ‘integral’ or ‘whole’. On beauty considered as a due proportion.g. and (2) its color or coloring (chroma) and (3) its ‘lustre’ (claritas. ‘radiance’. of the parts to the whole. which pertains to the notion of ‘order’ ( taxis. which may be understood as an excellence of the color of a thing) or the analog of this in what is intelligible rather than sensible. and so pertains to quality. 3. which pertains to the notion of ‘symmetry’ (summetria) understood as ‘commensurability’ (which has to do with the relative sizes of the parts.

understood as commensurability) according to quality (=the limited or definiteness) in shape or figure (= being well-formed or good looking) in color or coloring (which exists in a surface) in lustre or brilliance (which pertains to the color) (= luminosity or intelligibility) beauty pertains to the notion of a formal cause beauty consists in a habit or disposition (where many things are ordered to one).6. a consonance or harmony) beauty consists in a due proportion of the parts to the whole (= integrity or perfection) to each other (= consonance or due proportion) according to situation or position (= order) according to quantity (= symmetry. On beauty in sum. therefore beauty consists in a ratio of some sort the sort of ratio in which beauty consists is a due proportion (i. especially sight and hearing. which is an order of parts according to power or virtue beauty admits of more or less beauty is the same in subject with the good beauty may be sensible or intelligible intelligible beauty may be observed in both speculative and practical matters moral beauty consists in a due proportion of circumstances 89 .e. (a) As known by what it does: beauty is that which pleases upon being seen beauty is that the very apprehension of which pleases (b) As known by what it is: beauty is grasped by the senses. which is the first species of quality (although parts of beauty are in the third and fourth species) beauty consists in a due disposition of the parts with reference to the nature considered as an end beauty as a disposition in the second sense. which are the most knowing senses and the senses which minister to reason but a sense power is a ratio.

But the definition of the length with reference to contests and the senses does not fall under the consideration of art.M. D. if they do [35] not expressly mention them. e. Metaph. W. and does not consider them in any other respect. 7 (1450b 34—1451a 15 (tr. whether [the statue] has the proportions of the body and the positions and arrangements of each of the parts.7. but also not just any chance size—for the beautiful consists in size and order—hence. B. but such as can be easily seen.A. Metaph. so also in plots. Thomas Pangle. For these sciences say and prove a great deal about them. 3 (1061a 29-b 3) (tr. sometimes in one. Ross.A. the performance would have to be regulated by a water- 90 . What then. rev.. and leaves only the quantitative and continuous. and also the colors and shapes. and examines the relative positions of some and the attributes of these.M..g. neither can any very small animal be beautiful. [1451a] for it is not contemplated at once. order and definiteness) are obviously causes of many things. but this such as can be [5] easily remembered. [1061b] and the ratios of others. B. Cf.14 14 Apparently an unfulfilled promise. sometimes in two. based on Buckley): Further still. Laws II (668d–669e) (tr. as in bodies and in animals there should be size. And so. should not only [35] have these things arranged.] for instance.A. sometimes in three dimensions. and the commensurabilities and incommensurabilities of others. while the beautiful is found also in motionless things). how many [parts] there are and how they fit next to one another in the appropriate order. rev.): Now since the good and the beautiful are different (for the former always implies conduct as its subject.M. but its being one and a whole escapes the view of the onlookers. or whether all the things have been put together in a confused way? Do you think someone can ever know these things if he is completely ignorant of what the living thing is that has been imitated? Cf. for the contemplation of it is confused. Principal observations on beauty. B. but yet we posit one and the same science of all these things—geometry)—the same is true with regard to being. those who assert that the mathematical sciences say nothing of the beautiful or the good are in error. which the mathematical sciences demonstrate in a special degree. and also heat and cold and the other sensible contrarieties. But we shall speak more plainly elsewhere about these matters. since that which is beautiful. Poetics ch. For if it were necessary to perform a hundred tragedies. And since these (e. nor yet a very large animal. D. since it is effected in a nearly insensible time. and the attributes of these qua quantitative and [35] continuous. evidently these sciences must treat this sort of causative principle also (i. there should be length. whether it be an animal or anything else which is composed of certain things. but prove attributes which are their results or their definitions. The chief forms of beauty are order and symmetry [1078b] and definiteness. XI.e. Cf. it is not true to say that they tell us nothing about them. hardness and its contrary. XIII. W.g. Plato. such as if there should be an animal of ten thousand stadia [in length]. Aristotle. the beautiful) as in [5] some sense a cause. 3 (1078a 31—1078b 6) (tr. if someone doesn’t know what each of the bodies of the things imitated is? Would he ever know what is correctly executed in them? What I mean is something like this: [would he ever know. Aristotle. Cf.): Ath. [30] weight and lightness. Ross): As the mathematician investigates abstractions (for before beginning his investigation he strips off all the sensible qualities. Aristotle.

a change from bad fortune to good fortune or from good fortune to bad fortune takes place. for example. And for this reason those senses especially look to the beautiful that are the most knowing. for the appetite is. dicimus enim pulchra visibilia et pulchros sonos. scilicet visus et auditus rationi deservientes. or which is unsymmetrical [e] in some other respect. 1 (116b 19-23) (ed. scilicet super formam. pulchrum autem dicatur id cuius ipsa apprehensio placet. for things which please by being seen are called ‘beautiful’. But in order to define it simply. Plato. art. quia super eandem rem fundantur. For health is inherent in moisture and dryness and in heat and in cold. but similitude [likeness] regards the form.. Thomas Aquinas.1 Cf. Cf. nam 91 . sed ad rationem pulchri pertinet quod in eius aspectu seu cognitione quietetur appetitus. Ia. 1. Timaeus 87 d-e (tr. in a word in all the primary constituents of the living creature. et propter hoc. And so it has the account of an end. But the definition according to the nature of the thing is this. for the good is what all things desire. and beauty to be in a certain symmetry of the limbs. 3 ad primum ergo dicendum quod pulchrum et bonum in subiecto quidem sunt idem. whereas the others are inherent in the secondary [constituents]. that the plot is [10] always more beautiful the greater it is.A. since the sense is delighted in things that are duly proportioned. 5. For the sense.3 1 Cf.clock. as they are said to have been at one time. cum enim bonum sit quod omnia appetunt. namely.” 2 ad tertium dicendum quod pulchrum est idem bono. Top. 4. sight and hearing. the form.A. non utimur nomine pulchritudinis. ‘in whatever extent.): To the first it must be said that the beautiful and the good are the same in subject because they are founded on the same thing. bonum laudatur ut pulchrum. B. ita quod bonum dicatur id quod simpliciter complacet appetitui. and indeed every knowing power. in successive incidents in accordance with likelihood or necessity.. q. q. is a certain ratio. but it pertains to the account of the beautiful that the appetite be brought to rest in the sight or knowledge of it.M. But in the sensibles belonging to the other senses we do not use the name ‘beautiful’. for strength is generally considered to reside in sinews and bones. For. & tr. et sic patet quod pulchrum addit supra bonum. health is better than strength or beauty. the servants of reason. Aristotle. one may say. qui maxime cognoscitivi sunt. St. if at the same time it is perspicuous. so that that is called ‘good’ simply which is pleasing to the appetite—but that is called ‘beautiful’ the very apprehension of which pleases. in sensibilibus autem aliorum sensuum. B. quendam ordinem ad vim cognoscitivam. for we do not call tastes or smells ‘beautiful’. is an unpleasant sight…. so to speak. since the good is what all things desire.. For the good properly regards the appetite.2 Cf. and for this reason the good is praised as beautiful. namely. for we call sights and sounds ‘beautiful’. non enim dicimus pulchros sapores aut odores. St. art. sed ratione differunt. Thomas Aquinas. Ia-IIae. For this reason beauty consists in a due proportion. differing only in account. ad 3 (tr. beauty properly pertains to the notion of a formal cause. Jowett): “Just as a body which has a leg too long. ad 1 (tr. de ratione boni est quod in eo quietetur appetitus. But they differ in account. III. B. a certain movement toward a thing. as in things similar to itself. unde et illi sensus praecipue respiciunt pulchrum. Summa Theol. 27. it belongs to the account of the good that the appetite be brought to rest in it. Loeb): And that is better which is inherent in things which are better or prior or more highly honored. And so it is clear that the beautiful adds to the good a certain order to a knowing power. But the beautiful regards a knowing power.): To the third it must be said that the beautiful is the same as the good. sola ratione differens. And because knowledge comes about by assimilation.M. Summa Theol. is a [15] sufficient limit of the size’.

M. 92 . B. as may be gathered from the words of Dionysius ( De Div. nom. Ethic. est enim bonum quod omnia appetunt. and so small men can be called ‘commensurate’ [or ‘well-proportioned’] and ‘good-looking’. iv). de div. to which pertains both a manifesting light and the ordering of a due proportion in other things….M. sed non pulchri. q. unde pulchrum in debita proportione consistit. consists in a certain lustre and due proportion. propter decentem proportionem in quantitate et situ et propter hoc quod habet clarum et nitidum colorem. consonance and lustre.Cf. 4).): …For thus we call a man beautiful by reason of an appropriate proportion in quantity and in situation and by reason of his having lustre and a bright color. pulchrum autem respicit vim cognoscitivam. just as we say that men are beautiful who have proportionate members and a resplendent color. secundum dionysium.3 And likewise spiritual beauty consists in this. 5 (tr.): …But according to Dionysius (De Div. c.dicit enim. Thomas Aquinas. cum quadam debiti coloris claritate. 4. nam et sensus ratio quaedam est. sicut supra dictum est.4 Cf. 2 …ad rationem autem pulchritudinis duo concurrunt.2 Cf. St.. art. be well proportioned according to the spiritual lustre of reason…. but not beautiful. et proportionem debitam in aliis ordinare….. St. et quia cognitio fit per assimilationem. two things come together in the account of beauty. 180.M. St.): I reply that it must be said that.. quod pulchritudo non est nisi in magno corpore. consistit in quadam claritate et debita proportione. quod deus est causa omnis pulchritudinis inquantum est causa consonantiae et claritatis. utrumque autem horum radicaliter in ratione invenitur. 3 respondeo dicendum quod. 2. cp.A. nam appetitus est quasi quidam motus ad rem. scilicet consonantia et claritas. concurrit et claritas et debita proportio. 5 …sic enim hominem pulchrum dicimus. sive actio eius.): To the third it must be said that beauty. B. namely. unde pulchritudo corporis in hoc consistit quod homo habeat membra corporis bene proportionata. as has been said above. 31. that a man’s conversation. sive decori. dicit enim quod deus dicitur pulcher sicut universorum consonantiae et claritatis causa.1 Cf. Summa Theol. To the these two the Philosopher adds a third where he says that beauty does not exist except in a sizable body (Nic. dist. ad rationem pulchri. 145. that a man have the members of his body well-proportioned. (tr. art 1.6). sit bene proportionata secundum spiritualem rationis claritatem…. B. iv cap. B.. 2. art. sicut dicimus homines pulchros qui habent membra proportionata et splendentem colorem. 4 et similiter pulchritudo spiritualis in hoc consistit quod conversatio hominis.. together with a certain due lustre of color. or his action. in the account of the beautiful or becoming both lustre and due proportion come together—for he says that God is called beautiful as the cause of the consonance and lustre of the universe. et omnis virtus cognoscitiva. lect. his duobus addit tertium philosophus ubi dicit. Nom. (tr. quia sensus delectatur in rebus debite proportionatis. sicut accipi potest ex verbis dionysii. St. c. Thomas Aquinas. q.A. For he says that God is the cause of all beauty insofar as He is the cause of consonance and lustre. ad 3 (tr. sicut in sibi similibus.M. 2. Summa Theol. q.. ad quam pertinet et lumen manifestans. Nom. unde parvi homines possunt dici commensurati et formosi. In Dionysii de Div.A. pulchrum proprie pertinet ad rationem causae formalis. In I Sent. c. Now both of these are found in reason as in a root. IV. similitudo autem respicit formam. Thomas Aquinas.. pulchra enim dicuntur quae visa placent. IIa-IIae.. IIa-IIae. et ideo habet rationem finis. For this reason the beauty of the body consists in this. Thomas Aquinas.A. Nom. c.5 And so proportionally in bonum proprie respicit appetitum. 1 ad tertium dicendum quod pulchritudo.

