Program for Peace 2006 - 2008

For DanChurchAid

Final Report
15 December 2008

Anne Davies, Team Leader Dr. Khoti Amos Chilomba Kamanga Mr. Emmanuel Nshimirimana

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Channel Research would like to thank all those who have assisted the team during this study. In particular Channel Research would like to thank the agencies who have supported the visits to the field with a lot of time and energy, and especially the staff of TCRS in Tanzania and LWF in Burundi, who have untiringly answered questions and provided additional documents on request.

19 Rue de l’Église St. Etienne 1380 Ohain Belgium Tel +32 2 633 65 29 Fax +32 2 633 30 92 www.channelresearch.com info@channelresearch.com VAT No 864 560 703

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Table of Contents I. Executive Summary .................................................................................................................................... 4 I.1. Objectives and methodology .............................................................................................................. 4 I.2. Key Findings ........................................................................................................................................ 4 I.3 Recommendations .................................................................................................................................. 9 II. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 13 III. Background, Context and target populations.................................................................................... 14 IV. Purpose and methodology of the evaluation ..................................................................................... 17 V. Evaluation findings ................................................................................................................................. 18 V.1. Level 1: Policy and Intervention Strategy ...................................................................................... 19 V.2. Level 2: Partner appraisal ................................................................................................................. 22 V.3. Level 3: Affected Populations ......................................................................................................... 23 VI. Cross-cutting questions......................................................................................................................... 34 VI.1 Gender .............................................................................................................................................. 34 VI.2 HIV/AIDS ....................................................................................................................................... 35 VI.3 Environment .................................................................................................................................... 37 VI.4 Human Rights .................................................................................................................................. 39 VII. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS: Strengths, Weaknesses, Lessons Learned ........................ 40

Annexes Annex A Annex B Annex C Annex D Annex E Annex F Annex G Annex H Annex I Annex J Annex K Terms of Reference List of people interviewed Bibliography Livelihoods – D. de Treville Background of TCRS and evaluation Sustainable Livelihoods chart Stages in the Relief-to-Development process Cash for Work case study - OXFAM Description of the SILC approach Environmental Concerns in LWF’s Program for Peace Annotated Recommendations
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ACT CBO CEP CfW COPP CSO DANIDA DC DCA DED DPAE DWS EDPRS ELCT EU FCA ICGLR IGA IOM IRST ISTEEBU LRRD LWF MHA MINALOC MKUKUTA NCA NSGRP PARESI PRA PRSP PTSS REDESO SL SOPRAD TCRS TRA UNHCR UNICEF UNDP WATSAN WFP Action by Churches Together, World Council of Churches, Geneva Community Based Organisation Community Empowerment Programme Cash for Work Country Operations Program Plan Country Strategy Outline (official LWF/TCRS planning document) Danish International Development Agency District Commissioner DanChurchAid, Denmark District Executive Officer Departement de l’Agriculture et l’Environnement Department for World Service, LWF Economic Development for Poverty Reduction Strategy (Successor to PRSP) Evangelical Lutheran Church in Tanzania European Union FinnChurchAid International Conference on the Great Lakes Region Income Generating Activity International Organisation for Migration (managing US resettlement program) Institut de Recherche Scientifique et Technologie Institut Statistique et des Etudes Economiques du Burundi Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development Lutheran World Federation Ministry of Home Affairs Ministry of Local Government and Social Affairs Kiswahili acronym for NSGRP (see below) Norwegian Church Aid National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty Projet d’Appui au Rapatriement et à la Réintégration des Sinistrés Participative Rural Appraisal Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome Relief for Development Societies Sustainable livelihoods Solidarité pour la Promotion de l’Assistance et le Developpement Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service Tanzania Revenue Authority United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Children’s Fund United Nations Development Programme Water and Sanitation World Food Programme
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I. Executive Summary
The Peace Program of Burundi (PPB) is a cross-border program of assistance to refugees, IDPs, expellees and host populations in Tanzania and Burundi. It is implemented in partnership between international and national agencies in both countries: DanChurch Aid (DCA), Lutheran World Federation/World Service (LWF/DWS1) and Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service (TCRS) in Tanzania and DCA, LWS/DWS and the Conseil National des Eglises du Burundi (CNEB) in Burundi. The program’s aim is to support the welfare and repatriation of Burundian refugees and their host population in Kibondo District, north western Tanzania, and to support the reintegration of the refugees on their return to Burundi, as well as other population groups in the return areas. The latter part of the program is implemented in four communes in Cankuzo and Ruyigi provinces in eastern Burundi. With the planned closure of refugee camps at the end of 2008, implementation of activities by TCRS on the Tanzanian side will end in December 2008 while those implemented by LWF Burundi will end in February 2009. Program beneficiaries number some 11,000 refugees repatriating to Burundi from the Kibondo camps (roughly 3,000 families2), out of an estimated caseload of 230,000 remaining as of October 20053, and an estimated 250,000 crisis-affected people in the two provinces in Burundi, including returning refugees, expellees and IDPs and the ‘host’ population of these communes.

I.1. Objectives and methodology
The evaluation’s terms of reference (TOR, reproduced in full in Annex A) required it to be both retrospective – looking backwards – and prospective – looking forwards. The task was therefore to review the progress achieved and constraints encountered during the 2006 to 2008 implementation phase of the Peace Program in Burundi, to draw out lessons learned and to recommend approaches for a possible funding extension from the Government of Denmark. The evaluation conducted on-site observations from 23 September to 8 October 2008 in the Kibondo refugee camps as well as in selected host communities in Tanzania, and in the communes of Gisuru (Ruyigi Province), Cendajuru and Mishiha (Cankuzo province) in Burundi. The study was led by Ms. Anne DAVIES, an international consultant fielded by Channel Research who specialises in forced migration and programme management, supported by Dr. Khoti Amos Chilomba KAMANGA, national consultant from Tanzania, an expert in refugees and human rights, and Mr. Emmanuel NSHIMIRIMANA, national consultant from Burundi, specialist in agriculture and livelihoods. A participatory approach was adopted where possible, including staff from TCRS and LWF to jointly draw out lessons learned.

I.2. Key Findings

Department of World Service is the internationally recognized humanitarian and development arm of the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), previously known as simply World Service (WS). 2 Status Report, Annex 2 3 Programme Outline Burundi/Kibondo 2006-2008

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1. As this heading suggests, the following two sections are not exhaustive but reflect the evaluation’s most salient impressions. Further details and additional findings and recommendations will be elaborated in the body of the report. 2. The program, which is actually two projects in Tanzania and Burundi, is a unique crossborder initiative that uses human capital sharing (knowledge and experience) in both countries to build effective strategies for alleviating the suffering of its target populations. Achieving coordination, coherence and seamless logistical links between two projects in two countries with differing objectives has been challenging: a. TCRS and UNHCR have not always agreed on operational decisions, for example, TCRS’ assistance to spontaneous returnees in providing them with food and water en route and helping them transport their possessions over the border – a dispute that was resolved when UNHCR realised the usefulness of this initiative to the returnees and began to support and encourage it. b. Coordination between humanitarian actors in Burundi is less than optimal, mainly due to the usual problem of agency imperatives to implement activities within limited time-frames, resulting in a lack of knowledge of ‘who is doing what, where’ and the attending risk of overlap. c. Logistical links are inevitably tricky when dealing with the transportation of people and goods, including animals, across international borders, ensuring onward transport and keeping loss of belongings to a minimum. Partners are to be commended for their ingenuity, cooperative spirit, willingness to find solutions to every problem, and professionalism. 3. The program has used its intervention in the two countries to good effect, « following the refugees » back from Tanzania to Burundi, understanding their existential fears/concerns and working to alleviate them both in the camps and after their repatriation. Intervention is appropriately selected for those areas of most need, according to Tanzanian refugee camp consolidation and provincial poverty levels in Burundi. Target populations are appropriately identified as the most vulnerable. TANZANIA 4. TCRS has led an appropriate, relevant and well-coordinated camp management activity, efficiently run and widely appreciated by partners and refugees. TCRS has shown resourcefulness and adaptability in managing to provide essential services while scaling down activities throughout the camp consolidation process. 5. The refugee camp management project has had a positive impact on the refugees and surrounding host communities, providing refugees with information to help them made decisions about return to Burundi and with small-scale livelihoods activities that have brought them some income and provided them with useful skills. 6. Life-preserving activities such as provision of water, sanitation and food distribution services have been efficiently managed according to international standards such as Sphere, the NGO Code of Conduct, environmental and UNHCR-specific norms. Activities promoting human rights are mainstreamed in project activities and refugees demonstrate awareness of their rights. Primary, secondary and post-primary education activities have been effective in
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ensuring access of all camp children to quality education – although not all of them have availed themselves of the opportunity and secondary school results are mediocre. TCRS has efficiently managed and maintained project fleets and vehicles belonging to local authorities. 7. TCRS has also filled ‘niche’ activities in the camps such as: assisting women to market and sell their basket-work made in the camps which provides them with a small income, setting up an innovative livestock multiplication chain, launching a successful new NGO – Stop SIDA – which is now also well-known in Burundi, and facilitating the manufacture and dissemination of improved ovens (fours améliorés) whose indirect impact has been to reduce the amount of firewood collected, thereby protecting the environment. These are not standard camp activities but they have allowed the refugees to improve their lives and learn important skills that should assist their livelihoods upon repatriation. Evidence of the effectiveness of these activities is the presence of many former refugees in positions of local authority and business in Burundi. Information and communications strategies have effectively helped prepare refugees for voluntary repatriation in combination with other strategies and incentives. 8. TCRS, through the Community Empowerment Program in areas surrounding the refugee camps, has contributed to mitigating tensions and the local population’s resentment of the refugees. The CEP has had a discernible impact on empowering people, selected by the communities for training in book-keeping, association-building, leadership and other skills, for earning small incomes from employment in community schemes and livestock ownership, providing milk for consumption and sale and thereby contributing to poverty reduction. Intervention sites have been selected appropriately for their predominance of poverty and need. Realistic goals have been set in recognition of the difficulties of vulnerable individuals achieving high results4. This is a sustainable activity with verifiable measurement indicators to determine when project goals have been achieved and intervention is no longer necessary. BURUNDI 9. The current context in Burundi is conducive to a transitional LRRD5 approach: relief and emergency preparedness needs persist, recovery is fragile and development still far off. LWF employs the LRRD approach to achieve coherently joined up goals in same-site areas. 10. Delays in obtaining registration in Burundi set LWF’s implementation schedule back by almost a year. In efforts to catch up, some necessary steps might have been omitted. For example, the evaluation noted that while LWF undertook the greatest efforts to ensure all activities were in compliance with government departments’ technical norms6, no environmental impact assessments (EIAs) were conducted on swamp development, water

According to recommendations in the Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service (TCRS) Programme Evaluation Report, Taylor, July 2007. 5 Linking Relief, Rehabilitation (Recovery) and Development 6 Before undertaking any swamp development activity, LWF contacted the Département National du Génie Rural et de la Protection du Patrimoine Foncier which is the Government authority on matters related to swamps in Burundi. A mission visit composed of heads of field offices of the Genie Rural et de la Protection du Patrimoine Foncier from the provinces of Cankuzo and Ruyigi, together with LWF’s Agronomy Department head, was undertaken in June 2007.

