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Narratives

Constitutional Law II
Michael Vernon Guerrero Mendiola 2005 Shared under Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Philippines license.

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Table of Contents

People vs. Obsania [GR L-24447, 29 June 1968] … 1 Melo vs. People [GR L-3580, 22 March 1950] … 2 People vs. Yorac [GR L-29270, 23 November 1971] … 3 People vs. Bocar [GR L-27935, 16 August 1985] … 3 Galman vs. Sandiganbayan [GR 72670, 12 September 1986] … 4 Flores vs. Ponce Enrile [GR L-38440, 20 July 1982] … 6 Heirs of Tito Rillorta vs. Firme [GR L-54904, 29 January 1988] … 7 People vs. Relova [GR L-45129, 6 March 1987] … 8 Perez vs. Court of Appeals [GR 80838, 29 November 1988] … 10 People vs. City Court of Manila [GR L-36528, 24 Septembe 1987] … 11 Cruz vs. Ponce-Enrile [GR L-75983, 15 April 1988] … 12 Tan vs. Barrios [GRs 85481-82, 18 October 1990] … 13 People vs. Grospe [GRs L-74053-54, 20 January 1988] … 15 People vs. Santiago [GR 80778, 20 June 1989] … 16 Que vs. Cosico [GR 81861, 8 September 1989] … 17 Caes vs. Intermediate Appellate Court [GRs 74989-90, 6 November 1989] … 18 Nierras vs. Dacuycuy [GRs 59568-76, 11 January 1990] … 19 Icasiano vs. Sandiganbayan [GR 95642, 28 May 1992] … 20 People vs. Milflores [GRs L-32144-45, 30 July 1982] … 21 People vs. Vergara [GR 101557-5, 28 April 1993] … 22 People vs. Tiozon [GR 89823, 19 June 1991] … 23 People vs. Villarama [GR 99287, 23 June 1992] … 24 Tupaz vs. Ulep [GR 127777, 1 October 1999] ... 26 People vs. Sandiganbayan [GR 140633, 4 February 2002] … 27

This collection contains twenty four (24) cases summarized in this format by Michael Vernon M. Guerrero (as a senior law student) during the First Semester, school year 2005-2006 in the Political Law Review class under Dean Mariano Magsalin Jr. at the Arellano University School of Law (AUSL). Compiled as PDF, September 2012. Berne Guerrero entered AUSL in June 2002 and eventually graduated from AUSL in 2006. He passed the Philippine bar examinations immediately after (April 2007).

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Narratives (Berne Guerrero)

374 People vs. Obsania [GR L-24447, 29 June 1968] En Banc, Castro (J): 8 concur Facts: On 22 November 1964, barely a day after the occurrence of the alleged crime, Erlinda Dollente, the 14-year old victim, and her parents, Ciriaco Dollente and Carmelita Lureta, filed in the municipal court of Balungao, Pangasinan a complaint for rape with robbery, alleging "That on or about 21st day of November 1964, at around 2:00 to 3:00 in the afternoon, particularly in sitio Cawakalan, barrio of Capulaan municipality of Balungao, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused Willy Obsania, armed with a dagger, by means of violence and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously did then and there have carnal knowledge of the complainant Erlinda Dollente, against her will and on the roadside in the ricefields at the abovementioned place while she was alone on her way to barrio San Raymundo." After the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for further proceedings, the assistant provincial fiscal filed an information for rape against the accused, embodying the allegations of the complaint, with an additional averment that the offense was committed "with lewd designs". Obsania pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, and forthwith with his counsel moved for the dismissal of the case contending that the complaint was fatally defective for failure to allege "lewd designs" and that the subsequent information filed by the fiscal which averred "lewd designs" did not cure the jurisdictional infirmity. On 8 January 1965, the trial court granted the motion and ordered dismissal of the action, ruling that "the failure of the complaint filed by the offended party to allege that the acts committed by the accused were with 'lewd designs' does not give this Court jurisdiction to try the case." From this order, the fiscal appealed. Issue: Whether the appeal of the Government constitutes double jeopardy. Held: An appeal by the prosecution in a criminal case is not available if the defendant would thereby be placed in double jeopardy. Correlatively, Section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that "When a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information." In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure in favor of an accused, the following requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. The complaint filed with the municipal court in the present case was valid; the trial court was a competent tribunal with jurisdiction to hear the case; the record shows that the accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. The particular aspect of double jeopardy, i.e. dismissal or termination of the original case without the express consent of the defendant, has evoked varied and apparently conflicting rulings from the Supreme Court. In People vs. Salico (1949), the Court held that "When the case is dismissed with the express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense; because, his action in having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right or privilege, for the reason that he thereby prevents the court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him." The Salico doctrine was adhered to and affirmed in People vs. Marapao (85 Phil 832, 30 March 1950), Gandicela vs. Lutero (88 Phil 299, 5 March 1951), People vs. Pinuela, et al. (91 Phil 53, 28 March 1952), Co Te Hue vs. Encarnacion (94 Phil 258, 26 January 1954), and People vs. Desalisa (GR L-15516, 17 December 1966). On the other hand, the doctrine of estoppel in relation to the plea of double jeopardy was first enunciated in Acierto which held that when the trial court dismisses a case on a disclaimer of jurisdiction, upon the instigation of the accused, the latter is estopped on appeal from asserting the jurisdiction of the lower court in support of his plea of second jeopardy. The doctrine of estoppel is in quintessence the same as the doctrine of waiver: the thrust of both is that a dismissal, other than on the merits,
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 1 )

section 13. On 29 December 1949. the doctrines of waiver and estoppel were obviously inapplicable for these doctrines presuppose a dismissal not amounting to an acquittal. the dismissals therein. People vs. at 8:00 a. did not actually abandon the doctrine of waiver in Salico (and not one of the said cases even implied the slightest departure from the doctrine of estoppel established in Acierto). the controverted dismissal was predicated on the erroneous contention of the accused that the complaint was defective and such infirmity affected the jurisdiction of the trial court. requiring medical attendance for a period of more than 30 days. and second. Tacneng and Robles. (96 Phil 927. The case was remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings in accordance with law.Narratives (Berne Guerrero) sought by the accused in a motion to dismiss. even if such dismissals were induced by the accused. The case of Bangalao. Indubitably. filed after the death of the victim. the dismissal must be sought or induced by the defendant personally or through his counsel." Under this provision.. 2005 ( 2 ) . 4 January 1950. Melo filed the petition for prohibition to enjoin the court from further entertaining the amended information. it was proper for the court to dismiss the first information and order the filing of a new one for the reason that the proper offense was not charged in the former and the latter did not place the accused in a second jeopardy for the same or identical offense. all sought by the defendants. and Labatete. 16 February 1961). during the first prosecution. Amada Reyes. were considered acquittals because they were all predicated on the right of a defendant to a speedy trial and on the failure of the Government to prosecute. and incapacitating him from performing his habitual labor for the same period of time. Ferrer. violates the accused’s right against double jeopardy. is deemed to be with his express consent and bars him from subsequently interposing the defense of double jeopardy on appeal or in a new prosecution for the same offense. The appealed order of dismissal in the present case did not terminate the action on the merits. Abaño.m. of the same day Benjamin Obillo died from his wounds. the court may dismiss the original complaint or information and order the filing of a new one charging the proper offense. There is identity between two offenses not only when the second offense is exactly the same as the first. for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused. Issue: Whether the second information. et al. to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. the present case falls squarely within the periphery of the said doctrines which have been preserved unimpaired in the corpus of our jurisprudence. and People vs. (98 Phil 646. and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial. and not on the right of the accused to a speedy trial and the failure of the Government to prosecute.m. 2d paragraph. provided the defendant would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy. et al. The application of the sister doctrines of waiver and estoppel requires two sine qua non conditions: first. Held: Rule 106. People [GR L-3580.. and on the following day. with a kitchen knife and with intent to kill. The Acierto ruling was reiterated in People vs. an amended information was filed charging Melo with consummated homicide. motion that was denied by the court. 375 Melo vs. Evidence of death was available to the prosecution only on 3 January 1950. This rule of identity does not apply. Moran (CJ): 6 concur Facts: Conrado Melo was charged in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. several serious wounds on different parts of the body. Melo filed a motion to quash the amended information alleging double jeopardy. with frustrated homicide. Reyes. and at 10:15 p. or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information. Melo pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. however. like in Cloribel. In Diaz.. Casiano (GR L-15309. such dismissal must not be on the merits and must not necessarily amount to an acquittal. provides that "If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. is charged with a new Constitutional Law II. 30 April 1955). on 27 December 1949. Therefore. Further. but also when the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof. Here. Archilla (GR L-15632. when a person who has already suffered his penalty for an offense. for having allegedly inflicted upon Benjamin Obillo. People vs. when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution. 22 March 1950] Second Division. 28 February 1961). 23 March 1956).

the rule of identity does not apply "when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution. said penalty may be credited to him in case of conviction for the second offense. Rogelio Zulueta. charging Yorac with frustrated murder arising from the same act against Lam Hock upon another medical certificate dated 17 April 1968 issued by the same Dr. a resident physician of the Occidental Negros Provincial Hospital. this time in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. that fracture must have existed when the first examination was made on 10 December 1956. for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused.Narratives (Berne Guerrero) and greater offense. not to mention saving both him and the state from the expenses incident to redundant litigation. according to the medical certificate issued in 10 April 1968 by a Dr. 376 People vs. The lower court. The wound causing the delay in healing was already in existence at the time of the first examination. People and People vs. On 18 April 1968. It is in that sense that the right against being twice put in jeopardy is considered as possessing many features in common with the rule of finality in civil cases. if after the first prosecution "a new fact supervenes" on which defendant may be held liable. protecting him from continued distress. For the accused is given assurance that the matter is closed. There is likewise the observation that this constitutional guarantee helps to equalize the adversary capabilities of two grossly mismatched litigants. Yorac [GR L-29270. Fernando (J): 8 concur. 23 November 1971] En Banc. Alampay. 2005 ( 3 ) . therefore." There is then the indispensable requirement of the existence of "a new fact [which] supervenes for which the defendant is responsible" changing the character of the crime imputed to him and together with the facts existing previously constituting a new and distinct offense." Stated differently. 377 People vs. Manolong. As ruled in Melo vs. No supervening fact had occurred which justifies the application of the rule in the case of Melo vs. 1 took no part Facts: Rodrigo Yorac was charged with slight physical injuries before the City Court of Bacolod. to the effect that the victim did suffer a greater injury than was at first ascertained. The later information for frustrated murder was based on a second medical certificate after the lapse of one week from the former previously given by the same physician who. 16 August 1985] Constitutional Law II. no new or supervening fact that could be said to have developed or arisen since the filing of the original action. resulting in altering the character of the crime and giving rise to a new and distinct offense. the fracture would have certainly been disclosed. People. to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. to the very superficial and inconclusive examination made on 10 December 1956. Bocar [GR L-27935. Zulueta. but said delay was caused by the very superficial examination then made. the offended party being a certain Lam Hock who. a poor and impecunious defendant hardly in a position to keep on shouldering the costs of a suit. The People appealed. which evidently lengthened the period of healing of the wound." A defendant in a criminal case should be adjudged either guilty or not guilty and thereafter left alone in peace. Had an X-ray examination been taken at the time." Then came a plea of guilty by Yorac on 16 April 1968 resulting in his being penalized to suffer 10 days of arresto menor. if the X-ray examination discloses the existence of a fracture on 17 January 1957. sustained the motion to quash (filed on 10 June 1968) in an order of 21 June 1968. He started serving his sentence forthwith. for which reason the general rule of double jeopardy should be applied. The new finding of fracture. apparently. was confined "since 8 April 1968 up to the present time for head injury. was much more thorough the second time. There is. presided by the Honorable Judge Nestor B. in the latter case the State being precluded from taking an appeal. Issue: Whether the new medical findings warrant the filing of the new information against the accused. considering that there was no supervening fact that would negate the defense of double jeopardy. during the first prosecution. "the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense. enabling him to plan his future accordingly. Herein. without violating the rule against double jeopardy. the provincial fiscal filed an information. Held: "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.

