The FARC–EP in Colombia

A Revolutionary Exception in an Age of Imperialist Expansion
J A M E S J . B R I T TA I N

The United States and the Colombian ruling oligarchy have, since the 1960s, repeatedly implemented socioeconomic and military campaigns to defeat the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia–Ejército del Pueblo, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army (FARC–EP). However, this offensive, whose main purpose is to maintain capitalist accumulation and expansion, has resulted in an embarrassing setback for U.S. imperialism and the Colombian ruling class. In a time of growing and deepening U.S. imperialism, it is important to examine this failure. Over the past four decades, despite U.S. efforts, support has risen for what has been the most important continuous military and political force in South America opposing imperialism. I examine how the FARC–EP has not only maintained a substantial presence within the majority of the country but has responded aggressively to the continuing counterinsurgency campaign. I also show as false the propaganda campaign of the U.S. and Colombian governments claiming that the FARC–EP is being defeated. This analysis provides an example of how a contemporary organic, class-based sociopolitical movement can effectively contend with imperial power in a time of global counterrevolution.
Some Historical Background

Many years ago, Che Guevara drove through Colombia and wrote in his Motorcycle Diaries (Ocean Press, 2004, 157) that the so-called oldest democracy in Latin America had “more repression of individual freedom” than any other country he had visited. Since Che’s journey, little has changed. During the mid-twentieth century Colombia was to experience several firsts in Latin American. Colombia was the first state to receive
James J. Brittain studies and teaches sociology at the University of New Brunswick, Canada. His research interests center on revolutionary and social movements throughout Latin America, the relevance of classical Marxism within contemporary geopolitics, and alternative forms of international development and social change.
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has sought to implement a neoliberal model throughout Colombia by way of mass privatization. During the decade of the 1960s the percentage of the national budget allocated for military expenditure. “The Possibility of Nonviolent Revolution. was over 16 percent. Uribe has supported measures that have reduced overtime wages. Álvaro Uribe Vélez. In 1990. the removal of tariffs. All hypocritical blather about democracy and the rule of law aside.” Marx suggested that some countries may contain a proletariat that “can attain their goal by peaceful means”. raised the age of retirement by a third. By 2000 the ratio reached 80:1. In an 1872 essay. Polarization of wealth is extreme.” supported of course by the United States.THE FARC-EP IN COLOMBIA 21 assistance from the World Bank (then called the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development). The richest 3 percent now own over 70 percent of the arable land. the Colombian state is ruled with great brutality by what Venezuela’s Chávez has termed a “rancid oligarchy.2 This economic reality underlies all political and legal events in Colombia. embedded in a model of neoliberal economics and overall subordination to the United States. “we must also recognize the fact that in most countries” this is not the case and that “the lever of our revolution must be force. that country is Colombia. and cut the salaries of public sector workers by 33 percent. In the face of this reality. and restricting labor unions. of communist ide- . he asserted. After neoliberal restructuring the disproportion in wealth yet further increased. while 57 percent subsist on less than 3 percent of that land. Colombia has maintained a strong tradition of leftist opposition. for the purpose of combating peasant and guerrilla forces. the ratio of income between the poorest and richest 10 percent was 40:1.” If this be true of any country in the world today. while half of the farmland is held by thirty-seven large landholders.1 The current president. In the late 1930s through the 1950s several hundred rural-based Colombians. It was also the first country to receive official counterinsurgency and military assistance from the United States. Class consciousness in Colombia has again and again constructed itself organically in the face of its ruling class. The richest 1 percent of the population controls 45 percent of the wealth. A small group of very wealthy landowners and capitalists within the country have the ability directly to affect governmental policy and economic conditions. however. In the current period Colombia finds itself in the throes of civil war.

