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Evidence from a Cross-national Analysis of Structural Conditions
Svend-Erik Skaaning, Assistant Professor, PhD Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus, Denmark firstname.lastname@example.org With Niels Bossen & Jeppe Kehlet Sørensen Paper prepared for the 66th MPSA Annual National Conference, Chicago, April 3-6, 2008
Oil production. Seven factors are included in the analysis to account for the outcome in question: oil production. and the aggregate rule of law governance indicator constructed by the World Bank. namely the rule of law sub-index from the Bertelsmann Transformation Index. and inequality.Abstract This paper seeks explain the current global variation in respect for the rule of law. and inequality tend to be consistently associated with the degree of rule of law in the expected way. The findings show that structural background conditions tend account rather well for the country-level variations in rule of law but they also call for more evaluation of the definition and measurement of this key concept and further inquiries into its causes. the law and order index linked to the ICRG dataset provided by Political Risk Services. ethno-religious diversity. Freedom House’s rule of law scores from the Freedom of the World Survey. 2 . modernization. Both noteworthy differences and similarities in the results emerge from the analysis. The empirical examination makes use of OLS-regression to test different structural explanations expected to facilitate or hinder the development of rule of law. Four different measures of rule of law are used interchangeably in the analysis. modernization. dominant religion. it basically depends on the measure used as dependent variable. country size. origin of legal system. while the picture is more blurred with regard to the other factors.
The rule of law is one of the essential pillars upon which any liberal democracy rests. then the situation is full of promise and men enjoy all the blessings that the gods shower on a state Plato. Thus. also here strong differences exists in the extent to which rule of law is violated. the other has hardly been subjected to general.. 1987: 138). whether the better form of government is one based on the rule of men or on the rule of law (Bobbio. especially within the developing world. and assembly are observed. systematic scrutiny – despite it obvious relevance from the perspective of ordinary citizens as well as the research discipline of political science in general and comparative politics in particular. the collapse of the state is not far off. 1993: 11-12). in Laws Introduction Throughout the history of political thought. However. or the courts (O’Donnell. 2004. Consequently. He came up with this proposition after making the observation that many of the new regimes emerging in the aftermath of the third wave of democratization meet the criteria of polyarchy. Furthermore. Scholars within the tradition of legal studies – producing the great majority of rule of law studies – have typically engaged in 3 . Guillermo O’Donnell has argued that. votes are counted fairly. the present study has clear connections to the research field engaged in democratization and regime studies. efficiency) values of rule of law also underlines the importance of digging deeper into its causes. yet they cannot expect proper treatment from the police. 2004). the state agencies. Such violations are frequent and serious in many countries. theoretical propositions and empirical investigations exclusively dedicated to account for the degree of rule of law are fairly underdeveloped. organization. equality) and functional (stability. This kind of variation naturally stimulates our curiosity to search for explanations. but if the law is the master of the government and the government is its slave. “The most critical aspect of a genuinely liberal state [is] the existence of a universalistic legal order” (1993: 10). Whereas one side of this distinction has been at the center of attention in a large number of empirical studies. while the rule of law is more frequently violated. the troublesome issue recurs. Also the intrinsic (freedom. O’Donnell. often citizens are not subject to direct coercion when voting. O’Donnell et al. as it has been emphasized by in more recent literature on the quality of democracy (Diamond & Morlino. In specific. and their freedom of expression. 2004.Where the law is subject to some other authority and has none of its own. the search for the best form of political rule not only concerns the contested question of who governs but also the equal question of how a country is governed.
