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Thomas Aquinas De Motu Cordis On the Motion of the Heart
Text, Translation, Supplemental Texts and Notes
§ (c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti
De Motu Cordis Quia omne quod movetur, necesse est habere motorem, dubitabile videtur quid moveat cor, et qualis motus eius sit. Non enim videtur eius motus esse ab anima. Ab anima enim nutritiva non movetur, animae enim nutritivae opera sunt generare, alimento uti, et augmentum et diminutio: quorum nullum motus cordis esse videtur. Et anima quidem nutritiva etiam plantis inest; motus autem cordis animalium proprius est. Neque sensitivae animae motus esse videtur, sed nec intellectivae, intellectus enim et sensus non movent nisi mediante appetitu: motus autem cordis involuntarius est. Sed neque naturalis esse videtur. Est enim ad contrarias partes: componitur enim ex pulsu et tractu; motus autem naturalis ad unam partem est, ut ignis sursum, et terrae deorsum. Dicere autem motum cordis esse violentum, est omnino extra rationem. Manifeste enim hoc motu subtracto, moritur animal, nullum autem violentum conservat naturam. Videtur quidem igitur hic motus maxime naturalis esse, vita enim animalis et hic motus se inseparabiliter consequuntur. Dicunt autem quidam hunc motum naturalem esse non ab aliqua particulari natura intrinseca animali, sed ab aliqua natura universali, vel etiam ab intelligentia. Sed hoc ridiculum apparet. In omnibus enim rebus naturalibus propriae passiones alicuius generis vel speciei aliquod principium intrinsecum consequuntur. Naturalia enim sunt quorum principium motus in ipsis est. Nihil autem est magis proprium animalibus quam motus cordis; quo cessante, perit eorum vita. Oportet igitur inesse ipsis animalibus aliquod principium huius motus.
On the Movement of the Heart 1. Since everything that moves must have a mover, what moves the heart, and what kind of motion it has is a matter for inquiry. 2. For it does not appear to be moved by the soul. For it is not moved by the nutritive soul, for the activities of the nutritive soul are generation, the use of food, and increase and decrease, none of which appear to have anything to do with the heart. For the nutritive soul exists even in plants; but the motion of the heart is proper to animals. 3. Nor does it appear to be moved by either the sensitive or intellective souls, for the mind and sense move only by means of desire: but the motion of the heart is involuntary. 4. But neither does it appear to be natural. For it goes in different directions: for it is composed of a push and a pull; but a natural motion goes in one direction, as fire only moves upward and earth downward. 5. Now to say that the motion of the heart is violent would be completely irrational. For it is obvious that when this motion is done away with the animal dies, since nothing violent preserves a nature. It therefore seems that this motion is indeed most natural to it, since the life of the animal and this motion inseparably follow one another.1 6. Now some say that this natural motion comes not from any particular nature intrinsic to the animal, but from some “universal” nature, or even from an [angelic] intelligence. But this seems ridiculous. For in every natural thing the proper passions of any genus or species follow upon some intrinsic principle. For natural things are those of which the principle of motion is in them. Now nothing is more proper to animals than the motion of the heart, upon the ceasing of which their life ends. There must, then, be some principle of this motion in animals.
That is to say, where there is life there is a heartbeat, and vice versa.
Adhuc, si aliqui motus corporibus inferioribus ex natura universali causentur, non semper eis adsunt: sicut in fluxu et refluxu maris apparet quod consequitur motum lunae, et secundum ipsum variatur. Motus autem cordis semper adest animali. Non igitur est ab aliqua causa separata tantum, sed a principio intrinseco.
7. What is more, if any such motion in lower bodies were caused by a universal nature [alone], this motion would not always be in them: as, for instance, is clear in the ebb and flow of the sea, which is a consequence of the moon’s motion, and varies according to it. But the motion of an animal’s heart is always in it. Therefore it is not from any separated cause alone, but from some intrinsic principle. 8. Others therefore say that the principle of this motion in animals is heat itself, which being generated by spirit moves the heart. But this is irrational. For that which is most principal in a thing must be the cause. Now the most principal thing in an animal, and more contemporaneous with life, seems to be the motion of the heart rather than any alteration involving heat. Therefore an alteration involving heat is not the cause of the heart’s motion; rather the heart’s motion is the cause of such an alteration as involving heat. And so the Philosopher in On the Movement of Animals (ch. 10, 703a 24-25) says: “what is about to initiate movement, not by alteration, is of this kind”. 9. Again, a perfect animal, which is one that moves itself, most approaches to a likeness of the whole universe: and so man, who is the most perfect of animals, is by some called a “microcosm”.2 Now in the universe the first motion is local motion, which is the cause of alteration as well as the other motions, for which reason even in animals the principle of alteration appears to be local motion. And so the Philosopher in the eighth book of the Physics (ch. 1, 250 b 14-15), pursuing this resemblance, says that motion is “like a kind of ‘life’ existing in all things”.3
Dicunt igitur alii principium huius motus in animali esse ipsum calorem, qui per spiritus generatos movet cor. Sed hoc irrationabile est. Illud enim quod est principalius in aliqua re, oportet esse causam. Principalius autem videtur esse in animali motus cordis et magis contemporaneum vitae, quam quaecumque alteratio secundum calorem. Non igitur alteratio secundum calorem est causa motus cordis, sed magis e converso motus cordis est causa alterationis secundum calorem. Unde et Aristoteles dicit in Lib. de motu Anim.: oportet quod futurum est movere, non alteratione tale esse.
Item animal perfectum, quod est movens seipsum, maxime accedit ad similitudinem totius universi: unde et homo qui est perfectissimum animalium, dicitur a quibusdam minor mundus. In universo autem primus motus est motus localis, qui est causa alterationis et aliorum motuum. Unde et in animali magis videtur motus localis esse alterationis principium, quam e converso. Unde et Aristoteles in octavo Physic., hanc similitudinem sequens, dicit quod motus est ut vita quaedam natura existentibus omnibus.
For further remarks on this comparison, see the supplemental texts given below. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 18, art. 1. obj. 1, ad 1 (tr. Alfred J. Freddoso): Objection 1: In Physics 8 the Philosopher says that motion is, as it were, a sort of life in all things that exist by nature. But all natural things participate in motion. Therefore, all natural things participate in life. <…> Reply to objection 1: This passage from the Philosopher can be understood to apply either to the first motion, viz., the movement of the celestial bodies, or to motion in general. And in both senses motion is said to be like the life of natural bodies according to a certain likeness and not properly speaking. For the motion of the celestial bodies in the universe of corporeal natures is like the motion of the heart by which life is conserved in an animal. Similarly, every natural motion is, as it were, a certain likeness of a vital operation in natural things. Hence, if the whole corporeal universe were a single animal, so that (as some have claimed) its motion were from an intrinsic mover, then it would follow that its motion is the life of all natural bodies.
4 But the first motion of an animal is the motion of the heart. but] we say that whatever things have a principle of motion in themselves are moving by nature. Whence the animal as a whole by nature. 4 That is to say. e. Motus autem secundum locum in animalibus causatur ex appetitu et apprehensione sensitiva vel intellectiva. One must therefore accept as the principle of this inquiry that. natura movetur. haec natura dicimus moveri. it is indeed a motion that is natural to the entire animal and its body. Differt enim secundum qualem motum quod movetur eveniat. [Quod enim ipsum a seipso movetur. sed oportet ei assignare causam quae per se possit esse principium motus localis.Adhuc. sicut Aristoteles dicit in octavo Physic. but it is nevertheless not natural to a heavy body. Now in animals. corpus tamen eius contingit et natura et extra naturam moveri. this motion is indeed natural to the animal since it comes from an intrinsic principle which is the soul. as the Philosopher teaches in the third book of the De Anima (433a 9-b 30). For an animal moves itself by itself. quod calor sit principium motus cordis.] But when an animal moves upward. But to act intentionally and not by nature belongs solely to man. but to move something in place per accidens. est quidem naturalis motus animali. For St.B. quidem est motus eius naturalis et toti animali et corpori. ut Aristoteles docet in tertio de anima. Principium igitur huius considerationis hinc oportet accipere quod. quia est a principio intrinseco ipsius quod est anima. Ridiculum igitur est dicere. non tamen est naturale corpori gravi. “[a thing which is moving by itself is moving by nature. et ex quali elemento constet. 254b 16-20). 12. 7. For it makes a difference what sort of motion what is moving chances [to have] and from what sort of elements it is constituted. sed a natura: naturaliter enim et hirundo facit nidum et aranea telam. Ia. Cum autem animal movetur sursum. 3. eo quod in corpore animalis elementum grave praedominatur. What is more. q. Thomas. In aliis quidem animalibus totus processus motus naturalis est: non enim agunt a proposito.g. It is therefore ridiculous to say that “heat is the principle of the motion of the heart. the entire process of motion is natural: for they do not act by intention but from nature: for a swallow builds its nest naturally and a spider a web. but heat does not move locally except accidentally: for it belongs to heat to alter per se. each of the animals. as Aristotle says in the eighth book of the Physics (ch. quod est per se. In other animals. ut quodlibet animalium. the nature of which is to move down. and so in [undergoing] this kind of motion the animal tires out more. Unde animal quidem totum natura ipsum seipsum movet. to be sure. since in the body of an animal the heavier elements predominate [. motion according to place is caused by desire and by a sensitive or intellective apprehension. et non a natura. 11. cf. Cum enim animal movetur deorsum. Glen Coughlin) For when an animal moves itself downward. the essential comes before the accidental. art. what is per se is prior to what is per accidens. calor autem non movet localiter nisi per accidens: per se enim caloris est alterare. 70.” rather one must assign a per se cause which can be an intrinsic cause of motion in place. per accidens autem movere secundum locum..” (tr. nevertheless its body can be moving both by nature and beside nature. N. the motion of the heavens comes from a conjoined mover. Movetur enim animal a seispso. 10.] quorumcumque principium motus in seipsis est. Primus autem motus animalis est motus cordis. prius est eo quod est per accidens. 4 . unde et magis fatigatur animal in hoc motu. Solius autem hominis est a proposito operari. moves itself by itself.
viii. nihil prohibet et alias formas alios motus naturales sequi. as the Philosopher states (Phys. prima tamen principia indemonstrabilia sunt ei naturaliter nota. ut probat Aristoteles in Lib. Likewise in the case of desire. Thomas Aquinas. So also in bodily movements the principle is according to nature. which follows from the union of soul and body. qui est felicitas.’ For which reason Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius. Nevertheless. and to flee from misery. still. the first indemonstrable principles are known to him naturally. Oportet autem considerare quod motus sursum est naturalis igni eo quod consequitur formam eius: unde et generans. whence all other things are derived: thus from the knowledge of principles that are naturally known. ut dicitur in secundo Physic. excerpts of which are given below. Now we must consider that upward motion is natural to fire as a consequence of its form: and so the generator. and from volition of the end naturally desired. from which he proceeds in order to know other things. 13. 703a —703b 2). St. which is happiness.6 Thus inasmuch as an animal has such a Sic igitur et cum motus omnium aliorum membrorum causentur ex motu cordis. and not according to the will: for like a proper accident. appetere ultimum finem. that which is according to nature stands first. Hom. the principle of any of his own activities is natural. q. Now just as any natural motion follows the form of the element. xxii] says that. ex quibus ad alia scienda procedit. but the first motion which is of the heart. is derived the choice of the means. is its per se mover in place. 17. 200a 1524). Sicut autem formam elementi consequitur aliquis motus naturalis. to desire the last end. in the same way other natural motions follow upon other forms. motus quidem alii possunt esse voluntarii. Sic igitur et animal inquantum habet talem formam quae est 5 Cf. Summa Theol. sed primus motus qui est cordis. et fugere miseriam. Thus the movement of heavy and light things results from their substantial form: for which reason they are said to be moved by their generator. as the Philosopher proves in On the Movement of Animals (ch. is derived knowledge of the conclusions. Now the principle of bodily movements begins with the movement of the heart. Consequently the movement of the heart is according to nature. 6 Cf.Sed tamen cuiuslibet suae operationis principium naturale est. 5 . is natural. English Dominican Fathers): Reply to Objection 2: In things pertaining to intellect and will. art. which motion is nevertheless not natural to it according to its character of being heavy or light. but discovers them by reasoning. Similiter ex parte appetitus. Thomas’s opusculum. just as the movement of generation and nutrition does not obey reason. Anim. est homini naturale. Wherefore this movement is called ‘vital. ut principium indemonstrabile in intellectualibus. the other motions can indeed by voluntary. For although he does not naturally know the conclusions of the speculative and practical sciences. De operationibus occultis naturae. 10. sed ex appetitu ultimi finis procedit in appetitum aliorum: sic enim est finis in appetibilibus. ad 2 (tr. Videmus enim quod ferrum naturaliter movetur ad magnetem. Quamvis enim conclusiones scientiarum speculativarum et practicarum non naturaliter sciat.15. By the pulse he means the movement of the heart which is indicated by the pulse veins.. quod dat formam.5 And so therefore since the motion of all the other members of the body is caused by the motion of the heart. so neither does the pulse which is a vital movement. but to desire other things is not natural but proceeds from the desire for his last end to the desire for other things: for in this way the end in desirable things is like an indemonstrable principle in intellectual things. De Nat. which gives the form. sed ratiocinando inveniat. 4). For we observe that iron is naturally moved toward the magnet. St. est per se movens secundum locum. Ia-IIae. 9. but insofar as it has such a form. is natural to man. sed secundum quod habet talem formam. it results from life. qui tamen motus non est ei naturalis secundum rationem gravis et levis.. est naturalis. as the Philosopher says in the second book of the Physics (ch. de Mot. sed appetere alia non est naturale.
namely. In civitate enim quando semel stabilitus fuerit ordo. nihil opus est separato monarcho quem oporteat adesse per singula eorum quae fiunt. John Y. inasmuch as it gives the form which is the principle of motion. nothing prevents it from having a natural motion. which is above. For every property and motion follows on some form according to its condition. scilicet inquantum est principium motus. et principaliter cordis. no action is performed by an individual agent that is truly separate from the monarchical rule. The motion of the heart is therefore natural as following upon the soul. Sed tamen necesse est motum cordis a motu 7 “Noblest”—that is. sed in quodam principio corporis existente alia quidem vivere. insofar. inasmuch as they held the soul to be from an intelligence. Sic igitur motus cordis est naturalis quasi consequens animam. For once a stable order exists in a city. sed ipse quilibet facit quae ipsius ut ordinatum est. eo quod adnata sunt. qui est sursum. seeing that. 4. 14. And so the motion following upon it is most similar to the motion of the heavens: for the motion of the heart in an animal is like the motion of the heavens in the world. 16. I take the position that the natural motion of an animal is that of the heart. 10. for example fire. but rather existing in a certain principal part of the body. and the mover [which gives it] its form gives it this motion. et movens hunc motum est quod dat formam. et fit hoc post hoc propter consuetudinem. sicut formam nobilissimi elementi.. Hood) 15. But the motion of the heart necessarily falls Forma autem nobilissima in inferioribus est anima. Now the noblest form in lower things is the soul. Omnis autem proprietas et motus consequitur aliquam formam secundum conditionem ipsius. as the Philosopher says in his book On the Movement of Animals (ch. Et forte secundum hunc intellectum aliqui dixerunt motum cordis esse ab intelligentia. de motu Anim. inquantum posuerunt animam ab intelligentia esse. just as upon the form of the noblest 7 element.anima. nihil prohibet habere aliquem motum naturalem. ut Aristoteles dicit in Lib. Unde et motus ipsam consequens simillimus est motui caeli: sic enim est motus cordis in animali. Now in animals this comes about by nature: and since each one is naturally constituted to perform its proper work. the motion of heavy and light things comes from that which generates them. follows motion to the noblest place. and principally of the heart. And perhaps in accordance with this understanding of the matter some have said that the motion of the heart is caused by an [angelic] intelligence. 6 . just as Aristotle says in the eighth book of the Physics (ch. form which is the soul. Dico autem motum naturalem animalis eum qui est cordis: quia. facere autem proprium opus propter naturam. existimandum est constare animal quemadmodum civitatem bene legibus rectam. the other parts live indeed because they are naturally adapted to perform their proper work according to nature. inasmuch as it is the form of such a body. 703a29-b2). ut nihil opus sit in unoquoque esse animam. In animalibus autem idem hoc propter naturam fit: et quia natum est unumquodque sic constantium facere proprium opus. which most approaches to a likeness to the principle of the motion of the heavens. sicut Aristoteles dicit motum gravium et levium esse a generante. sicut motus caeli in mundo. as it is a principle of motion. so to speak. that which has “the highest rank”. “In a sense. 256a1). inquantum dat formam quae est principium motus. but everything is done by custom and in accord with due order. B. so that there is no need for a soul to be in each one. puta ignis. an animal can be compared to a city governed by good laws. inquantum est forma talis corporis.” (tr. consequitur motus ad locum nobilissimum. quae maxime accedit ad similitudinem principii motus caeli.
there must be a fixed point of immobility as its ‘center’. Omnia autem pulsu et tractu moventur.) It is to be understood. and. et hoc competit ei inquantum est principium omnium motuum mundi: accessu enim et recessu corpus caeleste imponit rebus principium et finem essendi. tr. “However. Unde ad hoc quod cor esset principium et finis omnium motuum. n. B. 8 Sc. in short” he briefly states his view on the organ of local motion. and while the arm moves the shoulder is still. Est autem motus caeli circularis et continuus. the entire passage from the Commentary on the De Anima excerpted above. Thus the first organ of local motion in animals 7 .. the motionless and the moved. for the drawing power draws something back to itself. proceeding in a circle. as term. Conway & Larcher. and having a swelling out at the starting point and a concavity at the end. as in a wheel. so is the pole in a way to a circle on a spherical surface. which are not always [occurring]. et ad hoc terminari. He says that the primary organic motive-principle must be such that the movement starts and finishes in the same point. then. O. propter quod oportet sicut in circulo manere aliquid et hinc incipere motum. et sua continuitate conservat ordinem in motibus. be motionless. as it were. § 833. composed from a pull and a push. Next. to take the obvious point of comparison. it must. unde Aristoteles dicit in tertio de Anim.A. habet quemdam motum non quidem circularem sed similem circulari. and terminate there. n. Anim. “for a body revolving in a circle is kept as a whole in the same place by the immobility of the centre and the poles” (St. and this is appropriate to it inasmuch as it is the principle of every motion of the world: for the approach and withdrawal of a celestial body imposes upon things the beginning and end of their existence. 11. granted that this primary organ is both the starting point and term of movement. for instance. 832-835: § 832.. For the contractual movement draws the organ into concavity. However.caeli deficere sicut et principiatum deficit a principio. 661a 13-14) says that “the motion involved in pleasure and pain and all other sensations seem to begin there.” And so in order for the heart to be the principle and end of every motion that exists in the animal. though distinct in thought. and so the Philosopher says in the third book of the De Anima (433b 20-25) “what moves instrumentally is found wherever a beginning and an end coincide” [. in the heart. Book III. Now.M. as with a fulcrum.P. if we desire to apply it to the fixed stars. Now the motion of the heavens is circular and continuous. qui non sunt semper. as with the pivots of the axle of a wagon wheel. For in any movement the starting point itself does not move. all movement must proceed from the motionless. Thomas Aquinas. Now the motion of the heart is the principle of all the motions that are in an animal. as in a ball and socket joint]. that for motion to take place. scilicet in corde. as starting point. just as what is from a principle falls short of the principle. and both these at once. In impulsion the motive force comes from the starting point.P.—as. in movement. And that the organ is both starting point and term (and therefore both motionless and moved) is clear from the fact that all animal movements consist of impulsions and retractions. Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima translated by Kenelm Foster. namely.” (St. as with the poles of the axis of the celestial sphere. and by its continuity preserves the order in motions. and from that point motion begins. on account of which there must be something remaining stationary. lect. But in retraction the motive force comes from the term. unde Aristoteles dicit in tertio de Part. In II De Caelo. quod movens organice est ubi est principium et finis idem. for the impelling agent thrusts itself forward against what is impelled. Cf. but similar to the circular—one. compositum scilicet ex tractu et pulsu. or. But “all things are moved by a push and a pull. O. Thomas Aquinas.”8 Motus autem cordis principium quidem est omnium motuum qui sunt in animali. § 834. short of the motion of the heavens. and so the Philosopher in the third book of On the Parts of Animals (ch. follows a swelling out of the organ. while the expansive impulse. 400. namely. it has a certain motion not in fact circular. rev. quod motus delectabilium et tristium et totaliter om-nis sensus hinc incipientes videntur. at ‘Now. 4. lectio 15. these two factors in the organ. then we must take the word “center” as meaning the “pole” since. nn. whence movement begins. & Sylvester Humphries. while the hand is moving the arm is still. just as the center is to a circle on a plane surface. are substantially and spatially inseparable. 835). 17.
but the motion of the heart varies according to diverse appre- Motus autem progressivus animalis causatur per operationem sensus et appetitus. 19. inasmuch as it falls short of the simplicity of circular motion. except inasmuch it is necessary for a pause to intervene between the push and the pull. Now the progressive motion of an animal is caused by an operation of sense and desire. Neque etiam oportet quod causetur ex apprehensione et appetitu. 415b13): but the being of each thing is from its proper form. even though it be caused by the sensitive soul. inquantum deficit a simplicitate motus circularis. motus autem cordis variatur secundum diversas apprehensiones et affectiones animae. § 835. naming ‘vital’ those which accompany the motion of the heart.Est etiam motus iste continuus durante vita animalis. and not only in thought. Hoc autem differt inter animam et principium motus caeli. though it not be moved per se.: esse autem unicuique est a propria forma. quem tamen imitatur inquantum est ab eodem in idem. quod illud principium non movetur neque per se neque per accidens. be-cause circular motion in some way is like this. For we are not saying that the motion of the heart is natural to the heart inasmuch as it is heavy or light. which it nevertheless imitates inasmuch as it returns to the same point it started from. by reason of which it falls short of circular motion. And thus it is not inappropriate if in some way it goes in different directions. but the sensitive soul. Unde motus caeli semper est uniformis. Thus it is. in a sense. In thought it may move as a whole. ut dicitur in secundo de Anim. 8 . and the two motions that appear to be contrary are like the parts of one motion composed from both. non enim causatur ab anima sensitiva per operationem suam. Based on this. we can easily dispose of the objections to the contrary. Nor is it necessary that it be caused by apprehension and desire. anima autem sensitiva etsi non moveatur per se. sed inquantum est animatum tali anima. And so it is with the heart: it remains fixed in the same part of the body while it dilates and contracts and so gives rise to movements of impulsion and retraction. So then there must be in it something that stays still and yet initiates motion. et quod animalibus cessantibus remanent vitales. quia et motus circularis aliqualiter sic est. For “in living things. both motionless and moving. Per hoc igitur de facili solvuntur quae in contrarium obiici possunt. for it is not caused by the sensitive soul by its own activity. et propter hoc medici distinguunt operationes vitales ab operationibus animalibus. And they do so with good reason. but inas-much as it is animated by a soul of this sort. is nevertheless moved per accidens: and so there arise in it diverse apprehensions and sensations. And in this it resembles circular movement: for a body revolving in a circle is kept as a whole in the same place by the immobility of the centre and the poles. In reality it keeps to one place. And this motion continues throughout the life of the animal. Non enim affec- must be at once both a starting point and a term. Neque enim dicimus motum cordis esse naturalem cordi inquantum est grave vel leve. Now the soul and the principle of the motion of the heavens differ in this. But its parts are changing their places really.” as is said in the second book of the De Anima (ch. et duo motus qui videntur contrarii sunt quasi partes unius motus compositi ex utroque. nisi inquantum necesse est intercidere morulam mediam inter pulsum et tractum. 7. vitalia appellantes quae motum cordis concomitantur. Et hoc rationabiliter. And so the motion of the heavens is always uniform. movetur tamen per accidens: unde proveniunt in ipsa diversae apprehensiones et affectiones. to live is to be. quamvis causetur ab anima sensitiva. and they say that even when animal activities cease the vital ones remain. but not in reality. and on this account medical men distinguish vital activities from animal activities. sed inquantum est forma et natura talis corporis. Et sic non est inconveniens si quodammodo sit ad diversas partes. but inasmuch as it is the form and nature of such a body. 18. Vivere enim viventibus est esse. 20. eo quod deficiat a motu circulari. that the latter principle is moved neither per se nor per accidens.
Non igitur propter hoc aliquis appetit vindictam quia sanguis accenditur circa cor. pity and so forth. Quamvis autem aliqua variatio accidat in motu cordis ex apprehensione diversa et affectione. ut probatur in secundo Physic. materiale autem quod pertinet ad alterationem cordis. when he says ‘Now all the soul’s. confidence. scilicet quod sit appetitus vindictae. what is formal is on the part of the sensation. n. Next. not the soul alone. that “oftentimes upon something appearing. in anger. quod est ex parte affectionis. 10.. Now although some variation occur in the motion of the heart from different apprehendsions and sensations. but material which pertains to the alteration of the heart.’ he draws out what had been presupposed above. Saying this he refers to the subject or material cause of the passion. must exist in matter. utputa in ira. Commentary on the De Anima. 9 Cf. the latter pertains to the body as well as the soul. meekness. even when there is no danger present. fear. (1) We sometimes see a man beset by obvious and severe afflictions without being provoked or frightened. for example that there be a boiling of blood around the heart. if the bodily constitution has this effect on the passions. but in matter there is a disposition for the form. namely. This is why ‘such terms.e. Obviously then.e. the definitions of these passions. i. And this he shows by one argument in two parts. and ‘existing for’ to the final cause. but one is angered from a desire for vengeance.9 Now in natural things the form is not for the sake of the matter. such as anger. since it is necessary for the animal to be altered by a natural alteration. quia non fit per imperium voluntatis. Whenever the physical constitution of the body contributes to a vital activity. For Aristotle says in the book On the Cause of the Motion of Animals (ch. Dicit enim Aristoteles in Lib. 22: § 22. which runs as follows. hensions and sensations of the soul. Non autem in rebus naturalibus forma est propter materiam. utpote quod sit accensio sanguinis circa cor. sed in materia est dispositio ad formam. formale est.” and he assigns the cause of this. but rather they cause them. unde in passionibus animae. but the other way around. sed e converso. Therefore someone desires vengeance not because blood boils around his heart. for instance melancholy people. nevertheless this variation of motion is not voluntary because it does not come about through the command of the will. whereas ‘proceeding from’ refers to the efficient cause. for example. passions arising that resemble one such ‘modification’ of the soul. are not to be predicated without reference to matter. sed potius causant eas. 9 . the heart and private parts are moved. whereas when he is already excited by violent passions arising from his bodily disposition. sed involuntaria. quod multoties apparente aliquo. 21. let it be called a movement ‘of some body’ such as the heart. that it be a desire for revenge. but by this one is disposed toward anger. are often timid when there is no real cause to be. or ‘of some part or power’ of the body. For the sensations of the soul are not caused by alterations of the heart. and so in passions of the soul. op. lectio 2.. as is clear in the second book of the Physics. and not by the intellect commanding. hence all these ‘modifications’ would seem to belong partly to the body. namely that certain modifications affect soul and body together. cit.’ i. simply as a result of their physical state. (2) At ‘This is still more evident:’ what makes this point even clearer is that we see in some people. non tamen iubente intellectu. he is disturbed by mere trifles and behaves as though he were really angry.tiones animae causantur ab alterationibus cordis. irascitur autem ex appetitu vindictae. And to show that the physical constitution plays a part in them he uses two arguments. non tamen ista variatio motus est voluntaria. the latter must be ‘material principles’. de causa Mot. so that if anger is being defined.. but this happens in the case of all the ‘modifications’ of the soul. 1121). movetur cor et pudendum. 703b 7-8. Anim. et huius causam assignat quoniam necesse est alterari naturali alteratione animalia. sed ex hoc aliquis est dispositus ad iram.
alteratione incidente fiunt. by reason of which the heart is heated or cooled. of the heart and private parts. and as a consequence it is the reason for the unity whereby a given thing is one. 2. haec quidem augeri. ut iam moveantur et permutentur natis haberi permutationibus invicem. anger and the like. idest cordis et pudendi. such as concupiscence. Therefore. it must be said that it is united to the body immediately. Now. Q. but another suffer decrease. Wellmuth (Milwaukee. Fitzpatrick and John J. ut concupiscentiae. is the form of the body. And let these things said about the motion ficiant. 1949). caused by the blood.alteratis autem partibus. For every form. § N. Disputed Questions on Spiritual Creatures. In consequence of the fact that the soul. cf. whether from without or occurring naturally within. For if the rational soul is united to the body only through virtual contact. so it cannot be said that there is any other medium uniting a form to matter or to a subject. Et haec de motu cordis ad praesens dicta suf. as some have asserted. and more so between the soul and prime matter. whether substantial or accidental. For an additional witness on the movement of the heart. such that they are immediately moved and changed by the influences they are naturally apt to have upon each other. whereby the heart is dilated and contracted. (excerpt): It must be said that the truth of this question depends to some extent on the preceding one. art. each individual thing is actually a being through a form. whether in the case of actual substantial being or in the case of actual accidental being. and also moves the body through the spirit.” Perhaps then our text ought to read: “and also moves the heart and the spirit. But in consequence of the fact that it is a mover.B. De An. come about by an incidental alteration.. Now the causes of the motions [are] warmth and coldness. (9 ad 13): “It must be said that the heart is the primary instrument by means of which the soul moves the other parts of the body.. c. is united to matter or to a subject. ad 7: “although the same effect is partly produced by the dissolution. For each individual thing is one on the same basis on which it is a being.e. i. one part will grow larger. irae et huiusmodi. For the mind and the imagination are productive of the passions. [of those] at any rate produced against reason. from this point of view nothing prevents our asserting many media there: for obviously the soul moves the other members of the body through the heart. nothing would prevent us from saying that there are many intermediates between the soul and the body. there cannot be any medium between the soul and the body.23. like a mover. Et praeter rationem utique facti motus dictarum partium. just as we cannot say that there is any other medium whereby matter has actual being through its own form. of those humors.” (emphasis added) § 10 . and therefore through it as a medium the soul is united to the other parts of the body as mover”. Causae autem motuum caliditas et frigiditas. then. but upon the parts being altered. quae de foris et intus existentes naturales. 22. But if it be asserted that the soul is united to the body as a form.7 7 Cf. And hence every form is an act. And motions of the aforesaid parts. ex quibus cor calescit et infrigidatur. of the heart suffice for the present. Thomas Aquinas. St. Intellectus enim et phantasia factiva passionum afferunt. haec autem detrimentum pati. translated by Mary C. ibid.
