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SOMALI PEACE CONCERNS AND ARTA OUTCOME

ABDISALAM M ISSA-SALWE

1. INTRODUCTION

Between March 2000 and August 2000 at Arta, a small town in the Republic of Djibouti another
Somali peace meeting was held. After six months, the peace meeting, known officially as the Somali
National Peace (SNP) ended up with the formation of a Transitional National Assembly, a Transitional
Constitution and the election of an Interim President. Some saw this as destabiliser and the return of
the old clique of the former dictatorial regime (thus Arta Group), whilst others saw it as the 'route’ to
the revival of the central state.

The Somali National Peace (Geeddi Socodka Nabadda) was the thirteenth Somali peace meeting since
the disintegration of Somali state in the early 1990s. This peace process was made of three symposiums:
the Technical Consultative Symposium, the Business Community Symposium, the Elders Consultative
Meeting, and the Somali National Peace Conference (SNPC), also known as Arta Conference. It is the
last one which gets the most attention, as it was the major conference which was leid by the three
symposioums.

In general, the SNP has been seen as the most serious attempt to solving the Somali crisis. Unfortunately,
its resolution, the Arta Outcome, fell short of becoming an answer to the Somali dilemma. This paper
attempts to examine the theoretical background of the Somali National Peace, and what let its outcome to
curb a process which was supposed to open new paths towards the reconciliation process.

2. THE PEACE INITIATIVE

In theory, Somali National Peace was expected to define a movement, a peace process. Although this
definition may seem mockery for Arta’s opponents and for those who were disappointed with it, the
principal guidance of the peace proposal included a ‘Convoy of Peace’ (Geeddi Socodka Nabadda),
which was to involve a process to transform the Somali conflict into peace by sending the traditional
leaders to all Somali regions. This approach was not only searching for a solution but hopefully initiating
a process within the war-thorn society affected, with the aim of empowering actors within the affected
society. A 'Convoy of Peace' describes the progression of the process to peace movement.

President Ismail Omar Guelleh of Djibouti who proposed the initiative at the 54th General Assembly
of the United Nations on 23 September 1999 triggered the proceedings of the Somali Peace Process.
This novel proposal that was meant to open a new dawn to the Somali crisis stimulated two factors.
Firstly, the peace talks were to be shifted to the civil society. In other words, the victims of the civil
war were to lead the peace process. The objective was to revive the conflict management of Somali
society which broke down during the civil strife. All societies possess conflict management
institutions. They may be formally established or informal procedures. This method was seen as the
practical way which could lead to a sustainable peace in the country.

Secondly, in reaction to the first factor, a popular interest by the Somali society was generated. The
Somali people gave their overwhelming support to the Djibouti peace initiatives, as they felt the
speech had shaken the conscience of the international community over their ‘indifference’ to the
Somali tragedy. There are several reasons why Somalis felt the Djibouti proposal as a promising
international solution to their dilemma: (a) Somalis share with Djiboutians the same ethnic group
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(during the colonial period Djibouti was known as French Somaliland), and (b) Somalis felt betrayed
by the apathy of the international community towards their problems.

The UN Security Council welcomed President Guelleh’s initiative. This initial support followed the
eighth Summit of Heads of State and Government of IGAD meeting in Djibouti on 26 November
1999. IGAD issued a resolution in support of the Somali peace initiative. Similarly, other international
organisation forwarded their support to the initiatives. Some of these organisations were the
Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the Arab League, IGAD Partners Forum, and the Organisation
of Islamic Conference.

2.1. BRIEF THEORETICAL BACKGROUND TO THE DJIBOUTI-SPONSORED PEACE CONFERENCE

Looking at the background and development of Somali peace developments in the last decade, no one of
them could be expected to have a conceptual foundation. Thinking about this may sound bizarre, as all
previous peace conferences were hastily set without prior preparation and rarely had clear direction. The
Somali peace conferences which had a major impact as well as theoretical background were the Addis
Ababa Agreement held in 1993 and the SNP in Arta. While Addis Ababa Agreement was set in a very
short period and was sponsored by the United Nations, the Djibouti-sponsored Arta Conference took time
to take off. The only peace process which was to take more time was the proposed peace process by the
defunct National Salvation Council (NSC) which was formed on January 3, 1997 in Addis Ababa by 26
Somali political factions. Under the NSC, also known as Sodare Group, the reconciliation process was
supposed to culminate in the IGAD-sponsored Bosaso National Reconciliation Conference in early 1998.