sicut sunt febres et hujusmodi aegritudines. ut supra dictum est cum de integritate corporum resurgentium ageretur. bellus pulchre. et de talibus deformitatibus et similibus defectibus. without a doubt. sicut mutilatos turpes dicimus. D. 1a. forma. iv. quod unumquodque dicitur pulchrum. et de tali deformitate nulli dubium est quod in corporibus damnatorum non erit. (tr. secundum quod habet claritatem sui generis vel spiritualem vel corporalem et secundum quod est in debita proportione constitutum. since all bodies of both wicked and good will rise again whole. ut magister in littera dicit. In IV Sent. will not be in the bodies of the damned.. ‘graceful’ beautiful beautifully beautify beauty = = = = speciosus. and insofar as it has been established in a due proportion…. deest enim eis debita proportio ad totum.2 8. In another way deformity arises from an undue disposition of the parts. augustinus indeterminatum et sub dubio relinquit in ench.1 Cf. quae interdum sunt deformitatis causae. quia omnia corpora tam bonorum quam malorum integra resurgent. Thomas Aquinas. quod in corpore humano potest esse deformitas dupliciter. or situation [or ‘position’. Some names of beauty: decor. moreover. And deformity of this kind. 3. dist. as was said above when the integrity of the resurrected body was treated of. alio modo deformitas contingit ex indebita partium dispositione.the rest of things it must be admitted that each thing is called beautiful insofar as it has its own kind of lustre. In one way from the lack of any limb [or ‘member’. c. B. either an undue quantity. art. Concerning these kinds of deformities and like defects such as fevers and similar ailments which sometimes are the cause of deformity. quae etiam proportionem debitam partium ad totum non patitur. incompatible with a due proportion of the parts to the whole. decorus. for in them there is a lack of due proportion to the whole. q. decor. pulchritudo. graciousness’ formositas. membri]: thus we say that mutilated things are ugly. whether spiritual or bodily. ‘seemliness’ suavitas. 44). uno modo ex defectu alicujus membri. ‘well-formedness’. situ]—which deformity is. St. Augustine remained undecided and doubtful (Enchiridion xcii) as the Master in the text says (Sent. or quality. formosus. ‘charm’ venustas.): I reply that it must be said to the first question that in the human body there can be a twofold deformity. ‘sweetness’. 93 .A. ‘the state of having good looks’ elegans. formose decoro formositas. venustas lovely pretty cute becoming comely well-formed good looking sweet graceful 1 unde proportionaliter est in caeteris accipiendum. ‘loveliness’.M. 44. 2 respondeo dicendum ad primam quaestionem. vel indebita quantitate vel qualitate vel situ..

elegant charming charm sweetness appeal allure attractiveness agreeableness § 94 .

3 as well as display [or ‘manifestation’.): Glory signifies a certain lustre [claritas]. even as through a crystal is known the color of a body contained in a crystal vessel. Since. 15:41). c. 3. 3 (= NPNF 1-07. Summa Theol. Tractates on the Gospel of John. ‘is in the glory of God the Father. art. Thomas Aquinas. lxxxii. sed per modum recipientis. But the cause of this clarity is ascribed by some to the fifth or heavenly essence. q. 44. which is the same in meaning. Thomas Aquinas.. 145.2 Now lustre [claritas] involves a certain seemliness [or ‘propriety’. c. and so to be glorified [glorificari] is the same as to be made illustrious [clarificari]. the man Christ Jesus. Sed causam hujusmodi claritatis quidam attribuunt quintae essentiae. for by so doing.X. art. 95 . 1. ‘seemliness’] from the ordination of reason” (Dicitur enim aliquid honestum. c. He would not have risen from the dead. inquantum habet quendam decorem ex ordinatione rationis). ut patet per apostolum 1 Corinth. IIa-IIae. manifestationem]. qc. from which the apostolic epistles have been translated into Latin. then. which the Latin translator renders by ‘clarifica’ (make illustrious). English Dominican Fathers). Suppl. as we have often remarked (Question [84]. 1. ideo melius est ut dicatur quod claritas illa causabitur ex redundantia gloriae animae in corpus. decorem]. ‘Wherefore God also has exalted Him. Wherefore clarity which in the soul is spiritual is received into the body as corporeal. I answer that. sicut in vitro cognoscitur color corporis quod continetur in vase vitreo..M. ut saepe dictum est. art. St. in the apostle’s epistle where we find ‘ gloria. ut Gregorius dicit super illud Job 28: non adaequabitur ei aurum vel vitrum. so is ‘glorificatio’ (the making glorious) from ‘gloria’ (glory). Gibb/Innes): “But His glory begins with the clause where he says. It is necessary to assert that after the resurrection the bodies of the saints will be lightsome [lucida]. for had He not died. St. et ita in corpore glorioso cognoscetur gloria animae. 2. For whatever is received into anything is received not according to the mode of the source whence it flows. Thomas Aquinas. sec.”1 Cf. 2 Cf. q. 1. Augustine. Summa Theol. 4. quae tunc dominabitur in corpore humano.): “For something is called ‘honorable’. c. δo/ξασον (glorify). But not to depart from the sound of the words. Sed quia hoc est absurdum.A. 3 Decorem being the same as honestum according to St. c. q.’ and reaches on to the words. II-II. glory. Cf. art. ita etiam erit differentia claritatis in corpore. Thus in the glorified body the glory of the soul will be known. non recipitur per modum influentis. SUPPLEMENT: ON CLARITAS OR ‘LUSTRE’ IN RELATION TO GLORIA.’ ‘claritas’ might have been used.). (tr. 85. dist. which in the latter is read.. as Gregory says on Job 28:17. quod corpora sanctorum fore lucida post resurrectionem ponere oportet propter auctoritatem Scripturae quae hoc promittit. the meaning would have been equally preserved. it is better to say that this clarity will result from the overflow of the soul’s glory into the body. cxiv in Joan. as has been said. the reward of humility”. inasmuch as it involves a certain decorem [= ‘propriety’.. is in the former read. which will then predominate in the human body. tr.: Respondeo dicendum ad primam quaestionem. although he might as well have said ‘glorifica’ (glorify). In IV Sent.. Tractate 104 (John 17:1). but according to the mode of the recipient. (tr. B.’For even the noun itself. glory. et ita claritas quae est in anima ut spiritualis. 15. might be made lustrous or glorious by His resurrection. recipitur in corpore ut corporalis.A. sicut dictum est. 1 Cf. as the Apostle affirms (1 Cor. “Gold or crystal cannot equal it. δo/ξα : whence we have the verb derived in Greek for the purpose of saying here. as Augustine says (Tract. (tr. on account of the authority of Scripture which makes this promise. B. Summa Theol. et ideo secundum quod anima erit majoris claritatis secundum majus meritum. And consequently according to the greater clarity of the soul by reason of its greater merit. Quod enim recipitur in aliquo. And for the same reason. this is absurd. Article [1]). however. He was first humbled by suffering. just as ‘clarificatio’ (the making lustrous) is derived from ‘claritas’ (lustre). 132. St. Humility is the earning of glory. if the language of the Greek codices be examined. q. In order.M. so too will the body differ in clarity. that the Mediator between God and men.

his goodness gains distinction [clarescit] in the notice of many. namely. and insofar as it has been established in a due proportion…. …sic enim hominem pulchrum dicimus. According to St. q. 2. (tr. B.): Glory’ is nothing other than distinguished notice [clara notitia] accompanied by praise [cum laude]. ad 3. B. sive illud sit bonum aliquod corporale. whether it be some bodily good. q. (St. Ia-IIae. St. Thomas Aquinas. unde proportionaliter est in caeteris accipiendum. 85. modified): . IIa-IIae. quod unumquodque dicitur pulchrum. 3 . St. Quia vero illud quod simpliciter clarum est. its form. In Dionysii de Div. Suppl. secundum quod habet claritatem sui generis vel spiritualem vel corporalem et secundum quod est in debita proportione constitutum…..) 2 Gloria claritatem quandam significat. see below. lxxxii. as well as to the substantial form where this is present (i.e. sive spirituale. a multis conspici potest et a remotis.Whence the name of ‘glory’ properly implies the display of something as regards its appearing seemly [decorum] among men. claritas results from the overflow of the ‘spiritual’ glory of the soul into the body.M. Cf. But. in the case of the resurrected body. Thomas Aquinas. (tr. c.A. But one must consider what pertains to form as figure.. And so proportionally in the rest of things it must be admitted that each thing is called beautiful insofar as it has its own kind of lustre. cxiv in Joan.)”. “Glory signifies a certain lustre [claritas]. Likewise in a thing of beauty. nam gloria dicitur quasi claria. Thomas Aquinas. q... and so to be glorified [glorificari] is the same as to be made illustrious [clarificari]”. 1. ideo proprie per nomen gloriae designatur quod bonum alicuius deveniat in multorum notitiam et approbationem. its claritas or ‘lustre’ will result from an overflow of something comparable to ‘glory’ arising from that in it which is analogous to the soul. such as an animal). art.claritas illa causabitur ex redundantia gloriae animae in corpus.5 1 “…For thus we call a man beautiful by reason of an appropriate proportion in quantity and in situation and by reason of his having lustre and a bright color..M. art.. Summa Theol. as Augustine says (Tract.. cp. 96 .... Summa Theol. English Dominican Fathers. 103. for by the fact that we give testimony to someone’s goodness. ut Augustinus dicit. whether spiritual or bodily.4 Cf..3 Cf. propter decentem proportionem in quantitate et situ et propter hoc quod habet clarum et nitidum colorem.... quam clara notitia cum laude. or a spiritual one. B.[T]his claritas will result from the overflow of the soul’s glory into the body. c. lect.”. as well as by those who are far away—for this reason by the name of ‘glory’ is properly designated that someone’s good come into the notice and the approval of many.A. 5. 3. c.A. St. quia ex hoc. Note on gloria and claritas. unde glorificari idem est quod clarificari. et hoc importat nomen gloriae. for which.2 1. et manifestationem. art. 4 gloria nihil aliud est.1 But since that which is lustrous simply [simpliciter clarum] can be seen by many. clarescit bonitas eius in notitia plurimorum.M. super Ioan. 4. Claritas autem et decorem quendam habet. tr. quod testificamur de bonitate alicuius. Nom. Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theol. and the name of ‘glory’ implies this.): Glory is the effect of honor and praise. 1. in things which exist by nature.. (tr. for ‘glory’ means something like ‘distinction’ [claria]. Et ideo nomen gloriae proprie importat manifestationem alicuius de hoc quod apud homines decorum videtur. 5 gloria est effectus honoris et laudis. Thomas Aquinas.

