THEME : FOURTH GEN WAFARE In the changing nature of modern warfare, fourth generation warfare (4GW) is a term coined in to denote the growing conflict between state and non state actors which blurs any distinction between ‘military’ and the ‘civilians’. Practitioners of 4GW will be transitional groups without territorially based armies, and much of their activity will probably resemble guerrilla warfare or low intensity conflict. These highly irregular practices will enable groups that are militarily weak to defeat larger and stronger forces. A premise of 4GW is that the world itself is changing, so terrorism and guerrilla warfare are now ready to move to the centre stage. Such warfare will invariably put the armed forces of any country in a quagmire where defeating and eliminating the enemy will be as important as winning the hearts and minds of the populace. Soldiers may be required to conduct full scale military action, peace keeping and humanitarian relief operations in the span of few hours and with the space of three contiguous city blocks. Pakistan Army is also faced with similar situations in its UN peacekeeping missions and operations in FATA and Balochistan where in addition to conducting military action against the miscreants and terrorists, it also has to undertake relief and security operations. Keeping the above in view, analyze the concepts of 4GW with the view to assessing their implication and suitability for adoption by Pakistan Army in order to meet the challenges faced due to our involvement in LIC sits.



Introduction “The first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that it is alien to its nature.” Clausewitz, On War 1. International security environment has undergone significant changes since the end of Cold War. On one hand, military technology has developed at a remarkably rapid pace; on the other hand a number of non-state actors have emerged who are challenging writ of states. Using asymmetrical means these actors have caused serious dilemma for modern armies that are organized / equipped to fight a conventional war. US military thinkers have argued that warfare has evolved into the fourth generation; with the premise that the world itself is changing, so terrorism and GW, and other elusive techniques which are still being invented, are now ready to move to the centre stage. 2. In order to defeat the fourth generation enemy, winning hearts and minds of the populace will be as important as military operations. US army, through its experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, has aptly tailored its doctrine to meet this challenge. US army now requires soldiers to be trained and equipped to conduct full scale military operations, peace keeping and humanitarian relief operations. 3. Pakistan Army is also faced with similar challenges in its operations in FATA and Balochistan where in addition to conducting military operations against the miscreants, it also has to undertake relief and security operations. Therefore, it is important for us to study concepts of 4GW, in order to adapt them to our peculiar threat environment. Aim 4. To analyze the concepts of 4GW with the view to assess its implication and suitability for adoption by Pakistan Army in prevailing LIC environment.


c. d. Characteristics and Challenges. Sequence of the paper is as under:a. e.3 RESTRICTED Scope 5. Application in Own Environment Recommendations RESTRICTED . b. Part I – Part II – Part III – Part IV – Conclusion Genesis. Manifestation of Concept.

3rd Generation Warfare – Manoeuvre Warfare . e. With invention of machine gun and indirect fire. “Pakistan Army Journal”. Four generations of modern war began with the ‘Peace of Westphalia’ in 1648. Evolution of Warfare. German Blitzkrieg in World War II which relied on fire and manoeuvre to bypass and cut off the enemy rather then close with and destroy. 7. In 2006. Hammes.g.4 RESTRICTED PART I – GENESIS. 13. e. Napoleonic era. Before exploring the probable form and potential impact of 4GW. 4GW eliminates state’s monopoly over waging wars and will be fought by adaptive and agile non-state actors operating and thriving along seams in ungoverned spaces. tactics relied on mass fire. c. 2 RESTRICTED . trench warfare in World War I. Unlike previous generations.g. USMC. The Sling and The Stone . The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century. It will employ political. CHARACTERISTICS AND CHALLENGES 4GW 6. three earlier generations of war are briefly described below 2:a.g. Lind in a 1989 Marine Corps Gazette article titled “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation”. drug traffickers or criminals. 1 Major General Muhammad Ahsan Mahmood. social and military means to directly attack enemy’s will to fight. b. the treaty that ended the Thirty Years' War1. They may also be nationalistic movements. 12-23. 2006-07). 2nd Generation Warfare – Mass Firepower . It is characterized by following3:a. pp. Characteristics of 4GW.e there will be no major battles or engagements. 207-224. Challenges and Response”. “4th Generation Warfare. Involved massive armies resorting to rigid line and column tactics to achieve concentration of fire. Winter 2008. the concept was expanded upon by USMC Colonel Thomas Hammes in his well-received book. this p. The concept was first described by the authors William S. pp. Non-State Actors. (Rawalpindi: Army Education Publishing House. economic. 3 Colonel Thomas X. 4GW does not attempt to win by defeating enemy’s military forces i. 1st Generation Warfare – Mass Armies (1648 – 1680) . e. Third Generation Warfare combined firepower with mobility and communication.