State-induced repression and violence aimed at small landholders. As a result. and Iván Ríos). these “self-defense groups” were based on nuclei of peasants operating land collectively in relatively isolated regions of the country. the organization not only maintained its existence but consistently expanded throughout the country. and to counter the repressive central government by extending the communities into other areas. The communities. Alfonso Cano. the United States and the Colombian government agreed to carry out attacks against the rural collectives. who oversee the Central General Staff composed of twenty-five members specifi- . was made possible by extensive economic and military support from the United States through the Latin American Security Operation Plan. organized themselves into structures of cooperation and security in response to expanding capitalist interests penetrating the hinterland. uncorrupted. which stipulate that oppositional armed movements vying for state power must formally arrange themselves into a visible ranked military construct—is formally organized as an Ejército del Pueblo (a people’s army) with a distinct chain of command. Iván Márquez. By 1964. rural workers. were considered a tremendous threat to not only the large landowning class and rising urban capitalists but also to the United States’ geopolitical interests. over sixteen such groups of communities had been successfully established throughout the country. Raúl Reyes. Contrary to the reports of several scholars that the FARC–EP had been liquidated. 1964. With support from a significant minority of the rural population. and other semi-proletarians met a peaceful. 1964.3 In May of 1964. the FARC–EP considers May 27. these regions became military targets during the Cold War offensive in Latin America that intensified under the Kennedy administration. peasants. The military assault. although peaceful. response. with ground zero being the Marquetalia region in the department of Tolima in southwestern Colombia. The Secretariat of the Central General Staff consists of seven members (Manual Marulanda Vélez. Timoleón Jiménez. these localized self-defense groups progressively expanded their spheres of influence in the late 1950s and early 1960s to include multiple areas of southern and central Colombia. The FARC–EP—pursuant to Protocols I and II of the Geneva Conventions. but firm (and armed). commencing May 27. and based on local control.22 M O N T H LY R E V I E W / S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 5 ology. the official date of its origin. Trying to exist as an autonomous geographical community. They sought to establish a stable society. As a result. Jorge Briceño.

an increasing number of rural inhabitants have begun to migrate to FARC–EP inhabited regions.050). During peace negotiations between the insurgency and the Colombian government (1998–2002). Caribbean.THE FARC-EP IN COLOMBIA 23 cally located within seven blocks throughout the country (Eastern. Central. Figures obtained by the author through participant observation and openended interviews with the FARC–EP establish that there are at least an additional dozen fronts.000 people migrated to the FARC–EP held Villa Nueva Colombia in one year alone. very little analysis of this topic has been collected. Middle Magdalena. there is good reason to believe that the FARC–EP is present in every municipality throughout Colombia. A comprehensive study published in 1997 revealed that the insurgency had tangible influence in 622 municipalities (out of a total 1.4 In 1999. Immediately after its founding. Over the past several years. grassroots judicial structures. examined. and so on. In each of these blocks there are a number of fronts that contain. By 2002. It was during the 1990s—with the rise of neoliberal economic policies accompanied by increased state repression. often carried out with unspeakable brutality by government-sanctioned paramilitaries—that the FARC–EP dramatically increased its social presence throughout the country.5 One example is the department of Cundinamarca. Many preferred to live in the rebel safe haven since it provided a sense of security and the ability to create alternative community-based . it was generally conceded that 105 fronts exist throughout the country. and Cesar). or presented to the larger public. Western. over 20. Southern. Today the number of regions in Colombia with a significant FARC–EP presence is substantial. be it for protection or solidarity. medical facilities. Within this area the power of the FARC–EP extends throughout 83 of the department’s 116 municipalities. the FARC–EP had increased its power to more than 60 percent of the country. Although its power varies in each borough. however. while others may have a guerrilla presence albeit in a much smaller capacity. and in less than three years it was estimated that over 93 percent of all “regions of recent settlement” in Colombia had a guerrilla presence. Some areas are formally arranged by the FARC–EP with schools. which completely surrounds the capital city of Bogotá. In conjunction with the material rise of the FARC–EP it cannot be denied that the insurgency has considerable support from the civilian population. 300 to 600 combatants per unit. on average. the insurgency was active in four municipalities and expanded its influence during the 1970s and 1980s.