XVI. vol.P. p.. but Eschmann prefers 1270/1. Thomas Aquinas. The Aristotelian references are to the Greek text. 1956. Rome. ed. p. It is hoped the following outline will be helpful: * Immaculate Heart College. 358. II. I have numbered the paragraphs. New York. a P. Thomas’ works” in E. 104. Parma edition. this has not been established by Mandonnet. Thomas d’Aquin. Turin. Eschmann. ed. [ 22 ] PART I I.a The letter is addressed to a Master Philip. Opuscula Philosophica. Munster. Vives edition. vol.P. Med. Opera Omnia. ed. the Platonic ones to the Greek text. Opuscula Omnia. The opusculumd is found in the following editions of Thomas’ works: Opera Omnia. b but. The present translation has been made from the Marietti text edited by R. 347-348. 1570-71. 1889. The Christian Philosophy of St. vol. Aristotelis opera.St. 165. Oxford. M. ed. Opuscula Omnia. Paris. Immanuel Bekker. Grabmann. c I. b Opuscula omnia. Hist. I. O. d For a summary of the contents of this work.P. 1852-73. vol. vol. 28. p.e Because the argument of this opusculum is not easy to follow. 1927. Spiazzi. O. Ottawa. which is here translated. c We conclude that nothing definite is known about Master Philip. John Burnet. Thomas von Aquin . 508. M. Marietti edition. pp. Los Angeles.. p. ed. 1899-1906. Des écrits authentiques de St. Die Werke des hl. Platonis opera. xxv. Thomas Aquinas on the Movement of the Heart VINCENT R. LARKIN* Introduction The letter De Motu Cordis. e The translation of Thomas in the footnotes were made from the Summa theologiae. vol. 1888-1906. 1949. I. I. Piana edition. O. 12. 1941 and from Summa contra gentiles in Opera Omnia. p. a penultimate assessment. xxvi. Ed. p. 141-143. 1954. Perrier. 1927. 419. 18. Paris. Mandonnet sets the date of composition at 1273. 1957. Parma. 62. Mandonnet says he was a professor of medicine in Bologna and afterwards in Naples. Paris. p.. XVII. 1910. see Walter Pagel. is regarded as an authentic work of Thomas Aquinas by Mandonnet and Grabmann. Mandonnet. THE PROBLEM The Movement of the Heart 11 . Mandonnet. T. Gilson. Rome. 24. 1831. as Eschmann observes. pp. Berlin. n. “A Catalogue of St. XVII. 1949. Rome.. p. Fribourg. Opera Omnia.” J. “The philosophy of circles—Cesalpino—Harvey.
Summa theologiae. art. Aristotle. What is its origin? (par. 3 The heart is not moved by the nutritive soul. Bk. vol. 4. 10) As to nature Heart movement is not natural because it is A. 2 Aquinas. 2. 1) II. 12 . ibid. c. heat (par. 918b: “Man’s life consists in a certain movement which flows from the heart to the other parts of the body. 37. 5) Refutation (par. Aristotle says in De anima. 896 a 1-2. 22) C. 1) B. VII. Also Aquinas.” 3 Plato defines the soul as the self-moving source of motion in Laws. I. 19. vol. vol. HEART MOVEMENT CONSIDERED IN ITSELF Cardiac cycle consists of a push and a pull with a rest period in between (par. 8) Refutation (par.A. p. q. Physics. Bk. ch. 27) TEXT 1. What is its nature? (par. 406 a 2 that the soul is not self-moving.. Because everything that is moved must have a mover. though it is the principle of living things. Now its movement does not seem to proceed from the soul. ch. 1. in opposite directions (par. q. Bk. 4) Refutation (par. p. II. Pars I. 9. 3) B.. 17) PART II I. His definition of the soul as the first act of a physically organized body having life in potency is found in De anima. 15. V. 23) nor 3) the intellectual soul (par. ch. vol. 4) Refutation (par. 22) B. 13 b. 412 a 27. 1 we can pose the problem: what is it that moves the heart and what is the nature of its movement?2 2. 412 b 5. 1 III. 3. II. 20) HEART MOVEMENT CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO EMOTION Emotions cause modification of cardiac rhythm (par. 2) nor 2) the sensitive soul (par. not the soul: neither 1) the nutritive soul (par. 16. 3. I. an intelligence (par. vol. Pars I-II. X. Bk. 4) SOLUTION As to origin The principle of heart movement is the soul As to nature Heart movement is natural because the soul is the form of the body (par. art. II. for the functions of the nutritive Cf. violent (par. OPINIONS As to origin The principle of heart movement is A. I. 1. 25. 3) Refutation (par. 241 b 24. I. vol. I.
6 For the various meanings of the word “natural” in Aquinas. 5 Aristotle. The voluntary and the natural have this in common. Pars I-II. or from an intelligence. as well as to the natural. Bk. 1. IV. which take place under compulsion or owing to ignorance. Thomas says. an immaterial substance. Bk. growth.” 8 I. and the desiring part. Fascicle IV. But some say that this natural movement flows not from some determinate nature within the animal. is characteristic of animals. but in the intellect only. which we call angels. 435 c 5 and in Phaedrus. since it goes now in this direction. now in that. 491 b: “In some works translated from Arabic. vol. vide: Deferarri and Barry. the striving part. None of these seems to account for the movement of the heart. art. vol. A lexicon of St. q.. vide: loc. He identifies them in Republic. Nicomachean ethics. however. whereas natural movement extends in one direction. Thomas Aquinas. But nothing is more characteristic of animals than the movement of the heart. Bk.8 6. vol. In all natural things the attributes characteristic of any genus or species depend on some intrinsic principle. III. The soul is found also in plants. as we observe in the case of the ebb and flow of the sea which depend on the movement of the moon and vary in accord with it. Indeed. nonvoluntary.” For Aristotle’s distinction between voluntary. the nutritive. involuntary and violent. art.[23-24] soul4 are reproduction. IV. for when it ceases. 439 d 5. that each proceeds from an intrinsic principle. It follows then that a principle of this motion resides in animals themselves. It is. the sensitive. namely. for the life of the animal and this movement are inseparably related to one another. 5. Aristotle recognizes three kinds of soul. if some movements were produced in earthly bodies by a universal nature. ch. II. 3. they would not remain always in them. whereas nothing that is contrary to a thing’s nature preserves it. p. I. I. p. but the violent proceeds from an extrinsic principle. and decay. 756 b: “Violence is directly opposed to the voluntary. their life perishes. are called intelligences. p. vol. 79. The movement does not seem to belong to either the sensitive or the intellectual soul because the intellect and the senses move only by means of desire. it appears that this movement is entirely natural.” The medical opinion referred to in Thomas’ De motu cordis depends perhaps on the philosophical doctrine of Avicenna. 439 d 8 & 439 e 3 as the rational part. 6. the animal ceases or dies. nutrition. q. as fire tends only upwards and earth downwards. ibid. Bk. But the movement of the heart Plato speaks of three parts or functions of the soul in Republic. 65. however. IV. II. 7. the movement of the heart. 5. Further. vol. Baltimore. completely unreasonable to say that the movement of the heart is a violent 7 one.. 1949. p. 724. I. cit. Pars I. perhaps because such substances are always exercising the act of understanding. and the rational in the Nicomachean ethics. 1110 a 1: “Those things are thought involuntary. II. vol.5 4. c. but from some universal nature. art. for it is plain that when this movement ceases. Pars I.” 4 13 . This movement does not seem to be a natural 6 one either. 1109 b 35. 399 b: “Avicenna and certain others did not hold that the forms of corporeal things subsist essentially in matter. II. But this is ridiculous. while the movement of the heart is involuntary. 13. vol. ch. the separate substances. for it consists of a push and a pull. 10 c. 7 Summa theologiae. q. 246 a 6—257 a 2. 4.e. The use of the word ‘intelligence’ is explained in Summa theologiae. Those things are natural whose principle of movement resides in them.
Hence an animal as a whole moves itself in a natural way. is called by some a world in miniature. ch. 91. not such and such an alteration. ch. Physics.” For when an animal is moved downwards. II. who is the most perfect of animals. The Movement of Animals:9 “Movement must come first. however. 10 9 [25-26] from its intrinsic principle. Therefore let us take as the principle of our contemplation what the Philosopher says in the eighth book of the Physics. 703 a 2 24-25.. resembles most of all the entire universe. I. Now the movement of the heart seems to be prior in the animal and more closely related to life than any alteration in heat. I. vol. 7. It depends on the nature of the movement and the nature of the elements of which the body is composed. ch. its movement is natural both to the whole animal and to its body by the fact that in the body of the animal the heavy element. Bk. that which exists essentially is prior to that which exists accidentally.13 “We say that those things that have a principle of movement within them are moved naturally. Local movement in animals is caused by desire and by sensitive or intellectual cognizance. XII. 153. hence in this movement the animal becomes more tired. Democritus. Summa theologiae. Hence the Philosopher says in his book. ch. but it is not natural to a heavy body. Bk. 1956. 1 c.” 9. which is the soul. moves the heart. vol.. But this is unreasonable. fragment 34. The movement of animals. ch. Further. which is one that moves itself. Hence the Philosopher. pursuing this analogy. VIII. I. 12. vol. the movement is natural to the animal because it proceeds Aristotle. Hence man. 1073 a 12. a kind of life that is naturally present in everything that exists. Also Aristotle. 13 Ibid. vol. H. Bk. Pars I. as the Philosopher teaches in the third book of the De Anima. 12 Aristotle. II. That which is prior in a thing must be the cause. Berlin. 8. because all the creatures of the world are in some way found in him. But when an animal is moved upwards. 1. It does not then depend on a separated cause but on an intrinsic principle. It is then ridiculous to say that heat is the principle of the movement of the heart. Cf. Ed. generated through a spirit. q. 252 b 26. Likewise. art. Diehls. a perfect animal. says in the eighth book of the Physics12 that movement is.is always present in the animal. I. Physics. 2. Hence in the animal also local movement seems more the principle of alteration than the converse.14 14 . as it were. in Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. VIII. causes local movement only in an accidental way. Therefore alteration in heat is not the cause of the movement of the heart. 10. 4. but it is accidental to it that it cause local movement. Others say that the principle of this movement in the animal is heat which. 11. is predominant. p. Bk. Metaphysics. 1072 b 9. vol. p. VIII. but we must assign to it a cause which can be essentially the principle of local movement. 11 which is the cause of alteration and of the other movements.10 Now the first movement in the universe is local movement. vol. 563 a: “Man is called a little world. Now the first movement of an animal is the movement of the heart. Aristotle.” 11 Cf. I. but on the contrary the movement of the heart is rather the cause of this alteration. 250 b 14-15. which by nature moves downwards. for it is of the essence of heat that it alter. 10. heat. 254 b 16-20. but it happens that its body can be moved both naturally or in a way that is contrary to its nature. vol.
10. Bk. Nevertheless the principle of any of his acts is a natural one. there is no need for a special overseer to supervise every activity.19 15. for they execute naturally their own functions. Pars I. q. It is not natural for him to seek other things. 3 c.18 other movements can be voluntary. ch. and the last end. 128 b: “Although our intellect moves itself to some things. from which he goes on to knowledge of other things. 8. ch. I. hence also the efficient cause. which it cannot doubt. In animals this same thing takes place by nature. and to flee misery.16 which is happiness. Bk. 200 a 15-25. Cf. so also nothing keeps other natural movements from proceeding from other forms. although this is not a movement natural to it inasmuch as it is heavy or light. 19 Summa theologiae.17 Since then the movement of the all the other members is caused by the movement of the heart. ch. art. and not according to will.13. 17. 18 Cf. vol. but the first movement. but discovers them by reasoning. Likewise. 433 a 9-b 30. 809 a: “In bodily movement the principle is according to nature. as is said in the second book of the Physics. 18. 16 Summa theologiae.16 It is characteristic of man alone to act by will. Aristotle. Physics. Pars I-II. but each man does the work assigned him. q. But the principle of bodily movement proceeds from the movement of the heart. 9. as the Philosopher says in the book. is natural. the entire process of movement is natural. ch. Now I say that the natural movement of the animal is that of the heart because. which produces the form. which is that of the heart. and not by nature. yet others are supplied to it by nature. for they do not act by purpose. vol.” 15 . as are first principles. II. inasmuch as it has certain kind of form which is the soul. I. it is natural for man. but inasmuch as it has such and such a form. from having a natural movement. De Anima. 9. for the swallow makes its nest and the spider its web in a way that is natural. Therefore nothing keeps an animal. Therefore the movement of the heart is according to nature. which it cannot not will.” 15 14 [26-27] Animals. Just as any natural movement results from the form of the element. vol. 703 a 14. The Movement of Animals. he goes on to desire other things. but because of his desire for the last end. II. The movement of animals. II.” 17 Cf. there is no need for the soul to be in each part as the principle of movement but it is in some principal part21 such as the heart which gives life to the other parts. to seek the ultimate end. ad 2. Thus the end is related to things desirable as the indemonstrable principle is to things intellectual. III. Bk. vol. is essentially one that causes local movement. and because each of the organs is naturally suited to execute its own function. and one task succeeds another in an accustomed order. led by desire. 14. 16. Now let us take into consideration that upward movement is natural to fire because it results from its form. For when order is once established in a state. For although he does not naturally know the conclusions of the speculative and practical sciences. p. Aristotle. Aristotle. We see that iron naturally is moved towards a magnet. Physics. then. 10. but by nature. the first indemonstrable principles. I. as the Philosopher shows in the book. vol. are naturally known to him. I. I. vol. and that which is causing this movement is that which accounts for the form. art. 190 a 26. p.20 “an animal must be regarded as resembling a state that is well and lawfully governed. In other animals. The Movement of Aristotle.
Summa theologiae. Ed. man has but one soul. However. 453 b. all the emotions seem to begin here. 461b. which resembles most of all the principle of the movement of the heavens. but is whole and entire in each and every part of the body. fire. art. 76. But the movement of the heart necessarily falls short of the movement of the heavens as the effect falls short of the cause. inasmuch as it is the form of one particular body22 and primarily of the heart. q. Albert Magnus. Bk.17. W. as the Philosopher says in the eighth book of the Physics24 that the movement of heavy and light bodies comes from an efficient cause inasmuch as it gives the form which is the principle of movement. it does not act on the body through an organ. 8. VIII. Paris. XLII. . Band XXIII. for by approach and recession a heavenly body confers on things the origin and end of being. Thomas departs from the teaching of his master. Hence the Philosopher says in the third book of The Parts of Animals25 that “the movements of delight and sadness. Now every property and movement proceeds from some form according to its rank. 8 c. II. vol. . who adopted the opinion of Alfred of Sareshel. I. Because the soul is not united to the body as its mover.. 33. 1841. q. 10. p. 8 that the soul is “wholly in the whole body. 7. pp/ 204-205. 255 b 31—256a 3. I. 6. but this was not the opinion of a certain Philosopher. 21 20 [27-28] 19. Munster i. A. vol. Summa contra Gentiles. vol. Alfred in his De motu cordis written about 1210 says: “The heart is the dwelling place (domicitium) of the soul. and by its continuity preserves the order in the movements that are not eternal. The movement of animals. art. Also Aquinas. p. But the noblest form that exists in earthly bodies is the soul.. p. ch. vol. 76.” 16 . in such a way that it would be whole in each part. t.” Migne. Cf. I. Patrologia latina. Vide: Summa theologiae. 76. By “a certain philosopher” Albert indicates his debt to Alfred. Paris. Thus the movement of the heart in the animal is like the movement of the heavens in the world. Therefore the movement of the heart is natural because it results from the soul. I. The movement of the heavens is circular and continuous. as in Platonic psychology. vol. 929. and. ibid. Pars I. ch. p. p. Thomas’ thinking is in accord with St. 703 a 14. I. Aristotle. . I. Thomas does not oppose Aristotle on this point for he interprets him as referring here not to the essence of the soul but merely to its power of originating movement. and whole in each part of it. Cf. 5. says: “The soul is in the heart. 76. 23 Thomas does not mean that the soul resides in the heart as its domicilium. Borgnet. vol. Albert in De anima. II. Hence the movement that results from it is most like the movement of the heavens. vol. art. VI. Bk. As a consequence of this. p. And perchance because of this notion some have said that the movement of the heart comes from an intelligence. and from there it pours out its powers on the whole body. XIII. Pars I. 447 b that the soul is the form of the body.” “Des Alfred von Sareshel (Alfredus Anglicus) Schrift de Motu Cordis” von Clemens Bauemker in Bëitrage zur Geschicte der Philosophie des Mittelalters. 1 c.. and so it is not wholly in the whole body. and this is appropriate to it inasmuch as it is the principle of all the movements of the world. 72. But there were and are certain men who say that the soul is wholly in the whole body. 1890. q.23 18. tract. Physics. ch. ch. ad 1. in general. Pars I. 462 a. Bk. 24 Aristotle. p. 4. The movement of the heart is the principle of all the movements that exist in the animal. Cf. art. Its being the form of the body precludes this. I. Pars I. 1923. namely.” Opera omnia. And this is the opinion of the Peripatetics. St. VIII. ch. 457. 3 c. q. Augustine who says in the De trinitate. but it is in each part by some of its powers. as movement to the noblest place which is above results from the form of the noblest element. vol. 22 Thomas argues in Summa theologiae.
ch. cit. cit. Vide: Best and Taylor. ch. q. because circular movement also is in some respects like this. 46. 4. there are periods of inactivity such as those of isometric relaxation and diastasis. And so it is not contradictory if it goes somehow in different directions. Therefore in order that the heart be the principle and end of all the movements in the animal. Pars I-II. and because of this medical men distinguish vital operations from animal 17 . p. because of this something must remain at rest. 666a 11-13. p. 24. He first gives the explanation of those who speak of a spirit flowing through the arteries: “They say that diastole results when the arteries are full and stretched by spirit that flows through them. But in the De motu cordis of Alfred of Sareshel we find specifically medical meanings attributed to ‘systole’ and ‘diastole. the word ‘systole. John of Damascus (c. which it imitates in so far as it goes from a point back to the same point.’ lacks medical significance. “Radiation causes diastole. 850 b) uses these terms in reference to cardiac activity: “In every emotion of the soul there is an increase or decrease in the natural movement of the heart according as the heart is moved more or less intensely in systole or diastole. According to this group.” Migne. 1. Bk. 2. which is itself the resting place of the ventricle. and the two movements which seem opposed are. 47). 25-27 27 Modern physiologists do not speak of a rest period between systole and diastole. and motion must originate from this position.’ However. p. ad 2. 1865. III. De anima. they are used only with reference to the arteries. as we see in the case of the wheel. 1964. I. parts of a single movement composed of both. 24. Migne. XCI. Bk. Patrologia Graeca. II. 11. In Summa theologiae. art. but inasmuch as it is the form and nature of one particular body. 44.28 for it is not caused by the sensitive soul through its own operation. vol. Nor must it be caused by apprehension and desire. in so far as it falls short of the simplicity of circular movement. 297 D. By this principle then we can easily solve the objections of an adversary. As used here.. XCIV. vol. Patrologia Graeca. John had taken over this definition from the work of Maximus the Confessor (580-662). namely. as Aristotle. 943 b. except that a rest period is inserted midway between the push and the pull 27 because it falls short of circular motion.. and to end here. Paris.namely. 23.” Op. 433b 21-22. art. Hence the Philosopher says in the third book of the De Anima26 “that which moves instrumentally is found wherever a beginning and an end coincide. 1958. Disputatio cum Pyrrho. 11. Thomas in Summa theologiae (vol. Paris. but inasmuch as it is animated by a certain kind of soul. in the heart. although it comes from the sensitive soul. New York. ch. III. 21. II. For we do not say that the movement of the heart is natural to it inasmuch as it is heavy or light. The parts of animals. This movement is continuous throughout the life of the animal. p. sed contra. 10. 23. The locomotion of the animal is caused by the operations of the senses and the emotions.” 20. not circular but like circular movement.” 26 25 [28-29] it were. t. q. it has a certain movement. 169-173.” (op. John says in De fide orthodoxa. its cessation causes systole. I.. Bk. All things are moved by pushing and pulling. Thomas cites the definition of fear given by St. one consisting of a push and a pull. The living body. ch. pp. 22. systole results when it leaves the arteries. ch. Aristotle. but within diastole. III. Pars I-II. 674-749) in which the word ‘systole’ appears. vol. He then gives the explanation of those who oppose the doctrine of the flowing spirits. t.’ which we can translated by ‘retreat’ or ‘contraction. 1088: “Natural fear is a force which maintains being by means of systole.
[see note d]) seems not to have avoided this snare. and generative soul. To start with he rejects the possibility that individual faculties of the soul cause the movements of the heart: plants possess a nutritive. p. II. supra. ad 1. Hence the movement of the heavens is always uniform but the movement of the heart varies according to the diverse emotions and cognitions of the soul. 141) and “The motion of the heart cannot be explained in terms of action by any force outside the organism. being a letter. 1. Dr. certain signs are especially evident in the exterior parts of those who are angry. for he writes of Thomas: “The author first analyses the relationship between the heart and the soul. in so far as they affect the body. 144 a: “The act of the sensitive appetite is always accompanied by some change in the body. vol. however. 922 b: “Every good disposition of the body reacts in some way on the heart. namely. but the sensitive soul.. the vital ones remain. art. life is at an end. Although some variation in the rhythm of the heart occurs due to diverse apprehensions and emotions. II. It is easy to take paragraph 3 for Thomas’ own position. Nor are the sensitive or intellectual faculties responsible. 962 b: “The movement of anger produces fervor of the blood and spirits about the heart. Bk. 413b 1-2. but conversely. For “to live” is the “to be” of living things. or even any partial faculty of the soul. For the emotions of the soul are not caused by the modifications of the heart but rather cause them. but the material element 32 is what pertains to the movement of the heart. They call vital those operations which accompany the movement of the heart. namely. 30 Summa theologiae. since the heart moves involuntarily” (p. 2. 26. cit. I. 2 c. as is made clear in the second book of the Physics.” Also loc. 922 b: “Sorrow and pain.34 He becomes angry.” 29 Aristotle. as for example in anger. which is the instrument of the soul’s emotions. q..” 31 Summa theologiae. vol. but no heart. 27. excitement of blood about the heart. Pars I-II. art. does not exhibit the clearly defined didactic structure of Thomas’ major works. 5.33 but in matter there is disposition for form. Pars I.. He is challenging the statement of an adversary as presented in paragraph 3. art. since this opusculum. p. which . In natural things the form does not exist for the sake of the matter. q. . especially in the heart. although not moved essentially. Pars I-II. . as on the principle and end of bodily movement. Walter Pagel in his splendid article ( loc. There is this difference between the principle of movement of the heavens and the soul: this principle is moved neither essentially nor accidentally. this variation of rhythm is not voluntary but involuntary. because of the great disturbance of the heart when one is angry. 25. 48. I.operations. ibid.” 28 [29-30] will. obj. for when they cease. ch. And hence it is that. augmentative. 31 the formal element is that which comes from the Thomas here tacitly concedes that the heart is moved neither by the nutritive nor by the intellectual soul but maintains that its movement is caused by the sensitive soul. Hence diverse cognitions and emotions arise in it. is the first principle of movement in animals. II. 3. is moved accidentally. vol. 18 . but because of this someone is inclined to anger. as is said in the second book of the De Anima:29 the “to be” belongs to each thing in virtue of its own form. ad 3. and this is reasonable. cit. De anima. Therefore it is not because the blood about the heart is excited that someone seeks vengeance. the desire for vengeance. out of desire for vengeance. bring about a certain change in the heart. 38.30 Therefore in the passions of the soul. 20. q. and say that when the animal ones cease. vol.
I.” 35 Aristotle.B.35 that often at the sight of something the heart and genitals are moved without a command of the intellect.. and a certain formal element. p. 36 which.1. II. vol. 34 Summa contra Gentiles. because the artery of speech is near the heart. and goes from the higher parts to the lower.because it does not take place at the command of the will. art. or something like this.] 19 . 240: “Every emotion comes about concomitantly with some bodily changes: for example. I. 945 b. II. 3. Physics. where Thomas illustrates the chilling effects of fear: “Because in fear heat leaves the heart. The lower lip. 37 A discussion of this is found in ibid. one undergoes increase. such as concupiscence. vol. and the like on account of which the heart grows warm or becomes chilled. Bk. the heart especially trembles in those who are afraid. 44. 703b 7-20. 89. 17. also tremble. ch.1093/jhmas/XV.. 22. Thomas Aquinas on the Heart. p. ch. the teeth chatter. Ibid. Transcribed from: Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 1960 XV(1):2230. 6. ad 2. anger. 2. ibid. which belongs to appetite. make the movements of the aforementioned parts.38 29. ch. p. Because of this. 9. 1. also tremble. vol. the bodily change. ad 3. art. Pars I-II. vol. ad. namely. Pars I-II. II. because of their connection with the heart. concomitantly with the contraction or dilation of the heart.” Journal of the History of Medicine. q. so that each is moved and modified by natural changes that are related to one another. p. vol. Larkin.. art. xv. the heart and genitals. I. Pars I-II. . “St. 843 b: “In the definitions of the movements of the appetitive part some natural change of an organ is found from the standpoint of matter. vol. 38 Cf. ad 2. 809 b. naturally present internally and externally. doi:10.” 33 Aristotle. q. p. Thus in anger . II. and another decrease. the material element is the excitement of blood about the heart.” 32 § Source: Vincent R. Hence the fearful tremble especially in their speech. I have silently corrected a few typographical errors in the text.” Also. take place in any case independently of reason when an alteration occurs. . 20. p. Pars I-II. vol. Bk. where the heart resides. art. II. and the members which are connected to the chest. ibid. 1 (January 1960). The Cause of the Movement of Animals. 200 a 30-34. or something like this. Let these words on the movement of the heart suffice. 1. q. For the philosopher says in the book.22 © 1960 by Oxford University Press [N. and the entire lower jaw. 36 This is explained in Summa theologiae.37 The intellect and imagination cause emotion. 22-30. ad 3. but when the parts are affected. 9. 144 a: “Let us distinguish in the emotions of the sense appetite a certain material element. the arms and hands tremble. art. q. vol. Pars I. The movement of animals. 753a. For the same reason. 11. 28. but the formal element is the desire for revenge. q. XIII.. I. The causes of the movements of the animal are warmth and cold. and he gives this reason: that animals necessarily are affected by physical changes. as it is said that “anger is the excitement of blood about the heart.
