APPENDIX

FOMC

Notes March

-- Peter 22, 1994

Fisher

I will morning, and

be

referring try to

to

the

two two

color

charts

distributed

this

I will

address

questions: the yen and the

mark

why is the dollar lower now against First, than it was at the time of your last meeting?

And second, what are some of the rapid and parallel backing up of interest countries starting in mid-February?

factors that triggered rates in a number Of

the

The absence of a U.S.-Japan trade agreement, following the and the glacial pace of monetary easing by Clinton-Hosokawa meeting, the Bundesbank are the two factors that most directly contributed to the dollar's decline. However, to understand the dollar's movements and the extraordinary movements in bond yields, it is worth looking at the expectations and the positions with which market participants Joan will be going over the events that directly affected began 1994. I will try to describe some of the U.S. government securities market. the key events in the foreign exchange market and in other cotintries, indicating some of the connections among markets. The first chart shows the movements in dollar-yen, dollarfrom last July through January. AS 1993 mark, and "G-5" bond yields market participants expected that the weak Japanese came to a close, stock market and the deteriorating economy would force the Bank of Japan to ease once again. Although the Bundesbank had fixed its market operations at 6 percent from December to early January, it was widely expected to resume the more rapid easing it had begun in October, which would permit German and European interest rates to come down quickly. While U.S. interest rates were expected to go up in the and extent of this remained uncertain. first half of 1994, the timing With these expectations, a wide range of market participants began the year with quite similar positions: long Japanese government bonds, long European government bonds, and long dollars against both the yen and the mark. The second chart shows the same exchange rates and yields from December to the present, with indications for the dates of some of the events--or "trip wires "--that successively undercut the assumptions that supported these positions, resulting in an accumulation of losses for market participants. In early January the Nikkei rallied sharply on a large flow of foreign money. This weighed on dollar-yen, both as a result of the demand for yen and by reducing the likelihood of an easing by the Bank of Japan. On January 13th rumors circulated in Tokyo that the Trust Division of the Ministry of Finance would begin liquidating some of its holdings of Japanese government bonds (JGBS), and the next day it was announced that 900 billion of JGBs would be sold before the end of

-2-

In the first half of the fiscal year the Trust the fiscal year. This shift in stance, combined Division had been a net purchaser. with rising expectations for an increased supply of government debt and the decreasing expectations for further ease, caused a rapid sellBy the as indicated by the first "trip wire." off in the JGB market, when the lo-year JGB had backed up by 75 basis points, end of January, we began to hear the first rumors of large-scale losses at investment banks and/or hedge funds. action led to a brief rise in On February 4th, the Committee's There was a brief the dollar against both the mark and the yen. while market participants awaited the outcome period of profit taking, of the Clinton-Hosokawa meeting and some signal of further easing from In retrospect, the failure of the dollar to sustain the Bundesbank. much more of a rally can be seen as reflecting just how long dollars the market was. Although the dollar-yen declined in the days running up to the Clinton-Hosokawa summit on February llth, market sentiment was dominated by the view that the dollar would rise against the yen (and also against the mark) once the meeting and the trade issue were "out Some market participants extended their long dollar of the way." positions at "cheaper" prices as their Washington "listening posts" With the embtyassured them that a trade deal was in the works. handed outcome of the meeting, the dollar began to sell off in thin On Monday, the liquidation of long-dollar positions Friday trading. accelerated, and in New York in the afternoon the dollar traded down to a low of 101.10 and closed at 102.60. The dollar also moved down against the mark, as market participants sought an alternative means of reducing their dollar holdings. Attention then turned to the prospect for further Bundesbank In this setting, easing. the dollar's post Valentine's Day weakness encouraged market participants to hope that the Bundesbank would lower After all, despite the rates at its February 17th Council meeting. Fed having tightened, the mark was not weaker but stronger against the dollar, giving the Bundesbank the opportunity to lower rates without the mark suffering a double hit--or so hoped market participants. On February 17th the 50 basis points, but left its The decrease in the Discount on the repo rate, provided a weeks, but this would be too participants who: Bundesbank lowered its Discount Rate by Lombard and repurchase rate unchanged. Rate, which acts as something of a floor prospect of further easing in the coming late and too uncertain for market

positions

-- had already incurred mark-to-market since the start of the year; the high cost of carry

losses

on

European

bond

under

--were incurring repo financing; --had already or both;

for

these

positions

suffered

losses

in either

JGBs

or

long

dollar

positions

--in "emerging

some

cases

also

suffered Brady

mark-to-market bonds.

losses

in

market"

equities

and

Although in subsequent weeks the Bundesbank it has done so in successive baby steps rep0 rate, and finally a 6 basis point move.

has reduced the of a 3, another 3.