James F. Rochlin. Democracy in Colombia (Oxford: Transaction Publishers.7 By the time the Colombian government invaded the region and ended the peace negotiations there were roughly 740. 99. 8. Osterling. 109–10. the displaced. 2003). 133. 99. cultural. Based upon ongoing research conducted by the author. Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America (London: Lynne Reinner Publishers.00 15.24 M O N T H LY R E V I E W / S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 5 development projects. Its program addresses a range of critical political.8 Table 1: Four Decades of FARC–EP Growth throughout Colombian Municipalities Year 1964 1970 1979 1985 1991 1995 1999 2004 Municipality 4 54 100 173 437 622 1. teachers. Timothy WickhamCrowley. landless rural laborers.050 Percentage of Municipalities 0. Roldolfo Escobedo.00 95. intellectuals. N.J. the current constituency of the organization has grown from its base in the subsistence peasantry to incorporate indigenous populations. 2003). & Enrique Querez. Colombia: Inserguridad.04 0.00 42.00 59.00 100. Guerrillas & Revolution in Latin America (Princeton.6 No better example of the growing support for the FARC–EP exists than the number of rural inhabitants entering the FARC–EP maintained demilitarized zone (DMZ). and economic issues. Throughout the four decades since its inception. 1992). What began as a largely peasant-led rural-based land struggle in the 1960s has since been transformed into a national sociopolitical movement attempting . Jesus Bejarano Avila. had a population of only about 100.000 Colombians who had migrated to the guerrilla held territory.000 1. FARC–EP Historical Outline (Toronto: International Commission. Forty-five percent of its members and commandantes are women. 1989).50 9.: Princeton University Press. 2000). 1997). Camilo Enchandia. acquired by the insurgency during the peace talks.00 Sources: Grace Livingstone. The DMZ. FARC–EP. AfroColombians. Jorge P. Inside Colombia (London: Latin American Bureau. prior to (official) FARC–EP consolidation. the FARC–EP has developed into a complex and organized movement. and sectors of the urban workforce. social. 14.000 inhabitants. Violencia y Desempeno Economico en las Areas Rurales (Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia. unionists.

for the insurgents have been largely made up of peasants from rural Colombia. organized.9 This plan was promoted as a way to reduce cocaine availability and usage in the United States.000–50.S. and an expanding ideological model of emancipation.S. While a slight decline was witnessed in 2002–2003.800 hectares. the United States gave 2.000 hectares (1986–1996). The revolutionaries were not formed within classrooms or churches. through the massive infusion of U. Part of the reason for this is that the previous drive. levels of coca cultivation consistently hovered at 40.04 billion dollars between 1999 and 2002. nor did it provide Colombia’s peasants with an alternative to cultivating the illicit crop. they are not a movement led or largely made up of lawyers. 81 percent for arms. and membership has come from the very soil from which it provides its subsistence.THE FARC-EP IN COLOMBIA 25 alternative development objectives through the realization of a socialist society. aid to Colombia in 1995 was $30 million. extensive geographical distribution. and maintained revolutionary organization. become the largest and most powerful revolutionary force—politically and militarily—within the Western Hemisphere. This is important to understand when discussing the contemporary forces arrayed against it. the FARC–EP has. money and personnel. support-base. Plan Colombia reinforced the Colombian military’s dominance over the country’s civil administration. unlike many recent revolutionary movements and struggles in Central and South America. is a peasant-based. the FARC–EP’s leadership. Embarrassingly. failed. Under Plan Colombia. In the spring of 2005. direct intervention within Colombia by way of Plan Colombia. it was recognized that the level of coca being cultivated within Colombia had in fact increased. the political administrations of the United States and Colombia have recently reformulated their counterinsurgency plans. doctors. students. With Plan Colombia. By constructing a substantial support base. On the contrary. Prior to U. Clinton’s Plan Colombia. or priests. current estimates suggest that coca cul- . with the exception of Cuba. U. who account for roughly 65 percent of its members. coca levels dramatically increased. The Imperial Necessity of Counterinsurgency To respond to their systemic failure in trying to defeat the FARC–EP since 1964. During the peak of Plan Colombia (2001) levels reached a historic high of 169. it neither stopped the flow of cocaine to consuming countries.S. The FARC–EP.

