All Politics is Local: Mayoral Party Affiliations and Labor Unrest in Mexico⇤

Grace Paras

NYU Department of Politics March 22, 2013

Abstract This paper examines the effect of mayors’ political parties on labor strike behavior in Mexico from 1991-2011. I focus on the three major political parties in Mexico, listed here from most ideologically right to most ideologically left: the PAN, PRI, and PRD. The empirical tests employed in this study exclusively consider those mayors who had been elected within a 5% margin of victory in order to generate a quasi-randomized sample of municipalities free from intrinsic characteristics causing them to strongly favor one party over another party. The research design also utilizes year fixed effects and municipality fixed effects, and controls for economic, crime-related, and healthrelated confounding variables. Using this approach, I find a statistically significant lower quantity of strikes in municipalities when a closely elected PRD mayor holds office, particularly when the PRD mayor in office had defeated a candidate of the incumbent PAN party. This effect is strongest in the second year of the PRD mayor’s term. These results address the gap in quantitative research regarding relationships between labor and political party affiliation on the local level in Mexico.

⇤ I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Dube for her keen analytical skills and her guidance when interpreting the results of my empirical design. I would like to thank Professor Beck for helping me develop my thesis topic and for sharing his extensive insight on how to set up quasi-experiments. I would also like to thank my teaching assistant, Omar García-Ponce, for his dedication to helping me succeed and for sharing his data set on the outcomes of local Mexican elections.

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1

Introduction

This paper explores the relationship between labor strike behavior and mayoral political party affiliations in Mexico. The purpose of this paper is to explore local governments’ effect on labor activity. The outcomes of local elections were historically more unpredictable and more highly contested than elections on a national level. My study examines elections during years in which historic party ties to labor were evolving, dissolving, and developing. Learning more about the effect of mayoral parties on strikes at the empirical level helps us better understand local party-union relationships. A deeper understanding of political parties’ influence on labor in relation to upcoming elections will also affect how we view election campaign strategies in Mexico. Labor and party ties have been widely researched in Mexico in a national context, but the idea that municipal government influences or is influenced by labor organizations has not been explored quantitatively, to the best of my knowledge. My data set includes election data, including margin of victory in mayoral elections; political party data, including the party holding mayoral office per year; and labor activity data, measured in strikes per municipality in each year, relative to population. I included only the three most dominant parties in Mexico in my study, which are: the National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional, or PAN), the Institutional Revolutionary Party, (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, or PRI), and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (Partido de la Revolución Democrática, or PRD). This study analyzes the quantity of strikes per municipality per year, relative to population, in relation to various political party and election variables. My research shows that there is a statistically significant decrease in strikes when the left-most party, the PRD, holds office. The results also demonstrate that when examining labor strikes in relation to particular election outcomes, there is a statistically significant decrease in strikes when the sitting PRD mayor had defeated a candidate of the PAN incumbent party. This demonstrates that ideology of the mayoral party in office influences strike behavior. I also studied the effect of a PRD mayor holding office on the quantity of labor strikes in a municipality in relation to years in which elections were held. When PRD mayors who had defeated a candidate of the PAN incumbent party in the previous election hold office, there is a statistically significant decrease in strikes during the year before the next election. This demonstrates that the relationship between labor activity and the political party affiliation of the mayor is not based on an existing relationship or the mere presence of the party in office itself. If that were so, we would also observe a significant decrease in strikes during the first year that the mayor takes office. Instead, the presence of a PRD mayor in office decreases the 2

amount of strikes taking place during the second year of the mayor’s term. This means there is either a decrease in strikes after the mayor has introduced policies that labor organizations deem favorable, or that labor organizations agree to suppress their strike activity in the year before the next election when the PRD is the incumbent party, in order to portray the PRD in a favorable light. In the following sections of my thesis, I will provide a brief overview of the political party composition in the years leading up to and including modern-day Mexico. As part of the presentation of historical context, I will provide an overview of labor organizations’ relationships with political parties. I will then present a summary of the previously existing literature on strike behavior in Mexico. Next, I will explain my data and share my empirical strategy. The last few sections of my thesis will present the quantitative results of my study and draw possible conclusions based on these quantitative findings. I will then propose areas of further research that may be conducted in response to these results. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first municipal level quantitative analysis of labor unrest as it relates to mayoral political party affiliation, so there is ample room for future study.

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2.1

Background
The Three Major Political Parties and their Ideologies

PAN The PAN is the most ideologically conservative of Mexico’s mainstream political parties. The PAN was founded in the 1930s as an “intense conservative and economic mobilization” against the prevailing radical social and economic policies instituted at the time (Middlebrook 2001, 8). Additionally, “the PAN, like center-right and rightist parties elsewhere in the [Latin American] region, has had strong links with conservative sociopolitical forces” (Middlebrook 2001, 7). Surges in the PAN’s conservatism have occurred in the late 1930s and began again in the mid-1980s (Middlebrook 2001, 8). The PAN wields more power at the state and local levels than at the national level. Historically, the “PAN was [ideologically] farthest from the PRI” though that “distance might have been reduced as the PRI became more associated with neoliberal reforms during the 1990s” (Diaz-Cayeros 2003, 15). As the PRI’s economic ideology continues to resemble the PAN’s economic ideology, “many people who vote for the PAN do so because they want a change from the PRI” (Camp 1993, 159).

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PRI The PRI is the largest party in Mexico, and has the most extensive political base. From 1946-1987, “the party essentially functioned as a vehicle for maintaining itself in power”, but began to experience competition for the first time at the national and state levels in the late 1980s (Camp, 2011 109). The PRI is an ideologically centrist party that has been historically regarded as the national party of Mexico. The dominance of the PRI in Mexico’s history was structured along a corporatist model, which included “four official sectors: a labor sector which would unite the principal unions, a rural sector for peasant organizations, a military sector for the armed forces, and a ’popular’ sector for professional and territorially based organizations” (Selee and Peschard 2010, 4). However, increasing dissatisfaction with one-party dominance across Mexico and demand for more government transparency weakened this corporatist structure beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s. PRD The PRD was originally composed of a number of leftist groups, with ideologies ranging from populist to Marxist. The PRD gained political momentum following an ideological split within the PRI, when the son of the popular PRI President, Lázaro Cárdenas, left the party in order to run as a more leftist candidate instead (Selee and Pechard 2010, 3). In general, the PRD has advocated for “more radical negotiations favorable to Mexico on the debt; preached caution on privatization; . . . favored land redistribution; advocated for fixed exchange-rates to protect working-class incomes; and called for . . . electoral reforms” (Camp 1993, 160). The PRD has also promoted the freedom of labor organization by supporting strikes and other types of labor protest (Middlebrook 1995, 326).

2.2

Party Representation in Mexico

On a national and state level, the PRI has dominated politics for most of the Twentieth Century. The PRI held the presidency from 1929 to 2000 and is currently in power after winning the 2012 election (Camp 2011, 107). (The PAN held presidential office for two terms between 2000 and 2012.) According to Alberto Diaz-Cayeros, Beatriz Magaloni, and Barry R. Weingast (2003), “the ’tragic brilliance’ of one-party dominant systems lies in that the party employs a complex system of rewards and punishments that lead citizens to actively support the party, even if reluctantly” (3). Many consider the 2000 presidential election as the start of stable democracy in Mexico, not only because an opposition candidate won the presidency against the PRI, but also because “voters believed that 4

According to the quantitative results of a study performed by Diaz-Cayeros. . . Magaloni. historically.” This article also states that municipalities.. but will be referred to as “mayor” in this study. Elections take place every three years.) Mayors are responsible for heading the municipal councils. . . However. the PRI began to lose its stronghold over local politics due to “Mexico’s dismantling of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) policies”. organize the public municipal administration. In 1989. [carry out] procedures. Party competition at the local level was largely a result of changing economic policy and the liberalization of trade. 305). regulate . In Mexico. the councils “shall be empowered to approve the orders of police and government. The PRI hegemony was also observed on the municipal level. though this was a rare occurrence. the “credible threat of punishment makes it too costly for the locality to elect the opposition [party]. formulating and overseeing zoning and urban development 5 . are in charge of freely administering their own finances. . led by mayors. popular elections. Current mayors may not run for mayor in the next election. 306). Magaloni. For example. As stated in Article 115 of Mexico’s constitution. whose members are also elected by direct. . popular vote. ISI policies favor domestic production over imports. and public services . . matters. as it is illegal for a mayor to hold consecutive terms in office.3 Mayoral Elections and the Role of Mayors The leader of a Mexican municipality is called the presidente municipal in Spanish (which literally translates to “municipal president”). Because the [state] PRI punishes localities by withdrawing funds. . the state of Baja California elected a PAN governor. (There are a few exceptions where some municipalities in certain states held elections every two or four years at some point between 1991-2011. 17). it forces the locality to choose between electing the opposition without funds and the local PRI with funds” (11). 2. infiltrating the PRI’s “monopoly” on governorships for the first time (Middlebrook 1995. making them antithetical to the neoliberal reforms favored for the first time in Mexico in the late 1980s and early 1990s. . PAN candidates and PRD candidates began to win multiple municipal elections during the late 1980s and early 1990s (Middlebrook 1995. which came about in the 1980s chiefly due to a debt crisis at that time (Diaz-Cayeros. a change in the political model was necessary” (Camp 2011. and Weingast 2003. and ensure citizen and community participation. which “meant that the remote central government increasingly lost control over the local economies” (Cayeros-Diaz 2003. 144). 18). most mayoral elections take place curing the month of July (Gonzalez 1). and Weingast (2003). According to Article 115 of the Mexican Constitution. functions. mayors are elected in direct.