Concerning the theoretical perspective of this paper. who have advocated a formal view of rule of law. Joireman. non-contradictoriness. and the results are compared and discussed. the study in divided into four parts. and Joireman (2001. Definition and Measurement of the Dependent Variable(S) A. The minimal attention previously directed towards empirical accounts for differences in the degree of rule of law means that no well-established explanatory factors exist within the rule of law field. prospectivity. Rule of law is thus limited to the so-called formal characteristics of 1 Joireman (2001) focuses on African countries and Andrews and Montinola (2004) on emerging democracies. cultural) explanations. 2004). empirical tests of theoretical explanations. the law has to fulfill eight criteria: generality. Hence. statistical assessments of theoretical explanations is thus very limited. Dicey popularized the concept rule of law (Harvey. stability. 2000. the inclusion of countries) more than limits on data availability forced upon their studies. Finally. out of these accounts for the rule of law. what accounts for the global variation in present-day variation in the rule of law. Second. 4 . and congruence between declared rules and the acts of administrators (1981: 158). and legal institutions rather than general. only two of them (Barro. namely the works of Andrews and Montinola (2004). In answering the research question. Lon Fuller has suggested that in a country characterized by the rule of law. The number of published studies representing general. 2003: 63-64). The first step sheds light on the concept of rule of law and identifies four measures to be employed as dependent variables. Within this tradition.. the theoretical accounts are examined by the use of multipleregression analysis. which are largely stable and outside the influence of current actors (Kitschelt.1 Instead of focusing on individual particularities. the main focus is thus placed on deep (structural. publicity. 1961: 491) and his thoughts have inspired most legal philosophers and political theorists. legal reasoning. capability of compliance. In the third step. the attention is directed toward characteristics that vary systematically across a broad range of countries.discussions regarding the nature of law. it seems reasonable examine a broad range of theoretical factors and to set out from one end of the causal chain and then move forward in future studies addressing proximate conditions in the form of institutional and actor-centered explanations.V. 2004) do not constrain the cross-sectional scope (i. a conclusion sums up the findings and makes an outline for further investigations into the issue. Barro (2000). clarity. legal systems. seven different theoretical explanations for differences in rule of law are presented and operationalized.e. Moreover.
3. General laws and not ad personam Publicly promulgated laws Prohibition against retrospective law Clear and comprehensive law No contradictory or inconsistent law No law should be impossible to respect Relative stability in the lawmaking Proportionality in the law Equality before the law Precedence of law. The first dimension is linked to the quality and functioning of the legal 5 . 6. Radin. then “the boundary of liberty is uncertain and liberty is restricted by reasonable fear of its exercise” (Rawls. 10. that is. respect for personal integrity. it is analytically fruitful to recognize that the overarching concept covers at least three dimensions. 5. 9. restraints on the Leviathan are warranted. 2. In the chief work on political philosophy in the last century. the installation of a coercive sovereign. if like cases are not treated alike. 8. Second. 4. not very different from Fuller’s list. John Rawls argues that rule of law is part of his overall scheme of justice as fairness. The rule of law is formal justice – understood as “the regular and impartial administration of law” – applied to the legal system (Rawls. in the absence of the formal characteristics of rule of law. A Theory of Justice. and certainty of legal consequences. 13. which has enforcement of penal sanctions as one of its core functions. the rule of law is the natural choice of a legal structure since it promotes liberty through the provision of predictability. determinateness. He advances two key arguments for establishing a linkage between the formal concept of rule of law and the basic value of liberty (cf. 1971: 235-43). 1989: 788). 11. no one is above the law Independent and effective juridical control Due process of law Liability to pay compensation for any damage caused Absence of arbitrary state action and promotion of justice Also normative political theory has addressed the rule of law. if rules are vague. or if the judicial process is irregular. 7. accentuates fourteen formal attributes shown in table 1.constitutional government or a Rechtsstaat. namely the functioning of the legal system. Table 1: Principles of the Rule of Law (formal Rechtsstaat) 1. 1971: 235-243 [§ 38]). 12. Hans-Joachim Lauth (2001: 33) has surveyed the literature on rule of law and. Thus. and maintenance of order. 14. However. There are good reasons to approve all the formal features presented above in a united package. First.