the same does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy. or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Second Division. Philippine currency. At the end of the "investigation.62 all valued at P7. The constitutional guarantee is that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy. the special civil action for certiorari seeking the annulment of the CFI order of 7 July 1967. the City Fiscal's Office received a copy of the lower court's order dated 7 July 1967. no evidence in law had as yet been entered into the records of the case before the Court. The lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process. valued at — P7." Proceedings were had on 7 July 1967. On 9 August 1967. Verily. Held: The parties were not placed under oath before they answered the queries of the the Judge. (d) a valid plea having been entered.62 belonging to one JUAN B. committed as "That on or about October 1. three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second. 1965. Contrary to law. In effect. (c) after arraignment. in the City of Manila. to raise the defense of double jeopardy. by a court of competent jurisdiction. the first jeopardy was never terminated.62. BAÑEZ. 3 took no part. the assistant fiscal (Carlos Galman Cruz) for Manila filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila (now Regional Trial Court) an information against Cesar S. and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge. and helping one another. the three accused. apparently. The Court's issuance of the questioned dismissal order was arbitrary. holding that the case is more civil than criminal. On 18 July 1967. with intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof." Thus. Teehankee (CJ): 4 concur. or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the defendant. JR. and on 8 August 1967. whimsical and capricious. Judge Juan L. — When a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted. conspiring and confederating together with three others whose true names." On 3 May 1967. unlawfully and feloniously. and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy. On 12 July 1967. 1 concurs in separate opinion to which 1 joined Constitutional Law II. Jose Gigante and Serapion Claudio of the crime of theft. did then and there willfully. the City Fiscal's Office joined the private prosecutors in their motion for reconsideration.104. Makasiar (J): 5 concur. or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof. Hence. A copy of said order was received by the City Fiscal's Office on 11 August 1967. Urbino. 1 on leave Facts: On 28 March 1967. On said date.104. pleaded "not guilty. Bocar (Branch XVI) conducted a "summary investigation" directing questions to the complainant as well as to the accused. the Court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration. identities and whereabouts are still unknown. upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction. to wit: Six (6) pieces of dao Veneer 1 Grade Exportable round logs. and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first. Thus. the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged. Sandiganbayan [GR 72670. the said accused. take. 378 Galman vs. 2005 ( 4 ) . Philippines. the Judge's dismissal order dated 7 July 1967 being null and void for lack of jurisdiction. (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated. the private prosecutors in the case filed a "motion for reconsideration". Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment. The Rules of Court clarifies the guarantee as "Former conviction or acquittal or former jeopardy.104. to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid sum of P7. steal and carry away the following property. Issue: Whether the Judge's dismissal order dated 7 July 1967 constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy. upon arraignment. " the Judge issued the order dismissing the case. a veritable abuse of discretion which the Supreme Court cannot permit. (b) before a competent court. 12 September 1986] Resolution En Banc.

It opines that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy. Galman. President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate the killing of Aquino. a former AFP Chief of Staff. was killed while being escorted by soldiers from his plane at the Manila International Airport. et.'s prayer for issuance of a TRO enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering a decision in the two criminal cases before it. filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration attached therewith. On 3 April 1986. et. and Rolando Galman at the MIA on August 21. 2005 ( 5 ) . After two false starts. Olivas. Prospero A. 5 incumbent and former university presidents. They prayed for the immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) restraining the Sandiganbayan from rendering a decision on the merits in the pending criminal cases which it had scheduled on 20 November 1985 and that judgment be rendered declaring a mistrial and nullifying the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial before an impartial tribunal by an unbiased prosecutor. But 10 days later on 28 November 1985. further arguing that assuming that the judgment of acquittal is void for any reason. al. The accused opposed the second motion for reconsideration and prayed for its denial. 1983. not a communist plot.Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Facts: On 21 August 1983. As a whole." On 11 November 1985 Saturnina Galman and Reynaldo Galman. On 20 March 1986. California) and heard the testimonies of 194 witnesses recorded in 20. with counsels for Ver and Tigas. that Rolando Galman was the NPA-hired assassin. The only difference between the two reports is that the majority report found all the 26 respondents headed by then AFP Chief General Fabian C. Aquino. Maj.377 pages of transcripts. At the hearing on 18 November 1985 of Galman. until the submission of their minority and majority reports to the President on October 23 and 24. Benigno S. The military investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman. Galman. and that the military escorts gunned him down in turn. he finally constituted the Board on 22 October 1983 which held 125 hearing days commencing 3 November 1983 (including 3 hearings in Tokyo and 8 hearings in Los Angeles. as well as Olivas. although he was the personal friend of Col. et. all the other respondents raised the issue of double jeopardy. Gen. filed a motion for reconsideration. composed of 3 former Justices of the Supreme Court. competent and convincing evidence the cause of the nullity. The thrust of the second motion for reconsideration was the startling and therefore unknown revelations of Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera that President Marcos had ordered the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez and the prosecution panel headed by Herrera to whitewash the criminal cases against the 26 accused and produce a verdict of acquittal. mother and son. On 29 November 1985. on account Constitutional Law II. the remedy is a direct action to annul the judgment where the burden of proof falls upon the plaintiff to establish by clear. the Court by the same 9-to-2-vote ratio in reverse. al. Ver involved in the military conspiracy and therefore "indictable for the premeditated killing of Senator Benigno S. of the late Rolando Galman. and invoked that the issues had become moot and academic because of the rendition of the Sandiganbayan's judgment of acquittal of all accused on 2 December 1985. and 29 other petitioners. Issue: Whether the acquittal of the 26 accused during Marcos’ time bars subsequent prosecution. Both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version as propounded by the chief investigator. filed the present action alleging that Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law. outstanding members of the Philippine Bar and solid citizens of the community. resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the temporary restraining order issued 10 days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. 1984. The military later filmed a re-enactment of the killing scripted according to this version and continuously replayed it on all TV channels as if it were taken live on the spot. Jr." while the chairman's minority report would exclude 19 of them and limit as plotters "the 6 persons who were on the service stairs while Senator Aquino was descending" and "General Luther Custodio because the criminal plot could not have been planned and implemented without his intervention. al. respectively. Arturo Custodio who picked him up from his house on 17 August 1983) was a communist-hired gunman. Aquino Jr. the Court granted the motion to admit the second motion for reconsideration and ordered the respondents to comment thereon. President Marcos instantly accepted the military version and repeated it in a nationally televised press conference that he gave late in the evening of 22 August 1983. the Court resolved by 9-to-2 votes to issue the restraining order prayed for.

or ignored wherever it exhibits its head. 1974. A void judgment is. and borne out by the happenings (res ipsa loquitura). in a memorandum to the Judge Advocate General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Through it. Flores. alias "Rolando Moreno". for the Tanodbayan's dismissal of the cases against all accused was unpalatable (it would summon the demonstrators back to the streets) and at any rate was not acceptable to the Herrera prosecution panel. and declared the sham trial a mock trial and that the predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio. Any judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a lawless thing. 20 July 1982] En Banc. which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight. It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process. alias "Norberto de Ramos". directing the withdrawal of the case from the Commission. all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. from Military Commission No.. the Secretary of National Defense. A dictated. et al. no judgment at all. The case was thereafter set for trial. By it no rights are divested." Manuel Lazaro. would accomplish the two principal objectives of satisfaction of the public clamor for the suspected killers to be charged in court and of giving them through their acquittal the legal shield of double jeopardy. (b) before a competent court. no double jeopardy attaches. Held: President Marcos misused the overwhelming resources of the government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases. Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment. directed the withdrawal of the charges against Capt. (c) after arraignment.The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to stand unrectified. On 25 March 1974. It neither binds nor bars anyone. Jr. Serrano. The presentation of evidence for the prosecution which started on 25 October 1973 was concluded on 24 January 1974. in legal effect. courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus. (d) a valid plea having been entered. As graphically depicted in the Report. 1 took no part Facts: On 19 October 1973.Narratives (Berne Guerrero) of new evidence that the proceedings leading to said acquittal was rigged. the violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will.. Magpantay. 13 with estafa through falsification of commercial documents. Castro". The prosecution deplored the withdrawal of the case. and falsification of commercial documents (Criminal Case MC 13-2). Therefore. the unholy scenario for acquittal of all 26 accused after the rigged trial as ordered at the Malacañang conference. 2 concur in result. and Atty/ Domingo V. More so does the rule against the invoking of double jeopardy hold in the present cases where the sham trial was but a mock trial where the authoritarian president ordered the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial and closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure the predetermined final outcome of acquittal and total absolution as innocent of all the accused. and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. Ponce Enrile [GR L-38440. 379 Flores vs. 2 reserve votes. Flores and his co-accused were arraigned on 25 October 1973 and all pleaded not guilty. The next day. counsel for Magpantay handed to the Commission the memorandum of the Secretary of National Defense and the letter of the Judge Advocate General. coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal such as that in the present case is a void judgment. the prosecution and the sovereign people were denied due process of law with a partial court and biased Tanodbayan under the constant and pervasive monitoring and pressure exerted by the authoritarian President to assure the carrying out of his instructions. claiming that they have proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. and two other "John Does" were charged before the Military Commission No. (J): 9 concur. 13. no rights can be attained. Corazon R. however. Rodolfo Magpantay alias "Honorato D. and the reception of the evidence for the defendants was set for March 26 and 27. Being worthless. since the resolution prepared by his "Coordinator. The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights. his Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs. Capt. but the Military Commission held itself to be without discretion on the Constitutional Law II. the day scheduled for the reception of the evidence for the defendants. Rodolfo V. a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. Manifestly. Concepcion Jr. 2005 ( 6 ) .

acquitted or put in jeopardy in respect to a real or supposed crime. Being so. The other accused. and the reviewing authority. Pleading double jeopardy. is merely recommendatory and subject to review by the convening authority. and. the review boards. therefore. there is no second proceeding to speak of. The constitutional mandate against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense is to protect the accused from going through a trial a second time. On 28 March 1974." For double jeopardy to exist. is not a final order of acquittal or dismissal. the accused can not claim double jeopardy. without his consent. Herein. if there be one. be it of acquittal or conviction. Andrew Costales. 380 Heirs of Tito Rillorta vs. it has not yet terminated. and in Section 70-C of the Manual on Courts Martial which reads "One who in a competent court has been convicted. the order has none of the attributes of a final judgment since it was not passed upon by the convening and reviewing authorities and confirmed by the President. But. no double jeopardy. pursuant to the Memorandum of the Secretary of National Defense to the Judge Advocate General. a military commission acts merely as a commissioner who takes the evidence and reports thereon to the convening and reviewing authorities with his recommendation. and the letter of the latter to the Military Commission 13. started presenting his evidence on 2 April 1974. terminating the hearing on 26 March 1974 pursuant to the Memorandum of the Secretary of National Defense to the Judge Advocate General and of the letter of the latter to the Commission. Under military law." It is restated in Article 39 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 2005 ( 7 ) . Issue: Whether the constitutional mandate against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense was violated when the Secretary of National Defense withdrew his previous memorandum and directed that further proceedings be had in the case. Held: The rule on double jeopardy is contained in Article IV. Rodolfo Magpantay and his co-accused. as "No person shall. the Military Commission scheduled the continuation of the trial and reception of the evidence for the defendants to 1 April 1974. Pursuant thereto. Flores moved to quash the case against him. otherwise. it is essential that the first judgment of conviction or acquittal or dismissal is final. however. Firme [GR L-54904. the proceedings were suspended upon the filing of the instant petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. be tried a second time for the same offense. the Secretary of National Defense. upon the other hand. withdrew his previous order and directed the Commission forthwith to proceed with the trial of the accused. directing the withdrawal of the charges against Capt. Although jeopardy had attached. a decision of a military tribunal. or dismissal. therefore. It is apparent that in the administration of justice by the military. Section 22 of the 1973 Constitution which provides that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. as the action of the Secretary of National Defense is but a continuation of the proceedings. Cruz (J): 4 concur Facts: Accused of killing Tito Rillorta. cannot be further or again pursued for it. constitutes 'double jeopardy". Jr. 408). and. since the first proceedings has not yet been terminated. Rodolfo Magpantay. but no proceeding in which an accused has been found guilty by a court-martial upon any charge or specification shall be held to be a trial in the sense of this article until the reviewing and.Narratives (Berne Guerrero) matter. Flores filed the petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. the constitutional mandate against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense was not violated when the Secretary of National Defense withdrew his previous memorandum and directed that further proceedings be had in the case. the confirming authority shall have taken final action upon the case". but the Military Commission denied his petition to quash. Capt. in that the "Withdrawal Order of the Honorable Secretary of the Department of National Defense dated 25 March 1974 operates as an acquittal of the accused Flores and a revocation and reinstatement of the case against the Domingo V. was held guilty only of less serious physical injuries Constitutional Law II. While the Military Commission 13 may have ordered the termination of the hearing of Criminal Case MC 13-2. 29 January 1988] First Division. there is no judgment of conviction or acquittal to speak of. Flores cannot invoke double jeopardy because the order of the Military Commission 13. But. after a full consideration of all the aspects of the case. unless he waives his right to rely on this immunity. Flores.