particularly for localities seeking to integrate with the United States economy. The neoliberal economic reforms introduced at this time also had an impact on expression of labor unrest. and worker demand was arguably greater [beginning] in the late 1980s and early 1990s than in previous years” (Middlebrook 1995. union formation. reducing importation taxes on goods traded amongst Mexico. Under Article 123. of Mexico’s constitution. Though the Constitution acknowledges that interaction between mayors and labor organizations will inherently occur. giving them credible exit options to the PRI’s centrally controlled spoils system” (4). the “growing opportunities in the international market.4 Economic Climate Because my data set spans from 1991-2011. allowed voters in those localities to exploit international opportunities. . . Magaloni. The more extensive “trade of goods and services” and a greater flow of “factors of production . Because “many labor organizations had been weakened by economic crisis and industrial restructuring” as a result of new. and reduced state control over labor and other social actors” (Camp 2011.plans. These reforms “returned the financial institutions back to private hands. Since the 1980s. decreased restrictions on foreign investment. . and Weingast (2003). 27). 307). These reforms were largely modeled after economic systems found in the United States and Canada. Title 16. “the practical impact of state controls on strikes. 2. it states that laws enacted by state legislators should regulate these relationships. the right to collective bargaining. 2. raised the opportunity costs . the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into effect in 1994. the US. by stating 6 . by forming unions [and] professional associations. increased trade dramatically since 1995. and providing resources and public services for citizens. of remaining under the inefficient PRI system” for “voters in those localities”. Mexico’s constitution grants laborers the right to assemble and protest peacefully. Mexico has implemented neoliberal policy changes. . neoliberal economic policies in Mexico. Consistent with these neoliberal reforms. it covers a period of economic transition in Mexico. and the right to strike” (50).5 Labor Laws and the Strike Process Anner (2008) argues that “labor’s ability collectively to pursue its demands is based on three complementary rights: the right to form unions. According to Diaz-Cayeros.” Under Title 17. and Canada. workers are given the right to “organize for the defense of their respective interests.

posing a potential threat to rights in the workplace. state controls over union formation became more formidable in the late 1980s and 1990s as compared to previous years (307). though postulated on a Latin American level. Strikes are considered legal when their goal is to establish “an equilibrium between the diverse factors of production and harmoniz[e] the rights of labor with those of capital” (La Botz 1992.that “the laws shall recognize strikes and lockouts as the rights of workers and employers. 34). and serve local regions (United States Department of Labor). these laws were “insufficient to counter balance the adverse effects of market-oriented reforms” because they often overlooked Mexico’s evolving economic context. La Botz (1992) observes that from 1982 to 1988. For example. and based on these petitions. meaning they needed to cut costs wherever possible.801 strike notifications were filed. Labor organizations must file petitions with the Board. The growing potential for labor rights violations spurred these labor-friendly reforms. Multiple Boards are established in each state as per the recommendation of the governor. The first is that. The result was a de facto form of labor market flexibility that contributed to the decline of union power” (Anner 2008. which now included outsourcing. To be considered legal. workers are granted the right to strike when the strike is declared “legal”. and informalization (34). internationalization. These obstacles have been successful in suppressing the number of strikes taking place in Mexico. labor unions continue to lose power in” Latin America during the 2000s (Anner 2008. but in practice. Anner (2008) concludes that there was a decrease in unionization in Mexico due to the absence of labor reform policy (37).3% of those strikes were actually carried out (50). Additionally. “well over a decade since the initial round of labor reforms. strikes also need to involve a majority of the coalition of workers and must be approved by the Board of Conciliation and Arbitration. In light of this new economic context. 49). the strike process in Mexico has severe limitations. Anner’s theory. 78. During the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. in spite of the passage of labor-friendly reforms. holds true in Mexico where. producers were under more pressure to vie for foreign direct investment.” Still. the Board can deem strikes illegal before they even occur. “many Latin American governments in the 1990s either maintained or reduced state resources dedicated to enforcement [of labor rights]. 24). according to Middlebrook (1995). but only 2. Anner states that two main factors are responsible for this trend. 7 .

110). 325-326). The following quantitative studies are important in establishing the context for my study. 107). it does not tend to form strong or long-term relationships with specific unions in the way that Burgess describes (Middlebrook 1995. The authors found that union-backed political parties in Latin America have garnered the support of their main constituencies through “adopting relatively union-friendly labor laws in an otherwise uncertain political and economic environment” (Murillo and Schrank 2005.1 Literature Review Past and Most Relevant Works Most of the existing qualitative and quantitative research on labor strikes in a political context has been conducted on a national level. Though the PRI had formed intricate relationships with labor unions in the past by way of its corporatist model. and organizational arenas and (2) govern the management of negotiation and conflict within the alliance” (Burgess 1999. Those involved in the relationship “(1) lay out each partner’s side of the bargain in the socioeconomic. many leaders of independent unions had begun to approach the PRD instsead of pursuing relationships with the PRI (Murillo 2001. including the labor framework it contains. the majority of union leaders had been quite closely tied to PRI leadership. political.2. Up to this point. Starting in the late 1970s. 305. the growth of opposition parties has weakened this model. the PRD emerged as a legitimate political challenge to the PRI and appealed for unions’ support. In exchange. the party uses its political power to benefit labor organizations and gives labor leaders a role in passing labor policy. and Labor Rights in Latin America”. Historically. A few years previous. the PRD began establishing itself as a labor-friendly force and also began using strikes as an election strategy. the first real threat to a PRI presidential victory occurred in 1988 and caused union leaders closely tied to the PRI to be fearful of their own political standing. 108). 3 3. Maria Victoria Murillo and Andrew Schrank (2005) explore the relationship between union-backed political parties and their constituencies in “With a Little Help from my Friends: Partisan Politics. Transnational Alliances. Still. On a national level. In the late 1980s. 972). party-union alliances tend to follow a structural norm in Mexico. unions are “expected to moderate their strike activity and refrain from maximizing their wage demands when the party was in government” (Burgess 1999. Their regression analysis leads to a 8 .6 The Party-Labor Relationship According to Katrina Burgess (1999).

Murillo examines the partisan loyalty to the PRI of two major unions from 1977 to 1993 on a national level. In her book Labor Unions. my paper instead explores the interaction between political parties and all labor organizations that go on strike at a municipal level. democratic transitions. Middlebrook also eliminates another potential factor influencing labor behavior: presidential policy. Murillo walks her readers through the corrosion of the relationships between the PRI and some unions due to the PRI’s implementation of neoliberal reforms in the late 1980s and early 1990s.variety of conclusions. nor produce statistically significant effects. The study also claims that unions are more likely to restrain their militancy when their allied parties are in power. Middlebrook found that the strike count over time did not vary alongside shifts in presidential policy. He also concludes that no significant relationship existed between economic variables (inflation. 985). on the notion that party-labor alliances generally influence demonstrations of labor unrest. Kevin J. and market reforms do not affect partisan alliances. democratic transitions. Unlike Murillo’s case study of specific unions in Mexico. In his paper regarding market reform and party support in Mexico. Labor. and Authoritarianism in Mexico. called “The Populist Road to 9 . and variations in gross domestic product) and the amount of strikes taking place in one year. This conclusion is a highly important motivating factor for my study. This conclusion is useful to my study because it potentially rules out sociopolitical transformations. First. do not have a significant impact “on the probability of reform nor compromise the effects of the political variables” (Murillo and Schrank 2005. Middlebrook performs a quantitative study of factors affecting labor strikes in Mexico on a national level. Partisan Coalitions. since my research is based. then. in part. might be influencing strike behavior in Mexico. across Mexico. Firstly. This conclusion is important because it leaves us wondering what. Using her case study of Mexico. which motivates my exploration of municipality effects on strike count. 106). and market reforms as confounding variables in my study. like price stability and growth rate. In his book. The Paradox of Revolution. the State. The authors’ conclude that sociopolitical transformations. The study also concludes that macroeconomic conditions. and Market Reforms in Latin America. the authors found that the presence of a party alliance increases the rate of labor reform implementation. changes in real wages. This study found that “partisan loyalty promoted union-government collaboration” and also that “partisan competition increased incentives for labor militancy” for allied union leaders because they “feared replacement” (Murillo 2001. Middlebrook found that there was a fairly low quantity of labor strikes taking place in Mexico over time.

as well. I design an empirical strategy laden with tough controls.2 Contribution to Existing Literature My research differs from the existing literature on labor activity in Mexico because I explore the relationship between labor unrest and political parties on a municipal level. apply on a municipal level. focus on a particular sector of labor. or provide case studies pertaining to specific labor unions. 3. In doing so. Then. 351). Middlebrook concludes that though believed to be the largest influence on strike behavior. There are very few quantitative studies on labor unrest in Mexico and I was unable to locate any that explored labor activity on a municipal level. Based on this demographic correlation. Though the average number of strikes taking place per year in Mexico nationwide has declined over time. there appears to be a lack of research regarding local factors and strike activity in studies worldwide.Reform: Policy and Electoral Coalitions in Mexico and Argentina”. 10 . Many studies on strike behavior in Mexico either concern the economic motivations for strikes. My study uses a close election research design in order to control for such economic and cultural factors. Gibson finds that since the PRI began to lose some of its absolute political stronghold in the late 1970s. In fact. this tidy pattern becomes undone even when breaking down strikes on a state level. I explore whether or not Murillo and Schrank’s results. I look at this effect more specifically in relation to the proximity of the next mayoral election. that party-union alliances remain strong in light of a plethora of controls. My research addresses political factors that affect strike activity. Edward L. countrywide. and occupations characteristic of the metropolitan economy” (Gibson 1997. generally its “electoral support has been strongly correlated with indicators of ruralness. As part of his quantitative work. and negatively correlated with indicators of urbanization. meaning the progression of strikes per state per year is not indicative of the national trend. I explore the relationship between the party affiliation of mayors and the number of strikes taking place in those mayors’ municipalities. and illiteracy. education. a president’s policy implementations and economic indicators are not significantly related to the amount of strikes taking place in Mexico. primary production.