Theoretically, the UN Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) inspired the
Djibouti-led Somali Peace Process. This had begun in late 1993 in what is generally known as a
“Culture of Peace” approach. A similar approach had been previously implemented in countries such
as Germany, Malawi and Cambodia.1

The first UNESCO-sponsored Culture of Peace Symposium on Somalia was held in Sana’a, Yemen
between 17 and 20 April 1995. A follow up meeting in Addis Ababa was held the following year. In
both meetings, Somali intellectuals, Somali peace organisations such as Somali Peace Line and
international organisations took part. The objective of the symposium was to “chart a course towards
an eventual and peaceful Somali culture”.2 The conferences focussed on three themes for debate: the
first being the restoration of Somali social fabrics; the second, the rehabilitation of the Somali state;
and the third, the reintegration of Somalia into the international community of nations.

As part of “The Social Integration and Development through Building Culture for Peace”, UNESCO
commissioned a survey to find out the potential of Somali culture and art in dealing with the Somali
civil strife.3 The survey was curried over by two researchers: Abdullahi Shirwa and Maxamed Daahir
Afrax. Shirwa was to look into the socio-political transformations taking place in Somalia following the
breakdown of government institutions.4 Afrax, on his part, identified cultural means and elements which
could help change the culture of violence to that of peace. Both of them gave an inside analysis of the
Somali situation.

Afrax in his report, “Channels of Communication for Peace-building in Somalia”, proposes the use of
literature and culture as the medium to solve the communication breakdown among Somalis. The main
concern or problem is seen here as communication breakdown within the Somali society. Afrax’s
recommendations comprised two goals. The first proposed the promotion of a non-formal education
for peace by the use of the media. The aim here is to use education and mass media in the process of
disseminating information pertinent to a Culture of Peace. Here, in the author's view, mass media
using Somali cultural material is considered as a potential force for mass enlightenment and hence,
behavioural change within Somali society. Along these lines, modern media have to teach the younger

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generation their culture, particularly that part of their culture which has good values. Similarly,
Samatar considered that poetic medium in Somali as “an institution which has a cohesive function”.5

Departing from this prospect, the purpose of media is to use as instrument to influence and change
people’s opinions, attitudes, actions and behaviour. On the other hand, however, media can serve to
repress as well as to liberate, to unite as well as to fragment society, both to promote and to hold back
change.6 Despite the degree of uncertainty, there can be little doubt that the media, whether moulders
or mirror of society, are the main messengers about society. In the context of behavioural change,
communication can be defined as a process of understanding people’s situation and influences,
developing messages that respond to the concerns within those situations, and using communication
processes and media to persuade people to increase their knowledge and change the behaviours and
practices that place them at risk.

The second goal is “to seek appropriate Somali partners who can help to bridge between international
organisations and the Somali public at large”.7 It is in this last approach where the notion of civil
society appears in the proposal. Afrax reiterates that, “working with the Somali civil society structures
could be a key element in the success of projects carried out by international agencies”8. He further
asserts that,

“Underestimating the need for these two approaches in the past has resulted in the failure of
many initiatives attempted by the international actors. That is why I felt the need to make them a
central element in these recommendations”.9

The Djibouti government who closely followed UNESCO’s Somali Culture of Peace activity took
Afrax’s advice seriously and it promised to implement the recommendations that were to culminate in a
“Festival of Somali Art and Literature for Peace Symposium” in March 2000 in Djibouti. This was
supposed to be a slow and continuing process which was to evolve at later stage as a political process for
the Somalis to meet and save for what they share first then build on it. The emotion created by this
beginning process was to lead to a positive understanding of their problems. Indirectly, this strategy
proposed an alternative framework to solve the “gridlock” of Somali peace as it advocated the utilisation
of cultural communication as means to change the negative attitudes that leads to war. Although this is an
innovative approach, it may have parallel in the example of the Somali cultural nationalism. Nevertheless,
Afrax does not elaborate the measures which could facilitate the transition from this ‘cultural
mobilisation’ to a ‘political accord’.