where the U. It need only be stressed that if the government itself cannot appeal. This motion was sent by registered mail on 2 February 1980. Issue: Whether double jeopardy will attach to a judgment which is allegedly tainted with grave abuse of discretion. 1 took no part Facts: On 1 February 1975.00. and although a miscarriage of justice resulted from said order. 6 March 1987] First Division. members of the Batangas City Police together with personnel of the Batangas Electric Light System. United States. In short. On 20 March 1980.After considering the opposition to the notice and the reply thereto. The certified cause of death was pneumonia.Narratives (Berne Guerrero) and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P500. Held: Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that "the People of the Philippines cannot appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy." During the subsequent investigation. Through their counsel acting under the direct control and supervision of the provincial fiscal. or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof. who are mainly concerned only with the civil indemnity. however erroneous the order of the respondent court is. for tardiness. reviewing a decision of the Philippine Supreme Court in 1904. It has been consistently applied since then in this jurisdiction. The heirs of Tito Rillorta filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. in an order that was communicated to the private prosecutor on 18 March 1980. Supreme Court. It did not affect the intrinsic validity of the decision. Feliciano (J): 5 concur. but these were denied on 12 May 1980." There is no question that the crime of less serious physical injuries. The petitioners argue that double jeopardy will not attach because the judgment convicting the accused of less serious physical injuries is tainted with grave abuse of discretion and therefore null and void. Branch IV. Court of First Instance of La Union. and "architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building" owned by Opulencia. searched and examined the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned and operated by Manuel Opulencia. This is the kind of error that can no longer be rectified on appeal by the prosecution no matter how obvious the error may be. Bauang. or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information." they filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision notified to them on 23 January 1980." This provision is based on the old case of Kepner v. La Union) dismissed the appeal on 14 April 1980. and this was obviously induced by the exploratory surgery which was needlessly performed upon him. The prohibition operates as a "bar to another prosecution for the offense charged. Both the fiscal and the private prosecutor filed separate motions for reconsideration. The heirs of the deceased did not agree. Infine. Manuel Opulencia admitted in a written statement that he had caused the installation of the electrical devices "in order to lower or decrease the readings of his Constitutional Law II. Firme (Presiding Judge. It was denied on 28 February 1980. devices and contraptions had been installed. thus. Judge Romeo N. declared by a 5-4 vote that appeal of the prosecution from a judgment of acquittal (or for the purpose of increasing the penalty imposed upon the convict) would place him in double jeopardy. 2005 ( 8 ) . of which the accused in this case was convicted. much less then can the offended party or his heirs. such error cannot now be righted because of the timely plea of double jeopardy. These electric devices and contraptions wereallegedly "designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current consumption in the electric meter of the said electric [ice and cold storage] plant. without the necessary authority from the city government. a notice of appeal was filed with the trial court under the signatures of the prosecuting fiscal and the private prosecutor. equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas City. The trial court said the defendant could not be held liable for homicide because the wound inflicted on the victim was only superficial. is necessarily included in the offense of homicide. Relova [GR L-45129. 381 People vs. the victim had succumbed not to the skin-deep wound that did not affect any vital organ but as a result of the attending physician's gross incompetence. This argument is flawed because whatever error may have been committed by the lower court was merely an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction.S. The police discovered that electric wiring.

provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. Issue: Whether under the information in case 16443.00 to P50. If the two charges are based on one and the same act conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other." Thus. one may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the same act. even if the offenses charged are not the same. By Order dated 16 August 1976. or does not include." On 24 November 1975. In an order dated 6 April 1976. or the offense charged in one case is not included in. Before he could be arraigned thereon. it appearing that the offense charged was a light felony which prescribes 2 months from the time of discovery thereof. whereas the second contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. which shall not exceed 30 days. section 1. the defense may be availed of in the other case involving the same offense. the petition for Certiorari and Mandamus was filed in the Supreme Court by the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City on behalf of the People. The second sentence applies. Under the first sentence. On 2 February 1976. In contrast. Opulencia could — if he failed to plead double jeopardy — be convicted of the same act charged in case 16054. the first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. ordains that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." The second sentence of said clause provides that "if an act is punishable by a law and an ordinance. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed but was denied by the Judge in an Order dated 18 November 1976. he filed a motion to dismiss the information upon the grounds that the crime there charged had already prescribed and that the civil indemnity there sought to be recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the Batangas City Court to award. The first sentence of clause 20. in which he has already been acquitted. Batangas City. Branch II. dated 5 May 1976. on 20 April 1976. 14 days later. conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. paragraph (1). Series of 1974. where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute. against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code. of the Revised Penal Code (Criminal Case 266) before the Court of First Instance of Batangas. the critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the accused is said to have committed and which are alleged to have given Constitutional Law II. an Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the City Court of Batangas City an information against Manuel Opulencia for violation of Ordinance 1. the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas. The Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds of double jeopardy. the Batangas City Court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription. A violation of this ordinance was." Opulencia pleaded not guilty to the information filed. at the discretion of the court. Incidentally. 2005 ( 9 ) . provided that he is charged with different offenses. On 1 December 1976. even if there has been neither conviction nor acquittal in either case. Thus. the crime charged in the other case. this time for theft of electric power under Article 308 in relation to Article 309. Held: The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution. Branch II.Narratives (Berne Guerrero) electric meter. although both the first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. another information against Manuel Opulencia. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional protection. the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charged: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where an identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. or both. punishable by a fine "ranging from P5.00 or imprisonment. such conviction or acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. alleging that he had been previously acquitted of the offense charged in the second information and that the filing thereof was violative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy. Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash. where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the same statute or by different statutes. Judge Benjamin Relova granted the accused's Motion to Quash and ordered the case dismissed. owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a violation of a statute. and it appearing further that the information was filed by the fiscal more than 9 months after discovery of the offense charged in February 1975. So long as jeopardy has attached under one of the informations charging said offense. Article III of the Constitution. under its terms.

The rule on double jeopardy under the Rules of Court is explicit. However.] The term "same offense" means identical offense or any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof or any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. without prejudice to its refiling in the proper Regional Trial Court. 22 of the 1973 Constitution. Court of Appeals [GR 80838. "When an accused has been convicted or acquitted. not all the technical elements constituting the first offense need be present in the technical definition of the second offense. Perez filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court. Sec 21 of the 1987 Constitution. should not be segmented and sliced. Yolanda Mendoza filed another criminal complaint against Perez on 22 July 1983. Issue: Whether the filing of an information for Qualified Seduction against Perez after he was acquitted for Consented Abduction constitutes double jeopardy. or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent Constitutional Law II. The accused pleaded not guilty and trial on the merits ensued. the Court of Appeals reversed.e. Thus. 382 Perez vs. Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code. On 28 June 1980 a judgment of conviction was rendered against Perez. as it were. and acquitted Perez of the crime of Consented Abduction. and on 29 October 1982. The law here seeks to prevent harassment of an accused person by multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical elements. the court dismissed the petition and Perez' motion for reconsideration. Complying with this. In a resolution of the Second Division dated 8 August 1984. Upon evaluation of the case. Perez filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition (GR 68122) questioning the denial of his motions to quash and for reconsideration filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Criminal Case 83-8228. the Supreme Court referred the case to the Intermediate Appellate Court. this time for Qualified Seduction (as was intimated by the Court of Appeals in Criminal Case 618) with the Municipal Trial Court of Pampanga. 2005 ( 10 ) .Narratives (Berne Guerrero) rise to the two offenses: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a statute. "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense" [Article IV. Branch VI (Criminal Case 83-8228). Subsequent to Perez's acquittal. i. Perez filed a motion to quash invoking double jeopardy and waiver and/or estoppel on the part of Mendoza. On appeal. Sec. Article III. It remains to point out that the dismissal by the Batangas City Court of the information for violation of the Batangas City Ordinance upon the ground that such offense had already prescribed. an order sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense. Cortes (J): 4 concur Facts: On 21 October 1974 Yolanda Mendoza filed a criminal complaint against Eleuterio Perez for Consented Abduction (Criminal Case 618) with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. Acts of a person which physically occur on the same occasion and are infused by a common intent or design or negligence and therefore form a moral unity. The identity of offenses that must be shown need not be absolute identity: the first and second offenses may be regarded as the "same offense" where the second offense necessarily includes the first offense or is necessarily included in such first offense or where the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof. for the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available. this motion and Perez's motion for reconsideration were denied." Under the Rules of Court. 29 November 1988] Third Division. It is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense is not to be understood with absolute literalness. Perez filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga (Special Civil Case 7623). On 16 December 1985 the Intermediate Appellate Court dismissed the petition. to produce as many different acts as there are offenses under municipal ordinances or statutes that an enterprising prosecutor can find. "prescription of the crime" is one of the grounds for "total extinction of criminal liability. Held: The rule on double jeopardy is that. amounts to an acquittal of the accused of that offense. Branch VI.

the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged. the City Fiscal amended the information in Criminal Case F-147347 (for violation of Section 7 in relation to Section 11. "conspiring. upon arraignment. 1 on leave Facts: Agapito Gonzales. an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. on the ground that said informations did not charge an offense. among other similarly and equally obscene and morally offensive scenes. was not arraigned as he was (and he still is) at large. De Leon Building Raon Street corner Rizal Avenue. Constitutional Law II. together with Roberto Pangilinan. without however. A single act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law. [Manila]. De Leon Building. the same accused. before arraignment in the 2 cases. there is no question that Perez was validly charged with the crime of Consented Abduction before a court of competent jurisdiction. unlawfully. in color. unlawfully. and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not. RA 3060). in relation to Section 11. 24 Septembe 1987] En Banc. to wit: at Room 309. Phrased elsewise. 1 concur with reservation. nor duly passed by said Board. if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other. however. No hearing was held on 7 August 1972. or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. in two (2) separate informations filed with the City Court of Manila on 4 April 1972.Narratives (Berne Guerrero) by a court of competent jurisdiction. did then and there willfully. this does not preclude the filing of another information against him if from those facts. by alleging that the accused. to wit: at Room 309. [Manila]." On the other hand. 16 July 1971. On 26 June 1972. City Court of Manila [GR L-36528. 3060 and Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code. was accused of violating Section 7. feloniously and publicly exhibit. depicting and showing scenes of totally naked female and male persons with exposed private parts doing the sex act in various lewd and lascivious positions. Moreover. Raon Street corner Rizal Avenue. and feloniously publicly exhibit and cause to he publicly exhibited completed composite prints of motion film. in a place open to public view." On 31 May 1972. 1 concurs in separate opinion. although both offenses arise from the same facts. size. and confederating together. each requiring different elements. upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge. in color forming visual moving images on the projection screen through the mechanical application of the projection equipment. and mutually helping each other did then and there willfully. 2005 ( 11 ) . On 7 April 1972. where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes. Consented Abduction and Qualified Seduction are not identical offenses as would make applicable the rule on double jeopardy. arose. Although it is true that the two offenses for which Perez was charged arose from the same facts. The other accused Pangilinan. in a public place. which motion pictures have never been previously submitted to the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures for preview. Gonzales pleaded not guilty to both charges. size. through the mechanical application of movie projection equipment and the use of projection screen. Padilla (J): 10 concur. to wit: motion pictures of the 8 mm. prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other. the very nature of these two offenses would negate any identity between them. Republic Act No. the information in Criminal Case F-147348 (for violation of Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code) was amended to allege that. The plea of double jeopardy cannot therefore be accorded merit. On 15 November 1972." Herein. as the two indictments are perfectly distinct in point of law howsoever closely they may appear to be connected in fact. 383 People vs. The motion was denied on 17 July 1972 and the cases were set for trial on 7 August 1972. Gonzales moved for permission to withdraw his plea of "not guilty" in Criminal Case F-147348. on the same date. or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof. Gonzales filed a motion to quash the informations in the 2 cases. as Gonzales moved for postponement of the trial set on said date and the trial set on 2 other dates. "conspiring and confederating together and actually helping each other. That he had been arraigned and had pleaded not guilty to the charge for which he was subsequently acquitted is likewise undisputed. It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or identical offense. of the 8 mm. examination and censorship. indecent and immoral motion picture scenes. two distinct offenses.