e. 4GW practitioner will be free to focus on offense rather then defense of his infrastructure. g. 4GW conflicts are likely to last many years and even decades. 4GW forces are decentralized. Civilian Casualties. their own supporters or international community. These will not occur due to military weapons alone but by materials available in modern society. The audience may include people / decision makers of target state. Duration of Conflicts. Role of Media. Altered Centre of Gravity. thereby altering their will and perceptions. Non-Linear Battlefields. family / clan honour. Exploitation of Have-Nots.5 RESTRICTED b. deny to their enemies a focal point at which to deliver a conflict ending blow. Logistics. k. Mass following of 4GW leaders will come from those who feel disenfranchised. widely dispersed with no fronts or boundaries and in some cases even absent. Combatants may even be missing and smaller groups might organize themselves into impromptu alliances to target a bigger threat. j. h. proving one’s manhood or fighting a religious war. industries / depots. As a result these alliances are weak. RESTRICTED . This entails a strong political base to defeat a 4GW enemy. Modus Operandi. People who are happy with their lives are generally not expected to be exploited by 4GW tactics. A large number of civilian casualties will be a regular feature. d. 4GW practitioners will employ various means including political. e. Disaggregated forces. Battlefields will be nonlinear. economic as well as military to send specific messages to diverse audience to affect them psychologically. such as guerrillas. social. In 4GW centre of gravity may revolve around nationalism. f. terrorists and rioters. Decentralized Enemy. lacking a centre of gravity. c. Media will play a vital role in 4GW by being an instrument in changing perceptions of masses through tailored images. Resources required for 4GW tactics are available in modern society and do not require war fighting infrastructure i.

d. b. Challenges for Armed Forces. religion may be a motivating force for miscreants as well as security forces (as in case of Pakistan). Motivational / ideological issues. Difficult transition from conventional to unconventional mode. Invisible enemy. Difficulty in countering asymmetric / unconventional means e. g.g. RESTRICTED . not irregular forces in 4GW environment. c.6 RESTRICTED 8. Armed forces of any country are usually equipped and trained to combat conventional threat. IEDs and suicide bombings. Avoidance of collateral damage. f. e. Irregular pattern of fighting. Complexity to identify between friend and foe. This entails following problems:a.

Insurgents. we withdraw When the enemy rests. Hammes. This victory was quickly followed by the emergence of a violent insurgency. When the enemy tires. RESTRICTED . (New York: Columbia University Press. 2006). with the Taliban initiating 4GW. Terrorists and Militias. It was extremely effective in forcing Taliban and Al Qaeda into mountains. taking lead from 3BW concept introduced by General Charles Krulak in 1990 to Colonel Thomas X. the United States engineered a rapid overthrow of the Taliban regime in response to the September 11 attacks. 4GW Threat. After a series of engagements.7 RESTRICTED PART II – MANIFESTATION OF CONCEPT “When the enemy advances. 2006-07). Former ISAF Commander General Stanley A. 4 Response Strategy. 147. we harass. Coalition forces formulated a response strategy. pp. When the enemy withdraws. The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century. starting operation from 7 Oct 11 but failed to achieve an effective dislodgment of Taliban. 46. b. (Rawalpindi: Army Education Publishing House. Mc Chrystal said that "The conflict will be won by persuading the population. US initiated air strikes against Taliban. US forces than launched a famous conventional operation. pp. In 2001. US forces were not able to gain complete success and Taliban command structure was still in place." Operations conducted in Afghanistan in response to 4GW are as under:a. 5 Presently the Coalition Forces have over 112. 5 Richard Shultz Jr and Andrea J Dew. we attack.000 troops and after a decade of fighting still they are away from point of culmination. we pursue. In Mar 2002 Taliban resurged and started attacking NATO / ISAF forces leaving no option but to find a new strategy to respond to 4GW threat. Ground forces launched offensive with assistance of CIA to overthrow Taliban Government at Kabul. not by destroying the enemy.” Mao Tse-Tung4 Operation Enduring Freedom 9. USMC. coded as Operation Anaconda. to knock out Taliban from Toraboara mountains which met little success.