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adduction and house construction activities. EIAs are legal requirements for these activities7. See ‘Recommendations’ (point 14) for suggested future action. 11. LWF has selected appropriate intervention sites in Burundi: Ruyigi and Cankuzo are among the poorest provinces8 and, bordering Tanzania, have registered high refugee return - either by choice or because of government resettlement incentives. The selection of project sites within these provinces has been guided by focusing on the predominance of extremely vulnerable communities, mainly comprised of expellees from Tanzania but also incorporating other dispossessed groups such as the Batwa community. This strategy ensures a character of inclusiveness thereby reducing the risk of resentment and conflict. 12. However, LWF has spread its activities too wide, diluting impact, efficiency and effectiveness. For instance, despite LWF’s efforts to shorten distances to project sites by opening an office in Cankuzo, it still takes two to three hours round trip to reach most of them and to work with communities who need careful and continuous support. 13. The program’s overall goal and its three key objectives, defined in participatory exercises between program partners and staff, are relevant to the needs of the affected populations. These are people whose extreme poverty and vulnerability are connected to, and will invariably continue to suffer from, the difficult physical environment in which they subsist. LWF has selected an appropriate mix of intervention measures to improve food security and rebuild damaged environments. 14. Two of the three program objectives are being implemented according to plan: Objective # 1: “unity and acceptance of returnees by receiving communities” has been partly met, but there is still much to do while refugees continue to return. Objective # 3, “refugees and receiving communities enjoy good access to vital resources and services” is visibly taking place although it will be a long time before Burundians are able to enjoy either good access, sufficient resources or adequate services. On the other hand, these activities have encountered no major unforeseen obstacles, with the exception of intervention in the Batwa community (see Section VIII.v. for more on this) and have acted effectively as a cushion to the returnees’ reintegration and to alleviating the suffering of the population at large. Objective # 2: “Burundian community members engage in the development of their collines” has been slower to implement, mainly because it is the program’s most complex component and requires time-consuming procedures and processes that cannot be by-passed. For example, time is needed to consult with national, regional and local authorities regarding intervention in specific areas and to obtain official authorisation for each intervention, to undertake technical studies required by law, for appropriate targeting of beneficiary groups both by ‘self-selection’ and ‘community selection’ methods, to design structural activities such as water adduction, housing and swamp development, to recruit and train staff in program specifics, to consult with communities with regard to their prioritisation of needs and to sensitize them regarding the nature of their participation. 15. An analysis of LWF’s livelihoods strategy and implementation, conducted by an external consultant in early 2008, made exhaustive conclusions and recommendations towards achieving the program’s Objective #2. The present evaluation fully endorses the report’s

‘Code de l’environnement’ promulgated in 2000, ‘code foncier’, promulgated in 1986 and ‘code forestier’, 1985. Ruyigi was the third poorest in Burundi and Cankuzo the fifth, according to a baseline poverty survey carried out by ISTEEBU in 1998. See http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr0746.pdf, p.30.
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findings which form an integral part of our recommendations. They are reproduced in full in Annex D. 16. Our own findings are consistent with the previous report’s observations concerning the general psycho-social state of the population: continuing trauma from the prolonged conflict in Burundi means that people – returnees and ‘remainees’ alike - are not yet ready to take full control of their lives. Most exist in an arrested state of fear of not being able to satisfy their food security needs. Relief inputs are still necessary in parallel with recovery activities, which risk failure due to the sale of project inputs to obtain money for food. 17. These people have seen their economic, social and physical capital drastically reduced, forcing them into protracted survival coping mechanisms from which many are having difficulties moving beyond. Passivity can be mistaken for laziness or lack of willpower but is in fact a common feature of trauma and Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome (PTSS) where people must pass through phases of denial, anger, fear and depression that manifest themselves as a mixture of hostility, aggressiveness, sullenness or apathy, in order to reach acceptance and move on to future livelihood planning. While international agencies may believe the ‘relief phase’ is over, leading to the timeliness of recovery activities, they are often surprised when people appear not to want to ‘help themselves’, remaining passive, dependent on handouts and unwilling to engage fully in the recovery activities on offer. In fact, people emerging from crisis need time to work through these PTSS stages and recovery or development activities cannot be accelerated9. 18. For this reason, achieving the livelihoods goals of LWF’s program is likely to take longer than planned. Partners must be prepared for success rates falling short of targets. The continuing extreme vulnerability of most of the population will make progress slow and unpredictable. Efforts must be directed towards step-by-step achievement of intermediary goals that at best ‘do no harm’ for longer-term development. 19. LWF’s intervention strategy in collines such as Musha (Gisuru), Muvumu (Cangajuro) and Mwiruzi (Mishiha) is an appropriate ‘integrated approach’ which has also been commended by other organizations10. It is characterized by Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) techniques of involving community stakeholders to identify their main problems and needs, prioritise intervention goals and provide support to achieve them11. Needs and goals were jointly identified with the communities to: construct new housing, provide potable water by gravitation methods, provide primary school rehabilitation and equipment, construct teacher dormitories, organize swamp drainage and prepare the reclaimed land for cultivation, plantation of agro-forestry trees and livestock replenishment. This integrated approach promotes project efficiency and effectiveness in a holistic, joined-up manner with appreciable impact on whole communities. Sustainability of inputs will need careful monitoring over several years.

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Stages in the Relief-to-Development process: The Impact of Crisis and Post-Crisis Trauma on Project Design & Implementation; Diana F. de Treville, Alliance Burundaise pour la Coopération et le Développement & Austrian Help Program, Bujumbura, Burundi, http://burundigoats.tripod.com 10 Document de Stratégie: Programme de villagisation dans le cadre du rapatriement et de la réintegration au Burundi, UNHCR, 1 August 2008, p.11. 11 Though PRA goes further, involving stakeholders in monitoring and evaluating results. See http://portals.wi.wur.nl/ppme/?Participatory_Rural_Appraisal_(PRA)

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I.3 Recommendations
Policy level 1. Donors promised recovery assistance to Burundi upon the return of refugees from Tanzania and needs in Burundi are indeed enormous – particularly in the two Burundian provinces of intervention which, with the influx of so many new people, will require sustained support over many years. DCA and its partners must advocate for fulfilment of this promise in order to secure sufficient funds to anchor the returnees in their communities and prevent future outflows to Tanzania or elsewhere; 2. TCRS should continue its life-preserving activities in the Tanzanian refugee camps for as long as the refugees are still there. It is, according to UNHCR, the best-placed agency to manage the camps, provide basic services to the refugees and wind down the camps when appropriate. 3. TCRS’s continued engagement in Kibondo community development activities in Tanzania will be necessary for an additional two years. This programme and the Community Empowerment Project (CEP) should wind down in the third year, ensuring the equitable distribution of remaining project property by: (a) retaining that which is still useful to TCRS in Tanzania, (b) transferring that which may be useful to LWF in Burundi and (c) transferring that which remains and may be useful among the community. A Non-Expendable Property Committee should be set up with TCRS, LWF and DCA to make this a transparent, needs-based exercise. 4. Building on the success of the CEP in Tanzania, LWF could usefully implement a similar program in Burundi. A technical feasibility assessment of how and where to implement a CEP in Burundi should be undertaken by TCRS and LWF as soon as possible, budgeting for the assessment to be done before the end of 2008. CEP intervention in Burundi should be initially in a maximum of three intervention sites (where LWF is already working), due to its requirement of close supervision and hence greater need for project technical staff in the initial stages. There are also possibilities to link it with the UNHCR-sponsored ‘Villagisation’ initiative, but this would require additional staff and inputs. 5. In Burundi, consistent with DanChurchAid’s policy of following an integrated approach to programming, the LRRD approach is the correct one to follow for at least next three years. Livelihoods activities will require this amount of time to be completed and start showing results. Progressive emphasis should be given to recovery activities that should aim to wean the affected population off its ‘handout dependency’ and link with longer-term development programs. In the future these are likely to be implemented by Burundian technical departments with international support. LWF should make proactive efforts to engage with the relevant ministries and UN agencies more closely, to learn of planned activities and have a say in their development. 6. Because recovery takes place at different speeds in different parts of the country, and because of the population’s fragility in coping with such shocks as drought or floods, LWF must retain its intervention capacity for provision of emergency assistance (food, seeds, tools) to vulnerable population groups in the two provinces. Although this might seem to be ‘going backwards’ in some cases, timely emergency assistance can protect program recovery inputs and activities by providing people with food security. As such, it reduces their need to eat or sell preciously built up stocks of seeds and livestock, or to flee to other countries.
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Organization and Partnerships 7. DanChurchAid has forged an excellent and long-standing partnership with various church groups and associations throughout Tanzania and Burundi that have a long history of providing support to refugees and other vulnerable population groups. These partnerships have translated to effective fund-raising at grass-roots and donor country levels. 8. TCRS has an efficient organizational setup and good coordination with its partners, particularly with local authorities and UNHCR. TCRS has been UNHCR’s NGO partner of choice when consolidating the camps and retaining vital services in remaining camps, attesting to its continued relevance and effectiveness. 9. Coordination is weaker in Burundi, in the provinces of Ruyigi and Cankuzo, where international actors tend to work in isolation and with little knowledge of each others’ programmes, strategies, intervention areas or target groups. LWF cannot change this situation on its own but the evaluation endorses continued development of its new mapping capability and recommends this be used to map ‘who is doing what, where’ in LWF intervention communes, liaising with Action Aid in Ruyigi, which is supposed to be leading coordination efforts. The mapping tool would also be a useful and relevant service to other actors and could eventually lead to greater synergies between programmes. LWF could be more ‘visible’ by regularly sharing information about its interventions with other actors. The monthly newsletter is an excellent conduit; e-mail abbreviated updates to selected mailing list targets could also be effective for advocacy and coordination. 10. The Cluster coordination mechanism will be set up shortly in Burundi. LWF should ensure participation at provincial Cluster meetings, especially those pertaining to Early Recovery, Shelter, Food/Nutrition, WASH and Education. This could prove an additional burden to ongoing work and scarce resources but it is essential that LWF staff participate to contribute their expertise and experiences, to learn from those of others, to prevent duplication and to ensure standardization of technical plans and inputs across agencies. Program and Affected Population 11. In Tanzania, camp management activities will continue to be needed for the foreseeable future, given the slowdown in voluntary repatriation. TCRS should continue its advocacy activities, giving particular attention to those parts of legal instruments contained in International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) addressing issues of particular relevance to IDPs and returnees, such as property rights and conflict resolution. Efforts should be made to identify and support those initiatives and activities of the ICGLR meant to address the issue of security, foster new cross-boundary trade patterns and civil society engagement 12. The contents of the ICGLR Pact and Protocols as well as the African Union (AU) Draft Convention on IDPs should be widely disseminated in the refugee hosting areas (RHAs) in Kibondo but also in the Burundi returnee areas. 13. In Burundi it is necessary to restructure activities and/or intervention areas (a) to maximise time spent with beneficiaries in the project sites and minimise time spent on the road and (b) to modify the approach of the project towards empowering people through Cash for Work (CfW). The rationale is that, more than anything at this stage of their psychological recovery, people need work. An income allows them to choose what to spend it on, including food, domestic items and later on livestock, seed or small businesses. Different community members will save
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and spend at different times. Those who have saved and spent their earnings from Cash for Work projects wisely will encourage those who have not to emulate them. CfW also has the advantage of increasing the money supply in a community and accelerating its circulation, meaning it will allow people to set up small businesses and employ others, creating a virtuous circle that should eventually result in an increased sense of security, willingness to invest in personal and community schemes and poverty reduction. In fact, this philosophy has already been followed to some extent, providing people with ‘incentives’ while they work to build their homes and develop the swamps. But the incentives are too low to provide a household income and people must still engage in other work to make ends meet. 14. In order to address the situation whereby LWF receives government authorization to intervene on structural projects while not conducting Environmental Impact Studies (EIAs), it is recommended that LWF request the government to organise a ‘round-table’ discussion on modalities and procedures with all interested stakeholders. The dichotomy here is that EIAs are legal requirements that the government is bound to uphold, but it appears to have ignored its own requirements by authorising interventions without EIAs. A Round-Table event, including government departments and legal bodies, the World Bank, the UN, donors and NGOs, could examine the issue and recommend procedures to be followed across the board. If necessary, a codicil may be necessary to waive the EIA requirement for certain areas during a certain period. Round Table discussions and decisions would set a clear stage for all parties assisting the country on its path to sustainable development. 15. The evaluation recommends withdrawing from Gisagara Commune where fewer activities have been started, and to concentrate on the remaining nine collines in Gisuru (3), Cendajuru (5) and Mishiha (1)12. Livelihoods technical staff should be present in each Commune and Community Facilitators should stay at project sites during the week. This will allow them to not only supervise activities more closely but be the community’s ‘ear on the ground’, intimately linked with and aware of everything that is going on there. Full-time presence is especially necessary for follow-up of livestock and local association interventions. Technical staff should visit each site at least once a week or any time when Community Facilitators require their presence. 16. In addition, Community Facilitators should recruit people from the communities who can be trained as experts. To begin with one man and one woman could be engaged in each colline. They would act as apprentices and learn the job from the Facilitators, earn a weekly stipend and be provided with bicycles; free up LWF regular staff to do the planning, coordination and supervision while ensuring sustainability of the intervention when LWF leaves. Although roles could be reversed, the man would normally learn about – and be able to take over – agricultural and livestock support activities and the woman would adopt the role of facilitator on such information as civic education, gender and human rights, HIV/AIDS sensitization and specific issues pertaining to women. As members of the colline there is a greater likelihood that their skills will remain and be of service to all. It would be necessary to coordinate these actions with other NGOs and the local authorities to avoid duplication. Colline Facilitators and/or local experts could be shared with other NGOs and trained by them also. The added benefit of this scheme would be the project’s legacy of skilled, empowered community members. 17. Simultaneous with rehabilitating the ‘hardware’ part of collines such as Musha, Mwiruzi and Muvumu is the need to instil the ‘software’. This includes civic education including citizen rights
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The collines are as follows: in Gisuru commune: Muvumu, Gacokwe, Musha; Cendajura commune: Rukoyoyo, Gitaramuka, Nyamuga, Kyurura, Ngashigwe; Mishiha commune: Mwiruzi. www.channelresearch.com
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and obligations, HIV/AIDS, action against violence and other key messages that need to get through to each member of the community. The Community Facilitators and their colline apprentices can undertake these tasks. If possible, and as mentioned above, LWF can partner with other agencies working in the area to conduct education sessions. The sessions should be made a requirement for assisting communities with other activities. For instance, the Community Facilitator might spend half an hour a day before daily workers under CfW schemes attend to, for example, seed multiplication or road reconstruction. Associations’ inclusion in the project should be contingent on their documented participation at these sessions. LWF is encouraged to undertake a participatory exercise that would result in a selection of subjects to be taught and a curriculum for each. The Programme Coordinator’s teaching skills will be highly relevant for this exercise.