In other words. while the offense punished in Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code is malum in se. Of the 217 prisoners. Gloria vs. while the appeal or review of the remaining 73 cases either had been expressly suspended pending the outcome of these petitions. The defense of double jeopardy cannot prosper. or is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof. also pending against him Criminal Case F-147347. 157 are civilians. the People filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of 20 January 1973. 1 filed separate opinion Facts: Habeas corpus proceedings were commenced in the Supreme Court on 1 October 1986 to test the legality of the continued detention of some 217 so-called "political detainees" arrested in the nine-year span of official martial rule and committed to the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinlupa. or are simply not dealt with in the records. the offense defined in section 7 of RA 3060 punishing the exhibition of motion pictures not duly passed by the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures does not include or is not included in the offense defined in Article 201(3) of the Revised Penal Code punishing the exhibition of indecent and immoral motion pictures. This was however denied by the court in its order dated 16 March 1973. where the information allegedly contains the same allegations as the information in Criminal Case F-147348. and only 26 confirmed as military personnel. Secretary of National Defense [GR L-79077]. Director of Prisons [GR L-80565] First Division. also In RE Habeas Corpus of Usman. The two (2) informations with which the accused was charged. the sentences of 68 had become final upon their approval by the Office of the President. this had neither been pleaded nor proved. and 3 were meted prison terms of less than 10 years. After the dismissal of Criminal Case F-147348. 115 accused had been condemned to die. 384 Cruz vs. As of the date of filing of the petitions. in Criminal Case F-147347. or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information. al. All these requisites do not exist in this case. constitutes double jeopardy. do not make out only one offense. 41 were given prison terms of 10 to 20 years. et.00. three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second. Chief of Staff (AFP) [GRs L79599-79600].Narratives (Berne Guerrero) substituting or entering another plea. Gen. Narvasa (J): 13 concur. A scrutiny of the 2 laws involved would show that the 2 offenses are different and distinct from each other. yet to this date he remains a prisoner at the Constitutional Law II. and a similar prosecution under Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code. He was accordingly sentenced to pay a fine of P600. Gonzales changed his plea of "not guilty" and entered a plea of "guilty" for violation of RA 3060. 15 April 1988]. 46 were sentenced to life imprisonment. the petition for review on certiorari. Considering these differences in elements and nature. 75 cases were pending review in either that Office or before the Board of Military Review. The two (2) offenses do not constitute a jeopardy to each other. and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense. Presidential amnesty was granted to Virgilio Alejandrino. dismissing Criminal Case F147348. Issue: Whether the prosecution under RA 3060. The crime punished in RA 3060 is a malum prohibitum in which criminal intent need not be proved because it is presumed. Ponce-Enrile [GR L-75983. there is no identity of the offenses here involved for which legal jeopardy in one may be invoked in the other. The nature of both offenses also shows their essential difference. Evidence required to prove one offense is not the same evidence required to prove the other. Held: It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double jeopardy. the City Court dismissed the case (Criminal Case F-147348). for violation of RA 3060. de la Cruz vs. Hence. On 27 December 1972. In an order dated 20 January 1973. 2005 ( 12 ) . if any of these offenses had any political color. 9 others were meted prison terms of from 20 to 30 years. as there was according to him. On 10 February 1973. All had been made to stand trial for common crimes before various courts martial. or on 7 February 1973. The Court granted the motion and reset the hearing of the cases for 27 December 1972. in which criminal intent is an indispensable ingredient. In RE Habeas Corpus of de la Cruz. Gonzales moved to quash the information in Criminal Case F147348 on the ground of double jeopardy. Goyena [GR L-79862]. (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated. and Jose vs. Usman vs. and in its amended order dated 16 March 1973.

1 concurs in separate opinion. 2005 ( 13 ) . control. Barrios [GRs 85481-82. Almost daily trials were held for more than 13 months. then President Ferdinand E.. although civil courts should have exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses not mentioned in Section 1 of GO 49.45 SN-1283521 with ammunition. Marcos. Ang Tiat Constitutional Law II. Because the case was a "cause celebre" in Cagayan de Oro City. Upon arraignment on 6 May 1975. for the killing on 25 August 1973 of Florentino Lim of the wealthy Lim Ket Kai family of Cagayan de Oro City. over violations of the law on firearms. withdrew his earlier order to transfer the case to the civil courts. Mariano Velez. The testimonies of 45 prosecution witnesses and 35 defense witnesses filled up 21 volumes of transcripts consisting of over 10. @ Go Bon Hoc]. in the public interest. all the accused pleaded "not guilty." In General Order 21 dated 30 September 1972. thru General Order 8 dated 27 September 1972.Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Penitentiary. Otherwise stated. He was released from detention on 5 May 1975." was promulgated by the Military Commission finding 5 of the accused namely: Luis Tan. penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Held: No breach of the constitutional prohibition against twice putting an accused in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense would result from the retrial of the petitioners' cases. Go E Kuan [@ Kunga]. However. 1 took no part Facts: On the basis of Proclamation 1081 dated 21 September 1972. Andres Parado and Daniel Campus. Antonio Occaciones. Joaquin Tan Leh (@ Go Bon Huat. William Tan (@ Go Bon Ho). "exclusive of the civil courts. the Court holds that the merits of the indictments against all these civilians are solely for the civil courts to weigh and decide upon after due proceedings. Manuel Beleta. The petitioners urge the Court to declare unconstitutional the establishment of all military tribunals as well as General Order 8 ordaining their creation. and Reynaldo C. in violation of General Orders 6 and 7 in relation to Presidential Decree 9. On 17 April 1975. Eusebio Tan [@ Go Bon Ping]. in relation to Section 1. Valid previous proceedings are required in order that the defense of double jeopardy can be raised by the accused in the second prosecution. Grino-Aquino (J): 12 concur. Marciano Benemerito [@ Marcing. Teodoro Patano. General Order 49. authorized the AFP Chief of Staff to create military tribunals "to try and decide cases of military personnel and such other cases as may be referred to them.000 pages. @ Donge). In General Order 12-b dated 7 November 1972. 385 Tan vs. redefined the jurisdiction of the Military Tribunals. a decision entitled "Findings and Sentence. for the crimes of: (1) murder through the use of an unlicensed or illegally-possessed firearm. they are entitled to the retrial they have explicitly requested of their respective cases in the civil courts. and the nullity of all the proceedings had against them before these bodies as a result of which they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. Issue: Whether the petitioners’ cases may be retried without subjecting said accused to double jeopardy. @ Taowie) and Vicente Tan (@ Go Bon Beng. "crimes against persons as defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code" were added to the jurisdiction of military tribunals/commissions. and John Doe). pursuant to the recommendation of Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile. Reyes and Rosalino de los Santos. and custody of a pistol. Alfonso Tan [@ Go Bon Tiak]. @ Dodong]. Ang Tiat Chuan [@ Chuana]. for the simple reason that the absence of jurisdiction of the courts martial to try and convict the petitioners prevented the first jeopardy from attaching. 6 of General Order 49. and other crimes which were directly related to the quelling of rebellion and the preservation of the safety and security of the Republic. and (2) unlawful possession. Oscar Yaun." Manuel Beleta was discharged to be used as a state witness. par. Leopoldo Nicolas. Enrique Labita. the military tribunals. Antonio Pumar. Subsequently. Jr. The enumeration of offenses cognizable by such tribunals excluded crimes against persons as defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. who appear to have fully served the sentences imposed on them by the military commissions which convicted them." were vested with jurisdiction among others. Hence. Section 2 of the same general order provided that "the President may. were arrested and charged in Criminal Case MC-1-67 before the Military Commission 1. President Marcos. caliber . the case was retained in the military court. On 10 June 1976. 18 October 1990] En Banc. In fine. with 12 others (Luis Tan [@ Tata. All the accused were detained without bail in the PC Stockade in Camp Crame. dated 11 October 1974. as do Domingo Reyes. although they were acquitted of the charges against them. refer to a Military Tribunal a case falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the civil courts" and vice versa.

2005 ( 14 ) . 79077. that there were no serious violations of their constitutional right to due process. On 17 January 1981. nullified the proceedings leading to the conviction of non-political detainees who should have been brought before the courts of justice as their offenses were totally unrelated to the insurgency sought to be controlled by martial rule. within 5 days from receipt" of his said order. A sixth accused. Marciano Benemerito. over civilians charged with criminal offenses properly cognizable by civil courts. namely: Oscar Yaun. The principle of absolute invalidity of the jurisdiction of the military courts over civilians should not be allowed to obliterate the "operative facts" that in the particular case of Tan. the proceedings were fair. and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by electrocution. who had been tried for common crimes and convicted by the military commissions during the 9-year span of official martial rule (G. requiring State Prosecutor Barrios to submit certified copies of "the supporting affidavits of the previous cases wherever they are now. and the order of Judge dated 26 October 1988 be annulled. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile. Cagayan de Oro City. to prosecute the case in the court of competent jurisdiction.Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Chuan. the Supreme Court in Cruz vs. Conformably with the ruling in Olaguer. Enrique Labita. where each of them was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of from 17 years. among others. et al. al. On 22 May 1987. et al. William Tan. In October 1986. Enrile (160 SCRA 700). to 20 years. 8 of the accused.. et al.. Go E Kuan. if the evidence warrants. et. was found guilty of both murder and illegal possession of firearm. and 21 days. (150 SCRA 144). and (2) Murder [Criminal Case 88-825] against all the 15 original defendants in Criminal Case MC1-67 including those who had already died. is an operative fact that may not be justly ignored. Nos. as long as those courts are open and functioning as they did during the period of martial law. Without conducting an investigation/reinvestigation. Proclamation 2045 ended martial rule and abolished the military tribunals and commissions. On 7 November 1988. Fiscal Barrios filed on 9 December 1988. William Tan. et al. 79862 and 80565 consolidated and entitled Manuel R. Before issuing warrants for the arrest of the accused. and Leopoldo Nicolas guilty of murder. Demecillo. Barrios was designated Acting City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City in lieu of the regular fiscal who inhibited himself. were assigned by raffle to the sala of RTC Judge Leonardo N.79599-79600. The belated declaration in 1987 of the unconstitutionality and invalidity of those proceedings did not erase the reality of their consequences which occurred long before the Court's decision in Olaguer was promulgated and which now prevent us from carrying Olaguer to the limit of its logic." and of the Supreme Court order "which is the basis of filing the cases. 4 months. et. Mariano Velez.. State Prosecutor Hernani T. and Vicente Tan were acquitted of the charges. and their co-accused before the Military Commission.R. and that the jurisdiction of the military Constitutional Law II. Criminal Cases 88-824 and 88-825 of the RTC. Joaquin Tan Leh. The doctrine of "operative facts" applies to the proceedings against Tan. Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez issued Department Order 226 designating State Prosecutor Hernani Barrios "to collaborate with the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City in the investigation/reinvestigation of Criminal Case MC-1-67 and. Joaquin Tan Leh and Vicente Tan filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that the informations in Criminal Cases 88-824 and 88-825. al. Judge Demecillo issued an order on 26 October 1988. 6 habeas corpus petitions were filed in the Supreme Court by some 217 prisoners in the national penitentiary. and released on 11 June 1976. et. On 15 September 1988. Held: The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before military tribunals and commissions during the ten-year period of martial rule (1971-1981) which were created under general orders issued by President Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers." On 15 November 1988. Cruz. al. Issue: Whether the reprosecution of Tan. The State Prosecutor has not complied with that order. 75983. and declaring that military commissions and tribunals have no jurisdiction. in the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City two (2) informations for (1) Illegal Possession of Firearm [Criminal Case 88-824]. vacating the sentence rendered on 4 December 1984 by Military Commission 34 against Olaguer. even during the period of martial law. Jr. 160 SCRA 700). Alfonso Tan. would violate their right to protection against double jeopardy. Eusebio Tan. Military Commission 34. Antonio Occaciones. the Supreme Court promulgated a decision in Olaguer vs. vs.