But they are beautiful by virtue of a due order of circumstances as it were of certain parts. nam in debita commensuratione partium. as with the fame of a celebrated concert pianist or any other virtuoso. sicut Isidorus dicit. ‘Honorable’ [honestas] expresses. understood as an excellence worthy of approbation (for which. pulchrae autem secundum ordinem debitum circumstantiarum quasi quarumdam partium. 6). n. On an excellence worthy of approbation as entering into the definition of ‘beauty’. 145. is ‘distinct’. St. lect. as St. but what is outstanding. Note how the foregoing text makes clear how in a thing of beauty ‘what is most praiseworthy’ (laudatissimum) corresponds to what is decorem.): And then when he says. not in the sense of that which has attained its end. Note also that clarus implies ‘what is seen from a distance’ and hence ‘what is widely known’. Thomas Aquinas. is owed to excellence. he shows that activities in accord with virtue are not only pleasing. Nay.delectabiles quidem sunt in ordine ad operantem cui conveniunt secundum proprium habitum. 3. and ‘the best’ is its proper activity. the state of honor. (tr.A. But they are good by virtue of an order to an end. 3.. 97 . B. Thomas Aquinas. when brought to notice. see below). as Isidore says. 5. B. For they are pleasing in an order to the one doing them to whom they belong by virtue of a proper habit. is referred to the same thing as virtue. xxxvi. so to speak. art. IIa-IIae. sed etiam pulchrae et bonae. But the excellence of man is chiefly considered with regard to virtue. Note that I have translated the noun claria by ‘distinction’ and the verb clarescit as ‘gains distinction’ in view of their subject.. Wherefore from this it appears that something is called honestum which is worthy of honor.2And so the honorable. quod est honore dignum. Historia Naturalis. but of that which is disposed according to nature. honestas dicitur quasi honoris status. 246b 23). q. But honor. 3 Respondeo dicendum quod.A.2.): I reply that it must be said that. Honor autem. it is ‘the disposition of the perfect’. Cf. Cf.. In I Ethic. as was said above. as is said in the Physics (VII.M. c. and so as what ‘stands out’ or ‘is outstanding’. Summa Theol. XXXV. lect. 2 That is. alioqui tantus diligentia. bonae autem sunt secundum ordinem ad finem. or something which ‘gains distinction’. in order to render in his painting what is most praiseworthy in each.3 1 deinde cum dicit quinimmo et ostendit operationes secundum virtutem non solum sunt delectabiles. 159 (tr. inspexerit virgines eorum nudas et quinque elegerit. For beauty consists in a due commensuration of parts. 1. n. ut quod in quaque laudatissimum esset pictura redderet. properly speaking. [Zeuxis] …examined the young maidens of that place naked. ut Agragantinis facturus tabulam. 1. pulchritudo consistit.M. since it is the disposition of the perfect for the best. Unde ex hoc videtur aliquid dici honestum. Pliny. quam in templo Iunonis Laciniae publice dicarent. In VII Physic. which is decorem. rather. excellentiae debetur. Note on the foregoing. and selected five. but also beautiful and good. Thomas elsewhere explains (cf. ut supra dictum est.64: Reprehenditur tamen [Zeuxis] ceu grandior in capitibus articulisque.1 Cf. the ‘seemly’ or ‘becoming’. St.

which. On the honorable good in sum. 1. 145. Summa Theol. eminent. (On this sense see further below. HONESTUM (‘THE HONORABLE GOOD’. Summa Theol. noteworthy an x of note a stand out a star having star quality having one’s praises sung far and wide a famous person. 145.. would have the latter sense as its first meaning. particularly in the case of a gemstone. being a moral excellence rendering its possessor worthy of honor (cf.A. c.M. Thomas Aquinas. art. distinct a shining example widely-known notice. 58).). noted. (1) That which is good according to reason. 3. 98 . art. famous. obj. 1. quia est dispositio perfecti ad optimum. however. IIa-IIae. the making public. q. EXPRESSING SO TO SPEAK ‘THE STATE OF HONOR’).. renowned prominent.). a superstar. IIa-IIae. (2) that which is desirable for its own sake.4. c. One can easily see. in idem refertur cum virtute. of whatever in a thing is worthy of approbation. or publicly known—of the excellences of a thing—that is. a certain excellence deserving of honor (cf. Summa Theol. Thomas Aquinas. IIa-IIae. “the state of honor” as having. ibid. Thomas Aquinas. Thomas Aquinas. In fact.) 6. IIa-IIae. St.. proprie loquendo. ut dicitur in VII Physic. St. 2. the very name of ‘lustre’. that the term naturally would be applied both to the intellectual virtues as well as to any bodily or physical excellences a person or thing might possess. having pleasure attached to it (cf. Thomas Aquinas. art. (6) a certain spiritual beauty accruing to a thing insofar as it is regulated by reason (cf. art. Summa Theol. St. famed. preeminent. c. public notice notorious. n. in the passages immediately at issue. q. St.. IIa-IIae.). 4). q. 145. (3) that good which is desirable for its own sake.).). claritas or ‘lustre’ may be understood as the manifestation—that is. 2. lect. q. Summa Theol. St. Et ideo honestum. According to St. so to speak. c. are certain virtues. expressing. celebrated conspicuous. 145.. (7) the Latin equivalent of to kalon as the noble or admirable good (B. (4) an integral part of temperance whereby one loves the beauty of that virtue (cf. distinguished. 5. art. 5. by reason of its spiritual beauty. The definition of claritas.. In I Ethic. art. being taken from a sensible quality. 3. principally the moral ones. Some expressions relevant to the interpretation of claritas: outstanding. a luminary a leading light my star pupil destined for stardom Excellentia autem hominis maxime consideratur secundum virtutem. Thomas Aquinas. (5) that virtue which moderates in accordance with reason everything pertaining to man (cf. 145. q.

] Decor. decoris [n. um [adj. the becoming what is worthy of esteem or admiration. the appropriate. whether bodily or spiritual manifestatio light (that which makes manifest) ‘all that makes manifest is light’ ‘argument’ understood as the middle term that which reduces a knowing power from ability to act that which illuminates a sense power or the intellect lucid pellucid clear diaphanous easily understood intelligible perspicuous whatever is grasped with ease glory and lustre sensible intelligible activities in accord with virtue are beautiful by virtue of a due order of circumstances as it were of certain parts schema (‘arrangement’.Decorus. the object of sight claritas is not light but a light-like quality of ‘color’ claritas pertains to intelligibility in the sense of perspicuity ‘easily held in memory’ = intelligible = claritas 99 . hence an excellence virtue understood as the disposition of the perfect for the best. or rather an ensemble of virtues. a. ‘coloring’) light = that which makes manifest to sight color = that which is seen.] ‘what is seemly or becoming’ (Deferrari) [= honestum. ‘the honorable good’ and hence ‘virtue’] the fitting. ‘configuration’) chroma (‘color’.

A.” —St. Albert the Great. 132. Brightness pertains to color. About Beauty: A Thomistic Interpretation: Each form has its own light or radiance (claritas) which it imparts to the being of which it is the form. Some contemporary Thomists on claritas.] . as well as display [or ‘manifestation’. manifestationem].9-10) [In III Sent. Thomas Aquinas.): Now lustre [claritas] involves a certain seemliness [decorem]. The etymology of the word for ‘form’. “Beauty is the splendor of form shining on proportionate matter.. a logical argument. because each in its own way ‘shines’ before us. (p.. 8. 3. rather than inward. harmony or proportion is essential to the beautiful.”] Cf. There is beauty in a sunset. (tr. The Pocket Aquinas.. See In Div. 339. 7.1. 13. so proportion or harmony comes from the ordering of a thing to an end. art. Bourke. Armand A. in a dream or fantasy. c. n.M. or mind and thereby gives us pleasure. lights up our senses.Cf. C. St. Cf. a. (pp. In this sense the form of a thing gives it its beauty. d 23. But it is a shining outward. 100 . Thomas remarks. 1. q. Cf. qu. n. q. an heroic deed..10) [Cf. It is these qualities and the order among them in some whole. A forma rei est decor eius. 261: …clarity (a special quality of brilliant appeal)….. 20: “…As radiance comes from form. Michael Augros. B. Nom. Both brightness and color are in the third species of quality. 1.B. Vernon J.. which is a quality around a quantity (of which a surface is one). et manifestationem. De Pulchro et Bono 1 Claritas autem et decorem quendam habet.. p. St. Summa Theol. sed contra. II-II. p. constitutes the fourth species. Scrapboo7: 4) Is beauty something other than the shapes and colors and proportions in a face? Is it some other quality added on? No. which exists in the surface of a body as its limit or boundary. whereas as shape or figure.It is easy to recognize the effulgence or luminosity of a being as an integral factor in its beauty. It has reference to the intensity or remission of the color.1 • • Claritas is the refulgence of a body. Maurer. …Besides radiance or luminosity.S. imagination.

This sense did not transfer into the English word form.” although evolving through the Greek morphe. The Indo-European root for the word FORM is mer-bh which means. GLIDE. but it is a single idea that stands behind all of the meanings. GUILDER. GLASS. What form means. the unknowable. that has given birth to a large word group. etc. GLITTER. The deep. The formless is the dark. GLANCE. which once implied outward appearance and beauty. sense of “to gleam. “to sparkle. and a meaning that. and what has been reformed has been brought back to some original splendor or goodness. When Genesis describes the world before creation as “without form and void. to gleam.. the formless. to sparkle” is revealed by the etymology of the word FORM. MORPHOLOGY] are based on the Greek morphe. the undistinct. 2. for what has been formed has been completed. YELLOW. One way to understand the English word “form” is to consider its opposite.” Some cognate American English words relating to form and shape [e.” it draws to mind the right image of the formless as what lacks being [void] and is unknown [the waters of the deep without light].g. meaning “gleam. is implied in the meaning of the word “formless” This shining or sparkling is both the splendor of existing (which gives us the sense of “to form” which means “to cause to be”) and of being intelligible (for what is known is brought to light). Now since the formless first brings to mind to be dark and unintelligible. 4. the shifting. 2007 at 6:02 pm Comments (0) 9. GLEE and ZIRCON. The Indo-European root of the modern English word form and its analogues in other languages is apparently “mer-bh-” or “mer-gwh-.Cf. including GOLD. CHLORINE. again. GLIMPSE.. sparkle” . 101 . Excerpts from various web sites: 1. the airy. GALL. CHLORO(phyl). and the Spirit of God moved upon the waters of the deep. divine. GLISSADE and GLOAMING. The word form also denotes the complete and the perfect. 3.” “to gleam. one of the original meanings of form traces back to the Greek morphe. JustThomism (a Website). and CHOLERA. precisely. Published in: Uncategorized on March 17. which derives from the Indo-European root mer-bh meaning to shine or to sparkle. this has come to focus on distinguishing the aspect of “change. deriving from the Indo-European root mer-bh. GLISTEN.”The word GLEAM derives from a different IndoEuropean root ghel(2).

Proto-IE: * merbh -, *bhermMeaning: shape Old Greek: morph…´ f. `„usserliche (k£rperliche) Gestalt, Form, sch£ne Gestalt, Anmut’, a-merphŒ´s <amerphe´s> `ugly’ (Hes.) Latin: forma f. `Form (Guss-, Modellform); Gebilde, Gepr„ge, Gestalt, Art; A¨sseres, Figur; Idee, Vorstellung’ References: WH (differently in Pok.) 5. The O-grade form of its Indo-European root, mer-bh, gives us the Greek morphe (‘form, beauty’), as well as, ultimately, morph, morpheme, morpho, morphosis. 6. Morphe- (also in metamorphosis) means to gleam or sparkle with an appearance seen as beauty. 7. morphe-”form, shape, figure, appearance; beauty, grace” 9. The order of meanings of the word for ‘form’ in sum. • • • • • ‘to gleam, to sparkle’, hence, ‘to gleam or sparkle with an appearance seen as beauty’, hence, ‘an appearance seen as beauty’, hence, ‘appearance’ (the look of something); ‘beauty’ “Some cognate American English words relating to form and shape...are based on the Greek morphe, which once implied outward appearance and beauty.”