10 The reality of Clinton’s Plan Colombia is that the paramilitary forces—indirectly trained by the United States and supported by the Colombian army—now control the drug industry. Therefore the aligned governments of Bush and Uribe moved toward an armed campaign against the insurgency’s support base in the people under a new rubric.5 precent of all coca cultivation in the country is indirectly connected to the FARC–EP. personnel and 400 contracted personnel). leading over 20./Colombian counterinsurgency was weakened as the falsehood became evident. and Meta. Assaults have been carried out by conjoined United States military and private combatants. largely dispensing with the hypocritical “drug war” rationale. Roughly 80 percent of paramilitary funding comes from drug trafficking. The AUC openly admitted that it principally financed its counterinsurgency troops through the Colombian narcotic industry. participation and began a direct offensive campaign of armed aggression against specific regions of Colombia.S. As a result of this pressure.S. 2001. propaganda of “narcotrafficking.” When Plan Colombia was first presented. what has occurred in Colombia’s narco-industry is a partial monopolization of coca processing. the government agreed to limit the number of U. a self-proclaimed war president.000 Colombian soldiers in a scorched earth policy directed at the civilian population. is a product of the Bush administration’s exploitation of the attacks of September 11. those who purchase the leaves from the peasants. troops and private-sector forces in armed combat in Colombia. often accused by U. for openly imperial goals.26 M O N T H LY R E V I E W / S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 5 tivation is again on the increase. the “war on terror. Under George W.11 At most some 2. In fact. The reformulated policy. Nariño. the U. troops and privately-contracted forces allowed to enter Colombian territory to 800 (400 U.S. internal domestic distribution. a surprising amount of opposition arose against the Clinton administration’s plan. Bush.S.S.12 Though the façade of a war on drugs was somewhat useful for a time. and international trafficking by the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)—the principal paramilitary organization. the Department of Defense ended these limits on U. production. Caquetá. Labeling Marxist revolutionary movements as “terrorist” ren- .” is merely involved in taxing revenededoras.S. The FARC–EP. Plan Patriota has seen an enormous increase in the participation of U. This ongoing initiative is called Plan Patriota. The plan is largely concentrated in the southern Colombian departments of Putumayo.

failed utterly to defeat the FARC–EP. The U. but it helps repress domestic opposition to U.” The piece argues that in the past “there were huge swathes of land that FARC dominated.15 Despite propaganda that Plan Patriota was aimed at fighting the .S. Under the new official U. in fact.” This past April. recruiting grounds or launch points for operations. military made no such pretense. talk of negotiation to resolve the conflict is meaningless. Plan Patriota was presented by the Colombian military as a prelude to the renewal of the previous government’s negotiations with the FARC–EP.”14 The United States and the Colombian government have tried to create an image that their new methods of war are working.” But it is now clear that Plan Patriota has. which they had sabotaged. and the FARC was free to plan further operations and train recruits in these areas” but “now the Marxist group cannot use these areas as havens. therefore half or more of Colombia is now subject to total war against the peasant population. Myers claimed that the current counterinsurgency campaign being carried out in Colombia was defeating the FARC–EP. United States Air Force General Richard B. and supposed insurgent supporters. Under these circumstances. global military intervention. In October 2002 reports were leaked indicating that United States Marines were on “orders to eliminate all high officers of the FARC. The government could not exercise sovereignty in those places. officials” are quoted as claiming that the FARC–EP “has been significantly degraded” and now “there is no portion of the country where Colombian forces cannot go. Myers was quoted saying that “we’re winning” and that “the cooperation between the United States and Colombia must be mirrored around the world” for “the future rests on the ability of nations to cooperate and concentrate against extremists.” “scattering those who escape to the remote corners of the Amazon. military machine (in total violation of all existing international law). General Reinaldo Castellanos said: “our activity and the force with which it must be carried out has to compel (the rebels) to sit down under the conditions set out by the government.S.S.THE FARC-EP IN COLOMBIA 27 ders the term meaningless.S.”13 Rural inhabitants have told me in interviews that the general has encouraged his troops to conduct murderous attacks against unarmed civilians. peasants.S. Repeated claims have been made that the Colombian army is “winning” and driving deep into FARC–EP strongholds. In a typical article unnamed “U. doctrine the terrorist label supposedly permits an assault by the U.