system.freedomhouse.aspx 6 . and equality before the law constitute core attributes of this dimension. Second. where the datasets and country-years to be used in the subsequent analysis have been emphasized. A survey of available datasets points out four measures that (more or less) live up to these conditions and two falling short of the scope requisite.org/template. the focus should be directed toward the actual level of rule of law. police violence. 2007 1984-2006 1996.com/ICRG.cfm?page=15 4 http://www.3 The third is the law and order scores provided by Political Risk Services in relation to its International Country Risk Guide. due process. and inhuman or degrading treatment (including torture). the next move is the operationalization of the dependent variable. Table 2: Rule of Law Measures (Generators and Empirical Scope) Generator(s) Bertelsmann Foundation (BF) Freedom House (FH) Freedom House (FH) Global Integrity (GI) Political Risk Services (PRS) World Bank (WB) Dataset Bertelsmann Transformation Index Freedom of the World Countries at the Crossroads Global Integrity Index International Country Risk Guide Worldwide Governance Indicators Measure Rule of Law Rule of Law Rule of Law Rule of Law and Access to Justice Law and Order Rule of Law Countries 125 193 30(60) 55 139 211 Years 2003. 2000. namely the contemporary degree of rule of law in all or. the scope of the data should fit the study’s scope. After the conceptualization. 2007 2005-2006 2003-2006 2003. the third dimension concerns the ability of the state to uphold order. First. 2006.bertelsmann-transformation-index. They are all presented in table 2.de/11. at least. 20022006 The first is the rule of law sub-index from the Bertelsmann Transformation Index2 covering most non-OECD countries with more than three million citizens.prsgroup. reduce violence (including armed conflicts and riots) and crime throughout its territory. 1998. An independent and impartial judicial system. that is. The second dimension covers the extent to which the government respects the personal integrity rights of its citizens.html?&L=1 http://www.0. Third. such as arbitrary arrests.4 The 2 3 http://www. which excludes indicators on formal commitment. Finally. The second is Freedom House’s scores for rule of law linked to the Freedom of the World survey. 2005. the measures should primarily build on expert assessments in the form of standards-based data. most countries of the world. The rule of law measures have to fulfill a range of criteria to be used. respect for the decisions of the courts.
is 5 http://info. including all those listed in the table. not used in any of the previous studies. policies.fourth is the aggregate rule of law indicator constructed by the World Bank5 based on many different data sources. exile. and timely hearing by competent. The noteworthy differences (and similarities make it a reasonable choice to employ more than one. and practices guarantee equal treatment Law and Order (PRS) Strength and impartiality of the legal system Popular observance of the law Agents have confidence in the rules of society Agents abide by the rules of society Rule of Law (WB) High quality contract enforcement High quality police High quality courts Low likelihood of crime Low likelihood of violence Although they all intend to measure the rule of law. Table 3: Rule of Law Measures (Attributes and Attribute Components) Measure Rule of Law (BF) Attributes Checks and balances Civil rights Independent judiciary Attribute Components Working separation of powers Independent judiciary Legal or political penalties for power abusing officials Protection of civil liberties and possibility to seek redress for violations Judiciary not subject to interference Judges appointed and dismissed in a fair and unbiased manner Judges rule fairly and impartially Governmental authorities comply with judicial decisions and these are enforced Private concerns comply with judicial decisions and these are enforced Protection of defendants’ rights. as we see from table 3.org/governance/wgi2007/ 7 . forced removal etc.worldbank. against such groups Women enjoy full equality in law and practice Non-citizens enjoy basic human rights Rule of law in civil and criminal matters Rule of Law (FH) Protection from political terror. public. including presumption of innocence Access to independent. competent legal counsel Fair. and freedom from war and insurgencies Laws. and impartial tribunal Prosecutors independent of political control and influence Prosecutors independent of powerful private legal/illegal interests Effective and democratic control of law enforcement officials Law enforcement officials free from the influence of non-state actors No arbitrary arrests and detentions and no fabrication or planting of evidence No beating of detainees or use of excessive force or torture Conditions in pretrial facilities and prisons humane Citizens have means of effective petition and redress Population not subjected to physical harm. unjustified imprisonment. torture. their conceptualization of the concept is fairly different. due to conflict/war Various distinct groups have equality before the law Violence against such groups not widespread and perpetrators brought to justice No legal/de facto discrimination in employment. indeed all four measures – interchangeably – as dependent variable in the regressions. housing etc. independent. This procedure.