Things were moving in this direction until suddenly President Ismail Omar Guelleh was elected to the
office of the president of Djibouti in 1999. With the coming of President Guelleh, Somali peace-oriented
events accelerated by changing the ‘cultural project’ to ‘political conference’. In another word, according
to the president, his action simply was ‘accelerating the events'. He further maintained that altering the
process of the project was a worthy ambition, as the Somalis could not afford the luxury of a slow
process.

2.2. CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE CASE OF REPRESENTATION

As mentioned above, what made the difference with President Guelleh’s initiatives from previous
peace conferences, was the new approach to Somali peace talks introducing the issue of civil society.
The academic literature reveals a number of conflicting lines of thinking on the definition, role and
value of civil society. Generally, a common understanding of civil society is between the family and
the state which exists to pursue collective goals. This is usually taken to include civic, professional,
trade union and other voluntary organisations. Civil society is often referred to as a 'third sector'
alongside the state and the market. According to British Overseas NGOs for Development (BOND),
this definition perceives civil society as a collective form of organised individuals, which pursues to
an end for the good of the community.10 In this case, the civil society should be organised to make a
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sense of their aims and concerns. When any part of civil society coalesces around a shared concern,
the individuals involved start with voluntary action. This is where those bodies known as Civil Society
Organisations (CSOs) begin.

Organised civil society needs an environment of relative peace to develop. It also aims at “reviving a
country’s economy, establishing participatory system of governance and accountable
administrations”.11 Other important characteristics during this stage include disarmament and
demobilisation of militia, and their sustainable social, psychological and economic rehabilitation.
Here, peace building refers to the post-conflict social construction in sustainable peace.12 .It is during
this period that restoration of civil society takes place.

How did the “civil society” concept fit into the practical stage of President Guelleh approach?
Basically, the civil society case came in the forefront following the failure of Somali armed factions to
come up with a viable solution to the revival of Somali central state. The civil society was seen fit to
fill this gap. This meant that the civil society as genuine representative of the local people to take over
the responsibility of recreating the Somali central authority.

2.2.1 THE QUESTION OF REPRESENTATION

Setting the stage for the civil society as the theoretical platform seemed to be working well until the
stage of implementation had arrived as the case opened the question of representation assumed
dominance. Since the question of representation had been of the most contentious issue in Somalia, the
Djibouti authority was very cautious about the matter. This is carefully expounded in Annex IV of
“Somalia National Peace Conference: An Action Plan for the Peace Process, [1999]” using extremely
guarded words about the matter. At the heart of the representation stands the issue of legitimacy and
who represents whom. It explains it as follows,

“In a such situation as the massive population displacement and the occupation of lands
by force there is no easy answer to what may or may not constitute legitimate
representation in a country such as Somalia, that has undergone a drastic breakdown…
and where basic information on population is lacking, and where major population
displacement as well as movement has occurred”.13

The document proposes that in a situation such that of social upheaval as that of Somalia, the local
constituencies (districts) should constitute the most the most realistic approach. This method
recognises civil society at the grassroots level in choosing its representatives. Reflecting on the
previous mistakes, the document cautions against the use of ‘clan’ representatives as the basis of
representation. It warns, “given these realities, it would be imprudent on the part of anybody to
attempt to be dogmatic about representation”.14 To establish room for the existing regional
administrations, the document suggests that “the process is neither designed nor geared to undermine
the existing “administrations”, and encourages others to emerge, because “the future governance shall
be based on a decentralised system of administration”.15 Again in the objectives of the process the
state is defined as the “formation of a national framework of governance, supported by regional
administrations”.16 This is because of the emerging trends for regional “administrations or
centralisation of administration", provide the basis for a system of “regional autonomy” or “federal
governance”.