After May 2003. the total amount allocated for humanitarian assistance by US and UK had been $275 Million and 240 Million Pounds respectively. a bitter 4GW threat emerged after that.S launched war in March 2003 with ground support of UK. In the realm of humanitarian assistance coalition countries contributed a lot. operating since 2009 and have trained 200. However. rehabilitation. US troops had been partially successful in PKO as the warring factions. waged one of the bloodiest campaigns against each other. Humanitarian operations include.S President declared “end to major combat operations” on 1 May 2003.2 billion appealed by the UN. insurgency started in Iraq by local Sunnis and Shiites with the help of non state actors. 4GW Threat.8 RESTRICTED conduct small group military operations. U.000 ANA troops as of June 2012. U. The task is being undertaken by Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). 27 PRTs are operating in Afghanistan.S and UK to persuade UNSC to pass new resolution against Iraq failed. The PKO include civil Military Operations. In February 2003. Without UN approval. Humanitarian operations and Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) in simultaneity. Coalition forces suffered heavy causalities but were able to mount an effective response by shift in strategy to 3BW. Training of ANA and ANP and other peace keeping operation. a. b. reconstruction. attempts by U. Training task are being undertaken by NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM – A). It was followed by combined ground and air actions against Republican guards to take Baghdad in 3 weeks. Response. created by chaos of invasion and presence of foreign troops. Australia and Poland. relief operations and local economic uplift. The first phase of operation unfolded on 19 Mar 2003 when US conducted air strikes to kill Sadam Hussain which were not effective. Against an estimated amount of 2. RESTRICTED . Operation Iraqi Freedom 10. As of May 2012.

suitably adopted for the Urban and Rural environment of the two countries. The doctrine employed for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is based on principles of MOOTW. It has helped US to legitimize its actions. It can thus be concluded that RESTRICTED . small cells/ sections made up of senior NCOs and led by seasoned leaders. Despite many initiatives of humanitarian assistance. “Abu Gharaib” incident had tarnished their image in Iraq and worldwide. Coordination . Training. US forces also made modifications in their tactics in Iraq and Afghanistan. e. overall image of US soldiers remains low as the local populations are acutely aware of the real motives. Lack of credible human intelligence has also resulted in a failure to capture any of the top wanted leaders. Organization. b. Humanitarian Assistance. In terms of cultural training and respecting local norms and customs. The US government has been able to put in place regimes of its choice both in Afghanistan and Iraq who are completely in unison with their policies despite massive human rights violations and friendly casualties. Analysis – Afghanistan / Iraq a.9 RESTRICTED 11. equipped and suitably augmented with specialist equipment/ vehicles for different combat situations.Local Government/ Military. supported by special air support. d.e. and aided by allies are effective against 4GW forces rather than committing large conventional forces which have not proved very effective. Heavy reliance on electronic means has limited US ability to accurately target real miscreants and has often resulted in incidents of killing of innocent civilian. at least in their own public opinion. f. Formations and units employed are organized. i. US troops success in avoiding large scale casualties despite prolonged employment of over 10 years bears evidence to their good training. US troops were not successful initially. Doctrine. The use of SOF in Afghanistan. c. Intelligence.

Transition and Synergy. An example is the tough operating environment of Fallujah where despite fanatical resistance US troops fared quite well. RESTRICTED . The formations and units have adapted well to the new environment and in their combined operations they have been able to achieve the desired synergy.10 RESTRICTED humanitarian assistance can only be useful if the ultimate objective is welfare and overall good of the target population. g.