20 January 1988] Second Division.20 in favor of SMC ([PDB] Check 19040865) but which was dishonored for having been drawn against "insufficient funds" and. the refiling of the information against Tan. It will be recalled that the questioned judgment was not an adjudication on the merits. which is the SMC depository bank. in spite of repeated demands.918. The present petition for Certiorari seeking to set aside the void Decision of the Judge does not place the accused in double jeopardy for the same offense. but which check was refused payment for "insufficient funds" and. On 8 July 1983.071. Held: The dismissal of the subject criminal cases by the Judge. for having failed and refused to redeem said check to the damage and prejudice of SMC. where it was delivered to and received by the SMC Finance Officer.80 in favor of SMC. he was charged with Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (BP 22) for having issued a check on 13 June 1983 for P86. the SMC depository bank received a notice of dishonor of the said check for "insufficiency of funds" from the PDB. On 8 July 1983. al. paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code for having made out a check on 18 June 1983 in the sum of P11.80 in favor of SMC (PDB Check 19040872) in payment of beer he had purchased. Pampanga. Grospe [GRs L-74053-54. Parulan likewise issued PDB Check 19040872 in the amount of P11.20 in favor of SMC. in turn. In Criminal Case 2813 of the same Court. Grospe (Presiding Judge. 2. Hence. as direct payment for the spot sale of beer. Because of these established operative facts. The two cases were tried jointly. who then deposited the check with the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI). Bulacan. Well-settled is the rule that questions covering jurisdictional matters may be averred in a petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether the present petition for certiorari places the accused in double jeopardy for the same offense. either to exult in his freedom or to be resigned to whatever penalty is imposed. for having failed and refused to make good said check to the damage and prejudice of SMC. Melencio-Herrera (J): 4 concur Facts: Manuel Parulan is an authorized wholesale dealer of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) in Bulacan. The trial court. which are equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. San Fernando Branch. and ordered the cancellation of the bail bond posted by the accused. Bulacan Branch) [PDB] Check 19040865 in the sum of P86. in itself time-consuming and expense-producing for the state as well. in spite of repeated demands. The error committed is one of jurisdiction and not an error of judgment on the merits. which was received by the SMC Supervisor at Guiguinto. deposited the check with the SMC depository bank in San Fernando. the SMC depository bank received a notice of dishonor for "insufficiency of funds" from the drawee bank. through the Hon Nathaniel M. Military Commission No. the drawee bank in Santa Maria. Bulacan." 386 People vs. It protects an accused from harassment. Bulacan.Narratives (Berne Guerrero) commission that heard and decided the charges against them during the period of martial law. 2005 ( 15 ) . Pampanga.918. Pampanga. predicated on his lack of jurisdiction. It was a Constitutional Law II. The check was forwarded to the SMC Regional Office at San Fernando.071. which was received also by the SMC Supervisor at Guiguinto. Bulacan. That check was similarly forwarded by the SMC Supervisor to the SMC Regional Office in San Fernando. in hard fact if not in constitutional logic. The doctrine of double jeopardy protects the accused from harassment by the strong arm of the State: "The constitutional mandate is (thus) a rule of finality. An error of jurisdiction renders whatever order of the Trial Court null and void. the PDB. A single prosecution for any offense is all the law allows. where it was delivered to the Finance Officer thereat and who. the special civil action for certiorari.' The ordeal of a criminal prosecution is inflicted only once. Branch 44. and is a bar to unnecessary litigation. is correctible by Certiorari. enables him to treat what had transpired as a closed chapter in his life. Parulan issued Planters Development Bank (Santa Maria. In Criminal Case 2800 of the RTC Pampanga. Parulan was charged with Estafa under Article 315. not whenever it pleases the state to do so. It has been referred to as 'res judicata in prison grey. the witnesses for both prosecution and defense being the same for the two suits. RTC Pampanga) rendered judgment dismissing the cases for lack of jurisdiction. On 13 June 1983. would place them in double jeopardy. had been affirmed by the Supreme Court (Aquino vs. in Santa Maria. 63 SCRA 546) years before the Olaguer case arose and came before the Supreme Court. et. inclusive of matters of grave abuse of discretion. On 18 June 1983.

There is double jeopardy only when: 1) there is a valid complaint or information." Upon arraignment. a building permit and survey plan covering the subject land. presented its title and plan showing that the accused built a structure within its property. The petition seeks to render null and void the decision for want of due process as the acquittal of the accused was rendered without a trial on the merits. Rosario pleaded not guilty and a pretrial conference was held on 14 August 1987 wherein Rosario informed the court that she has a title. Constitutional Law II. No doubt. U. Hence. The conclusion of the trial court that the accused did not build her structure illegally as she has a title to the property in question is without any factual or legal basis. with the approval of the city fiscal. in the RTC of the same city against Segundina Rosario y Sembrano. in Quezon City. and for sometime prior thereto and persisting up to the present. double jeopardy cannot be invoked as a bar to another prosecution in this case. the said accused taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the University of the Philippines.. "That on or about 16th day of December. or to the accused. A trial on the merits should be undertaken to determine once and for all whether the place where the structure was built by the accused belongs to U. The prosecution was not given the opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut the representations of the accused. The prosecution is as much entitled to due process as the accused in a criminal case. Santiago (Presiding Judge of Branch 101 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City) acquitting the accused of the offense charged with costs de oficio. as stressed by U.P. and 4) of which he has previously been convicted or acquitted or which was dismissed or terminated without his express consent. 1986. There is therefore. 3) to which defendant had pleaded. That is the mandate of the rules. The accused by her proffer of exhibits and manifestation pretended to have a title to the questioned land. Philippines. 387 People vs. Hence. in behalf of the People of the Philippines.P. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. did then and there. 20 June 1989] First Division. Issue: Whether double jeopardy has set in in this case. However. 9462 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. the observation of respondent judge in the questioned decision as to "the inadequacy in details of the state's evidence" simply demonstrates that a trial on the merits should have been held to enable the prosecution to establish its case. which reads. 2005 ( 16 ) .Narratives (Berne Guerrero) dismissal upon the Judge's erroneous conclusion that his Court had no "territorial jurisdiction" over the cases. the decision was rendered by Judge Pedro T. no second proceeding which would subject the accused to double jeopardy. Santiago [GR 80778. U. Campus where the structure of accused was built. A trial should follow a pre-trial. among others. It was not a court of competent jurisdiction when it precipitately rendered a decision of acquittal after a pre-trial. Where an order dismissing a criminal case is not a decision on the merits. The dismissal being null and void the proceedings before the Trial Court may not be said to have been lawfully terminated. Indeed.P.P. the titled property of accused is located in Marikina and not in Quezon City and said title could not cover the very lot in question which is at Pook Amorsolo. unlawfully and feloniously succeed in occupying and/or possessing a portion of the said property. wilfully. At the pretrial. it cannot bar as res judicata a subsequent case based on the same offense. Held: The judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in rendering the decision without affording the prosecution the opportunity to have its day in court. 2) filed before a competent court. The decision that was rendered in disregard of such imperative is void for lack of jurisdiction. the University of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari. double jeopardy has not set in in this case. This issue cannot be determined by a mere examination of the titles and documents submitted by the parties. by then and there constructing his/her house therein for residential purposes. the prosecution was deprived of an opportunity to prosecute and prove its case. On 27 October 1978. Gancayco (J): 4 concur Facts: On 2 June 1987 an information for violation of PD 772 was filed by the Assistant City Fiscal of Quezon City.P. The issue before the Court is whether or not the accused built the structure on the land belonging to U. the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. without the consent and against the will of the said offended party. the acquittal of the accused is a nullity for want of due process. Obviously. In fine. the counsel for the private offended party.

also People vs. Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. In turn. which was duly received on the same date by the defense counsel. the pre-trial was then reset to 26 June 1986. On 22 July 1986. the prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration from the order of dismissal. Bernabe Que. Amelia Que. Renato Elauria and Amelita Tutica could not be arraigned because they were still at-large. On that date. On the same date. 1986. granted the prosecution's motion for reconsideration and caused the case to be reopened. The court then set a separate trial for some of the accused on 8 May 1986. counsel for Bernabe Que and Amelia Que. Suplico issued the order dismissing the case. In the meantime. Martelino were arraigned while the other accused. The hearing of September 18. within 30 days from 8 May 1986.Narratives (Berne Guerrero) 388 Que vs. upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge. Lorenzo E. Lorenzo Coloso. filed a motion to postpone the arraignment and pre-trial. The People of the Philippines filed the petition to review on certiorari (GR 83114) the decision of the Court of Appeals. 21. 2005 ( 17 ) . the defense counsel were given 10 days from receipt of the stipulation of facts to file their counter proposal or answer. as the former judge was not reappointed after the reorganization of the judiciary. Judge Enrique P. Held: Criminal Case C-2152 may be reinstated as no double jeopardy has attached. after which the defense counsel shall make their counter proposal within 10 days from receipt thereof.511. On 17 September 1986. or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily Constitutional Law II. and 11. Gualberto Devera. Paz Martelino filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari praying that the order of Judge Cosico reinstating the case be declared null and void on the ground of double jeopardy. (J): 3 concur Facts: The information for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents involving the amount of P2. Meanwhile. as amended which provides that "When an accused has been convicted or acquitted. Warren Machado and Paz L. Coloso. Issue: Whether the reinstatement of the criminal case placed the accused in double jeopardy. 1986 was reset to November 10. The setting for 26 June 1986 was. postponed to 22 July 1986 due to the motion for postponement filed by Atty. Branch XVI. which was received by the court on 1 April 1986. Cosico [GR 81861. or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction. Antonio Blancaflor. On 17 December 1987. The case was set for arraignment and pre-trial on 31 March 1986. the City Fiscal submitted his proposals for admission of facts. found merit in the petition and set aside Judge Cosico's order. On 31 March 1986. the court again directed the prosecution to furnish machine copies of the 489 US treasury warrants to the accused through counsel within 15 days from the said date. the date was reset to September 17 and 18. Judge Enrique Suplico directed the prosecution to file its written stipulation of facts with respect to the US checks with machine copies of the said documents attached thereto. Bernabe Que and Amelia Que filed a petition for certiorari directly with the Supreme Court seeking to declare Judge Cosico's orders dated 22 May 1987 and 27 November 1987 as null and void and to prohibit the judge from further proceeding with Criminal Case C-2152. 1986 upon request of the prosecution and without objection on the part of the defense counsel as the prosecution witnesses were in Manila. On 21 November 1986. namely. The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by the defense was denied in an order dated 27 November 1987. the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged. the prosecution submitted supplemental proposals for admission of facts. Atty.24 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City. 8 September 1989]. Upon motion of the City Fiscal." This is complemented by the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Martelino [GR 83114] Third Division. or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof. In the meantime. In a motion for postponement dated 24 March 1986. Wilfredo Azarco. On 10 November 1986. Gutierrez Jr. however. copy furnished all the defense counsel. the case was re-raffled to Judge Rodrigo Cosico. and prayed that the date be reset to 8 May 1986. The rule on double jeopardy is found in sec.120. in its decision dated 22 April 1988. The Court of Appeals. on 29 November 1985. Judge Cosico in an order dated 22 May 1987. in light of the accused's constitutional rights to speedy trial.