By this time.2 5. This data ranges from 1991-2011 and comes from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Georgrafía (INEGI). 5. Hypothesis 3:Because my study contains data spanning from 1991-2011.1 Independent Variables Main Independent Variable I use mayoral election outcomes as the main independent variable in this study. will occur when the PRD is in power. I chose to make my strike measure proportional to population in order to account for any effects due to varying municipality size.4 Hypothesis By adapting these theories about Mexican political parties and labor ties at a national level to my local study. the PRI had adopted neoliberal economic policy. 5 5. spanning from 1987 to projected data in 11 . My data set includes outcome information for mayoral elections in each municipality. I hyopthesize: Hypothesis 1: The least amount of labor unrest. garner as high a quantity of strikes as the PAN will when in office. My key dependent variable is the number of strikes per municipality per year.1 Data Dependent Variable My unit of analysis is municipality per year. as measured by strikes. based on its more conservative policies. on average. when the PAN is in power. qualitative literature suggests that some unions continued to maintain very close relationships with the PRI. causing many of its relationships with labor organizations to dissolve and its political stronghold at the local level to weaken.2. respectively. Hypothesis 2: I expect to find the most amount of labor unrest. meaning that the PRI had not lost all its union loyalty by any means and therefore will not. due to its tendency to produce labor-friendly policy and its growing role in forming relationships with labor since the 1970s. Still. relative to a population of 100.000 people. I believe that a PRI mayor holding office will not have as strong of a negative or positive effect on the number of strikes as the PRD or PAN will. measured by strike count.

and dummy variables for each possible election transition outcome for the three major parties (the PAN. I run regression tests using a series of election transition independent variables. 5. my crime variable is the number of homicides per municipality per year. 12 . Also. like my strike variable.2 Control Variables All of my tests include year fixed and municipality fixed effects. and are restricted so that they only include municiaplity years in which the mayor in office won by a margin of victory less than 5%. All three of these variables are scaled per 100. one crime-related. To measure the party of the mayor within my various regressions. which could interfere with the analysis of political variables. moving from the most generally defined outcomes to the most specific. My economic variable is the municipality’s budget per year. and one health-related. and PRD). time-varying control variables.000 people. These three variables could act as potential confounders because a mayor may be elected based on social and economic conditions. Within these three categories. my options were quite limited due to the scarcity of municipal data available ranging from 19912011. a dummy variable corresponding to the party of the mayor in office. The election data comes from el Centro de Investigación para el Desarollo (CIDAC). PRI. All three of these external confounding variables also come from INEGI and range from 1991-2011. I also included three additional. and my health variable is the number of fetal mortalities per municipality per year. the margin of victory percentage.2.2013. one economic. for consistency and proportionality. I used varaibles such as the year a mayor holds office. These categories of variables were selected in order to reduce any effect of a municipality’s intrinsic characteristics on labor unrest. certain socioeconomic conditions of a municipality unrelated to a mayor’s presence in office may influence strike outcomes. the year in which that mayor was elected.

243 0.5.139 0.046 0.479 0.269 0.014 256000.073 0.053 0.006 0.250 0.074 0.404 0.212 0.005 0.156 0. (100.0000555 46.391 0.262 0.059 0.067 0.205 0.008 0.62 170.047 0.183 13. 1.374 0.506 21.182 0.429 0.000 people) Population per municipality PAN PRI PRD Margin of victory Budget (in thousands of pesos) Budget per pop.006 0.050 5980000.473 0.363 0.000 people) PAN defeats another party PRI defeats another party PRD defeats another party PAN Remains PRI Remains PRD Remains PAN defeats PRI PAN defeats PRD PRI defeats PAN PRI defeats PRD PRD defeats PAN PRD defeats PRI Year 1 of mayoral term Year 2 of mayoral term PAN defeats another party x Year 1 PAN defeats another party x Year 2 PRI defeats another party x Year 1 PRI defeats another party x Year 2 PRD defeats another party x Year 1 PRD defeats another party x Year 2 PAN defeats PRI x Year 1 PAN defeats PRI x Year 2 PAN defeats PRD x Year 1 PAN defeats PRD x Year 2 PRI defeats PAN x Year 1 PRI defeats PAN x Year 2 PRI defeats PRD x Year 1 PRI defeats PRD x Year 2 PRD defeats PAN x Year 1 PRD defeats PAN x Year 2 PRD defeats PRI x Year 1 PRD defeats PRI x Year 2 Obs.047 0.224 0.020 0.00 2750000.452 10.000 people) Homicides Homicides per pop.538 32.949 0.073 0. (100.211 0.3 Descriptive Statistics Table 1: Summary of Descriptive Statistics for Sample Restricted to a Margin of Victory of 5% or Less Variable Name Strikes Strikes per pop.337 0.236 0.800 0. Dev.635 0.078 0.025 77600.296 0.223 0.019 0.042 St.000 152000.234 0.200 Min 0 0 219 0 0 0 0.241 0.060 45434.159 0.100 1611497 1 1 1 0.480 21.138 0.000 people) Fetal mortalities Fetal mortalities per pop.080 0. (100.062 0.00 1243 548.020 0.019 0.498 0.135 0.345 0.139 0.000 182000.66 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Max 50 50.825 116910.034 0.163 0.188 0.168 0.209 0.058 0.000 31. (100.180 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 13 .357 0.000 6.454 0. 8508 8481 8481 8508 8508 8508 8508 7764 7738 8508 8481 8508 8481 7066 7066 7066 7066 7066 7066 7066 7066 7066 7066 7066 7066 8508 8506 7066 7065 7066 7065 7066 7065 7066 7065 7066 7065 7066 7065 7066 7065 7066 7065 7066 7065 Mean 0.456 0.540 0.074 0.900 24.159 528 244.168 0.088 0.374 0.053 0.026 0.027 0.135 0.190 0.111 0.260 0.

5. semi-urban municipalities. The municipalities in Figure 1 that contain the highest average quantity of strikes include rural municipalities. and are not overwhelmingly confined to one specific geographic area of the country. higher average quantities of strikes do appear to be more prevalent in some regions over others. 38). 14 .4.4 5. The map demonstrates that strikes occur all over Mexico. Still. nor are they most prevalent along specific borders. and metropolitan municipalities (OECD 2007. fairly urban municipalities.1 Visual Representation of the Data Dependent Variable Figure 1 represents the density of the average number of strikes in municipalities from 1991-2011.

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! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 1 Dot = 0.

The trends on the state level are not as “neat” as the trend at the national level. Strikes have generally been declining over time. aggregated to a national level. Nationally Average Number of Strikes Relative to Population 0 91 .1 . and some states do not have a clear pattern defining the fluctuations in the average number of strikes per year. Relative to Population 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 Figure 3 represents the average number of strikes relative to population in Mexican states over time.15 . 16 20 10 20 11 . Figure 2: Average Number of Strikes Over Time. because even strikes per year per state do not follow the national trend. Already.05 . we see that there is a need to study strike behavior on a more local level.Figure 2 represents the average number of strikes relative to population in Mexico over time.2 Average Number of Strikes per Year.

Relative to Population. Per State 17 Nuevo León Tlaxcala 20 03 07 20 19 11 91 19 95 99 19 20 20 20 19 11 91 19 95 99 19 20 Chihuahua Jalisco 20 20 03 07 20 19 11 91 19 19 95 99 20 20 San Luis Potosí 03 07 20 19 11 91 19 19 95 99 México Campeche Durango Oaxaca Sinaloa 20 03 07 20 19 11 91 19 95 99 03 07 11 19 19 19 95 99 20 19 11 91 20 07 20 03 20 20 19 11 91 19 95 99 19 20 20 20 20 03 07 20 19 11 91 19 19 95 99 20 20 03 07 20 19 11 91 19 19 95 99 20 20 03 07 20 19 11 91 19 19 95 99 Veracruz de Ignacio de la Llave Puebla Sonora Guanajuato Yucatán 20 03 07 11 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 03 07 20 11 20 20 03 07 20 11 20 20 03 07 20 11 20 20 03 07 20 11 Coahuila de Zaragoza Michoacán de Ocampo . State-wide Average Number of Strikes per Year.! Average Number of Strikes Relative to Population 19 91 95 99 19 99 99 99 99 99 03 07 19 19 19 19 19 95 95 95 95 95 19 19 19 19 19 91 19 19 0 91 91 91 91 91 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 19 0 1 2 3 19 0 1 2 3 19 0 1 2 3 19 0 1 2 3 19 0 1 2 3 19 95 19 99 Colima Morelos Guerrero Querétaro Tabasco Aguascalientes Zacatecas 20 03 07 20 19 11 91 19 95 99 19 99 99 99 03 07 19 19 19 95 95 95 95 99 19 19 19 19 19 20 19 11 91 20 19 11 91 20 19 11 91 20 19 11 91 20 07 07 07 07 20 20 20 20 03 03 03 03 20 20 19 11 91 19 95 99 19 03 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 07 20 11 Chiapas Hidalgo Nayarit Baja California Quintana Roo Tamaulipas 20 03 07 20 19 11 91 19 95 99 03 07 20 19 11 91 19 95 99 03 07 19 19 19 95 99 20 19 11 91 20 07 07 20 20 03 03 20 19 99 99 19 95 95 19 19 19 19 19 95 99 20 19 11 91 20 19 11 91 20 19 11 91 20 07 07 07 20 20 20 03 03 03 20 20 19 11 91 19 95 99 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 03 07 20 19 11 91 19 19 95 99 Baja California Sur Figure 3: Average Number of Strikes Over Time.