(5) Non-State Actors. due to competing economic interests in the region have raised concern on their mutual relationship. India is always ready to initiate steps.” Sun Tzu. by committing Army on two fronts. it is quite possible that it is supporting a 4GW campaign in FATA and Swat. possible Indian objectives by supporting 4GW in FATA / Balochistan are:(a) (b) (c) (2) Involve maximum Pakistan Armed Forces in LIC. To this end. Create a force imbalance. Geo-Strategic Environment (1) India. (3) Iran. which undermine the solidarity and integrity of Pakistan. Degradation of Army’s vital combat assets and ensure decline in conventional capability. Afghanistan wants to lay the blame on Pakistan due to its internal political problems. However. (4) USA. thus indirectly promoting the cause of 4GW players. Their aims are of complete political nature yet these Non in Pakistan. Afghanistan. Apart from posing a 2GW/3GW threat. These are as under:- RESTRICTED . US drone attacks in FATA are creating resentment among the local masses and undermining credibility of our government. Art of War Factors Contributing to 4GW in Pakistan 12. It is important to understand the various factors which are contributing towards 4GW a. American presence in Afghanistan started the 4GW struggle in the region. Historically the relations between Iran and Pakistan have been very cordial.11 RESTRICTED PART III – APPLICATION IN OWN ENVIRONMENT “He who understands himself and understands his enemy will prevail in one hundred battles. Pakistani brand of Taliban divided in to various factions and groups resorted to challenging the writ of Government throughout tribal areas on the pretext of non Islamic practices allowed by state.

Cashing in upon perceived grievances. Since then. They pose a serious threat to law and order situation in the country. Afghan Taliban. local Taliban and rebel tribesmen. It is promoted by certain self serving Madrassahs. The enemy consists of AlQaeda. foreign militants. Sensitive issues like construction of additional water reservoirs. Pakistan Army’s response is as under:- RESTRICTED . Their tactics of hit and run. Pakistani troops entered Tirah Valley in the Khyber Agency for the first time since 1947 to stop influx of Taliban from Afghanistan. Internal Dynamics (1) Perceptions of Global War on Terrorism . (4) Economic Disparities. terrorism and hostile propaganda against Pakistan and its army have a pattern of a 4GW campaign. (5) Sectarianism and Religious Extremism . distribution of water.12 RESTRICTED State actors tend to promote Armed Forces as a disciple of the evil and have waged a 4GW against them. In July 2002. b. (2) Provincial Disharmony. FATA / Operation Al-Mizan. (3) Political Instability. NFC award and mutual supply of essential daily commodities have been exploited by so-called ‘nationalist leaders’ for their nefarious designs. Growing gap between have’s and have-not’s along with a high degree of poverty and unemployment creates discontentment and disenfranchisement in the society. Sectarianism and religious extremism is the most complicated sociological phenomenon. Pakistan Army’s Response to 4GW 13. a number of military operations have been launched at various places in FATA and numerous peace deals have been made and then scraped. it is sometimes feared that it is a war against Muslims. they create discontentment and polarization. Some political parties are following a divisive strategy with narrow and self-centered aims. Such perception actually serves the objectives of 4GW practitioners. Since global war on terrorism is mostly being fought in Muslim countries.