which has some analytical and technical benefits. The extraction of natural resources such as oil and minerals is the second economic and socio-economic factor suggested to have an impact on the respect for liberaldemocratic rights (Ross. that is. it is expected that natural resource dependency tends to make countries less bound to the principles of rule of law. the theoretical perspective is constricted to structural explanations largely stable and beyond the control of current actors in contrast to more proximate political and institutional factors. resource wealth may lead to ethnic or regional conflict over access to the ‘easy money’. Presentation and Measurement of the Explanatory Variables Because of the global character of the study. As regards the repression effect. some of the propositions are very much inspired by the democratization literature.followed in order to compare. Resource Curse (oil production). Karl. 1997). 8 . are: resource curse (oil production). According to Ross (2001). dominant religion (Islam). Following a similar line of reasoning. Due to the immaturity of the research field. The logic of the rentier effect is that governments in oil-rich countries use their revenues from natural resources to reduce public pressures for greater state accountability. and inequality. In the present study. 2001. included as independent variables in the model. 100 signifying the highest rule of law level. that the scores of the four measures have been standardized to go from 0 to 100. the results.6 The theoretical accounts selected for examination. The governments can use low tax rates and greater spending on patronage to decrease public demands for broader societal development including the institution of rule of law. the argument says that natural resource wealth is used to suppress competitive and oppositional forces. the theoretical perspective needs to be formulated at a level of generality high enough to test the explanatory propositions on dissimilar countries. This choice does not mean that such theories are generally disqualified as explanations of the variation in rule of law but. country size. ethnoreligious fractionalization. the resource curse consists of at least two possible causal mechanisms. Empirical research has shown that having natural resources generally harms a country’s prospects for democratic development. given the scope of this study and the lack of well-established relationships. origin of legal system. As mentioned in the introduction. a search for more deep-rooted explanations seems justified. this choice reduces the number of potential explanations substantially. the resource 6 Furthermore. modernization (wealth). and check the robustness of. In addition. Notice. namely a rentier effect and a repression effect.
Therefore.php 9 . The (natural log) of a country’s total area in square kilometres is used to measure this variable based on data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. there are reasons to believe that countries with a Western (or Western like) civilization show higher respect for the rule of law. Lipset. 193. which feeds corrupt practices and generally biases the incentives of the elite and public officials towards ‘unlawful’ rule. and acceptance of pluralism.org/external/np/pp/2007/eng/051507g.edu/php_site/pwt_index. The concept of rule of law was created and developed in the West and then spread around the rest of the world. 241). because of inherent authoritarian straits (1996: 102-116. the standard wealth indicator is used. Second. As regards the theoretical mechanisms at place.econ. Modernization (wealth). In this way. Moreover. Religion. which sets it apart from other civilizations. in terms of 7 8 http://www. Gustav Hansson and Ola Olsson (2006) propose to causal links for the relationship. receive the value of 1 and the rest a 0 meaning that the variable is treated as a dichotomy. namely (natural log of) GDP per capita (PPP) represented by data from the Penn World Tables8 for year 2004. In the measurement of modernization. A country’s territorial size has been argued to influence the degree of rule of law. the strength and autonomy of the civil society increases. they present a direct ‘broadcasting-effect’ suggesting that rule of law has the character of a local public good that is imperfectly spread from the capital to the remaining territory. Country size. Samuel P.curse is operationalized by the use of IMF’s list of hydro-carbon rich countries (2000-2005) found in the Guide on Resource Transparency. Przeworski et al. Epstein et al.7 These countries. with a heavy reliance on oil production for government revenues. the theory emphasizes changes in attitudes towards more moderation. larger countries tend to be endowed with a larger amount of primary sector rents. First. which help its readiness and ability to control the exercise of political power broadly understood. Huntington generally regards Islam as a counter-civilization to the West. The modernization theory is the most notorious of the suggested explanations. This circumstance means that the size indirectly brings about a ‘rent seeking-effect’.upenn. tolerance.imf. 2000.. 184-185.pdf http://pwt. 311) regards rule of law as a central aspect of the Western civilization. The overall theoretical argument is that modernization increases the probability that regimes are liberal (democratic) (cf. 1959. 2006).. Huntington (1996: 70.