A number of market participants have described the period from but one which began not so much mid-February as a "liquidation crisis" with an abundance of selling as with limited buying capacity. In who have suffered losses on their major market makers, particular, strategic positions since the start of the year, were trying to limit The risk losses--or hold onto profits--for the first quarter. management systems used by hedge funds, investment banks, and the major commercial banks typically specify a profit objective, a loss and volatility assumptions all for a given month or tolerance, AS either losses or volatilities rise, these systems dictate quarter. a reduction of risk over the remaining period and, thus, require the As market makers reluctantly took on bond closing of positions. positions from their customers, they were forced to head to the futures markets to offset these additional exposures at the same time they were trying to unwind their own positions. As prices moved

further and faster, volatilities increased and additional mark-tomarket losses were incurred, leading to further reductions in'risk
tolerance and further reductions in positions. while this risk management discipline is obviously desirable in terms individual firm's exposure, the pressure is shifted to the price movement and volatility. kind of of an markets

in

The widespread use of "proxy hedging" also contributed to the parallel movements in bond yields. An extreme example of this is reflected in the movements of U.K. government securities (the green line on the third panel of the second chart). Following the Bundesbank's February 17th meeting, the futures contract on gilts was sold as a proxy for a wide range of European government bonds, and as a result U.K. lo-year interest rates backed up faster than others. On March 1st the 7.5 percent U.S. GDP figure was released, as was the NAPM survey. On March 2nd. the Bundesbank announced that German M3 grew by over 20 percent in January. Both events contributed to market volatility and to market anxiety about the course of interest rates. Then on March 3rd two events occurred which helped to calm at least some markets. First, the Bank of Spain cut its repo which provided a reminder to market rate by 50 basis points, participants that the trend for short-term European interest rates was still downward. To some this reawakened the possibility for a "decoupling" of U.S. and European bond yields. Also on March 3rd, the Clinton Administration announced the reassertion of "Super 301" trade sanction powers. To the surprise of some, this served to reduce anxieties in the exchange market. Following the Clinton-Hosokawa meting, the absence of concrete actions by the Administration on the trade front contributed to the view that the U.S. would rely principally on talking up the yen. The

-4-

dollars Bank of Japan's operations, which totalled purchased from February 15th to March 4th, had stabilized the dollar around 104, but anxiety remained about U.S. policy, and market participants continued to perceive a risk that the dollar could fall The Super 301 announcement indicated quickly to and through 100 yen. that the U.S. did intend to use policy tools other than exchange and the next morning in Tokyo the dollar moved up quickly rates, through 105 and has recently traded around 106. Foreign exchange market participants express the view that the market has priced in a 25 basis point increased in the fed funds rate resulting from this meeting. While clearly they expect such an action from this meeting, I think it is extraordinarily difficult to assess what is and what is not priced into the dollar at this point. There has been a pronounced reduction in leverage and in positions over the past month and, at some point, both are likely to increase. But focusing on dollar-mark, my gut tells me that the dollar might rise by a small amount on the fact of a further tightening but could then come off as profits are quickly taken, much as it did in February. Mr. Chairman, during the period we sold 600 million Swiss francs and 34 million Belgian francs for a total of $417 million. These operations, conducted in furtherance of our objective of eliminating the System's non-mark and non-yen foreign currency' balances occurred on 5 different days and--as we intended--had no impact on exchange rates. I note for the Committee that I expect complete these currency sales by Mid-April. Mr. Chairman, I need the Committee's operations. I would be happy to answer any report or on the currency sales. approval questions of these either on my

to

July 1993 through January 1994
US Dollar/Japanese Yen Spot Exchange Rates

IOdl”’ Jul
1993

Aua -

SW

act

Nov

DfX

Jan
1994

100

US Dollar/German
1.76

Mark Spot Exchange Rates

‘ z l .58J”
1993

Aug

Sep

Ott

Nov

1.58 DE Jan 1994

10 Year Government Bond Yields (%)

Jul
1993

Aug

Sep

Nov

Dee

Foreign Exchange Function: Federal Reserve Bank of NY Source: Spot rates, FRBNY; Bond yields, Bloomberg Information Services.