with full national consensus. Pakistan army. Conduct of MOOTW. b. After clearing the area Pakistan Army took the challenge of returning displaced people to their native area. Conduct of MOOTW. conducted a successful military operation against the Taliban. ranging from small group combats to joint armed team operations. The first block is valid in the sense that fighting in built up areas continues to be a major ingredient of operation. there are no warring groups in Swat. food and basic health facilities in camps established in various parts of NWFP.080 families (80. Tank and Hangu. 2009.13 RESTRICTED a.e.477 families (41. Limited Peace Keeping Operations . Nizam-e-Adl Regulation / peace deal and finally Operation Rah-e-Rast. As per ISPR RESTRICTED .000 individuals) had registered themselves with the Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps in Tank District and Dera Ismail Khan District before the start of the operation on October 2009. dated October 20. Learning from last seven years of experience. religious and sectarian violence is not prone to situations demanding maintenance of domestic peacekeeping force. Pakistan Army is undertaking various development projects. Pakistan though faced with limited ethnic. Unlike Kurram Agency. 14. Peace Keeping in Swat. Pakistan army conducted numerous operations in and around villages of FATA to defeat TTP.289 individuals) had registered after the military onslaught in Waziristan. c. 11. Humanitarian Operations. Swat / Operation Rah-e-Rast. Search and clearance operations are still continuing in Swat and Malakand. c. Pakistan Army remained involved in providing these masses with shelter. b. In recent days the Army has been involved in limited peace enforcing missions in cities such as Parachinar. This operation can be related to US model as under:a. Army also carried out rehabilitation and reconstruction projects to “Win Hearts and minds” of populace. while a total of 4. Operations in Swat can be broadly divided into three phases i. Pakistan Army is maintaining peace by evicting the miscreants only. Humanitarian Operations. Operation Rah-e-Haq. According to the official Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) press release.

Threat Perception. 15. With only a small segment of Baloch falling under the spell of Response. After the death of Nawab Akbar Bugti. Brahamdadh Bugti commands BRA is supported and funded by Indian consulates in Fighting Insurgency. blowing up gas lines. whose origin predates to 1964. Baluchistan constitutes of comprises of only 4% of 42% area of Pakistan but population divided between Pashtuns. It got its support from pro-Soviet Iraq and other states in the gulf in its initial years. BLA was more active in Iranian Baluchistan. seeking to break Baluchistan away from Pakistan. Brahwis and Sindhis. Unequal distribution of wealth Hegemony of settlers on business in Balochistan Undue share in national politics and services Misuse of mineral wealth of Balochistan. After devastating floods of 2010 Pakistan Army undertook massive rehabilitation and reconstruction works in Swat. Baluchis. In the beginning.14 RESTRICTED press release. a.580 cash cards have been distributed amongst the IDPs of Malakand. the insurgency in Balochistan must be one of the world’s most intractable separatist or ethno-nationalist conflicts. Makranis. On another axis. Balochistan. BRA was established during the 1970’s. Balochistan situation has changed drastically giving boast to armed struggle by sub nationalist factions like BLA and BRA. yet it is rarely covered in the Western media. by the support of Russian KGB. destroying power cables and State infrastructures as well as attacking security forces and assassinating non Baloch settlers from the rest of the country. The mode of operations against the State include. the situation RESTRICTED . BLA is the oldest insurgent movement in Baluchistan. to divert Pakistani military establishment’s focus from Afghanistan. CIA and RAW have stirred up another insurgency in Baluchistan by supporting the Secular Marxist Pakistani Baloch Separatists. Causes exploited by separatist movements includes (1) (2) (3) (4) b. 280. armed insurgency and also due to the remoteness of the region.

Analysis 17. when it comes to promulgate nationalist sprit in hostile territories. Situation in FATA. it is a serious menace. The package to a 9. Police and local militias have been performing the security duties. Swat and Balochistan has most of the characteristics of 4GW. 4GW Pattern. 16. c. (2) Aghaz-eHuqooq-e-Balochistan . Humanitarian Crisis. e. 1500 youth have been inducted in Pakistan Army as a measure to bring them to Federal Government on November 25. mainstream. b. In order to solidify the success of military operations. 2009 presented the Aghaz-eHuqooq-e-Balochistan joint sitting of the parliament in which share of Balochistan from the divisible pool has been increased from 5. due to BLA/BRA militancy is not as critical as it is due to the TTP insurgency but still. there is a need to maintain peace through IS operations by effectively incorporating local police and civil armed forces. Our response has to be tailored accordingly. Duration of such conflicts is likely to have long time lines instead of days or months. Winning Hearts and minds. Taliban were able to establish them properly before our government understood the gravity of situation. In addition to above.11% to RESTRICTED . Response includes following: (1) Use of Para military forces. Incorrect Threat Assessment . Military has not been used in Baluchistan as yet and only Para military forces.09%. Such operations will result in humanitarian crisis in shape of displacement of locals as well as disruption of civic infrastructure. Conclusions a. Constant Watch. (3) Induction in Pakistan Army.15 RESTRICTED in Baluchistan. National Level a. d. Long Timelines. Such operations are a necessity.