divide national legal traditions in the world into five legal traditions developed in England (common law). Among the causal mechanisms suggested to link religion and rule of law. it might be more difficult to coordinate and produce a coherent opposition to a repressive. rule-violating state in a divided society (Hayo & Voigt. 2001: 388). Ethno-religious Fractionalization. Data on the degree of heterogeneity are taken from Alesina et al. it is claimed. meaning that a high value on the index corresponds to a high degree of fractionalization in a given country (2003: 158-160). As the same logic applies to both ethnic and religious fractionalization. Steven Fish (2004) in the operationalization of the hypothesis. Moreover. The Origin of Legal Systems. was developed mostly to protect the property of individuals and to limit the power of the state. 2004: 162). socialist law. 2005: 11). English common law. In short. while rather significant between common law. France (French civil law).religion. respectively. a combined measure. the distinction between the latter three being relatively small. who have constructed scores of ethnic and religious fractionalization. Huntington expects countries. Following M. One line of thought suggests that common law systems are superior as a result of their origin. is employed. whereas civil law 10 . to be negatively associated with rule of law. where Islam is the dominant religion. La Porta et al. The values of the indices correspond to the probability that two randomly selected people belong to different ethnic and religious groups. Germany (German civil law). Hayo & Voigt. different characteristics of the legal systems are expected to account for some of the variation in rule of law. and Scandinavia (Scandinavian civil law). 2001: 497) as illustrated by different degrees of imposition of Islamic law in a number of countries. One of them anticipates a negative relationship because greater diversity is likely to stimulate conflict (Fish & Brooks. Weingast. based on the maximum value of the two original indices for each country. and civil law. 1997: 256). It has been argued that Islam has more propensity to penetrate all spheres of society (Hefner. (2003). A second argument says that a negative effect is to be expected because different groupings tend to help ‘their own’ by corrupt means (Paldam. some emphasize whether a religion is hierarchical and authoritarian or individualist and egalitarian (Treisman. 2005: 10. Various linkages between ethnic and/or religious fragmentation and the quality of political regimes have been suggested in the literature. the Soviet Union (socialist law). a dummy variable is created distinguishing between countries where Islam (in its various form) is the dominant religion (1) and all others (0). 2000: 403. There appears to be several reasons to anticipate a lower level of rule of law in Muslim countries than in others.