we see that there have been PAN and PRD mayors who have most frequently held office spread throughout the country. and the intensity of the PRI’s years in office also varies across the country. all three parties seem to have held mayoral office in geographic regions across the country. on the map of Mexico. These maps are color coded in order to demonstrate the total number of years in which a mayor of said party held office from 1991-2011 in each municipality. In this paper. Therefore. While the map in Figure 4 demonstrates the party that most frequently held mayoral office from 1991-2011 in each municipality. Restriction to close elections also helps assuage this concern. Still. 351). and PRD mayors. in his study. Gibson highlights the importance of including some sort of urbanization or ruralness measure when analyzing party support (Gibson 1997. 6. Though the PRI has held mayoral office most frequently. as previously stated. figures 5. municipality fixed effects already help control for characteristics associated with rural or urban municipalities. and 7 show the distribution of PAN. Also. I do not merely analyze the municipality-years in which the PRD holds mayoral office versus those in which other parties hold office. a “closely elected” mayor refers to a mayor elected with a margin of victory under 5%. this map illustrates that the PRD has primarily dominated in southwestern Mexico in terms of longevity of the amount of years in office. Figure 7 demonstrates that the PRD has held office all over geographic Mexico. It is important to consider the geographic distribution of mayors holding office because if all mayors of a certain party were concentrated in one geographic area and that party was found to have a significant effect on strikes. Figure 6 demonstrates that the PRI has held office all over geographic Mexico. and the intensity of the PAN’s years in office also varies across the country. respectively.Just as strikes occur all over Mexico. that effect might be due to geographic factors instead of political variables. Figure 5 demonstrates that the PAN has held office all over geographic Mexico. PRI. but rather restrict the sample to locations where the PRD barely wins or barely loses (elections in which the mayor holding office won an election by a margin of victory less than 5%.) 18 . Still.

Figure 4: Distribution of Political Parties in Mexican Municipalities 1991-2011 Legend Missing Data Mayor most frequently in office PAN 19 PRI PRD .

Figure 5: Intensity Map of PAN Mayors 1991-2011 Number of Years PAN Mayor Held Office One Year or Less Two to Five Years Six to Nine Years Ten to Fourteen Years Fifteen to Twenty-One Years 20 Missing Data .

Figure 6: Intensity Map of PRI Mayors 1991-2011 Number of Years PRI Mayor Held Office Five Years or Less Six to Nine Years Ten to Thirteen Years Fourteen to Sixteen Years Seventeen to Twenty-One Years Missing Data 21 .

Figure 7: Intensity Map of PRD Mayors 1991-2011 Number of Years PRD Mayor Held Office One Year or Less Two to Four Years Five to Eight Years Nine to Thirteen Years Fourteen to Twenty-One Years 22 Missing Data .

I aim to create a uniform context in which I will explore the effects of the mayoral political party on strike activity per municipality. Through the use of fixed effects.508 municipality-years. the opposite pattern should hold for the PRD” (28). and Weingast (2003). I also chose to exclusively examine mayors elected in close elections. my data set. The close election design eliminates almost any bias of this sort. now includes 8.487 municipalities over a span of 20 years.324 municipality-years for which strike data and party transition data was available. My regressions are clustered by municipality and are performed with year fixed and municipality fixed effects. according to DiazCayeros. other characteristics should be quite similar across these locations. By restricting my sample in this way. making for a total of 51. If we compare places where a mayor barely won versus places where a mayor barely lost. For example.138 municipality-year observations. I chose to perform a series of fixed-effect regressions. which circumvents concerns that locations where one party tends to win may have other characteristics that affect demonstration of labor unrest through strike behavior. Magaloni. 23 . which once included 43. making for an approximately 80% reduction in sample size (Figure 8). Gibson (1997) supports this claim by stating that PRI is associated with ruralness and illiteracy (35).6 Empirical Strategy My raw data set includes strike data for 2. we expect “the PAN to win in richer states and in more urban. My study considers mayors elected by a margin of victory of less than 5%. literate municipalities.

Municipality-Year Observations ! Mayoral Elections and Competition Years in which the mayor in office won the election with a margin of victory > 5% Years in which the mayor in office won the election with a margin of victory < 5% 19.Figure 8: Margin of Victory of Mayoral Elections.64% 80.36% 24 .

a factor that often has a profound effect on labor behavior. My economic confounder enables my regressions to account for an aspect of economic wellbeing. in order to further reduce the effects of any inherent municipality characteristics on the number of strikes. aside from the political party of the municipality’s mayor. Although budget is not the ideal variable with which to measure the economic wellbeing 25 . This means that about 65% of the total municipalities contained in the unrestricted sample had at least one closely elected mayor during the 1991-2011 span. In his international study on strike activity. I also included the three aforementioned additional confounding variables in my study. 157).Figure 9 illustrates that at least one mayor elected within a margin of victory of 5% or less held office in 1.487 municipalities contained in the unrestricted sample. Figure 9: Margin of Victory of Mayoral Elections.02% 64.616 of the 2.98% Though all of my regressions include year fixed and municipality fixed effects. Total Municipalities ! ! Mayoral Elections and Competion Municipalities with at least one election in which an election was won with a margin of victory < 5% Municipalities without at least one election in which an election was won with a margin of victory < 5% 35. Doug Hibbs found that “strike activity exhibits great year-to-year fluctuation” and cited depressions and economic recovery as some of the main causes of this fluctuation (Hibbs 1978.

which Murillo calls “union militancy”.813. Militancy “refers to organized protests disrupting production or governance” and “is usually measured by counting the number. I also chose strikes because they seem to be the standard measure of organized labor action. Emplazamientos are filed much more frequently than strikes are actually carried out. I chose to use the number of strikes relative to population as my dependent variable. or strike petitions. 26 . Moreover. per 100. strike petitions may be filed routinely whenever contract negotiations are due. Whereas the average number of strikes from 1991-2011 in a municipality in one year.000 people is . By also using crime and health controls. I reduce the influence of a municipality’s standard of living. I found strikes per population to be the best indicator of labor behavior in Mexican municipalities because. after considering two other possible dependent variables. duration. I also considered using a strike dummy variable as my dependent variable in order to examine the effect of the presence of one or more strikes in a municipality per year versus the absence of strikes in a municipality per year. On the one hand. that could mean that permission to strike was not granted due to political factors. as strikes. restricted sample based on margin of victory. 11). or as a way for unions to “flex their muscles”. I was only able to access comprehensive data for the number of strikes taking place per municipality. and confounding variable controls). The majority of these petitions get resolved without ever making it to the strike stage of the process. Due to the very strong set of controls (fixed effects. per 100. This means about 126 times more emplazamientos are filed in a year than strikes coming to fruition. 162).of a municipality. Since there are many years for which no strikes took place in a municipality. Of these three strike subcategories. I believe that it is appropriate to examine the results of my regressions within a 90% confidence interval. or scope of strikes” (Murillo 2001. I ruled out using emplazamientos. Though the inclusion of emplazamientos would have allowed for a greater number of non-zero observations in my data set. as my dependent variable. the parameters of the budget should be larger in years of economic prosperity and lower in years of economic downturn. Due to strikes’ high opportunity cost. as “collective actions. or as standard of a measure. the average number of strikes in a municipality in one year. I do not believe them to be as accurate. which further isolates the effect of a mayor’s political party on strike behavior.054.000 people is 6. On the other hand. strikes represent workers’ most important means of bringing strong pressure to bear on private-sector employers” and often “serve as the principal vehicle for workers’ political protests” (Middlebrook 1995. labor unions carrying out strikes to fruition indicate a serious investment of time and effort for a cause.

160). Mayors in all other Mexican municipalities are prohibited from running in the next election immediately following their term of office. before 1997. t = year.. I felt the count number of strikes taking place in a municipality was still the best measure of labor unrest since continuous variables contain more unadulterated information than dummy variables. and most general. the president of Mexico was in charge of appointing the mayor of México. The mayor of México. D. (Wirth 2006. p = year fixed effects. Y = strikes relative to population.000 people. as part of my study would not represent the “typical” relationship between labor strikes and the mayor’s political party affiliation found in Mexico. where i = municipality. q = a vector of controls that includes economic.F. Therefore the inclusion of México. regression included in this study tests this relationship when a closely elected PAN or PRD mayor holds office relative to when a closely elected PRI mayor holds office. However. including different party transitions following elections and the chronological point in the mayor’s term. the independent variable. the party of the mayor holding office.F. Only in 1997 did Congress grant the citizens of México. D. The fixed effect regressions included in this study test the effect of closely elected mayors’ political parties on strikes relative to population in a variety of different circumstances. I also chose to make the strike variable a more consistent measure by making it proportional per 100. Mayors in México. whereas mayors in other municipalities traditionally serve three-year terms. I use the following equation. D. In each set of regressions.F. D. a = municipality fixed effects.F. (Wirth 2006. and E = error. 154). is presented within numerous political contexts. D. The first.Ultimately. is also part of the federal government. D. from my data set because its mayoral election process is different from that of the other 31 Mexican states. crime and health-related variables. This way.F. I chose to eliminate México.F. one strike per year in a small municipality will be weighted similarly to multiple strikes per year in a large municipality. There are also no term limits for mayors of México. the right to elect mayors through a democratic process. also serve six-year terms. My second regression considers whether a closely elected PAN or PRD mayor holding office 27 . the dependent and control variables remain uniform. D.F. 156). Yit = ↵i + ⇡t + b1 P ANit + b2 P RDit + it b + ✏it My next series of tests examines the effect of party transitions following mayoral elections on strike behavior. and can only be removed by the federal senate (Wirth 2006.