” During the early stages of Plan Patriota. But this withdrawal was purely tactical and as events have developed the insurgency has not been marginalized by Plan Patriota but. due to the fact that the FARC–EP’s military capacity. Upon discussion with people from the community and through a subsequent interview with Raúl Reyes.” not against the guerrilla army itself. commandante of the FARC–EP’s International Commission. In times past it was customary to be stopped at FARC–EP checkpoints on primary and secondary roads or to see guerrilla members in conversation with persons of the community. and Colombian troops attacking the peasants in fact built support for the FARC–EP and were vulnerable to ambush and counterattack. One example of this was documented while I was conducting research within the department of Huila. .S. I noted that there was minimal insurgent visibility in areas where the guerrillas had a strong presence for over seven years. chose to limit its immediate visible presence in the hope of diminishing the chance of injury against the rural populations within FARC–EP extended regions.” The target is the unarmed peasantry. what is really happening is an attempt to “drain the sea. some observable socio-geographical characteristics appeared to change concerning the FARC–EP alliances with the rural peasantry. admitted that the reformulated campaign began “with an attack on rural areas where local peasant farmers support the FARC. on the contrary. and for this reason. During the beginning of Plan Patriota. James Hill. Plan Patriota offenses have been carried out against “suspected rebel-extended regions. I was told that the guerrillas that have remained in the area have reduced their visible presence to prevent state aggression against the local populace.S. Southern Command.28 M O N T H LY R E V I E W / S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 5 FARC–EP. however. the former general of the U. The Colombian military has a horrendous record of committing human rights abuses against noncombatants. But the U. and support largely stems from this group. The relationship between the peasantry and the FARC–EP has remained consistent for well over half a century and is visible throughout much of rural Colombia./Colombian state forces to enter into campesino-inhabited regions that are supporters of the insurgency. during specific periods of 2003 and 2004.16 In response to this brutal tactic. has increased. the FARC–EP purposely began to dissolve into the mountains and was able to take pressure off specific regions where they have received peasant and indigenous support. the FARC–EP. Reyes explained that the FARC–EP was trying to limit the opportunity for the U.S. power.

a Phantom fixedwing gunship and helicopters.”19 By the end of . Unlike past years when one confrontation would be followed by a pause of several days or more. We move freely throughout the region as we have for the past several years. and it has of late demonstrated a completely new method of dealing with Plan Patriota. contradicting government and mainstream media reports. beginning on the first two days of the month. it was apparent that the FARC–EP had actually increased the size of its combatant forces throughout several regions. when the guerrilla forces mounted another major attack that “ambushed 41 soldiers in the jungle province of Urabá” and “killed at least 20 Colombian soldiers.” A few days later the offensive would be labeled as “the bloodiest rebel attack in two years. internal areas are as fully held by the FARC–EP as ever and are in fact expanding. the FARC–EP remained vigilant in their offensive. the FARC–EP increased the size of its movement by a total of one hundred newly trained combatants within one municipality alone. In just the month of December. The FARC–EP was tactically withdrawing before the U./Colombian military offensive but preparing the counteroffensive. During the subsequent days the insurgency carried out smaller tactical operations until February 9. “look around. were labeled as the “worst two-day period for the armed forces since President Álvaro Uribe took office in August 2002 promising to defeat the rebels on the battlefield. Since February 2005. here we are.S. During my interview with Raúl Reyes I was told. In the last two months of 2004. the withdrawal into the mountains during specific periods of 2003 and 2004 is quite different from what the insurgency has done since the onset of 2005.” However.”18 The Eastern Block of the FARC–EP (one of seven blocks) averaged roughly one major attack per day during the month of February alone. The first offensives. and left eight members of the 17th Brigade unaccounted for. the FARC–EP has proved itself to be at the top of the short list of armed sociopolitical movements fighting imperialism. The attack against the 17th Brigade was then labeled as “the deadliest attack on the armed forces in years.”17 The FARC–EP assaulted a major military consolidation equipped with “river gunboats. Do you see any [government] troops? Plan Patriota has not disseminated the FARC–EP.” wounded several.THE FARC-EP IN COLOMBIA 29 The Response to Plan Patriota While access through the border regions surrounding the departments of southern Colombia is impeded by a major effort of the military and state-supported paramilitary.