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II. Introduction
The present evaluation is commissioned by DanChurchAid (DCA) and covers the following projects: Under Cooperation Agreement PHS id 1573 Title: Program for Peace in Burundi, SON 28-4201 Implementation Period: 1 March 2006 – 28 February 2009 Total Budget: USD 2,046,355 DCA contribution: DKK 12,645,300. Title: Kibondo Refugee Project (CSO 2004-2008) Implementation Period: 1 March 2006 – 31 December 2008 Total Budget: US$ 7,910,00013 DCA Contribution: DKK 7,354,700 (US$ 1,190,080) Total DCA Contribution: USD 3,236,246, or DKK 20 mio. The Peace Program of Burundi (PPB) is a cross-border program of assistance to refugees, IDPs, expellees and host populations in Tanzania and Burundi. It is implemented in partnership between international and national agencies in both countries: DanChurch Aid (DCA), Lutheran World Federation/World Service (LWF/DWS14) and Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service (TCRS) in Tanzania and DCA, LWS/DWS and the Conseil National des Eglises du Burundi (CNEB) in Burundi. DCA has had a substantial engagement in the Great Lakes Region since 1992. In Tanzania, DCA has worked with the TCRS to support the refugee programme for Burundians in Kibondo. In Burundi, DCA’s assistance took a more sustained form in 1997 with the CNEB as its main national partner. In March 2006 DCA secured a three-year grant from the Government of Denmark of DKK 20 million, for a “Near Region Program” in Burundi with an extension covering remaining refugees in the Kibondo Refugee Camps in Tanzania. The program’s aim is to support the welfare and repatriation of Burundian refugees in Kibondo District, north western Tanzania, and to support the reintegration of the refugees on their return to Burundi, as well as other population groups in the return areas. Since 1992, with funding from DCA’s Framework Agreement with DANIDA for development projects, DCA has supported TCRS’ development efforts, including the CEP, a complementary project to the humanitarian (refugee) project that targets host communities in Karagwe, Ngara and Kibondo. The program is implemented in four communes in Cankuzo and Ruyigi provinces in eastern Burundi. With the planned closure of refugee camps at the end of 2008, implementation of activities by TCRS on the Tanzanian side will end in December 2008, while those implemented by LWF Burundi will end in February 2009. The evaluation aims to draw out lessons learned during the

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Statistics in TCRS Programme Evaluation Report, 2007, p. 13.

World Service is the internationally recognized humanitarian and development arm of the Lutheran World Federation (LWF). It recently became renamed as the Department of World Service (DWS). www.channelresearch.com
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three-year course of the program and to plan for future activities under a possible funding extension from the Government of Denmark. From 23 September to 8 October 2008 the evaluation conducted on-site observations in the Kibondo refugee camps as well as in selected host communities in Tanzania, and in the communes of Gisuru (Ruyigi Province), Cendajuru and Mishiha (Cankuzo province) in Burundi. The study was led by Ms. Anne Davies, an international consultant fielded by Channel Research, and supported by Dr. Khoti Kamanga, and Mr. Emmanuel Nshimirimana, national consultants in Tanzania and Burundi respectively, identified by LWF and its partners.

III. Background, Context and target populations
TANZANIA
It was in 1972 that Tanzania experienced the first major, present day, influx of Barundi refugees. As opposed to this group which came to be hosted in the Settlements of Mishamo, Katumba and Ulyankulu (in Central and South-western Tanzania), the second major influx which occurred in 1993 (and since then, cyclically) has been hosted, primarily in the 5 refugee camps of Karago, Kanembwa, Mkugwa, Mtendeli, Nduta, in Kibondo District bordering Burundi. In 2003, Tanzania articulated government thinking and aspirations in the National Refugee Policy (NRP). The period from the early 1960s right up to the mid 1990s, Tanzania’s approach has widely been described as an ‘open door policy’ for which the country won in 1983 the prestigious Nansen award. While many commendable initiatives have been and continue to be undertaken in mitigating the impact on communities in the RHAs of Kibondo District, one cannot ignore the countless, debilitating challenges arising from hosting such a phenomenal number of refugees for over a decade in a remote, sparsely populated region endowed with the most rudimentary infrastructure. According to the 2002 Census, Kibondo recorded a population of 413,777 with an average annual growth rate of 6.1%, the highest in the country, and consistent with “inflow of refugees” (p 14).15 According to the Poverty and Human Development Report (2005) the District ranks poorly in each of the 5 major indicators: poverty headcount; adult literacy rate; under-five mortality; total net enrolment; and improved water supplies. Generally, of the four Districts (Kigoma Rural, Kigoma Urban, Kasulu, Kibondo) comprising Kigoma Region, Kibondo appears to be experiencing the greatest developmental challenges. In evaluating TCRS interventions financed by DCA it is important to bear in mind these specific challenges confronting Kibondo District and by extension, the nation, as well as the proximate Ruyigi District of Burundi. Along with these drawbacks, Kibondo is an area of considerable potential. It is endowed with fertile soil, forests, pasturelands, regular and abundant rainfall, and moderate weather conditions. On its borders are fast developing mining locations such as Geita in Shinyanga Region. Kibondo is also an important transit stop for road traffic, especially between Tanzania’s second largest town and port of Mwanza on Lake Victoria, and Kigoma, on Lake Tanganyika. Both ports, incidentally are directly linked to the neighbouring countries, Kenya and Uganda in the case of Mwanza, and DRC and Burundi in the case of Kigoma.
The Programme Evaluation Report (2007:3) notes that Kigoma is a region with “the lowest level of development”.
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At the politico-legal front three recent developments are worth noting. Firstly, is the consolidation of peace and gradual re-establishment of democratic institutions within Burundi itself. Secondly, is the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), and the third factor is the draft African Union Convention on Assistance and Protection of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa16. The provision of several social and basic services in the camps was suspended following decisions made by the Tripartite Commission in 2007 to consolidate and eventually close refugee camps in Kibondo District. Though Kibondo camps were scheduled to close in June 2008, Nudta Camp remains open and will most likely close at the end of 2008.

BURUNDI
Since the Arusha Accords signature Burundi and its international partners expected a massive repatriation of refugees from the region. In May 2001 a Tripartite Commission was set up between the Tanzanian and Burundian Governments and UNHCR to promote repatriation despite the continuation of armed conflict in Burundi. This policy failed: in 2002 only slightly more than 50,000 refugees were repatriated although provisions had been made for double that number. At the same time a further 29,000 Burundian refugees fled the conflict and sought refuge in Tanzania. While repatriation picked up to 80,649 in 2003 and 90,327 in 2004, between 2005 and 2008 it has progressively fallen: • • • • • 2004 : 90,327 2005 : 68,108 2006 : 44,915 2007 : 39,798 2008 (to May) : 22,749 17.

In all, and since the start of the repatriation in 2002, only 401,546 refugees have repatriated up to May 2008 – half the expected number. Information from Burundi persuaded the refugees that peace dividends were not yet visible, despite the democratic elections of 2005. They knew that human rights violations and a climate of impunity continued to dominate society, that social services systems and employment possibilities were broken or weak: primary health and education structures were insufficient, especially in rural zones. Importantly, the refugees knew they would face problems in recovering their land and property on return. Finally, the extreme poverty in the country and particularly in return regions were major obstacles to repatriation since the majority of refugees were subsistence farmers. Effectively, Burundi is one of the poorest countries in the world. Its per capita GDP of US$ 83 is one of the lowest in sub-Saharan Africa which is already one of the poorest regions in Africa. Burundi is essentially an agriculture-based economy and most Burundians live from cultivation and livestock rearing. Agriculture occupies 90% of the population and produces around 50% of GDP, constituting nearly all of its export products. Agricultural production has been decreasing since the year 2000 and food crises occur almost every year. This weak national production limits the fulfilment of
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According to a statement made by the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs on the occasion of UNHCR’s 59th session of its Executive Committee, a meeting of Government Legal Experts of AU Member States will be held in November 2008 to ‘finalise and adopt the Draft AU Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, which is expected to be one of the key outcomes of the Special Summit’ to be held in early 2009, http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/index/index.htm ; 17 UNHCR, May 2008

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basic needs in all sectors: food security, health, education, housing, infrastructure and even access to clean water which is a sure indicator of extreme poverty in a country with abundant rainfall. Investment has not yet recovered its potential. Among the wide range of problems facing the country’s agriculture, the main ones are technical limitations (cultivation methods remain archaic), soil degradation due to sustained erosion, the lack of quality seeds and the lack of rural credit available to farmers. Refugees come home to harsh conditions which, more than not, preclude or limit resumption of their productive pre-war rhythms. In 2007, for example, food shortages threatened famine and aid agencies were forced to distribute food and seeds to particularly vulnerable population groups. The relationship between civil conflict and food security, including access to land and resources, is evident in the project area, where the years of nation-wide political, economic and social upheaval have gone hand-in-hand with famine, food insecurity and lack of rural enterprise/employment opportunities. However, there have been few efforts to systematically address these dynamics in such a way as to better understand linkages and underlying factors. Better understanding should foster an increased ability to strengthen sustainable livelihoods and conflict mitigation/resolution processes through specific improvements to food security and linked rural enterprise/employment opportunities. Affected Populations/Target populations Program beneficiaries in Tanzania are refugees repatriating to Burundi (over 25,000 repatriated in 2008 alone) and those remaining in the camps in Tanzania. At the time of the evaluation these numbered some 11,000 individuals (roughly 3,000 families18), out of an estimated caseload of 230,000 remaining as of October 200519). In Burundi, beneficiaries are an estimated 250,000 crisisaffected people in Ruyigi and Cankuzo provinces including returning refugees, expellees and IDPs and the ‘host’ population of these communes. The locus of TCRS is the District of Kibondo, within Kigoma Region. All existing assessments, including national census results, National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty as well as the UNDP Human Development Report all recognise Kigoma and indeed Kibondo as one of the most underprivileged areas of the country. For this important reason, there can be little doubt that TCRS programme activities are directed to the most deserving communities. The fact that Kigoma and more pertinently, Kibondo, is a pre-eminent Refuge Hosting Area (RHA), lends additional justification to the appropriateness of the area and its communities as a deserving recipient of DCA funding. Returning Burundian populations fall into four main groups: refugees assisted to repatriate and refugees returning spontaneously from Tanzania, expellees (those who refused to live in the camps and were therefore not registered as refugees) and IDPs. Of these groups, camp-based refugees repatriating with international assistance are best-placed to pick up their lives and climb out of the poverty trap, having received (a) education, vocational and skills training and accumulated knowledge of cultivation and livestock techniques in the camps, (b) six-months food ration, domestic items and BIF 50,000 (US$ 45) per person from UNHCR/WFP on repatriation and (c) assistance from TCRS/LWF to return with their livestock and other income-generating assets.

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Status Report, Annex 2 Programme Outline Burundi/Kibondo 2006-2008 www.channelresearch.com
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However, spontaneous returnees, expellees and IDPs do not receive this assistance package and are in greatest need of external assistance. Persons in these categories typically arrive in Burundi, or to their collines, empty handed and with hardly anything to help them to restart their lives. Many, realising the futility of returning to their places of origin where little awaits them, have been resettled by the government to previously unsettled areas in Burundi, or await the chance to be granted land elsewhere. There is no substantial assistance provided to them and they are living in extreme conditions of poverty. According to testimonies by the expellees interviewed by ACT members in Burundi, some expelled persons were threatened, beaten and had their property looted. They claim to have been forcefully evicted from their homes and many of them say they have left part of their families in Tanzania. It is these caseloads, as well as the communities to which they return or resettle, that LWF and its partners have targeted for implementation of the Program for Peace in Burundi.