Hence a word that began its career meaning ‘gleam’ or ‘sparkle’ comes to mean ‘form’ by way of ‘appearance’ and ‘beauty’. Note also that the ‘look’ of something comes to be identified with its shape or figure, understood as its ‘form’, as is indicated by the following: Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In VII Physic., lect. 5, n. 5 (tr. B.A.M.):
Now for the evidence supporting these arguments one must consider that among all the qualities, figures [or shapes] more than anything else follow on and reveal the species of things. This is most evident in plants and animals, in which no more certain judgement of the diversity of species can be made than by the diversity of figures. And this is so because, just as among the other accidents quantities stand nearest to substance, so figure, which is a quality around a quantity, stands nearest to the form of the substance.1
1

ad evidentiam autem harum rationum considerandum est, quod inter omnes qualitates, figurae maxime consequuntur et demonstrant speciem rerum. quod maxime in plantis et animalibus patet, in quibus nullo certiori iudicio diversitas specierum diiudicari potest, quam diversitate figurarum. et hoc ideo, quia sicut quantitas propinquissime se habet ad substantiam inter alia accidentia, ita figura, quae est qualitas circa quantitatem, propinquissime se habet ad formam substantiae. unde sicut posuerunt aliqui dimensiones esse

102

XI. ‘FORM’ AND ‘FIGURE’ IN RELATION TO CLARITAS. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In VII Physic., lect. 5, n. 3 (tr. B.A.M):
Where it must be considered that form and figure differ from each other in this, that ‘figure’ implies the termination of quantity, for it is the figure which is comprehended by a boundary or boundaries: but ‘form’ means what gives specific being to the work of art; for the form of works of art are accidents.1

N.B. Hence I say that the form which gives specific being to the work of art, or to the thing existing by nature as the case may be, is the source of its ‘lustre’ (cf. St. Albert, quoted above). Further, the form which gives specific being to the thing is the same as its nature; but nature is something of the divine art in things; but the divine art is a kind of reason. With these observations in mind, consider the following: Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In IV Phys., lect. 3, n. 3, tr. B.A.M.):
In this way, then, what first and foremost contains each thing is its per se place; but of this sort is the term at which each thing is bounded; it therefore follows that place first and foremost is the term of a thing. But the form is the term [or ‘limit’] of each thing, the reason being that by the form the matter of each thing is terminated at its proper being, and by the magnitude to its determinate measure. For the quantities of things follow upon their forms.2

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIIa, q. 45, art. 1, obj. 2 & ad 2 (tr. B.A.M.):
obj. 2. Further, figure is in the fourth species of quality, whereas lustre is in the third, since it is a sensible quality. Therefore the assumption of lustre by Christ ought not to be called ‘transfiguration’.3 ad 2. To the second it must be said that figure is considered in relation to the extremity of a body; for the figure is what is comprehended by a boundary or boundaries [Euclid, bk i, def. xiv]. And so everything which is considered in relation to the extremity of a body appears to pertain to the figure in some way. Now as is the case with the color, so too the lustre of a non-transparent [i.e. opaque] body is observed in its surface. And so the assumption of lustre is called ‘transfiguration’.4

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIa-IIae, q. 189, art. 2, ad 3 (tr. B.A.M.):

substantiam rerum, ita posuerunt aliqui figuras esse substantiales formas. 1 ubi considerandum est quod forma et figura in hoc ab invicem differunt, quod figura importat terminationem quantitatis; est enim figura, quae termino vel terminis comprehenditur: forma vero dicitur, quae dat esse specificum artificiato; formae enim artificiatorum sunt accidentia. 2 Sic ergo illud quod primo et per se continet unumquodque, est per se locus eius; huiusmodi autem est terminus ad quem res terminatur; sequitur ergo quod locus proprie et per se sit terminus rei. Forma autem est terminus uniuscuiusque: quia per formam terminatur materia uniuscuiusque ad proprium esse, et magnitudo ad determinatam mensuram: quantitates enim rerum consequuntur formas earum. 3 Praeterea, figura est in quarta specie qualitatis, claritas autem est in tertia, cum sit sensibilis qualitas. Assumptio ergo claritatis a Christo transfiguratio dici non debet. 4 Ad secundum dicendum quod figura circa extremitatem corporis consideratur, est enim figura quae termino vel terminis comprehenditur. Et ideo omnia illa quae circa extremitatem corporis considerantur ad figuram quodammodo pertinere videntur. Sicut autem color, ita et claritas corporis non transparentis in eius superficie attenditur. Et ideo assumptio claritatis transfiguratio dicitur.

103

To the third it must be said that beauty, as has been said above, consists in a certain lustre and due proportion. Now both of these are found in reason as in a root, to which pertains both a manifesting light and the ordering of a due proportion in other things….1

• • • •

lustre due proportion a manifesting light the ordering of due proportion

1. The definition of ‘light’. Light. 1. Properly speaking, that which makes manifest to the sense of sight. 2. Commonly speaking, that which makes manifest to any knowing power. (St. Thomas Aquinas); 3. that which reduces a knowing power from ability to act (Aristotle). 2. In sum. gloria (glory) claritas (lustre) claritas (lustre) decorem (which is the same as honestum, ‘the honorable good’) manifestatio (display or manifestation) glory a display or manifestation (in which it is like light) of what appears estimable among men (or the many) (and so consisting in virtue) hence glory comprehends the coming into the awareness and the approval of the many of a man’s excellent qualities 3. On manifestation and the estimable. to manifest or to make manifest is proper to light but what appears estimable is a good, especially the good which consists in virtue cf. the honorable good cf. the good which is sensible (the admired) that which is worthy of honor that which is worthy of commendation or admiration the good understood as virtue: virtue is the disposition of the perfect for the best
1

ad tertium dicendum quod pulchritudo, sicut supra dictum est, consistit in quadam claritate et debita proportione. utrumque autem horum radicaliter in ratione invenitur, ad quam pertinet et lumen manifestans, et proportionem debitam in aliis ordinare…..

104

quod testificamur de bonitate alicuius.N. Note the idea of ‘distinction’: a man in possession of admirable qualities is a man of distinction. as of achievement. clarescit bonitas eius in notitia plurimorum. Thomas-Lexikon. .B. We observe that ‘lustre’ names a kind of ‘radiance’ or ‘diffusion of light’—that is. Herrlichkeit. 1 ad 3. 2. 9. nitidum (‘brightness’. 103. 2. Whereas the third meaning is the one St. the following definitions: 4. ut Augustinus dicit. On lustre as a sensible quality (in which case it enters into the definition of beauty). th. Soft reflected light. or beauty. . In the case of a sensible thing. that quality will therefore be analogous to the estimable so understood. nam gloria dicitur quasi claria. Glory. Berühmtheit. lustre means: 1. ‘splendor’) 5. but something of which light is the principal component. radiance. unde glorificari idem est. s. but distinctness pertains to lustre: ‘distinction’ or ‘distinctness’ pertains to merit but merit is due or owed to estimable qualities clarus (‘bright’) claria (‘splendor’. reputation. ‘distinction’) claritas (‘lustre’) nitor. which quality is quite literally the reflection of light coming from its surface. Cf. especially insofar as what is moved is ‘reflected’. quia ex hoc. ‘flash’. Brilliance or radiance of light. So wherever there is something estimable or worthy of admiration coming into the knowledge or awareness of the many there is ‘lustre’. gloria est effectus honoris et laudis. ib. . According to The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. quod clarificari. gloria claritatem quandam significat. brightness. or splendor. 3 c. quia vero illud. II. gloria. I. ideo proprie per nomen gloriae 105 . II. that something being a kind of movement outward to the eye. distinction. et hoc importat (bedeutet) nomen gloriae. 9. 3. it is not just light. The appearance of a mineral surface judged by its brilliance and ability to reflect light. claritas autem et decor quandam habent manifestationem alicuius de hoc. the ninth is the more known. II. a multis conspici potest et a remotis. quod simpliciter (schlechtweg) clarum est. Verherrlichung. quam clara notitia (BekanntSein) cum laude. ‘splendor’) fulgor (‘lightning’. Thomas is speaking about. b) Ruhm.v. 1 c): gloria nihil aliud est. quod apud homines decorum videtur. der Gegensatz zu ignominia (mal. sheen. sive illud sit bonum corporale aliquod sive spirituale. and hence furnishes a natural starting point for any exposition.

patriae. qui. 4 c) = die himmlische Herrlichkeit oder die Herrlichkeit des (himmlischen) Vaterlandes. 132. Secundo est utile ad proximorum salutem. 95. naturalis. 106 . iactantia (Prahlerei). qui bonum alicuius cognoscentes aedificantur ad imitandum . i. 9. Est enim homini naturale. Die filiae d. → dominus.. III. zu comprehensio g. vera (th. 132. II. 2 c. zu dilectio g. Als Arten der gloria gehören hierher: 1. c. 2 t. cg. Dei. → g. . 9. erit gloria vana. III. vgl. dum considerat bona sua ab aliis laudari. → cognitio sub b. caelestis. hypocrisis (←). g. 61 pr. 3. I. 2 c. cg. 4 ad 2. ib. 37. . mal. ib. 6. nämlich seine Ebenbildlichkeit mit Gott und sein gutes Gewissen). 1 ob. 10. ib. 63. 2 c. 4. Tertio modo ordinari potest ad utilitatem ipsius hominis. 9. spiritualis. ib. quam gratia consummata. quod non habet . • Zu bonum gloriae → bonus sub c. 22. g. 63. beatitudo in sacra Scriptura frequentissime gloria nominatur. 1 c. supererogationis (th. vitae aeternae (ib. 7. quando aliquis gloriatur de aliquo bono. II. . II. etwas über das Geforderte oder Notwendige hinaus geleistet zu haben. III. 38. → g. ≈ . divina. 10. 6. cg. ad 5). ib. Primo quidem. quod appetat cognitionem veritatis. sed quod aliquis appetat bonum suum ab aliquo cognosci. • • Über den Unterschied zwischen gloria & honor → honor. 11. → g. zu donum g. → claritas sub c. quia per hoc perficitur eius intellectus. vana. de his gratias agit et firmius in eis persistit . 4 ad 3) = die Herrlichkeit des ewigen Lebens. vera. mundana. glorificatur Deus. 67. Secundo dicitur gloria vana. unde habet quandam vanitatem. g. inanis sive vana & g. 6 ad 3) = der Ruhm.) de bono. zu claritas g. 1 c. 1 c. vgl. Dei. II. mal. 8. quod bonum alicuius manifestatur. → donum sub a. g. Primo quidem ad gloriam Dei. 4 c) ist und sich von der superbia unterscheidet (→ superbia sub a). Tertio modo dicitur gloria vana. pertinacia (Halsstarrigkeit). 2. . gloria. gloria . sind: inoboedientia (Ungehorsam). th. IV. die Sprösslinge der inanis gloria. quando gloria hominis non ordinatur ad debitum finem. 29. I. quod de facili transit . spiritualis (Ps. welche eine von den sieben Haupttodsünden (vgl. quae nihil est aliud. quando aliquis gloriatur falso. 81. II. 4 c. 45. . vgl. I.. • b) himmlische Herrlichkeit. 132. 112. g. mundana (th. novitatum praesumptio (←) . vgl. naturalis & g. . g. . gloria caelestis sive patriae (th. I. überirdische Verklärung: perfecti sunt in gratia vel gloria. 62 pr. 5. 20. zu esse g. → comprehensio sub b. 1 ob. g. II. II. I. g. 55) = die Herrlichkeit Gottes und die der Welt oder die göttliche und die weltliche Herrlichkeit. 70. → g. 9. 2 c. prout hoc non est utile ad aliquem finem. 9. vera. . contentio (←). Potest autem laudabiliter ordinari ad tria. 3 c. 5 c. mal. → g. puta (z. zu cognitio g. quod bonum alicuius deveniat in multorum notitiam et approbationem. ib. . Si quis ergo appetat manifestationem suorum bonorum. g. vgl. Dei sive divina & g. 7 b) = der natürliche und der geistige Ruhm (des Menschen. . .designatur. cuius est principaliter illud bonum sicut primi auctoris . per hoc enim. non est appetitus perfectionis. discordia (←). zu dominus g. 1-5 c. 12. ad 5 & 10 & 2 c) = der eitle und der wahre Ruhm (tripliciter potest dici gloria vana. IV. 84. B. II. inanis. → dilectio sub a. cg. ib. g. vel etiam in huiusmodi manifestatione delectetur non propter aliquod trium praedictorum. III. 132. quae in cognitione Dei consistit. g. 8. . ib. mal.