December 1993 through March 1994
US Dollar/Japanese Yen Spot Exchange Rates

I,,,,,,i!,,,,,,,.,,,, Jan
1994

100

13

Feb

4

11

17

Mar 12

Dee
1993

I,‘ ‘ ,i’ ,“ “ ‘ “ “ “ “ “ ” ’ ’ ” ” ” ‘ ,“,‘ ,‘ “ “,“ “ “ “ ,,“ ” ”,i”,” ” ” “,’
Jan
1994

13

Feb

4

II

17

Mar I*

10 Year Government Bond Yields (%)

=a!;
1933 Bryan p. Bradley

’ 1994
Jan

13

l..l....l,.~I..~.~..il~..~.~.....
Mar 12 Foreign Exchange Function: Federal Reserve Bank of NY Source: Spot rates, FRBNY; Bond yields, Bloomberg information SewiCes. Feb 4 11 17

NOTES FOR FOMC MEETING MARCH 22, 1994 JOAN E. LOVETT

Desk in reserve federal was

operations

were

aimed at your 3-l/4

at maintaining last meeting,

the

slight

firming with

pressures trading

adopted around

associated

funds

percent.

The borrowing

allowance the the period. the part, with

raised

by $25 million stance.

to $75 million

in conjunction level

with

altered
interval.

policy

and it was held averaged steady

at that

throughout

Actual borrowing

borrowing has been

$62 million low.

for the full Meanwhile,

Seasonal funds

and quite

rate

remained rate

near the new intended averaging 3.24 percent

area

for the most

the effective

for the full estimated

period. reserve need

At the in the period dimensions factors, tended

start

of the interval,

a small

just

underway

was expected

to grow to moderate and other operating have

as a result

of movements reserves. shortages

in currency Net revisions

and in required reserve frequent A token were

to factors few periods.

to enlarge We made

in the past

use of temporary round of customer

operations

to help meet on February in

reserve 4th when order Since

needs. funds

RPs was arranged above

tending

to probe degree

somewhat

the new level that day.

to clarify then,

the intended

of firming

adopted

a total

of 12 multiday

System

operations

and 8 overnight

RPs have

been

arranged. to acquire securities on a permanent on March basis. 15th, and

We also began buying about $3.3 billion $1.6 billion These need

of coupon of bill

issues

in the market

issues

intermittently

from

foreign margin the

accounts. reserve

actions

have

narrowed period

by a considerable currently

in the maintenance

underway.

.2-

Reserve shortages are expected to expand markedly further in upcoming weeks as required reserves and currency grow seasonally, and more outright purchases are contemplated. Some very deep deficiencies

could eventually emerge if the Treasury balance bulges following the April tax date, as it frequently does. Given all the modifications to

the tax code over the past year and the apparent underlying strength in the economy. this April-May tax season is shaping up to be a very uncertain one. Pricing of daylight overdrafts is scheduled to commence April 14th. adding another dimension of uncertainty. We have been giving

careful consideration to how possible changes in market behavior designed to limit these overdrafts could affect our flexibility in arranging RPs. inconclusive: A recent test-period from daylight overdrafts was collateral available to us was always sufficient for But participants may have been too

the volume of RPs we planned.

focused on the turmoil in financial markets at the time to pay close attention to daylight overdraft positions. Of course, we will be Before leaving

monitoring this impending development very closely. the subject of reserve management,

let me note that the reserve

estimates suggest that the normal intermeeting leeway may be constraining ahead. Against that background, Mr. Chairman, I would

like to request Committee approval of a temporary increase in the leeway of $3 billion, bringing it to $11 billion, for insurance purposes. In the securities markets, interest rates have moved sharply higher across the yield curve since early February. Short-term rates

were already beginning to back up just ahead of and during your last meeting when the slight firming in reserve pressures was announced. Since that time, yields on two- to ten-year Treasury coupon securities

-3

have

increased rising

a net 80 to 90 basis about 65 basis points. points.

points,

with

rates

on long-term have risen

issues

Treasury

bill

rates

some 45 to 75 basis

The intensity yields been have surprised

of the updraft most market about

in intermediate-and A variety

long-term of factors of each the A rean of has

observers. the

cited,

but disagreement uncertainty

relative

importance

contributes building assessment important harsh

to the interest risk premium

rate outlook.

Thus,

in of a larger of the role

was certainly

a factor. played

strength

of the expansion After

has also

in this

jump.

abstracting analysts

from the effects now believe that

winter

weather has

conditions, retained This gave

most

economic

activity

more momentum

from late

last year firice into the

than

anticipated pressures remaining sensitive

earlier. could slack

rise to apprehension as continued growth

that eats

be intensifying in the economy.