IV. Purpose and methodology of the evaluation
Purpose: As the first phase of the Program for Peace in Burundi comes to an end, DanChurchAid and its programme partners have decided to conduct an evaluation of the program’s activities, covering the implementation period from March 2006 to date. It is in the interest of the partners and other relevant stakeholders to understand how to best improve on future interventions for achieving better and sustainable reintegration and resettlement of displaced persons in Burundi. Evidence based information, good practices and key lessons, and following up on recommendations from the evaluation will enhance learning and improve future program design and delivery. This process is especially important now since the evaluation comes at a time when DCA is preparing for a new application grant for 2009-2010 from the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Secondly, although future interventions will primarily focus on Burundi, the evaluation will also inform DCA on strategic directions for future involvement in Kibondo and Ngara regions of western Tanzania. Lastly the evaluation will serve to enhance accountability to DCA and external stakeholders such as rights-holders, partners, donors and others. Methodology: A two-part approach was used to gather data for the analysis necessary to achieve these objectives. First, a general review was conducted of project documents and other documents relevant to the intervention areas. Particular attention was given to previous assessments and evaluations of technical aspects of the program in recent years20. Second, field visits were made to the project areas incorporating project technical staff as a way of enhancing staff abilities in assessment exercises and to encourage a participatory assessment exercise. Discussions were held with project staff, local authorities, refugees and other beneficiaries in development villages in Tanzania and with project staff, local authorities and target population groups and individuals in the collines in Burundi over a two week period. In addition, the assessment built on work conducted in May, June and July of 2007 that was associated with a PRA training exercise organized and implemented for LWF staff. Finally, discussions were held with church groups, UN agency, NGO partners and other stakeholders relevant to the task. Work was conducted in the context of a Sustainable Livelihoods (SL) approach to evaluate achievements in
Notably, the evaluation entitled ‘Program for Peace in Burundi: Enhancing and Diversifying Livelihoods through Sustainable Improvements’, de Treville, 2008 and the ‘TCRS Programme Evaluation Report’, Taylor, Korpivaara, Magingo, Megiroo and Ringgaard, July 2007. www.channelresearch.com
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accordance with where each implemented activity was situated in the SL framework (see Annex F). Discussion groups with TCRS and LWF staff broadly followed a stakeholder assessment of Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT). In compliance with the Terms of Reference the program evaluated the program according to the OECD/DAC criteria of relevance, coverage, coherence, coordination, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. Overall guidance of the evaluation was assured by DCA; practical facilitation during the field phase was provided in Tanzania by TCRS and in Burundi by LWF. Constraints: The evaluation went very smoothly thanks to the excellent preparations made by TCRS and LWF in both countries. No specific constraints were encountered.

V. Evaluation findings
The team used the following framework to analyse the program in terms of the above criteria, using a model that follows the flow of policy and resources through the program’s system to deliver benefits to the affected populations. This approach is particularly useful for analysing the program as it allows us to concentrate on the different issues arising at each level. Different evaluation criteria takes precedence at different levels, though there is inevitably some overlap.

Policy Level
Relevance, appropriateness, coverage*

DCA policy

Partner Level
Coordination, coherence, connectedness, efficiency*

Tanzania Partners: TCRS

Burundi Partners: LWF, CNEB

Affected population level
Sustainability, impact, effectiveness* *these are the main criteria at each level but inevitably they were evaluated at the other levels.

Burundian Refugees in Tanzania Burundian returnees in Cankuzo and Ruyigi provinces

In general, the program is a good example of the “near region” policy espoused by Danida seen ‘in action’. Activities in one country are clearly and coherently linked to outcomes in the other. However, while both projects are closely linked, they are implemented with different sub-objectives
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and different activities in the different country contexts. We have therefore split each level of analysis according to country. V.1. Level 1: Policy and Intervention Strategy TANZANIA DanChurchAid (DCA) has been involved in support to refugees in Tanzania since 1963 and is currently a major donor of TCRS, one of its longest standing partners along with LWF (TCRS is an associated member of LWF). DCA has partnerships with LWF, TCRS and with Evangelical Lutheran Church in Tanzania dioceses, and supports programmes implemented jointly by the ELCT and LWF/TCRS. DCA’s intervention in both Tanzania and Burundi is consistent with its policy of: • Non-discrimination and irrespective of the causes of suffering, helping the weakest and most neglected population groups: in the case of Tanzania, these are the refugees and in the case of Burundi, the most marginalized in society including the most vulnerable of refugees, expellees and impoverished community members who remained in Burundi; • A gender sensitive approach to relief assistance: gender policies are adequately mainstreamed into TCRS and LWF programmes and the programme staff are sensitive to their meaning; • In addition to support to concrete projects, DCA contributes to the development of the human and institutional resources of its partners; • A ‘programming relief for development’ approach in its relief assistance so that distressed humans will not only receive relief assistance but will also become capable of self-support: these policies can be observed in action in both countries and in all aspects of the various project activities; • Commitment to a ‘rights approach’. Working within the framework of international humanitarian laws and conventions and in advocating for, implementation of and adherence to international conventions and laws in connection with its humanitarian activities.21 This policy is being practised through TCRS advocacy efforts with the Government of Tanzania to allow refugees to own livestock and engage in incomegenerating activities, compliance with Sphere standards in the camps and with the NGO Code of Conduct. In Burundi, LWF’s contribution towards conflict-mediation and resolution are emblematic of its commitment to upholding human rights standards. Through on-site observations in both countries, the evaluation was able to attest to the positive impact on the refugees of the self-support programmes implemented through TCRS thanks to DCA’s self-reliance policy. Refugees have regained a measure of dignity and self-sufficiency through training, livestock and handicrafts initiatives managed by TCRS. They are able to transfer these skills and assets to Burundi on repatriation, thereby contributing to family food security. The ‘crossborder initiative’ of assisting refugees back with their livestock and following the ‘solidarity chain’ of livestock rearing and transfer of young stock to other returnee families was instrumental in persuading many refugees to repatriate. Previously they were obliged to sell these assets at reduced prices to comply with the UNHCR policy of limiting belongings to 50kgs per family, leaving them with no start-up capacity for successful reintegration.
21

DanChurchAid Policy for Relief Assistance beyond the year 2000 policy document.

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TCRS has been involved in refugee work since 1964 when it was established as the first African field program of the LWF/DWS. In its 44 years of existence TCRS has been involved in refugee camps and settlements as well as in area development work with the rural poor in several districts in Tanzania. TCRS currently has two main intervention strategies: (1) Refugee camp management and related assistance to refugees, and (2) the Community Empowerment Program (CEP). Camp activities include water and sanitation delivery and maintenance, food and non-food distribution (food is provided by WFP), shelter, secondary and vocation education and camp infrastructure maintenance. In 2005 these services assisted camp populations of 76,000 Burundian refugees in Kanembwa, Mtendeli, Karago and Nduta camps. Today, repatriation has enabled TCRS to consolidate the camps into Nduta (some 11,000 refugees remaining) and Kanembwa, where roughly 1,200 refugees await resettlement to the USA. Intervention rationale has been relevant in TCRS’ camp management project: intervention sites were ‘self-selected’ according to the presence of the refugee camps. TCRS became a registered national NGO in 2006 and, as such, has increased its autonomy to act independently of its main camp management partner, UNHCR. In addition to life-preserving services to camp refugees, TCRS has been consistent with its policy of recognizing a refugee ‘as a human being, more than a recipient of donations’, helping the refugees to enhance their self-reliance in the camps. Especially relevant to the program objective of ‘peace-building’ and has been the TCRS Community Empowerment Program (CEP). Intervention sites were appropriately selected for their proximity to the camps, otherwise known as Refugee Hosting Areas (RHAs). In these villages, where the host population witnessed massive amounts of aid being transported to and consumed in the camps with nothing going to them, resentment against the refugees was highest and poverty levels significant. The CEP’s policy of targeting the most marginalized villages has been responsibly undertaken in conjunction with the local authorities and according to national development plans.22

BURUNDI
In Burundi, the LWF/DWS intervention rationale has also been relevant, ‘following the refugees back’ to the two border provinces of Ruyigi and Cankuzo, chosen appropriately as the most marginalized and yet the most likely areas of settlement for returnees, expellees and landless families. Marginalized and under-populated as these provinces (referred to broadly as the Mosso region) have been traditionally due to their infertile soils and difficult environment, they have been selected by the Government of Burundi for settlement by landless or otherwise dispossessed citizens. There is simply no room, no spare land, in other provinces which are more fertile, productive and densely populated. Project objectives are particularly relevant to assist returnees, expellees and local populations to live together in peace, resolve their differences – especially property disputes – and raise awareness of their rights, to restore basic infrastructure and housing and to regain a measure of food security by supporting their livelihoods aspirations and strategies. However, the evaluation finds that project coverage in Burundi is too wide to be truly effective. Activities such as seed multiplication centres and livestock replenishment has in some cases been spread too thin, targeting collines that are spread too far apart and cannot be sufficiently monitored. The time spent in travelling to these sites and the administrative resources necessary to conduct activities there are not commensurate with expected outputs or cost effectiveness. It would be more efficient and effective for LWF to limit intervention to its ‘integrated approach’ strategy, targeting collines where multiple activities can be conducted with a potential for optimum results. This is explored more fully in Section V.3 level 3, below.
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Interviews with the District Commissioner and local representative of the Ministry of Home Affairs. www.channelresearch.com
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The program is timely for returning refugees and expellees. Since 2003 refugees have been returning in high numbers relative to absorption capacity. Many people were expelled from Tanzania in 2006 and 200723, from areas where they had settled spontaneously, because they had chosen not to relocate to the camps. The expulsion was conducted in such a way that people had no time or possibility to gather their possessions and were therefore the most dispossessed on re-entry to Burundi. Spontaneous returnees also returned with no benefits, whereas those returning under UNHCR’s official repatriation programme received a repatriation kit including six months food ration, non-food items and facilitation to transport their possessions such as accumulated livestock and other assets to assist them re-establish their lives. Burundi needed help to absorb the returnees. The program offers an appropriate mix of activities for refugee traditional care and maintenance in Tanzania and a transitional (LRRD) framework in Burundi. Returnees are starting the recovery process that will eventually lead to longer term development at the community and national level. Yet at the individual level the great majority remain vulnerable to past and future shocks, most notably drought, floods, food insecurity and a resurgence of the conflict that could yet see them flee across the border again. It is essential now to anchor people in their communities and, simultaneous to pursuing recovery strategies, to retain an emergency intervention capability in case of new shocks that would assist the most vulnerable with relief inputs if necessary. More humanitarian funding is needed for Burundi. Over the last two years a consistent message has been diffused in the refugee camps: donor funding will progressively decrease in Tanzania but will increase in Burundi if the refugees return. Now that a great many refugees have returned, it is incumbent on the donors to make good on their promises by funding recovery and development projects in order to achieve the anchoring effect that is now so necessary. OCHA statistics show that 2008 humanitarian funding to Burundi is less than half that of 2007 levels24 - just at a time when returning populations need most support: YEAR 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 FUNDING US$ 54,912,626 130,473,553 90,274,388 105,901,520 95,661,523

In 2006, OCHA recorded on average 200 expellees per week throughout the year, though official figures are not available. In 2007, the Burundian Government project for the reintegration of war-affected persons, PARESI, recorded 8,665 expelled persons, consisting of 4,229 families. Since January 2008, PARESI registered a further 5,418 Burundians (2,324 families) expelled: www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/
LSGZ-78SDX2. 24 http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/fts.nsf/doc105?OpenForm&rc=1&cc=bdi

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The evaluation recommends that DCA advocate for increased humanitarian funding to Burundi. There is still much work to be done in transitional recovery before longer-term development plans can be implemented in a way that will have a measurable impact on alleviating the poverty of individuals and communities. LWF has demonstrated its capacity and programmatic responsibility to implement a sound and sustainable recovery program and, with additional resources, could be considered as responsible ‘guardians’ of increased aid. V.2. Level 2: Partner appraisal The ‘Program for Peace’ is marked by its close coordination and understanding of a common vision between stakeholders. The present three-year programme has been funded by Danida as part of its Regional Host Area Programme through DanChurchAid. As a cross-border program, it was developed on the strength of several years fruitful co-operation between the ACT members TCRS, CNEB and DCA on humanitarian projects for war-affected Burundians during the crisis in Burundi. With the gradual stabilisation of the situation in Burundi, cross-border exchange and coordination became easier and the partners started paying exchange visits to each other, facilitating refugees’ exchange visits to Burundi and Burundian NGO visits to the refugee camps. DCA has been a valuable partner for both LWF and TCRS who in turn have valuable contacts with church groups in their respective countries and abroad. LWF is instrumental in filling ‘gaps’ in funding through support from its international networks. A joint CNEB/LWF/TCRS/DCA Steering Committee, made up of one member each appointed by LWF, TCRS and DCA and three members appointed by CNEB, provide oversight for the program, set policy and guide activities. Meetings take place on a quarterly basis, rotating between countries to allow committee members to appreciate the different country contexts and constraints. This represents an excellent and systematic format to ensure all partners are informed of developments and can jointly assist in problem-solving. The committee meetings are appreciated by all partners.