Again. zu status g. we are told. g. animae. and unmixed intellect is a substantial being in act. g. as in the manner of a fixed disposition. For in some sense. and another of such a kind to make [it] into everything. zu potestas g. And this separable. is prior in time in the one thing [individual]. futura. stands to the potential intellect as art to its material or light to colors. III. 11 ad 6) = die nebensächliche oder unwesentliche und die wesentliche Herrlichkeit im Himmel. → perfectio sub b. The agent intellect as ‘light’. Aristotle. zu visio g. knowledge in act is identical to the thing [known]. the passive intellect is destructtible. 6. “The agent intellect. Mark Smillie): Since further. II. And so there is an intellect of such a kind to become everything. 4. such as how light acts. III. I. these different things also must exist in the soul.→ esse. where (or whenever) light illuminates. → g. g. 7. claritatis (cg. 3. moreover. 5. 10. zu lumen g. 86) = die in der Klarheit oder im Lichtschein des Körpers bestehende überirdische Verklärung. And this alone is immortal and continuous. g. finalis sive futura (th. creata (verit. claritas results. 2 ad 4) = die überirdische Verklärung der Seele und die des Körpers oder die geistige und die körperliche überirdische Verklärung. IV. it is impassible. as art stands to matter. → impassibilitas. II. 73. 2. 7. but knowledge in potency. zu libertas g. → incorruptibilis. and the principle (originating force) is always superior to the matter. It does not remember. This intellect alone is separated. 8. there is something which is indeed the matter of each genus. the soul understands nothing. 4 c. → similitudo sub a. and is in potency all those things [in the genus]. → potestas sub b. and without this. corporis. because. → vita sub a. ≈ . cg. 5 (tr. but it is not sometimes knowing. → libertas sub a. 3 c. → g. That is. spiritualis. zu incorruptibile secundum g. g. g. zu immortalitas g. 9. animae sive spiritualis & g. → retributio. 1 ad 3. cg. zu perfectio g. g. Cf. sive g. just as in every nature. 45. De Anima. it is not entirely [prior] in time. It [the intellect or the agent intellect?] sometimes does not know. IV. → imago sub a. gloria accidentalis & g. 1 a) = die geschaffene überirdische Herrlichkeit. consummatae → status sub c. accidentalis. g. g. 91) = die schließliche oder zukünftige Herrlichkeit (quae est in caelis. zu retributio g. which it is truly. animae. light too makes colors existing in potency. IV. essentialis. zu vita g. zu imago g. For the agent is always superior to the patient. sive divinae g. corporis sive corporalis (th. However. In sum. 2 ad 11) = die vollendete oder vollkommene überirdische Verklärung. 11. 7. colors existing in act. 66. → visio sub a. 4. finalis. corporalis. g. → g. → immortalitas. 18. → lux sub a. → lumen. zu impassibilitas g. and there is another which is a cause and productive because all those things are in its making.” But claritas is the property of that which results from the action of what is manifestative. 107 . 29. → g. 6. zu lux g. essentialis (mal. perfecta (pot. 91). zu similitudo g. • Arten der gloria in diesem Sinne sind: 1. → operatio sub b. zu operatio g. and impassible.

which is a spiritual excellence.1 the integral parts of claritas or ‘lustre’ the possession of admirable qualities the coming into public notice an illustrious man I say: this ‘good’ which enters into the awareness and approbation of many is. 1. B. q.. as well as capable of ‘lighting up’ the mind or the senses. art. the honestum or honorable good. c. St. in way. 132. decorem]. Summa Theol. Aristotle on making an impact on the senses that goes beyond the nature of the poetic art (end of Chapter 15). beauty is said to have lustre insofar as it is admirable or worthy of esteem.M.A.): Now lustre [claritas] involves a certain estimable quality [or ‘propriety’. Cf. (tr. Thomas Aquinas. what is honestum in the case of the physical or bodily as well as the spiritual the latter is a moral excellence. et manifestationem. but in another way. That is. decor decorousness fittingness appropriateness worthy of approbation or admiration the admirable but what is worthy of approbation is honorable or commendable but what makes manifest is light Hence the notion of claritas involves the notes of being worthy of esteem as well as informing the knowing power. II-II. • • to be manifestative is to reduce a knowing power from potency to act to be decorous is to be worthy of approbation Cf. as well as display [manifestationem]. the former a bodily honor is given to spiritual excellence (a war hero) admiration is given to the bodily (a beauty pageant winner) cf. 108 .Claritas is both transparency and luminosity. Jane Austen (cited below) on someone being “much admired” 1 Claritas autem et decorem quendam habet. it is a certain sensible excellence which is worthy of admiration.

being a moral excellence rendering its possessor worthy of honor to manifest as by light: cf. “a shining example of fidelity” cf. but also ‘preeminently clear’ approbation light is that which makes manifest to the sense of sight the honorable is that which is desirable for its own sake. the active intellect: it manifests something to the knowing power by reducing it from potency to act decor > becoming > spiritually beautiful > the honestum and the admirable: what is worthy of approbation § 109 .I say that claritas is the same as lustre or an illustrious reputation. praeclarus as meaning ‘famous’ or ‘celebrated’.

AG4 praeterea. primo per id quod dicitur joan. spiritual substances. dist. DS13QU1 AR2.AG1 ad secundum sic proceditur. One proceeds to the second as follows. 9: erat lux vera quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum.. it seems that. according to the literal sense and properly. First. sed non est probabile. the bodily]. who is spiritual to the greatest extent. 2: DS13QU1 AR2-TT utrum lux proprie inveniatur in spiritualibus. augustinus dicit: non christus sic Further. things. hoc utique figurative.AG3 Therefore. Thomas Aquinas. by the production of light the creation of the angelic nature is to be understood. quod de deo intelligitur. praeterea. then. non autem christus proprie diceretur lux. it does not mention the creation of the angels. quasi deo proximior. among the other creatures the spiritual substantia nobilior est. scripturam divinam But it is not likely that divine Scripture would nobilissimae creaturae creationem subticuisse. 1. videtur quod ad litteram et proprie per lucis productionem creatio naturae angelicae sit intelligenda. inter alias creaturas spiritualis Further. q. ergo videtur quod lux proprie in spiritualibus It seems. sed illud proprie. that light is properly found in substantiis inveniatur. St. DS13QU1 AR2. Cf. Whether light is found properly in spiritual things. which must be understood of God. videtur quod lux proprie in spiritualibus It seems that light is found properly in spiritual inveniatur. 110 . then. Augustine says.. the other. 13. On light. 1. by what is said in John 1:9: He was the true light enlightening every man on coming into this world. qui maxime spiritualis est. cum ergo de creatione angelorum mentionem non faciat. unless light were properly found in spiritual ergo etc. perhaps figuratively. luci convenit maxime activum esse. DS13QU1 AR2.8. etc. Further. but <He is called> the one properly. to be active belongs to light most of all. art. Christ is not called dicitur lux quomodo dicitur lapis. Since. nisi But ‘light’ would not be said properly of Christ lux proprie in spiritualibus inveniretur. sc.AG2 praeterea. substance is nobler. as being nearer to God. have placed the creation of the noblest creature under [that of the less noble. things. DS13QU1 AR2. In II Sent. ‘light’ in the same way He is called a stone.

ergo videtur quod et lux verius in eis inveniatur. then. Therefore.. phorically. est Further. that light is not found in spiritual things except metaphorically. augustinus enim videtur velle. quod deus dicitur Further. than to the bodily.CO respondeo dicendum. DS13QU1 AR2. DS13QU1 AR2. ergo et lux. praeterea. among those things said of God by a proportional transfer. quod in hoc videtur esse quaedam diversitas inter sanctos.SC-1 sed contra est quod dicit ambrosius. who. dionysius dicit. DS13QU1 AR2. that with respect to causality a likeresultat in radio solari quantum ad causalitatem. DS13QU1 AR2. It seems. in But manifestation is more properly in spiritual things where there is a nobler knowledge. etc. puts down the splendor that comes about from a multiplication of light. from a bodily creature belongs to Him metaconvenit sibi metaphorice. ones. And so then light.unde luci attribuitur diffusivum esse.AG5 praeterea. ponit splendorem qui contingit ex multiplicatione luminis. ubi est nobilior cognitio. ness of Him most results in a ray of the sun. sed manifestatio magis proprie spiritualibus. sed actio convenit verius spiritualibus quam But action more truly belongs to spiritual things corporalibus. ergo etc. then. Dionysius says that light is said of God lumen ex hoc quod similitudo ejus maxime from this. actus proprius lucis est manifestare. ergo videtur quod lux in spiritualibus non nisi metaphorice inveniatur. that light is more truly found in them. I reply that it must be said that on this matter there seems to be a certain diversity among the Saints. 111 . sed omne nomen quod dicitur de deo per But every name said of God by a likeness taken similitudinem a creatura corporali sumptam. It seems. qui inter ea quae transumptive de deo dicuntur.SC-2 But to the contrary is what Ambrose says. quod lux in For Augustine seems to wish that light be found spiritualibus verius inveniatur quam in more truly in spiritual things than in bodily corporalibus. the proper act of light is to manifest. for which reason to be diffusive is attributed to light.

not be found in spiritual things except metaphorically.RA1 1 The attribution of this quotation is mistaken. ness. although something common can be found analogously in spiritual and bodily things. and this is analogiae. since light is a quality visible per se. not something sensible per se. unde cum lux sit qualitas per se visibilis. ‘clear’. what Augustine says is true. quod omne quod manifestatur. it must be understood that bodily things in spiritualia per quamdam similitudinem. quod utrique For being. not according to the proper account of light. v:13. but heat. non secundum propriam rationem lucis. is not properly found in spiritual things. quod lux verius est in spiritualibus quam in corporalibus. because nothing per se sensibile spiritualibus convenit nisi sensible per se belongs to spiritual things except metaphorice. DS13QU1 AR2. et omne occultum obscurum. quae are carried over to the spiritual by a certain likequidem est similitudo proportionabilitatis. But manifestation is more truly found in spiritual things. and a certain determinate species in sensible things. metaphorically. it is actually Ephesians. prout dicitur in canonica joannis. et sic est in proposito: the case in the point at issue: dicitur enim lux in spiritualibus illud quod ita se habet ad manifestationem intellectivam sicut se habet lux corporalis ad manifestationem sensitivam. And with respect to this. which is common to both. non potest dici in spiritualibus nisi vel aequivoce vel metaphorice. 112 . ens enim non est per se sensibile. ‘obscure’. in spiritualibus proprie non invenitur. verum est dictum augustini. quod transferuntur corporalia Still. And so. lumen est. et hoc quidem videtur magis verum.sed ambrosius et dionysius videntur velle. ut patet in ente. and everything hidden. calor autem quod per se sensibile sensible per se. that “everything that is manifested is light”. In this way everything that is manifest is called clarum dicitur. it cannot be said in spiritual things except either equivocally or metaphorically. that light is more truly in spiritual things than in the bodily. which is sensible per est. vel community of univocity or analogy. is not commune est. sed secundum rationem manifestationis. still.1 per quem modum omne quod manifestum est. quia quamvis aliquid commune possit inveniri analogice in spiritualibus et corporalibus. non tamen aliquid per se sensibile. which is in fact a likeness of proportionability. et species quaedam determinata in sensibilibus. sciendum tamen. et hanc similitudinem oportet reducere in And this likeness must be reduced to some aliquam communitatem univocationis. as it is said in the Canonical Epistle of John. quia nihil And this seems the more true. et quantum ad hoc. but according to the account of manifestation. et calore. For that is called ‘light’ in spiritual things that stands to intellectual manifestation in the same way as bodily light stands to sensible manifestation. manifestatio autem verius est in spiritualibus. as is clear in being and heat. quod But Ambrose and Dionysius seem to wish that it in spiritualibus non nisi metaphorice inveniatur. the reason being that. se.