By this point. The quadratic prediction plot labeled Figure 10. Any significant results could therefore be defined as a right-of-center party or a left-of-center party producing a significant effect on the number of strikes relative to population. Yit = ↵i + ⇡t + b1 P RItoP ANit + b2 P RDtoP ANit + b3 P AN toP RDit + b4 P RItoP RDit +b5 P AN remainsit + b6 P RIremainsit + b7 P RDremainsit + it b + ✏it The remaining regressions take into account the specific year of the mayor’s term in which strikes took place and consider municipalities in which a closely elected PRI mayor holds office. which is why I chose to narrow my remaining tests to closely elected PRD mayors holding office in more specifically defined political contexts. I chose to use a closely elected PRI mayor holding office as the omitted category for two reasons. In my data set. I elaborate on the election outcomes presented in my second regression. the PRI is a sort of political “standard” in Mexico due to its historical dominance on the municipal. there are 29. since I define the party of the incumbent specifically. Yit = ↵i + ⇡t + b1 OthertoP ANit + b2 OthertoP RDit + b3 P AN remainsit + b4 P RIremainsit + b5 P RDremainsit + it b + ✏it In my third regression. This equation is an elaboration of the one I use in my second test. this time looking at specific party transitions following close elections. First. before municipality 28 . for example. there is no overlap in the confidence intervals of the two lines of best fit on either side of the cut-off. state. the PRI is the most ideologically center party. Second. shows the lines of best fit (based on a quadratic regression) for the number of strikes in a municipality when a PRD mayor does not hold office and when a PRD mayor does hold office. and national level. making it an intuitive measure.213 years in which a PRD mayor held office.504 municipalities per year in which a PRI mayor held office. There is an evident relationship between a PRD mayor holding office and fewer strikes per year in a municipality. This plot examines the raw data.had defeated a candidate of the incumbent party relative to when a closely elected PRI mayor who defeated a candidate of the incumbent party holds office. In fact. I expand on the first equation by defining the transition dummy variables. a PRD mayor holding office has produced a significant effect on strikes.545 municipalities per year in which a PAN mayor held office and 5. as compared to 6.

The equation once again considers a more broad definition of transition by including municipality-years when a PAN or PRD mayor in office had defeated a candidate of the incumbent party relative to when a closely elected PRI mayor who defeated a candidate of the incumbent party holds office.10 0. Relative to Population Number of Strikes in a Municipality.00 -. I examine the effect of a closely elected PRD mayor who had defeated a candidate of the incumbent party during the first year and second year of his term in office.fixed effects.05 .04 0.05 Margin of Victory 0 in a Mayoral .1 -. year fixed effects.10 0. 29 .1 .04 0. relative to the third year of his term.14 The Effect of a PRD Mayor on the Number of Strikes in Municipalities 0.05 Election Margin of Victory in a Mayoral Election .05 0 . Relative to Population 0.07 0.14 The Effect of a PRD Mayor on the Number of Strikes in Municipalities -.00 0. Figure 10: Quadratic Prediction Plot . or any other control variables are considered.15 -.1 -.15 0.1 .15 -.15 Frequency when a PRD mayor does not hold office Frequency when a PRD mayor holds office 90% Confidence Interval Fitted values when a PRD mayor does not hold office Fitted values when a PRD mayor holds office In my fourth regression.Average number of strikes per municipality per year and a 15% margin of victory or margin of loss for the PRD ! ! Number of Strikes in a Municipality.07 0.

My fifth regression examines the effect on strikes when a closely elected PRD mayor who had defeated a PAN incumbent in the previous election holds office. relative to population. in relation to the specific year of the mayor’s term. I combine my fifth and sixth regressions to make for an even tighter test of the effect of a closely elected PRD mayor who had defeated either a PAN or PRI incumbent in the previous election on the number of strikes per municipality per year. Yit = ↵i + ⇡t + b1 P RItoP RDit + b2 Y ear1 + b3 Y ear2 + b4 P RItoP RDit ⇤ Y ear1 + b5 P RItoP RDit ⇤ Y ear2 + it b + ✏it Lastly. in relation to the specific year of the mayor’s term.Yit = ↵i + ⇡t + b1 OthertoP RDit + b2 Y ear1 + b3 Y ear2 + b4 OthertoP RDit ⇤ Y ear1 + b5 OthertoP RDit ⇤ Y ear2 + it b + ✏it My fifth and sixth regressions explore the specific transitions that take place as the result of a close mayoral election. Yit = ↵i + ⇡t + b1 P AN toP RDit + b2 Y ear1 + b3 Y ear2 + b4 P AN toP RDit ⇤ Y ear1 + b5 P AN toP RDit ⇤ Y ear2 + it b + ✏it Similarly. the sixth regression examines the effect on strikes when a closely elected PRD mayor who had defeated a PRI incumbent in the previous election holds office. Yit = ↵i + ⇡t + b1 P AN toP RDit + b2 P RItoP RDit + b3 Y ear1 + b4 Y ear2 + b5 P AN toP RDit ⇤ Y ear1 + b6 P AN toP RDit ⇤ Y ear2 + b7 P RItoP RDit ⇤ Y ear1 + b8 P RItoP RDit ⇤ Y ear2 + it b + ✏it 30 . in relation to the specific year of the mayor’s term.

0187 (0. Fetal mortality per pop. Therefore. Since the elected mayor does not take office until the next year.01 31 .0107 0. The nature of the data simply cannot provide enough details to draw chronological conclusions regarding the number of strikes taking place relative to the election within the election year itself. ***p<0.0274) (0. or they may respond to the presence of the current mayor due to his party affiliation or the policy he has implemented.000225 -0.10.000454) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 7738 8481 8481 1572 1616 1616 0.0107 PAN PRD Budget per pop. sixth.0188 -0.0426** -0.0262) (0.0426** (0. and seventh regressions because the third year is synonymous with the next election year.13E-10 (1.0165) Strikes per population (2) (3) (4) -0.17E-10) -0. it would be impossible to distinguish whether strikes taking place in a municipality during an election year occurred leading up to the election or following the election.0107 (0. Homicides per pop. though the years preceding and following elections are farther removed from the election itself.0165) (0.13E-10 (1.05.0000396 -0.0173) (0.00011 (0.0107 (0. (1) -0.01 (5) -0.0263) -0.0424** (0.00000869 -0.0174) -1.0107 -0. Because my strike data is compiled on a yearly basis and most mayoral elections take place in July.000197 -0.0273) -0.0165) -1.17E-10) -0. Year Fixed Effects Municipality Fixed Effects Sample: Margin of Victory < 5% Number of Observations Number of Groups R-squared Yes Yes Yes 8481 1616 0. strikes taking place during an election year may be a political reaction to the lead-up or outcome of an election.01 Robust Standard Error in Parentheses *p<0.01 0. **p<0.0000995 (0.I chose to use the third year of a mayor’s term as the omitted category in my fourth.0422** -0. 7 Results Table 2: Relationship Between Mayoral Party and the Number of Strikes per Pop. fifth.0263) -0.0427** (0.000519) Yes Yes Yes 7738 1572 0. strikes taking place in these years can be clearly defined as taking place before or after the election.

crime.0375* (0. there are not significantly fewer strikes when a PAN mayor comes to office after a close election as compared to when a PRI mayor comes to office after a close election.00427 (0.00455 0.0148) (0.000671 (0.0221) 0. **p<0.00511 (0.00536 Robust Standard Error in Parentheses *p<0.0445) (0.00737 § 0.0129) (0.10.0129) -1.00167 0.00795 § (0.0046 (0.00615 0.000598 (0. 4.0453** (0.0136 0.0284) -0. the effect of a PRD mayor in office decreases strikes by 70.0136 (0. Year Fixed Effects Municipality Fixed Effects Margin of Victory < 5% Number of Observations Number of Groups R-squared Yes Yes Yes 7046 1455 0. Table 3: Relationship Between Mayoral Party Election Outcomes and the Number of Strikes per Pop. (1) 0.0445) -0.0136 (0. and health control. Fetal mortality per pop.0201) (0.50E-10) 0.84E-10 (1.00536 0. 3.83E-10 (1.15 32 .0283) (0. ***p<0.00562 (5) 0.0146 (0. Homicides per pop.0498) -0.3% to 71.060 strikes (Table 1). When running these regressions with an economic.0191) (0.0290) -0. and 5.01 § p<0. The average number of strikes per population per municipality-year in a close election is .0211) (0.0000448 (0.00507 (0.0371* -0.0293) (0. This means that based on the regression in column 1.2%.Table 2 demonstrates that there are fewer strikes when a PRD mayor comes to office after a close election as compared to when a PRI mayor comes to office after a close election.00167 (0.0129) Strikes per population (2) (3) (4) 0.0190) -0. In contrast.0221) (0.0210) 0.0210) 0.0141 (0.000142) -0.00506 -0. there is a 71% decrease in strikes when a closely elected PRD mayor holds office.0498) (0.012 -0.0283) -0.000415) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 6460 7046 7046 1419 1455 1419 0.0452** -0.00457 -0. and all of these controls together.0148) -1.00646 PAN Defeats Another Party PRD Defeats Another Party PAN Remains in Office PRI Remains in Office PRD Remains in Office Budget per pop.015 (0.000172) -0.0191) -0.05. When taking into consideration the other controls in columns 2.00203 (0.0444) -0.50E-10) -0.0202) -0. the effect of a PRD mayor coming to office after a close election on strikes is still significant.00000146 (0.0452** (0. depending on the specific combination of controls.000464) Yes Yes Yes 6460 1455 0.0146 -0.