TANZANIA
1. DCA’s network of assistance partners works well in both Tanzania and Burundi. Partnerships have developed with and between TCRS and ELCT. TCRS has an efficient organizational setup and good coordination with its partners, particularly with local authorities and UNHCR. TCRS has been UNHCR’s NGO partner of choice when consolidating the camps and retaining vital services in remaining camps, attesting to its continued relevance and effectiveness. DCA is a valuable partner for LWF and TCRS, having considerable experience of working with CNEB and other ACT partners in Burundi and through its sustained support since 1992 to the TCRS refugee and CEP programmes in Kibondo25. 2. The present evaluation found ample evidence for a positive appraisal of TCRS’s coordination performance. Its partnerships with ELCT and ACT have provided it with resources to introduce the additional activities in the refugee camps described in Section V.1. above. According to camp partners interviewed by the evaluation team, TCRS is well
In 2004, DCA’s Board revised DCA’s strategy for geographical focus of long-term development and support. Part of this revision was to phase out long-term development support, of which part was related to Tanzania. At the same time DCA committed to maintain fund-raising efforts for and support to refugees in Kibondo as long as there was a need. DCA phased out its support to the CEP in 2007. According to the CEP manager, phase-out was notified well in advance, giving TCRS time to look for other donors. CEP’s activities have been supported in 2008 by FinnChurchAid.
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respected and appreciated for its flexibility, adaptability and capacity to respond to new developments. The local government authorities in Kibondo also attested to the excellent coordination they enjoyed with TCRS and requested that it continue its development activities in the host villages after the repatriation of all refugees. Camp coordination is smooth mainly due to weekly meetings between partners that solve day-to-day problems.

BURUNDI
3. LWF has close ties to its head organization in Geneva and benefits from additional funding from LWF church networks. It also has close relations with the CNEB in Bujumbura which assists with numerous administrative matters: providing grounds for the LWF office, guidance through Steering Committee meetings, assistance in matters of recruitment of staff and procurement and interaction with the Government. 4. However, coordination between international, national and community actors is weaker in Ruyigi and Cankuzo. Agencies and government departments tend to work in isolation and with little knowledge of each others’ programmes, strategies, intervention areas or target groups. 5. The above notwithstanding, Government departments interviewed (Education, Agriculture and PARESI) all appreciate the coordination, information sharing and support provided by LWF. Those officials interviewed hold LWF in high regard and attest to its close consultation on such matters as national and regional policy and coherence with national technical standards. 6. LWF could be more ‘visible’ by regularly sharing information about its interventions with other actors. The monthly newsletter is an excellent conduit; e-mail abbreviated updates to selected mailing list targets could also be effective for advocacy and coordination. V.3. Level 3: Affected Populations The programme’s overall goal is stated as: “war-affected Burundians achieve a sustainable return, resettlement and reintegration in their communes of origin, contributing of nationhood”. Three specific objectives are given under which several result areas fall: a) Unity and acceptance of returnees by receiving communities is increased, b) Burundian community members engage in the development of their Collines through enhanced skills and new trades (métiers), c) Refugees and returnees enjoy good access to vital resources and services. This section of the evaluation examines these goals and assesses to what extent they have been achieved at the population level.

TANZANIA
By the time the evaluation took place, voluntary repatriation had emptied most of the camps previously managed by TCRS and only an estimated 11,000 refugees remained in two camps: Nduta (under 10,000) and Kanembwa (1,100). As of early 2007 the Government of Tanzania had directed all non-essential camp activities to cease – schools, vocational centres, income-generation activities – all had been closed down, consequently it was impossible to observe camp activities other than
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distribution, water and sanitation and animal husbandry in Nduta, camp shelter and essential activities in Kanembwa – whose total caseload is destined for resettlement. Those refugees remaining in the camps were mostly idle. Particularly distressing to witness was the number of refugee children not attending school, but adults claimed they would not repatriate, even to enrol their children in school. According to NGOs, government officials and refugees interviewed TCRS has led an efficient and well-coordinated camp management activity. TCRS has maintained standards throughout the camp consolidation process despite the Government’s directive to reduce activities. Life-preserving activities such as provision of water and food distribution, hygiene and sanitation have been managed according to international (Sphere) standards. For example, through the project’s hygiene and sanitation activities in Nduta Camp, the ratio of persons per latrine, per shower head, and per refuse pit met UNHCR recommended standards: 93% of families had family latrines, 88.3% bathing shelters, and 76.8% garbage pits. The camp populations also had access to free HIV/AIDS testing and anti-retroviral treatment. TCRS has used its separate funding avenues to provide non-traditional camp activities to promote the dignity of individuals. The focus has been on food production and micro-enterprise in the camps, establishing and running a vocational training centre, apprenticeship training and handicrafts production by women, which have equipped the refugees with practical skills to enhance their income-generating possibilities on return to Burundi. These activities have positively impacted on the welfare, improved knowledge and capacity-building of the refugees. Health levels of camp residents are higher than those of the host population, according to UNHCR health statistics, reflecting partly on TCRS effective management of the water and sanitation sectors. Primary, secondary and post-primary education activities have been effective in ensuring access of all camp children to quality education – although not all of them have availed themselves of the opportunity and, according to camp records, secondary school results are mediocre. TCRS has efficiently managed and maintained project fleets and vehicles belonging to local authorities. LWF Burundi continued to provide vital information materials from Burundi to Kibondo refugee camps through TCRS. Cross-border visits have been supported to conduct dialogue with leaders of the Kanembwa and Nduta refugees on several issues including access to land. Other TCRS ‘niche’ activities in the camps, many of which have ‘followed the refugees back’ to Burundi, include: Organizing information and communications strategies and exchanges have effectively helped prepare refugees for voluntary repatriation. While it was not possible to measure whether or to what extent these strategies expedited the ‘volrep’ process, the go-and-see visits were apparently instrumental in helping refugees secure future work in Burundi, which in turn would have logically accelerated their decision to return. TCRS and LWF have helped to address people’s concerns regarding lack of land or housing to which they could return by bringing over to the camps some of the Burundian local authorities (both the traditional ‘Bashingantahe’ leaders and locally elected leaders) so these problems could be discussed openly and directly. In most cases fears were allayed by promises of government assistance on land issues, and this (anecdotally) has also encouraged people to repatriate. TCRS’ innovative livestock chain has had multiple – and measurable - benefits for camp residents. By providing 28 heifers in 2006, initially benefiting 28 families, the stock has multiplied to 350 in the past 20 months, benefiting the same number of families. The scheme also helped families to improve animal husbandry techniques and learn simple
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veterinary practices to maintain the stock in good health, skills that will serve them in the future. In addition, the important logistics activity organized by TCRS and LWF that assists refugees to repatriate with their livestock and other property accumulated in the camps has had an appreciable impact on the ability of the returnees to start their lives anew with capital assets. For example, the price of cattle in Tanzania is about half that per head in Burundi. Those who could afford to do so bought cattle in the former and sold them in the latter, thereby gaining enough cash to give them a kick-start in their new lives. Others who were in the livestock ‘chain of solidarity’ scheme were able to sell their cattle as soon as they had reproduced and the heifers passed along to other beneficiaries in the chain. The team was not able to verify this system in action but program staff were keen to stress the benefits. In Nduta Camp, over 200 refugee farmers have been equipped, through TOT training, with knowledge on improved agronomy and animal husbandry practices. These transferable skills will be used even after repatriation. Other activities have included supporting refuges sustain small scale vegetable gardens to supplement WFP rations (now closed down). Another initiative that has had significant impact is the assistance to women basket-weavers to market and sell their camp-made products, both in the camps (before the activity was stopped) and on return in Burundi, allowing them to earn a small income. In 2006-2007 the refugee women sold US$ 30,000 worth of goods to the outside world. In Burundi, a women’s association in Cendajuru commune explained how LWF took orders for a company in the US, then the women made products according to the orders; other products are sold in hotels in Bujumbura. The income earned has helped the women provide three meals to their families instead of just one per day. While this activity is not sustainable in the long-term (when LWF phases out the marketing link may be lost), it empowers the women through training in literacy, book-keeping and quality assurance, skills which will serve their livelihoods strategies in the longer term. Of admirable intention but unmeasured impact, the improved stove, kiln or oven (four amélioré) was been introduced in the refugee camps with the double aim to limit the worrying rate of deforestation around the camps by both refugees and host populations gathering firewood, as well as to improve the living conditions of the community. Making the ovens is a simple activity that anyone can carry out. By reducing the amount of firewood that needs to be collected, environmental protection is improved and women spend less time out collecting wood, by implication reducing their exposure to rape. Impact is dubious because people claim the stoves give out little light or heat, therefore they also need to use a traditional fire as well. It would be useful to undertake an impact survey of the use of these stoves to assess to what extent they have (or haven’t) favourably impacted the environment, within the framework of the CEP, where the manufacturing activities are still taking place. The above are not usual camp activities but they serve as examples of the innovative ways in which TCRS has helped the refugees to improve their lives and learn important skills that should assist their livelihoods upon repatriation. Evidence of the effectiveness of these activities is the presence of many former refugees in positions of local authority and business in Burundi – including senior national staff in LWF. They have gone a long way to achieving the program’s sub-objectives a) and c).