And the market inflationary

is especially pressures, scouring indicators of

to any hint

of incipient

the behavior inflation.

of all available

indices

for use as leading

Against also undergone

this

background.

the outlook as the market Last month's

for monetary asked

policy

has

a re-evaluation, have to move.

how far and how was seen as the from

fast the Fed would first installment

action

in a series Longer-term

of gradual

policy

adjustments

away to

accommodation. incorporate explaining have even

yields

have moved

up as they began

a higher

expected

trajectory response move

for shorter-term to this itself action, may have

rates. some

In

some of the market's suggested that

analysts

the firming front

contributed

to disquiet something

on the inflation didn't:

by suggesting only

the Fed knew a limited step, the

the market

and by taking

-4

Fed may have pressures.

"fallen

behind

the curve"

in forestalling

price

Several various abroad times.

other

developments effects

also helped

to unsettle

markets rates

at

Feedback

from the upswing were an influence trade

in interest as was the

over the past two months war of words hedged

escalating investment liquid U.S.

in U.S.-Japanese their markets. amid foreign

negotiations. by selling pressure losses

Many in the more made

funds

exposures

securities sales

The downward rumored peaked heavy

on prices for some

additional accounts. rumors caution.

necessary

large

The backup new

in rates

in mid-March yet another

when

Whitewater for market at that time.

raised

concerns

or provided rose just

reason

The long-bond Amid

yield

shy of 7 percent traders lacked

all the volatility ability

in rates,

Confidence Having also

about been

the market's caught with

to consolidate move,

at any given many

level. were

off guard average

by the Fed's

participants

caught

maturities

that were

too long on February while

4th. in

They worked mortgage

aggressively

to shorten

duration,

the decline

refinancing

exerted

the opposite

pull.

The extensive sometimes by retail set of PPI and yields pull lifted

adjustments trading accounts

to portfolios to record

during levels,

the past two months although involvement favorable

volume was

generally provided

limited. some support highest

Last week's

CPI reports back

to the market levels.

and helped coupon

a little

from their been

Our recent

purchase But the

also may have underlying

of minor

technical remains

benefit very

to the market.

tone At this

in the market point, most

nervc~us indeed. see further seen policy adjustas

participants

ments

as a near-certainty, There pace

with

the next move

likely

to come

soon as today. the appropriate

is. however, of further

some diversity actions.

of opinions Another

about

policy

modest

firming than

at this

time would move and,

probably in fact,

be greeted another

with

greater points

equanimity is already say the

the initial into the take

25 basis

priced

existing

rate

structure.

Some participants in light steps

Fed will market's warranted 50 basis "other to such

a measured

approach

to its firming

of the are move

adjustment by the points

to date

and because

only modest

economy in case

in any case. it has fallen the market's those

Some feel the Fed should behind and to get ahead judging the move or create

of the

shoe"

syndrome

with

jitters: suggesting

its reaction are unable additional

a move

is difficult,and this would

to say whether volatility.

stabilize

the market

E.M.Truman March 22, FOMC Presentation -- January that Data on Trade in Goods

1994

and Services about the

We had planned January released the main data data this meal on U.S. morning As close

I would

say a few words and services before

trade

in goods

that were Mike provides the and

as an hors

d'oeuvre

it happens, to what

I can be very

brief

because

are very

we projected

for the Greenbook, are also minor. the Commerce basis

the revisions

to the data was

for December month

January Department estimates payments billion deficit

the first data

for which

released of trade basis.

on a new comprehensive goods and services services than

covering of

on both

and on a balance deficit was

The

nominal

goods

and

$6.3

for the month in the fourth

slightly quarter,

smaller' but about

the average

monthly than $11 on

$2 billion trade (about this

larger was

the deficit billion the more larger larger

in December.

The merchandise of payments basis). basis Again,

deficit $9.8

on the balance familiar

billion was

Census

figure

slightly

than than

the average the deficit with but

for the fourth in December. December, both

quarter

but substantially

Compared January Most were

imports

and exports was

in

lower,

the reduction was

in exports due

larger.

of the decline and lower Imports

in imports prices,

in oil,

to lower also in

quantities declined.

but automotive goods

imports

of capital

increased.

The decline

-theoriginal 1. reported to be slightly meeting.

the January presentation, larger; this was corrected

deficit was later in the

- 2 -

exports was more broadly based, including gold, agricultural goods, and aircraft. On balance, based on our quick look at the data, the January data are remarkably close to what we had been anticipating, implying at this stage no need to adjust our outlook that net exports of goods and services resumed their trend deterioration this quarter. I turn now to Mike for the main event.