" Thus. Copy of the motion was furnished the City Fiscal of Caloocan City but not Caes. Dacanay (he had been promoted in the meantime) and Sgt. On 12 July 1983. Court of Appeals (92 SCRA 136. Moreover. On 3 June 1983. trial was reset for lack of material time. On 19 January 1983. On 14 November 1983. as held in Bermisa v. On 21 February 1983. the requisites that must concur for legal jeopardy to attach are. where a defendant expressly consents to or moves for the dismissal of the case against him. had been personally served with subpoena to appear and testify at the hearing scheduled on 6 June 1983. On 15 November 1982. Joel Caes was charged in two separate informations with illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of marijuana before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Intermediate Appellate Court [GRs 74989-90. was denied on 9 October 1984. Lustado. the judge issued the order granting the "Motion for the Revival of the Case. the trial was reset to 14 November 1983. Bonifacio Lustado. The fourth requisite is lacking in the instant case. no trial could be held as the prosecution witnesses were absent. 21 March 1983. The purpose is to set the effects of the first prosecution forever at rest. (b) Constitutional Law II. Cruz (J): 4 concur Facts: On 21 November 1981. the trial was again postponed because the prosecution witnesses were absent. a sheriffs return informed the trial court that the prosecution witnesses. and 19 April 1983. Amelia Que and Paz Martelino invoked their constitutional right to a speedy trial when the prosecution refused to present evidence until the court had ruled on the motion for inhibition. Arraignment was originally scheduled on 11 January 1982. the general rule is that the dismissal of the case must be without the express consent of the accused. Trial was scheduled for 13 October 1982. The accused Bernabe Que. 3) the accused has pleaded to the charge and 4) the accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the accused. the trial was again postponed. It has been held in a long line of cases that to constitute double jeopardy. It was on their oral motion that the lower court ordered the case to be dismissed. the trial was again postponed for reasons that do not appear in the record. On 20 December 1982. and reconsideration was denied on 17 June 1986. Caes filed the petition for certiorari with th Supreme Court. 2005 ( 18 ) . which was referred to the appellate court. there must be: (a) a valid complaint or information. namely. a motion to revive the cases was filed by Maj. no reason appearing in the record. The cases were consolidated on 10 December 1981. On said day. Carlos Dacanay and Sgt." the right against double jeopardy prohibits the prosecution of a person for a crime of which he has been previously acquitted or convicted. On 9 January 1984." A motion for reconsideration filed by Caes dated 7 June 1984. On 18 May 1984. For double jeopardy to attach. and the revived cases were set for hearing on 19 November 1984. assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected to the danger and anxiety of a second charge against him for the same offense. but was for some reason postponed. for lack of notice. 6 November 1989] First Division. who alleged that they could not attend the hearing scheduled on 14 November 1983. to wit: 1) a valid complaint or information. 141-143 [1979]). Issue: Whether the revival of the cases would place Caes in double jeopardy in violation of the Bill of Rights. On the same date." 389 Caes vs.Narratives (Berne Guerrero) included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. the prosecution moved for the provisional dismissal of the case because its witnesses had not appeared. Caes was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. On 19 October 1983. Capt. the trial was once more reset by agreement of the parties. even if the court or judge states in the order that the dismissal is definite or does not say that the dismissal is without prejudice to the filing of another information. but this was reset upon agreement of the parties. Gorgonio issued the order provisionally dismissing the case. the third resetting of the case was also canceled. The case was dismissed upon motion and with the express consent of the accused. Held: Fittingly described as "res judicata in prison grey. 2) a court of competent jurisdiction. this time because there was no trial fiscal. On 31 August 1982. the dismissal will not be a bar to a subsequent prosecution of the defendant for the same offense. Caes filed the present petition. On 6 September 1983. Judge Alfredo M. "the consent of petitioner to the dismissal constituted a waiver of the constitutional right not to be prosecuted for the same offense. The petition there was dismissed for lack of merit on 20 May 1986.

it was final and operated as an acquittal of the accused on the merits. 4085. and separately also be held liable for the crime of estafa under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code for the issuance of the same bouncing checks. (2) specific and different penalties are Constitutional Law II. In both sets of criminal cases. purchased oil products from it. Dacuycuy in a resolution dated 17 September 1981. 4385. 4386 and 4387) and similarly for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law or Batas Pambansa 22 (Criminal Cases 3790. This is in effect a failure to prosecute. Simultaneous with the delivery of the products. he issued 9 checks in payment thereof. Any doubt on this matter must be resolved in favor of the accused. It is settled that a case may be dismissed if the dismissal is made on motion of the accused himself or on motion of the prosecution with the express consent of the accused. 3793. 4384. 2005 ( 19 ) . under Article 315. Under the latter law. 4123. petitioner moved in open court to be allowed to withdraw his plea of not guilty upon his filing of a motion to quash. 4382. Held: Nierras is charged with 2 distinct and separate offenses. Nierras was charged for for estafa under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code (Criminal Cases 4379. Paras (J): 13 concur. so as to leave no doubt as to the defendant's conformity. with prejudice to the refiling of the case. the dismissal will be regarded as final. which was denied by Judge Auxencio C. The first is where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to the evidence filed by the accused after the prosecution has rested. neither may it be lightly inferred from the presumption of regularity. also on motion of the accused. Implied consent is not enough. i. Such a dismissal is correctly denominated provisional. (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code. Nierras entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment before the lower court. This consent cannot be presumed nor may it be merely implied from the defendant's silence or his failure to object As held in a number of cases. No less importantly. 3792. while under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code. such circumstance negates criminal liability. The other exception is where the dismissal is made. and 4125). mere issuance of a check that is dishonored gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the same without sufficient funds and hence punishable which is not so under the Penal Code. As it was based on the "lack of interest" of the prosecutor and the consequent delay in the trial of the cases. 1 took no part Facts: Peter Nierras. such consent must be express. But a dismissal is not provisional even if so designated if it is shown that it was made without the express consent of the accused. 3791. and (d) of which he had been previously acquitted or convicted or which was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. There is no question that the first three requisites are present in the present case. second. 4122. immediately after his plea of not guilty in these estafa cases. 4381. Nierras filed the petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation repeatedly demanded of Nierras either to deposit funds for his checks or pay for the oil products he had purchased but he failed and refused to do either. 390 Nierras vs. because of the denial of his right to a speedy trial. Other differences between the two also include the following: (1) a drawer of a dishonored check may be convicted under BP 22 even if he had issued the same for a pre-existing obligation. The circumstance that the dismissal of the cases against Caes was described by the trial judge as "provisional" did not change the nature of that dismissal.e. Thereafter. Issue: Whether Nierras may be held liable for the 9 criminal cases for violation of BP 22. Dacuycuy [GRs 59568-76. Leyte. There are instances in fact when the dismissal will be held to be final and to dispose of the case once and for all even if the dismissal was made on motion of the accused himself. 4383. Deceit and damage are essential elements in Article 315 (2d) Revised Penal Code. 4380. first under Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and. 11 January 1990] En Banc. However.. but are not required in BP 22. (c) to which the defendant had pleaded.Narratives (Berne Guerrero) filed before a competent court. Otherwise. Upon presentation to the Philippine National Bank at Naval. there is no proof that Caes expressly concurred in the provisional dismissal. for we are dealing here with the alleged waiver of a constitutional right. 4124. said checks were dishonored for the reason that his account was already closed. a customer of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation. Such dismissal has the effect of a judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal.

3 par. It appears from the records of the Tanodbayan. 28 May 1992] En Banc. Icasiano then moved to quash the information on the grounds. while those of BP 22 are mala prohibita. The office of the Tanodbayan received another complaint from the same Romana Magbago (TBP-87-01546). The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash. 2005 ( 20 ) . as amended. the mere filing of the 2 sets of information does not itself give rise to double jeopardy. unfortunately. Magbago also filed with the Office of the Ombudsman the same lettercomplaint earlier filed with the Supreme Court. [e]) in TBP-87-00924. this time. Cavite. Gonzales. After considering Judge Icasiano's answer. of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019. the prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one offense. Icasiano. on estafa. The corresponding information against Icasiano was thereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan (Criminal Case 14563). the Court is of the view that the distinction between administrative and criminal proceedings must be upheld. upon order of the Court in connection with this case. The recommendation was approved by then Special Prosecutor/Tanodbayan Raul M. Icasiano's motion for reinvestigation was denied in the 29 June 1990 resolution. because a single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses and where there is variance or differences between the elements of an offense in one law and another law. Icasiano's comment thereon and the Court Administrator's recommendation. that the accused shall be placed in double jeopardy in so far as the resolution of the Hon. After evaluating the allegations of the complaint. issed 2 orders of detention dated 18 and 27 November 1986 against Romana Magbago for contempt of court because of her continued refusal to comply with a fifth alias writ of execution. among others. and that a prosecution in one is not a bar to the other. When the Supreme Court acts on Constitutional Law II. Hence. The exact date of filing of the second complaint is not stated but the records of the case were allegedly among those transmitted to the then newly created office of the Ombudsman. Aurelio G. she claimed violation by Judge Icasiano. What is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense. Jr. the Supreme Court dismissed the administrative complaint for lack of merit in an en banc resolution dated 2 February 1988. there will be no double jeopardy because what the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the 2 offenses. that the resolution dismissing the complaint was released on 14 April 1988. (4) violations of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are mala in se. Padilla (J): 13 concur. Magbago filed an administrative complaint dated 17 February 1987 with the Supreme Court against Judge Icasiano. Furthermore. while violation of BP 22 is principally a crime against public interest as it does injury to the entire banking system. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied." While the filing of the two sets of Information under the provisions of BP 22 and under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code. Icasiano (as accused) filed a motion for reinvestigation. Special Prosecutor Nicanor Cruz. the transmitted records did not contain the earlier resolution of dismissal in TBP-87-00924. Jr. Otherwise stated. Section 5 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 provides that "Prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code. Jr. It is. (3) estafa is essentially a crime against property. sec. who was assigned to investigate the case (TBP-87-01546) appeared completely unaware of the earlier case. therefore. which were forwarded to the Supreme Court. Held: After a closer look at the records of the case. Issue: Whether the resolution of the administrative proceeding in the Supreme Court bars the subsequent filing of a criminal case against the accused in the Sandiganbayan. correct for the Sandiganbayan to hold that double jeopardy does no apply in the present controversy because the Supreme Court case (against Judge Icasiano) was administrative in character while the Sandiganbayan case also against Judge Icasiano is criminal in nature. Sandiganbayan [GR 95642. After said information was filed on 21 March 1990. TBP-87-00924. prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. 1 on leave Facts: Acting Municipal Trial Court Judge of Naic. on 17 March 1987. 391 Icasiano vs. in a resolution dated April 1988 Special Prosecutor Evelyn Almogela-Baliton recommended dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. Meanwhile. Icasiano filed the petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.Narratives (Berne Guerrero) imposed in each of the two offenses. may refer to identical acts committed by Nierras. of the Sandiganbayan. Supreme Court in Administrative Case RTJ-87-81.

par. entitled him to raise the defense of double jeopardy in the criminal case in the Sandiganbayan. Mrs. Constitutional Law II. for the crime of murder. Here no appeal from the questioned orders of the issuing judge (Icasiano) was taken: instead. (b) a competent court. As she did so.m. it cannot be assumed at this point that Judge Icasiano is not criminally liable under RA 3019. and yet. he was charged with multiple frustrated murder (Criminal Case 88173) before the Court of First Instance of Manila. Administrative procedure need not strictly adhere to technical rules. since double jeopardy does not apply. on the other hand. or convicted. manifest partiality and incompetence in having issued 2 orders of detention against complaining witness Magbago. Ordinarily. It is precisely for this reason. Florencia Tactay Javier came out of the door and met the caller.Narratives (Berne Guerrero) complaints against judges or any of the personnel under its supervision and control. and to reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim in the sum of P12. Heeding such call. Substantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction. As held in Cirilo Cinco. with the accessory penalties of the law for the crime of multiple attempted murder. Manila. and (e) the defendant was acquitted. The charge against Judge Icasiano before the Sandiganbayan is for grave abuse of authority. Milflores appealed. 2005 ( 21 ) . It is only when an appellate court reverses the lower court issuing the questioned orders can abuse. Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines.. Issue: Whether the filing of Criminal Case 88174 placed Milflores under risk of double jeopardy. (d) the defendant had pleaded to the charge. Milflores was arraigned on said two informations on 14 December 1967 and 23 January 1968. among other. In any case. however. On 6 December 1967. an old man approached the house on 2233 Garrido Street. Barredo (J): 7 concur Facts: Early in the morning of 27 November 1967. vs. respectively. In a separate information filed with the same court on even date. and multiple injuries and wounds to 7 other occupants of the house. Later. followed moments later by a deafening bomb explosion which caused death of one. the two cases were tried jointly. et al. 30 July 1982] Second Division. In fact. partiality or incompetence be imputed to the judge. at about 7:45 a. The old man handed to her a paper bag containing some vegetables — pechay. Florencia Javier brought the bag into the house and proceeded to empty the same of its contents. complainant's available remedy was to appeal said orders of detention in accordance with the Rules. or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. Criminal proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. imposing discipline and not as a court judging justiciable controversies. he moved to quash the information for murder but the same was denied by the trial court. require proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. something inside the paper bag began emitting smoke and whistling sound. a preliminary investigation (assuming one had been conducted in TBP-87-00924) is not a trial to which double jeopardy attaches. which should take care of Judge Icasiano's contention that said administrative case against him before the Supreme Court. it acts as personnel administrator. 392 People vs. Ana. that the administrative case against Judge Icasiano was dismissed by the Supreme Court for lack of merit. the Ombudsman has found a prima facie case which led to the filing of the information. administrative and criminal cases were filed against the judge for issuing the orders. Investigations thereafter conducted by various police agencies led to the arrest of Naño Milflores y Laksa. as minimum. Thereafter. which was dismissed. 2 Months of prision correccional. upo and sigarillas — and then left the place. All these elements do not apply visa-vis the administrative case. while they may involve the same acts subject of the administrative case. Milflores [GRs L-32144-45. as maximum. and entered pleas of "Not Guilty" to the charges. 3(e) for issuing the questioned orders of detention. Javier. he was likewise charged for murder (Criminal Case 88174). it is fundamental that the following requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information. calling out the name of one of the occupants — Mrs. To avail of the protection against double jeopardy. to 8 Years of prision mayor. at the conclusion of which the the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch XI) rendered the decision of conviction and and sentenced Milflores to imprisonment of 4 Years. Sta.000. the dismissal by the Tanodbayan of the first complaint cannot bar the present prosecution.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. c) a valid arraignment.