are used. 2001: 575). it should have a clear negative impact because it ‘is a clear manifestation of the State’s intent to create institutions to maintain its power and extract resources.. Therefore.undp. Among the civil law countries. and courts).org/en/statistics/ 11 . Furthermore. 2001: 573). common law is expected to function better in very dissimilar contexts. 9 The coefficient varies theoretically between 0 (no income inequality) and 1 (one person earns all income). a preferential treatment of economic elites is expectable as they can use their economic resources for privileged treatment (through bribery etc. First. so they initiate a high level of suppression using ‘private helpers’ or the state apparatus (military. Opposing the poor. Inequality. In addition to these differences. As to socialist law. Income inequality is operationalized using the Gini-coefficient scores from the UNDP Human Development Indicators. Common law constitutes the reference category since it typical in the literature compare the performance of legal systems with this tradition. thereby increasing the chances for a development of rule of law (Joireman. the common law system allows for the development of the legal system in a more flexible manner across time and space (Joireman.developed more as an instrument for the state to expand its power and regulate its citizens. In general. which can provide an important alternative power to the state. lawyers have a stronger position within common law systems. those with German or Scandinavian legal origin are expected to perform better than those with French civil law because they have managed to build professional rather than patrimonial bureaucracies.). an unequal income distribution can increase instability (Londregan & Poole. however. it is argued that due to an emphasis on process and legal precedent. 1990) if low-income groups feel forced to make use of civil disobedience and violence (etc. without much regard for protecting the economic interest or the liberties of the population’ (La Porta et al. the distinctions and data (constructed as a set of dummies) provided by La Porta et al. Empirical Analysis 9 http://hdr. a rich elite probably feels more pressure on their position if they have much to loose and their opponents much to gain. Several theoretical arguments are readily available regarding why income inequality should affect the level of rule of law. police. 1999: 231-232). Concerning the operationalization of legal origin.) in order to attain socio-economic objectives.
212** 0.573*** 0. the findings indicate no significant relationship between this factor and the PRS index. even though inequality is a socio-economic explanation.275*** -0.383*** -0.332*** 0.373*** -0.01-level. In this way.803*** 0. the cultural variables are added. Inequality is not included before because. In contrast.129* -0. However. This tentative result indicates that the explanations in focus are relevant.246*** Muslim -0. only the geographical and socio-economic factors are included. The associations between the resource curse and inequality on the one hand and rule of law on the other are negative and significant. which is likely to introduce a selection bias. and in the final step. they are included in a combined model. The similarities predominate but differences do exist. Table 5: OLS Estimation Results of Models with WB06 and PRS06 as Dependent Variables WB06 WB06 WB06 PRS06 PRS06 PRS06 12 .164** -0.184** -0. In the first step.212*** -0.1-level.263*** -0.281*** Fractrio -0.218*** 0. to assess whether the strength of these relationships are stable.096 -0.330*** -0.476*** -0. Then.123* Legfrench -0. respectively.207** -0. Thirtythree out of thirty-six are significantly related in the expected direction.432*** -0.257*** 0. ***Significant at the 0.121* Legscan 0. Multiple regression analysis is employed in three steps for all the separate measures of rule of law. or increase. From table 5 we see that there is much agreement between the results of the regressions using the WB and PRS measures.196* -0.409*** Size -0. Also noteworthy. **Significant at the 0. decrease. a socialist legal origin tends to be worse for the rule of law than oil production if the WB indicator functions as the dependent variable.134* 0.713*** 0.104 Leggerm 0. also inequality takes part in the tournament of variables. Table 4: Bivariate Correlations between Dependent and Independent Variables WB06 PRS06 FH06 BTI07 Oil -0.001-level (one-tailed test). The explanatory power of the models is considerably higher for the World Bank measure.409*** *Significant at the 0.265*** -0.076 -0.136* Legsocia -0. it is the explanatory variable showing the highest extent of missing data.Table 4 shows the bivariate correlation (Pearson’s r) coefficients between the measures reflecting the dependent variable and the indicators representing the explanatory variables. whereas modernization and the presence of a Scandinavian legal origin show a positive relationship.309*** 0.234*** 0.378*** GDP 0. the importance of the explanatory variables tested against each other demonstrates their relative relevance for the outcome once controls are introduced.