or “how it quomodo redolet. c. smells”.. then. § 113 .St. ut ambrosius dicit. sight. secundum usum loquentium. extended) even to the knowledge of the quoniam ipsi deum videbunt. secundum primam eius in one way according to its first imposition. (the name of ‘sight’ has been secundum illud matth.Afterwards. quod primo This is clear in the case of the name ‘sight’. (dicimus enim. Thomas Aquinas. si autem accipiatur secundum quod est in usu But if it be taken according as it has been loquentium ad omnem manifestationem extended in common usage to every instance of extensum. alio modo.). nominis. vide quomodo sapit. according to the use of the name. et similiter dicendum est de nomine lucis. to speak of a name in two ways: uno modo. v. q. it is said metaphorically in spiritualibus dicitur. QU67 AR1 CO respondeo dicendum quod de aliquo nomine I reply that it must be said that it is appropriate dupliciter convenit loqui. the name has been extended to all knowledge (obtained through) the other senses. extensum est hoc nomen. nam primo quidem est institutum ad For it was first instituted in order to signify that significandum id quod facit manifestationem in which produces a manifestation in the sense of sensu visus. sic proprie in spiritualibus dicitur.A. et ulterius etiam ad cognitionem intellectus. B. metaphorice in its first imposition. ad omnem cognitionem aliorum sensuum but by reason of the dignity and certitude of this sense. for they shall see God. act of the sense of sight. vel quomodo est calidum). knowledge of any kind. sicut patet in nomine visionis. Ia. vel (For we say: “see how it tastes”.M. in impositionem. in this way it is said properly in spiritual things. art.. according to common usage. as in Matt. it was extended to signify that candum omne illud quod facit manifestationem which produces a manifestation according to secundum quamcumque cognitionem. And the same thing must be said in the case of the name ‘light’. And finally. the name ‘light’ be taken according to suam primam impositionem. secundum usum another way. spiritual things. as Ambrose says. or “how warm it is”). Summa Theol. (tr. si ergo accipiatur nomen luminis secundum If. manifestation. 1. sed propter dignitatem et certitudinem huius sensus. impositum est ad significandum actum sensus which was first imposed in order to signify the visus. intellect. 5:8: Blessed are the clean of heart. beati mundo corde. 67. postmodum autem extensum est ad signify.

(a) On the four primary colors. makrou/j te kai\ braxei=j fqo/ggouj mi/casa e)n diafo/roij fwnai=j mi/an a)pete/lesen a(rmoni/an. The Pythagoreans call the visible surface of the body skin-color. mousikh\ de\ o)cei=j a(/ma kai\ barei=j. Cf. xrwma/twn e)gkerasame/nh fu/seij ta\j ei)ko/naj toi=j prohgoume/noij a)pete/lese sumfw/nouj. w(/sper a)me/lei to\ a)/rren suh/ngage pro\j to\ qh=lu kai\ ou)x e(ka/teron pro\j to\ o(mo/fulon. For painting by mixing the nature of colors white and black. red and yellow as the elementary colors (the families of colors). e)/oike de\ kai\ h( te/xnh th\n fu/sin mimoume/nh tou=to poiei=n. Pseudo-Aristotle. Furley. but grammar by making a mixture from the letters of vowels and consonants composes out of them the whole of its art. On color (chroma). black. Diels.A.. B. ou)k e)k tw=n o(moi/wn. but music simultaneously mixes sounds high and low. also does this by imitating nature. tr. The differences of the colors (of bodies?) derive from what mixtures of the elements are involved. De Mundo ad Alex. perfects images that accord with their prototypes. and not each of them to another of the same sex. thus making the first concord not through similar things.ed. But art. Pythagoreans (A) Aëtius (plac. just as she has joined the male to the female. ou) dia\ tw=n o(moi/wn.): i)/swj de\ kai\ tw=n e)nanti/wn h( fu/sij gli/xetai kai\ e)k tou/twn a)potelei= to\ su/mfwnon. long and short.The followers of Pythagoras (regard) white. I. Berlin 1965) 313 Plutarchi Ept. § 114 . yellow and red. But perhaps it may be that nature has a liking for contraries and perfects a consonance from them and not from similar things. w)xrw=n te kai\ e)ruqrw=n. grammatikh\ de\ e)k fwnhe/ntwn kai\ a(fw/vwn gramma/twn kra=sin poihsame/nh th\n o(/lhn te/xnhn a)p) au)tw=n sunesth/sato.. Doxographi Graeci (4. 1-7) Color is the visible corporeal quality. but through contraries. kai\ th\n prw/thn o(mo/noian dia\ tw=n e)nanti/wn shnh=yen. zwgrafi/a me\n ga\r leukw=n te kai\ mela/nwn. (396b 8-19) (ed. Loeb. I) H. and perfects a single harmony in different sounds.M. rev.15. it seems.9.

perfectam eorum speciem non things are found not to follow after the perfect consequi. sed quoddam sun is not generated from the sun. nor is a stone the soul. species of those things from which they proceed.): LB1 CP-43 …inveniuntur autem quaedam quae ex aliis …Now certain things that proceed from other procedunt. animal.). fit and color comes from light received in a limited color. non enim imago hominis dicitur verus homo. light from light is added. fit domus quae est in materia. B. but the species of the stone. excluded from divine generation. In another way. lack of truth— quia scilicet non vere recipit eius naturam. Thomas Aquinas. For the image of a man is not called a true man. ut ergo talis imperfectio a generatione divina Therefore.10. like an image in a mirror or a sculpture.. confitemur natum deum de deo. fit and a shadow comes from a ray [of light] by the umbra. sed species lapidis. body. when. 43. aut etiam similitudo rei in intellectu vel sensu. sicut imago in speculo vel sculptura. or even the likeness of a thing in the intellect or sense. Philosopher says (De Anima. generation. ex quibus procedunt. That color comes from light received in a limited body. Theol. it does not truly receive its nature. that an imperfection of this kind be excludatur. fit mixtum. as the philosophus. as in equivocal generations: for a sole enim non generatur sol. but a certain animal. sed similitudo. cp. what proceeds from something differs from it because of a lack of purity. dum scilicet ab eo quod est in se simplex et purum. ut hoc ergo a divina generatione excludatur. namely. that is. differt ab eo propter defectum puritatis. ut dicit but a likeness. alio modo quod procedit ex aliquo. et ex igne adiuncto aliis elementis. tertio modo quod ex aliquo procedit. non In a third way what proceeds from something consequitur speciem eius propter defectum does not follow after its species because of a veritatis. we confess God born of God. nec lapis est anima. (tr. I. et ex radio per oppositionem corporis opaci. Cf. 115 . per applicationem ad extraneam materiam aliquid producitur a prima specie deficiens: sicut ex domo quae est in mente artificis. et a lumine recepto in corpore terminato.A.M. that this be excluded from divine additur lumen de lumine. uno modo sicut in generationibus aequivocis: a In one way. Comp. St. opposition of an opaque body. because. but only a certain likeness of it. from what is simple and pure in itself by an application to exterior matter something is produced falling short of the first species: as a house in matter comes from a house in the mind of an artisan. Therefore. III. and a mixed thing comes from fire joined to the other elements. 8 (431b 29). sed quamdam eius similitudinem tantum.

multo ergo magis deus. § 116 . the first principles. Therefore the Word itself is from Him by nature. understanding is His own essence. That. additur: genitum. ut a nobis procedunt res artificiales. non sicut ea quae praeter naturalem originem procedunt. according to the power of His will. these things be excluded from the additur: deum verum de deo vero. ne igitur dei verbum non naturaliter a deo Therefore. sed secundum potestatem to proceed from God not by nature. cuius intelligere est Therefore.ut igitur haec a divina generatione excludantur. divine generation. understand Himself naturally. but as artificial things proceed from us. But those which proceed from us by nature nature we say are generated [begotten]. but suae voluntatis. since this is natural to quod se ipsum intelligat. secundum naturam etiam impossibile est It is also impossible for the Word to differ from verbum a deo differre. quas facere dicimur. which we say are made. it is added: true God from true God. whose suum esse. sicut intellectus noster naturally understands. God. habet enim omnis intellectus aliqua quae For every understanding has something which it naturaliter intelligit. cum hoc sit deo naturale God according to nature. seipsum naturaliter intelligit. it is added: Begotten. non factum. quae vero naturaliter a nobis procedunt. not made. that he understand Himself. verbum ergo ipsius naturaliter ex ipso est. like a son. as our understanding has habet prima principia. then. lest the Word of God be understood procedere intelligatur. much more does God. ut filius. dicimur generare. not in the manner of those things which proceed beyond a natural origin.

to be radiant. or pervaded by much light. 2007. vivid brightness. brilliant light. First Edition (v 1. Shine intr. 1. Light shining with diverging rays. refulgency — the quality of being bright and sending out rays of light The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language. Of vivid or brilliant colour.” Roget’s New Millennium™ Thesaurus. 03 Apr. glittering. Brilliance 1. splendour. Sending out rays of light. shining brightly. radiancy. Fourth Edition Copyright © 2004. Shining. Published by Houghton Mifflin Company.com http://thesaurus. Brightly shining. reflecting.11. sheen. the opposite of dull. luster n. Bright A. Radiance 1.reference. (in general. 117 . Of a heavenly body or an object that is alight: To shed beams of bright light: to give out light so as to illuminate.com/browse/illustrious>. Clear or luminous to the mental perception. Some dictionary definitions pertaining to ‘lustre’: Roget’s New Millenium Thesaurus. Brightness or radiance shed by a luminary or an illuminant. splendour. effulgence. lustrous. s. Great brightness. Radiant 1. emitting. as bright red. Modern Language Association (MLA): “illustrious. while illustrious means widely known and esteemed or having or conferring glory. brilliant light or lustre. lustre. sparkling.) 1. Intense or sparkling brightness or radiance. refulgence. luster. ‘Lustre’: “the visual property of something that shines with reflected light” shininess. 2. shine. Lexico Publishing Group. <Thesaurus. Shine 1. lustre is a kind of: • radiance.3. hence.v. “illustrious”. 2000 by Houghton Mifflin Company. used also with names of colour. Brilliant 1. adj. Splendour. LLC. The Oxford English Dictionary. 4.1). Notes: illustrative means clarifying by use of examples or serving to demonstrate. 1.

4. search For other senses of this word. used to give an object a gloss or polish. fame. rock.1. or beauty. knowledge/ignorance. A decorative object. prominence. A radiant brightness or glow. sheen. and generally implies radiance. and silky. 6. illustriousness. as of achievement. prominency. notability. like soapstone. See light/darkness. prestige. 9. Any of various substances. glaze. radiance. especially on a chandelier. resinous. a diamond is said to have an adamantine lustre and pyrite is said to have a metallic lustre. distinction. sheen. that gives off light. or splendor. 2. fabric. gloss. A glass pendant. 118 . See important/unimportant. especially silk and satin. 8. note. greasy. The word lustre traces its origins back to the Latin word lux. like amber. For example. gloss. A position of exalted widely recognized importance: distinction. such as alpaca. especially the metallic sheen of lusterware. luster noun 1. The appearance of a mineral surface judged by its brilliance and ability to reflect light. pearly. or metals). eminency. Lustre (American English: luster) is a description of the way light interacts with the surface of a crystal. Lustre (mineralogy) From Wikipedia. sleekness. The surface glossiness of ceramic ware after glazing. 7. Glory. mark. shine. 2. meaning “light”. respect/contempt/standing. Third Edition by the Editors of the American Heritage® Dictionary Copyright © 1995 by Houghton Mifflin Company. brightness. waxy. preeminence. such as wax or glaze. the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigation. Other descriptive terms used for gems include vitreous. 5. Soft reflected light. The term is also used to describe other items with a particular sheen (for example. like glass. reputation. such as a chandelier. glory. or brilliance. polish. having a glossy surface. usually due to light reflected from a smooth surface: burnish. eminence. 3. like jade. renown. Brilliance or radiance of light. or mineral. A fabric. see lustre. Roget’s II: The New Thesaurus. Published by Houghton Mifflin Company.