Michael J. Prell March 22. 1994

FOMC

Briefing

Examining the warning is. funds rather markets something almost percent level the that,

the Greenbook if something

economic looks too

forecast. good

one

is reminded it probably in the year

of

to be true. an increase the next and

Basically, rate mild

we are projecting a percentage cyclical

that. point

with over

federal

of roughly rise

or so--a than the

by past

standards.

perhaps forward GDP

less

are currently akin

discounting--you soft 3-l/4

can look Real

to achieving which was

to the mythic in 1992 and

landing. percent

growth. would

4 percent this year

in 1993.

slow

to 2-2/3 would

and to 2-l/3 6-112

percent

in 1995. to what core

Unemployment

out just

above

percent.

close

we thirik constitutes inflation with would this be a

"natural below

ratew

in today's What.

economy.
you

And

smidge picture?

3 percent.

might

ask.

is wrong

Clearly. further something there's restraint

if one's over

objective the next But.

is solely couple the

the

achievement this

of leaves

disinflation

of years. logic

scenario

to be desired. an obvious than solution

within

of our projection. greater monetary From this to

to that

problem: path the

Apply we've

assumed

in the baseline issues aspects regarding

presented. may than

perspective. relate

the bigger

forecast rather

be said the would

to the positive That

of our analysis the

normative. the

is. do we have of growth, if.

relationships utilization. the

right? and

you that

get

combination projected

resource you

inflation rate path

we've

in fact.

followed

funds

we‘ve

assumed?

Michael J. Prell

2

March 22, 1994

so. let me address those features of our forecast in sequence.
First. we think that real GDP this quarter probably will post another substantial rate. gain, our point estimate being 3-l/4 percent. at an annual interval around this estimate is wider than it

The confidence

might normally be at this stage, because the signals from the January and February labor market surveys were distorted methodological changes. by storms and suggest that has increased

Still, a variety of indicators

employment has been growing and that industrial production appreciably--with a substantial

boost from motor vehicle assemblies.

On the expenditure production Meanwhile,

side of the ledger. the step-up in vehicle accumulation.

should show through partly in greater inventory

final sales appear likely to register only a moderate 2-l/2 percent. Consumer spending seems,to be growing

increase--around

at about that pace, judging from recent retail sales data and the evident heavy outlays for heating and brokerage sectors, the early indications residential construction services. In other and

for business fixed investment

are that gains in expenditure

will be sizable And. as

this quarter. but far less so than in the latter half of 1993. Ted noted, this morning's softening of net exports. trade data point in the direction All this said, though,

of some

I would reiterate my even

earlier comment that we're still on very shaky ground in estimating where we've been in the current quarter. Which brings me to the uncertain prospects you know, we are projecting second quarter, to a further deceleration for the future.

As

in output during the

about 2-l/2 percent for GDP.

One might argue that recovery and a catchlosses in the But

the second quarter should b e boosted by earthquake up in some types of activity for the weather-related winter.

Indeed, we have factored such effects into our forecast.

they are more than offset by the scheduled drop-off in seasonally

Michael J. Prell

- 3 this spring--which

Mzrzh 22. 1994 will be deducting

adjusted motor vehicle production about l-l/2 percentage

points. at an annual rate. from GD?. after adding In addition. we :hink that

a similar amount in the current quarter. forces tending to moderate be increasingly the underlying

trends in demaxi growth will

felt in coming months. sector. spending will no longer b, receiving flow freed up by nej_ mortgage have z.lrbed the

In the consumer

the boost it has been from extra cash refinancings; recent securities net worth

market developments

growth of household

and alerted naive investors to the risk consumer credit

that today's asset values may not be sustained tomorrow: undoubtedly will become more expensive as increases

in mtrket rates feed

through to loan rates: tax payments are rising: and purchases of consumer durables the gradual already have reached rates sufficient.ro of old vehicles of stocks. and household accommodate as

replacement

furnishings consTruction eraugh to

well as some expansion

In the residential

sector. while we still think affordability warrant a projection

is favorable

of starts well above what might be dictated by trends. the backup in mortgage rites will take

longer-range

demographic

some toll on demand. significantly, resurgence. waning.

We've trimmed our projection

of sri~ts

and see them dropping

off somewhat after a spring effects

And. in the business

sector. with acceleratsr

internal

funds growing less rapidly, and external financing

costs higher. capital spending is likely to be less rob,;: than it has been in recent quarters. Obviously. this analysis involves a lot of difficult judgments.

one of them relating to the interpretation interest _

of the recenr rise in

rates and. thus. where rates can be expected tc 50 from here.

It is our view that the run-up in bond yields likely has heen exaggerated by transitory trading dynamics. as well as 5:; some excessive

Michael J. Prell

4,.