In columns 2 and 5.In Table 3 we consider the effects of a transition to the PRD from another party holding office previously. be due to missing budget data for some municipality-years. The regression in column 1 demonstrates that there is a 75. Still. there is a 75. as compared to the average number of strikes relative to population per municipality-year when a closely elected mayor holds office. 33 .3% and 75. this effect is significant at the 5% level. and all of these controls together.5% decrease in strikes. there is no significant effect of a PAN mayor coming to office after defeating a candidate of the incumbent party in a close election as compared to when a PRI mayor comes to office after defeating an incumbent of a different party in a close election. which decreases the number of observations and the number of groups in columns 2 and 5. respectively. and when all controls are included. When the budget control is included. When running these regressions with an economic. crime. and health control. again. this is quite a tough test to pass considering the magnitude of controls included in my regressions. whereas without these controls. This could be due to the fact that the data set is missing budget information for some municipalityyear observations.5% decrease in strikes. This decrease in the percentages’ absolute value in these tests may.8% and 62. In columns 3 and 4.3% decrease in strikes when a PRD mayor comes to office after defeating a candidate of the incumbent party. respectively. the effect is a 61. This table shows that there are fewer strikes when a PRD mayor comes to office after defeating a candidate of the incumbent party in a close election as compared to when a PRI mayor comes to office after defeating a candidate of the incumbent party in a close election. the effect of a PRD mayor coming to office after defeating a candidate of the incumbent party in a close election on strikes is still significant. the effect of the a PRD mayor coming to office after defeating a candidate of the incumbent party in a close election becomes significant at the 10% level. In contrast.

000141) -0.0000464 (0.0261) (0.10.000552 (0.00569 (5) 0.0919 § (0.092 § -0.0129 0.0445) -0.0327) (0.0397) (0.00402 (0.00418 -0.0345) (0.0598) -0.0599) (0. with p-values of .0368* -0.83E-10 (1.00853 0.000122 (0. we observe that there was an average decrease of about -0.00355 (0. This suggests that the inclusion of the budget control affects the standard error because data is missing for some municipality-year observations.00402 -0.0138 (0.50E-10) 0.05.0396) -0.00686 (0.0191) -0.0218) 0. I further disaggregate based on which specific party the PRD defeated in a close election.0389 § (0. (1) 0.0218) (0.0246) -0.0201) -0. in columns 2 and 5.0133) -1.014 (0.0128 -0.0063 (0.0599) -0. **p<0.00389 (0.00615 0.0325) 0.0157) (0.00971 (0.15 In Table 4.0241) (0.113 and .0218) -0.000410) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 6460 7046 7046 1419 1455 1455 0.00543 0.00646 PAN Defeats PRI PAN Defeats PRD PRD Defeats PAN PRD Defeats PRI PAN Remains in Office PRI Remains in Office PRD Remains in Office Budget per pop.092 § (0.000599 (0.0200) (0.0128 (0.0241) -0.00567 -0.0042 (0.0134) Strikes per population (2) (3) (4) 0. the PAN or the PRI.0383 § -0.0226 -0.0229 (0.000556 -0.83E-10 (1.0370* (0.0121 -0. and also when we include all controls.01 § p<0. Still the absolute value of the effect is getting larger with these controls.Table 4: Relationship Between Specific Mayoral Party Election Outcomes and the Number of Strikes per Pop.000 people. the result becomes marginally insignificant.50E-10) 0.0498) -0.0367* (0.00686 0.00543 Robust Standard Error in Parentheses *p<0.0134 (0.0339) 0.0242) 0. This effect is significant at a 10% level. Year Fixed Effects Municipality Fixed Effects Margin of Victory < 5% Number of Observations Number of Groups R-squared Yes Yes Yes 7046 1455 0.000457) Yes Yes Yes 6460 1419 0.109.0134) (0.0329) 0. Homicides per pop.0254) -0. When we include a control for the budget.0497) (0.0246) (0.37 strikes per 100.000172) -0. respectively.0445) (0. In municipalities where the PRD mayor defeated a PRI incumbent in a close election.00574 0. relative to when a PRI mayor came to office after defeating a candidate of the incumbent party was in office.0445) -0. Fetal mortality per pop. ***p<0.0190) -0.00257 (0. 34 .0156) -1.0191) (0.0129 (0.000673 (0.00000367 (0.

0227) 0. **p<0.0284 -0. relative to when a PRI mayor who defeated a candidate of the incumbent party was in office.0287 (0.0173 (0.0229) (2) -0.0251) Strikes per population (3) (4) -0.0237) (0.0175 (0.000461) Yes Yes Yes 6460 1419 0. Still. We still observe a decrease of about -0. which might account for why we do not observe similar p-values in these instances.00679 Yes Yes Yes 7046 1455 0.000658 (0.000413) Yes Yes Yes 7046 1455 0. this effect is only marginally insignificant.000592 (0. respectively.124.51E-10) 0.0406 § (0.0237) -0.0228) 0.0235) -0.0237) -0.0229) (5) -0.05.0237) -0. Also.The effect of a PRD mayor defeating a PAN incumbent in a close election is not significant within a 90% confidence interval. or when the PRD wins an election as the incumbent party. This is important because there is a larger decrease in strikes when there is a transition from the PAN to the PRD than when there is a transition from the PRI to the PRD. ***p<0.000000482 (0.0292 (0.0000436 (0.52E-10) -0. there is no significant effect on strikes when the PRD is the incumbent and wins the mayoral election.0211) -0.014 (0. In columns 2 and 5 the number of observations and number of groups have decreased due to missing budget data for some municipality-year observations.0256) -2.0167 (0.000177) -0.0285 (0. (1) -0.0213) -0.0237) -0. .15 0.000149) -0.0232) -0.125.0182) -0. and . Fetal mortality per pop.092 strikes per 100.0144 (0.0174 (0.000 people.0406 § (0. Year Fixed Effects Municipality Fixed Effects Margin of Victory < 5% Number of Observations Number of Groups R-squared Robust Standard Error in Parentheses *p<0. Homicides per pop.0175 (0.0237) 0.0284 (0.00709 -0.0229) (0.0231) -0.0182) -0.0227) 0.0117 (0. and 4.0256) -2. with p-values of .10.0172 (0.0116 (0.0286 (0. Table 5: Relationship Between a PRD Mayor Winning an Election Over a Candidate of the Incumbent Party and the Number of Strikes per Pop.00E-10 (1. in columns 1.0298 (0.00606 Yes Yes Yes 7046 1455 0.01 § p<0.0167 -0.0182) -0.0233) -0.0144 (0.018 (0.0251) PRD Defeats Another Party Year 1 of Mayoral Term Year 2 of Mayoral Term PRD Defeats Another Party x Year 1 PRD Defeats Another Party x Year 2 Budget per pop.0058 Yes Yes Yes 6460 1419 0.0058 35 .125.0286 (0.00E-10 (1.0168 (0.0168 (0. 3.

This table also seems to suggest that there is a greater decrease in strikes in Year 2 as compared to in Year 1. which is also the first year a mayor takes office. Still. when a closely elected PRD mayor has defeated a candidate of another party there is a 67. (Moreover. Year 1 refers to the year after an election year. In this test. for columns 2 and 5. As compared to the average number of strikes relative to population per municipality-year when a closely elected mayor holds office.113 and . the effect of the PRD taking office after a mayor of another party previous held office after a close election leads to a greater decrease in strikes. namely when the PRD defeats the PAN and when the PRD defeats the PRI. I test if there are differential effects of a transition to the PRD from another party holding office previously after a close election on strikes. when the budget control is included (column 2). the effect of the PRD defeating a candidate of the incumbent party in a close election on strikes in Year 2 is only marginally insignificant with p-values of . This table illustrates that there is no significant effects on strikes when PRD mayors who have defeated incumbents of other parties are in office relative to the year in which they were elected.114.In Table 5. relative to the election year. there exists the general trend of a decrease in strikes when a PRD mayor who has defeated an incumbent of another party holds office in both years following the close election. and when all controls are included (column 5). in the first year and second year of the mayor’s term. 36 . which is also the second year of the mayor’s term.) These outcomes motivate my examination of specific party transitions.6% decrease in strikes in Year 2. while disaggregating across years. Year 2 refers to the year before the next election. It is also important to note that in these two tests (2 and 5) where there is an almost significant confidence interval. respectively.

respectively.00560 0.0736 (0. Year Fixed Effects Municipality Fixed Effects Margin of Victory <5% Number of Observations Number of Groups R-squared Yes Yes Yes 7046 1455 0. Homicides per pop.0235) 0.0108 (0. relative to the next election year.0212) (0.0377* (0. **p<0.0148) (0.0754 (0.000149) -0.0122 0.0202 (0.00631 (0.0235) (0.2%.0211) -0.0212) 0.7% as compared to the average number of strikes relative to population per municipality-year when a closely elected mayor holds office.000462) Yes Yes Yes 6460 1419 0. When we control for fetal mortality.0204) (0.0213) 0.0211) Strikes per population (2) (3) (4) -0.0331 § -0.000589 (0.0118 (0.8% decrease in strikes relative to population in Year 2 when a closely elected PRD mayor holds office.0185 -0.0150) (0.51E-10) 0.0215) -2.0158) -0.0210) (0.0582) (0.0202 -0.000413) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 6460 7046 7046 1455 1419 1455 0.0211) (0.0208) -0. 62.0212 (0.. Fetal mortality per pop. causing a decrease in strikes.0212) (0. For columns 1. and 5.000177) -0.00560 Robust Standard Error in Parentheses *p<0. I examine the effect of a PRD mayor who came to office after defeating a PAN mayor in a close election.05.0141) -0.2%.0197 (0.0363) -0.0142) -0. The significant effect appears during the second year of the mayor’s term.0185 (0.62E-08 (0.52E-10) -5.0583) -0.00871 -0. This table demonstrates that there is a statistically significant effect of a PRD mayor who had previously defeated a PAN mayor holding office during the second year of his term.0219) -2. there was a 62.0754 -0.0397* -0.0000393 (0. the 37 . ***p<0.0211 -0.0584) -0. 3.Table 6: Relationship Between PRD Victory over the PAN and Strikes per Pop.0430** (0.0226 (0. Relative to Election Year (1) -0. When we control for budget.03E-10 (1.01 § p<0.0187 (0.00586 (5) -0.000657 (0.0397* (0.00674 PRD Defeats PAN Year 1 of Mayoral Term Year 2 of Mayoral Term PRD Defeats PAN x Year 1 PRD Defeats PAN x Year 2 Budget per pop. as compared to the average number of strikes relative to population per municipality-year when a closely elected mayor holds office.0111 (0.04E-10 (1. the effect becomes significant at the 5% level. and strikes decrease 71. and 62.10.0209) -0.0161 -0.0361) (0.15 In Table 6.00645 0.0111 0.