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BURUNDI
In general project beneficiaries and target populations have been appropriately selected. Although the programme has a slight bias towards refugees and expellees from Tanzania because of the focus on return, the primary focus groups are appropriately selected as the most vulnerable in society. Project coverage was considered in an earlier evaluation as too wide and recommended the project decrease intervention areas from 28 collines to nine. This recommendation has been implemented. Project progression and implementation rates The evaluation found that program activities proceeded fairly rapidly after a slow start due to delays in LWF becoming registered in Burundi (achieved only in November 2006) and the killing in January 2007 of an expatriate worker that considerably slowed staff movements in the critical needs assessment phase. Staff recruitment and training workshops were principal activities during the first six months of 2007, after which actual project activities were able to begin. The evaluation considers that, while delays might have caused frustration, LWF acted responsibly in taking the necessary time to recruit and train technically appropriate staff during the start-up phase. Project activities have proceeded at different speeds. For example, key tangible benefits of the programme in general were observed by the team as: important contributions towards improving peace and justice, and better access to social infrastructure (objectives a) and c). Objective b) has been slower to achieve due firstly to a serious drought in 2007 that meant having to revert to providing relief support (food, seeds and tools) to affected communities, and secondly to the fact that this component takes more time to establish and to achieve results than the other two objectives. This is to no fault of LWF – rather it is the nature of support to livelihoods, which is a more complex intervention than, for example, rehabilitating infrastructure. Attainment of project objectives: (a) Unity and acceptance between returnees and people in the receiving community promoted. According to the government authority PARESI (Projet d’Appui au Rapatriement et à la Réintégration des Sinistrés), appropriate and effective activities were undertaken to mitigate feelings of mutual suspicion between the returnees and host populations. Host population attitudes have improved towards the returnees, comités d’accueil (welcome committees) have helped to promote peace and reconciliation between former neighbours and LWF has promoted justice and a reduction in tensions between elected local leaders and Bashingantahe. LWF and PARESI joined forces to facilitate training of trainers (TOT) for the welcome committees. Bringing training to key locations where peace and justice problems arise is an effective way to provide context-specific focus and to train people in the places where they live. The committees are trained to help people reintegrate back into their communities and in conflict resolution skills to help resolve disputes that may have the potential to spiral out of control and reignite conflict if left unattended. Concretely, LWF provided logistical and technical support to four tribunals during the period January – June 2008, enabling them to expedite the handling of land dispute cases. The TOT team provided training on the use of legal materials distributed to local authorities. Thirty paralegals were trained in the two provinces and were involved in datagathering and the resolution of land cases. Fifteen local leaders were also trained in conflict
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resolution, leadership, human rights and the legal protection of vulnerable groups. 45 members of welcoming committees were trained. ‘Soft peace’ activities were held: a volleyball tournament involving 128 players attracting about 1,300 spectators and two community theatre groups promoting peace and reconciliation reached 3,500 persons in the host communities. The result of these activities is manifested by the lack of conflict and reduction of tensions in project areas, according to PARESI and to all individuals interviewed throughout the evaluation in Burundi. It was important to the team to have confirmation of peace consolidation in Burundi to assess the justification of the Tanzanian authorities’ and international agencies’ promotion of voluntary repatriation of the remaining refugee population in Kibondo. (c) Refugees, returnees and people in the receiving community enjoy access to basic social services: Implementation of this project sub-objective is on target. It is a particularly successful component of the program with high visibility attesting to its positive impact to a wide number of beneficiaries. It has brought important cash for work benefits to all those working on infrastructure activities, such as road, school and water rehabilitation. Project staff indicated the extent to which CfW is popular among the communities of intervention. Activities have been carried out in accordance with national technical standards with the exception of failure to conduct ‘environment impact assessment studies’ (EIAs) which are prescribed by law for any infrastructural undertaking. Even acknowledging that the project started late and that an EIA would have slowed implementation further, this was an essential preliminary step that should not have been omitted. Rehabilitation and re-equipping of primary and secondary schools in six collines (Mwiruzi, Muvumu, Murore, Nyabitare, Gisuru and Cendajuru) have provided a safer learning environment to returnees and receiving communities as school populations increase with continuing repatriation. The provision of school kits to vulnerable secondary schools at secondary schools has, according to school committees, reduced drop outs and enhanced academic performance. On the other hand, and despite these inputs and the policy of free primary schooling to all in Burundi, the evaluation noticed a great many children of primary school age not attending school in project areas. There are different reasons for this: lack of school uniforms, lack of food to give to the children when in school, distance to schools, classroom overcrowding and ignorance of the benefits of education for girls. UNICEF has indicated that it might provide uniforms in future, but the main underlying reason for the limit to education accessibility is poverty. To assist the landless, expellees, marginalized populations and recent returnees either from Tanzania or from neighbouring communes, LWF has successfully negotiated with local authorities through its human rights advocacy work to obtain land with corresponding land title in several Communes. With community participation, LWF has provided ‘decent housing’26 to those newly granted land title, thereby improving their living conditions significantly.
This is a particular term used in Burundi to denote a certain housing standard that has been designed and accepted among the Government and international aid agencies. It is somewhat at variance with UNHCR’s continuation of the term ‘shelter’, though UNHCR-assisted housing follows the same ‘decent housing’ standards. A house unit costs about US$ 500.
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The three water gravity schemes have had a discernible positive impact on communities, especially to women. Potable water is now available at a distance of no more than 500 metres from most colline dwellers whereas prior to the intervention, women would have to walk up to five kilometres. Water taps have also been installed in the proximity of school intervention sites. The project has made an appreciable difference to people’s health and welfare, especially to children. Road rehabilitation has opened access to previously isolated collines, such as Musha. The new road has promoted access to the primary school of children in neighbouring collines, a new bridge spanning the swamp between Musha and Cendajuru will allow secondary school students easy access to the school in the latter colline and feeder roads have helped people bring their produce to market. Unfortunately, sustainability of the rehabilitated roads is doubtful: experience shows that a couple of rainy seasons are enough to damage and pothole the laterite surfacing. While LWF has been careful to ensure proper maintenance of its water structures and taps, no such mechanisms have been put in place for road maintenance and it is doubtful that communities will independently decide to maintain their roads if there is no CfW component involved. Towards the end of each activity LWF must ensure that the relevant plans are handed over to responsible local authorities. The evaluation found that the above infrastructure activities have been implemented in a coherent and joined-up manner. When assessing the merits of spreading project inputs wide in one sector, or of intervening in several sectors in the same locations, the evaluation considers that the latter is a more effective approach: it enhances project efficiency, allows for close monitoring and builds trust between communities and project staff. A ‘scattering’ of same-sector activities over a wider area may have positive impact but would be difficult and non cost-effective to monitor adequately with the small staff component of LWF. It would also lack the ‘joined-up’ character that is so effective and efficient under the current integrated approach. (b) Burundian Community members engage in the development of their collines through enshanced skills and new trades: As mentioned above, this objective is a more complex one to achieve, requiring careful planning in the start-up phase. LWF engaged in responsible planning by first conducting a study on livelihoods activities that the project could feasibly undertake. The findings and recommendations of the study subsequently informed the project’s livelihood intervention strategy and planning. Nevertheless, the evaluation considers that the overall approach taken was not fully appropriate because of the erroneous assumption on the state of psychological recovery of the population. A key evaluation finding was evidence of the population’s generally high level of post-traumatic stress that impedes program goals of achieving self-sufficiency. Studies have shown that people emerging from prolonged periods of stress, including shocks from natural disasters, conflict and personal loss, take time to reach a stage in their lives when they can look ahead and plan for themselves and their families. Details of how this process works its way through are provided in Annex G. The population target groups in the project sites mostly manifest signs of being trapped in the stage of fear, anger, denial and inability to take full control of their lives or to take full advantage of the future benefits that the project activities offer. They see project inputs not as a means upon which to build up their financial, physical or social capital but as ready sources of cash, translatable into food to address their most basic fear which is food insecurity. This is why many project inputs distributed to them for husbanding, reproduction or improved welfare (including goats, seeds, tools,
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house roofing etc.) have been sold, mostly for prices far inferior to their value. Examples of this are as follows: • Despite the sound structure of the livestock rearing committees in the collines where the project has distributed goats, some beneficiaries sell the goats entrusted to them for husbandry and reproduction. Sales are conducted surreptitiously in such a manner that it is impossible to tell if the goats were stolen (the most common explanation for their disappearance) or if they died or got lost. Part of this may be due to the fact that the goats are too sparsely distributed to achieve a sustainable impact on the beneficiary communities. For example, 28 goats to 14 households spread over seven sub-collines, that is, two per subcolline. Such dispersal of project assets cannot make a meaningful impact and, furthermore, is not cost effective due to the amount of project monitoring necessary, spread over a wide area. It should be mentioned that a similar scenario was observed with the ‘goat project’ of another agency in 2005, in a different part of the country27. This project ultimately failed for the same reasons. Association members appear to become involved in associations not out of conviction of their use as development tools but out of speculation with regard to their potential for monetization. This is probably attributable to the fact that the activities undertaken by associations are not at all profitable for individual members. For example, the Association ‘Kanguka’ in Mwiruzi includes 25 members in the production of sorghum on a one-hectare plot. The harvest from this crop represents about FBu 24,000, or FBu 9,600 per member. Yet each member must work for at least 24 days to obtain this benefit, which amounts to only FBu 400/person/day. In another example – and another season – the association cultivated 30 kgs of groundnuts seed provided by LWF, harvesting 120 kgs. Of this, 30 kgs were reimbursed to LWF and 30 kgs stored for use as seed for the next season. The remaining 60 kgs went to the beneficiaries at a value of about FBu 90,000, or FBu 3,600 per person. Cultivation took 15 days of work per association member, representing only FBu 240/person/day. These ‘profits’ are too low to serve as a daily wage when latter usually yields between FBu 800 – 1,000/person. In contrast, those working in manioc fields and earning around FBu 1,000/day were very happy and claimed that this kind of work is more profitable for them. According to testimony from other interviews part of the LWF-distributed seed was sold by beneficiaries at inferior prices to their market value. The other part of the seed donation was sown, but the harvest was not good. The Batwa community in Gacokwe asked LWF to help them build ‘decent housing’, but in their perception the corrugated iron roofing signified a means to obtain food, and all except one of the 30 beneficiary families sold the roofs and allowed their houses to crumble. Free handouts risk keeping communities in the passive dependency phase. It is therefore necessary to identify transitional strategies that will permit people to satisfy their urgent needs while becoming progressively more active. From observations during this evaluation and in other parts of the country covered by the evaluation experts, what people most need at this stage of their recovery is revenue. Revenue is important because it gives people freedom of choice to buy what they most need, individually. The evaluation recommends a re-orientation of project activities to respond to this need in a sustainable manner. Possible actions to take are as follows:

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Programme Cadre d’Appui aux Communautes du Burundi (PCAC)

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Cash for Work: this is another word for ‘employment’ or ‘income-generation’ and essentially means providing people with work opportunities and paying them for their labour. CfW can be a very good alternative to the often used Food for Work. It gives beneficiaries the flexibility to use the cash on their specific needs instead of getting “one size fits all” food packages. Re-investment of the cash into the community economy can strengthen the recovery process. There have been some very good results with the multiplier effect of cash injections into community28. CfW also translates to more cost effective programming as it is easier, with the necessary safeguards, to hand out cash than food (which involves expensive and complex logistics). CfW has scope to employ skilled labour to implement its activities - for example, agronomists, vets and livestock experts - or non-skilled labour, which constitutes the majority of rural Burundi, for rehabilitation on communal infrastructure. LWF has already used CfW successfully in its road-rehabilitation schemes but in future it is recommended that it uses the daily rates officially stipulated (different rates for different gradations of skill), to remunerate people adequately to cover their basic needs29. CfW is an opportunity that most community members would wish to benefit from, so a community-based self-selection process should be used on a ‘roster’ basis with a new group of people employed every six months, offering a chance to everyone willing to work. The objective of CfW is to help people overcome their passivity and to regain their dignity and independence. This psychological boost should help many (but not all) to start saving, planning their futures, establishing networks, investing and generally ‘move on’. It will be interesting to monitor how the Batwa people respond to a CfW schemes since daily labour is their chief livelihood strategy. In general there should always be very careful inclusion of the community on the kind of work that needs to be done. Some CfW activities tend to be labour intensive and thus there is a risk of excluding women or vulnerable groups that cannot engage in hard labour. Also gender issues would be relevant if the work is away from the village and that women have to bring children or find alternative care for their children. It is thus a good idea to implement any CfW project in conjunction with other livelihood activities that are targeting these groups, or in conjunction with food relief activities. When planning the Cfw activities, it could be considered how the vulnerable groups also can contribute to, or have their role in the project - for instance, by giving them jobs that are of a more administrative nature. There may be a seasonality issue, and CfW should not be implemented in the peak agricultural season when people need to be working on their fields. Finally, working with cash always increases risk of fraud and abuse and that vulnerable groups can be tricked or have their money stolen30. Seeds multiplication: quality seeds constitute a real need expressed by the population as well as by the Direction Provinciale d’Agriculture et d’Elevage (DPAE), and recognized by LWF. LWF’s logical intervention strategy has been to create seed multiplication centres at the commune level, organized and managed by associations. The approach recommended here is to retain

Example: Concern in Malawi, which implemented the scheme some years back; Cecile Winther, Program Advisor for Relief, DCA Copenhagen. 29 For example, in Burundi as elsewhere there is a risk that the daily ‘incentive is too low and people having to work all day on the CfW programme have no time to seek alternate employment or no time to work on their fields, and the cash earnt cannot feed the family. 30 Cecile Winther, op.cit.

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the goal (improved seeds) while re-orienting the management aspect such that LWF administers the centres and hires community members to do the work in them. This should be a period of about three years in order to guarantee the quality and regular maintenance work needed to propagate the seeds. During the period, LWF would regularly analyse progress and assess the potential for self-financing via controlled sale of the improved seed. After three years LWF could initiate a strategy to transfer the seeds centres to community structures, which would equally have gained time to grow in strength, with careful monitoring. The manual labour required to plant, grow, harvest and sell the seeds would be done by community members who would be paid for their work (CfW, otherwise known as daily labour). Anyone wishing to buy the seeds – including community members - would have to pay for them. The seeds could also be sold to other communities requiring that particular variety.

Most of the soil in the region is poor, lacking fertility, as manifested by the presence of ferns (fougères). The project could thus be complemented by developing the pool of livestock to produce organic fertilizer (manure), preferably dairy cows which would provide additional income-generation possibilities. Livestock rearing would also be done by offering daily labour to community members. The seeds centres could, in this way, progressively become farms where the community could buy the various seeds and livestock products they require individually. They could also constitute model centres to train interested community members in agricultural and pastoral techniques. The main constraint to the purchase of cows is funding: a cow costs approximately US$ 600 and would constitute thus a heavy project outlay. Rehabilitation/reconstruction of community infrastructure: such as roads, schools, health centres, etc. can also be conducted via cash-for-work schemes, which would have the effect of employing a large number of people. For non-skilled labour it would be advisable to select the most vulnerable among the communities and rotate them every six months, by which time they would have earned a significant, regular income and have moved beyond the dependency syndrome phase. SOPRAD31 in Ruyigi has already implemented such schemes and should be consulted for modalities. In the interest of project follow-up and monitoring and ensuring sustainability, it is preferable that the seed centres and community infrastructure rehabilitation activities be conducted in the same collines. Swamp development: this activity has had a beneficial impact on communities and shows further promise, providing landless people with cultivable plots in areas where land is limited and mostly arid. Here again, LWF would need to seek clarity on the issue of EIAs. Results of swamp development to date are impressive and communities are eager to obtain cultivable land. According to recent reports, 26 hectares of swamp have been developed and are ready for use while a topographic study for another 76 hectares is under way. 33 associations involving 660 households have been involved in cassava planting material multiplication. 124 households have been involved in planting of fixing grasses on 52.7 km of galleys. Fifty farmers have been trained on making and proper use of organic pesticides and fertilizers and 60 farmers on modern compost development.

1.

31 SOPRAD – Solidarité pour la Promotion de l’Assistance et le Développement. SOPRAD is in the process of conducting an agricultural planning exercise in the diocese of Ruyigi. It is necessary for LWF to coordinate activities with them in order to avoid duplication.