As mentioned above, as part of SNP the Arta Conference was proceeded by three symposiums: the
Technical Consultative Somali Peace Process Symposium attended by Somali intellectuals, the
Business Community Symposium and the Elders Consultative Meeting attended by Somali traditional
elders. The first symposium was to advise on the technical side of the proposed conference, while the
latter was to decide on representation. The Elders Consultative Meeting decided on proportional clan

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representation and to send delegates to their respective area to enable them to choose their
representatives for the peace gathering.

The action of asking people to represent themselves called for consultation was a complete
infringement of the logic of representation, therefore, legitimacy. The first infringement came with the
breach of legitimacy, as this issue has always become the reason for previous failures. The first phase
of infringement has been generated by this action. Furthermore, in their move, delegates were rejected
to return to their respective areas to consult their constituents. And instead where asked to represent
their own groups to the Arta Conference.

OPPONENTS OF THE ARTA C ONFERENCE

Many groups objected to the Djibouti-sponsored Somali peace conference some of which were
Somaliland, Puntland, RRA and some of Mogadishu warlords. While Somaliland’s position was seen
as 'obstinate', Puntland and RRA’s were ambiguous and confusing. Somaliland position relies on their
political ambitions following their decisions to ‘break away’ from the Somali Republic. It has refused
to attend all Somali peace conference held since 1991. Acting as a separate republic, they claim that
Somalia should solve its problem only when they are ready to deal with their representatives. With this
view, they imply the idea of two separate regions: Somalia, which stands for the southern part of
Somalia, and Somaliland, as the northern regions.

Following the breakdown of the central authority in Somalia in early 1990s a new political situation
arose which formed four major political units, whose influence, ambitions and antagonisms have
shaped Somali political landscape since then. These are: (1) Somaliland Republic situated in the north-
west, (2) Puntland which is also situated in the north-east part of Somalia, (3) Bay & Bakool regions,
controlled by Rahanwayn Resistance Army (RRA) which draws its support from the Digil and Mirifle
communities, and (4) Great Mogadishu area and some of central Somalia which is controlled by group
of warlords and their militias, and the TNG, which has existed since August 2000. This latter group
includes Hiiraan region which controls the most stable section in this area. In late 1998 the Somali
Peace Alliance (SPA) was formed. Under this alliance came Puntland, RRA, Somali Patriotic Movement
(SPM Gabyow-faction) and United Somali Congress (USC Sudi Yalahow faction).

To cash in on the new initiative, the SPA claimed that as a group they fill the entire requirement for
President Guelleh’s initiative. They maintained their support was based on being representative of their
own respective area and has created an environment where civil society could work.

However, in a bizarre development, the SPA's support fell off with Djibouti before the proposal was
launched. There had been some speculations which suggested that the alliance fell off with the Djibouti
authority when they attempted to ‘take over’ the process for their own ends. To save the proposal from
early failure, Djibouti authority was anxious that the proceeding would not be ‘hijacked’ by any
particular party in the Somali conflict.

SPA claimed that Djibouti authority was ‘tampering’ with the agenda so to undermining Somali
ownership of the decisions of the meeting. The first SPA member to withdrew the “trust and support”
was Puntland when it accused Djibouti of playing an 'ambiguous role' and of 'straying' from the
principle of the peace initiatives by attempting to ditch “what have been achieved already”.17 Similarly,
RRA objected on the basis that “their lands are still occupied”. They changed their position later
following an internal split within the RRA leadership.

To boost the chances of the peace conference, the Djibouti authority sent delegations to the country to
meet the local people. On April 18 a delegation led by Idris Harbi Farah, the Deputy Parliament
Speaker of Djibouti, arrived in Puntland to talk with the administration and the traditional elders
(Isimo). After animated discussions, Puntland accepted the proposal to send a fact-finding delegation
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led by the Vice-President Mohamed Abdi Hashi, with nine points to be addressed, some of which
concentrated first on the issue of legitimacy and representation. Puntland feared that Djibouti's effort
might end up rejecting the existence of Puntland administration and “the mandate given to this
administration by its people to represent them”.18 Everything was set on distrust and for Puntland
administration the decision of the Elders Consultative Meeting to formulate the representation on clan
basis was a good excuse to withdraw from the conference for good.