0131 (0.00E-10 (1.0190) -0. with a p-value of . ***p<0. but not from the PRI.0228) 0.0171 (0.0301 -0.52E-10) -0.000653 (0..0302 (0.0165 0. this may reflect the loss of observations due to missing data.0128 (0.0190) (0.0000433 (0.0168 (0.00000211 (0.0264) (0.0255 (0.00586 (5) -0.0249) (0.01 In Table 7.0171 -0.0190) -0.0266) (0.0249) 0.0229) -0.0214 (0.135 and there is a 55.05.0210 (0.000178) -0.0227) (0.effect becomes marginally insignificant.0242) -0.0242) (0. There is no significant effect on strikes when a PRD mayor who had previously defeated a PRI mayor holds office during the first or second year of his term.0390 (0. This shows that when disaggregating across years.0223) (0. 38 . the effect on strikes stems from when there is a transition to the PRD from the PAN.0210 -0.99E-10 (1.000412) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 6460 7046 7046 1419 1455 1455 0. **p<0.00676 0.2% decrease in strikes as a result of a closely elected PRD mayor holding office in Year 2.0179 (0. including budget.0159 (0.0264) -0.000460) Yes Yes Yes 6460 1419 0. Again.0264) -1.0259 (0.0232) (0. in relation to the next election year.0123 -0.0177 -0.0228) -0.000149) -0.0230) (0. the effect is still significant when we consider all the controls together.0224) -0.0167 -0.0398 -0.0233) (0. Year Fixed Effects Municipality Fixed Effects Margin of Victory <5% Number of Observations Number of Groups R-squared Yes Yes Yes 7046 1455 0.00560 0. However.0232) -0.0136 0.0136 (0. Homicides per pop.0259 -0.52E-10) 0.10.0167 (0.0242) -0.0233) Strikes per population (2) (3) (4) -0.00560 Robust Standard Error in Parentheses *p<0.0227) 0.000589 (0.0172 (0.0232) -2.00705 PRD Defeats PRI Year 1 of Mayoral Term Year 2 of Mayoral Term PRD Defeats PRI x Year 1 PRD Defeats PRI x Year 2 Budget per pop. I examine the effect of a PRD mayor who came to office after defeating a PAN mayor in a close election. Table 7: Relationship Between PRD Victory over the PRI and Strikes per Pop. Fetal mortality per pop. Relative to Election Year (1) -0.

0588) -0. Fetal mortality per pop.0170 (0.52E-10) 0.0265 -0.0419* (0.0154) -0.0229) 0.000179) -0.0251) (0.0144 (0.99E-10 (1.0424* (0.0168 (0.0153) -0.0000463 (0. The magnitude of the effect is a 70.0227) (0.0165 -0.0229) (0.00E-10 (1. I include in my regression both elections in which the PRD defeated the PAN and elections in which the PRD defeated the PRI.0173 (0. This time.0144 0.0170 -0.00615 (5) -0.0242) (0.00583 -0.0160) (0.0119 -0.0397 (0.0262 (0.0269) (0.7% decrease in strikes relative 39 .0192) -0.000413) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 6460 7046 7046 1419 1455 1455 0.05.000592 (0.0164) (0.0192) (0.0718 (0.0236) (0.0232) -0.0405 -0.0205 -0. which is also the year before the next election.0172 -0.0174) -0.01 In Table 8.00000512 (0.0587) (0. Relative to Election Year (1) -0.10.52E-10) 0.Table 8: Relationship Between PRD Victory over the PAN or a PRD Victory over the PRI and Strikes per Pop.0242 (0.0234) -0.0425* -0.000461) Yes Yes Yes 6460 1419 PRD Defeats PAN PRD Defeats PRI Year 1 of Mayoral Term Year 2 of Mayoral Term PRD Defeats PAN x Year 1 PRD Defeats PAN x Year 2 PRD Defeats PRI x Year 1 PRD Defeats PRI x Year 2 Budget per pop.0242) -0.0456* (0.0366) (0.0191) -0.0242) -0.0231) -0.00589 Robust Standard Error in Parentheses *p<0. we see that fewer strikes exist when a PRD mayor who has defeated a PAN incumbent holds office during the second year of his term. **p<0.0227) -0.0587) -0.0218 (0. Year Fixed Effects Municipality Fixed Effects Margin of Victory <5% Number of Observations Number of Groups R-squared Yes Yes Yes 7046 1455 0. This effect is significant within a 90% confidence interval.00342 (0.0374* -0.0141 (0. ***p<0.0225) (0.0235) -0.0264) -0.0165 (0.000658 (0.0230 (0. Again.0736 -0.0264) (0. like in Tables 6 and 7. which is equivalent to the next election year.0251) 0.0229) 0.0267) -1.0265 (0.0124 (0..0235) Strikes per population (2) (3) (4) -0.0166 (0.0209 (0.0219 -0.0235) (0. I compare the effect of the a PRD mayor who defeated a PAN or PRI incumbent in a close election on the number of strikes relative to the third year of the mayor’s term.0234) -2.0173 0.000151) -0.0368) -0.0233) (0.00589 0.0193 -0.0307 (0.00679 0.0305 -0. Homicides per pop.0172 (0.0227) -0.0736 (0.0205 (0.0223) (0.0235) -0.

and control variables. It may also indicate that the PRD has a standing relationship with labor organizations. originally formed for the purpose of pushing an ideologically left agenda. and 69. respectively. When a PRD mayor holds office. This generally means that there is less labor unrest during PRD mayoral terms than during mayoral terms in which a PAN or PRI mayor is in power. that labor unrest declines in the presence of a PRD mayor and also highlights that strikes are related to party transitions at the municipal level. 8 Interpretation of Results After reviewing this progression of regressions. PRI. This implies that there is a significant increase in strikes when a PAN or PRI holds office after having defeated a candidate of a PRD incumbent party. In exchange for beneficial policy or other political perks. there exists a statistically significant relationship between the party of a mayor in office who had defeated an incumbent and the number of strikes carried out during that mayor’s term. When considering the controls used in columns 2.8%. demonstrate that there is a significant decrease in strikes for a PRD mayos holding office after having defeated a candidate of the incumbent party in a close election. shown in Table 3. There is no significant effect on strikes relative to a PRI mayor holding office after having defeated a candidate of the incumbent party when a PAN. 70. 3. The results of my second regression.8% decrease in strikes relative to population per municipality-year. This may indicate that the PRD’s governing ideology is generally favorable to workers and therefore decreases the need for labor organizations to strike. 40 . and 5. there is a statistically significant effect of fewer strikes occurring in municipality-years as compared to when a PRI or PAN mayor holds office (see Table 2). labor organizations keep their number of strikes down in order to show the PRD in a favorable light. or PRD incumbent wins in a close election. relative to a PRI mayor holding office after having defeated a candidate of the incumbent party.3%. close elections. 76%. The PRD is traditionally quite favorable to labor activity. The fact that labor organizations respond so heartily to changes in party indicate that even when considering fixed effects. Tables 2 and 3 support this idea quantitatively. it is clear that the PRD has a significant effect on decreasing the number of labor strikes taking place in a municipality. This result further enforces the idea that labor activity responds to the political party affiliation of the mayor.to population during Year 2 when a closely elected PRD mayor holds office in column 1 as compared to the average number of strikes relative to population per municipality-year when a closely elected mayor holds office. This result enforces the idea presented in Table 2. 4. there is a 62.

When considering the close election design and other controls.The lack of significant change in strike behavior when a mayor of the incumbent party holds office demonstrates that labor organizations employ certain conduct when mayors of specific political parties hold office. we observe the largest decrease in the number of strikes. This means that the consistency in strike behavior when a candidate of the incumbent party comes into power is related to the party itself and not the candidate personally. This chronological effect allows us to rule out the idea that labor unions immediately reduce their strike count as a direct result of a PRD mayor taking office. and yields an even greater reduction in the number of strikes when the PAN was the incumbent party. This is consistent with Middlebrook’s 41 . There exists no significant relationship amongst a PRD mayor holding office after having previously defeated a PAN incumbent on strikes during the first year of his term. After testing strikes relative to the chronological point of the current mayor’s term. the absolute value of the decrease in strikes is greater when the PRD mayor in office defeated a PAN incumbent. Ideologically. cultural. Though marginally insignificant. or social characteristic of these municipalities that would prompt labor parties to strike. when he had previously defeated a PAN incumbent. labor organizations also adjust their response to this transition via strike behavior. this makes sense: the effect of a victorious PRD challenger holding office yields a reduction in the number of strikes when the PRI was the incumbent party. we can confidently hypothesize that there is likely no intrinsic societal. This supports the theory that labor unions behave in ways specific to the party in power. I was able to explore the effect of the PRD on strikes in more detail. other than the party of the mayor in office. Therefore when we observe a mayoral transition from the most ideologically conservative party included in this study to the most ideologically liberal party included in this study. When there is a party transition. The output expressed in Table 4 indicates that there is a significant decrease in strikes when the PRD mayor in office defeated a candidate of the incumbent PRI party. but it is a less drastic effect. Furthermore. Tables 6 and 8 demonstrate that there is a significant effect of a PRD mayor holding office in reducing the number of strikes taking place in that municipality in the second year of his term. labor union’s behavioral conduct seems to align directly with the political ideology of these three parties. we see a significant decrease in the number of strikes. This relationship is further demonstrated by the fact that Mexican mayors cannot run for consecutive terms. When we observe a mayoral transition from the centrist party to the most ideologically liberal party included in this study.

