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FOR THE LPG STORAGE PETROLEUM ASPROPYRGOS
P. D. Petrolekasa and I. Andreoub
SPEC Process Services S.A., 75 Patission Str., Athens 104 34, Greece
Safety and Hygiene Department, Aspropyrgos Industrial Complex, Hellenic Petroleum S.A., 193 00 Aspropyrgos, Greece Abstract This study examines domino effects related to the LPG storage installation of Hellenic Petroleum refinery at Aspropyrgos, in accordance with the new SEVESO II Directive requirements. The analysis involves a systematic procedure for the evaluation of potential domino accident scenarios, based on a set of damage-toequipment criteria. The results show that the main concern is for a potential BLEVE accident in the nearby LPG handling establishment, which could result to a BLEVE accident in the refinery LPG installation. 1. INTRODUCTION The LPG storage installation of the Hellenic Petroleum refinery at Aspropyrgos, includes four 4000 m3 LPG storage spheres, two 1600 m3 propane spheres, an 1800 m3 butane sphere, an 800 m3 LPG sphere and a truck loading station. Figure 1 shows the layout of the installation, which is located across the southern fence of the refinery establishment. Nearby installations include refinery process units, oil storage tanks, an oil truck loading station, and an LPG handling terminal. The latter establishment includes eight cylindrical LPG storage tanks, 170 m3 each, incoming pipeline from the refinery, truck loading and packaging facilities. The Safety Study of the refinery LPG installation , performed according to the SEVESO I Directive requirements, examined accident scenarios resulting from failures in the installation itself, and assessed their consequences to people and the environment. This Study, performed in accordance to the SEVESO II requirements, examines domino accident scenarios that result from failures in nearby installations and could have an impact to the refinery LPG installation. This is particularly important with respect to the identification of external hazard sources for the facility . In addition, the study examines domino accident scenarios that result from failures in the refinery
for rupture and deformation of structural elements. etc. AIChE considers heat flux of 37. the type of material.5 -1 bar can cause cylindrical tank displacement or failure of connecting pipes. thus leading to a secondary accident. while TNO identifies critical radiation intensities of 100 kW/m2 and 25 kW/m2.1 Damage criteria Thermal radiation and explosion overpressure produced during an accident can cause severe damage to nearby process equipment. respectively . The extent of the damage depends on radiation or overpressure intensity. This involves assessment of the initial accidents consequences and evaluation of domino effects zones according to a set of damage-to-equipment criteria. This involves identification of potential accidents in all installations involved. TNO suggests that overpressures of 0. by means of systematic process hazard analyses. . 2. Practical ‘rules of thumb” found in literature.LPG installation and could have secondary effects to nearby installations. (c) Evaluation of the secondary accident. describing a sequence of accidents. This is also important with respect to a complete off-site consequences evaluation. provide values of thermal radiation or overpressure corresponding to a given degree of damage. accidents in the refinery LPG installation that could cause secondary effects to nearby installations.20 minutes. the presence of protection (e. using the following procedure: (a) Identification of the initial accident. the duration of exposure. and thus may initiate a secondary accident.5 kW/m2 as the limit for severe damage to process equipment .g. water deluge) systems. (b) Assessment of domino effects zone. 2. and overpressures above 1 bar can cause failure of spherical tank supports . The procedure is employed for the identification of domino scenarios resulting from accidents in nearby installations that could have an impact to the refinery LPG installation. METHODOLOGY The domino effects analysis involves identification of domino scenarios. This involves visualisation of domino effects zones into suitable plot plans and identification of the equipment in nearby installations that could be subjected to high loads and fail. Concerning explosion consequences. as well as. In both cases. the duration of exposure is considered to be of the order of 15 .