Joseph Story. 1984). Considering the nature of the duties. and betrays him into vain fantastick Recitals of his own Performances: His Discourse generally leans one Way. Ch. Commentaries on the Constitution 3: § 1472 (1833): § 1472. and hastening towards their ripest state. which gives lustre to the virtues of life. or efface. Cf. Adam Bede (1859) =. this Desire of Fame naturally betrays the ambitious Man into such Indecencies as are a lessening to his Reputation. George Eliot. which has been selected. and. or receive any Disadvantage from the Reports which others make of them. no one can reasonably doubt the propriety of some qualification of age. have acquired public confidence and approbation. if they have not then attained to their highest maturity. The judgment. and it was not an approbation to be enjoyed quite gratuitously. and how can a man’s candour be seen in all its lustre unless he has a few failings to talk of? Cf. it must be won by a fair amount of merit. and he had considerable reliance on his own virtues. Cf. tends obliquely either to the detracting from others. He had never yet forfeited that approbation. and as the World is more apt to find fault than to commend. lie sometimes in very opposite directions. This often sets him on empty Boasts and Ostentations of himself. lest his Deserts should be concealed from the Notice of the World. attained a solid cast. which leads to the one. and the solid wisdom and experience required in the executive department. Vanity is the natural Weakness of an ambitious Man. and the integrity. p. XII: Not an heroic strain. or to the extolling of himself. which form the character. and set to show by his own Hand. they lose their Lustre when they are drawn at large. Ind. are in full vigour. in the splendid situation to which he advances. by that time. That. 119 . by which period the character and talents of individuals are generally known. and that which leads to the other. The faculties of the mind. Cf. has. and the principles. for unhappily. and fully developed. the extent of the information. The Spectator 225: But further. must then. candour was one of his favourite virtues. The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Indianapolis.12. Adam Smith. the candidates for fortune too frequently abandon the paths of virtue. But the ambitious man flatters himself that. which exposes him to the secret Scorn and Derision of those he converses with. the road. He is still afraid lest any of his Actions should be thrown away in private.: Liberty Fund. and ruins the Character he is so industrious to advance by it. Joseph Addison. whatever is the Subject of it. acting upon large materials. For tho’ his Actions are never so glorious. the Boast will probably be censured when the great Action that occasioned it is forgotten. No young man could confess his faults more candidly. he will have so many means of commanding the respect and admiration of mankind and will be enabled to act with such superior propriety and grace that the luster of his future conduct will entirely cover. 64: To attain to this envied situation. the foulness of the steps by which he arrived at that elevation. and opportunities have usually been afforded for public service. His own approbation was necessary to him. Readings pertaining to ‘lustre’. nevertheless Arthur felt himself very heroic as he strode towards the stables to give his orders about the horses. if ever. is the middle age of life. and for experience in the public councils.

notoriety. I go to court.. What does the name Gloria mean? A. [1995] S. As stated in the landmark decision of Hill v.com/q541024.com/ca2/defamation/cyberlibel. It follows that the protection of the good reputation of an individual is of fundamental importance to our democratic society.. That importance must. and prestige.html [3/30/07]) (http://www. has an interest in ensuring that its members can enjoy and protect their good reputation so long as it is merited.. A democratic society. A good reputation is closely related to the innate worthiness and dignity of the individual. For I obey the laws.R. therefore. be based upon the good repute of a person. Although it is not specifically mentioned in the Charter. Cf. I go to church. little has been written of the importance of reputation. It is that good repute which enhances an individual’s sense of worth and value. Cory J. False allegations can so very quickly and completely destroy a good reputation. It is an attribute that must. Gloria is a name generally used for a female.blurtit. high repute. Cf...24 24. 1130 at 1175-1179 1 2 (http://www. “Competing Interests and the Courts” (Cyberlibel):2 Protection of reputation seems to be gaining prominence over the freedom of expression. mark. in turn. Thus. Lustre and repute. nobility. The name ‘gloria’ has a Latin origin and means ‘glory’ in English. wrote that: Although much has been very properly been said and written about the importance of freedom of expression. their good reputation is to be cherished above all. a concept which underlies all of the Charter rights. if you or someone you know is named Gloria then her name means honour and lustre. A Wife’s Protest:1 16. The protection of a person’s reputation is indeed worthy of protection in our democratic society.13. just as much as freedom of expression. repute. No breath of scandal flaws The lustre of my fair repute. Church of Scientology the Supreme Court of Canada stated that defamation laws are a reasonable limit on free speech in Canada. Yet.com: Q. She has a golden aura in her name. The publication of defamatory comments constitutes an invasion of the individual’s personal privacy and is an affront to that person’s dignity. Ada Cambridge (1844-1926). Cf. popularity.. Her name symbolizes distinction. Democracy has always recognized and cherished the fundamental importance of the individual.angelfire.html [3/30/07]) 120 . the good reputation of the individual represents and reflects the innate dignity of the individual. to most people..C.. be protected by society’s laws.. éclat. A reputation tarnished by libel can seldom regain its former lustre. Blurtit.

and she was the only creature in the room that he asked a second time. the village where they lived.14. and Catherine and Lydia had been fortunate enough to be never without partners. So. “Oh! my dear Mr. though in a quieter way. He had rather hoped that all his wife’s views on the stranger would be disappointed. (emphasis added) § 121 . Mary had heard herself mentioned to Miss Bingley as the most accomplished girl in the neighbourhood. he was regardless of time. Then. They returned therefore. but. and of which they were the principal inhabitants. he asked Miss Lucas. and the two sixth with Lizzy. and he seemed quite struck with Jane as she was going down the dance. and the Boulanger. Elizabeth felt Jane’s pleasure. Bingley had danced with her twice. in good spirits to Longbourn. They found Mr. Bennet had seen her eldest daughter much admired by the Netherfield party. and on the present occasion he had a good deal of curiosity as to the event of an evening which had raised such splendid expectations. but he soon found that he had a very different story to hear. Mr. and asked her for the two next. Jane Austen. Bennet still up. he enquired who she was. Pride and Prejudice (1813). and danced with her twice. Jane was so admired. he actually danced with her twice. “we have had a most delightful evening. I was so vexed to see him stand up with her. you know. Only think of that my dear. which was all that they had yet learnt to care for at a ball. ch. and the two fifth with Jane again. nobody can. and got introduced. the two third he danced with Miss King. and Mr. and she had been distinguished by his sisters. Mrs. nothing could be like it. a most excellent ball. he did not admire her at all: indeed. First of all. Bingley thought her quite beautiful. I wish you had been there. 3: The evening altogether passed off pleasantly to the whole family. With a book. Every body said how well she looked. On being admired. and the two fourth with Maria Lucas. Cf. however. Bennet. Jane was as much gratified by this as her mother could be.” as she entered the room.

1 The bad (or evil) is that which all things avoid. Eth. is blamed.A. from which it follows that the good is that which all things desire.M. “If. Summa Theol. being desired for its own sake. THE PRINCIPAL MEANINGS OF TO KALON AND TO AISCHROS.A. honestum autem dicitur.). quod contra honestum dividitur. The good is that which all things desire. ta)=lla de\ dia\ tou=to. “the good is that at which all things aim”.. two of which. B. But. I. Rhet. and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity. 4. clearly this must be the good and the chief good” (1094a 19-22. c. 5. have the character of ends because each is desirable for its own sake. n. which we wish for its own sake (everything else being wished for the sake of this).B. D. the pleasing. quod quidem habet delectationem annexam. Nic. quia utrumque est appetibile propter seipsum. tr. has pleasure attached to it. The honorable (or noble) is that which. is pleasing according to sense. (Aristotle. Ia. In I Ethic. quorum duo.) Cf. q.) 4 Finis autem habet rationem boni.. B. But that is called ‘honorable’ which is good according to reason.M. namely.M. the bad or evil is that which all things ‘fly from’. (1) But the end has the character of the good. I. which. or ‘abhor’. is praised. B. Whence the pleasing.M.. there is some end of the things we do. 1 Bonum est quod omnia appetunt. w(/st' ei)=nai kenh\n kai\ matai/an th\n o)/recin. in fact. the pleasing and the honorable. Thomas Aquinas. tr.3 The dishonorable (or ignoble) is that which. ou(= pa/nt' e)fi/etai. 3 kalo\n me\n ou)=n e)stin o(\ a)\n di' au(to\ ai(reto\n o)\n e)paineto\n h)=?.XII. the pleasing according to the sensitive appetite. malus). so that our desire would be empty and vain). delectibile et honestum. est delectibile secundum sensum. and the honorable (or noble). 2 That is.A. 1366a 34-37. then. bonus) and ‘bad’ or ‘evil’ (kakon. scilicet delectibile et honestum. lect. This account is implied by the foregoing definition. rev.) 122 .A. kai\ mh\ (20) pa/nta di' e(/teron ai(rou/meqa pro/eisi ga\r ou(/tw g' ei)j a)/peiron. (c) As being the same in subject with the three kinds of good and bad or evil. bonus autem in tria dividitur: in utile. (a) As being the same in subject as ‘good’ (agathon. or ‘feel an aversion to’. as the Philosopher goes on to say: ei) dh/ ti te/loj e)sti\ tw=n praktw=n o(\ di' au(to\ boulo/meqa. (St. tr. But good is divided into three: the useful. which is divided against the honorable. 58.4 (2) For these two (goods) are desirable for their own sakes: the honorable (or noble) indeed according to the rational appetite. unde delectabile. 1 (1094a 3): ta)gaqo/n. W. 9.2 (b) As meaning the ‘honorable’ or ‘noble’ and the ‘dishonorable’ or ‘ignoble’. 5. Aristotle. tr. N. habent rationem finis. dh=lon w(j tou=t' a)\n ei)/h ta)gaqo\n kai\ to\ a)/riston. quod est bonum secundum rationem. art. Thomas Aquinas. Ross. B. being abhorred for its own sake.. (St.