108) -5.404) -1.76 128 0.312* (3.741) -0.805) -3.521) -2.726) -12.021 (0. Moreover. however.942) 20.693) -5.852* (18.717* (4. Concerning country size and ethno-religious fractionalization. Apropos legal original.001-level (one-tailed test).136) -38.856) 7. Country size.532** (2.331) 11.079*** (1.935) -2.575) 10.203** (11.171) -21.215 (0. have lower levels of rule of law.523) -0. Oil production and wealth are oppositely and robustly associated with rule of law. but in one of the regressions on PRS06 the association turns insignificant when inequality is added to the model.997 (6.689) -34. namely those generated by Freedom House and the Bertelsmann Foundation.102** (4.452** (5.936) -15.787 (5.688) -4.949*** (0.233*** (3. If we move ahead to the findings connected to the two remaining rule of law measures.681*** (2.692*** (3.48 137 0.73 185 0.602** (6. and the fact that it looses significance in the third could be selection bias induced by the inequality indicator as it tends to lack data on very small countries.299) -7.911* (3. twice more the results indicate that economic inequality is bad for legal equality.588) -4.734 (2.845* (0.648*** (2.257 (4.460 (5.399 (4. The results linked to FH06 also correspond to those based on 13 .031 (0.031*** (1.797** (15.1-level.270 (5.44 137 0.512*** (0.520) 14.418) -35.512 (8.791) -12.942) -0.895* (2.943 (29.389) 0.433) 13.51 110 Unstandardized coefficients reported with (heteroscedasticity-consistent) robust standard errors in parentheses.66 186 0.800) 21. This conclusion stands in contrast to the previous findings and constitutes the most striking exception from the overall impression that somewhat similar patterns emerge.611 (5.495) 12. **Significant at the 0.543) 3.994) -6.854 (2.267) -0.928*** (4.771) -12.Constant Oil Production LnGDP/cap LnSize Ethno-religious Fractionalization French Legal Origin Socialist Legal Origin German Legal Origin Scandinavian Legal Origin Muslim Inequality R2 (Adjusted) N -51.961) 0. is significant in the first two regression analyses with WB06 as dependent variable.648*** (10.492) -1.01-level. a French inheritage shows a consistent.599) 4.284* (14.803) 15. negative impact on the rule of law compared to the British common law tradition.123*** (0.237) 11.842 (0.346 (4.914) -10. ceterus paribus.487) 0.387 (5.518* (4.314) 0.989) -0.792*** (1.111) 9. *Significant at the 0.565* (3.441) 3.600* (0. ***Significant at the 0.600*** (0. they agree that Muslim societies.312) 7. the theoretical links to rule of law are largely disconfirmed.327) 11.306) -11.129) 7.675) 1.632*** (2.274) 3.913) -0.769* (0.707*** (3.997** (3.
028) 1.254) 0.541* (0.147 (4.644 (19.656) -0.168) -29.584) FH06 -16.640*** (4.899*** (1.001-level (one-tailed test).422*** (3.807) BTI07 -1.634*** (4.836*** (3.518 (8.01-level. This fact probably offers a partial explanation of the relatively unimpressive level of variance accounted for and why fewer of the explanatory variables gain significance in the BTI06 regressions.56 127 0. Table 6: OLS Estimation Results of Models with FH06 and BTI07 as Dependent Variables FH06 Constant Oil Production LnGDP/cap LnSize -37.756*** (7. the primary reason why the indicators German and Scandinavian legal origin are left out.626) 10.316*** (1.654** (5.424) -7.088 (6.319* (4.612*** (1.087 (9.248** (4.377) 10.262) -14.114) 10.429) 13.761) 10.989) -14.WB06 in emphasizing the potentially negative impact of big country size as well as the inverse effect of a socialist and Scandinavian legal origin. Conclusion 14 .229) 0. the coefficients connected to the shared.145 (22.361) -3.686 (4.933 (3.647) 5.648) -0.194*** (2.801 (3.619) -8.38 99 BTI07 -23.735) 12.196) 10.116* (9. *Significant at the 0.829*** (1.641* (5.574 (25.809*** (3. no matter the operationalization of rule of law.172) 2.171) -23.388) -7.831) -0.969) BTI07 -17.52 181 0. Variation in the dependent and independent variables are more constricted for the Bertelsmann measure than its competitors since it only covers non-OECD countries.593 (29.031) -0.605* (0.46 122 -12.337) -1.555** (16. **Significant at the 0.558*** (3.069) -13.290 (6.578 (1.222) -0.749) FH06 -11.385 (19.59 180 0.709) -0. On the other hand.40 122 0.714** (0.449 (0.502) Ethno-religious Fractionalization French Legal Origin Socialist Legal Origin German Legal Origin Scandinavian Legal Origin Muslim Inequality R2 (Adjusted) N Unstandardized coefficients reported with (heteroscedasticity-consistent) robust standard errors in parentheses.1-level. significant factors are fairly similar across all regressions.193) 23.084) 19.957*** (4.306* (0.130) 13.496*** (4.635) -20.865) 6.055) -0.196) -12.694) -1.508) -1. ***Significant at the 0.479) -17.421 (8.957 (4.093) -22.575) -0.491*** (1.515 (1.922* (9.642) 7.683** (4.111 (1.