March 22, 1994 surge in activity and

fears of inflation stirred up by the year-end rising materials prices. Therefore.
we are

expecting bond yields to

come back down somewhat, that retracing being limited. though, by the assumed increase in the funds rate. When things settle out, we expect

that nominal long rates will run about a half percentage point above the path in our last forecast, the increment being mainly attributable higher real rates that will tend to damp aggregate demand. I must say that I'd feel more comfortable projection week.
It

to

about our rate

if there had been at least some hint of a rally in the pasr certainly would be folly at this point to rule out the that bond yields will reach even higher levels if and as the But, given the steepness of the yield curve

possibility

funds rate rises further. and our assessment

of the other forces shaping demands in the economy I still wouldn't want to rule out, either, a The uncertainties with

and financial markets,

bigger drop in bond rates than we've projected.

which one must contend here involve not simply the anticipations risk tolerance assessment

and

of securities market investors but also the difficult in light of

of what level of real rates is sustainable

expected returns on physical abroad. On that confident noted earlier--the

capital here and, to at least an extent,

note, let me turn to the other two issues I degree of slack in the

current and prospective

economy and the outlook for inflation. reasons. we believe that the published decline in the unemployment

For a variety of technical statistics have overstated the

rate in the past couple of months.

But the

higher level of output growth now indicated for late 1993 helps explain the decline in joblessness -decline registered through December, and some further We would think of a

seems likely to have occurred this quarter.

unemployment

as having been around 6-314 percent in February--perhaps

Michael .I. Prell

5 average.

March 22. 1994 Meanwhile. industrial

quarter point below the fourth-quarter capacity utilization

has risen a percentage

point further. pressures One

The question is how much farther this can go without on resources becoming

so great that wages and prices accelerate. many

might argue that some warning signs have already emerged: materials prices have risen. and--putting

together the indications

from

the Employment

Cost Indexes and the monthly average hourly earnings--the out in the

pace of increase in wages seems at least to have flattened past year. We don't think that these are compelling

signals of an

imminent pickup in the prices of finished goods and services, but we do think that the economy may not have much room to run at this point before pressing hard against its potential. A range of representative econometric point estimates of the

NAIRU probably would extend from about 6 percent to 6-3/4 percent, making a half-poir,t adjustment household survey. to the old numbers for the change to new
percent or a

Our point estimate is b-l/2 confidence

shade less.

If one allows for a reasonable estimates,

interval around these

it is clear that we may already be at the NAIRU or at least Even if one adopts a more optimistic view (say, the 6

close to it.

percent NAIRU), continuation

of GDP growth at the pace of the past

couple of years probably would mean that we would run out of slack in 1995--a time span that is relevant, given normal lags, to monetary policy decisions today. One might well wish to take a broader approach to assessing the prospects for inflation. We can summon up without difficulty reasonable

stories supporting Favorable

slower or faster growth of aggregate demand. example, then, too, the rate

supply shocks are certainly possible--for improvements could prove stronger--but

productivity

sideways trend of recent years in the labor force participation

Michael

J. Prell

6

March

22. 1994

might

persist

and speed could

the

decline into

in unemployment. line with recent

Inflation experience. but, the our the to you. risks if

expectations anything, possible

drop more

recent

developments risks in this

might

be viewed In the

as highlighting end, we think balances

upside

regard.

characterization forecast of course, in the risks

of the

inflation

outlook sense. policy

reasonably

in a probabilistic of applying

We respectfully to those

leave

the task

weights

and other

economy.

March 22, 1994 FOMC Briefing Donald L. Kohn The question that would seem to be facing the Committee at this meeting is should reserve conditions be tightened further at this time, and if so by how much. Recent developments in financial markets

undoubtedly complicate judgment on this issue.

Interest rates are at the

substantially higher and money growth weaker than anticipated

last meeting of the Committee, even after allowing for the firming of reserve conditions on February 4. MOreOVer. markets are quite skitto new information.

tish, reacting strongly and somewhat unpredictably The implications of these developments.

along with an assessment of

the response of markets to further Federal Reserve action or inaction. may have a bearing on your evaluation of the economic outlook going forward and policy options. The reasons for the extent of the rise in rates are not entirely clear. especially in the bond market. action of February 4 played a major role. Obviously, the FOMC's

It came sooner than many

had expected. and markets now see the Federal Reserve as tightening much more rapidly than they had previously built into the yield curve. This revision of expectations has had its largest effects on shortand intermediate-term rates. but the arithmetic of the yield curve An eval-

indicates that some has fed through to the long end as well.

uation that the Fed was more willing to raise rates would increase real rates. if anything damping inflation expectations. The resulting

rise in rates would restrain aggregate demand relative to previous forecasts--presumably the reason for undertaking the action. seemed to reflect

HOWeVer, expectations of faster tightening -reassessment not only of the Fed's willingness

to act but also of the

need for action.