In the opinion of Omar Abdirahman Hersi, the first withdrawal of the SPA alliance in early April 2000
has exposed the vulnerability and poor planning of the pending peace gathering. However, the second
one has shattered its direction. According to Omar, "the Convoy of Peace" was scrapped because of
fear of failure. 19

The Somali National Peace has been undermined by competing and contradictory peace initiatives.
These so-called “External Actors” dimension what has exacerbated the Somali conflict. Critics alleged
the influence of Ethiopia as the main reason for SPA's withdrawal. Ethiopia might have some reasons
not to see the success of peace conference without its influence. Egypt was also accused by Djibouti of
sabotage when in May 2000 Mogadishu warlords Hussein Aideed and Osman Ato declined to attend
the conference.

The Somali case is impacted by the conflict of interests between some regional and internal states. For
instance, there was an open conflict between Ethiopia and Egypt. This argument lies over the River Nile.
The River Nile and the Nile Valley have assumed a major importance within the orbit of the policy
framework since the beginning of colonialism in Africa in late 1869. Both Egypt’s and Ethiopia’s
strategies over the Nile Valley has dominated the European colonial powers’ policy regarding the Horn of
Africa. This conflict of interest is the reason for both states perceiving Somalia through their own
interests. Although officially both Ethiopia and Egypt were backing the Djibouti-sponsored Somali peace
process, many believe that both states would not be happy to see a new Somalia which was not under
their influence.

The Outcome

As mentioned above, after six months, the Somali National Peace ended up with the formation of an
Interim President, a Transitional National Assembly (composed of 245 members) and a Transitional
National Charter.

Theoretically, the outcome leads to a decentralised unitary state structure where the regional autonomy
will be at the discretion of the central authority. Article 32 of the transitional constitution emphases
that during the transitional period, a decentralised unitary system based on regional autonomy shall be
used. Only after the end of the transitional period will the country have a federal system based of the
18 regions. In practical terms, it is possible to apply such solutions as this leads to a reversal of the
“building blocks” approach for the resolution to the Somali central authority.

The Djibouti proposal advocated a peace process which could lead to many stages at different levels.
Process defines a means to an end and not an end in itself. The aim was to resuscitate the Somali
central state by using the "building blocks” approach. The "building blocks” approach concept has
raised following the continued failure of Somali factions to respond to efforts to create a unitary
Somali administration. Basically, shifting the focus of the peace process from the factions to the civil
society was meant to turn the responsibility to the local administrative units arising out of genuine
consultative process.

Djibouti authority embraced the “building blocks” approach, when using the development of local
administrative units as a basis for a decentralised approach to Somali unity. President Omar Guelleh at
the 54th session of UN General Assembly on 22nd Sept 99 stated that,
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" … indeed it [Somalia] is evolving into a country of stark contrasts between the
troubled central and southern regions and the relatively stable and peaceful north,
namely the self-declared Somaliland and the Puntland region… this move toward
decentralisation or self-administration by many parts and communities of the country is
fuelled by the need to survive. The international community, therefore, need to support
economically these regions or communities that have achieved relative peace, security
and development. we must reward those who have made serious efforts to restore
security and peace to protect human rights."20

Despite the positive initiative input, the Arta Conference was geared towards the reversal of the
“building blocks” approach for the resolution to the Somali central authority. A kind of centralised
approach was adapted thus making the Arta Conference glad to see things evolve with the motto: “a
bad government is better than no government”.

This perspective may also contradict the natural trend into which Somali regions have been moving
since the collapse. The task of recreating the Somali state leads to the need to establish a body, which
could represent the central authority of the Somali nation. The logical conclusion is that such a body
could stem out from the sum of its parts.