. 2.” who is otherwise unknown. De motu cordis ad Magistrum Phillipum de Castrocaeli (Paris 1270-71). No English translation: English trans. Parma v. lat. Friar Thomas D’Aquino. By James A. Eschmann suggests Paris 1270-71. lat. Vincent R. 14546: Bible Nat. professor first at Bologna and later at Naples..3 395. 1967). and Works: With Corrigenda and Addenda.” 11 The latter does occur in this Opusculum.6 Bibl. cf. but appertains to the motion of the heart and not of the blood. 90-93: (b) St Thomas Aquinas on the Movement of the Heart (pl. the next excerpt. 6) The Opusculum or rather Letter de motu cordis of St Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) 10 has occasionally been looked upon as a work on the motion of the blood—an appraisal that was largely due to a misunderstanding of the term “circular. Nat. Opuscula Phil. a work that displays interesting aspects and deserves a short discussion in the present context. Circular Symbolism. p. 1983). (Basel/New York. 16297. Nat.43 (Rome 1976).1. Thomas Aquinas on the Movement of the Heart”.. 14546) as a topic of special current interest. 74) were both addressed to a certain “master Philip of Castrocaeli. His Life. No English translation. Both Mandonnet and Walz give the date as Naples 1273. Journal of the History of Medicine. 165-68. *16. Cf. * Cf. DE MOTU CORDIS: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW. 22-30. William Harvey’s Biological Ideas: Selected Aspects and Historical Background. this letter and another on the mixture of the elements (n. ON THE DATE OF THE WORK. pp. The purpose of this letter is to show that the motion of the blood 10 and heart is produced by “nature” and not by “soul” or any outside forces. 63-93 (basic text: Paris Bibl. 394-395: A Brief Catalogue of Authentic Works 73. 485: CORRIGENDA AND ADDENDA 395. 25 (1960). v. pp. lat. 14546). This is one of the treatises preserved by Godfrey of [394-395] Fontaines (Paris MS Bibl.Nat. however. Weisheipl (Washington: Catholic University of America. 20 . lat. Heart and Blood Before Harvey. 10 Contrary to what is here asserted. but no evidence is given.: “St. Thought. text 127130. Marietti 1954. preface 95-122. the word “blood” nowhere appears in the letter. Extant MSS: 119. Cf. 5. Mandonnet suggested that master Philip may have been a physician. EDITIONS: add: Leonine ed. * EDITIONS” Perrier. 358-60. 507-11. 27. Walter Pagel. Larkin.1 395. According to the catalogue of Bartholomew of Capua. Opuscula. ibid. It is. Vivès v. I.
14 See below. The latter had denied the intimate connexion of the motion of the heart with the soul: it is not a motus animalis as it is independent of appetitus and intelligentia practica. P. Kl. Physician and Biologist: His precursors. d. Med. 13 Excerpta a libro Alfredi Anglici de motu cordis item Costar-ben-Lucae de differentia animas et spiritas liber translatus a Johanne Hispalensi.19 Nor finally is it caused by such external force as heat—for it is the very movement of the heart that engenders heat. but because movement is immanent to the heart that is animated by a certain kind of soul18 and not due to external force causing the so called motus violentus. 445. J. not in the ordinary sense of motus naturalis. 1270). Isis 1960. VINCENT R. This is seen in the role which it played in Alfred of Sareshal’s De motu cordis. Annals of Sci. Bayer. IX München 1913. Philos-hist. St Thomas Aquinas on the movement of the heart. With this St Thomas does not mean that the soul resides in the heart. with a life of St Thomas by Anton Pizamanus) published in 4o by Herman Liechenstein Coloniensis. C. Des Alfred von Sareshal (Alfredus Anglicus) Schrift De motu cordis . 1915. (folio) Milan. p. 14 St Thomas’ speculation is mainly concerned with the soul as the vital principle causing and directing the motion of the heart. a letter addressed to a Master Philip (ab. Differing from Alfredus who made it the dwellingplace ( domicilium) of the 10 De motu cordis ad Magistrum Phillipum . Wiss. J verso to J 2 verso = a separate edition with another opusculum – Libelli doctoris Sancti Thomae aquinatis occultorum naturae effectum Et proprii cordis motus causas declarantes studentibus phusice summe necessari appeared at Leipzig—per Jacobum Thaner of Würzburg—1499. Antwerp 1612 opus XXXV.15 St Thomas regarded the latter as the form of the body as a whole. Jarhunderts. Akad. LI 67-72—a translation of St.20 In all these points opposition to Alfred’s stipulations is recognisable. William Harvey. Its result is that the movement of the heart is due to the soul as the form of the body and primarily of the heart. – Edition also used by the present writer: Venetiis 1490 (ed. See also idem. and under this aspect is linked with the soul.”16 The movement of the heart that appears first in the developing organism is the principle of all the movements that exist in the animal. and successors Part III. its character as a “natural” motion and its analogy with the motion of the heavens—its “circularity”. Münster 1923. BAEUMKER. 12 LARKIN. III. 17 Secondly.if only to the show the variety of meanings attaching to “circular” and “circulatio” and for the influence it exerted in the era of the Renaissance. de Honate. – C. the heart had formed the central focus of biological speculation. of Alexander Neckham to whom it is dedicated. Die Stellung des Alfred von Sareshal (Alfred Anglicus) und seiner beginnenden XIII. In this he followed Plotinus and St Augustine who regarded the soul as “wholly in the whole body.S.12 Ever since the reception of the philosophy of Aristotle and the acceptance of his psychophysical ideas in the early thirteenth century. First ed. 214. BARACH Innsbruck 1878. however. St Thomas Aquinas on the combining of the elements . 11 BAYON. Beninus et Joh. written before the death. It is regarded as a genuine work and has been translated and commented upon in recent times. C. ed. Thomas’ De mixtione elementorum. Hist.13 Some of St Thomas’ statements seem to be directed against Alfred. the motion of the heart is natural. in 1217. XV. the vital principle of the organism as a whole. [90-91] soul. predicated of a body because it is heavy or light and thus follows one direction. Sitzber. – Idem. 1958. like De motu cordis. It is so. 22-30. H. opponents. and whole in each of its parts. sig. 1960. Alfredus refutes its natural 21 . Opusculum Omnia. Ant. Kgl.
cor—quendam motum non circularem. l. It is not the movement of the blood with which he is concerned. p. it imitates its perfect and uninterrupted—“simple”—circular movement in so far as it goes from the a point back to the same point (quem tamen imitator in quantum est ab eodem in idem ). see p. 16 Hoti hole en pasi kai en hotooun autou hole: Plotinus. 1880. l. 412b. sed similum circulari compositum ). The circularity with which he deals merely indicates the rhythmical repetition of a movement that is uniformly composed of two acts: that of pull and push. cit. IV. ed. 10. p. To this [see] LARKIN’S long note 23 on Thomas’ departing from the teaching of his master Albertus Magnus who adopted the opinion of Alfred of Sareshal. then. 1. 17 Therefore the movement of the heart is natural because it results from the soul. in note . but in quite a different way. as the effect falls short of the cause. On the other hand. I . arcem corporis. VINCENT R. – We return to this in the chapter on Marcus Marci later in this book. but remains on its level. therefore. 6. 314. however. vol. 35. inhabitat: p. 45. The blood sets out from the heart and returns to it after having travelled a long distance. also as circular movement is in some respects like this. See above our footnote  with the passage from Baruch. Thomas Aquinas on the Heart 17 tr. 22 . 23 Nor is its going in different directions a point against its circularity. Though consisting of two parts—systole and diastole 22— it is 15 Cor igitur domicilium est. namely the heat which distends air and blood. as the heart does not follow its weight and move to the centre. 2. Mueller Berol. 70: [remainder of note omitted]. See also Barach loc. cit. Thomas knows nothing of this or at all events does not mention it. l. cap. De Anima lib. The basic ref. – ARISTOTLE. p.F. l. p. St. the “form” of the body and primarily of the heart—the noblest form that exists in earthly bodies—and thus resembles the principle of the movement of the heavens.character. cap. Its composite structure does not therefore exclude it from being “natural” although its “naturalness” does not follow from this. in note . It necessarily falls short of the latter. really a single movement. p. 45. belongs to the same category as the movement of smoke that moves upwards and that of a burning torch which leads the fire in a downward direction. and 703 a 19. It follows that the movement of the heart must be like that of the heavens. Its movement. id est cor. In this “circular” means that it starts from one point and returns to it—so does the blood. but from its animation by a certain kind of soul—the sensitive soul as the form and nature of a particular kind of body. ed. Ennead. 86. Though continuous throughout the life of the animal this movement is not strictly circular because there is a rest period inserted midway between the push and the pull. It is a movement not circular. quae sensus et motus et vitae principium est. II. 20. 10. cit. in note . H. to Aristotle is [91-92] De motu animal. but that of the heart. Baeumker loc. It results from the soul. LARKIN loc. This circularity comes about because the heart and its movement are the principle and end of all the movements that exist in the animal. p. 703 a 29 and 703 b 1 seq. Alfred De motu cordis. that he indeed speaks of a circular movement or at least one that comes close to the “simple” circular motion of the heavens. From this short analysis of St Thomas’ treatise it emerges. 5. moreover it is moved by an outside force. anima igitur. 103. in as much as it is the form of one particular body and primarily of the heart. but “like circular movement” ( habuit— namely. 18. 8 and similar passages as compiled in the index to Baeumker’s ed. of pulsus and tractus. of systole and diastole. 21 According to St Thomas the movement of the heart is a rhythmically repeated series of pushing and pulling actions.
art. cap. as for example in a ball and socket joint. 24. but not separate spatially. 2. cap. cit. to the IVth Particula of Maimonides. 377. He says. LARKIN 22.”25 The similar way in which this matter is treated by Maimonides and St Thomas may justify the suggestion that the latter was influenced by Maimonides therein. the flux of the spirit through the arteries causing them to be repleted and elevated has been called diastole and its cessation systole. LARKIN 22. referring to Aristotle. IX.Perhaps this should be associated with a term used by the—older—Maimonides (11351204). but used exclusively with reference to the arteries.A. cum arterio egressus fuerit. p. which deals with the pulse. 703 a 19. 20) and the increase or decrease in its natural movement in systole and diastole in every emotion. 24 LEIBOWITZ. 20 Tr. and from that point the movement must originate. J. For the latter Larkin quotes from Summa theolog. De anima. for there the convex and the concave sides are respectively an end and a beginning (that is why one remains at rest while the other is moved): they are separate in definition. De Anima: “that which is the instrument in the production of movement is to be found where a beginning and an end coincide. 25-27 tr. Bauemker. 850b. 461L diastolen igitur irraditio. p. 7-8 with ref. By contrast Thomas speaks of the rest period inserted midway between push and pull of the heart (paragr. § 23 . 10. cit. See also ARISTOTLE De motu animal. sed fit irradiatione virtutis p. De specie motus cordis. By contrast. 10. see above note  and below p. XIX. Aphorismi. 23 Tr. in common with Maimonides speaks of the rhythmically repeated movement 18 19 Tr. [92-93] of the arteries—he does not mention it with reference to the heart. in note . [remainder of note omitted] 25 ARISTOTLE. loc.276. cit. Also: GALEN. Defin.III. sistolen vero. cap. ed. J. I. sistolen spadulatio fecit.”24 This seems to allude to the very passage which St Thomas quotes from Aristotle. note . 28 note 27 to passage 20 of Thomas’ De motu cordis on the medical meanings attributed by Alfred to systole and diastole. in note . see below note  and text to this note. as against: repleta et elevata arteria per fluentem spiritum diastolem fieri dicunt. SMITH. Ottawa 1941. in Korath 1935. vol. loc.26 26 ALFREDUS ANGLICUS. 22 Tr. De anima lib. p. He stipulates that the spirit of life is not moved. ed. See to this: Larkin loc.. so here there must be a point which remains at rest. 46-47. in note . Alfred. pars I-II. Kühn. Bauemker. then.O. This is compared with the “moving of a ball. p. For everything is moved by pushing and pulling. St Thomas does. Oxford 1931. cxii. LARKIN 8. q. Hence just as in the case of a wheel. 10. med. An additional influence on St Thomas may be found in the use of the terms systole and diastole with regard to the arteries by Alfred of Sareshel. Tr. cap. III. II. 21 ALFREDUS ANGLICUS. 35-37. since the palpitation of the artery is explained to the senses by the termination of the circuit (gemirath ha-sibbuh). LARKIN 19-22. ed. ad 2. but emanates from the left ventricle of the heart by irradiation. LARKIN 4. The latter speaks of the circular movement of the arteries. 433 b 21-22. Quod spiritus vitae non movetur. XI.
So also in bodily movements the principle is according to nature. art. that arise from the natural powers. 17. But the powers of the vegetal soul do not obey reason. as the Philosopher states ( Phys. q. Hom. Dei xiv. Now the principle of bodily movements begins with the movement of the heart. and whereas the heart is warm with desire. 16) that “the movement of the genital members is sometimes inopportune and not desired. 9): “The mind commands a movement of the hand.” Therefore the movement of the bodily members is not subject to the command of reason. but are moved through the powers of the soul. whereas those movements of members. viii. that are moved by the sensitive powers. it results from life. which follows from the union of soul and body. On the contrary.” I answer that. Hom. St. is derived knowledge of the conclusions. By the pulse he means the movement of the heart which is indicated by the pulse veins. Consequently according as the powers of the soul stand in respect of obedience to reason.3. Objection 2: Further. is derived the choice of the means. Thomas Aquinas. For it is evident that the members of the body are more distant from the reason.” For which reason Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius. so do the members of the body stand in respect thereof. But the movement of the heart is not subject to the command of reason: for Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius. whereas the natural powers are not. 9 (tr.” Therefore the movements of the members are not obedient to reason. xxii. Augustine says (De Civ. viii.] says that “the pulse is not controlled by reason. the heart is the principle of animal movement. SUPPLEMENTAL TEXTS. Augustine says (Confess. Since then the sensitive powers are subject to the command of reason. Reply to Objection 2: In things pertaining to intellect and will. so neither does the pulse which is a vital movement. than the powers of the vegetal soul. sometimes when sought it fails. The members of the body are organs of the soul’s powers. and from volition of the end naturally desired. 4). are subject to the command of reason. as stated above (A). Therefore much less do the members of the body obey.. Consequently the movement of the heart is according to nature. that scarcely can one discern obedience from command. 24 . a. Ia-IIae. whence all other things are derived: thus from the knowledge of principles that are naturally known. xxii) says that. Wherefore this movement is called “vital. of which powers. that which is according to nature stands first. and so ready is the hand to obey. some are in closer contact with the reason than are the powers of the vegetal soul. just as the movement of generation and nutrition does not obey reason. and not according to the will: for like a proper accident. Whether the acts of the external members are commanded? Cf. De Nat. the body remains cold. De Nat. Summa Theol. Reply to Objection 1: The members do not move themselves. Thus the movement of heavy and light things results from their substantial form: for which reason they are said to be moved by their generator. therefore all movements of members. Objection 3: Further. are not subject to the command of reason. English Dominican Fathers): Objection 1: It would seem that the members of the body do not obey reason as to their acts.
in so far as the intellect and imagination represent such things as arouse the passions of the soul. Animal. which is virtually the entire animal. Dei xiv. we must consider the natural cause of this particular member’s in submission to reason. which change is not subject to the command of reason.” and that the reason of this is as follows. by the insubmission of that member whereby original sin is transmitted to posterity. that the soul is punished for its rebellion against God. This is stated by Aristotle ( De Causis Mot. But they are not moved at the command of the reason or intellect. § 25 .Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. as we shall state later on. and from the organ of generation proceeds the seminal virtue. because these movements are conditioned by a certain natural change of heat and cold. the effect of the sin of our first parent was that his nature was left to itself. This is the case with these two organs in particular. and the principle is virtually the whole. 17. Consequently they have their proper movements naturally: because principles must needs be natural. in so far as it is a principle of life. of which passions these movements are a consequence. But because. because each is as it were a separate animal being. through the withdrawal of the supernatural gift which God had bestowed on man. For the heart is the principle of the senses. These members are stirred at the occasion of some apprehension. 2).20) it is in punishment of sin that the movement of these members does not obey reason: in this sense. as stated above (Reply obj.) who says that “the movements of the heart and of the organs of generation are involuntary.
b. On the causes of animal motion: Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima translated by Kenelm Foster, O.P. & Sylvester Humphries, O.P. (New Haven, 1951), Book III, lectio 15:
TEXT 433a9–433b27 BOOK III, CHAPTER X THE PRINCIPLES OF MOVEMENT IN LIVING BEINGS CONTINUED WHAT THEY ARE It seems that there are two motive-forces, mind and appetency (if one is to account imagination a sort of mind. For many follow the imagination instead of intellectual knowledge, while in other animals there is no intellect or reason at all, but only imagination). Both of these effect movement in place then,—intellect and appetency. §§ 818-19 Now, the intellectual power which reasons to some purpose in view, and is practical, differs in its end from the speculative. Appetition also is always for a purpose; for that of which there is desire is the principle of the practical ‘intellect. The last end is the first principle of action. Hence, it seems reasonable to take these two as the motive forces, appetition, and the practical reason. For the object of appetite causes motion; and it is for this that reason also initiates movement, the desirable being its principle. And when imagination moves, it only does so with appetition. Therefore there is one single mover,—the object desired. For if there were two movers, intellect and appetition, they would move in virtue of some common principle. Now reason does not appear to cause movement apart from appetency; for will is an appetency. When there is movement by reason there is also movement by will. But appetition moves apart from reason, for concupiscence is a sort of appetition. §§ 820-5 All intellect, then, is right, but imagination and appetition may be right or not right. Hence, while the object of appetite is always what motivates, this can be either a good or only a seeming good. Not, however, every good, but the practical good. Now a practical object is that which is able to be other than it is. It is therefore evident that what moves the soul is a power of this kind called appetite. §§ 826-7 For those who divide the soul into parts, if they split it up by: distinguishing its powers, a great many parts result: the vegetative, the sensitive, the intellective, the deliberative, and lastly the appetitive. These differ from one another much more than do the concupiscible and irascible. § 828 Since appetites may run counter to one another, this occurs when reason and desire are contrary (and only in beings possessing a time-sense. Reason commands restraint for the sake of some future thing, but desire is for what is now present. For what appears desirable at any given instant appears desirable without qualification and good without qualification, because the future is not apparent). § 829 The motive-force will therefore be specifically one,—the desirable, or the appetite itself; and first of all the desirable, for this is what causes motion without itself being moved, simply through being understood or imagined,—but numerically there are several moving factors. § 830
Since there are these three: the mover; secondly, that by which it moves; thirdly, that which is moved; and since the mover is double (the immobile one, and the mover that is also moved) the immobile mover is, accordingly, the practical good, whereas that which both moves and is moved is the appetite. For the subject desiring is moved in so far as it desires, and its desire is an act or movement of a certain kind. What receives the motion is the animal. But that by which it moves is an organ, already something corporeal. Hence, what pertains to it must be studied along with activities common to body and soul. § 831 Now, in short, organic movement arises where the principle and term are the same: as in the joint of a hinge are the convex and the concave,—the latter being the end, the former the beginning. Hence one is at rest while the other moves They are distinct in idea, but inseparable spatially. All things move by pushing and pulling. Hence there must, as in a circle, be something that stays still; from which [point] movement begins. §§ 832-5 ST. THOMAS’S COMMENTARY LECTIO FIFTEEN § 818. So far the Philosopher has pursued his enquiry into the principle of local movement in animals by the method of refuting unsatisfactory solutions; but now he states the positive truth on the matter: first, showing in general what that principle is; and secondly, at ‘Generally then’, how it varies in different subjects. The first point again divides into (a) a statement of the motive principle in animals; and (b), at ‘The motive-force will therefore’, an analysis of the factors at work when this principle is in action. Again (a) subdivides into three points: (1) That there are two motive-principles; which (2) he reduces to one, at ‘Now the intellectual power’, while with (3) he answers an objection (at ‘Since appetites.’) already raised. First, then, he says that the foregoing examination makes it clear that neither the vegetative nor the sensitive part is the motive-principle, since they are found in things that do not move. So it would seem that the moving principles are two: intellect and appetency. Note, however, that he includes imagination under intellect; for it resembles intellect in that it impels to action in the absence of sense-objects. § 819. For in their actions many people follow the changes in their imaginations rather than rational knowledge; for instance, those who act impulsively without reflection. Besides, other animals ate obviously only impelled to action through imagination, not through intellect or reason; but men through both intellect and imagination. Clearly, then, both these are motive-principles: intellect (including imagination) and appetition. § 820. Then at ‘Now the intellectual,’ he reduces the two to one; and this in three stages: (1) justifying the reduction; (2), at ‘All intellect, then, is right,’ using it to show the cause of a particular accidental factor in animal movements; and (3) refuting, at ‘For those who divide’ an early division of the powers of the soul. First, then, he says that the mind as a motive-principle is the mind in so far as it reasons for some purpose other than mere reasoning; in other words, it is the practical reason, which differs from the speculative by a different finality; for while the latter regards truth for its own sake and nothing else, the practical reason relates its knowledge of truth to some deed to be done. § 821. Now obviously every appetition is for some end beyond itself. It is absurd to say that desire is for the sake of desiring; desire is essentially a tendency to ‘the other’. Moreover, an object of desire is always the practical reason’s starting point; what is first desired provides
the end whence its deliberations begin. If we wish to weigh a course of action we first lay down some end and then deliberate about the means, moving back, so to say, from what is to come later on to what is immediately to be done at the beginning. So he adds that the last thing that the practical reason considers is the first thing that has to be done—i.e. the starting point of the whole action. This is why it is reasonable to assert that both appetition and the practical reason are motive-principles; for the object desired certainly incites to action, and it is also what the practical reason first considers; so that the latter is said to impel to action because the starting point of its deliberations, the object desired, does so. § 822. And what is said of the intellect may be applied to the imagination; if it moves it does so only in virtue of an object desired: of which it contains, like the intellect, a representation. § 823. So it is clear that there is ultimately one mover, the object desired. For this both moves appetition and affords a starting point for the practical intellect—the two motiveprinciples which have been assumed. § 824. And it is reasonable that these two principles should be reduced to unity in the object of desire; for if both intellect and appetition are principles with respect to one and the same movement they must, as such, share the same specific nature; since a single effect implies always a single cause of precisely that one effect. Now it cannot be said that appetite is a moving principle through sharing the specific nature of intellect, but rather e converso; for intellect only moves anything in virtue of appetition. It moves by means of the will, which is a sort of appetition. § 825. The explanation of this (given in Book IX of the Metaphysics) is that the practical reason is essentially balanced between alternatives; nor can it initiate movement unless appetition fixes it exclusively upon one alternative. Appetition, on the other hand, can move to action independently of reason, as we see in the case of the concupiscible desire which is a sort of appetite. He mentions this desire rather than the irascible because, unlike the irascible, it has no admixture of rationality (as he shows in Book VII of the Ethics). Clearly, then, the motive-principles are reducible to the one object of appetition. § 826. Next at ‘All intellect then’ he applies what has been said to a particular accidental factor in movement or action, explaining why we go amiss in our actions. ‘All intellect’, he says, ‘is right’, by which he means that we never err about the first principles of action, about such truths as ‘it is wrong to do harm to anyone’, or ‘injustice is never right’, and so on. Those principles correspond to the equally infallible first principles of the speculative reason. But as for the consequences of these first principles, if we apprehend them aright it is because our thought is consistent with our grasp of the principles, whereas if we deviate from the truth the fault lies in our reasoning. Appetition and imagination (motive-principles likewise) may be, on the other hand, either right or wrong. Hence if we act amiss it is, in the last analysis, because we fall short of what we intellectually know; and our previous conclusion stands, that the final motive-impulse comes from the object of desire. § 827. Now this object is either a real good or a seeming good: it is a real good if the mind’s original correct judgement is maintained; it is only a seeming good if appetite or imagination cause a deflection from that judgement. Yet not every good is desirable as a cause of action, but only the good-as-term-of-action, i.e. a good that is actually related to our actions. And precisely as such no such good is always good in the same way; for it must vary in relation to ourselves. That is why the ultimate and absolute good, regarded in its universality, does not, as such, move us to act. Clearly, then, the final motive force derives from the soul itself acting through the appetitive power.
Next. namely the vegetative. But here and now we are concerned particularly with the soul. they are numerically many.§ 828. Contrariety of desires springs out of an opposition between reason and the concupiscible appetite.e. Next. hence it has to be treated along with the activities common to body and soul (and is. irascible and concupiscible potencies. For the contractual movement draws the organ into concavity. for this is the absolute starting point of movement. And because the secondary motive-principles only move in virtue of their share in the primary one. the unmoved mover is some actual good influencing desire through the intellect or imagination. In the case of animals. Now the mover is twofold: an unmoved mover. for whatever desires is moved inasmuch as it desires. § 829. therefore they all as such partake of the nature of this primary one. and this happens ‘in beings possessing a time-sense’. which has to do with contingent matters. he briefly defines each of the factors on which movement depends. desire itself being a certain act or movement in the sense that we give to the term ‘movement’ when we apply it to activities that are consequent upon actuality. § 830. at ‘Now. of which the continent follow one and reject the rest. follows a swelling out of the organ. at ‘Now. being itself unmoved. in the Ethics. at ‘Since there are these three’. he rejects an old division of the motive parts of the soul into the rational. If.2 Book VI. Aristotle distinguishes the ratiocinative faculty. § 831. namely that if desire were a motive force. But this difficulty vanishes if we consider that in man there are contrary appetites. by definition. These last two are distinguished in the same way and for the same reason as. inasmuch as. to the object of desire or appetite. from the scientific faculty which has to do with necessary objects. examined in the De Causa Motus Animalium). in fact. For sometimes the mind forbids a man to indulge a desire in view of what will happen in the future if it is indulged: thus a man in a state of fever sees with his mind that he ought to abstain from drinking wine. Finally. the intention was to enumerate the potencies which are really distinct from each other. Then at ‘Since there are these three’. Next. he explains how they are interrelated. i. do not follow their desires. and (3) the thing moved. in short” he briefly states his view on the organ of local motion. 29 . For what is here and now pleasant seems absolutely pleasant and good if it is not related to the future. not of the present moment only. while the expansive impulse. but of past and future as well. But desire prompts one to take things for the sake of ‘what is now’ i. deliberative and appetitive powers. Hence that old division was incomplete. he shows how the factors in movement are at once many and one. he interrelates three factors in movement: (1) the mover. (2) the organ by which it moves. And yet. Then at ‘The motive-force’ he analyses the process of the movements in question. at ‘Since appetites may’. proceeding in a circle. he meets an objection already touched upon. First. the continent. and this in three stages. he says. Then at ‘For those who divide’. such as sensing and understanding. whence movement begins. in the present moment. in short’. which are both included in the sensitive appetite. then. First. nobody would be continent. and a mover that moves through being moved itself. sensitive. The mover moved is the desire itself. he observes that if the moving principles are considered formally and specifically they are reducible to one. that are aware. Then the thing moved is the animal itself. All these parts of the soul differ more than the irascible and concupiscible. others should have been included. intellectual. and having a swelling out at the starting point and a concavity at the end.e. it initiates movement through the mind or the imagination. And the organ by means of which desire issues into movement is a part of the body. it is the primary motororgan. though specifically one. He says that the primary organic motive-principle must be such that the movement starts and finishes in the same point. as it were. § 832.