b. Presently no system of training exists in which civilian and military personnel can be trained together for coming up with a synergistic response to 4GW. f. popular support / consensus for military operations is mandatory for success against 4GW. local sensitivities and culture have to be given due importance to avoid alienating a large chunk of society. RESTRICTED . e. Implications for Pakistan Army a. Capacity Building for Humanitarian Operations .e. integration with civil agencies is either non-existent or poor. Half hearted military operations will not be successful in 4GW environment. Shortage of Officers / Bayonet Strength . There is a shortage of officers / men in the units. As witnessed in Operation Rah-e-Rast. effective training programmes cannot be followed. Employment Limitations. Prudence in application of force has to be applied. due to which. Our doctrine caters only for a conventional war along eastern border with India and does not incorporate essential aspects of 3BW. e. Hence. National Consensus / Will. Efficacy of Local Police and Civil Armed Forces . Areas of concern are as under:(1) Communication (a) Present Communication arrangements i. Military operations if launched without resorting to dialogue / negotiations will not achieve desired results.16 RESTRICTED b. c. Moreover. d. Although. Equipment Deficiencies. Pakistan army is not an occupational force in FATA or Swat. Requirement of Joint Civilian-Military Training . Weakness of these forces came to fore during the operations. Scale of Military Operations. c. d. They could not prevent the 4GW networks from spreading. PRC-77 held with infantry battalions are of old and cumbersome to carry. Importance of Other Political Instruments . Doctrine. it has many shortcomings. our army has been playing the lead role in humanitarian relief operations. 18.

GPS. following aspects pose tough challenges to our training system:(1) Lack of Emphasis on 3rd Block. Special Forces. Surveillance capability of infantry battalions is limited due to lack of GSRs and support of UAVs. TIs and NVDs are held in less numbers. Presently very less number of GPS receivers is held with infantry battalion. Units moving to FATA prefer use of Chinese SMG instead of Rifle G-3. Our training institutes have incorporated LIC training in their curriculum but only to a limited degree. g. Moreover. Paucity of combat as well as transport helicopters and limited night fighting capability does not match the dynamics of 3BW operations. Personal Weapon. RESTRICTED . Pakistan army is already emphasizing a lot on LIC training based on its experiences in FATA / Swat. Combat worthiness of a Pakistani soldier is adversely affected due to deficiency of individual combat gear like Bullet Proof Jackets. Training Challenges.17 RESTRICTED (b) Compatibility. aviation. (5) Individual Equipment. These would prove very useful in difficult terrain conditions. (6) (7) f. Sniper rifles would pay rich dividends by targeting key figures at longer ranges. However. Moreover training for humanitarian relief operations does not figure out. Aviation. Surveillance Equipment. ground forces do not have direct communication with helis. Short range wireless sets held with Army. FC and political administration are incompatible (c) Electronic Warfare Capability. (2) (3) Night Fighting Equipment. Difficult terrain hammpers the use of triangulation equipment and jammers and deny much needed edge to security forces. especially at battalion / company level. There is a need to look at utility of Rifle G-3 / MP5A2 in LIC environment. (4) Sniper Rifles. Sufficient sniper rifles are not held with infantry battalions.

Field operators are facing problems to understand this aspect due to linguistic and cultural barriers. Psychological Operations. (4) Motivational Training. In 3BW. will strengthen moral grounds for own operations and discredit enemy propaganda. (2) Less Understanding of Contemporary Operating Environment . m. RESTRICTED . soldiers should be dynamic to deal with masses and media. if handled properly. Media Strategy. we are not launching well thought out psychological operations. Thus requiring sound understanding / conviction of own ideology / objectives. j. Our training system needs to be modernized to raise the quality of junior leaders. Intelligence Problems (1) Intelligence intelligence Coordination. media. thus sharing of requisite intelligence with field commanders is neglected.18 RESTRICTED (2) Junior Leaders Training. Presently. in the op Working is of various on the tentacles principle of of area based compartmentation. Junior leaders will have a very important role to play in 3BW. (3) Individual Skills. As evident from Operation Rah-e-Rast. Our soldiers need focused training to reach to that level. Troops will be required to operate under unfavourable moral conditions due to 4GW networks. negotiate with belligerents and also carryout combat operations against an unseen enemy. l. which if launched properly would change perceptions of tribals / locals and create problems for the enemy.