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Knowledge transfer: in those communities visited by the evaluation team a general ignorance prevails among the population on a number of themes. Most people interviewed did not have ID cards, had entered into illegal marriages or engaged in polygamy without realising it is illegal, hold false beliefs on the origins of certain illnesses, the practice of bushburning etc. Ignorant agricultural and pastoral practices are the reason for weak production. Ignorance is also rife on health topics such as HIV/AIDS and other illnesses that are the origin of poor community health, and on the advantages of having written proof of land ownership, scolarity or family planning. Women are particularly ignorant in these areas yet should be the standard-bearers for inculcating sound practices in children and for disseminating key community health messages. It is recommended that LWF make it obligatory for all those enrolled in CfW schemes to attend ‘sensitivity sessions’ that would aim to instil good practice and build capacity in three main areas: o Civic education : rights, such as laws and conventions on land tenure, human and children’s rights, national and local procedures, etc. and on citizen responsibilities; o Public health education : hygiene and sanitation, sound nutritional practices, family planning and the prevention of transmissible diseases such as HIV/AIDS as well as the origins of malaria, diarrhoea and respiratory illnesses and how to prevent them; o Good practice and techniques regarding agricultural and pastoral activities.

Micro-credit: It is evident that most citizens suffer from a lack of access to financing, leaving them vulnerable to the predatory practices of ‘loan sharks’ who further impoverish them. When people need money for various reasons (illness, food, school material purchases etc.) they have little option but to secure usurious loans which demand up to 100% interest. Thus, even when harvests are good, the beneficiary is often the loan shark, not the farmer. A system allowing even poor people to save and have access to affordable credit would contribute towards alleviating the unending cycle of poverty to which many people have fallen victim. A particular micro-credit methodology might serve as a good model for these poor rural communities: the Saving and Internal Lending Communities (SILC), implemented by BIRATURABA association, funded by Catholic Relief Services in Burundi:

Savings groups consist of 10 to 25 members, who may convene in any open space, even under a tree, to pool their savings and disburse loans. Five of the members head the group and organize the meetings. Minimum savings amounts, commonly around 50 cents, are based on what the poorest member of the group can afford. The groups also set aside contingency funds to help with the burden of unexpected disasters or medical needs. Once the groups are up and running, field agents monitor the process for 10 to 12 months until the group masters the technique and becomes autonomous. For many women, microfinance means they can put food on their tables and provide their children a chance at a decent education. Marguerite found quick success from her saving activities. In only a few weeks she was able to secure a small amount of credit. She used the money to start a business, reselling various necessities at the market. With more income she can provide her family with three meals a day. She’s now looking forward to renting land for rice farming.

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As of March 2008 there were 133 SILC groups in Burundi. As of June 2008 this had increased to 173 groups with 2,716 members in Buterere and Mutimbuzi communes.
Source: BIRATURABA report and http://crs.org/burundi/small-loans-for-women/

The success of all these activities depends on close monitoring and follow-up, which can be labour-intensive for NGOs. The evaluation team recommends a re-structuring of its technical staff as follows :

Coordination Office, one in Ruyigi and one in Cankuzo

Communal Office (Gisuru) : one agronomist and one ‘animateur social’

Communal Office (Cendajuru) : one agronomist and one ‘animateur social’

Communal Office (Mishiha) : one agronomist and one ‘animateur social’

One agricultural monitor per colline

One social animator per colline (preferably female)

One agricultural monitor per colline

One social animator per colline (preferably female)

One agricultural monitor per colline

One social animator per colline (preferably female)

To reinforce the capacity of existing structures: - It would be preferable to engage agricultural monitors from DPAE (if they can be spared for the project). If not, community members carefully selected for their technical and leadership qualities could be trained by DPAE and would benefit from incentives and means of transport (bicycles). They could then serve as models from whom other members of the community could learn agro-pastoral techniques. - It would also be preferable to engage the social animators who are already social agents for community health from the provincial health Bureau (if such agents exist). If not, the above training and mentoring model could be used. - In time, other community members could join the agricultural monitor and social animator to act as apprentices, getting on-the-job training with small incentives and with future possibilities of employment within provincial structures. Refugee returnees who have benefited from training in the camps could be identified as either professional monitors/animators, vetted by the provincial bureaux, or as apprentices.
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VI. Cross-cutting questions VI.1 Gender

DCA and its partners employ appropriate Human Rights Programming and Gender Equality approaches which provide concessions promoting equal access for men and women to resources and decision-making. In most activities observed, women are involved in project activities but to a much less extent than men in both Tanzania and Burundi. Women in positions of leadership were rarely encountered by the evaluation teams. In discussions with project staff it transpires that although there is a gender balance in the hiring of women in both TCRS and LWF, a great many are absent at any one time due to pregnancy, post-natal leave or sick leave. Additionally, women face greater vulnerability in travelling to isolated villages or collines and are understandably reluctant to go there alone. Men are needed to cover the project activities that necessitate travel to such isolated spots. This evaluation’s recommendations to recruit female community educators who live in, and do not have to move from their collines, should partially redress the project imbalance. Both TCRS and LWF staff are gender-sensitive and make sure that key messages they need to get out to the community are disseminated by women who, they say, are better communicators and more committed to the adoption of sound community practices. TCRS has also organized community groups that give out practical advice to refugees aimed at preventing violence, advising husbands to accompany their wives when they go out to gather firewood or advising women to go out in groups. These small but sensible advocacy messages have reduced reports of SGBV incidence and have also empowered women to denounce perpetrators. The CEP has included female-headed households and widows in its project activities and found that some of these, through training, have become strong community leaders. In Burundi the evaluation found that while LWF follows the policy of including women in community activities, especially in ensuring their inclusion in CfW projects that are best suited to them (clearing ground for example), women’s knowledge of civic matters is very weak. Repatriated refugee women are generally better informed on their rights and duties as citizens, having learned these at TCRS human rights advocacy sessions in the camps. However, the team found examples in each colline of LWF intervention areas where the majority of marriages are illegal, ie. undocumented, and where polygamy is almost the norm. Such practices reinforce the vulnerability of women and children: an illegally married woman can be forced to leave the household or abandoned by her husband with no means of redress. When the husband dies she has no rights to the family property. Furthermore, succession rights cause conflicts when children have been born into illegal marriages. The majority of polygamous husbands behave irresponsibly and child care is mostly left to women who in the majority of cases do not have the means or opportunity to raise them appropriately or have them educated. Another consequence of polygamy and illegal marriage is that children are not entered on the official register, limiting their access to free government services for children under five years old. Most adults – male and female - in the collines interviewed for this study did not hold identity cards. The incidence was even greater concerning women who were ignorant of the advantages and duties of holding ID cards, such as maternity benefits offered by the Government.
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This state of affairs not only limits the achievement of project activities, it constitutes a major barrier to development.
VI.2 HIV/AIDS

One of the most lasting legacies of the refugee camps in Tanzania may well be the initiation of Stop SIDA. This grass-roots initiative of the 1990s has gradually gained experience and media coverage throughout the world and now operates as an independent NGO in Burundi and other countries. The association originated in Kanembwa refugee camp in Kibondo district Kigoma region where a patriotic man called Noe Sebisaba decided to declare himself as one of the people living with HIV/AIDS, and he was the first person in the camps to declare publicly that he is HIV victim. He then found that it was wise and essential to rescue the lives of those who are not yet infected by initiating a small group of people, and then launch an association called STOPSIDA NKEBURE UWUMVA with its main objectives been making awareness to the people living in the camps about HIV/AIDS32. There are over 1,000 references in more than seven languages about Stop SIDA on the internet, making it a truly global phenomenon. Its main impact in the refugee camps has been to make refugees aware of the dangers of contracting HIV/AIDS and to propose simple and practical preventive measures. The evaluation found camp residents far more knowledgeable about the HIV/AIDS than people interviewed in Burundi, where ignorance on all aspects of the disease is still the norm. HIV/AIDS awareness has also been disseminated in Tanzanian host communities. In CEP intervention sites the team found there existed in each village a subcommittee on matters of HIV/AIDS and people repeatedly emphasised to the ET how important the HIV/AIDs intervention was regarded where it has had a meaningful impact on the whole community of the target zone. Women already take the leadership in sensitizing the community on matters related to the spread of HIV/AIDS and human rights in addition to specially trained Youth Peer Group leaders. Victims of the disease have been the recipient of cost free testing and anti-retrovirals.World Bank statistics on HIV/AIDS prevalence for both countries are as follows:
Year Latest available data

TANZANIA
Development Outcomes Estimated number of adults and children living with HIV (millions) HIV prevalence, female (ages 15-24, %) HIV prevalence, male (ages 15-24, %) Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population ages 15-49) Financing World Bank commitments for HIV/AIDS, US$ (millions) 2007 2007 2007 2005 2005

0.2 0.3 0.2 3.7 29.60

Source: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/EXTAFRHEANUTPOP/EXTAFRREGTOPHIVAIDS/0,,co ntentMDK:20450516~pagePK:34004173~piPK:34003707~theSitePK:717148,00.html

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http://www.stop-sida.org/page/2/

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Year

BURUNDI
Development Outcomes Estimated number of adults and children living with HIV (millions) HIV prevalence, female (ages 15-24, %) HIV prevalence, male (ages 15-24, %) Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population ages 15-49) Financing World Bank commitments for HIV/AIDS, US$ (millions) 2007 2007 2007 2005 2005

Latest available data

0.1 1.3 0.4 3.3 15.00

Source: http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/ddpreports/ViewSharedReport?REPORT_ID=11013&REQUEST_TYPE=EXCEL&HF=N

Source documents show that statistics are probably much lower than reality due to the ‘taboo’ subject that HIV/AIDS represents, translating to a great many cases not being registered. Even so, these figures show that Burundi has higher relative indicators than Tanzania in almost every area – and Tanzania has been quoted as a country where HIV/AIDS is potentially a national disaster. Especially worrying is the high prevalence of HIV in females of reproducing age. LWF’s HIV/AIDS project component is woefully inadequate to confront the high and complex needs to address the disease: sensitization has little meaning if people cannot get tested and testing has little meaning in a country where a cure is out of reach for the majority of rural people. Even though cross-border exchange visits brought together STOP Sida members in the refugee camps to repatriation sites in Burundi and even though HIV/AIDS awareness raising campaigns have been organized, it is evidently much easier to sensitize refugees in a camp situation than it is to reach noncamp bound people going about their daily lives, who are not necessarily a captive audience. LWF staff report that returnees from the Tanzanian camps do not dare to speak up about the HIV/AIDS information they learned in the camps, it is just too sensitive a subject to address. According to UNICEF, Burundi has a national plan to address HIV/SIDA. In order to carry out testing it is necessary to have authorization from the Ministry of Health and a separate authorization to carry out treatment. Given the state of rural Burundi’s health posts and clinics it is likely to be a long time before such activities will become the norm – there are simply too many urgent priorities to address before HIV/AIDS is done so in any meaningful way. For example, in the LWF-equipped health clinic in Nyamugari colline (Cendajuru commune) the health staff would like to be able to undertake testing but recognize that there are other priorities, such as malaria, TB and diarrhoea, that require more urgent intervention and that even if HIV testing were positive, it would be costly and difficult to ensure that sufferers could obtain regular follow-up treatment (anti retrovirals). In the circumstances, LWF’s best course of action is to continue sensitization activities in the collines through community animators, as described in section V.3 above. Repeated messages and information, coupled with UNICEF posters placed in strategic locations in the collines can alert people to sensible sexual practices and pass along messages on family planning simultaneously. Closer coordination with UNICEF and WHO on harmonization of intervention areas and standardized procedures is recommended.

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VI.3 Environment

TANZANIA A core value for TCRS is to promote sustainable livelihoods with people living in harmony with their environment. Within the CEP there is a project on ‘Environmental Management’ and entails: environmental education, support and provision of tree nurseries, reforestation, agro-forestry and soil conservation. According to the TCRS CEP Project Profile, more than 15,000,000 tree seedlings have been developed. This intervention is most appropriate for Kibondo given the environmental damage caused inadvertently by the presence of the refugee camps and the predominant position of agriculture in the lives of inhabitants, both local communities and refugees. On its visit to the refugee camps of Kanembwa and Nduta the evaluation team was able to witness the impact of TCRS intervention both within the camp perimeter but also beyond, as illustrated by the seedling project at Kazilamihunda Village. A relevant, appropriate and high impact intervention has been the introduction of fuel-efficient cooking stoves. Refugee presence entails felling trees for poles used for shelter and related construction works. Forests and trees also serve as the only source of fuel wood for cooking. Trees are also cut for purposes of making charcoal, another common source of energy for cooking and energy. The significance of interventions in respect of fuel-efficient cooking stoves must be seen in this context.
Made simply from earth and wood, the improved stove has no additional cost than that of initial ‘main d’oeuvre’ to make it. Wood pieces are arranged and lit. Once the wood starts to burn it is covered with earth and holes made in the top to let the smoke through. The production of embers is facilitated by a low but steady supply of oxygen.