“it follows that while that which originates…”. lect. Secondly. he shows how they are ordered to each other. Thus it is. Then.B. and not only in thought. One which is the mover. But although all things agree in the species of the first mover. for the drawing power draws something back to itself Thus the first organ of local motion in animals must be at once both a starting point and a term. For in any movement the starting point itself does not move. when he says. But the organ by which the appetite moves is something corporeal. 30 . where he says. But what is moved is the animal. For in this book he intends to treat of the soul by itself. another is the organ by which the mover moves.§ 833. one indeed immobile. Then. because everything which seeks in so far as it seeks is moved. And that the organ is both starting point and term (and therefore both motionless and moved) is clear from the fact that all animal movements consist of impulsions and retractions. and to seek itself is a kind of act or motion in the sense that motion is the act of the perfect as was said of the operation of the intellect and sense. In reality it keeps to one place. 15. namely what is the first organ of motion. he assigns the order of motion. pp. But the mover is twofold. 830-835.: College of St. the mover which is not moved is the actual good which moves the appetite in so far as it s understood or imagined. nn. “All movement involves three…”. And so it is with the heart: it remains fixed in the same part of the body while it dilates and contracts and so gives rise to movements of impulsion and retraction. granted that this primary organ is both the starting point and term of movement. there will be one mover. III. For he treats of this in a book on the cause of motion of animals. as term. Bk. I give next an alternate translation of the last part of St. and. it must. and he says that there are three things which are found in motion. Cf. And in this it resembles circular movement: for a body revolving in a circle is kept as a whole in the same place by the immobility of the centre and the poles. “To state the matter summarily…” Therefore he says first that if the moving principles are considered formally and according to species. and therefore we must consider an organ of this sort among the operations common to soul and body. R. Now. for instance. Therefore in the motion of the animal. So then there must be in it something that stays still and yet initiates motion. when he says. Thirdly. for the impelling agent thrusts itself forward against what is impelled. but not in reality. N.—as. § 835. these two factors in the organ. though distinct in thought. And with respect to this he does three things. while the hand is moving the arm is still. St. as starting point. Thomas Aquinas. In thought it may move as a whole. And therefore all things agree in the species of the first mover. § 834. But its parts are changing their places really. namely the appetible. in a sense. Kocourek (Minn. First he shows how the moving principles are one and how they are many. all movement must proceed from the motionless. For purposes of comparison. he shows the order of motion. 1946). 170-171: 830. and while the arm moves the shoulder is still. But the moved mover is the appetite itself. and the third is that which is moved. trans. Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle . both motionless and moving. are substantially and spatially inseparable. the motionless and the moved. 831. still they are many in number. in so far as it is imagined or understood. Thomas’s Commentary. in movement. he treats in summary each one of these which are required for motion. However. A. For it is clear that the second movers are not moved except in so far as they participate in the first. But in retraction the motive force comes from the term. where he says. “All movement involves three…”. and another which is a moved mover. and both these at once. be motionless. for this is the unmoved mover. In impulsion the motive force comes from the starting point. Thomas.
Aristotle. ye would not pull Zeus. and not in reason only. namely the resting and the moved are diverse in definition. And that it is necessary that it be the beginning and end of motion and consequently at rest and mobile is clear from the fact that every motion of the animal is composed of pushing and pulling. And therefore it is necessary that in this there be something fixed. in summary. 834. does not change place totally except perchance in reason. in that it depends from an original which is immovable. he treats in summary of local motion. But in pushing. no not even if ye toiled right hard. For one part of an animal must be moved. just as when the hand is moved the arm is at rest. And these two in themselves. And because of this it is necessary that the first organ of local motion in the animal be both as the beginning of motion and the term. Farquharson): To resume. and no part of it. And herein lies the solution of the difficulty stated some time back. for one part. Movement of Animals. ch. thus also it is in every motion of the heart. because the pulling moves to itself that which is pulled. For the body which is moved circularly because of the immobility of the center and pole. [700a] for that which is entirely immovable cannot possibly be moved by anything. 4 (799b 33-800a 11) (tr.S. which is the heart. come. but it is moved according to dilation and constriction. in so far as it is the beginning of motion. just as in a kind of ball and socket joint. A. and against this the  part which is moved will support itself and be moved. 2 See Iliad VIII 20-22. And because in itself there is the beginning and end of motion. and just as every motion proceeds from something immobile. or not? And must this necessarily be so also in the case of the universe? Perhaps it would be thought strange were the origin of movement inside. as it were the end and the other the beginning. Cf. but the beginning of motion must be immobile in each thing moved.L. and when the arm is moved the shoulder is at rest. 833. that the first mover organically must be such that the beginning and end of the motion are the same thing. Then. For the concave is as the end. supports itself against another part at rest. just as appears in circular motion. For according to concavity it is contracted in itself. but according to the whole it remains in the same place according to subject. when he says. the possibility or  impossibility of dissolving the system of the heavens. as it were. But in pulling that which moves is the end of the motion. if it move one of its parts. but also within those things which move in place. in so far as motion is terminated in it. all ye gods and goddesses! Set hands to the chain’. there be something at rest. 835. according to convexity its dilation is noticed. and initiate their own movement. For the heart remains fixed in the same part of the body. although they are inseparable from each other in subject and in magnitude. and thus in a way it is mobile and in a way at rest. but the parts vary their place in subject. And to those who so conceive it the word of Homer2 would appear to have been well spoken:  ‘Nay. that which is moving is only the beginning of motion because that which pushes removes from itself that which is pushed. in which there is convex and concave. 31 . and another be at rest. Now in the animal world there must be not only an immovable without. and something which is moved. it is necessary that in the very organ of motion itself. “To state the matter summarily…”. highest of all from heaven to the plain. as the principle of motion and pulsation is produced by it.832. and still that [is] whence the motion begins. one of which is. and he says. must there be something immovable and at rest outside of what is moved. for example. [170-171] so that it causes the motion of pushing and pulling. but the convex seems to be the principle of the motion.
A. William Ogle): We have now dealt with the neck. others only a part. is capable of being passive to an external force.. while that which initiates movement must needs possess a kind of force and power. ibid. and so is able to pull and to thrust from one and the same cause.11 for the elementary bodies prevail over one another in a compound body by dint of disproportion. and what is the reason for this. The question whether the spirit remains always the same or constantly changes and is renewed.e. and the remaining parts live by continuity of natural structure. At all events we see that it is well disposed to excite movement and to exert power. Aristotle.S. 8. [665b] For these parts are to be seen in the egg sometimes as early as the third day. Accordingly. cf. Thomas adduces these words as being said of the heart. still in the material animated body there must be some material which itself moves being moved. Now since this centre is for some animals in the heart. And the animal organism must be conceived after the similitude of a well-governed commonwealth. 11 Notice that St. and the windpipe. and are visible also in aborted embryos. and have next to treat of the viscera. rather than of the spirit. exhibiting gravity compared with the fiery element. For.Cf. 10 (703a 3—703b 2) (tr. 4 (665a 27-666b 1) (tr. and while it is still extremely small.)] must be of the kind described.M. and [703b] play the parts Nature would have them play. in the rest in a  part analogous with the heart. being then no bigger than a point. so is it with the internal parts. and desire moves being moved. and this is precisely the characteristic of spirit. and one thing follows another in its accustomed order. There is no need then of a soul in each part. and levity by comparison with the opposites of fire. Democritus then seems to have been mistaken in the notion he formed of the viscera. some of which have all of them. These are peculiar to sanguineous animals. Aristotle. while still excessively minute. the organ of movement must be capable of expanding  and contracting. and the functions of movement are thrusting and pulling. III. n.L. without alteration (B. A. ch. that is to say. So in animals there is the same orderliness—nature taking the place of custom—and each part naturally doing his own work as nature  has composed them. both heart and liver are visible enough when the body is only just formed. Now that which is to initiate movement without  change of structure [i. in sanguineous animals. he fancied that the reason why none were discoverable in bloodless animals was that these animals were too small to allow them to be seen. Now experience shows us that animals do both possess connatural spirit and derive power from this. Moreover. like the cognate question about the rest of the parts of the body. De Motu. the oesophagus.  (How this connatural spirit is maintained in the body is explained in other passages of our works.) And this spirit appears to stand to the soul-centre or original in a relation analogous to that between the point in a joint which moves being moved and the unmoved. Now that which is moved. Farquharson): Although from the point of view of the definition of  movement—a definition which gives the cause—desire is the middle term or cause. Cf. but whose nature is not to initiate movement. as the external organs are not precisely alike in all animals. We have now explained what the part is which is moved when the soul originates movement in the body. is better postponed. but she resides in a kind of central governing place of the body. the light is overcome and kept down by the heavier. while no bloodless animals have any at  all. On the Parts of Animals. these also differing in different animals. but each creature is provided with such as are suited to its special mode of life and motion. we further see the reason for the connatural spirit being situate where it actually is found. It contracts and expands naturally. 32 . and the heavy kept up by the lighter. The individuals each play their assigned part as it is ordered. When  order is once established in it there is no more need of a separate monarch to preside over each several task. if.
 when possible.  and the reason for this has already been given. and no sooner is it formed than it contains blood. and generally of all sensation. and secondly. And. B. and this before any of the other parts. and the  heart lies about the centre of the body. as the blood is fluid. Again its position is that of a primary or dominating part. the vessels continue their course through the other viscera. It is hollow to serve for the reception of the blood. St. that is to say of the part which terminates in the vent for excrement. There is a heart. be one. as is shown by its intolerance of chill. For in itself it constitutes the origin and fountain. and of greater bulk in proportion to the body. Again. according to their representation. while its wall is dense. Again. This primary source of the vessels is the heart. De Motu Cordis. and here alone in all the viscera  and indeed in all the body. being as it is homogeneous. but also evident to the senses. In this they are clearly mistaken. in the centre of the necessary part of the body. plainly have their source in the heart. It is however. the best suited for a source is the centre. For the heart is the first of all the parts to be formed. namely.12 This. than at any later period of life. Nor is this but consistent with reason.M. of all places. of  the blood. For in the first place. it 12 Cf. places the more honourable part in the more honourable position. there would be many sources for the vessels. rather than several. the blood elsewhere being always contained within vessels. as neither the blood itself. This is most evident in the case of man. whereas the region of the heart is as manifestly hot. these sources would  be in a region that is manifestly cold. in all sanguineous animals. There are some who say that the vessels commence in the head. For its central part consists of a dense and hollow [666b] substance. it being in the earliest stage of formation that the nature of the material and its abundance are most conspicuous. nor yet any part which is bloodless. must necessarily have one primary source. while it is self-evident that the addition of them to an animal is not destructive of it. but even in other animals there is a tendency in the heart to assume a similar position. For nature. For that sanguineous animals must necessarily have blood is self-evident. but rather in its upper than its lower half. From this it is quite evident that the heart is a part of the vessels and their origin. as though the vessels took thence their origin. and is equally or almost equally within reach of every part. Thomas Aquinas. in the heart. is endowed with sensation. and terminate there. it is plain that that part which first has blood. and is moreover full of blood. the motions of pain and pleasure. Moreover. For the limbs vary in position in different animals. and therefore are each and all formed from sanguineous material. For it is preferable that there shall be one such. and so the Philosopher in the third book of On the Parts of Animals (ch. than its heart is seen in motion as though it were a living creature.) 33 . then. it is also a matter of necessity that there shall be a receptacle for it. For the centre is one. and find in it their ultimate termination. there is blood without blood-vessels. For the vessels manifestly issue from it and do not go through it. whenever  possible. For in such the viscera are more sanguineous. And that this part is the heart is  not only a rational inference. n. but no vessel spreads through the heart. and it is apparently to meet this requirement that nature has devised the blood-vessels. as already said.  are peculiar to sanguineous animals. For life can be maintained even when they are removed. indeed. 17: “Now the motion of the heart is the principle of every motion which is in an animal. from dissections and from observations on the process of development that the truth of these statements receives its clearest demonstration. For here. and  are not to be counted with the parts which are necessary for life. as is plainly to be seen in the new-born young of these animals.Viscera. and these scattered. and. again. and which holds it as it were in a receptacle. reason would lead us to expect. These. For the source must. For no sooner is the embryo formed. that it may serve to protect the source of heat. Moreover. and for this it is well suited by its structure. For the blood is conveyed into the vessels from the heart. then. but none passes into the heart from without. when no other more important purpose stands in her way. it has the character of a blood-vessel. 661a 13-14) says that ‘the motion involved in pleasure and pain and all other sensations seem to begin there. 4. or primary receptacle.’” (tr. and also more in front than behind. must be the primary source of sensation.A.
34 . But it is manifest that the container is more honorable than the contained. and ask what is its condition according to nature. as in the case of an animal. Hence they should not be concerned with the whole universe as though it needs a guardhouse in such a way that such a prison or guardhouse would have to be assigned to the center.e. as  does the heart. containing bodies are more formal and contained bodies are more material. and which place naturally befits it. Exposition of Aristotle’s Treatise On the Heavens . Conway and F. the spleen. cf. the extremity. to seek that which is the middle of nature in the universe. which is the middle of magnitude. for it is from the heart that all the vessels take their rise. as thus shown. And he says that it is a principle of other bodies. and most honorable among other bodies: and this is the sphere of the fixed stars. rather.e.” i. but to be a container and that which terminates to the notion of form. It is true that  sanguineous animals not only have a heart but also invariably have a liver. showing first how the middle of the universe is as corresponding to the heart of an animal. Thomas Aquinas. extends through it. for that which is the magnitudinal middle among the places of the universe is more like an ultimate than like a principle. lect. it follows of necessity that it is the heart which is the source of the blood. univocally. The vessel. P. and no vessel whatsoever originates in it. Since then one or other of these two parts must be the central source. is the most material and ignoble among bodies. so the outermost sphere is most formal and most noble. just as the earth which is contained by all. and the middle of a thing according to nature. Consequently. Book II. the heart.being. the liver contains no spacious receptacle in its substance. in the whole universe.. that through which the nature of a thing is preserved – as we see in animals that the middle by which the nature of an animal is preserved. But no one could ever deem the liver to be the primary organ either of the whole body or of the blood. is not the same as the middle of the body’s size.. For the definitive  characteristic of an animal is the possession of sensation. For the primary source of blood must of necessity be present in them all. in the most perfectly finished animals there is another part. For the position in which it is placed is far from being that of a primary or dominating part. for that would be the umbilicus. St. 1964). But it is not the middle place but rather the place of the outermost container that belongs to it.. to the whole universe. n. trans. and since it is not the liver which is such. 20. moreover. Then at  he refutes the aforesaid reason [argument] and says that in the aforesaid reason [argument] the Pythagoreans used the word “middle” as though one called “middle” absolutely. R Larcher (Ohio. which is the source of blood [666b] and the first of the parts to contain it. as also the primary organ in other respects. i. while that which is the “end. moreover. has the nature of a determinant and container. both the middle of a magnitude. that is to say is the heart. the starting-point of their nature in all animals that have blood. The reason is that the middle is contained and determined by all the others. A further evidence of the truth of what has been stated is the fact that no sanguineous animal is without a heart. It is necessary. being in the middle.. among bodies according to the order of place. and the end more honorable than the thing ended – since the contained and the terminated pertain to the notion of matter.e. which as it were counterbalances it. while among the elements fire is above all containing and formal. 485: 485. i. namely. and. which is the substance of the whole consistency of things. And therefore. i. A similar viewpoint must be taken with respect to the whole heaven.e. Still further. and the first sensory part is that which first has blood. On the heart of an animal as being analogous to the “middle” of the universe. He explains these two things. but its blood is in a vessel as in all the other viscera.
creating night and day by its circular motion about the centre. and name it. § 35 . and the earth is one of the stars. Most people—all. or to call in a guard for its centre: rather let them look for the  centre in the other sense and tell us what it is like and where nature has set it. Stock):  It remains to speak of the earth. and of its shape. [293b] which is the centre. who regard the whole heaven as finite—say it lies at the centre. he sums up  and concludes that in regard to the place of earth. but rather forcing their observations and trying to accommodate them to certain theories and opinions of their own. L. J. That centre will be something primary and precious. Their  view is that the most precious place befits the most precious thing: but fire. and what defines it is the limit. and that which contains or limits is more precious than that which is limited. of its position. seeing that the latter is the matter and the former the essence of  the system. is more precious than earth. and the circumference and the centre are limits. They further construct another earth in opposition to ours to which they give the name counterearth. 13 (293a 15—293b 15) (tr. some have an opinion such as has been described. For this reason they have no need to be so disturbed about the world. or rather the fire which occupies that place. cf. For the middle is what is defined. looking for confirmation rather to theory than to the facts of observation.Finally. The Pythagoreans have a further reason. but to the mere position we should give the last place rather than the first. and the centre of the mathematical figure were always the same with  that of the thing or the natural centre. De Caelo (On the Heavens) II. For the text of Aristotle. of the question whether it is at rest or in motion. the ‘Guardhouse of Zeus’. In all this they are not seeking for theories  and causes to account for observed facts. should be most strictly guarded. They hold that the most important part of the world. in fact. and the limit than the intermediate. Reasoning on this basis they take the view that it is not earth that lies at the centre of the sphere. is fire. As to its position there is some difference of opinion. But it is better to conceive of the case of the whole heaven as analogous to that of animals. as if the word ‘centre’ were quite unequivocal. But the Italian  philosophers known as Pythagoreans take the contrary view. they say. but rather fire. I. At the centre. in which the centre of the animal and that of the body are different. they say. But there are many others who would agree that it is wrong to give the earth the central position.
Qi synonyms:14 But pneuma was central in the theories of the Greek physician Galen (Klaudios Galenos.htm [10/25/09]) (http://www. originating in the heart and flowing through the arteries. Galen distinguished between three types of spirit: the spiritus vitalis or life spirit. 3 (736b 29—737b 6) (tr. II. Qi-energy Info. From such considerations it is clear that the heat in animals neither is fire nor derives its origin from fire. the heat of the sun and that of animals does generate them. and a spirit of the psyche (pneuma psychikon. which traveled through the heart and the blood.qi-energy. cf. Stefan Stenudd. but it is the spiritus included in the semen and the foamlike. and belongs to those animals in which is included something divine (to wit. lungs and other organs. while the other is inseparable from matter. Let us return to the material of the semen. Galen II. pneuma entered through the lungs. which traveled from the brain out to the nerves. cf. Arthur Platt): Now it is true that the faculty of all kinds of soul seems to have a connexion with a matter different from and more divine than the so-called elements. Hence. Not only is this true of the heat that works through the semen. Philosophy:13 On the basis of his philosophical studies. including the brain. being analogous to the element of the stars. for the senses to function. and was in the liver transformed to natural spirit ( pneuma physikon.com/IslamPencereleri/galen_2. Of this principle there are two kinds. All have in their semen that which causes it to be productive. Pneuma as vital spirit and its relation to the fifth element called aither: On pneuma in general. This material of the semen dissolves and evaporates because it has a liquid and watery nature. I mean what is called vital heat. This is not fire nor any such force. this also has still a vital principle in  it.geocities. Thus. Blood from the liver nourished the heart. which were the basics of medicine all the way to the 17 th century. but whatever other residuum of the animal nature there may be. but as one  soul differs from another in honour and dishonour. the spiritus animalis or animal spirit to be found in the brain and nerves. Therefore we ought not to expect it always to come out again from the female or to form any part of the embryo that has taken shape from it. spirit-like material which drifted through the universe and which controlled and organized physical bodies. His thoughts on pneuma can be described as biological applications of Aristotle’s ideas about the quintessence. blood and air. in and with which comes away from the male the spiritus conveying the principle of soul. For Aristotle. in Latin spiritus vitalis). According to Galenos. which was converted into blood in the liver. blood circulation and metabolism are critical elements of Galenic physiological theory. whereas fire generates [737a ] no animal and we do not find any living thing forming in either solids or liquids under the influence of fire. Cf.  what is called reason [nous]). However. Galen came to the conclusion that the various bodily functions were induced by the Pneuma or universal spirit. the case resembles that of  the 13 14 (www. so differs also the nature of the corresponding matter. formed in the liver. He also talked about a vital spirit ( pneuma zotikon.info/qi-synonyms-P. and the natural principle in the spiritus [pneuma]. Waste materials were also thought to be removed by the blood. and Galen was the first person to suggest a relationship between food.htm [10/30/09]) 36 . He believed the pneuma to be a fine. in Latin spiritus animalis). setting the body in motion. or natural spirit. On the Generation of Animals. Galen also believed that the life process was sustained by food. Claudius Galenus. and the spiritus naturalis. in Latin spiritus naturalis). 131-201 CE). which entered the blood.c. the one is not connected with matter.
15 It being the vital heat in the pneuma which makes it to be the element analogous to that of the stars. and as the earthy parts solidify membranes form all round it. for just as the young of mutilated parents are sometimes born mutilated and sometimes not. in what sense the embryo and the semen have soul. and has all the parts in it potentially though none of them actually. It has been settled. Arthur Platt):  When the material secreted by the female in the uterus has been fixed by the semen of the male (this acts in the same way as rennet acts upon milk. only not pure. 15 with which Soul is “associated”. the difference being one of more or less. for this is introduced by the semen of the male. and it is this pneuma which Soul charges with a specific “movement” and uses as its “instrument” in generation just as it does in locomotion. 4 (739b 20-32) (tr. and the catamenia are semen. for rennet is a kind of milk containing vital heat. the liquid is separated off from it. and they exist in ovipara and vivipara alike. then.” in order to create his works of art. this quality. to which he imparts “movement. A. the egg so forming has in it the parts of both sexes potentially.  whenever a wind-egg is produced by any animal. like the solid scum which forms on boiled foods when cooling. As we shall see. For the female’s contribution also is a secretion. but has not the principle in question. is acquired by the sinewy substance. for these differ in being more or less glutinous and generally in excess and deficiency. Peck. the latter because the foetus must not be in a liquid but be separated  from it. 32: It may be noted here that the physical substance concerned throughout the theory of generation is pneuma [= spiritus] (a substance “analogous to aither. All bodies are held together by the [737b] glutinous. with the heavenly bodies: there must be something like pneuma which the mover of the heavens makes use of to move other things.fig-juice which curdles milk. just as there is a material pneuma which the soul as form uses to produce motion in things here below. for there is only one thing they have not in them. blood-vessels. and in what sense they have not. it has in it potentially even those parts  which differentiate the female from the male. too. rprt. Some of these are called membranes and others choria. the principle of soul. and as an artist uses his instruments. 1963). this is both a necessary result and for a final cause. Aristotle. so. milk and the  catamenia being of the same nature)—when. being actual sinew in some and its analogue in others. (emphasis added) Cf.  Liquid but corporeal substances become surrounded by some kind of covering on heating. When it has entered the uterus it puts into form the corresponding secretion of the female and moves it with the same movement wherewith it is moved itself. and the relation of the semen to the catamenia is the same. and the like. For this reason. the more solid part comes together. Sec. When such a principle has been imparted to the secretion of the female it becomes an embryo. which holds together the parts of animals. For the female is. Generation of Animals (London. L. On the Generation of Animals. so also the young born of a female are sometimes female and sometimes male instead. 1942.  membranes. for this too changes without becoming any part of the curdling masses. Aristotle. Cf. so that it does not develop into a living creature. 37 . I say. as it were. Now semen is a secretion and is moved with the same movement as that in virtue  of which the body increases (this increase being due to subdivision of the nutriment in its last stage).” the “fifth element. the former because the surface of a mass must solidify on heating as well as on cooling. they have it potentially but not actually.” the “element of the stars”). From the Introduction. which brings into one mass and fixes the similar material. a mutilated [or ‘defective’] male. as the embryo develops and increases in size. To the same class belong also skin. II.
as stated ( De Anima ii. ad 2). In perfect animals. the active force is in the semen of the male. Reply to Objection 4. then it already operates in act. 1. 412b 27—413a 3). 3-4. q. as is attested by its whiteness. comm. Therefore the sensitive soul cannot be generated from the semen. the vegetative soul exists from the very beginning.Cf. elemental heat is employed instrumentally by the soul’s power. In this matter. until it is actually informed by the sensitive soul. and the movement of an instrument ceases when once the effect has been produced. 89. 3. s. for it has been proved above (76. for no part of the sensitive soul is elsewhere than in some part of the body. But neither the sensitive soul itself nor any part thereof is actually in the semen. 38 . indeed. has been produced in one of the principal parts of the thing generated. 9. the generator begets its like: so that the form of the generator must be actually in the cause of generation. there is a certain heat derived from the power of the heavenly bodies. as it were. ad 9. c. 4). ad 3-4 (tr. Objection 4. which is impossible. Now it cannot remain. moreover. is. Nor is there anything unreasonable in this. In which spirit. then it is that the sensitive soul of the offspring begins to work towards the perfection of its own body. and again this is impossible. n. as the sensitive soul is in one who sleeps. this principle either remains after the animal is begotten. this again seems to be impossible: for thus an agent would act to its own destruction. II. 16 In contrast. maker and made: or it would be distinct therefrom.” Moreover. 3. but a certain movement towards that form. St. Consequently there is no need for this active force to have an actual organ. ibid. 1. Further. Animal. but as to the first act. which is the soul. a certain movement of this soul itself: nor is it the soul or a part of the soul. moreover. SCG II. 4) that in one animal there is but one formal principle. English Dominican Fathers): Objection 3. ad loc. as the Philosopher says (De Gener. for thus there would be identity between begetter and begotten. by the power of the active principle in the semen. because this force is not the principal but the instrumental agent. if there be in the semen any principle productive of the sensitive soul. Thomas. the generator and generated would be identical. it ceases to exist.. Summa Theol. obj. because there is not a particle of the body which is not made from the semen and by the power thereof.. as also by the nutritive power. or it does not remain.. art. cf. not as to the second act. but it is based on the (vital) spirit in the semen which is frothy. also St. De An. for thus. 118. when the semen is dissolved and the (vital) spirit thereof vanishes. save virtually. generated by coition. the seed of the male possesses a prior grade of potency (cf. Further. art. 16 But as soon as it begins to attract nourishment. Ia. also de Pot. q.. ii. <…> Reply to Objection 3. As to the active power which was in the semen.. but the foetal matter is provided by the female. 3. For either it would be identified with the sensitive soul of the begotten animal. it has been said that “man and the sun generate man. as the Philosopher says. If on the other hand the aforesaid principle does not remain. Therefore the sensitive soul is not produced through the semen. And after the sensitive soul. while in the semen there is not even a particle of the body. not as though the force itself which was in the semen becomes the sensitive soul. and which is derived from the soul of the generator. thus the form of a bed is not in the saw or the axe. by virtue of which the inferior bodies also act towards the production of the species as stated above (115. This matter therefore is transmuted by the power which is in the semen of the male. 3). by nourishment and growth.c. this would be more like nourishment and growth than generation. which cannot be. This active force which is in the semen. Thomas Aquinas. And since in this (vital) spirit the power of the soul is concurrent with the power of a heavenly body.