the membership of the FARC-EP had.. 2003). Colombia’s Immediate Future and the FARC–EP’s Role In the spring of 2004.000 2.: International Commission. UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Estimates of the FARC-EP forces have been oddly constant over the past five years even though the geographical expansion of the insurgency has been remarkable (see table 1).30 M O N T H LY R E V I E W / S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 5 February. By conducting first-hand research and interviews throughout ten departments of Colombia I found that far from remaining constant. Ricardo Peñaranda. Table 2: Four Decades of FARC–EP Growth in Combatant Forces 1964 1965 1970 1978 1983 1986 1991 1992 1994 2002 2004 48 750 1. Raúl Reyes avowed that the FARC–EP’s support was growing and that their objective of taking state power was becoming an ever closer reality. but grew in strength despite a determined offensive by the most vicious and powerful military forces in the world. Ont. It may be argued that the latter numbers (2002-2004) are high compared to estimates from U. 2000). dramatically illustrating that the FARC–EP not only maintained their substantial existence and support base. This conservatively averages to 46.S. 61 (1965).000 3. 15 (1991).000 40. at an average of 300600 insurgents per front. ongoing field research being conducted by the author and R. Jorge P. James Sacouman (2002-2004). which is roughly the number obtained through the interview process. & Gonzalo Sánchez. Nazih Richani. Violence in Colombia 1990–2000 (Wilmington.17 (1964). 1989).000 4. FARC–EP. state sources. 76 (19921994).000 32. Del. FARC–EP Historical Outline (Toronto. Since the spring of 2004 the insurgency has increasingly aligned its program to directly support the inter- . The campaign initiated in February has continued with an ongoing series of successful attacks on the Colombian military.000 Sources: Charles Bergquist. 2002).000 50.000 7.000 FARC-EP combatants. It has been well documented that the FARC-EP has about 105 fronts. 294 (1970–1986).600 18. Osterling. the Eastern Block (by itself) had eliminated over 450 counterinsurgent forces. 2002).: Scholarly Resources Inc. Russell Crandall. Driven by Drugs (London. in fact. Democracy in Colombia (Oxford: Transaction Publishers. Systems of Violence (New York: SUNY. grown surreptitiously with the increase of the movement's extension.

understood that only through the support of the people could a socialist society be created. to their name. “anti-drug” spraying operations and assassinated by Colombian soldiers and paramilitary. continuous. 2005. hence FARC–EP. FARC–EP forces carried out a major ambush of a military unit in the far southwestern province of Putamayo (“the worst death toll in a single day for the military since Uribe came to power in 2002”).THE FARC-EP IN COLOMBIA 31 ests of those exploited within the rural regions of the country. People’s Army. direct confrontations implemented through well-orchestrated. the FARC–EP had to “play a decisive role in winning power for the people. Poisoned by U.”21 For years the insurgents carried on their familiar tactical patterns of micro-level attacks against state/paramilitary forces without engaging the enemy in a continuous full-scale war of assault. and they successfully engaged with military troops in North Santander near the Venezuelan border at the other end of the country. Under these circumstances the heroic response of the . simultaneous attacks on state forces in many parts of the country. with hundreds murdered in the last several years and no one yet punished. Repeatedly Colombia has been acknowledged to be the most dangerous country in the world to be a trade unionist. The revolutionary ideology of the insurgency was heavily entrenched in maintaining guerrilla characteristics in defensive structure and militaristic operations. the FARC–EP have fully usurped the department of Putumayo including several areas adjoining its southwest. The dynamic of the FARC–EP’s revolutionary strategy has developed and increased. In the last week of June 2005. and in turn.S. However.-backed Uribe regime runs a country where torture and murder by the military and the state-backed paramilitaries goes unpunished. demonstrates the growing depth of their strength. The reasoning behind this strategy was twofold. the FARC–EP have been moving away from small-scale operations and into large-scale. The FARC–EP counteroffensive that began on February 1.S. through a MarxistLeninist strategy. The U. Since July and the beginning of August. The actions that began in the early weeks of 2005 mark an important change. the peasants have suffered greatly in the years of Clinton’s Plan Colombia and the Bush/Uribe Plan Patriota. In May 1982. The first was that the Secretariat. the insurgency recognized the need to begin its historic development by expanding its operations into “an authentically offensive guerrilla movement.”20 The second reason was based on the guerrilla’s military activity. the FARC formally added Ejército del Pueblo. While maintaining its guerrilla structure.