MOOTW. government needs to ensure registration of Madrassahs and streamline their syllabi according to modern day demands. Consensus at national level be achieved as a matter of policy to deal 4GW proponents with iron hand regardless of their geographical or ethnic affinities. In this regard. Political Peace Process.19 RESTRICTED (3) PART IV RECOMMENDATIONS 19. the need to completely harness this concept at a national and Army level still exists. IS Operations and Humanitarian Operations. c. Political Backing. National Level. Political resolve in the face of 4GW will guide our way for future course of actions. Pakistan has also adapted to prevailing environment and is effectively countering emerging fourth generation threats. On discovery of 4GW ailments the first response strategy should be political negotiations by incorporating local Jirgas or elders to stand up against the enemy. Political Resolve. The recent politico – military synergy displayed in operation Rah-e-Rast is an encouraging outcome which led to a mass support for military operation. Suggested design in this regard includes Political decision and backing. as it will provide the much needed strength and legitimacy to the military actions. This policy must be continued. Certain measures at national level are covered in succeeding a. Development of Response Model. Pakistan may develop a response model to suit own peculiar environments at National level. b. paragraphs without which any response against 4GW would not be complete. e. Taking lead from US 3BW model. extremism promoting religious figures should be dealt with legally. This is particularly applicable to own environment. Eliminating the Root Cause. Op Rah-e-Rast being a clear manifestation of that. Recommendations proffered in this regard are as follows:20. Moreover. However. d. RESTRICTED .

Based on consensus. Socio – Economic Development. Military Dimension a. equipping and incentives for these forces. jobs and better lives. b. 21. Training objectives should also be revamped to meet the 4GW threat. Formulation of 4GW Doctrine. Emphasis should be on small unit actions. (3) Raising of Tribal Lashkars. The bottom line is to make the insurgents and anti-state elements irrelevant. Preventive Measures (1) Judicial Reforms. c. g.20 RESTRICTED f. Capacity Building Humanitarian Relief Operations . Government should identify areas where lack of socio . Containment of Collateral Damage . Precision / surgical strikes. Enhancement of logistic and technical muscle is required to undertake humanitarian relief operations. Nothing can be more degrading to the cause of military operations under 4GW environment than the collateral damage caused by them. Government should ensure provision of speedy and cheap justice to masses. Pakistan Army has so far done more than its capacity to carryout such operations. This would would preclude employment of army. and selective use of arty fire. This would eliminate another line exploited by militants. It can be achieved by better training. Collateral damage can be contained to a great extent by use of military strength matching threat. pro-government tribal lashkars should be raised at probable flashpoints in FATA under local elders. (2) Strengthening Local Police and Civil Armed Forces . Feeling of deprivation has been a source to motivate and coerce population against State. Such a doctrine should be highly flexible to allow smooth transition from 2GW/3GW to 4GW mode rapidly. There is a need to formulate a 4GW doctrine and published as a note. in this regard it is recommended that specialized equipment RESTRICTED .economic development can be exploited by non state actors in this regard and undertake such measures as to bring hope for the peace.