The Outcome also ignored the social aspect of Somali conflict by prioritising the political
reconstruction. This approach contradicts also UNESCO’s approach to Somali civil war. UNESCO’s
approach is set on three stages each preceding the other: the first being the rebuilding of Somali
society; the second, the rehabilitation of the Somali state; and the third, the reintegration of Somalia in
its international environment

Approaches to Reconciliation

Many have doubted the viability of the Arta Outcome, particularly the formation of the central
authority (TNG). What they hoped from at most, however, was that the ‘spirit of Arta’ could open new
paths towards the reconciliation process. However, what few could not anticipate was that the fate of
the future reconciliation was sealed by the very outcome. For the TNG, the end of the process of the
formation of the “central authority” had been reached. This principle was seen as the solution to the
Somali problem could be non-negotiable because as it would put in jeopardy the existence of the very
‘state’. According to them, what remained was to invite its rivals to be in a position of ‘either on board
or die out’.

A policy of assimilation was set, and as proof of its ‘success’, this was measured by the absorption of
a few waning Mogadishu warlords. Its failure disguised as scapegoat, is what made the former TNG
Premier Ali Khalif Galeyr a victim. This policy is what makes the Arta Outcome unable to be seen as
the solution, but as an obstacle to the very principles, which is supposed to stand for. As one of the
main purposes of the ‘Arta spirit’, the national reconciliation became a mockery of the peace process.

Conclusion

In spite of the good start and strong theoretical background, the Arta Conference resolution (also
called (Arta Outcome) and its expectations did not materialise. Cutting short the time needed for a
project such as Somali peace process, the Arta Conference ended with a similar fate as that of the
previous peace meetings. Ironically, this conference was supposed to be based on lessons learned from
past failures. Despite the setback, the Somali National Peace process still could provide a good lesson
for the direction of future peace.

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Although President Guelleh's accelerating effort of the Somali peace process was worth attempting,
the reason is unclear why he was unable to contain the outcome within his initiatives.

Shifting the process of the revival of the Somali central state from the factional leaders to the civil
society was meant to shift responsibility to the people. The due process was meant to be a process of
rebuilding the Somali central state in a fashion, which could be viewed as building from bottom-up.
The United Nations (UN), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the Arab League, IGAD Partners
Forum, and the Organisation of Islamic Conference hailed this approach.

However, the Arta Conference trounced the initial proposal by reversing it and started a motion
leading to a top-down approach for the formation of the Somali central authority. Legitimacy is seen
as central to the failure of the state. Political power requires political authority, which in turn demands
legitimacy.

Rebuilding a country such as Somalia after a long conflict is not just about making ministers and
presidents. It is most of all about restoring trust, rebuilding relations and underpinning hope for the
future. The way forward was to gain the trust of the people and start from the grassroots so the local
people could be involved in the process.

The Djibouti initiative was set at a time when the Somali regions and towns were passing through a
different organisational level after a decade of lack of national government. Since the outbreak of the
civil war, Somali regions developed apart in different directions. Some parts have made considerable
progress towards institution building and provision of basic services to their communities. This
situation let Somalia be distinguished by three different zones: recovery zones, transitional zones and
crisis zones. Similarly, Mr Kofi Anan, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, also uses the same
classification. In his report to the Security Council of 16 August 1999, Mr Anan urged that this
classification be considered for assistance in humanitarian and rehabilitation strategic aid.21 The
Secretary-General concluding recommendations ranged from emphasis on providing basic and life-
saving service in the zones of crisis, to the provision of the technical support for good governance and
capacity building in the recovery zones.

Considering these conditions, the most realistic approach for the Somali peace process was to begin a
phased means or mechanism which could bring each of the three zones to a stage of effective local
governance. This mechanism could stand as a national committee or a national operational body. For
instance, this mechanism could help those regions in the crisis zones to move into the recovery stage.
So each may develop its own unique institutions according to local need, within the overall framework
of a federal Somali state. This could have been a slow and painful process, but at least realistic and
practical.