notice to the Provincial Fiscal of their intention to appeal the latter's resolution to the Department of Justice. acting on the motion of the Provincial Fiscal... Floresita Salde and Gloria Salde-Panaguiton were arraigned. on 6 April 1990. the trial Constitutional Law II. 52. the crime for which Milflores could be made to answer is the virtually single complex offense of murder with frustrated murder pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. it is as if Milflores had been prosecuted and tried under a single information. later resolved in their favor. Floresita Salde. the explosion of the bomb which according to the prosecution was handed by Milflores to Florencia Tactay-Javier. Sr. the victim in Criminal Case 88174. for the simple reason that the primary basis of the defense of double jeopardy is that the accused has already been convicted or acquitted in the first case or that the same has been terminated without his consent. Sr. by throwing stones at Amado Rubite and hacking him with a bladed weapon. But the more untenable aspect of the position of Milflores is that when he invoked the defense of double jeopardy. it is plain to see that such was impossible or could not have happened. Still. to do so would result in duplicating what had already been done. To be accurate. counsel for the offended parties gave. In effect. namely. the legal error of the prosecution here consists of having filed two separate informations for a single offense. Bellosillo (J): 3 concur Facts: On 7 April 1988. Br. Leonardo Salde. Meanwhile. Leonardo Salde. Criminal Case 88173. Leonardo Salde. ordered the dismissal of Criminal Cases 7396 and 7397. what could have been the first jeopardy had not yet been completed or even began. the woman who died and is precisely named as the deceased in the murder case. Estiller of Puerto Princesa City filed Criminal Cases 7396 and 7397 for frustrated murder against Leonardo Salde. For there can be no doubt about the fact that since the injuries suffered by the offended parties in Criminal Case 88173 resulted from the same act allegedly of the accused that caused the death of Felicidad Mique. Counsel is thus off tangent in invoking double jeopardy. pending appeal to the Department of Justice. Jr. with both prosecution and defense presenting all their respective evidence. Jr. Jr. 2005 ( 22 ) . as the proceedings were actually conducted. which was opposed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. 2 new Informations for frustrated murder against the same accused were filed by Acting Provincial Prosecutor Clarito A. the Regional Trial Court of Palawan. On 3 June 1988. Provincial Fiscal Luis E. the full-dressed trial of the case. Jojeta Panaguiton was also arraigned and likewise entered a plea of "not guilty. Gacott. the technical error of the fiscal in filing two separate informations did not cause Milflores any substantial prejudice at all. In the sense. after pleading "not guilty" to the new Informations. on 1 March 1990. On 2 February 1989. Jr. Demaala (Criminal Cases 8572 and 8573). Vergara [GR 101557-5. therefore. the Secretary of Justice ordered the Provincial Prosecutor to refile the Informations. moved for the dismissal of the cases on the ground that the reinvestigation disclosed that spouses Amado and Teresa Rubite were the real aggressors and that the accused only acted in self-defense. that Milflores was ever in jeopardy in that first case.. which Provincial Fiscal Eustaquio Z. when the cases were initially called for trial. 28 April 1993] First Division.. Provincial Fiscal Gacott. Hence." On 19 September 1988. It is settled jurisprudence in the Court that the mere filing of two informations or complaints charging the same offense does not yet afford the accused in those cases the occasion to complain that he is being placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense. the accused moved to quash on the ground of double jeopardy. On 9 February 1989. It would be giving premium to technicality and sacrificing substantial justice to yield to counsel's contention.. They all pleaded "not guilty.. hitting him on the left fronto-parietal area which would have caused his death in Crimianl Case 8572 (GR 101557). On 12 December 1988. On 10 July 1991. Besides. There is in law only one offense because there is only one penalty that can be imposed notwithstanding that the act may in fact involve a cluster of otherwise separate or distinct offenses. 393 People vs. On 13 May 1991. does not include among the victims or offended parties Felicidad Mique." On 2 August 1988. 3rd Asst. Gloria Salde-Panaguiton and Jojeta Panaguiton for allegedly conspiring together in attacking and taking turns in assaulting the spouses Teresa and Amado Rubite. and by striking Teresa with wood and stones and hacking her with a bolo which would have caused her death in Criminal Case 8573 (GR 101558). the Prosecuting Fiscal together with counsel for accused jointly moved for the suspension of the hearing pending the outcome of the motion filed by the accused for reinvestigation of the cases against them.Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Held: The first information for frustrated murder. Criminal Case 88174.

mare. The objective is to set the effects of the first prosecution forever at rest. (b) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated. 394 People vs. and his co-accused merely defended themselves from the attack of the Rubites. Held: The right against double jeopardy prohibits any subsequent prosecution of any person for a crime of which he has previously been acquitted or convicted. and. it would be unfair. or proof of service thereof. it would be to his best interest if the accused did not oppose the motion. and heard Tiozon knocking at their door and at the same time informing her that he accidentally shot Leonardo. arbitrary and unjustified to prosecute the accused in the above-entitled case. the conditions for a valid defense of double jeopardy." Since it was the prosecuting officer who instituted the cases. al. The remedy of the aggrieved party in such cases is either to have the order set aside or the irregularity otherwise cured by the court which dismissed the complaint.e. i. et. While it may be true that. a court of competent jurisdiction. the Rubites. Criminal Cases 7396 and 7397 were filed against Salde. Amado and Teresa Rubite filed the petition for certiorari. The order of the court granting the motion to dismiss despite absence of a notice of hearing. It is likewise admitted that Salde. a hearing on the motion to dismiss would be useless and futile. there was no express consent of the accused when the prosecutor moved for the dismissal of the original Informations. whether the first jeopardy was invalidly terminated. It is undisputed that valid Informations for frustrated murder. and not certiorari. Davide Jr. 5 minutes later and or after Leonardo's wife heard two successive gunshots. al. The motion to reconsider the order of 10 July 1991 filed by Acting Provincial Prosecutor Demaala was denied on 16 August 1991.e.. as a general rule." Leonardo's wife sought help to carry Leonardo towards the main road. The court still retains its authority to pass on the merits of the motion. (c) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that of the first. gave. it was the public prosecutor himself who after instituting Criminal Cases 7396 and 7397 filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that after a reinvestigation it was found that "the evidence in these cases clearly tilts in favor of both accused. nabaril ko si Pare. "Mare. It is axiomatic that a hearing is necessary only in cases of contentious motions. and.. or to appeal from the dismissal order. Consequently. Hence. Tiozon showed a gun to her husband and the latter even toyed with it. Tiozon sat down and the two exchanged pleasantries. The motion filed in this case has ceased to be contentious. of 24 February 1989. Hence. It cannot deprive a competent court of jurisdiction over the case. a hearing on his motion to dismiss was not necessary at all. hindi ko sinasadya. The two left. et. to come inside their house. 19 June 1991] Third Division. is merely an irregularity in the proceedings. To equate this with express consent of the accused to the dismissal of the case in the lower court is to strain the meaning of "express consent" too far. Leonardo invited Tiozon. This is hardly what Saldy. Once inside their house. before the Regional Trial Court of Palawan. Here. Some of the neighbors arrived bringing Constitutional Law II. these cases present an unusual situation where the motion to dismiss filed negates the necessity of a hearing. the defense of double jeopardy must prevail. gave their express consent to the dismissal of the original Informations. Tiozon [GR 89823. (a) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second. after being properly arraigned. What they did was merely to move for reinvestigation of the case before the prosecutor. (J): 4 concur Facts: At around 11:00 p. all motions should contain a notice of hearing under Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. i. et. are precluded from questioning the discretion of the fiscal in moving for the dismissal of the criminal action. The spouses Amado and Teresa Rubite were the aggressors and the accused Salde. 2005 ( 23 ) . Definitely. Simply. al. who appeared to be very drunk. on the other hand. and who thereafter moved for their dismissal. The only question then remaining is whether the cases against them were dismissed with their express consent. Eutropio Tiozon. Sr..Narratives (Berne Guerrero) court granted the motion and dismissed Criminal Cases 8572 and 8573.m. al. assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected to the peril and anxiety of a second charge against him for the same offense. Leonardo opened the door and they saw that the person who was knocking was their "Pareng Troping". entered a plea of not guilty. all being present in these cases. Issue: Whether Salde. Leonardo Bolima y Mesia and his wife were awakened by the loud knocks on their door. et.

Manuel's counsel verbally manifested in open court that Manuel was willing to change his former plea of "not guilty" to that of "guilty" to the lesser offense of violation of Section 17. In an information filed by the Asst.00 as reasonable expenses for the wake and burial expenses and to pay the costs. Contrary to law. to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Leonardo Bolima the sum of P30. Thereafter. veterinarian. otherwise. however.D.08 grams of Methamphetamin Hydrocloride (Shabu) wrapped with an aluminum foil. acquire. 2005 ( 24 ) . the rule against double jeopardy cannot be invoked because the first is punished by a special law while the second. which is just a malum prohibitum.00. Held: Section 1 of PD 1866 imposes the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua "upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture. Pre-trial was conducted and thereafter the trial court received the evidence for the parties. is punished by the Revised Penal Code. The rationale for the qualification is to effectively deter violations of the laws on firearms and to stop the "upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order and safety due to the proliferation of illegally possessed and manufactured firearms. RA 6425. Tiozon filed a Notice of Appeal. were it not for its abolition. manufacturer. Medialdea (J): 3 concur Facts: On 24 August 1990. The accused cannot plead one as a bar to the other. to reimburse the heirs of the victim the sum of P50. dentist." It goes further by providing that "if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm. City Prosecutor of Caloocan City on 27 February 1989 with Branch 131 of the Regional Trial Court (Caloocan City) of the National Capital Judicial Region. The information against him reads: "That on or about the 21st day of August. Thereafter. as amended. Philippines. In a decision promulgated on 30 June 1989. the trial court found Tiozon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of P. Section 1 of PD 1866. It does not. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. dispose or possess any firearm. On 5 July 1989 Tiozon filed a motion to reconsider the decision which. in light of the right against double jeopardy. as amended. 1990. On 21 November 1990. On 9 January 1991. Manuel entered a plea of not guilty. RA 6425. without the corresponding license or prescription did then and there willfully. however. an anomalous absurdity results whereby a more serious crime defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code is absorbed by a statutory offense. follow that the homicide or murder is absorbed in the offense. should have been imposed. was denied by the court in its order of 16 August 1989. Issue: Whether prosecution for violation of PD 1866. or. deal in. bars prosecution for murder or homicide. tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition. Constitutional Law II. "the death penalty. the above-named accused. as amended." In fine then." It may be loosely said that homicide or murder qualifies the offense penalized in Section 1 of PD 1866 because it is a circumstance which increases the penalty. which is a regulated drug. The penalty prescribed in the said section is imprisonment ranging from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years and a fine ranging from P6. part of firearm. wholesaler who violates or fails to keep the records required under Section 25 of the Act. custody and control 0.. According to the trial court. the sentence imposable under 2nd pa. in the Municipality of San Juan. The said section provides a penalty of imprisonment ranging from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and a fine ranging from P600 to P4. ammunition or machinery. stated otherwise. Villarama [GR 99287.000 shall be imposed upon any pharmacist.Narratives (Berne Guerrero) with them lights. unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession. physician." During the arraignment. which is qualified by murder or homicide. trial ensued. Metro Manila. if the violation or failure involves a regulated drug. Tiozon pleaded not guilty when arraigned on 15 March 1989. 23 June 1992] First Division. the prosecution rested its case.000. homicide or murder. the killing of a person with the use of an unlicensed firearm may give rise to separate prosecutions for (a) violation of Section 1 of PD 1866 and (b) violation of either Article 248 (Murder) or Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged with violation of Section 16.000. Eutropio Tiozon y Acid was charged for violation of Presidential Decree 1866. On 17 August. as amended". the penalty of death shall be imposed. 1866 and Murder qualified by treachery and sentenced him to suffer life imprisonment.000.000 to P12. 395 People vs. Kalookan policemen arrived and so she caused the arrest of Tiozon.