hoc autem tertium.) Cf. if they be taken commonly. which is more common among the things mentioned. 27. non distinguerentur subiecto abinvicem. B. 10.A. sed solum ratione. nam bonum dicitur aliquid secundum quod est in se perfectum et appetibile.” (tr. malus autem homo peccat: et praecipue circa delectationem. so what is loved is lovable. conferens. 9. quae est communior inter praedicta.2 (4) And he says that there are three things which fall under human choice. quod opponitur delectabile. vel delectabile vel utile. But something is called pleasing insofar as the appetite rests in it. utile autem refertur ad utrumque. but the useful is lovable on account of another. (St.5 (3) For not everything is loved indiscriminately because what is evil. Thomas Aquinas. Now with respect to these things the good man disposes himself rightly..A. lect. “For those things are called ‘beautiful’ which please when seen. i. delectabile secundum apptetitum sensitivum. 3. idest utile. In II Ethic. Ia. Ia-IIae. namely. as that which is for an end. But the third. For something is called ‘good’ insofar as it is perfect and an object of appetite in and of itself. i. the honorable (or noble). Thomas Aquinas. but only in meaning. 1. B. But the good and the pleasing.) 2 Non enim quodcumque indifferenter amatur. 4. idest vitium.M. in fact. ad 1: Pulchra enim dicuntur quae visa placent. namely. namely. et triste. quae cadunt sub electione humana: scilicet bonum.M. the useful. tr. and the painful. honestum quidem secundum apptetitum rationalem. art. tr. 2.3 (d) As meaning the ‘beautiful’ (kalon. the vicious. ita amatur amabile.e. (St.A. Summa Theol. 2. deformis). are not distinguished from each other in subject. ad 3: Cum enim bonum sit quod omnia appetunt. tr. pulcher) and the ‘ugly’ (aischros. but.) 3 Et dicit. n.. ‘misses the mark’): and principally with respect to pleasure. three things are contrary. sicut videtur visibile. To these. delectabile autem secundum quod in eo quiescit appetitus.M. (St. videtur esse id per quod pervenitur ad bonum honestum vel delectabile.. unde bonum honestum et delectabile sunt propter se amabilia ut fines. is not loved. the evil. B. quod tria sunt. which is opposed to the pleasing. by a twofold community. bonum autem et delectabile si communiter sumerentur. the good. which is opposed to the honorable. but the evil man errs (‘sins’. scilicet honestum. de ratione boni est quod in eo quietetur appetitus. the helping. Thomas Aquinas. n. to the extent that it is of this sort. the harmful. is either what is good per se. scilicet utile. the honorable (or noble good)—or it is the pleasing or the useful (good). 4. namely. idest honestum. duplici communitate. In IV Ethic. q. The beautiful is that which pleases upon being seen. In VIII Ethic.. sed. n.A.4 5 Haec enim duo sunt propter se appetibilia. quod opponitur honesto. nocivum. and the pleasing..) 4 Cf.e. St.e. quibus tria contrariantur: scilicet malum. sicut id quod est ad finem. just as what is seen is visible. lect. quod quidem est vel per se bonum. Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theol. the useful (good) seems to be that through which the honorable or pleasing good is arrived at.M. And so the honorable and pleasing goods are lovable for their own sakes as ends. art. which. quod opponitur utili. circa omnia autem haec bonus recte se habet. 123 . q. et delectabile. quia malum in quantum huiusmodi non amatur. which is opposed to the useful. lect.But the useful is referred to either one. 5. utile autem est amabile propter alterum. B. i.

Virtue. quae scilicet consistit in deformitate actus voluntarii.3 The disgraceful is an evil thought to tend to ignominy (or ill repute). 3 Ditto. to be ashamed necessarily has to do with such evils as are thought to be disgraceful either for oneself or for those about whom one has a regard” (tr. which consists in the 124 . a certain indifference and insensibility about such things.M. namely. vicious. it is the ‘admirable’ or ‘honorable’ (kalon. Vice. 1365b 35-37. it would seem. 2. for. vitia). from which it follows that the beautiful is that which quiets desire upon being seen. then virtue must of necessity be honorable (or noble).) 2 I have derived this definition from that of the honorable just given. being bad.M.2 (f) As the object of admiration (thaumazein. 9. 144. But if shame is what has been defined. 5 This definition is derived form the definition of the vicious disgrace given next.1 But if this is the dishonorable (or ignoble).: una quidem vitiosa.. tr. 6 Cf. is a faculty of providing and preserving good things. honestum) and the ‘disgraceful’ (aischros. art. B. a faculty productive of many and great harms. is praised. Thomas Aquinas. The sort of admirable deed which is virtuous consists in the conformity of a voluntary act.).A. past. Aristotle. then vice must of necessity be dishonorable or ignoble. it is worthy of blame. “Now shame is some pain or disturbance over evils present. kai\ du/namij eu)ergetikh\ pollw=n kai\ mega/lwn. that which. virtus) and ‘vice’ (poneria. c. 1 ei) de\ [35] tou=to/ e)sti to\ kalo/n. W. 4 Cf.. considered as a certain act. The admirable is a good thought to tend to good repute. 6. a)reth\ d' e)sti\ me\n du/namij w(j dokei= poristikh\ a)gaqw=n kai\ fulaktikh/.4 (g) As the object of admiration or of shame. would be a faculty of providing and preserving bad things.The ugly is that which displeases upon being seen. “For. or to come [15] which are thought to tend to ignominy (or ‘ill repute’).. kai\ pa/ntwn peri\ pa/nta. but it pertains to the account of the beautiful that the appetite be brought to rest in the sight or knowledge of it”. then. a)na/gkh ai)sxu/nesqai e)pi\ toi=j toiou/toij tw=n kakw=n o(/sa ai)sxra\ dokei= ei)=nai h)\ au)tw=? h)\ w(=n fronti/zei .A. being good. St. in fact. of all things in all cases. in fact. a)na/gkh th\n a)reth\n kalo\n ei)=nai: a)gaqo\n ga\r o)\n e)paineto/n e)stin. 1383b 14-20: e)/stw dh\ ai)sxu/nh lu/ph tij h)\ taraxh\ peri\ ta\ ei)j a)doci/an faino/mena fe/rein tw=n kakw=n. a faculty productive of many and great benefits. verecundia). being avoided for its own sake. but shamelessness. B. namely. If this is the honorable (or noble). Rhet.6 sed ad rationem pulchri pertinet quod in eius aspectu seu cognitione quietetur appetitus. for. Summa Theol. (Aristotle. Rhet. it is worthy of praise.5 The sort of disgrace which is vicious consists in the deformity of a voluntary act. being desired for its own sake. q. from which it follows that the disgraceful is an evil thought to tend to ignominy (or ill repute). ei) dh/ e)stin ai)sxu/nh h( o(risqei=sa. it belongs to the account of the good that the appetite be brought to rest in it. of all things in all cases. IIa-IIae. admiratio) or of shame (aischune. (e) As being the same as ‘virtue’ (arete. Rhys Roberts. turpis). is blamed. in fact. that which. h( d' a)naisxunti/a [15] o)ligwri/a tij kai\ a)pa/qeia peri\ ta\ au)ta\ tau=ta. I. “One (sort of disgrace is). h)\ paro/ntwn h)\ gegono/twn h)\ mello/ntwn. rev. II. since the good is what all things desire. turpitudo) or some ‘disgrace’ (aischos.

” (tr. considered as a certain act. and the useful goods. B. The beautiful is that which pleases—i. The painful evil is that which is opposed to the pleasing good. excites aversion—upon being seen.e. The disgraceful is an evil thought to tend to ignominy (or ill repute).(h) As being the same in subject as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ or ‘evil’. is praised.. (k) The three evils contrary to these goods. and having pleasure attached to it. The admirable is a good thought to tend to good repute. (n) As the object of admiration or of shame. being desired for its own sake. being referred to either one as that through which the honorable or pleasing good is arrived at. The honorable (or noble) good is that which is desirable for its own sake.M. The dishonorable (or ignoble) is that which. (m) As the object of admiration or of shame. and hence fly from). The pleasing good is that which is desirable for its own sake. is blamed.) 125 .e. The good is that which all things desire (and hence pursue). being good according to reason and the rational appetite. The honorable (or noble) is that which. The vicious evil is that which is opposed to the honorable good. (j) The honorable. deformity of a voluntary act. (i) As meaning the ‘honorable’ or ‘noble’ and the ‘dishonorable’ or ‘ignoble’.A. The harmful evil is that which is opposed to the useful good. being abhorred for its own sake. the pleasing. (l) As meaning the ‘beautiful’ and the ‘ugly’. The ugly is that which displeases—i. quiets desire—upon being seen.. The bad (or evil) is that which all things avoid (or feel an aversion to. being good according to sense and the sensible appetite. The useful good is that which is desirable for the sake of the other two.

). admiratio). from which it follows that the disgraceful is an evil thought to tend to ignominy (or ill repute). B. c. admiratio). or to come [15] which are thought to tend to ignominy (or ‘ill repute’). from which it follows that the disgraceful is an evil thought to tend to ignominy (or ill repute). but shamelessness. it is the ‘disgraceful’ (aischros. quam intelligibilia . q. art. ei) dh/ e)stin ai)sxu/nh h( o(risqei=sa. The disgraceful is an evil thought to tend to ignominy (or ill repute). 31. Rhet. 5. (tr. Aristotle. II.M. h( d' a)naisxunti/a [15] o)ligwri/a tij kai\ a)pa/qeia peri\ ta\ au)ta\ tau=ta. past.) Why the pleasing good appropriates the name ‘pleasure’: Sensibilia sunt magis nota. h)\ paro/ntwn h)\ gegono/twn h)\ mello/ntwn. B. (p) As the object of shame (aischune. II. to be ashamed necessarily has to do with such evils as are thought to be disgraceful either for oneself or for those about whom one has a regard” (tr. honestum). however. verecundia) or of admiration (thaumazein. or to come [15] which are thought to tend to ignominy (or ‘ill repute’). turpis) and the ‘admirable’ or ‘honorable’ (kalon. II. 1383b 14-20: e)/stw dh\ ai)sxu/nh lu/ph tij h)\ taraxh\ peri\ ta\ ei)j a)doci/an faino/mena fe/rein tw=n kakw=n. Aristotle..).A. art. The disgraceful is an evil thought to tend to ignominy (or ill repute). tr.A. IIa-IIae. a)na/gkh ai)sxu/nesqai e)pi\ toi=j toiou/toij tw=n kakw=n o(/sa ai)sxra\ dokei= ei)=nai h)\ au)tw=? h)\ w(=n fronti/zei .).M.1 The admirable is a good thought to tend to good repute. But if shame is what has been defined. ad 1: The pleasant.. extends to more things than the useful and the honest: since whatever is useful and honest is pleasing in some respect. 6. 6.. 3. but shamelessness. 1383b 14-20: e)/stw dh\ ai)sxu/nh lu/ph tij h)\ taraxh\ peri\ ta\ ei)j a)doci/an faino/mena fe/rein tw=n kakw=n.The sort of admirable deed which is virtuous consists in the beauty of a voluntary act. ‘Sensible things are more known to us than intelligible things’ (St. Rhet. Thomas Aquinas. 1 Cf. “Now shame is some pain or disturbance over evils present. a)na/gkh ai)sxu/nesqai e)pi\ toi=j toiou/toij tw=n kakw=n o(/sa ai)sxra\ dokei= ei)=nai h)\ au)tw=? h)\ w(=n fronti/zei . “Now shame is some pain or disturbance over evils present. Ethic. The sort of disgrace which is vicious consists in the deformity of a voluntary act. it is the ‘disgraceful’ and the ‘admirable’ or ‘honorable’. Summa Theol. 2 Cf. a certain indifference and insensibility about such things. q.2 The admirable is a good thought to tend to good repute.. h( d' a)naisxunti/a [15] o)ligwri/a tij kai\ a)pa/qeia peri\ ta\ au)ta\ tau=ta. h)\ paro/ntwn h)\ gegono/twn h)\ mello/ntwn.A. a certain indifference and insensibility about such things.A. Ia-IIae. B. whereas the converse does not hold (Nic. 145.. But if shame is what has been defined. B.. quoad nos. 126 . (o) As the object of shame (aischune.M. 3). turpitudo) or some ‘disgrace’ (aischos. to be ashamed necessarily has to do with such evils as are thought to be disgraceful either for oneself or for those about whom one has a regard” (tr. ei) dh/ e)stin ai)sxu/nh h( o(risqei=sa. Summa Theol.M. verecundia) or of admiration (thaumazein. past.

Mazzetti. See also: ‘Perfect and Whole’: Aristotle’s Poetics on the Structure of the Plot (Papers In Poetics 1) 127 .§ On That In Which Beauty Consists (c) 2013 Bart A. All Rights Reserved.