The findings also demonstrate that structural factors account for a great deal of the variation in rule of law. it may help the reader to get a better overview of the results.(socialist) + (Scandinavian) + (Scandinavian) BTI07 + The results of this study lend strong support the theoretical claims that oil production. the impact of each theoretical factor on the different rule of law measures are summarized in table 7. contingency. although a few candidates showed significant association with rule of law across changes in models and measurement. by far. irrespective of the index employed to reflect this feature of good governance. Table 7: Summary of Results WB06 Oil Production Modernization (wealth) Country Size Ethno-religious Fractionalization Legal Origin Religion (Islam) Inequality . Following the tentative conclusions from the regression analyses. This means that rule of law far more follow clear patterns than theories exclusively focusing on elites. Scandinavian legal origin. Although nuances are missed in such presentation. the results 15 . the strict focus of the present study on structural explanations in a comparative perspective implied that the crucial relationship between these factors and the actors making history has been adequately addressed. while the evidence did not point out fractionalization and country size to be important.(French) . Elaborating on this fundamental point. unconstrained choice.(Socialist) + (Scandinavian) + (Scandinavian) + (+) PRS06 + FH06 + (+) (+) . The results for the effect of religion and socialist legal origin were mixed. Given the level of generalization.The completion of the analyses calls for a summary of the findings as many of the results turned out vary along with the different indices reflecting rule of law. On the other hand. which limit and enable certain actions via their impact on the resource and preference distribution and thus shape the feasible set of outcomes. structures constitute agent-embedding contexts. and inequality influence whether the rule of law observance is high or low. wealth. and formal institutions would predict.
16 . Due to the immaturity of the research on the topic addressed in this paper. current variations in rule of law neglects important knowledge if deeper explanations are not taken into account. so the actual working of the logic presented in the theoretical set-up would benefit from process-tracing in case studies. Nonetheless. there are many obvious ways to proceed. measurement.. Of course. but we have chosen to track the differences in results back to the conceptualization. that is.gave a rather simple picture of the relationships. Previous general studies with an aim similar to this one have only used a single index to measure the rule of law. institutional) with a plausible theoretical foundation is evident. and aggregation of the rule of law indices.g. besides undermining the comparability of results. Like different measures of the dependent variable were used in this paper. to assess the plausibility and comparability of the country scores (cf. This choice has their conclusions very dependent on the reliability and validity of the scores employed. alternative operationalizations of the independent variables could be employed. what the findings certainly do suggest is that an exclusive focus on proximate conditions in the explanation of global. Skaaning. 2008). the addition to the model of more structural and other kinds of variables (e. Instruments variables could be included in the regressions to statistically investigate the direction of causality (first and foremost relevant with respect to modernization).
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