or semi-confined in a heavily congested process plant. e. Flame jets. which were derived taking into account the literature guidelines and the specific characteristics of the various phenomena: • Fireball. Therefore. However. Beyond this.7 bar is considered as the domino effects limit. A large release of superheated liquid (e. will burn as a flame jet. Radiation levels are generally moderate. the danger is mainly for the people that may be affected by the radiation. For modelling purposes. Pool fires can occur when a significant quantity of liquid is released and immediately ignited. e. but the radiation levels are intense e. These can be confined. if ignited. the domino effects radius is defined as the distance from the centre of pool to a thermal radiation of 37. The effects of an explosion.g. in case of releases into containment dikes.g. could lead to a flash fire burning that part of vapour cloud within the flammability limits. the fireball radius is defined as the domino effects radius. Any equipment on which that flame jet impinged would be subjected to very high thermal loads. the risk for domino effects is small. If however. Within the radius of the fireball there will be severe damage to process equipment and buildings. but due to the short duration of the phenomenon. if ignited. tank fires. the ignition of a vapour cloud may result in an explosion. e. but duration can be long. LPG). there is sufficient mass within the cloud (e. may burn as a fireball. unless the cloud is confined in a building. Pool & tank fires. defined by blast overpressure. Outside the flame jet itself radiation hazards are very small.5 kW/m2. e. there may be ignition of equipment. • • • . Within the burning cloud. explosions are unlikely.g.g. can be significant. for an LPG pool fire the radiation at the surface of the flame is about 100 kW/m2 . are considered as confined pool fires. Vapour cloud fire and explosion. Overpressure 0. In such cases. or unconfined. the evaluation of domino effects zones is based on a set of damage-toequipment criteria. Therefore. the domino effects zone is defined by the length and width of the jet.In this study. often exceeding the capacity of fixed water sprays.g. The duration of the fireball is small (< 40 sec). in case of releases from LPG or gasoline road tankers.g. The fireball grows larger and moves upward continuously because of buoyancy.g. fire in a crude tank following failure of floating roof. the radiation at fireball surface can be up to 200 kW/m2 . the centre of explosion may be assumed to be very near to the point of release. Therefore. Release and dispersion of LPG. A high-pressure release of vapour or vapour/aerosol into free space. >1t). if immediately ignited.
RESULTS 3. accidents in the other refinery installations do not appear to involve any potential effects to the LPG installation. Figure 1 presents the results for the case of a fireball due to BLEVE of an LPG tank in the nearby LPG handling establishment.g. Catastrophic failure of a liquid LPG pipeline in the LPG handling establishment leading to flame jet. Failure of a gasoline road tanker in the refinery loading station leading to unconfined pool fire. Fire in a refinery oil storage tank. though smaller. and thus there is danger for them to BLEVE. flame jets associated with catastrophic failures of LPG pipelines. The results show that.3. Catastrophic failure of an LPG road tanker in the LPG handling establishment leading to fireball (BLEVE) or vapour cloud explosion.1 Domino scenarios due to accidents in nearby installations Accidents in nearby installations could be an important external hazard source for the refinery LPG installation. It can be seen that the domino effects zone includes the refinery four 4000 m3 LPG spheres. Similar analysis shows that BLEVE of an LPG road tanker in the nearby LPG handling establishment can also cause BLEVE of a refinery LPG 4000 m3 sphere. In addition. do not appear to have an impact to nearby installations. BLEVE of a refinery LPG sphere will have a substantial impact to nearby installations and could cause several. The assessment of domino effects zones leads to the identification of domino scenarios. there is concern for a potential BLEVE of an LPG road tanker that could cause further BLEVEs in the nearby LPG establishment. These include: • • • • • Catastrophic failure of an LPG tank in the LPG handling establishment leading to fireball (BLEVE) or vapour cloud explosion. . secondary accidents (Figure 1). 3. Smaller accidents e.2 Domino scenarios due to accidents in the refinery LPG installation The identification of domino scenarios that result from accidents in the LPG installation is also performed according to the procedure described above. The first step in the domino effects assessment is the identification of potential accidents in nearby installations. Conversely.
are presented. . Plot plan of the refinery LPG storage installation and the nearby installations. Domino effects zones of BLEVE accidents in the LPG handling terminal (solid line) and the refinery LPG installation (dotted line).LPG terminal 200 m Figure 1.
Amendola (Eds). JRC (1997). Methods for the calculation of physical effects. EUR 17690 EN. The control of such hazards could be achieved by enhancing communication on safety issues between the two companies.A. the danger for a major accident. “Yellow Book” CPR 14E. BLEVE accidents in the refinery LPG installation could cause secondary effects to nearby installations.. Due to the high safety standards of Hellenic Petroleum. AIChE (1994) 4. 2. 2nd Ed. “Green Book” CPR 16E. Voorburg. Voorburg. Guidance on the Preparation of a Safety Report to meet the Requirements of Council Directive 96/82/EC (SEVESO II). The Netherlands(1992). in accordance with the SEVESO II Directive requirements. Labour Inspectorate. Papadakis and A. Flash Fires. Safety study of the LPG storage installation at Hellenic Petroleum Aspropyrgos Refinery.4. General of Labour . is very low. A. The Netherlands(1989). . Guidelines for Evaluating the Characteristics of Vapour Cloud Explosions. CONCLUSIONS This study examined domino effects related with the LPG storage installation of the Hellenic Petroleum refinery at Aspropyrgos. such as BLEVE. (1996). REFERENCES 1. 5. Methods for the determination of possible damage to people and objects resulting from releases of hazardous materials. This study identified external sources of hazard related to the nearby LPG establishment. Dir. G. 3. The analysis indicates that: • • BLEVE accidents in the nearby LPG handling establishment could involve potential domino effects to the refinery LPG installation. Hellenic Petroleum S. Centre for Chemical Process Safety. Director General of Labour. and BLEVEs.