326). Worker organizations learn over the course of the mayor’s first term that he is an ally of labor and therefore decrease their strike behavior as a result of the favorable political climate. is that the PRD. 11). If the PRD had previously fostered symbiotic relationships with labor organizations. “electoral strategy became dominant on the Left” (Middlebrook 1995. By the late 1980s. we would expect to see a decrease in strikes immediately during the first term of a PRD mayor’s office. My statistical output alludes to the relationship between parties and unions described earlier by Burgess (1999): in exchange for labor benefits or favorable policy toward labor. 326). If there were a significant effect of the PRD remaining in power on the number of strikes in that municipality. promulgates policies favorable to labor organizations’ agendas. In order to ensure that the labor-friendly PRD party wins the incumbency. The first theory is supported by the lack of significant effect of a PRD incumbency on the number of strikes because the labor organizations in that municipality would have grown to understand the PRD’s policy towards labor during the previous term and would not need to adjust its reaction via strikes. There is another possible explanation of the effect of a PRD mayor on decreasing strikes.qualitative explanation of the PRD’s relationship with labor unions. As part of the labor-political relationship. One explanation. then this element of transition pertaining to strikes would have to be reevaluated. we see that by the mid 1980s. He states. “union leaders are more willing to restrain their militancy when their allied parties are in the government” (Murillo 2011. labor unions will refrain from striking as an election approaches. This further confirms that the effect on decreasing strikes is the result of a PRD mayor who had previously beaten a PAN incumbent holding office during Year 2. 325). the PRD “fully embraced an opposition strategy centered on elections” (Middlebrook 1995. “although the PRD supported strikes and other forms of labor protest. then. Unions have less to strike about since they become more contented as the PRD mayor’s term progresses. The absence of a previously established relationship between the PRD and labor organizations is supported quantitatively by my regression output. Both of these explanations are consistent with the result that there is no significant increase or decrease in strikes when the PRD remains in power (meaning situations in which the PRD won a mayoral election after it had already been the incumbent party). specifically. in that labor unions would not increase the 42 . The second theory is also supported. Concerning the PRD. it made only limited efforts to establish longterm ties to worker organizations” (Middlebrook 1995. unions are “expected to moderate their strike activity” (108). which concerns the proximity of the upcoming election. being a labor-friendly party.

and cuts in social services” (Burgess 199. 305). in part. or CTM). relative to a PRI mayor defeating an incumbent of another party. the PRI fostered strong relationships with the labor organizations. the PRI was able to maintain some of its relationships with labor unions like the Confederation of Mexican Workers (Confederación de Trabajadores de México. unemployment. these relationships between the PRI and labor unions began to decline in the late 1980s. to the PRI’s loss of control over labor activity due to weakened relationships. trade liberalization. industrial restructuring. At this time.amount of strikes when a PRD candidate was up for re-election. 303-304). as a closely elected PRD mayor in office has a statistically significant effect on a fewer amount of strikes per municipality. often even granting union leaders positions of power in the government. and its fading. historically. This newly-adopted political ideology by the PRI generally caused labor organizations to become less supportive of the PRI than they had been in years just before the commencement of my data set. I believe that the remaining historical-political ties the PRI held with some labor unions during the early 1990s. 106). and welfare reform” which “subjected workers to declining incomes. decreased job security. Though. the statistical output also illustrates that when a PRD mayor won in an election in which the PRI was the incumbent. and local politics at this time. explain why the significant relationship between a decrease in strikes and a PRD mayor who had won in an 43 . 303. as compared to when a closely elected PRI mayor holds office. we see fewer strikes occurring when PRD mayors hold office due. In Table 4. to dissatisfaction with the PRI’s economic and social policy and. in part. price deregulation. the PRI adopted policies including “fiscal and wage austerity. it is important to remember that the PRI still generally dominated national. Therefore. Though the PRI’s absolute power was deteriorating in Mexico in the late 1980s and early 1990s. an idea which “did not reaffirm the legitimacy of collective social rights” (Middlebrook 1995. This effect is statistically significant as well. along with its centrist ideology at this time. President Carlos Salinas. there are fewer strikes. which wanted to maintain “political mobility opportunities for labor leaders” and continue to “use influence within the party to shape public policy decisions” (Middlebrook 1995. we see this effect visually. proposed a plan for “social liberalism”. Therefore. privatization of state-owned enterprises. Still. I argue that the deterioration of many labor unions’ relationships with the PRI means that. yet overall dominant political presence. In Table 2. flexibilization of the labor market. he argued that the “state should regulate social and economic activities in order to eradicate injustice”. Though the leader of the PRI in the late 1980s and 1990s. state. in order to encourage the election of a PRD mayor. compared with the labor-friendly PRI.

political factors on labor activity. when that PRD mayor had previously defeated a PRI incumbent. This lack of a significant decrease in the number of strikes occurring during a PRD mayor’s first year in office. Still. Because the second year of the current mayor’s term is equivalent to the year before the next election. this average decrease in strikes in the year before the next election may demonstrate labor organizations’ preference for the PRD party currently in power to win the next election because a year of little labor unrest projects a positive image of the mayor in power to voters. the current PRD mayor does not have a significant effect on reducing the number of strikes before an election year. we can better predict labor behavior relative to proximity of the election year and the party transition on a mayoral level. This may also indicate that there is a decrease in strikes due to a political campaign strategy employed by the PRD in the year before the next election. potentially indicating an indifference to the possibility of a PRI mayor coming to office once more. shows that there is no significant initial demonstration of a favorable reaction to a PRD mayor coming into office if a PRI mayor had been in office previously. Though insignificant. By understanding the influence of local. though the result is not significant. where the PRD uses its relationship with labor parties to suppress strikes for the election in which it will be the incumbent party. 9 Conclusion The results of my study are important in that they show a statistically significant relationship between labor strikes and political parties on the municipal level. after having defeated a PRI incumbent. 44 . we observe a decrease in the average number of strikes per municipality in the second year of a PRD mayor’s term. This result may mean that the PRD mayor was unable to form a strong political ties with labor organizations in a municipality that had just previously experience a PRI mayor. This indicates that there still may be a labor preference for the reelection of a PRD mayor who took office following a PRI mayoral term. the results shown in Tables 7 and 8 also indicate that when a PRI mayor previously held office. This lack of a significant decrease in the number of strikes occurring during a PRD mayor’s second year in office also demonstrates that there is no significant favorable reaction to policy implemented by a PRD mayor in his first year or during his second year in office when a PRI mayor had held the mayoral office previously.election in which the PRI was the incumbent party disappears when considering strikes relative to the specific year of a mayor’s term (see Table 7).

Also. Though the ties between labor unions and the PRI. we do not see a significant relationship between labor activity in the form of strikes and the PRI holding local power. Still. strike data could be considered just before and just after the election. political involvement (Middlebrook 1995. it would be useful to focus on the amount of strikes by different unions as the dependent variable in a further study. In order to better understand the influence of mayoral political parties on strikes. This study concerns a general trend of the decrease in strikes as they pertain to the party holding the mayoral office and the year of the mayor’s term. In this study. in spite of the PRD’s advocacy for labor freedom. exploratory study. the nature of relationships between parties and specific unions has not been historically uniform in Mexico. Instead. like the PRD. had largely diminished by the 1990s and 2000s. my study did not include a control for corruption. it is possible that strike activity decreases as more corruption occurs. First. the data output suggests that the PRD might employ an electoral strategy of encouraging suppression of strikes for political gain. Still. once almost inseparable. Since. party-driven. Many ideologically left parties. to the best of my knowledge. Perhaps unions tended to strike less because they were threatened with political consequences or because union leaders would be rewarded if they kept their strike activity low. Instead of having to discount the entirety of the election year due to its inclusion of both time leading up to an election and time following the election. I interpreted a decrease in strikes as a positive response to the PRD’s presence in the mayoral office. a new model of the party-labor relationship seems to have formed. 325). Based on the data. advocated for labor reform in the late 1970s that would allow unions to separate themselves from seemingly obligatory. the PRD-labor relationship is much less intrusive as compared to the nature of the PRI-labor relationship model. historically. However. there is a need for further research to better understand the relationship between PRD mayors and labor organizations. although I believe that incorporating corruption within the framework of party-labor relations on the local level would be an interesting way to hone the results I have presented in this more preliminary. 45 . this is the first quantitative study of labor strike behavior on a muncipal level across Mexico. Further study may also include an examination of union-specific relationships with mayoral parties. I believe that using strikes relative to population in municipalities per month as the dependent variable in this study would allow for a more accurate appraisal of strike behavior as an election strategy.The results also allow us to better understand the new state of party-labor relations.

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