text 45). and similar animals) having a body formed of a series of rings. insofar as it undergoes change and is altered.v. when it is divided an animate part is produced having a distinct soul.): …But the position of Aristotle is much more reasonable. albeit virtualiter. they differ in this. and in On the Soul. the seeds of both the male and the female are in proximate potency to such a form: the male containing its active principle. but is in proximate potency. if the result of generation is a composite of matter and form. For the other powers in their operations use determinate organs: but the intellect uses none. dist. that the seed lives in potency and not in act. 19 On this comparison see our remarks below. it [namely. the female.Cf. art. q. Collins English Dictionary. and so the principle of such a composite cannot be a form separated from matter. “annulose: adj. B. And so since the seed is the final residue of food at its closest approximation to its final conversion. according to the Philosopher. 3. St. and this is the cause of its whiteness. Now this potency is not passive in the seed of the male in the way in which we say that wood and stones are in potency to a house (for in this way there is a power in the menstruum of the woman) but it is an active potency. that indistinct potency exists in it just as the form of the whole which does not exist in the part except in potency. as is said in On the Generation of Animals I. Now to this spirit the formative virtue is conjoined in the manner of a mover rather than in the manner of a form.text 39. s. Now the manner of its transmission is like this. Still. there is in it a potency to the whole and not any part in act. just as we say the form in the mind of the artisan is in potency to a house. whence. its passive one. at the end of the process.M. just as we also observe in annulose animals. and so a perfect soul remains in the part just as existed in the whole. Now the subject and organ of this power is the vital spirit enclosed in the seed. Now the seed when it has been separated is not yet similar to the whole in act. and food. Whence the Commentator in Book 7 of the Metaphysics says that that virtue is included in the seed in some way just as the movers are united to the orbs.A. Therefore before the final assimilation. whence in order for a spirit of this sort to be contained in the seed it is foamy. turns into nourishment for the body (the reason being that it nourishes insofar as it is in potency to flesh. Thomas Aquinas. it is produced in act having such a potency and form. the food that is to be turned into the substance of the body] must. with respect to the mode of operating is a mean between the intellect and the other powers of the soul. 18 in which. 18. c.” Since the part possesses the same species as the whole from which it was severed. In II Sent. (of earthworms. even if in some way it is its form. crustaceans. 39 . seeing that nothing begins either to come to be or to be generated except in accordance with the manner in which it has being: 17 and so we concede the sensible and vegetative soul to be transmitted. But this uses something bodily in its operation which does not yet have a determinate species. there is one soul in act. segmented. when it is turned into a determinate part in act such as flesh and bone. in fact. But when it is separated. the virtue of the species exists in it indeterminately to this or that [species] with respect to the proper virtue of a determinate part.19 17 That is to say. Whence the Philosopher in Book 17 of On Animals compares it to art. seeing that by reason of the slight differentiation into organs in those animals the part is practically identical to the whole.. 18 Cf. 2. the generator must also be such. it must possess that form in act right from the start. receive the species and virtue of nourishment. for. and this power Avicenna and the Commentator in Book 7 of the Metaphysics call the formative virtue: which virtue. and many in potency. since every univocal and proximate agent introduces into its patient its species. Conversely. But before it is resolved by the act of the generative virtue in separation from the rest of its kind. on account of which it is said in On the Soul II. And therefore after its division the soul does not remain in act but in potency. (tr.
c. and since it has already been stated that such is the character of the female—putting all these considerations together we see that the [727a] sanguineous matter discharged by the female is also a secretion. Summa Theol. Ia. for the loss of the pure and healthy blood is an exhausting thing.. and that in its final stage. a celestial body shares less in common with the activity of the rational soul. On the relation of the celestial element to the sublunar. then. for the hand also or any other bodily part is not hand or other part in a true sense if it be without soul or some other power. a celestial body can enter into the composition of mixed bodies only through the effect of its power. But since it is necessary (1) that the weaker animal also should have a secretion greater in quantity and less concocted. Second. their claim that light is a body is false (cf. 2). So that the semen which is to form the hand or the face or the whole animal is already the hand or face or whole animal undifferentiated. For in a certain way a rational soul takes its knowledge of truth from the sensory powers. q. and that they are analogous in females to the semen in males. then. ad 2 (tr. 7). and (2) that being of such a nature it should be a mass of sanguineous liquid. Arthur Platt). it follows that it will be either (1) blood or that which is analogous to blood. Freddoso): Reply to objection 2: Even though a celestial body is. It is plain. 40 . And this is the reason why it has so great power. cf. And such is the discharge of the so-called catamenia. either in virtue of its own mass or because it has a certain power in itself. and (3) since that which Nature endows with a smaller portion of heat is weaker. so much may be laid down. that each part of the body is made. Nor is it true that a bit of the fifth essence ( aliquid de quinta essentia) enters materially into the composition of the human body. for that which goes to all the parts of the  body resembles that which is left over. absolutely speaking. Thomas Aquinas. St. when concocted and somehow divided up. nonetheless. But since  it is from the blood. Hence. and what each of them is actually such is the semen potentially. 1. q. On the Generation of Animals (tr. I. Bk. therefore it is plain that semen will be a secretion of the nutriment when reduced to blood. for this reason also it is natural that the offspring should resemble the parents. art. 76. more noble than an earthly body. it is impossible for any part of the fifth essence to be divided off from a celestial body or to be mixed in with the elements—and this because of the celestial body’s impassibility. because a celestial body cannot be acted upon (cum sit impassibile).  On this subject. or whether it has in it some faculty and efficient cause thereof. First of all. but if not properly concocted has been known in some cases to issue in a bloody condition if one forces oneself too  often to coition. a. a. that the catamenia are a secretion. this claim is made by some who hold that the soul is united to the body by the mediation of a certain sort of light (cf. whose organs cannot be formed from a celestial body. being that which is finally distributed to the parts of the body. but is only called by the same name as the living hand. Since the semen is also a secretion of the nutriment. 91. 19 (726b 1—727a 3): We have previously stated that the final nutriment is the blood in the sanguinea and the analogous fluid in the other animals. I mention these alternatives here because we have not yet made it clear from the distinctions drawn hitherto whether it is the  matter of the semen that is the cause of generation. q. or (2) something formed from this.For the basis of the foregoing doctrine in Aristotle. and since the semen if properly concocted is quite of a different character from the blood when it is separated from it. cf. 67. Alfred J.
(tr. but by creation. which moves with an everlasting circular motion and so presupposes as its instrument a vital spirit pervading the cosmos as such. 41 . English Dominican Fathers): On the contrary. corresponding to the material principle the soul uses as an instrument must there not likewise be such a principle employed by the mover of the celestial orb? In other words. would not also the heavens? That is to say. as Aristotle shows. Thomas Aquinas. 737b 33-34). St. corresponding to the sublunary pneuma there must be a celestial ‘spirit’ with respect to which the former is said to be the likeness: “I mean what is called vital heat. In II Sent. so. seeing that an effect cannot be more powerful than its agent cause. it is now clear that the vital heat belonging to the seed stands to it just as the corresponding quality in the stars—which is their vital heat— stands to the aither. 2. q. But in the latter animals the soul is produced by the elemental power. 1. (tr. et nihil agat ultra suam speciem. sicut in virtutem primi alterantis. every activity of a lower nature is reduced to a heavenly virtue precisely as to the virtue of the first altering thing. Summa Theol. Now as we have seen. q. cf. the pneuma being its immediate subject. But the sensible soul cannot be educed by the virtue of the heaven.But to return to our immediate object. quod supposito secundum fidem nostram quod caelum sit corpus inanimatum. the virtus formativa of Thomas. <…> ad tertium dicendum. St. With respect to the comparison of the natural motion of the heart to that of the heavens.. ergo videtur quod non per operationem naturae. 18. ad 2. but it is the spiritus included in the semen and the foam-like. cum corpus caeleste inanimatum sit. and the natural principle in the spiritus [pneuma]. Therefore it seems that it is educed in being not by the activity of nature. art. B. But inasmuch as the one bears “the principle of soul”. But “the element of the stars” whose analogue here below is the principle of pneuma is nothing other than aither. which requires a fixed point as its center. On this matter. But if the former requires vital spirit in order to produce motion. art. The power in the semen is to the animal seminally generated. too. since the heavenly body is not alive. Thomas Aquinas. quia effectus non potest esse potior causa agente. as the power in the elements of the world is to animals produced from these elements—for instance by putrefaction. the counterpart of which in the heavens lies in the two poles of the celestial sphere. 3. while the element aither stands to it as its ‘principle’. would the other: cf. <…> To the third it must be said that.. obj. the fifth element. having supposed according to the Faith that the heaven is an inanimate body. being analogous to the element of the stars” (GA II.M.A. 3. 118.): praeterea. the expansion and contraction of the heart is due to that of the pneuma which he held to be diffused throughout the body. omnis operatio naturae inferioris reducitur in virtutem caelestem. nihilominus tamen ponimus quod motus ejus sit ab aliqua substantia spirituali sicut motore: Further. Thomas explain the way in which the heart moves as being comparable to the motion of a wheel. sc. and nothing acts beyond its species. sed per virtutem caeli anima sensibilis educi non potest. we nevertheless hold that its motion comes from some spiritual substance as mover.” Therefore also the souls of animals seminally generated are produced by the seminal power. Ia. Aristotle and St. according to Genesis 1:20: “Let the waters bring forth the creeping creatures having life. sed per creationem in esse educatur. This is not fire nor any such force. 2. dist.
are the counterparts to such a pivot-point? But. 7 (1072a 19-1073a 12). “this spirit appears to stand to the soul-centre or original in a relation analogous to that between the point in a joint which moves being moved and the unmoved” (De motu. and so must be something like the effervescence observed in an active substance (about which see the following note). the heavenly body.et cum motus sit actus motoris et mobilis. inasmuch as it exists in it by the intensity and power of the mover. for which reason must we not also suppose there to be a cosmic pneuma standing in the same relation to the axis of the celestial sphere the poles of which. si motus caelestis. In the case of reproduction. 42 . De An. in the way in which the virtue of the principal agent exists in the instrument. Paradiso. for the correlative in animal motion. at the end. And because the mover is a thing living with the noblest life.21 § 20 21 Cf. as he also explains. qualis est per animam sensibilem et vegetabilem. it must be the case that there remain in the motion not only a bodily virtue on the part of the mobile. Applying these principles to the movement of the heavens. but also a certain spiritual virtue on the part of the mover. of the sort which comes by the sensitive and vegetative souls. ch. animal.20 such a virtue would move by being moved by the love that moves the sun and the other stars. the aither. per modum quo virtus agentis principalis est in instrumento. is the cause of material life. whereas a spiritual virtue. cf. so. 10 (703a 12-14). just as the seed of the male consists in pneuma possessing vital heat as founded on the analogue of the element of the stars. est causa vitae materialis. must possess a vital heat in the form of pneuma. III. understood as “the first altering thing”. In the foregoing passage St. as we have seen. sed etiam virtus quaedam spiritualis ex parte motoris: et quia motor est vivens nobilissima vita. And since motion is the act of the mover as well as the mobile. is the movement imparted to the seed by the generator whereby his form comes to exist in it virtualiter in the manner of an instrument. and therefore stands to it just as the idea in the mind of an artisan stands to the instrument he employs in producing his work. Now as Aristotle explains in the case of animal motion.. itself founded on the element in which it consists. or fifth element. we maintain that. Canto XXXIII. ideo non est inconveniens. 10. Thomas distinguishes a bodily virtue from a spiritual one. inquantum est in eo intensio et virtus motoris. Metaph. XII. it is not unfitting if the motion of the heavenly body. as is elsewhere explained. too. a bodily virtue can only be the pneuma enclosed in the seed of the male by reason of which it is foamy and white. oportet quod in motu non tantum relinquatur virtus corporalis ex parte mobilis.
Form and Soul (Oxford.N. but the world too. (GA 3. sec. as in a fermenting liquid. That this is how Aristotle pictured the pneumatization seems to be confirmed by his description of male semen. between sexual and ‘spontaneous’ generation in Aristotle’s physiology: from a physiological point of view.In 22 The American Heritage® Science Dictionary Copyright © 2005 by Houghton Mifflin Company. a procedure we may safely assume he had occasion to observe. These tiny bubbles do not coalesce to form large ones and they do not immediately rise to the surface.. 11. a ‘frothy bubble’ is formed ( GA 3. Aristotle’s Theory of Material Substance: Heat and Pneuma.”22 For evidence of the Philosopher’s understanding of this property. 762a19 ff. then. it contains bubbles through and through—it remains thoroughly “pneumatized” in the precise sense of the term. and in water pneuma is present. 43 . 121-124. heat. rather. cf. which (d) carries vital. The action of heat on milk [121-122] almost from the outset (above 30 o C) causes the formation of minute bubbles throughout the liquid.The continued existence of bubbles throughout the liquid—its pneumatization—thus is a phenomenon which is characteristic of milk and indeed is due to some very specific chemical features. On the aforementioned quality of the pneuma. is potentially—present. III. he had in mind the singular characteristic features of the process in which fresh milk is heated and eventually boiled.. as long as milk is maintained warm. 11. the only difference relates to the source of the vital heat. The gas may form by a chemical reaction.. . 736a24). as in a carbonated drink. 1995).) Aristotle here says in so many words that (a) in all moisture pneuma is—and this means. Thus. they persist in the liquid and rise only very slowly.34 Now Aristotle considers milk one of the fluids produced in the body through the concoction of the blood. the following definition: “Effervescence. There is no essential difference. so that (b) upon heating by the sun’s generative37 heat (c) pneuma is formed (just as in the living body).. and my suggestion is that he took it as a model of how the pneuma can durably remain suffused in the blood: milk is the paradigmatic instance lurking behind the notion of a pneumatized fluid as a fluid in which an aeriform substance continuously inheres without separating off and rising to its natural place. The bubbling of a solution due to the escape of gas. Ch. and in all pneuma soul-heat is present.36 Our interpretation of Aristotle’s view of how connate pneuma is produced and maintained can be confirmed by considering the four following accounts in which pneuma is explicitly or implicitly involved: (1) The most impressive one is Aristotle’s account of ‘spontaneous’ generation: ‘Animals and plants are formed in earth and in the water because in earth water is present. so that in a way all things are full of soul. where they would vanish. is blood that has undergone further concoction: Aristotle says that the semen contains pneuma in the form of tiny bubbles (GA 2. generative. 2)—manifestly the pneuma of the semen does not separate off the fluid.B.. or by coming out of solution after having been under pressure. pp.35 Similarly. . Gad Freudenthal. cf.2.To improve our insight into Aristotle’s ideas in pneuma we should consider here not only the word.. 128-129: . which. when pneuma 34 35 [footnote omitted] [footnote omitted] [122-123] is produced in water by the action of the heat of the sun. like milk. I suggest that when Aristotle referred to the formation of pneuma within the blood through the action of vital heat. 2.
whose rationale was precisely to bridge the gap between the two competing construals of the elements [one being according to their proper places. 3. etc. respectively (e. and the more so the hotter (and purer) it is. because they are made natural to them. 44 . 2. 11. arg. [intervening text omitted. remain sometime after the action of the agent. 2. as is well known. Meteor.. on yeast making dough rise. cf. arg.g. n. Also 2. I.g. is of a fluid nature. remain in the things generated after the generation. and that heat is not proper to the wood.). but beyond its nature. Meteorology I. can warmer (and purer) pneuma be assumed to travel higher than less warm pneuma? For Aristotle’s answer. 4. 346b33. and Meteorology. N. wood is heated by fire. either of bodies or of animals. postulates the existence of a moist and a dry exhalation. unlike the connate pneuma. 3 (tr. And note as well the comparison of the aither with semen suggests that the former. [123-124] ‘spontaneous’ generation that initial pneuma is produced by the action of the heat of the sun. 341b5ff. Aristotle says. 3. 4. 6 743a33 f. raised by the sun from water (the sea. then. like the latter. 1. 346b29ff. is ‘most naturally moist and warm’ ( Meteorology I. receiving what the agent gives it as something foreign to it [matter is reluctant. GA 3. because they are in them as on the way to nature. 4. then the thing in motion must in the beginning of the motion undergo the impressions of the agent imperfectly.. n. 3. 4. [footnote omitted] Note Freudenthal’s description of pneuma as “aeriform substance”. 6: The impression of the agent does not remain in the effect if the action of the agent is ceased. but not forever. 359b34. Now the idea that the exhalations produced by the sun rise is self-evident: it is part of their definition. but cf. For the form and properties of generators.) 51 The vapour results from the action of heat on water. but dispositions and passions (properties).B.).)] a gap which forbade one to say that something rises because it is hot.. 340b2f f.36 37 [footnote omitted] GA 3. cf. 54. but in the end of the motion the things given to it by the agent become proper to it. 9. also called ‘vapour’ ( atmis. Michael Augros): Whenever something is moved by an agent to something which is the property of that agent. in the end. Aristotle.50 Physically speaking. 380b23 on the ripening of fruit] On [128-129] what grounds.B. The ‘exhalation from water’. the heat becomes proper and connatural to it. but in the end. separates off). 762a14. Aristotle calls ‘exhalation’. but then takes on things as its own]. unless the impression is turned into the nature of the effect. 52 On the basis of the theory of exhalations. the other according to the primary qualities (B. ibid. as connate pneuma results from blood within the body (except that the vapour. Meteorology I. 51 52 . On the nature of the transformation such as is involved in concoction. Summa Contra Gentiles III. the connate pneuma is somewhat analogous to what. on the scale of the entire world. then. E. when the wood is ignited.M. And likewise habits are difficult to change. 737a3. we must turn to his theory of exhalations. the connate pneuma can indeed be held to rise by virtue of its heat.) and the earth. then. 2. And Ch. In the present context we are interested in the first only. 2. Cf. 152. 9.A. because they are turned into the nature. ff. 755a17 ff. 354b31.
d. Supplement: On natural definitions: How they are dialectical: Cf. Charles De Koninck, Natural Science as Philosophy (repr.; Québec: Laval University, 1959), p. 1:
We are often told of a distinction between philosophical psychology and experimental psychology. This is a distinction that I do not understand. Take the beginning of the De Anima, where Aristotle shows that even here we must provide natural definitions as distinguished from the logical or dialectical. His example is that of ‘anger’. It is true that anger is ‘a desire for vengeance’. But this definition is purely formal, somewhat like the definitions of mathematics, i.e. ‘per species’. Now, in mathematics, formal definitions are sufficient to the subject, since the subject is abstract; anger, however, is also something physical, as may be seen in the behavior of any person in a rage. If we are to form a natural definition of what anger is, we will have to add something to that ‘desire for vengeance’, such as ‘attended by an effervescence of the blood about the heart’. A psychology which would confine itself to formal definitions would be no more than dialectical. (Notice, however, that this natural definition of anger is itself only dialectical, but dialectical in a different sense. For propositions—and a definition is virtually a proposition—may be called dialectical for two different reasons: either because the composition or division of the known terms which it comprises is no more than probable; or because one or both of the terms themselves are insufficient, which is the case of purely formal definitions of natural things. We have to do with something less than dialectical when the terms are themselves no more than likely constructs, even though they have some basis in experience. Such was the case of Aristotle’s ‘incorruptible’ heavenly bodies, and of Dalton’s ‘atoms’.) In the definition of anger as ‘a desire for vengeance attended by an effervescence of the blood about the heart’, the former part is certain, though dialectical; the latter part, taken by itself, is natural, yet dialectical qua insufficient even as a natural definition. Natural, because it refers to something sensible; dialectical because no more than provisional.
Cf. Charles De Koninck, The Unity and Diversity of Natural Science:
We must consider still another difficulty, one which is more obvious in our time, and that seems to justify the distinction between philosophy of nature and natural science. The ancients did not respect the prodigiously fruitful role of fictions—“logical fictions”, as Bertrand Russell calls them. Nor did Galileo or Newton, for the matter of that; a fact ironically brought out by Newton’s famous hypotheses non fingo. (Newton actually contrived most fruitful fictions, though he failed to realize that they were fictions.) The contemporary mathematical physicist knows that he can probe into the world of nature only by means of mental constructions suggested in part by experience, in part by mathematics. They are fictions in the strict sense of this term, whose power we must not underrate. The atom, for instance, is largely a logical fiction. If you have any doubts, look at what has happened to atoms since Dalton’s days. (I say “largely”, for in physics the mental constructs must have some foundation in experience and experiment, else they could hardly lead to further knowledge of nature)…. Now, all this faces us no doubt with a deep enough cleavage between diverse modes of knowing the things in nature. But does this cleavage restrict natural philosophy to our initial gropings under investigation? What we are agreeing to call philosophy of nature is experimental too, though not quite after the manner of mathematical physics nor even of advanced biology. I pointed out long ago that in the study of nature we must distinguish between strictly scientific knowledge (in Aristotle’s sense) and that which is called dialectical, as providing no more than an opinion. Now, opinions are still enunciated in words, and are in fact true or false if it be speculative knowledge that we mean to express.
Notice, however, that an opinion is not a fiction in the strict sense of this term. It is, at bottom an inquisitive proposition. The opinion that “the world is eternal” still leaves open the question whether the world really is or has to be eternal. We can unfold what we mean by “world” and by “eternal”, but can we in truth say the latter of the former? The notions of “world” and “eternal”, though vague, have a relatively stable meaning. What we are questioning is not their meaning, of course, but their connection in a proposition. Is such a proposition necessary? Is the eternity of the world a fact? But in mathematical physics, when words are used to describe, not how things are in fact, but merely how a certain symbolic construction has been laid down, e.g., that of the atom, we must be aware that, unlike the terms used in a statement about nature, the symbols, the construction, and the names we choose to employ for the purpose of communication do not have a stable meaning. The only stable meaning the word “atom” ever had was that of “indivisible”. In other words, we are now entitled to question not merely the connection of the terms, but the very terms themselves. At any rate, these are utterly provisional, whereas what “world” or “eternal” stand for are not.
e. On the principle of the motion of the heavens: Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book II: Creation. Translated, with an Introduction and Notes by James F. Anderson (Notre Dame, 1975), cap. 70, nn. 1-7:
Chapter 70 THAT ACCORDING TO THE WORDS OF ARISTOTLE THE INTELLECT MUST BE SAID TO BE UNITED TO THE BODY AS ITS FORM  Now, since Averroes seeks to confirm his doctrine especially by appealing to the words and proof of Aristotle, it remains for us to show that in the Philosopher’s judgment we must say that the intellect, as to its substance, is united to the body as its form.  For Aristotle proves in the Physics [VIII, 5] that in movers and things moved it is impossible to proceed to infinity. Hence, he concludes to the necessity of a first moved thing, which either is moved by an immobile mover or moves itself. And of these two he takes the second, namely, that the first movable being moves itself; for what is through itself is always prior to that which is through another. Then he shows that a self-mover necessarily is divided into two parts, part moving and part moved; whence it follows that the first selfmover must consist of two parts, the one moving, the other moved. Now, every thing of this kind is animate. The first movable being, namely, the heaven, is therefore animate in Aristotle’s opinion. So it is expressly stated in De caelo [II, 2] that the heaven is animate, and on this account we must attribute to its differences of position not only in relation to us, but also in relation to itself. Let us, then, ask with what kind of soul Aristotle thinks the heaven to be animated.  In Metaphysics XI , Aristotle proves that in the heaven’s movement two factors are to be considered: something that moves and is wholly unmoved, and something that moves and is also moved. Now, that which moves without being moved moves as an object of desire; nor is there any doubt that it moves as a thing desirable by that which is moved. And he shows that it moves not as an object of concupiscent desire, which is a sense desire, but of intellectual desire; and he therefore says that the first unmoved mover is an object of desire and understanding. Accordingly, that which is moved by this mover, namely, the heaven, desires and understands in a nobler fashion than we, as he subsequently proves. In Aristotle’s view, then, the heaven is composed of an intellectual soul and a body. He indicates this when he says in De anima II  that “in certain things there is intellect and the power of understanding, for example, in men, and in other things like man or superior to him,” namely, the heaven.  Now the heaven certainly does not possess a sensitive soul, according to the opinion of Aristotle; otherwise, it would have diverse organs, and this is inconsistent with the heaven’s simplicity. By way of indicating this fact, Aristotle goes on to say that “among corruptible things, those that possess intellect have all the other powers,” thus giving us to understand that some incorruptible things, namely, the heavenly bodies, have intellect without the other powers of the soul.  It will therefore be impossible to say that the intellect makes contact with the heavenly bodies by the instrumentality of phantasms. On the contrary, it will have to be said that the intellect, by its substance, is united to the heavenly body as its form.  Now, the human body is the noblest of all lower bodies, and by, its equable temperament most closely resembles the heaven, which is completely devoid of contrariety; so that in
Hence Augustine (De Vera Relig. Ia.” I answer that. therefore. text. Nor was there less diversity of opinion among the Doctors of the Church. 36). Now the noblest of all forms is the soul. moon. is adorned with living beings. Much more. and the beasts of the field. For the nobler a body is. the Platonists held that the heavenly bodies have life. Philosophers have differed on this question. to which the whole question is entirely irrelevant. to my mind. “The spirit goeth forward. we have spoken of this not as though asserting its accordance with the teaching of the faith. the movement of the heaven and the heavenly bodies are natural ( De Coel. But the sun. Objection 4: Further. 7. xii. Summa Theol. “Let no one esteem the heavens or the heavenly bodies to be living things. the first of movables is the heaven. Augustine says in the Enchiridion: “Nor is it certain. Objection 3: Further.8): and natural movement is from an intrinsic principle. But a body less noble than the heaven. the more nobly it should be adorned. the nobler must be its form. for instance. But only beings that are living move themselves. Therefore the heavenly bodies are living beings. 70. moon. text. which receive life from the power of the sun and stars. xxix) says: “Every living substance stands higher in the order of nature than one that has not life. as is especially evidenced in the case of animals generated from putrefaction. for they have neither life nor sense. as being the first principle of life. Now the principle of movement in the heavenly bodies is a substance capable of apprehension. with fish. therefore. should be living beings also. “was condemned by the Athenians for teaching that the sun was a fiery mass of stone. text. Damascene says (De Fide Orth. St. because. Dei xviii. are living beings. Objection 5: Further. and the latter seems to explain in that sense the words (Eccles. surveying all places round about. and must therefore have nobler forms. moon. and stars are a cause of life. a cause is nobler than its effect. birds. of all things that are endowed with movement the first moves itself. although to some they appear to be luminous bodies devoid of sense or intelligence. Objection 2: Further. and neither a god nor even a living being. and stars are nobler bodies than plants or animals. have the heavenly bodies a living soul. what is such of itself precedes that which is by another. But the sun.” The lights of heaven. English Dominican Fathers): Objection 1: It would seem that the lights of heaven are living beings. Therefore. 34. seemingly. On the contrary. 3 (tr. 41). q. Anaxagoras..  As for the heaven being animate.” On the other hand. Therefore the lights of heaven. i. 1:6). viii. and all the stars belong to the same community. It was the belief of Origen ( Peri Archon i) and Jerome that these bodies were alive.Aristotle’s judgment the intellectual substance is united to the human body not by any phantasms. but as its form.” 23 See the excerpt from the Prima Pars below. art. whether the sun. as is proved in Phys. 27).” 23 (emphasis added) Cf. ii). namely. and is moved as the desirer is moved by the object desired ( Metaph. Hence. 48 . the apprehending principle is intrinsic to the heavenly bodies: and consequently they are living beings. Thomas Aquinas. the nobler a body is. that of the angels. Now. as pertaining to its adornment. as Augustine mentions (De Civ. as is shown in the same book (text.
though he goes so far as to say that if the heavenly bodies are really living beings. do not need a body as their instrument. ad lit. which does not act through the body. A proof that the heavenly bodies are moved by the direct influence and contact of some spiritual substance. iii. text. by nature. iii. In examining the truth of this question. Augustine leaves the matter in doubt. which are not exercised through the medium of the body. though the body ministers. our body is a necessary instrument. From what has been said. The intellect. vi in Hexaem. it rests. as it were. it can only be equivocally. then. and generation. their souls must be akin to the angelic nature ( Gen. like bodies of specific gravity. on the part of one only. 49 . this does not appear in the movement of heavenly bodies. although capable of existing apart from it. is not a difference of things but of words. Augustine appears to be of the same opinion when he expresses his belief that all corporeal things are ruled by God through the spirit of life (De Trin. then. and is in proportion thereto. need be united to the latter as its form. without committing himself to either theory. he says. in order to move the heavenly body. that these bodies have life. can be exercised by the heavenly bodies. to their production. not that the soul. which perceives elemental qualities. Wherefore Aristotle ( Phys. after showing that the first mover is made up of two parts. Hence it is clear that the sensitive and nutritive souls must be united to a body in order to exercise their functions. as sensation and nutrition. we shall do well to bear in mind that the union of soul and body exists for the sake of the soul and not of the body. It will also be seen that the difference of opinion between those who affirm.) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. The Platonists explain the union of soul and body in the same way.But Basil (Hom. growth. and all the organs of the senses require a certain proportion in the admixture of elements. whereas the nature of the heavenly bodies is not elemental. for such operations are incompatible with a body naturally incorruptible. Enchiridion lviii). but by contact of power. except to supply phantasms through the senses. where such diversity of opinion exists. goes on to show the nature of the union between these two parts. There are. ii) maintain that the heavenly bodies are inanimate. Yet for some of these operations. Now the nature and power of the soul are apprehended through its operation. 18. This.43). since all the senses depend on the sense of touch. 4). but the matter for the form. then. for the form does not exist for the matter. and since Plato holds the heavenly bodies to be living beings. which is to a certain extent its end. Equally impossible is it that the functions of the sensitive soul can appertain to the heavenly body. It follows. is effected by contact which is mutual if both are bodies. and thus far is dependent on the body. But the operations of the intellect. possible that the functions of nutrition. the operations of the sensitive soul. the union of a soul to a heavenly body cannot be for the purpose of the operations of the intellect. cannot be attributed to the heavenly bodies. and not. however. only to consider whether the movement of the heavenly bodies demands a soul as the motive power. however. it is clear that the heavenly bodies are not living beings in the same sense as plants and animals. if one is a body and the other not. and that if they are called so. Accordingly. through which the nutritive soul operates. operations of the soul. viii. It remains. and those who deny. that of the operations of the soul the only ones left to be attributed to the heavenly bodies are those of understanding and moving. as a contact of a moving power with the object moved. makes use of the phantasms derived from the bodily senses. ii. this means nothing else but that substances of spiritual nature are united to them. as a mover is united to that which he moves. It is not. for appetite follows both sensitive and intellectual perception. and act as their moving power. 42. Hence it follows that they are moved by some intellectual substances. the moving and the moved. Moreover. as we have seen. lies in the fact that whereas nature moves to one fixed end which having attained. for example.