In part. markets are said to have taken their cue More fundamen-

from the Fed--if we're worried they should be too.

tally. incoming data on the economy indicated greater strength in aggregate demand and lower unemployment than many had anticipated. With less slack and greater demands. higher real rates would be needed to keep the economy from overshooting. In retrospect, interest rates

may have been below sustainable levels last fall, especially in light of the increasingly accommodative intermediaries. lending posture of banks and other strength

It would not be surprising if unanticipated

in aggregate demand led also to some upward adjustment in inflation expectations as the economy was seen to approach potential output sooner. Higher inflation expectations may be evident in the continued

rise in commodity prices and the relatively small size of.the stock market decline: both suggest that real rates probably did not rise by the full extent of the increase in nominal rates. Finally, increased uncertainty--about tions and about a wide range of developments Federal Reserve inten-

in foreign economies and

our relations with them--may have contributed to the upward movement in rates. And scxne may have resulted from attempts by major players

to head for the door simultaneously. with selling motivated less by a sense of changing fundamentals than a need or strong desire to trim long bond positions at whatever price. Included in this last category

might be those new mutual fund owners awakening to the risk of their investment. These types of factors would increase liquidity premiums, real rates.

raising longer-term

Some of these influences may moderate over coming weeks. as portfolios are better adjusted. as the Committee's intentions become growth

clearer, and as information on the economy confirms a moderate path and continuing low inflation. AS a consequence.

in the staff

forecast a portion of the recent runup in long rates is reversed. even with rising short-term rates. But not all of it. Higher long-term

rates than in the last Greenbook are associated with about the same outlook for inflation and the GDP gap. In effect, information on the

performance of the economy has led the staff to see a slightly higher natural long-run interest rate. at least for a time. Short-term rates embedded

need to rise further, validating to some extent expectations

in the yield curve, to keep long-term rates from slipping significantly below the natural rate again, which. given the small amount of slack. would allow inflation pressures to strengthen. With regard to how fast short-term rates should rise. the recent behavior of money and credit provides limited information. growth of credit to nonfederal sectors did pick up over t.he second half of last year and appears to be growing at its more advanced pace in the first quarter. At 5 percent or so, expansion of private credit seems indicative of The

remains in a moderate range. but its acceleration

lessened restraints on the supply of credit and greater demand to use it. The more aggressive attitude of intermediaries is underlined by

our latest survey of interest rates charged by banks on business loans. which was taken after the February tightening. Not only, as we

know, was the prime unchanged, but the survey suggested that little of the increase in rates was passed through to business borrowers whose loans were not tied to prime. In capital markets, quality spreads As a conse-

remain low. P/Es high, and credit readily available.

quence, as federal borrowing has slowed, private borrowing has filled the gap, keeping total debt growth mostly in the 5 to 6 percent area. We see the rise in rates as having very modest effects on credit demands. damping growth in private and total debt slowly over the year.

All of the monetary aggregates--narrow

and broad--were weaker Our

than expected in February, with M2 and M3 actually declining.

assessment. however. is that this behavior arose primarily from particular short-run influences, rather than from an underlying constric-

tion of financial flows or as a precursor of lagging income growth. Some of the shortfall in money may have reflected an outsized reaction to higher short-term interest rates--especially institution-only money funds in M3. in the behavior of the

And a portion owes to large, but

temporary, effects of the back-up in long-term rates in depressing mortgage prepayments and associated demand deposits. M2 and. to a

lesser extent. M3 seem to be rebounding in March, partly as savers reassess the risks of owning bond and stock mutual funds, and we are projecting modest growth on the order of 2 percent plus for M2 and 1 percent plus for M3 through June. cate Data available this morning indiMea-

an even stronger rebound in March than in the bluebook.

sures of money that include mutual funds have slowed substantially, partly reflecting the effects of capital losses. If weak money, or the mixed economic data in recent weeks, were seen by the Committee as suggesting the possibility of a significant slackening in the trend of aggregate demand growth. there would be a case for waiting to take any further action, as in alternative B. If the economy were already slowing substantially, the recent

rise in long-term rates, which would damp aggregate demand further over coming quarters, would only bolster that case. alternative might embody a judgment Choice of this

that much of the rise in rates of a more In

was in liquidity premiums or resulted from perceptions

aggressive Fed rather than a persisting shift in aggregate demand. addition. the continued downtrend in consumer prices and in labor costs may suggest the possibility of greater slack than in the staff