This would inculcate alertness of mind. Recommended duration is 2x weeks. RESTRICTED . Camel Bag for water. MOOTW. LIC and GW. leadership skills and innovation. (5) Focus of Schools of Instruction. Apart from conventional training requirements. e. 4GW demands intimate cooperation of all arms especially with air and combat aviation. Unit Level Training. LBE (Load Bearing Equipment). Light weight helmets with add-on features. FW. Training Approach (1) Areas of Emphasis. Integrated Training. 3BW should form a part of basic / MCC for officers and JLC for non-commissioned officers. Focus of schools of instruction should be on application and practical problem solving instead of memorization. Following must form part of his kit to make him combat worthy:(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) Body armour. Elbow and knee pads. Equipment (1) Individual Soldier Kit. Situational training should form the major portion of Junior Leader training.21 RESTRICTED including dozers. Media Handling. d. A portion of unit training must be allocated for 3BW training. plant machinery and mobile medical hospitals etc for undertaking humanitarian relief work may be maintained as Army Reserve pool to be employed as and when required. Religious and cultural education. following need to be emphasised at every level:(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (2) (3) Leadership and motivational training. flexibility. (4) Training of Junior Leader. Infantry should have requisite expertise for optimal utilization of these force multipliers. Stress Management.

reliable and compatible with existing ammunition calibre. Task force should have requisite support of attack helicopters with night fighting capability. (5) Surveillance Equipment. e. SMG Chinese. Combat teams should have compatible communication with helis. should be issued at rate of 2 per section. Maximum use of GSRs and UAVs in 4GW environment be made and provision of such assets down to Brigade level be made. ISPR needs to play a more pro-active role by launching a media campaign when military operations are launched. All intelligence resources should be answerable to local task force commander. Base sets for enhancing range can be placed at company and battalion headquarters. Media Handling. 81 mm mortars should have ample authorization of illuminating shells. Civilian and military intelligence resources should be coordinated to achieve a synergistic effect. 1x high quality thermal imaging sight should be issued to each platoon. f. (4) Night Fighting Capability . A long range sniper rifle like Range master may also be provided at 1 per company. kenwood sets should be curtailed.g. Personal Weapon should be light weight. Aviation (1) (2) g. Harris Handheld set or LMR SK-2 sets. Portable handheld radio sets. This campaign should not limit itself to PTV but utilize other popular media channels. e. Detachment of ISPR should be under command task force commander and operate from operations area. (1) (2) h. Use of commercial communication equipement like Motorola. Intelligence RESTRICTED . Control of Intelligence Resources . Synergetic Intelligence Effort.22 RESTRICTED (2) Weapons. Moreover. (3) Communication Equipment.g.

Thrust should be nullifying effects of hostile propaganda on own population and locals. RESTRICTED . Dilemma for our policy makers and military leaders is further increased due to an even stronger third generation threat towards our eastern borders. Organizing brigade sized task forces in selected zones on lines of 3BW will make our military response more effective and wholesome. Psychological Operations. However.23 RESTRICTED i. asymmetric warfare or LIC. Whether we call it 4GW. learn and adapt to rapidly changing nature of conflict. Effective Psyops as a part of overall IO campaign be undertaken to counter malign propaganda of non state actors. threat on our western borders is real and we have been dealing with it for the last 8 years. CONCLUSION 22. the future lies in flexibility to identify.

Challenges and Response”. The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21 st Century. “Pakistan Army Journal”.ca/caj/documents/vol. Khurshid Khan and Afifa Kiran. 2012.opinion-maker. Farzana Shah. 2006) 4GW on Question of Strategy.. Winter 2008. 10 feb 2012.4_07_e.org/2011/12/4th-generation-war-and-pakistan/ www. Insurgents.gc. 2 (Summer 2012) en. Hammes.wikipedia. IPRI Journal XII./CAJ_vol8.mil/pdffiles/pub632. “4th Generation Warfare.strategicstudiesinstitute. “Understanding Fourth Generation Warfare And It’s Relevance To Pakistan”. Terrorists and Militias. USMC.forces.pdf RESTRICTED . (New York: Columbia University Press. Edition: 1st.24 RESTRICTED BIBLIOGRAPHY • • • • • • • • • • Major General Muhammad Ahsan Mahmood. (Rawalpindi: Army Education Publishing House.Authors: Syed Zaid Zaman Hamid Shahzad Masood Roomi..pdf www. 2006-07) Richard Shultz Jr and Andrea J Dew.army. Colonel Thomas X.org/wiki/Fourth_generation_warfare www. Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan.army. no. Dr Noor Ul Haq.

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