18. but not in a particular respect. Secondly. Secondly. whereas a soul does not do this. Reply to Objection 4: The movements of the heavenly bodies are natural.Reply to Objection 1: Certain things belong to the adornment of the universe by reason of their proper movement. The number shown to agree with modern astronomers. it seems to us that the order of their motions should be in accord with the order of numbers and according to the position of the bodies. concerning the number of motions of the stars. Exposition of Aristotle’s Treatise On the Heavens . But if the problem at hand is to be settled. So far. trans. Also as regards movement the power that moves the heavenly bodies is of a nobler kind. As to the first he does two things: First he shows what ought to be assumed in order to make the first question easier to resolve. 458. as we have said. 1964). not on account of their active principle. and do not act by the sole impulse of nature as do all irrational things. it is not conceded that the souls of heavenly bodies are nobler than the souls of animals absolutely it must be conceded that they are superior to them with regard to their respective forms. which is not in potentiality to other forms. and consequently its movement natural with respect to that active principle. Having proposed the two doubts. just as we say that voluntary movement is natural to the animal as animal (Phys. which act for an end as being masters of their act. P. at 459. then. from a certain natural aptitude for being moved by an intelligent power. the Philosopher here starts to solve them. Thomas Aquinas. Conway and F. Cf. for they are moved by a living substance. it is of the nature of an instrument. Book I. Reply to Objection 3: Since the heavenly body is a mover moved. Reply to Objection 2: One being may be nobler than another absolutely. is solved. he gives the solution. as the matter. 27). which acts in virtue of the agent: and therefore since this agent is a living substance the heavenly body can impart life in virtue of that agent. nothing is seen to be occurring unreasonably if the number of their motions does not proceed according to the position of the bodies. First he solves the first question. since their form perfects their matter entirely. viii. not by the union of the mover. lect. the second one (L. Reply to Objection 5: The heaven is said to move itself in as far as it is compounded of mover and moved. If this is assumed. St. 19). n. but on account of their passive principle. 458: Lecture 18: The first difficulty. R Larcher (Ohio. then. the principle that moves it may be called intrinsic. but by contact with the motive power. While. For the diversity and number of the motions is to be taken more in terms of a relation to the final good. As a consequence. as the form. with the moved. text. that is to say. which is 50 . we must assume that they have not only some sort of life but also actions – this being proper to things with a rational soul. He says therefore first  that the reason why the first question is difficult is that we investigate the heavenly bodies as though they were merely an orderly system of bodies without being animated. and in this way the heavenly luminaries agree with others that conduce to that adornment.
every motion [caused] by a soul is accompanied by labor and suffering. Question 1. Translation by Erik Norvelle. 1) It appears that the motion of the heavens is not from a soul or from an intelligence. (Norvelle’s note) 51 . St. being completely uniform. and not from anything which moves by understanding. Parma. Book VII. art. 3 (tr. Therefore it appears that the motion of the heavens is from its natural form. Therefore. But there would be no way to solve this question if they were moved by the sole impulse of nature. that [the heavenly body] is moved by itself. as is shown in the same place. Erik Norvelle):24 Article 3: Whether the motion of the heavens is due to an intelligence Regarding the third issue. Therefore it is not moved by a soul. because it would not be able to be continuous and uniform. But the heavenly body. One should note in this regard that it makes no difference whether we suppose that the heavenly bodies are moved by intellectual substances united to them after the manner of a soul. But a natural motion is that whose principle is a form of a natural body. 3) Further. or by these as separated. Book II.e. which would be required in order that it be an instrument for a vegetative and sensitive soul. as is clear from the comparison of the parts of the soul with the species of figures in On the Soul. as well as other differences of position. and another part the moved. 2) Further. as is plain from the words of the Philosopher in Ethics VII and Physics II. voluntary actions]. Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. But on the contrary. as heavy and light bodies are. But every such motion is the motion of an apprehensive power. Book II. the motion of the heavens is from some kind of apprehension. as the Philosopher states in On the Heavens. But the heavenly bodies cannot have a sensitive or vegetative soul. an intellective soul is not connected to a body except by the sensitive and vegetative soul. Therefore it appears that [the heavens] cannot be moved by an intellective soul. This translation is for informational purposes only. For the motion of the heavens is a natural motion. 1) it is proven in Physics. 1856. and should not be cited for the purposes of academic publications without prior comparison with the Latin text. 24 * This translation is based on the Latin text contained in Scriptum super Sententiis Petri Lombardi. Book II. unless it is that sort of thing of which one part is a mover.the principle in all things able to be done [i. 4) Further. does not have this kind of diversity of parts. published under a Creative Commons 2. Thomas Aquinas. Therefore it appears that it cannot be moved by a soul. But this is impossible to posit in the heavens. as is stated in On the Heavens.0 Non-Commercial Share-Alike license. But something moved by itself cannot exist. Cf. Book I. every body moved by a soul has a left and a right.. because they do not have a composite body. But the motion of the heavens is not of this sort. Distinction 14. we proceed as follows. 2) Every natural motion is from a body existing outside of its own location. Therefore it is necessary that the motion of the heaven be from some apprehensive power.
but because the celestial body itself is of such a nature that it naturally is susceptible to such a motion [imparted] by some intellect. like a cause proportioned to itself. But this our faith does not suffer. since it posits that only God is the creator of things. But this appears not to be true. all of which is also foreign to the heavenly body. For every motion is from some motor. are separated and remote motors. and another separated. Therefore it can be said that the proximate motor is its form or soul. according to the Law. The essential motor. which move the spheres in a proximate fashion. and thus labor and suffering would 52 . in that the higher Angels. and is therefore not appropriate for immediately directing the renewals of the diverse motions of the heavens. But in the motion of simple bodies. but not existence. and thus they demonstrated the number of intelligent movers on the basis of the number of these [moved and mobile things]. Hence it is necessary that there be a motor in which there are the particular forms which direct [the lesser things] in motion. as was stated above. which have more universal forms. or those things which are educed by the motor of the heavens. possesses universal forms. whereas the Souls of the spheres are said to be lesser. just as the Commentator says in the first book of his commentary on On the Heavens. but not immediately from God Himself: for this does not correspond to the order of divine wisdom. the Intelligences are created immediately by the First Cause. and these are called ministering Angels. Thus also Avicenna says that [those beings] called Intelligences by the philosophers are what. But we can sustain [their position] in this respect. even though the natural form is the principle of motion. which they called the soul of the sphere. which they called an Intelligence. and the accidental [motor] is that which removes that which blocks motion. And thus we can say that the Angels. but this is totally inappropriate for the celestial body. it should be stated that.I respond by saying that concerning this issue there are multiple opinions. The reason for this position was that an Intelligence. and thus it is probable that some created intellect is the proximate motor of the heavens. so also will be the motion of the celestial body. and from this there is produced the substance of the sphere itself. for then that motion would be caused by a soul against the nature of the moved body. are called higher Angels. For some say that. is the generator which gives form. a natural motion is to one place only. are motors. and from [the Intelligences] the soul of the sphere proceeds. and this they called the soul of the sphere. as there is in us. as Dionysius states. not because its active principle is some natural form. the motion of the heavens is said to be natural. but also in regards to matter. they assigned to every sphere two motors: one conjoined. 1) In response to the first argument. according to these thinkers. however. And thus Gregory [the Great] states that corporeal creatures are governed by spiritual creatures. But this position is partly heretical. which is God. as is proven in Physics. For nature is not said only in regards to the form. And further. because the spheres receive only motion from them. and is perfected by natural rest. just as the motion of other simple bodies is from their corporal natures. And thus others say that it must be the case that the motion of the heavenly body is from another intelligent being endowed with will. but not forms or souls. it is nevertheless not the motor. For these same [thinkers] hold that things proceed in an ordered fashion from God.e. and is of a body which exists outside of its natural place. not having a natural repugnance to this voluntary motion. 2) Regarding the second argument: the Philosopher is speaking against those who posited the heavens to be of the [same] nature as the inferior bodies. which have more particular forms. because it gives itself existence. as we said. and partly can be held in a Catholic manner. However. are proximate motors. whereas the inferior Angels. Nevertheless it should be known that the philosophers posited diverse motors in diverse moved and mobile things. i. Book VIII. as was stated before. the effect of which comes to the last things through middle things. such as Cherubim and Seraphim.
e.be necessary present in causing motion. But the heaven is animated and possesses a principle of motion. 314. in us that determinate part which is right never becomes left. he explains which dimension determines “up” and “down” in the heaven. nn. as is said in Physics VIII. (emphasis added) Cf. there will not then be violence nor labor. and its ‘left’ is the West. With respect to the first he gives the following argument : It has been previously determined that in things possessing a principle of motion. 3) Regarding the third argument: as the Commentator states in his book On the Substance of the Spheres. and which is down. St. 1964). i. Thomas Aquinas. later becomes left. Secondly. Nevertheless. but this is not the case in the heavenly body. as in the case of non-living bodies which do not possess within themselves an active principle of motion but a passive one only. there are found “such powers. After determining the question of the positional parts of the heaven according to the opinions of others. muscles and nerves. at 320. differences of position according to the respective virtues in the parts. and thus its ‘right’ is said to be the East. lect. Thirdly. because the part which is now in the East will later be in the West. Secondly. as are our bodies. First. since it is spherical everywhere. and ‘behind’ is the lower hemisphere. according to the Philosopher’s opinion. also. the Philosopher here discusses them according to his own opinion. the heavenly body is neither generable nor corruptible. from whence the motion originates. Secondly.e. About the first he does two things: First he proves his proposition.” i. 323. and thus according to the philosophers the soul of the heavens and that of man are not said univocally. in us these parts are diversified by figure and power. and ‘below’ is the Northern pole. 313-315: Lecture 3: How. But if we posit that that motion is from an intellect according to the condition of the body moved. the differences of position befit the parts of the heaven 313. are assigned differently to the heavenly body and to our bodies. in living bodies which possess a moving principle within themselves. Book I. trans.. he shows which part of the heaven is up. Exposition of Aristotle’s Treatise On the Heavens. these parts. as the Commentator himself states. the celestial body can be assigned differences of position. and ‘ahead’ is the upper hemisphere. Conway and F. in two regards. he excludes certain objections. As to this he does three things: First he shows that such positional differences must be in the heaven. and ‘above’ is the southern pole. P. at 317. namely. Similarly. and thus it does not need a sensitive soul. but in the heavenly body that part of the sphere which is now right. its motor does not acquire cognition from things. but has a kind of active knowledge. 4) Regarding the fourth argument: according to the Philosopher. 53 . This occurs because the power which brings out motion in us is the act of the body to whom organs are affixed. but this is not the case in the heavenly body. and thus it does not need any vegetative form. R Larcher (Ohio. and not merely with respect to us. 3.
inasmuch as it gives the form which is the principle of motion.That the heaven is animated he supposes from something proved in Physics VIII. (emphasis added) That the soul is the noblest form in lower things St. from its soul. And perhaps in accordance with this understanding of the matter some have said that “the motion of the heart is caused by an [angelic] intelligence. following Plato’s opinion. that all mobile beings must be reduced to one first self-mover that possesses its own active principle of motion and not merely its own passive principle. it makes little difference whether the heaven is moved by a conjoined spiritual substance called its soul. since the mover is nobler than the moved and since motion depends more on the former. because through it the soul attains the perfect existence of its species. yet for the spiritual substance it is nobler to be separated from a body. And according to this. moves the heaven as an object of thought and desire moves something. n. Now according to this. namely. then for that substance it is nobler to be in such a body than to be separated. or by a separated spiritual substance. This last consideration led Plato and Aristotle to posit an animated heaven. however. it seems better to say that the substance moving the heaven is separated from the body than to say that the heaven is animated. just as Aristotle says in the eighth book of the Physics (ch. namely. except that a greater dignity accrues to the heaven if it is considered moved by a conjoined spiritual substance. Now in regard to this way of causing motion. because the action is more perfect which is performed through a conjoined instrument than with a separated instrument. the motion of the heaven proceeds from its nature and from its soul: from its nature. the heaven is according to its soul something that desires and understands. as from a primary and active principle of motion. Consequently. that the soul of the heaven would be in a worse condition than the human soul. which is completely immobile. For this reason Plato was led to say that it is for the good of the rational soul to be separated from the body at some time. the motion of heavy and light things comes from that which generates them. to the extent that it moves the body with labor against its nature. it follows that. as from a secondary and passive principle. Thomas Aquinas explains in On the Motion of the Heart (De Motu Cordis). that although it is more noble for a body to have a spiritual substance conjoined to it. however. that the soul in it is nothing other than the nature of such a body. Consequently.M. for this will give greater nobility to the motion of the heaven. But an answer to this could be that in one sense it is nobler for the human soul to exist outside the body than in the body. The motion of the heart is therefore natural as following upon the soul. as such a body is apt to be moved in such a way. 256a1). Otherwise it would seem. namely.): 15. 315. Someone could object. For every property and motion follows on some form according to its 54 . For they say that Aristotle called the heaven animate not because it had a rational soul but inasmuch as it had a kind of life implanted in its body in such a way. But in respect to the natural existence of the soul it is better for the soul to be in the body. and principally of the heart. if there be a spiritual substance whose power is determined to the motion of the heaven. But that this is false is clearly shown by the words of Aristotle in Metaphysics XII to the effect that the first mover. indeed.” inasmuch as they held the soul to be from an intelligence. according to his opinion. inasmuch as it is the form of such a body. as was said above. as some mentioned by Simplicius would claim. B. 4. however. 15 (tr. inasmuch. which it moves without labor.A. But a separated substance whose power is not determined to this effect is absolutely nobler….
And so the motion following upon it is most similar to the motion of the heavens: for the motion of the heart in an animal is like the motion of the heavens in the world. (Basel/New York. as it were in a circle. Thomas does not consider the relation of the heart’s movement to that of the blood. and by its equable temperament most closely resembles the heaven. more perfect. it is made fluid again and pregnant with spirits and so to speak balsam is dispersed from here again. Thus the heart is the principle of life and the sun of the microcosm (just as proportionally the sun deserves to be called the heart of the world). so that in Aristotle’s judgment the intellectual substance is united to the human body not by any phantasms. so would the blood that of the heart. for example.” 25 26 “Noblest”. The circular movement of the heart in relation to that of the heavens: Cf. William Harvey’s Biological Ideas: Selected Aspects and Historical Background. the vapours lifted up are condensed. In the foregoing passage Harvey has in mind Post. William Harvey’s Circular Symbolism. It is this intimate hearth—the fundament of life and author of all—that is devoted to the whole body. Conversely. Walter Pagel. quickened and protected against corruption and clotting. which I give next. II. 82-83: In Harvey’s own words: “I began to think by myself whether it (the blood) has a certain motion. For the moist earth evaporates when heated by the sun. potent. fire. in the same way in which. Anderson (Notre Dame. and condensed into rain come down again. fervent heat.. accord. his approach and recession. namely the heart. so to speak. 26 In the same way in all likelihood it should happen in the body through the motion of the blood that all parts are nourished. which is above. the human body is the noblest of all lower bodies. with an Introduction and Notes by James F. and all this depends upon the motion and beat of the heart. 1975). its circulation would seem to follow from Harvey’s principles. as it were the treasure of life. warmed and quickened by the warmer. but as its form. 55 . vaporous.condition. does not pursue this part of the analogy. f. and that the blood is propelled from the heart through the arteries into the body and all parts … and back again through the veins … to the right auricle…. Harvey. 6:  Now. whereas St. that which has “the highest rank”. Book II: Creation. which afterwards I found to be true. it is through its virtue and heat that the blood is moved. however. 12 (96a 5-8). which is completely devoid of contrariety. here. perfected. heating and quickening it. that is. air and rain emulate the circular motion of the bodies above. thickens and as it were becomes effete—whence it returns to its principle.[82-83] ing to Aristotle. That the body is the noblest of all lower bodies he explains in Summa Contra Gentiles. just as upon the form of the noblest 25 element. Translated. spirituous and so to speak nutritious blood: that by contrast the blood in these parts is cooled down. n. but rather considers the blood’s effect on the body as resembling that of rainfall on the earth. And notice how his understanding of the circulation of the blood seems to demand the circular motion of the heart: for just as the cycle of evaporation and condensation follows the circular motion of the heavens. 70. Now the noblest form in lower things is the soul. follows motion to the noblest place. moisten the earth and in this manner generation takes place and similarly tempests and atmospheric phenomena develop through the circular motion of the sun. nourishing. through the natural. which most approaches to a likeness to the principle of the motion of the heavens. pp. the fountain and hearth of the body in order to recuperate its perfection. 1967). This may be called circular motion. An. cap.
p.. Aristotle. to syllogize from what is subsequent. and it is then that conversion takes place. an motionem quandam quasi in circulo haberet. and that is the meaning of the circular process. there is a kind of circular conversion in the sense that one passes from the first thing to the last thing. 12 (95b 37—96a 8) (tr. tr. and we observe that this may happen when the major and minor and also the middle terms are each of them consequences of the other. First. it is possible in these cases also to follow what has been established above. Roterod. 5-7) that causes and effects may be proved circularly. Cf. lect. 102 (“coepi egomet mecum cogitare. For if A is predicated— a20. 1628. and when the third is present the first recurs again. he elucidates it with examples (96a2). Bouchier): We see with regards to matters in process that production is effected in a circular manner.  When the earth has been moistened vapours must arise.46. When that happens a cloud is produced. ed. II. he proves his proposal. when that is present a third follows. ed. Bk. p. provided that the terms of the demonstration are taken in such a way that middle and extremes follow one upon the other: because in the case of things that are generated in that way. 56 . Some occurrences are universal— a12. WILLIS. From the cloud comes rain. and then a return is made from the last to the first. Secondly.. p. Now we proved at the outset [96a] ( Pr. and water in turn from earth. He says therefore (95b38) that since we observe a certain pattern of generation in things that are generated circularly. In the case of matters of production the method may be regarded as follows. and as a result of the rain the earth must be moistened. We have already explained After showing how one must take the middle.S. and when any one of the terms is present another follows. or is cause and effect. 1648. An. Now we observe in Nature— a2. In regard to the first it should be noted that because the circular movement of the heavens is the cause of generation in sublunar things. In actual fact— a8. De motu cap. IN THINGS THAT OCCUR ALWAYS AND IN THINGS THAT OCCUR AS A GENERAL RULE b38. as is explained in On Generation II. A CAUSE WHICH IS NOT SIMULTANEOUS WITH THE EFFECT IS TAKEN AS MIDDLE IN A DEMONSTRATION HOW ONE DEMONSTRATES THROUGH CAUSE DIFFERENTLY. O. Larcher. II. Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle by Thomas Aquinas translated by Fabian R. in things that come to be in a direct line. VIII. 12: Lecture 12 (95b38-96a20) HOW IN THINGS THAT COME TO BE RECIPROCALLY. the Philosopher now shows how one should take it in the case of things that come to be in reciprocal generation. II.”). Cf. Hence it does not follow that the same numerical thing is prior and subsequent. An. 42. it is stated in On Generation II that a kind of circular reciprocity is found in generation in the sense that earth is generated from water. namely. Post. HARVEY.P. which is the cause. E. Hence the process has returned to its starting point. although these things are not numerically but specifically the same.
it is necessary that rain water be formed. is not per se but per accidens. For if one were to assume the opposite by taking a middle which occurs universally and always.. First. i. or because they come to be as changeable things which always follow a uniform pattern. as it is stated in Physics I. still another comes to be. another comes to be. Then (96a8) he shows how one demonstrates through the cause differently in things which occur always and in things which occur as a general rule. it is necessary that in falling upon the earth it saturate it. whenever conclusions are converted. and when this is formed. however. and that other existing. Therefore. and B of C. Now this saturation of the earth was the very thing we took as being first. Yet this cycle of causes cannot be found according to the order which is found in per se causes. which is the middle. and as to subject. nevertheless if they are not entirely the same. and after they are formed. He says therefore first (96a8) that there are some things which come to be universally both as to time. he proposes what he intends. Thus it is clear that a cycle has been achieved in the sense that with one of them existing. then it follows of necessity that A is predicated universally of C both as to time and as to subject. but as a general rule. if A. For we will accept as the efficient cause of the rain-soaked earth. it is necessary to take a middle that occurs as a general rule. Secondly. he proves what he has proposed (96a12). Then (96a12) he proves that if one is to conclude to something that occurs as a general rule it is necessary to take a middle which occurs as a general rule. but specifically the same. and that one existing. for. Therefore. An example of this is that every human male develops a beard as a general rule. because in all cases.e. as in the case of heavenly movements. is predicated universally of B. for in per se causes it is necessary to reach some one thing which is first in each genus of causes as is proved in Metaphysics II. which is not numerically the same. Hence. Thirdly. whenever some of the premises can be syllogized from them. because always. but not vice versa. there are other things which do not occur in the sense of always. which is the same as being predicated always and of each thing. he sums up (96a20). Concerning this he does three things. as has been established in the foregoing. it is not the same saturation as the one from which we first began. but the material cause we take as water. a return is made to the first. and fire in turn from water. so in the case of things which occur as a general rule. there is nothing unfitting. But the fact that water is generated from fire. although it does not occur always.And this is suitable to the process of demonstrations. And although this is not fitting if the very same thing which was first the conclusion is later the principle of the same numerical thing (otherwise the same thing would be at once better known and less known). For if the earth is saturated with rain. when these are released and borne aloft. for example. it is necessary that clouds be formed. if we proceed from cause to cause in per se causes. For being is generated per se not from actual being but from potential being. which is the major extreme. Again. either because they maintain themselves as unchangeable things which are not subject to coming to be. as happens in things that are circularly generated. saying that a circular process is seen to occur in the works of nature. it is necessary to take a middle which is always. Then (96a2) he uses examples to elucidate what he has said. we are now saying that for something to be predicated universally is the same as 57 . whose matter is not vapor but the common matter of the elements. the heat of the air which is caused by the sun. this is a circular demonstration. which is the minor extreme. it is necessary that the action of the sun release vapors from it. just as in the case of things that occur always. there will not be a cycle.
being predicated of all and always. Then are all the things that come-to-be of this character? Or. within the field of being. must a house cometo-be? It seems that this is not so. For the prior was assumed to be so related to the posterior that. but only conditionally. Joachim): Wherever there is continuity in any process (coming-to-be or ‘alteration’ [337b] or any kind of change whatever) we observe consecutiveness. namely. their coming-to-be will not be necessary. it must at the same time be true to say of it that it is. (emphasis added) g. i. it is necessary that the posterior should come-to-be. on the contrary. the prior  also must have come-to-be: and if the prior has come-to-be. Hence we must investigate whether there is anything which will necessarily exist. necessary. saying that we have now established how the quod quid which is practically identical with the propter quid is assigned among syllogistic terms. such that those principles exist or come to be as a general rule. For it will always be necessary that some other member shall have come-to-be beforehand.  though it be true to say of something now that it is going to be. if there are to be foundations). Yet such demonstrations do not enable one to know that what is concluded is true absolutely but only in a qualified sense. impossible that they should fail to be able to occur? Assuming that what is prior must have come-to-be if what is posterior is to be (e. is the converse also true? If foundations have come-to-be. therefore. Hence sciences of this kind fall short of sciences which deal with things absolutely necessary. but because the future being of the posterior was assumed as necessary. that foundations must have come-to-be if there  is to be a house: clay. if the latter is to be. On cyclical processes: Cf. should be taken as existing as a general rule. whereas. If. On Generation and Corruption. that it is true in the majority of cases.  is it absolutely necessary for some of them to come-to-be? Is there. Therefore. as well as vice versa. in fact. unless it is necessary absolutely for the latter to come to be. If that be the case. Then (96a20) he sums up what has been said. when the prior has come-to-be the posterior must always come-to-be too. is it necessary that solstices shall come-to-be. II. though he is now going for a walk. then the posterior also must come-to-be—not. Aristotle. or whether everything may fail to come-to-be.e.g. the prior also must have come-to-be before it. And since in general amongst the things which are some are capable also of not-being. Now if the sequence of occurrences is to proceed ad infinitum downwards. on account of which it is necessary that this should come-to-be: consequently. inasmuch as we have shown how the several genera of causes are middles of demonstration according to the respective diversities of things. the nexus is reciprocal—in other words. H. when the being of the posterior is necessary. it is quite possible for it not come-tobe—thus a man might not go for a walk. it is necessary that the middle. 58 . it is clear that the same character will attach to them no less when they are coming-to-be: in other words. however. because of the prior. this coming-to-be after that without any interval. which is B. a house must come-to-be if foundations have come-to-be. i.e. the  coming to-be of any determinate later member will not be absolutely. in any sequence. Hence. But it has been assumed that A is predicated of C as a general rule. And this is the way that the principles which are taken possess truth. between things that cannot possibly not-be and things that can not-be? For instance. H. For if it be true to say of something that it will be. We have also shown in what sense there is or is not demonstration or definition of the quod quid. however. Thus it is obvious that certain immediate principles of things which occur as a general rule can be taken. 11 (336b 35-338b 19) (tr. a distinction in the field of coming-to-be corresponding to the distinction. so far as the certitude of demonstration is concerned.
g.e.  It is in circular movement. was seen on other grounds to be eternal since precisely those movements which [338b] belong to. we must begin by inquiring whether all things return upon themselves in a uniform manner. his coming-to-be does not presuppose yours)? Why. Nor again (ii) will it be possible to say with truth. its coming-to-be is eternal. when Water comes-to-be from Air and Air from Water. is not the same numerically. it is evident that those things. Those things. therefore. i. that it is absolutely necessary for any one of them to come-to-be. which need not always be. whose substance—that which is undergoing the process—is imperishable. That is why. on the contrary. members. a thing. In consequence of this distinction. i. must  be cyclical—i. it must be always in its coming-to-be. And this will hold continuously throughout the sequence: for it makes no difference whether we take two. But the first of these last two alternatives is impossible if coming-to-be is to be eternal. No: if its coming-to-be is to be necessary. not ‘numerically’: and if these too recur numerically the same. e. By this I mean that the necessary occurrence of this involves the necessary occurrence of something prior: and conversely. on the contrary. 30 Consequently it must be cyclical. conversely. For since the revolving body is always setting something else in motion. so that it must rain if there is to be a cloud and. there must be a cloud if it is to rain). and since they come-to-be cyclically. will be numerically. since the upper movement is cyclical. at any rate this does not happen with things whose ‘substance’ comesto-be-whose ‘substance’ is such that it is essentially capable of not-being. or whether. if the coming-to-be of any things is cyclical. if it is absolutely necessary.g. nor can it be eternal if it is limited. so in their turn do the things  whose coming-to-be the seasons initiate. the coming-to-be of a thing is necessary. therefore. for circular motion.since what is infinite has no beginning.e. though specifically the same. on the other hand. For coming-to-be must either be limited or not limited: and if not limited. And this is reasonable. the same in their recurrence: for the  character of the process is determined by the character of that which undergoes it. must always be. Then why do some things manifestly come-to-be in this cyclical fashion (as. that it is absolutely necessary for a house to come-to-be when foundations have been laid: for (unless it is always necessary for a house to be coming-to-be) we should be faced with the consequence that. though in some sequences what recurs is numerically the same. as well as specifically. the sun 31 moves in a determinate manner. the movement of the things it moves must also be circular. because there could not be any beginning . since that which ‘must be’ cannot possibly not-be. even in regard to the members of  a limited sequence. and of necessity will be. For what is of necessity coincides with what is always. or by many.e. whether the members being taken downwards (as future events) or upwards (as past events). the revolution of the heavens. In other words. Hence the nexus must be reciprocal. must return upon itself. And if. neither will there be in the infinite sequence any ‘primary’ member which will make it necessary for the remaining members to come-to-be. the seasons in consequence come-to-be in a cycle. the Air is the same ‘specifically’. it is also necessary for the posterior to come-to-be. and depend upon. given the prior. return upon themselves. necessary. 59 . Yet coming-to-be must have a beginning  (if it is to be necessary and therefore eternal). and since the sun moves thus. does this coming-to-be seem to constitute a rectilinear sequence? In discussing this. this eternal revolution ‘come-to-be’ of necessity. it is of [338a] necessity. It follows that the coming-to-be of anything. showers and air. and if eternal. We cannot truly say. it is necessary that each of them is coming-to-be and has come-to-be: and if the coming-to-be of any things is ‘necessary’. their coming-to-be is cyclical. when foundations have been laid. while men and animals do not ‘return upon themselves’ so that the same individual comes-to-be a second time (for  though your coming-to-be presupposes your father’s. in other sequences it is the same only in species. and in cyclical coming-to-be that the absolutely necessary is to be found. Hence a thing is eternal if its being is necessary: and if it is eternal. it must be either rectilinear or cyclical. Thus. e. whose substance is perishable (not imperishable) must ‘return upon themselves’ in the sense that what recurs.