the judge's acceptance of Manuel's change of plea is improper and irregular. may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense.Narratives (Berne Guerrero) That same day. shall be equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy. on the said date. The right against double jeopardy given to the accused in Section 2. On 21 February 1991. alleging therein. Rule 117 which states that "the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following instances: xxx (c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the Fiscal and of the offended party." However. Manuel could still be prosecuted under the original charge of violation of Section 16 of RA 6425 as amended because of the Constitutional Law II. The trial court need not wait for a guideline from the Office of the Prosecutor before it could act on the accused's motion to change plea. among other matters. However. Subsequently. and set the promulgation of decision on 30 January 1991. the law still permits the accused sufficient opportunity to change his plea thereafter. Judge Martin S. Also. that the Rules on Criminal Procedure does not fix a specific period within which an accused is allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense. Herein. or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. Rule 116 of the Rule of Court applies to the accused's change of plea in the preent case." Under the rule. with the consent of the offended party and the fiscal. Instead. Section 2 thereof. Forthwith. which provides that "The accused. the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense under the rule is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court. The prosecutor filed the petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged. On 20 February 1991. A conviction under this plea. as provided by Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. Manuel filed his Reply to Opposition with Leave of Court to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense. the more pertinent and applicable provision is that found in Section 7 (c). (2) the possibility of conviction of Manuel of the crime originally charged was high because of the strong evidence of the prosecution. and (3) the valuable time which the court and the prosecutor had expended would be put to waste. As soon as the fiscal has submitted his comment whether for or against the said motion. 2005 ( 25 ) . Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence in hand. is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. A reading of the disputed rulings in this case failed to disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence. issued an order directing Manuel to secure the consent of the prosecutor to the change of plea. Further. the prosecutor filed his Opposition to the Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense on the grounds that: (1) the prosecution already rested its case on 21 November 1990. Since this is not the situation here. Manuel filed his Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense. the Judge issued another order postponing the promulgation of decision to 25 February 1991 to give Manuel further opportunity to secure the consent of the prosecutor. In such situation. the prosecutor filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the same was denied in the order of 13 March 1991. on 25 February 1991. The consent of both the Fiscal and the offended party is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense. the Judge rendered a decision granting Manuel's motion. Manuel cannot claim this privilege. Issue: Whether the right against double jeopardy given to the accused in Section 2. Rule 116 is clear. jurisprudence has provided the trial court and the Office of the Prosecutor with a yardstick within which their discretion may be properly exercised. Manuel moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense after the prosecution had already rested its case. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. Ordinarily. Held: Plea bargaining in criminal cases. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge. On 18 February 1991. plea-bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the criminal proceedings. Villarama Jr. the Judge postponed the promulgation of the decision to 18 February 1991 to give Manuel another opportunity to secure the consent of the prosecutor. On said date. the provision of Section 2. it behooves the trial court to assiduously study the prosecution's evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused made his change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of the public will be served. Rule 116 of the Rule of Court applies in cases where both the fiscal and the offended party consent to the accused's change of plea.

On December 4. as corporate officers of El Oro Engravers Corporation. 1996.085. Criminal Case Q-91-17321 was raffled to Branch 105. Quezon City. a motion for leave to file and admit motion for reinvestigation. and no cogent reasons existed to alter. On 11 September 1990. and she pleaded not guilty to the information therein. the state. the trial court granted the motion and admitted the amended information. Petronilia filed the special civil action for certiorari with the Supreme Court. 2005 ( 26 ) . stating that the motion to withdraw information was made through palpable mistake. Branch 105 (Q-91-17321). Branch 33. Prosecutor Agcaoili filed with the Regional Trial Court. State Prosecutor (SP) Esteban A. Jr. Jr. amounting to P346. The trial court granted the motion in its order dated 13 December 1995. In the meantime. the Tupazes filed with the Regional Trial Court. Branch 86.46. Solano. Issue: Whether the reinstatement of the information in Criminal Case Q-91-17321 exposes Petronilia Tupaz Constitutional Law II. Branch 105. He considered the reinvestigation as terminated. Quezon City. Petronilia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration. Quezon City. Jr. amounting to P2. Quezon City. on 25 July 1993. However. granted the motion for withdrawal of the information in Criminal Case Q-91-17321 and dismissed the case. 1 October 1999] First Division. On 6 November 1991. i. Quezon City.000.. Fernandez stated that no new issues were raised in the request for reinvestigation. presided over by Judge Benedicto B.29. as the amendment was only on a matter of form. a motion for consolidation of Criminal Case Q-91-17322 with Criminal Case Q-91-17321 pending before the Regional Trial Court.e. then presided over by Judge Antonio P. Petronila C. SP Molon filed with the Regional Trial Court. filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC). Branch 105. On the same date. Tupaz. Branch 105. On 20 May 1996. On 24 September 1996. on 6 August 1996. He thought that Criminal Case Q-9117321 was identical to Criminal Case Q-90-12896. both accused posted bail bond in the sum of P1. On 25 September 991. 2 informations (Criminal Cases Q-91-17321 and Q-91-17322). Judge Solano denied the motion. Subsequently. Molon. Branch 105. to wit: on or about August 1984 or subsequently thereafter. More importantly. Jose J. granted the motion and ordered the information in Criminal Case Q-91-17321 reinstated. Quezon City. Quezon City. as prayed for by the prosecution. Quezon City. Q-91-17322 was raffled to Branch 86.879. Ulep [GR 127777. wherein Petronilia was charged with nonpayment of deficiency contractor’s tax. a motion to dismiss/quash information (Q-91-17322) for the reason that it was exactly the same as the information against the Tupazes pending before RTC. Tupaz. the prosecution filed with the Regional Trial Court.Narratives (Berne Guerrero) lack of consent of the Fiscal who also represents the offended party. Over the objections of Petronilia. Despite opposition of the accused. Tupaz filed with the Regional Trial Court. Tupaz and her husband Jose J. the MeTC dismissed the information for lack of jurisdiction. On 16 November 1990. an information against Petronila C. a motion to reinstate information in Criminal Case Q-91-17321. and was the result of excusable neglect. On 17 October 1994. on 11 November 1991. On 20 September 1994. a motion for leave to file amended information in Criminal Case Q91-17321 to allege expressly the date of the commission of the offense. Judge Ulep of Regional Trial Court. for their provisional liberty. On 5 September 1994. Branch 105. On 5 December 1995. Senior State Prosecutor Bernelito R. Branch 86. Quezon City. Quezon City. Prosecutor Agcaoili filed with the Regional Trial Court. the trial court's approval of his change of plea was irregular and improper. Branch 105. Branch 105. modify or reverse the findings of the investigating prosecutor. Quezon City. On 10 January 1991. Pardo (J): 3 concur Facts: On 8 June 1990.00 each.. a petition for reinvestigation. Petronilia filed with the Regional Trial Court. Ulep.369. On 15 May 1996. Petronilia was not re-arraigned on the amended information. died in Quezon City. in violation of Section 51 (b) in relation to Section 73 of the Tax Code of 1977. the trial court denied the motion. 396 Tupaz vs. and recommended the prompt arraignment and trial of the accused. on 2 March 1995. which Judge Ulep granted in an order dated 30 August 1994. the court granted the motion for consolidation. the trial court (Branch 105) arraigned Petronila Tupaz in Criminal Case Q-91-17321. the Regional Trial Court. the trial court denied the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration. On 28 May 1996. for nonpayment of deficiency corporate income tax for the year 1979. against Jose and Petronila Tupaz for the same alleged nonpayment of deficiency corporate income tax for the year 1979. Quezon City.

with leave of court. fairness and justice." The interest in the finality-of acquittal rule. a government owned and controlled corporation. such order amounts to an acquittal. a Demurrer to Evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. On the basis of humanity. After the prosecution rested its case. Consequently. the case was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Sandiganbayan [GR 140633. managed by Telin Development Corporation and owned by Gervel. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. is easy to Constitutional Law II. being then the Minister of Energy and Chairman of the Board and President of the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC). Bataan. Significantly. Philippines. the accused filed. Such consent must be expressed as to have no doubt as to the accused’s conformity. 2005 ( 27 ) . The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.032. reads: "That on or about and during the period from 1977 to 1986. in Metro Manila. and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion. there was a valid complaint filed against her to which she pleaded not guilty. This consent cannot be implied or presumed. Velasco filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was granted by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated 11 October 1999. once the court grants the demurrer. Contrary to law.. the said accused. thereby giving himself unwarranted benefits and causing undue injury to PNOC. to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount of P3. However. Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. in resolving the accused's demurrer to evidence. it was denied by the Sandiganbayan. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction. as amended." Upon arraignment. Philippines.00. the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the information against Petronilia in violation of her constitutionally protected right against double jeopardy. An accused is placed in double jeopardy if he is again tried for an offense for which he has been convicted. The court dismissed the case at the instance of the prosecution. As Petronilia’s consent was not expressly given. Consequently. Thus. the petition for certiorari.993. Held: The reinstatement of the information would expose Petronilia Tupaz to double jeopardy.032. Herein. for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 ("The AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act"). without asking for Petronilia’s consent. Hence. confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty. This constitutes an exception to the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion bars a plea of double jeopardy. and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. acquitted or in another manner in which the indictment against him was dismissed without his consent. did then and there deliberately and unlawfully. 4 February 2002] Third Division. an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. Sandoval-Gutierrez (J): 3 concur. a corporation wholly owned by said accused.993. Held: Under Section 23. then Minister of Energy. 397 People vs. the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or support a verdict of guilt.00 in the construction and maintenance of his own Telin Beach Resort located at Bagac. the trial court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence upon a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court. 1 abroad on official business Facts: The Information filed by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) against Geronimo Velasco. Issue: Whether the dismissal of a criminal case made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion bars a plea of double jeopardy. spend funds and utilize equipment and personnel of PNOC and its subsidiaries at a total cost to PNOC of P3. Philippine Currency. in evident bad faith and shameless abuse of his administrative official function and power as such Minister of Energy and PNOC President and Chairman of the Board. Velasco pleaded not guilty. as amended. Inc.Narratives (Berne Guerrero) to double jeopardy. the dismissal of the case must be regarded as final and with prejudice to the re-filing of the case.

will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding. the criminal justice system has built in a protection to insure that the innocent. the petitioner in such extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. Thus. Velasco filed his demurrer to evidence after the prosecution adduced its evidence and rested its case. the People was not deprived of its right to due process. The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction due to a violation of due process. 2005 ( 28 ) . Such is the magnitude of the accused's right against double jeopardy that even an appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of evidence by the trial court will not lie. With this right of repose. even those whose innocence rests upon a jury's leniency. Here. that the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case. Velasco's plea of double jeopardy must be upheld. Constitutional Law II." a desire to know the exact extent of one's liability.e. However. while certiorari may be resorted to cure an abusive acquittal..Narratives (Berne Guerrero) understand: it is a need for "repose. Obviously. i.