The improved stove has a number of positive effects, both for the environment and communities : • • • • As an income-generating activity accessible to the whole population ; Uses small twigs and large trunks alike, particularly useful for recycling fallen trees ; Lightens the daily burden of women and young girls by reducing the amount of time needed to collect less quantities of cooking fuel – also reducing their risk of exposure to rape ; Frees up time for women to pursue other activities, such as literacy and other training. This is seen as a plus to the community as the high rate of female illiteracy is considered one of the major obstacles to development
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• •

One NGO estimates savings on household fuel for cooking of up to 75%33; Its low emission of smoke can contribute to the improvement of household health (reduction of acute respiratory infection).

REDESO observed that as many as 60% of the refugee population in Kibondo employed brick/mud improved stoves, the equivalent ratio for neighbouring Ngara District, being 99%. Use of such stoves reduces firewood consumption by 25% with the major implication that women have to go out less frequently into the woods to fetch deadwood, thereby exposing themselves less to SGBV, though no studies exist to show the precise dimensions of this interface. The interviewee also conceded that the mud stove has a number of drawback of which three are particularly relevant. The stove (unlike the open charcoal stove) does not allow heat to spread and provide warmth to the immediate surrounding environment, nor does it serve as a source of lighting (in the absence of electricity). Finally, by its nature, it has to be built in such a manner as to be an attachment of one of the walls, presenting challenges for its relocation. It is also not accompanied by a chimney, thus presenting challenges of ventilation and related health hazards. Therefore refugees continue to use firewood for their homes – though less than previously, and in tandem with the improved stoves. BURUNDI The evaluation found worrying signs that the project is not adequately following environmental precautions that could have major long-term repercussions. Ruyigi and Cankuzo provinces are among the most environmentally impoverished in Burundi. The Mosso region is typified by steppe/prairie hills, in parts quartzite and rock based, a zone that is much drier and significantly different from that of the interior highlands, where more intensive agriculture is possible. According to the Livelihoods evaluation, ‘challenges are particularly great in the agroclimatic zone of the project area - the sub-tropical and fragile ecological conditions found in the Mosso depression. This area cannot sustain the kinds of intensive agricultural techniques practiced in the highlands of Burundi’. The major hazard to this fragile environment is peasant-initiated fires, erroneously supposed to accelerate grass growth but instead burning extensive swaths of hillside, killing vegetation and leaving the soil open to erosion. LWF’s promotion of agricultural and pastoral livelihoods strategies must be carefully presented to target communities, who should in addition be informed about the damage wrought by bush fires and firmly discouraged from starting them. Goats, it is well-known, are detrimental to such fragile land. Development of swamp areas can be exploited to improve people’s food security, but this must be done in conformity with the law and with careful engineering in order not to inadvertently stop the flow of irrigation water and dry out the swamp. There are risks in the current project that have not been properly addressed. It is worth repeating that LWF must in future undertake EIAs prior to swamp development, both to comply with the law and to avoid costly environmental mistakes. The evaluation observed that, through project implementation certain environmental dispositions have not been followed. These

33

SOS Enfants: http://www.sosenfants.com/actionrdc-fours-carbonisation.php

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dispositions are found in the Environmental Code promulgated in the year 200034, in the land code (code foncier) promulgated in 1986 and in the forestry code (code forestier) of 1985. LWF’s project sites, spread far apart across the two provinces, necessitate lengthy car trips which are detrimental to the environment. Part of the reason for recommending no further project activities in Gisagara commune, apart from consolidating activities where they can be more closely monitored, is to reduce the number of vehicle journeys needed to the site. Project staff are encouraged to make more use of motor-cycles, where possible, and reduce the use of cars. LWF should also station more of its staff nearer to the communes where they are working. Further details of the evaluation’s findings regarding environmental risks are outlined in Annex J.
VI.4 Human Rights

Each of TCRS’ two intervention activities – camp management and CEP - has accorded a high focus on human rights. At the same time, the July 2007 Programme Evaluation Report (p 26) commissioned by TCRS and LWF/DWS states that “rights advocacy … seems to be more a background commitment than a programme of public action” and that this has been the position over many years. It was therefore recommended in the report that a more robust, focussed intervention be rolled out both as a response to an evident need but also as a fundraising strategy. The evaluation noted that the TCRS ‘Description of Activities: 2006/2008’ lists several interventions of relevance to human rights such as: establishment of leadership and conflict resolution structures; engagement of para-legal advisors; training refugee TOT on human rights, conducting SGBV awareness campaigns, holding training on rights of the child, conducting discussion groups (in collaboration with Film Aid), disseminating human rights awareness among primary and secondary students. While commending the project for including these participatory-based learning approaches the evaluation was not able to observe specific results. A number of other activities especially within the CEP seem well-directed to achieving improved quality of life, better governance, popular participation and facilitating sustainable development. At its meetings with TCRS staff in Kibondo, the team was not made aware that there indeed is a Human Rights Advocacy Officer with a detailed programme of action. Likewise, the relevant human rights curriculum documents were unavailable for the team to examine due to the closure and occupation by military authorities of the Kanembwa Refugee Camp. In Burundi advocacy for human rights is limited mostly to training local authorities to mainstream human rights into conflict resolution between individuals and communities. More advocacy could be undertaken as part of the ‘civic education’ activities recommended for inclusion in Cash for Work projects. Especially relevant would be repeated advocacy for the rights of women (rights against violence and rape, rights to equal opportunity for work, etc.) and children (education), as well as other basic human rights such as each individual’s right to possessing identity cards that allow him/her access to state services. Such sensitization has had success in the refugee camps and, with sustained advocacy, could – in the words of a Department of Education official – ‘increase our people’s understanding of respect for the other person’.
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Article 52 of the Code reads: «les travaux, ouvrages et aménagements susceptibles de modifier les équilibres des réseaux hydrauliques, les cours d’eau ou la configuration des berges des cours d’eau ou des lacs, de nuire à la préservation des espèces aquatiques sont soumis à la procédure de l’étude d’impact environnemental et ne pourront être réalisés qu’après l’avis favorable du Ministre chargé de l’environnement », (all modifications pertaining to hydraulic networks can only be undertaken upon authorization of the Ministry of the Environment).

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VII. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS and RECOMMENDATIONS:
Strengths, Weaknesses, Lessons Learned

TANZANIA
STRENGTHS
Cross-border character of the overall program, assisting people to return with skills and livestock acquired in camps. “Go and see” & “Come and Tell” visits helped expedite refugees’ decisions to repatriate. During visits some people negotiated to get jobs on return. Advantage of camp sites being close to border. TCRS and other camp partners could have done more at an earlier stage to reduce suspicion between local communities and refugees. Conflict mediation by TCRS between refugees and host communities who were suspicious of refugees stealing resources. Tensions reduction through mediation committees, government and TCRS mediating. CEP: excellent for reducing tensions in host communities by ‘putting something back in’. Connected to national development plan so supported by Government with government officials involved in leadership training. Participatory approach with communities who prioritise skills they’d like to learn. Helps people become self-sufficient and alleviates poverty. TCRS establishment of ‘way stations’ to help refugees return spontaneously, prior to UNHCR assisted repatriation. Helped refugees with food and water on their way home. Reduction of SGBV incidents through gender initiatives: education, sensitization, practical advice such as husbands accompanying women to collect firewood. ‘Stop SIDA’ – NGO formed in camps now widely recognized in both countries. Women’s role in HIV/AIDS prevention and promotion with youth. ‘Movement of Men against AIDS’ – women trained men to be sensitive – good at passing messages. Good camp partner communications. Good distribution and logistics. Coordination at all levels on problem-solving. Degradation of environment.

WEAKNESSES

LESSON LEARNED/ RECOMMENDED ACTION
Useful activities to replicate in other refugee programs, especially where the camp management partner has independent funds to carry them out. Replicate in other refugee situations.

Become involved at earlier stages with conflict resolution strategies and don’t wait till tensions boil over.

Highly relevant in other refugee contexts where scarce resources have to be shared with local communities.

DCA to advocate for CEP approach in other countries where it supports refugee programs.

DCA/DANIDA: Advocate with UNHCR for future spontaneous return situations: spontaneous returnees have right to return in safety and dignity. UNHCR should encourage such initiatives and not try to stop them, as they did initially in Tanzania. Continue this kind of practical sensitization in Burundi. Include in daily ‘education’ sessions in ‘cash for work’ schemes. ‘Stop SIDA’ could be established in other countries. DCA to advocate in country programs it supports. Privilege use of women in passing ‘key messages’ on hygiene, health, etc. Involve women in ‘cash for work’ projects with daily ‘civic and health education’ sessions of approx. half an hour at start of day. Ensure weekly coordination meetings with partners. Always give ration cards to women for safe-keeping and distribution of goods. Impact study of improved stoves. Introduce community reforestation schemes in affected areas: CfW.

BURUNDI
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STRENGTHS
LRRD strategy is relevant to current needs in Burundi: relief inputs available if necessary in times of disaster and recovery goals appropriate to context. ‘Integrated approach’ of project activities in Musha, Muvumu, Mwiruzi contributes to sustainable return by giving whole communities access to vital services.

WEAKNESSES
Psychological state of the population does not yet lend itself to promoting much capacity-building. Project activities may be too focused on building up associations when individual need predominate. Unintentionally, most LWF interventions are in the form of free hand-outs, reinforcing dependency and passivity rather than encouraging beneficiary self-development and ownership. Creating associations may have unintended consequence of creating ‘elites’ who control others. No indication that association members have benefited from seeds multiplication project, only association heads. Tendency to use ‘top-down’ approach. Internal planning could be strengthened. Current system is for each head of technical service to propose actions independently of one another – weak coordination. Batwa community in Gacokwe asked LWF for improved housing but their greater need for food security forced them to sell the roofs and dissolve the houses. Cultural differences also a factor. Weavers rely uniquely on LWF to market their products. Unsustainable in the long term. Difficult to know if this is sustainable and if it has really contributed to environmental protection. Project report coherence is poor: documents are undated, project objectives are different from document to document... Little interaction with other actors on the ground in project sites: risks duplication.

LESSON LEARNED/ RECOMMENDED ACTION
Focus activities on Cash for Work that will help get people back into a work mindset and off ‘handouts’ dependency. Individual choice of how to spend wages essential to restore dignity & independence. The ‘hardware’ is there, now need to instil the ‘software’ – civic education and key messages on: family health, nutrition, sanitation, HIV/AIDS awareness, family planning, advantages of education, especially for girls, etc. Simultaneous to creating associations, offer Cash for Work opportunities to everyone in a colline, selecting workers on a rotation basis if there are too many for one project to absorb. Condition for inclusion is daily attendance at ‘civic education class’. Could be useful to organise a planning workshop where all heads of technical services ensure coordination and integration of different sectors towards common goals. Ensure consultation with communities and authorities prior to setting up CfW schemes. Identify/ site test it before replicating. Avoid creating ‘sellable’ project outputs. This community is only interested in daily labour as a livelihoods strategy. Involve them in CfW projects such as infrastructure projects but insist that each beneficiary attends ‘civic education class’ before the work day begins. Rotate beneficiaries. Continue with this activity and help put women in touch with markets so that when LWF phases out they have established contacts with markets. Conduct a study to measure estimated reduction of firewood per household per year. Replicate production and dissemination where possible. Edit documents more closely and ensure all reports are dated.

Good use of participatory approaches to define project priorities with target communities.

Support to women in finding markets for basket weaving products. Introduction of fuel efficient stoves

DCA program partnerships: value added through choice of partners facilitates certain activities and access, mix of specialities. Good coordination and partnerships with local authorities.

Closer coordination with other partners working in project sites to build synergies and complementarities, avoiding overlap. Continue to liaise closely with authorities on new activities and help with agricultural training.

Most interventions are appropriately cemented through contracts with

Environmental concerns may jeopardise long-term sustainability. The contracts are not systematically signed in all interventions (viz. mana-

Ensure EIA studies are carried out in compliance with the law. While the contracts are written in Kirundi, many people are not literate. The members of the

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beneficiaries (donations of goats, seeds and management of seeds centres, etc.)

gement of the seeds centre in Mwiruzi) and the wording of the contracts is not always understood in the same way (despite the contract there are differences in understandding between LWF and the associations concerning the sharing out of manioc cuttings after harvest).

associations do not understand their meaning and do not understand the binding nature of the contracts. This could be redressed through improved and repeated explanations.

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