” namely. Now those who posit that the world and motion are perpetual must also posit perpetual generation. at the end of the present book. of the perpetuity of generation absolutely speaking and in the qualified sense. the part which is first among all the parts.e. 1964). the answer to which resolves the previous objection. another cause may be assigned. With respect to the first he does three things: First. Thirdly. namely. both absolute generation and generation “with respect to a part. at 54. F. the material—for the moving cause has been discussed in the tract on motion. generation in a qualified sense.” i.” i. the heavens. where it was said that there exists a certain immobile mover for all time. namely. the moving or efficient cause. at 57. namely. Secondly . About this he does two things: First. the mover which causes perpetual generation because it is itself continually being moved. What the force of Aristotle’s arguments is with regard to the perpetuity of motion and the eternity of the world we have explained in Physics VIII and in On the Heavens I. he resolves it. Commentary on Aristotle’s Generation and Corruption by Thomas Aquinas.e. he uses this solution to resolve the main question (L. Larcher (Columbus. by Pierre Conway & R. in order to get a better understanding.. which is matter. he tackles the question. But regarding the other mover. pertains to another part of philosophy. the first mover.30 31 The text is corrupt at this point. namely. 53. Secondly. Reading ku/kl% o) h(/lioj. he explains the question he has introduced and says that one cause that may be assigned of the eternity of generation is that which is called “whence the principle [beginning] of motion comes. the mover of the heavens. we should inquire into the reason why generation always exists.e.. and that.e. he presents the question.” i. the previous objection should be handled to the extent that the proposition requires. 7 complete: Lecture 7 The cause on the part of matter in generation never fails. 8). tr..e. i. Cf. To determine concerning one of these. lect.” i. Bk. the Philosopher here introduces another question. I.. and a mover which is always moved. 60 . 52. After presenting an objection against the aforesaid solution. Regarding the first he does two things: First he introduces the question  and says that “these. how this is the cause “of each of the aforesaid. he introduces the question and resolves it.. hence in Metaphysics XII the Philosopher determined concerning the cause of the perpetuity of motion and of generation. And this is the one to be assigned now. Secondly. in Physics VIII. it will later be assigned. namely.
who says that it cannot be that the reason why generation does not cease is because that is infinite from which something is generated. since. First. he rejects some answers to this objection. For if. And lest this seem to be foreign to the proposition.e. so that nothing should be left now but emptiness. someone could say that. even though it is not infinite. endowed that principle with infinity. The first was that of the ancient natural philosophers who. 54. from natural body. Anaxagoras posited an infinitude of similar parts as principles. a substance. or quantity. Consequently. at 55. since accidents cannot exist without substance. For someone could say that. For all who posited one principle. Secondly. something can be taken which. as is said in Physics III. even though it is not infinite in act.” i. and if generation is ab aeterno. there is nevertheless an infinite in potency. or “where. there is always being subtracted some one or other of the things having natures. by corruption. Then  he pursues the question brought up. For just as what is generated absolutely comes to be from non-being absolutely. there is in nature no infinite in act. 55. Consequently. as well as an infinitude of indivisible bodies. as is evident in the division of a continuum. eternally revolves in nature. For that into which it falls cannot be a “something. 56..” or any of the other predicaments. therefore. for since absolute corruption is of substance. from a finite continuum. But this is excluded. be finally consumed—for example. the void. what is corrupted absolutely must fall into nonsubstance.. is finite. 61 . generation and corruption do not desert nature. Hence. A second answer is now presented and refuted . it will. in the sense that this non-being would be absolutely nothing. the same quantity is always removed. He says therefore first  that there seems to be sufficient reason to inquire as to the cause why generation is “folded around..e. so too.But now we must assign the cause why in perpetuity. Then  he excludes two answers.e. if that which is corrupted absolutely falls into non-being. it is plain that whatever is finite will be consumed if something is continually removed from it. something can be taken ad infinitum by division from a continuum without its being consumed. such as fire or air or water or something in-between. from which each and every being is generated. yet without its ever being totally consumed. falls away to non-being. For such a thing is impossible. it seems that some being will always be falling into non-being. attributed infinity to the principles. neither can the non-being at which corruption ends be quality. although there is not present in nature any infinite in act. in order to account for the perpetuity of generation. just as. out of which all things are generated. and which is the cause “classed under the head of matter. if the whole universe. he presents an objection that would deny perpetuity of generation. he [Aristotle] adds that perhaps it will at the same time be shown both what must be said about this question and what must be said of absolute generation and corruption.” namely. All these tenets are rejected by the Philosopher. then all being should have been exhausted long ago. whether there be one principle or many principles. Consequently. no matter how large.” i. so what is corrupted absolutely would seem to fall into non-being absolutely. Now. generation and corruption go on forever. as was proved in Physics III and in On the Heavens I. the material cause. Democritus however assumed infinite empty space. If. Likewise. i.
propera. and so on infinitely. John Henry Newman. Similarly. another is generated. however. The Second Spring: A sermon delivered to the First Provincial Council of Westminster. columba mea. Jam enim hiems transiit. he concludes to the true one.e. a thing is per se corrupted into a being in potency. from matter. Mary’s College. before Cardinal Wiseman and the Bishops of England. the Catholic faith does not suppose. in the First Provincial Synod of Westminster. what is generated being always less. amica mea. in St. Finally he concludes with the summary that the aforesaid cause should be considered sufficient as to why there should be absolute generation and corruption with respect to each and every thing in perpetuity. there is in generation and corruption a certain cycle which gives it the aptitude to last forever. On this account Aristotle in Physics I says that generation is per accidens from a being in act. make haste. in the way that a continuum is forever divided. that which has been generated. Such a division having been made. 10-12. [Preached on July 13.—Cant. ii. 1852: A Sermon by John Henry Newman. or “unceasing. That nature is cyclical: Cf.if one should continue to remove a palm’s breadth from the diameter of the heaven..e. and at the same time of the privation of the form to be induced. Arise. and vice versa.D. that the reason why the transmutation of generation and corruption must be unfailing. as has been said elsewhere. namely. imber abiit et recessit. 1852. That is why. v. for although that which is corrupted becomes non-being. Then  having rejected the false solutions. with respect to which it is now non-being in act. my love. The same holds for any other ratio. formosa mea. it is plain that what is taken after the half will always be less than what was taken before—for the half of the half is always less than the half of the whole.e. the original quantity will not be totally consumed.. and the half into half. with respect to which it is non-being in act. namely.. so that. The flowers have appeared in our land. 57. and to the privation of the previous form. Oscott. the way generation and corruption endure ad infinitum cannot be similar to the division of a magnitude ad infinitum. For the winter is now past. Hence Aristotle concludes that. upon the corruption of one thing.] Surge. D. is that the corruption of this is the generation of something else. (emphasis added) h. Consequently it does not follow that what is corrupted departs completely from the whole nature of things. then whatever is generated later will always have to be smaller in quantity. i. i. 62 . c.. Accordingly matter cannot remain without being subjected to some form. But we do not see this happen. namely. if a continuum be divided in half. and come. the rain is over and gone. according to which it is a being in act. my beautiful one. with respect to which it is being in act. Consequently. But a continuum is divided ad infinitum if subtraction is always made according to the same proportion—for example. if this is the way that generation and corruption are to endure forever. For generation per se is indeed from a being in potency. but per se from a being in potency. yet something else remains. et veni.” i. unceasing. which indeed is now subject to another form. my dove. This is true on the supposition that the world and motion are eternal—which. by virtue of what is subtracted from natural body being always less. Flores apparuerunt in terra nostra . and upon the generation of one thing another is corrupted. Consequently. which is as the subject of natural things—it is accidental to the matter out of which something is generated that it be the subject of another form.
yet how secure. by its own ultimate return.perseus. 1997. ever to be sober. C. the day is swallowed up in the gloom of the night. VII: BOOK II. and one death is the parent of a thousand lives. and easily discernible to the naked or even blind eye. The Nature of the Gods and Divination . thought. in such a harmony of all the parts of the universe without the continued influence of a divine spirit? (emphasis added) 27 (http://old. in other terms) the mind. which is preceded by spring. 1995):27 With or without astronomy. On the pagan view. is the great whole. I. I say. original edition H. Spring passes into summer. 1853). though it is ever dying. which is ever the same. to be born out of it. is but a testimony. like the alternate Seraphim. This order is unfailing. or more excellent.—which teaches us in our height of hope. if such a number of things regulated their own changes. Each hour. they must necessarily be a part of what we all allow to be the most excellent. Frail and transitory as is every part of it. the successor of winter. still it abides. the perpetual renovation of the material world which surrounds us. Amherst: Prometheus Books.edu/GreekScience/Students/Chris/TIME2. The sun sinks to rise again. G. “A Brief History of Time” (April 9. but we know.—yet one change cries out to another. xvi (tr. (emphasis added) Cf. It is like an image on the waters. how fleeting. by the revolution of that solemn circle which never stops. casual observation over the course of one’s life makes the cyclical nature of seasons self-explanatory. On the Nature of the Gods. Change upon change. and. VII. and in our depth of deso-lation. only the more surely. as fresh as if it had never been quenched. We mourn over the blossoms of May. never to despair. or (if you please. But where did we find that which excels all these things — I mean reason. prudence. Marcus Tullius Cicero. but we cannot even conceive anything superior to it. never-ceasing as are its changes. and not only there is nothing better. and if reason and wisdom are the greatest of all perfections. Who is not compelled to admit the truth of what I assert by that agreeable. One need have no appreciation of the earth’s orbit around the sun to discover that fall invariably follows summer. or more beautiful than the world. though the waters ever flow. that May is one day to have its revenge upon November.html [12/21/09]) 63 . which is the most important and valuable of all? But certainly there is nothing better. Dissolution does but give birth to fresh modes of organization. could the approach and retreat of the sun in the summer and winter solstices be so regularly known and calculated? Could the flux and reflux of the sea and the height of the tides be affected by the increase or wane of the moon? Could the differ-ent courses of the stars be preserved by the uniform movement of the whole heaven? Could these things subsist. cf. how certain. Bohn. as it comes. and from whence did we receive it? Shall the world be possessed of every other perfection. It is bound together by a law of permanence. understanding. restless and migratory as are its elements. in praise and in glory of their Maker. Yonge. and be destitute of this one. the constancy. because they are to wither. it is set up in unity. and through summer and autumn into winter. towards which it resolutely hastened from its first hour. at another be covered with snow? Or. and continued agreement of things in the universe? Could the earth at one season be adorned with flowers. to triumph over that grave. Book II. D. withal.We have familiar experience of the order. it is ever coming to life again.tufts. uniform. Chris Weinkopf.
and all those things that move in the air and in the water. …All things. supposing their coming into existence was due to the spontaneous. whose existence originated in change. Translated by E. and continue to abide in indissoluble union. and the maker cannot have been created. I mean angels and spirits and demons. 6. of increase and decrease. of quality and of movement in space. An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith by St John Damascene. and its preservation and government. it follows that they are also wholly mutable. such as fire and water. 34. are subject to changes of will. Naz. whether it be that they perish or that they become other than they are by act of will. will refuse to grant that all existing things. Vol. not only such as come within the province of the senses. whether it is a progression or a retrogression in goodness. to heaven and earth and air and the elements of fire and water? What  was it that mingled and distributed these? What was it that set these in motion and keeps them in their unceasing and unhindered course? Was it not the Artificer of these things. Orat. who supports and maintains and preserves and ever provides for this universe. Greg. and He Who hath implanted in everything the law whereby the universe is carried on and directed? Who then is the Artificer of these things? Is it not He Who created them and brought them into existence. air and earth. then. things are created. that exist. have combined with each other so as to form one complete world. What of that which has preserved and kept them in harmony with the original laws of their existence ? Clearly it is something quite distinct from the spontaneous. that is to say. For we shall not attribute such a power to the spontaneous . And what could this be other than Deity? 5. For things. Cont. Book I. must also be subject to change. or. are subject to change and transformation and movement of various kinds? For the things appertaining to the rational world. Reading προαίρεσιν. Pullan. 9. From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers. For things which are opposed in the nature of their existence must also be opposed in the mode of their existence. perhaps = to the accidental. must have opposite properties: who. a variant is τροπήν.For the Judeo-Christian understanding of this subject. whether a struggle or a surrender. or rather to what was in existence before these. But things that are created must be the work of some maker. The Creator. 10. viz. Second Series. were there not some omnipotent power which bound them together and always is preserving them from dissolution? What is it that gave order to things of heaven and things of earth. If.. Whose was the disposing of them in order? 64 . then. to the automatic. to chance. Or.W. teach us that there does exist a Deity. For if he had been created. what of the power that put all in order? And let us grant this.. 1899). Chapter III: CHAPTER III Proof that there is a God. then. 7. Who. Various reading. Watson and L. 9. he also must surely have been created by some one. and so on till we arrive at something uncreated. The Greek is τῳ αὐτομάτῳ.. but even the very angels. 8. are either created or uncreated. Gent. Athan. while the others suffer changes of generation and destruction. But if things are uncreated they must in all consistency be also wholly immutable. cf. Edited by Philip Schaff and Henry Wace (Buffalo. being uncreated. For how  could opposite natures. For. if you please. Things then that are mutable are also wholly created. And what could this be other than Deity? And even the very continuity of the creation. is also wholly immutable.
the constant or fitful blowing of the winds. Moralists of old. cf. Archibald Geikie. pp. clouds to 1 “Seek not out the things that are too hard for thee. is likewise of no avail. and on the other hand. παρα τὸ αὐτόματον. (emphasis added) For a witness from the Jewish tradition. indeed. when the sun is observed to rise and set.11. The Philosophy of Ibn Ezra. the unvarying succession of day and night. Naz. the [2-3] regular circling of the ocean tides. there is evidently another sense in which we may speak of the life of the Earth. When. First Essay. 1886). 1886). for instance. Elementary Lessons in Physical Geography (London. This variety [sc. De Incarn.. amidst all this change a certain constancy is noticed. Friedlaender. and on which. 4 (London. Greg. appear and disappear. The restless human mind tries to break down every fence. and the keeping of them in accordance with the principles under which they were first placed? 12. When and how did this series of successions commence? When will it end? We are as much at a loss to form a conception of its absence as to comprehend its continuance from infinity to infinity. Whose are the preserving of them. Vol. or. seasons to come and go. Consider. the orderly march of the seasons. Verbi. and said. and to comprehend the scheme of Providence by which all parts of the divine work are kept in marvellous harmony.” we are not satisfied with only admiring the grandeur of the Universe and the infinite wisdom of its Creator: we are anxious to know this great Architect. however. Athan. or. Introduction pp. and see who created these things. 13. of systems which flourished for some time and faded away. Or. (emphasis added) Cf. 1 The experience of previous failures.” also limited the sphere of the all-investigating human mind. the ceaseless flow of rivers. the question is naturally asked. yet in view of all that multitudinous movement which is ever in progress upon its surface. “we lift our eyes on high. in short all things to flow in a perpetual tide. change appears to be the rule of nature. near the beginning. than chance. 18) 2 ESSAYS ON THE WRITINGS OF IBN EZRA. in compliance with the exhortation of the prophet. i. § 65 . neither search the things that are above thy strength” (Ben Sira iii. 21). on the one hand. When. M. we know that our own existence depends. poets and prophets have warned us in vain against any attempts at realising such a desire as useless and even dangerous.. 2-3: 4. 1-2: HE who set a boundary to the ever-flowing billows of the sea. in order to pass into regions which are beyond its reach. Orat. observable “on the face of the earth”] is everywhere associated with life and movement. generation to succeed generation. “Thus far shalt thou go and no further. the manifold growth and activity of plant and animal life! Surely it was no strange thought when men in old times pictured this world as a living being. to understand the mysterious art by which He became the Author of all Beauty. And even though we cannot look on the earth as a living thing in the sense in which a plant or animal is so called. “For in much wisdom is much grief. Essays on the Writings of Ibn Ezra. quite other than the spontaneous. and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow” (Eccl. 34.
what are styled the gods are only the first principles. W. 28 The rest of the tradition has been added later in mythical form [ta de loipa muthikos ede prosektai ] with a view to the  persuasion of the multitude and to its legal and utilitarian expediency. Cf. And this.A.gmu. if all immaterial substances be called gods. something that pervades the cosmos (frr. 12. But the rest [sc. 11. they say these gods are in the form of men or like some of the other animals. and insofar as it was the best [expedient] for delivering the laws. while probably each art and each science has often been developed as far as possible and has again perished. Ross): [1074b] Our forefathers in the most remote ages have handed down to their posterity a tradition. In XII Meta. And what was introduced in the manner of fable he explains. Alexander Wilder. George Mason University: “Rather. Aristotle and St. in fact.M.i. of their traditions] have been introduced in the manner of fable for the persuasion of the multitude who cannot grasp intelligible things. But if one were to separate the first point from these additions and take it alone—that they thought the  first substances to be gods. when he says. B. one must regard this as an inspired utterance. have been preserved until the present like relics of the ancient treasure. then. Metaphysics. may be gathered from the things above. New Platonism and Alchemy: The Eclectic Philosophy: Aristotle declares: “The divine essence pervades the whole world of nature. 10. with others. as is clear from the things already said. The myths and stories were devised to make the religious systems intelligible and attractive to the people. D. and that the divine encloses the whole of nature.] seems to mean some sort of cosmic mind. 31 (tr. 14)…. and for their usefulness to human social life [conversationis humanae]. They are handed on. and certain animals. “Notes on Anaxagoras and Philolaus”. he compares the things that have been discovered about immaterial substances to ancient and popular beliefs. is the opinion of our ancestors and of our earliest predecessors clear to us. For they put down in the manner of fable certain men made into gods. Thomas on Thales’ understanding of the soul in the excerpts given below.” (emphasis added) (www. And he says that certain things were handed on by the ancient philosophers about the separated substances and were dismissed by those coming after them as being in the manner of fables. But if only the first principle be called God there is only one God. so that from inventions of this sort the multitude would be persuaded to tend to virtuous acts and turn away from vices. that these [celestial] bodies are gods. Supplement: The comparison of the universe with a living thing: That the divine encloses (or ‘pervades’) all of nature: Cf. n. lect. (emphasis added) Cf. and reflect that. who otherwise would not give them any regard or veneration. and they say other things consequent on and similar to these which we have mentioned. and certain things consequent to those things. (emphasis added) Cf. speaking of Nous.edu/courses/phil/ancient/anph2. Thomas Aquinas. these opinions. he [sc. Aristotle. that they are gods. St.” <…> 28 Cf. Anaxagoras. namely. also Rose Cherubin. adding that they said the gods were similar in form to men and to certain other animals. in the form of a myth [en muthou schemati].htm [12/18/08]) 66 .. Only thus far. and that what is divine contains [or encloses] nature as a whole.): Next. 8 (1074b 1-14) (tr. XII. and they said other similar things.
Therefore. which is one that moves itself. 1. or to motion in general.” On the motion of the heavens as founding the comparison with life. is by some called a “microcosm”. q. Thomas Aquinas. CHAPTER. II. For the motion of the celestial bodies in the universe of corporeal natures is like the motion of the heart by which life is conserved in an animal. art. invented to instruct the common people and secure their obedience to wholesome laws. Now in the universe the first motion is local motion. Freddoso): Objection 1: In Physics 8 the Philosopher says that motion is. Ia. Thomas. O. all natural things participate in life. ad 1 (tr. from what they recollect of him. But the First Principle is neither fire. who is the most perfect of animals.He [Proclus] also repeats the words of Aristotle: “There are many inferior theoi but only one Mover. a perfect animal. as it were. And so the Philosopher in the eighth book of the Physics (ch.. §58 TEXT 404b30–405b30 29 Cf. 3. Summa Theol. all the motions and all the forms which are so much admired in it.29 For related notions. then it would follow that its motion is the life of all natural bodies. pursuing this resemblance. [N. nor water. the Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima by Thomas Aquinas translated by Kenelm Foster. But all natural things participate in motion. De Motu Cordis (On the Motion of the Heart). For St. was also of opinion that the soul was a cause of motion. nor anything that is the object of sense. This is the general doctrine of the ancients. the motion of the heavens comes from a conjoined mover. And in both senses motion is said to be like the life of natural bodies according to a certain likeness and not properly speaking. Ia. 1.M. B.B.] 67 . Again. most approaches to a likeness of the whole universe: and so man. Alfred J. cf. STh. 70. a sort of life in all things that exist by nature. q. O.P.. A spiritual substance is the cause of the Universe. (New Haven. viz. as it were. All must be led up to this one primitive substance. if the whole corporeal universe were a single animal. a certain likeness of a vital operation in natural things. 1. Hence.—if it is a fact that he said that the magnet had a ‘soul’ because it attracts iron. art.): 9. n. cf. cf. Similarly. St. so that (as some have claimed) its motion were from an intrinsic mover. Thomas Aquinas. for which reason even in animals the principle of alteration appears to be local motion. says that motion is “like a kind of ‘life’ existing in all things”. 250 b 14-15). escaped the wreck of truth amid the rocks of popular errors and poetic fables. nor earth. which has. happily. St. obj. All that is concerning the human shape and attributes of these deities is mere fiction. every natural motion is. which is the cause of alteration as well as the other motions.A. and the source of all order.P. <…> Reply to objection 1: This passage from the Philosopher can be understood to apply either to the first motion. 1951): TEXT 404b30–405b30 BOOK I. which governs in subordination to the First. and Sylvester Humphries. the movement of the celestial bodies. CONTINUED PREVIOUS THEORIES SOUL AS IDENTIFIED WITH THE ELEMENTS It seems that Thales. all beauty. 18. 9 (tr.
so to say. Hence he asserted that a certain stone. that the latter was water. Orpheus. he said water was that principle. rather. he too is mentioned here. This Thales was one of the Seven Wise Men. Then at ‘Some cruder thinkers’. of whom Thales was one. though admitting water to be the first principle. and since all the principles or seeds of living things are moist. he defined it as that which has motive force. at ‘It seems that Thales’. for they wrote in verse on philosophy and about God. And after these three poet-philosophers came the seven sages. and that the so-called souls of living bodies were really nothing but the air these bodies breathed. Yet he did not follow his theory to the point of saying that soul was water. The other two were Museus and a certain Linus. then. (emphasis added) TEXT 409b18–411a7 BOOK I. II. he says. For Thales thought that the way to find the principle of all things was by searching into the principle of living things. saying that it is just as inadequate as the others he has criticised. would not. allow that the soul was water. For there were certain rather crude followers of Thales who tried to make the principle of one particular thing an analogy of the first principle of Nature as a whole. Thales. but whereas he. CONTINUED EMPEDOCLES’S THEORY OF COGNITION SOUL NOT COMPOSED OF THE ELEMENTS § 190. ‘a fact’. CHAPTER. the magnet. are included in the present list. and the latter that it was at the origin of movement. was indeed a sort of living soul. And a certain philosopher named Orpheus having fallen into a rather similar error in what he said about the soul. had a soul because it moved iron. was the first man to induce his fellows to live together in society. The criticism touches the inadequacy of the theory. 68 . Hippo tried to refute those who said the soul was blood with the argument that blood is not the generating seed (which they called ‘the inchoate soul’) of animate things. referring to those who said that water was the basic principle of things. Orpheus was one of those three early thinkers who were. Observing that moisture was fundamental to living things they concluded that it must be the first principle of all things. he thought that the absolutely first principle must be the most moist of things. which really means that his eloquence could melt the hardest hearts. So far indeed they followed their master. not for identifying the soul with fire.BOOK I. poet-theologians. Next. his cruder disciples (such as Hippo) asserted that it was water . in short. but because the former said that the soul was the source of knowledge and sensation. CHAPTER V. that he identified soul with a motive force. He identified this with water on account of its humidity. Now this Orpheus thought that the whole air was alive. he states the opinion of a philosopher called Thales who had only this in common with the others mentioned above.’. Thales devoted himself to the world of nature and was the first natural philosopher. For this reason it is said of him that he could make rocks dance to the sweet sounds of his harp. as we have seen. and this idea he expressed in verse. But the Philosopher objects to the Orphic theory. but rather a motive force. CONTINUED PREVIOUS THEORIES SOUL AS IDENTIFIED WITH THE ELEMENTS § 58. ‘which was overlooked’ by those who held this opinion. but while the others studied moral questions. a wonderful orator whose words had power to civilise wild and brutish folk. Hence Aristotle remarks ‘from what they recollect etc. and this being water. for there are many animals that do not breathe at all. Anaxagoras and Thales. <…> § 62. Aristotle states an opinion of some who made water the first principle.
something of it [the soul] will exist and something not. §§ 193-5 They seem to have held that there was a soul in these on the ground that the Universe is made up of homogeneous parts. § 198 I That the distinction here referred to between parts of ‘soul’ refers to mortal and immortal existence is St. Chapter I. (And one might well query why the soul in the air should be nobler and more enduring than that in animals. the argument used to support it. As the Holy One. divided off thus. blessed by He. LECTIO THIRTEEN § 192. Abraham Cohen. CONTINUED THE ELEMENTS HAVE NO SOUL And some say that the soul is intermingled generally with the Universe. Thomas’s interpretation of this passage (§ 197). so also the soul dwells in the inmost part of the body’ (Ber. and if there is a soul in them. the Philosopher is now led. blessed be He.) On either count the theory is absurd and unreasonable. an analogy is drawn from the incorporeal part of the human being—the soul. whereas it does so in composite beings?—and that.’ attacked. That is perhaps why Thales thought that the whole world was full of divinities. even though it is thought to be more excellent in the former. whether simple elements or things composed of these. so also the soul nourishes the whole body. from what has been said. involves several difficulties. at ‘They seemed to have held’. For why does the soul in fire and air not result in an animated being. 69 . cf. perhaps he thought that the entire Universe was alive and its life was divine. blessed be He. then. fills the whole world. 30 For an analogue in the Judaic understanding of God. To say that air or fire is an animal is among the most wanton of absurdities. by the same train of thought. sees but cannot be seen. so that if animals become animate by partaking of the containing element. § 192 This. dwells in the inmost part of the Universe. 6: To assist the comprehension of the place of the incorporeal God in the Universe. 10a). upheld by some. p. Everyman’s Talmud: The Major Teachings of the Rabbinic Sages (New York. And perhaps this was the notion that underlay idolatry. Omnipresence.TEXT 41a 8–411a25 BOOK I. either that it be of homogeneous parts. § 197 It is evident then. § 196 If then the air. so also the soul is pure. As the Holy One. There are. but the soul be composed of heterogeneous parts. it is inconsistent not to call them animals. he says. and that it is neither true nor apposite to say that it is in motion. they must say that the soul [of the Whole] is homogeneous with its parts. some who see a soul intermingled with everything. however. As the Holy One. so also the soul sees but cannot be seen. blessed be He. however. is pure. at ‘This. that just as soul exists everywhere in each living thing so a god was everywhere in the Universe30 and everything therefore was ‘full of divinities’. to discuss the notion. that the cause of knowledge being in the soul is not that soul is made up of the elements. he states this opinion. CHAPTER V. or that it be not in any and every part of the whole. It is necessary then. As the Holy One. This perhaps is what Thales meant when he said that everything was full of gods. and then. be homogeneous. so also the soul fills the whole body. Having stated and rejected the theories and arguments of those who maintained that the soul was composed of elements. First. And the opinion itself is first stated and then. 1949). The Doctrine of God. blessed be He. ‘As the Holy One. according to which a soul is intermingled with the elements. nourishes the whole world.