-5

forecast happened steeper

and little repeatedly trajectory

risk in delaying in recent for policy years. action Holding

action. markets than

In effect. may have

as has in a to foster percent

built needed

is actually funds

the Committee's for a time measured rates would

objectives. send path

federal

at 3-l/4 was

a signal

that the

Committee

on a more interest the inflathought over time

firming

than the market While

had assumed might

and real

should

decrease.

questions

be raised

about

intentions tion,

of the Committee economy were

and its commitment in fact on the more

to containing moderate path

if the

consistent would yields quiet

with

the choice

of alternative

B, data

emerging

inflation

expectations

and allow

nominal

as well

as real

to decline. If, on the other hand. the Committee tightening quite saw the would risks as skewed for. staff

toward Judgment

greater that

inflation. the remaining

additional slack was

be called as in the

limited.

forecast, pressures were

might

suggest

that

the costs,

in terms

of building surge

inflation in demand of

and inflation than

expectations,

of an unexpected In the demand rates rates

greater

the penalty

for a shortfall. strong aggregate

context

generous tinct low,

credit

availability. so long

might

be a disquite real

possibility especially rates In this

as real short-rem to raise those

were

still

if the failure as well. case,

pulled

down

long-term

the question the federal point increase

would funds

remain rate

as to how much

to

firm--whether An immediate kets at this

to raise 25 basis time.

25 or 50 basis what is built would

points. into marmuch,

is about rates

Other

interest

probably action

not move

at least decreases

initially,

if this more rates

limited still

were

taken,

though time.

in long-term

would

be quite

likely

over

The risk of an outsized

reaction

in markets

is small.

and.

in fact,

behaving in a steady. predictable fashion may erode some of the expectations of a steep trajectory of Federal Reserve firming over coming months. This option might be especially favored if there were sig-

nificant uncertainty about the strength of demand going forward. the level of long-term rates consistent with containing inflation, and

hence about the need for more decisive action in reserve markets. HOWeVer. a 25 basis point move would leave in place expectations of another action in the near term and the uncertainty about its timing. C, is a If the

A full 50 basis point firming, as under alternative higher-risk option. with the potential for greater rewards.

Committee were convinced that a 50 basis point increase were needed, and fairly soon. to contain inflation pressures or to reduce them

further if that were your objective, there might be little advantage to doing it in two steps. Because it would surprise markets, their Bond rates are more likely to go up

reaction is difficult to predict. than down. at least initially.

HOWeVer. if it were perceived as the

last move for a while. simply bringing forward in time actions expected fairly soon in any case, the more decisive action of this option might have a calming influence, and it should damp any emerging inflationary expectations. Accompanying the action with words that

suggested the Federal Reserve had returned to a posture of "watchful waiting" for a time might help to temper market reaction. regard, if the Committee favored something like alternative In that C. con-

sideration might be given as to whether a 50 basis point increase ought to be accomplished through Board approval of a discount rate hike. That would give a natural forum for explaining the Federal if the Committee wished to

Reserve's intentions and expectations,

avoid reinforcing the precedent of explaining changes in policy brought about through open market operations. There is some risk of a

7-

further sharp market response to alternative C if unanticipated

action

were read as indicating that the Federal Reserve was even more concerned about inflation and prepared to continue tightening faster than previously expected. Suggesting that short-term rates might not need to change for a while after implementing alternative C would be easier if you could have some confidence that they were then close to their "neutral" or natural level--consistent with the economy growing at its potential.

Surely they are below that level now. but how close another 25 or 50 basis points would bring them is hard to say. The neutral level of

short-term rates is very much a moving target. depending on the other forces acting on the economy. including the level of intermediatelong-term rates. absent a good indication of inflation MOt-eovt?r. and

expectations,it may be difficult to determine the level of real rates. By almost any measure. inflation and inflation expectations have come down over the last year. so that even before the February 4 action real short-term rates probably were rising. If I use as a first

approximation the lagging 12-month CPI. the real funds rate is around 3/4 percent right now. though under the staff forecast it would fall as increasing energy prices pushed up overall inflation. From 1954

(when the fed funds series begins) through 1993. the average was l-3/4 percent, suggesting a neutral funds rate of 4-l/2 percent plus if inflation and inflation expectations level out near 3 percent. An

interesting subperiod is 1954 to 1965, which excludes the inflation of the 1970s and fiscal expansion of the 1980s. For this period, the A 50 basis

average real funds rate is a little over l-l/4 percent.

point increase in the federal funds rate would bring real short-term rates close to their 1954 to 1965 average. -tures Of course. market strucsince then. and

and relationships have changed considerably

inflation of the that tion

expectations 12 months.

are probably

in excess

of the measured you may

CPI

rate

last

But such measures the next

suggest

not have if infla-

far to go beyond remains subdued.

few tightenings.

especially