130.defenselink. “Elusive Peace: Struggling Against the Logic of Violence.kansascity. Killing Peace. 8. The Rape of the Peasantry (New York: Anchor Books. 5. & Gonzalo Sánchez. and Catherine C.” 13. 17. Violencia y Desempeno Economico en las Areas Rurales (Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia. Notes 1. 1971). 11.com. Latin America: Reform of Revolution? A Reader (Greenwich.com/wp-dyn/world/issues/colombiareport/.html. Policy Toward Colombia (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. http://msnbc. imperialism and the murderous Colombian oligarchy. Camilo Enchandia. Garry M. 163. Garry M.: Fawcett Publications.. Rebels. Full Spectrum Disorder (New York: Soft Skull Press. http://www. Ernest Feder. Mark Chernick. 6 (May–June 2005): 18. 2005).” February 2.” October 18. 9.: Scholarly Resources Inc. 12.reuters. Doug Stokes.S. Leech. 16.com. . Del.com/article. Driven by Drugs: U.” October 25.” November 11. Ricardo Peñaranda. Colombia Says. 2004.msn. 335. America’s Other War (London: Zed Books. 2002). Nazih Richani. 33. Russell Crandall.com/id/6894272/. 15.php3?ArticleID=19. 1986). http://www. Jason Webb. Violence in Colombia 1990–2000 (Wilmington.. 68 6. 2004). & Enrique Querez. “US Increases Colombia Involvement. Kill Eight Troops. 2002).32 M O N T H LY R E V I E W / S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 5 FARC–EP is a testament to the human spirit. 10. Leech. 88. “Rebel Rockets Kill 14 Soldiers. “Colombia Say’s It’s Winning Vs. Scott Wilson. Associated Press. N. 18. Colombia Will Continue Pressure on Narcoterrorists. 14. 2005.” February 1. 2003.S. 1968). 2005. Ramsey Clark. 2003). Colombia: Inserguridad. “Colombia’s Rebel Zone: World Apart. 3. 9. As quoted from Juan Pablo Toro.com/ips/vieira.Y. 2 (2000): 32–37. http://www.” June 30. “Colombia’s Rebel Zone. 23–47.” NACLA Report of the Americas 34. no. 1997). Roldolfo Escobedo. 189. 2002).mil/news/Apr2005/20050412_563. 2005. 1850–1936 (University of New Mexico Press. Jim Garamone. 78. 133. 2005.washingtonpost. “Marines Ordered into Colombia: February 2003 is Target Date. See Stan Goff. “U. They have demonstrated not only that class-conscious support for revolution can be created in populations subjected to the utmost brutality by the forces of U. As quoted in Constanza Vieira. http://www.” April 12. 15. Wilson. 2004. Systems of Violence (New York: SUNY. Charles Bergquist. “Colombian Rebels Strike Again. James Petras & Maurice Zeitlin. Killing Peace (New York: Information Network of the Americas. 2003). http://www.narconews.php?articleid=2915. 7.S. LeGrand Frontier Expansion and Peasant Protest in Colombia. “The Politics of Negotiating Peace in Colombia” NACLA Report on the Americas 38. 4. 2. Peter Gorman.antiwar. no. “The Future of Latin America” in War in Colombia (New York: International Action Center. but also that through solidarity and emancipatory fortitude successful armed revolutionary guerrilla warfare remains a viable option in contemporary geopolitics. http://www. Jesus Bejarano Avila. Nazih Richani.

http://www.reuters. Kill 20 Colombian Troops. Jason Webb & Luis Jaime Acosta. FARC–EP Historical Outline (Toronto: International Commission. 21. 313. 2005. 26 (italics added). .” and “Marxist Rebels Kill 17 Colombian Soldiers.THE FARC-EP IN COLOMBIA 33 19. 2000). Pomeroy.” February 9. Guerrilla Warfare and Marxism (New York: International Publishers. 1968).com. William J. “Marxist Rebels Ambush. FARC–EP. 20.

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