Therefore either of two awkward consequences flow from this theory. after which.e. why air and fire are not animals. that all the containing air was alive. § 198. If all the parts of air. Neither of these two predications made’ by the ancients was. is not immortal.e. and one would expect the soul to be all the more powerful where the element is pure and simple. To say that fire or air is a living body is most improbable in itself. that is to say. the foregoing reasons furnishing the foundation for the comparison of the cosmos to a living thing. Again . for it would follow that there was no difference between souls that exist in bodies and those that do not. in all the elements. however the objections are put. which came into contact with the bodies of animals through their breathing. § 196. he says. i.e. evident’ he draws a general conclusion from all the foregoing discussions. and is unsupported by any good reason. was the cause and principle of animal life. So much should be clear to anyone who has followed the discussion up to the present. he says. if a soul exists in air and in fire (and of these two especially this was asserted) it is hard to see why it does not make ‘animated beings’ of them. whereas the soul of this or that particular animal ‘does not exist’. at ‘They seem to have held’. which is against those who said that all the air had a soul. At ‘If then’ he refutes this argument. But in accordance with the first explanation. however. of the whole air. 70 . And to deny that things which have souls need be living bodies is most unreasonable. the air. i. i. he states the reason used in support of this theory and refutes it.e. The reason. Then at ‘It is evident’ Aristotle concludes this part of the discussion of earlier opinions. But if the soul’s parts are heterogeneous while the air’s are homogeneous. for. and (3) the place of air in the phenomena of ‘life’.’ he points out. since the elements are simple . is immortal. then the same is true of the soul. the result is damaging to this theory. according to them. and that movement is in it for the same reason. one might ask.e. i. not so the former. against this opinion. as that which has never ceased from vivifying animate beings.§ 193. that it presents certain difficulties. it is contradicted by experience. those outside and those breathed in. But. but this has been disproved.. sentient animals. The assumption is that. the soul of air ‘exists’. (emphasis added) One may therefore liken the world to an animal and its motive principle to the soul on the basis of three things: (1) the ubiquity of motion in the universe. because the portion of the air removed and inhaled by an animal is of a like nature to the air as a whole. i. § 197.. as it were. why the soul which they place in the elements should be considered higher and more immortal than the soul of things composed of elements. § 195. Observing that that part of ‘the containing element’. at ‘It is. one may therefore speak of a ‘soul’ of the world and the like without being committed to the view that the world as such is an animal. then the soul is not in every part ‘of the whole’. why some philosophers seem to have thought that a soul existed in ‘these’. (2) the inference that a ‘motive force’ even in inanimate things like a magnet suggests that all things are full of soul. was that they thought that the whole and the parts in elements were of the same nature. Then. they thought it necessary to conclude that the soul of the whole was ‘of the same specific nature as the parts’. are homogeneous.e. a portion of the soul of the whole air. For instance. the soul of the animal itself is. either true or well-expressed. i. he says. At ‘This. Things composed of several elements are animals precisely because they contain a soul. But on their own principle this is clearly false. For the latter constitute knowing. § 194. namely that knowledge in the soul is a consequence of its being composed of elements.
The Compendium of Theology. Thomas Aquinas. ST I. cf. Ryland): CHAP.—He who is not visible to human eyes. translated by Cyril Vollert. being Himself the Father of both sensible and invisible things. They say that God is present and exists in all things “by His power in so far as all things are subject to His power. But God is in man. men of Greece.--THE CHRISTIANS WORSHIP GOD ALONE. and this. Does my master command me to act as a bondsman and to serve. if I am not disposed to comply with the usages of some of them. do you wish to bring the civil powers. Him we know from His creation. nor comes within the compass of human art. since even by nature we spontaneously love. is not to be honoured equally with the perfect God . can I adore my own servants? How can I speak of stocks and stones as gods? For the Spirit that pervades matter is inferior to the more divine spirit. I acknowledge the serfdom. (St.J. Now this wonderful union. (emphasis added) On the right way of understanding the presence of God to the world. ch. The sun and moon were made for us: how. Tatian. J. and enjoys God in all fullness and sweetness. cf. for He who is in want of nothing is not to be misrepresented by us as though He were indigent. into collision with us? And. more so than the friend is united to his most loving and beloved friend. I am ready to render it.. by His essence. which is properly called “indwelling. and apprehend His invisible power by His works. He is invisible. not pervading matter. by His presence. inasmuch as He is present to all as the cause of their being” (St. Man is to be honoured as a fellow-man. God is a Spirit. iv (tr. and seek after the good. 1947). not only as in inanimate things. will I not obey. Our God did not begin to be in time: He alone is without beginning. 130: CHAPTER 130 GOVERNMENT OF THE WORLD BY GOD Second causes do not act except through the power of the first cause. desire. as in a pugilistic encounter. Louis.” differ[s] only in degree or state from that with which God beatifies the saints in heaven.. Leo XIII. S.3). IV. Cf. 71 . Address to the Greeks. God by grace resides in the just soul as in a temple. in a most intimate and peculiar manner. Thomas. but the Maker of material spirits. also St. then. but will rather die than show myself false and ungrateful. 1897). n. impalpable.For the Christian alternative to the pagan point of view. In such event the mover and the movement must be simultaneous. Nor even ought the ineffable God to be presented with gifts. E. why am I to be abhorred as a vile miscreant? Does the sovereign order the payment of tribute.8. just as the movement of a mobile object is caused by the motion of the mover. Divinum illud munus (May 9. The action of any of them is caused by God. even when assimilated to the soul. From this proceeds that union of affection by which the soul adheres most closely to God. Moreover. Consequently all the agents through which God carries out the order of His government. can act only through the power of God Himself. But I will set forth our views more distinctly. and He Himself is the beginning of all things. inasmuch as all things are naked and open to His eyes. God alone is to be feared. and of the forms that are in matter. For what reason. I refuse to adore that workmanship which He has made for our sakes.. 9: It is well to recall the explanation given by the Doctors of the Church of the words of Holy Scripture. Only when I am commanded to deny Him. but because He is more fully known and loved by him. c. thus instruments operate under the direction of art.
as Gregory says (Moral. Secondly. as was shown above. First. English Dominican Fathers): I answer that. 104. for there are some things of such a nature that nothing can corrupt them.Hence God must be inwardly present to any agent as acting therein whenever He moves the agent to act. art. The same principle applies to natural things. similarly God must unceasingly confer existence on things if they are to persevere in existence. (emphasis added) Cf. Thus all things are related to God as an object made is to its maker. Summa Theol. which consists in the putting together and arrangement of the materials. thus a person is said to preserve anything by removing the cause of its corruption. 1. by Himself. a thing is said to preserve another ‘per se’ and directly. Ia. since it would then be the cause of its own form. But we must observe that an agent may be the cause of the “becoming” of its effect. But existence is that which is the most intimately present in all things. but not directly of its “being. xvi). Therefore the “being” of a house depends on the nature of these materials. The continuous shining of the sun is required for the preservation of light in the air. St. so that not for a moment could it subsist. it may be the cause that “this matter” receives “this form.” This may be seen both in artificial and in natural beings: for the builder causes the house in its “becoming.” And this is to be the cause of “becoming. Such activity is. but not all. and results from the natural qualities of certain things. indirectly. Thus whenever a 72 . whom he guards from falling into the fire. but it can be the cause of this form for as much as it is in matter—In other words. (tr. we are not to suppose that the existence of things is caused by God in the same way as the existence of a house is caused by its builder. Thomas Aquinas. and thus the builder is directly the cause of the becoming of the house. For the being of every creature depends on God. But a maker and the object made must be simultaneous. the constructing of the house. a process that ceases when he desists from his labors. which is essentially the same as the form of the other. Thus a cook dresses the food by applying the natural activity of fire. Hence God is necessarily present to all things to the extent that they have existence. the house still remains standing. just as in the case of a mover and the object moved. and fire causes fire. When the builder departs. q. thus a builder constructs a house. However. Therefore God must be in all things…. In this manner all creatures need to be preserved by God. just as its “becoming” depends on the action of the builder. but so far as they continue to exist. namely. For the builder causes the existence of the house only in the sense that he works for the existence of the house as a house. and wood which are able to be put together in a certain order and to preserve it.” For it is clear that the “being” of the house is a result of its form. but would fall into nothingness were it not kept in being by the operation of the Divine power. In this way God preserves some things. Both reason and faith bind us to say that creatures are kept in being by God. so far as it is its cause. we must consider that a thing is preserved by another in two ways. To make this clear. This is made clear as follows: Every effect depends on its cause.” but he is not the direct cause of its “being. so that it is not necessary to keep them from corrupttion.. and this not only so far as they begin to exist. indeed. But God is directly. and accidentally. Now it is clear that of two things in the same species one cannot directly cause the other’s form as such. the cause of every existence.” as when man begets man. neither will it be directly the cause of “being” which results from that form. stones. when what is preserved depends on the preserver in such a way that it cannot exist without it. c. as a man may be said to preserve a child. by making use of cement. but it will be the cause of the effect. Another point: not only the action of secondary agents but their very existence is caused by God. in its “becoming” only. For if an agent is not the cause of a form as such. and communicates existence to all things just as the sun communicates light to the air and to whatever else is illuminated by the sun.
12) he says: “As the air becomes light by the presence of the sun.” Therefore as the becoming of a thing cannot continue when that action of the agent ceases which causes the “becoming” of the effect: so neither can the “being” of a thing continue after that action of the agent has ceased. 12): “If the ruling power of God were withdrawn from His creatures. In catabolism. Water is vital both as a solvent in which many of the body’s solutes dissolve and as an essential part of many metabolic processes within the body. “Water”. and all nature would collapse. consequently it is not merely the cause of “becoming” but also the cause of “being. On the other hand.natural effect is such that it has an aptitude to receive from its active cause an impression specifically the same as in that active cause.” (emphasis added) j. without water. Wherefore if it were to be reduced to the perfect form of fire. Supplement: The importance of water for life: Cf.” In the same work ( Gen. as Augustine says (Gen. Now every creature may be compared to God. which is the principle of light. because water is a matter susceptive of the fire’s heat in the same way as it exists in the fire. Effects on Life:31 From a biological standpoint. their nature would at once cease. the light ceases with the action of the sun. For as the sun possesses light by its nature. however. Water is also central to photosynthesis and respiration. air is not of such a nature as to receive light in the same way as it exists in the sun. such as gas absorption. glucose.org/wiki/Water [02/01/10]) 73 . In anabolism. and as the air is enlightened by sharing the sun’s nature. Metabolism is the sum total of anabolism and catabolism. when the sun ceases to act upon it. ad lit. by reason of the imperfect participation of the principle of heat. so that its essence is not its existence. Therefore. in the same way as it exists in the agent: as may be seen clearly in all agents which do not produce an effect of the same species as themselves: thus the heavenly bodies cause the generation of inferior bodies which differ from them in species. whereas if it has the form of fire imperfectly and inchoately. since His Essence is His existence. the effect has not this aptitude to receive the impression of its cause. so is man enlightened by the presence of God. Therefore. while. the heat will remain for a time only. It carries out this role by allowing organic compounds to react in ways that ultimately allow replication. since it has no root in the air. dust collection. then the “becoming” of the effect. it would retain that form always. etc. as the air is to the sun which enlightens it. the free encyclopedia.g. water is used to break bonds in order to generate smaller molecules (e. but not its “being. water has many distinct properties that are critical for the proliferation of life that set it apart from other substances. on the contrary. Sometimes. Such an agent can be the cause of a form as such. water is removed from molecules (through energy requiring enzymatic chemical reactions) in order to grow larger molecules (e. starches. Wikipedia. ad lit. viii. and in His absence returns at once to darkness. so God alone is Being in virtue of His own Essence.” depends on the agent. All known forms of life depend on water.wikipedia. Water is thus essential and central to these metabolic processes. whereas every creature has being by participation. fatty acids and amino acids to be used for fuels for energy use or other purposes). leaving us to muse about what processes would be in its place. the air does not continue to be lit up. these metabolic processes would cease to exist. Photosynthetic cells use the sun’s energy to split off water’s hydrogen from oxygen. iv. and not merely as existing in this matter.” This is why hot water retains heat after the cessation of the fire’s action. Therefore. which is the cause of the effect not only in “becoming” but also in “being. triglycerides and proteins for storage of fuels and information). even for a moment.g. Hydrogen is combined with CO 2 (ab31 (http://en.
making Him exist apart from the Universe. The Ancient Theology did not so separate God from the Universe. Mortimer J. a single substance. by a constant and regular progression. The Great Ideas: A Syntopicon of Great Books of the Western World (Chicago. had sought for God or the Cause of all. on which acted the Abstract Cause. being as it were its head. Thus he made the Universe a great intelligent Being. which man has not. fruit of the intelligence. The highest portion of the Universe. what man has in himself. the Soul of the World to that of man. and intelligence. Adler. or little world. as possessing in miniature all the qualities found on a great scale in the Universe. Chapter 51. Therefore Pythagoras called man a microcosm. All living cells use such fuels and oxidize the hydrogen and carbon to capture the sun’s energy and reform water and CO 2 in the process (cellular respiration).32 He denied the doctrine of the spiritualists. movement. On man as a microcosm: Pagan and Christian views on the divine which pervades all things: Cf. Morals and Dogma of the Ancient and Accepted Scottish Rite of Freemasonry. as having in itself perpetuity of movement and life. and one God who pervades all things . a perpetuity of existence. and besides. like Moses. Albert Pike. whose continuous parts extended through all the Universe.” man has only to exercise the divine spark of reason in himself in order to be at home in a world which reason rules. so that. act everywhere equally nor in the same manner. therefore the Supreme Cause of all. does not know who he is. the Universal Soul that moves. while the Philosophers of Egypt and Phoenicia. of growing. isolated from it. like the soul in the human body. The World or Universe was thus compared to man: the Principle of Life that moves it. had placed the Supreme Cause in the Universe itself. 1952). partaking of elementary Nature. having in itself. the immortal bodies that form the harmonious system of the heavens. II. In the seven concentric spheres is resident an eternal order. like man—an immense Deity. a God. this Universal Soul does not. real authors of all the old Cosmogonies.” writes Marcus Aurelius. the world and all its parts are in God. in the view of Pythagoras.” According to the Stoic emperor. without separation. 1871: God. “does not know where he is. Vol. which thus became no more than a material work. and. in the view of Pythagoras. and reproducing himself. Everywhere extended. seemed to him its principal seat. He does not hesitate long before the dilemma that “it is either a well-arranged universe or a chaos huddled together. (emphasis added) Cf. was ONE. Aristotle’s obersvations that the divine encloses nature. outside of that ALL.” In the belief that it is through and through an orderly world 32 Cf. nor what the world is. by his reason and intelligence partaking of the Divine Nature: and by his faculty of changing aliments into other substances. This Eusebius attests. to that which moves man. life. and there was the guiding power of the rest of the world. and that the soul of the world is homogeneous with its elements. prepared for the Supreme Council of the Thirty Third Degree for the Southern Jurisdiction of the United States: Charleston. in saying that but a small number of wise men. or inequality. and in its parts. difference. k. for whom “there is one universe made up of all things. And he who does not know for what purpose the world exists.sorbed from air or water) to form glucose and release oxygen. 74 . who had severed the Divinity from the Universe. “World” (Introduction): HE who does not know what the world is. in their view.
Montaigne is also willing to conceive the universe as the stage on which man acts his destined part. then man belongs both to this world and to another—the realm of spiritual creatures which is also part of the created universe. On this view. his strength.” How then does the world appear? Is it. Though man is greater than the earth he treads or the skies he watches. which is his whole honor. and bringing the sky down beneath his feet. the infinite substance which exceeds the sum of all the finite things that exist only as its modifications. The cosmology that “is associated in our minds with the name of Copernicus” displaces man and shrinks him. and the foundation of his being. as for the Stoics. only presumption or conceit can save man from being dwarfed by the world. in terms of his own reason and knowledge. taken by Christian theologians. should call himself master and emperor of the universe. Whether God is the prime mover of the universe. that the “admirable motion of the celestial vault. in all its vastness. its lord and master? Man deceives himself. What could lead him to believe. as Montaigne thinks he should. that we consider “man alone. but only a tiny speck in a world-system of a magnitude hardly conceivable. Montaigne thinks. armed solely with his own weapons. man “feels and sees himself lodged here. the fearful movements of that infinite sea. if he pictures the world thus. But science robs man of such conceit. Montaigne adds. were established and have lasted so many centuries for his convenience and his service? Is it possible to imagine anything so ridiculous as that this miserable and puny creature. Plotinus.” NOT ONLY IN THE reflections of Marcus Aurelius. to know 75 . without outside assistance. according to Freud. is unaffected by the world’s coming to be or passing away. . nailed and riveted to the worst.” how absurd for him to imagine himself “above the circle of the moon. and if “world” means the physical totality. and man has a special place of honor in the hierarchy of beings which constitutes the order of the created world. amid the mire and dung of the world. Sometimes the whole universe lies on one side of the infinite distance between the Creator and His creation. though the resulting pattern of thought varies according to the direction in which thought moves from any one of the three to the other two. the whole world is less than God. and Hegel. These three ideas always interpenetrate each other. God is not part of the world. the transcendent One from which emanates in all degrees of being the multiplicity of intelligible and sensible things. or the Absolute Spirit which manifests itself historically in both physical and psychical nature-on any of these views cosmology merges with theology. when it realizes that the earth is “not the center of the universe. uncreated and coeternal with the divinity which dwells in it.” how can he regard himself as occupying an exalted position in the universe? Deprived of the religious faith that he is made in God’s image and that all the rest of the visible universe is made for him. including mind as well as matter.” With a Christian’s faith in God’s plan and providence. governed by providence rather than by chance – Aurelius is willing to assume whatever place destiny allots him in the universal scheme. the deadest. who is not even master of himself . Humanity cannot hold on to “its naive self-love. the least part of which it is not in his power to know.” Freud writes. but throughout the tradition of the great books. But suppose. and the most stagnant part of the universe. the human habitat—the home of man. “Everything harmonizes with me. as in the theories of Aristotle. and deprived of divine grace and knowledge. “which is harmonious to thee. . he asks. For Spinoza and Hegel. the conception of the world or universe is inseparable from the ideas of God and man. Sometimes “world” means the all-embracing universe. the eternal light of those torches rolling so proudly above his head. Who has made it out of nothing and Who. Montaigne.” Except “by the vanity of this same imagination” by which “he equals himself to God. a thing of soul as well as body. in the freedom of His act of creation. on the lowest story of the house and the farthest from the vault of heaven. and Freud.– a cosmos rather than a chaos. the world is not part of God. Spinoza. nor is there any whole which embraces both. O Universe. much less to command?” If.” he says.
Lucretius exiles his papier-mâché gods to the interspaces where they “lead lives supremely free of care. Tanner Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils London: Sheed & Ward. each and every man in turn but mirrors back his own mysterious self. Yet from time to time defeat reminds him that the world remains unruly.” Socrates suggests in the Philebus that “in reality they are magnifying themselves. It is thrown together by blind chance rather than designed by a presiding intelligence. For a Christian.” writes Lucretius. reflecting in the unity of a single creature both spiritual and corporeal realities. for the most part. and in this unequal struggle science alone gives him the sense-or perhaps the illusion-that at least in his little corner of the world his mind may dominate. its matter and mind. Orthodox and Reformed traditions) Prepared by Rev David Jones MA MSt.” Nevertheless. 33 Of course the viewpoint of Isaac Newton finds a way to reconcile a world of matter in motion obeying fixed laws and a belief in a provident cause setting all things on their course. to look upon the individual man as a microcosm mirroring the macrocosm. and in which. (emphasis added) For the Judeo-Christian perspective. The universe obeys no laws except the laws of its own matter in motion. gazing on the gold doubloon he has nailed to the mast as a reward for sighting Moby Dick. he holds no checkrein to prevent his being overthrown. the doctrine of a world soul animating the body of the universe is repeatedly proposed in the dialogues of Plato as a way of understanding man. man is burdened with heavy cares. cf. Bridle its matter and harness its energies as he will. “A Theologian’s Brief On the Place of the Human Embryo Within the Christian Tradition. The world’s body and soul. Considering the philosophers who assert that “mind is the king of heaven and earth. Its order or structure is more than divinely instituted. 1990.” For their own happiness. 30 Creed of Nicaea. Catholic. he must be entirely self-reliant. Captain Ahab. which.31 The beginning of each human being is therefore a reflection of the coming to be of the world as a whole. and all there is of it can be reduced to atoms and the void. the question of the status of the human embryo is directly related to the mystery of creation. The dominant note here is that of man against the world. as with Lucretius and later philosophers of a materialist cast. like a magician’s glass. the world is all there is.” But man is not so fortunate. It is the indwelling divinity itself.”34 The Linacre Centre for Healthcare Ethics Reproduced with Permission (Submitted to the House of Lords Select Committee on Stem Cell Research by an ad hoc group of Christian theologians from the Anglican. but neither is he. Since he is one of nature’s progeny.the world is to know God. The Linacre Centre for Healthcare Ethics. In a world that is not made for him. he may not be wholly alien in this world of material forces. and that mad or at least cryptic Platonist. observes in soliloquy that “this round gold is but the image of the rounder globe. “But always acts of her own will. In the context of the creation of things ‘seen and unseen’ 30 the human being appears as the microcosm. 5. Some theological principles 16.” A third alternative remains.net/writers/mis/mis_02christiantradition1. assured of nature’s hospitality. It reveals the creative act of God bringing about the reality of this person (of me). N. 34 (http://www.lifeissues. godless.html [11/18/08]) 76 . There is a mystery involved in the existence of each person. like a beloved son. are there to be seen in miniature. she has / No part of any godhead whatsoever. p. I. 33 “Nature has no tyrants over her. Sometimes. London. in an analogous way to the creation of the entire cosmos. Such views of the world tend.
as it were. and they shall be created. 7: For having made the body..P. that the hearts of men. Thomas Aquinas. but the outpouring of the Holy Spirit is to be understood. destroyed by sin. Creed of Lateran IV. The Eighth Article. Re-edited and missing chapters supplied by Joseph Kenny. IV. In The Catechetical Instructions of St. The Divine Institutes. Ph. cf.T. O. out of nothing. of the dust of which we have said that it was formed. The reason is that one must repair that which one has made. which is everlasting. Thomas Aquinas THE EIGHTH ARTICLE: “I Believe in the Holy Ghost. Book II. pp. for God. S. Wis. rather Moses said the outpouring of the Holy Spirit was superimposed on the human soul. Lactantius. Translated with a Commentary by Rev. 19. (emphasis added) Cf. St. Another doubt arises from Cyril’s statement that “when in Genesis 1 109 God is said to have breathed the breath of life into the face of man in order that man might become a living being. And what is more.” It is necessary. and Thou shalt renew the face of the earth. D. On the ‘vital source’ of man’s soul. Rudolph G. In The Ante-Nicene Fathers: translations of the writings of the Fathers down to A. we do not call this breath of life the soul. and who shows how from this it does not follow that it is of the divine substance: for it is a figurative way of speaking. created everything: “Thou lovest all things that are. For were it the soul. (Baltimore. Tanner p. Collins. 110 This is contrary to the explanation of Augustine 111 who claims that by that breath is meant the human soul. F.D.. Contra Errores Graecorum by St. et M. Cf. The Catechism of St. translated by Peter Damian Fehlner. the body out of the earth. 13. 325. Introduction by Rev. 30. therefore.D. that is. Bandas. but only that he made the spirit. Dionysius says: “Divine love did not permit Him to be without offspring.” Many benefits come to us from the Holy Ghost.B.” Thus. Div. which is composed of opposing elements. 25. ciii. that is the soul. For he consists of soul and body. S. Thomas Aquinas. The Apostle’s Creed.I. that it might bear the similitude of the world itself.S. out of heaven from God. Ph. Nom. Now. because God has made all things through Him. it appears to 77 . John Damascene Exposition of the Orthodox Faith II. ch. 50: The Catechism of St. be made anew by the Holy Ghost: “Thou shalt send forth Thy Spirit. (1) He cleanses us from our sins... the soul would be uncangeable and would not sin because it would be of the divine essence..D. He breathed into it a soul from the vital source of His own Spirit.D. as it were. of heaven and earth: since the soul by which we live. O. Joseph B. Thomas Aquinas. and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made. 230. 112 meaning not that the Holy Spirit breathed as a body. the soul is created by the Holy Spirit. 48. 20.P. xi. Vol. by loving His goodness. Thomas Aquinas.31 Gregory of Nyssa On the Making of Man.D. Chapter 27: CHAPTER 27 How the assertion that the breath of life which God breathed into the face of man is not the rational soul. Ps.. 1939).” <…> [49-50] 18.12. has its origin. N.
Mazzetti. See also: De Mixtione Elementorum ad Magistrum Philippum de Castro Caeli (On the Combination of the Elements to Master Philip of Castrocaeli). 111 De Gen. 1. then. VII. abbreviated by Peter Lombard II Sent. the “giver of life”. whereas the heart stands to the body as the heaven to the world. from the Thesaurus ass. “the Creator Spirit” (Veni. (emphasis added) Cf. c 2 (PL 34. 109 110 Rather Gen. 112 Figurative way of speaking: thus Peter Lombard. also The Catechism of the Catholic Church. Byzantine Troparion of Pentecost Vespers. Lib. Cyril’s explanation cannot be described as literal. 291: 291. Here the life of the soul is expressly declared to be different from the life which is through the Holy Spirit.131 131 Cf. 36. 34 (PG 75. c. As a composite of body and soul. All rights reserved. Bart A. 584 D). man is the image of the world. Creator Spiritus”. the last Adam became a life-giving spirit. ad litt. 5-12. St.. the principles of which are earth and heaven. Nicene Creed: DS 150. Hymn “Veni. Hence that inbreathing by which man became a living being cannot be understood as the grace of the Holy Spirit. Consoler”. and then the spiritual”. Thomas Aquinas. d 17. c 1. of matter and spirit. Hence. § (c) 2013 Bart A. 2:7. 356). but only allegorical. Mazzetti 78 . Creator Spiritus). 15 (45): The first Adam became a living being. …The Church’s faith likewise confesses the creative action of the Holy Spirit. Trans. “O heavenly King. But it is not the spiritual which is first but the physical. n. the “source of every good”.contradict statements of the Apostle who says in 1 Cor.
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