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Notes:
1
Shirwa, 1997: 4
2
"Symposium on the Culture of Peace in Somalia for the Reconciliation of Somalia with Itself,"
http://www.unrisd.org/wsp/db/docs/w1162.htm, visited 1 Jan 2001
3
Afrax, 1997: 8
4
Shirwa, 1997: 6
5
Samatar, "Somalia: The politics of poetry", www.anaserve.com/~mbali/samatars.htm, visited 2 December 2001
6
McQuail, 1994: 69
7
Afrax, 1997: 7
8
ibid.7
9
ibid. 9
10
Thinking about the role of civil society organisations, http://www.bond.org.uk/advocacy/bondpoldocs/response2.html,
visited 7 March 2002; see also "Meeting on the Culture of Peace in Somalia" Final Report, 8-10 June 1996,
"http://www.unesco.org/education/emergency/peer/pdf/peaced.pdf
11
bid
12
Heinrich, 1997: 67
13
“Somalia National Peace Conference: An Action Plan for the Peace Process", Annex IV, 1999.
14
ibid. 45
15
ibid., 3-4
16
ibid., 2
17
Puntland State Withdraws Trust and Support for Djibouti Peace Initiative Puntland State Withdraws Trust”, March 23,
2000, http://www.somaliawatch.org/archive/000323101.htm, visited 1 August 2000.
18
Ibid.
19
Omar Abdirahman Hersi interviewed in London, 28 May 2001
20
Ali A.Jama , "The Djibouti Peace Process and the Northern Recovery Zones",;
http://www.somaliawatch.org/Archivemay/000626602.htm, 5 February 2002.; and Ali A Jama “What is the Future of
the Djibouti Peace Initiative?”, http://www.somaliawatch.org/archive/000324501.htm, visited 1 Feb 2002.
21
"Report of the UN Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia" , S/1999/882, 16 August 1999,
http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/CAB/rep882.pdf, visited 15 March 2002.

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NOTE:

Heinrich, Wolfgang (November 1997): Building the Peace: Experience of Collaborative


Peacebuilding in Somalia 1993-1996. Uppsala: Life & Peace Institute.
McQuail, Denis; Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction, 3rd Ed. (London: Sage Publications,
1994).
Afrax, M. D.: “Channels of Communication for Peace-building in Somalia”, UNESCO Report,
November 1997.
Shirwa, Abdullahi; “Recent Socio-political Transformations in Somalia”, Mission Culture of Peace,
September 1997, Mogadishu, Somalia.

Notes:
1
Shirwa, 1997: 4
2
"Symposium on the Culture of Peace in Somalia for the Reconciliation of Somalia with Itself,"
http://www.unrisd.org/wsp/db/docs/w1162.htm, visited 1 Jan 2001
3
Afrax, 1997: 8
4
Shirwa, 1997: 6
5
Samatar, "Somalia: The politics of poetry", www.anaserve.com/~mbali/samatars.htm, visited 2 December 2001
6
McQuail, 1994: 69
7
Afrax, 1997: 7
8
ibid.7
9
ibid. 9
10
Thinking about the role of civil society organisations, http://www.bond.org.uk/advocacy/bondpoldocs/response2.html,
visited 7 March 2002; see also "Meeting on the Culture of Peace in Somalia" Final Report, 8-10 June 1996,
"http://www.unesco.org/education/emergency/peer/pdf/peaced.pdf
11
ibid
12
Heinrich, 1997: 67
13
“Somalia National Peace Conference: An Action Plan for the Peace Process", Annex IV, 1999.
14
ibid. 45
15
ibid., 3-4
16
ibid., 2
17
Puntland State Withdraws Trust and Support for Djibouti Peace Initiative Puntland State Withdraws Trust”, March 23,
2000, http://www.somaliawatch.org/archive/000323101.htm, visited 1 August 2000.
18
Ibid.
19
Omar Abdirahman Hersi interviewed in London, 28 May 2001
20
Ali A.Jama , "The Djibouti Peace Process and the Northern Recovery Zones",;
http://www.somaliawatch.org/Archivemay/000626602.htm, 5 February 2002.; and Ali A Jama, What is the Future of
the Djibouti Peace Initiative?, http://www.somaliawatch.org/archive/000324501.htm, visited 1 Feb 2002.
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"Report of the UN Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia" , S/1999/882, 16 August 1999,
http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/CAB/rep882.pdf, visited 15 March 2002.

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