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CRUZ VS TUASON AND CO FACTS On the case at hand is an appeal from the order dismissing the complaint of appellant Cruz for the recovery of improvements he has made on appellees' land and to compel appellees to convey to him 3,000 square meters of land By virtue of an agreement arrived at in 1948 by the plaintiff and the Deudors, the former assisted the latter in clearing, improving, subdividing and selling the large tract of land consisting of 50 quinones covered by the informacion posesoria in the name of the late Telesforo Deudor and incurred expenses. the tract of land supposedly improved by the plaintiff had been registered way back in 1914 in the name of the predecessors-in-interest of defendant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Then in 1952, defendants approached plaintiff and asked him to prevail upon the Deudors to enter into a compromise agreement with them regarding a civil cases. Defendants promised and agreed to cede, transfer and convey to plaintiff 3k sqm. of land in consideration of certain services to be rendered to them to them. The condition was that the plaintiff succeed in convincing the DEUDORS to enter into a compromise agreement and that such agreement be actually entered into by and between the DEUDORS and defendant. Plaintiff acted as an emissary in conveying both parties’ respective proposals and counter proposals. A compromise was later entered into by the Deudors and the defendants. Since the defendants were the ones who were benefiting from the improvements he made on the Deudor’s property, plaintiff then filed an action for reimbursement. The second cause of action deals with the 3,000 sq. ms. which defendants have agreed to transfer into Plaintiff for services rendered in effecting the compromise between the Deudors and defendants. the claim for sum of money was dismissed and motion for reconsideration was susequently denied. Hence, the appeal. Held: Appeal denied. WON there was a quasi-contract between appellant and appellees? NO A presumed qauasi-contract cannot emerge as against one party when the subject mater thereof is already covered by an existing contract with another party. Predicated on the principle that no one should be allowed to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another, Article 2124 creates the legal fiction of a quasi-contract precisely because of the absence of any actual agreement between the parties concerned. Corollarily, if the one who claims having enriched somebody has done so pursuant to a contract with a third party, his cause of action should be against the latter, who in turn may, if there is any ground therefor, seek relief against the party benefited. It is essential that the act by which the defendant is benefited must have been voluntary and unilateral on the part of the plaintiff. As one distinguished civilian puts it, "The act is voluntary. because the actor in quasi-contracts is not bound by any pre-existing obligation to act. It is unilateral, because it arises from the sole will of the actor who is not previously bound by any reciprocal or bilateral agreement. The reason why the law creates a juridical relations and imposes certain obligation is to prevent a situation where a person is able to benefit or take advantage of such lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts at the expense of said actor." (Ambrosio Padilla, Civil Law, Vol. VI, p. 748, 1969 ed.) In the case at bar, since appellant has a clearer and more direct recourse against the Deudors with whom he had entered into an agreement regarding the improvements and expenditures made by him on the land of appellees. it Cannot be said, in the sense contemplated in Article 2142, that appellees have been enriched at the expense of appellant.
) Even should it be held that the said consent was granted subsequently to the sale. the sale of the said property made by Duran to Gutierrez Hermanos was indeed null and void in the beginning. It having been proven at the trial that he gave his consent to the said sale. which was registered in his name in the property registry and that he had not executed any written power of attorney to Jose Duran. power of agency upon his nephew Duran. RATIO Article 1259 of the Civil Code"No one can contract in the name of another without being authorized by him or without his legal representation according to law. GUTIERREZ HERMANOS (firm). 1888 and 1892. A contract executed in the name of another by one who has neither his authorization nor legal representation shall be void. a nephew of the defendant. Duran reserved the right to repurchase it for the same price within a period of four years. ISSUE WON the defendant is liable for the sale done by his nephew? HELD YES. Orense's ratification produced the effect of an express authorization to make the said sale. plaintiff-appellee. (Civil Code. ENGRACIO ORENSE. or at least implied. The principal must therefore fulfill all the obligations contracted by the agent. defendant-appellant FACTS The defendant Orense had been the owner of a parcel of land. who acted within the scope of his authority. executed before a notary. as they are a full ratification of the acts executed by his nephew Jose Duran. meet the requirements of the law and legally excuse the lack of written authority. wherein he affirmed that he had given his consent to the sale of his property. Defendant’s refusal was based on the allegations that he had been and was then the owner of the said property.) The repeated and successive statements made by the defendant Orense in two actions. they produce the effects of an express power of agency. arts. (Civil Code. Hence.5. nor had he given the latter any verbal authorization to sell the said property to the plaintiff firm in his name. Plaintiff then filed a complaint praying that the defendant Orense be compelled to execute a deed for the transfer and conveyance to the plaintiff company of all the rights. vs. situated in Albay. 1709. and. Previous judgment affirmed. He replied that he had. the plaintiff has still not gotten possession of the property because Orense and Duran continued occupying it by virtue of a contract of lease executed by the plaintiff to Duran. At the trial. After the lapse of the four years stipulated for the redemption. arts. a document whereby he sold and conveyed the property to the plaintiff. The said property has up to date been recorded in the new property registry in the name of the defendant. unless it should be ratified by the person in whose name it was executed before being revoked by the other contracting party. Since then. 1710 and 1727. . However. with the buildings and improvements thereon. Plaintiff charged Jose Duran with estafa. it became perfectly valid and cured of the defect of nullity it bore at its execution by the confirmation solemnly made by the said owner upon his stating under oath to the judge that he himself consented to his nephew Jose Duran's making the said sale. the defendant refused to deliver the property to the purchaser and to pay the rental for its use and occupation when the period for its repurchase terminated. it follows that the defendant conferred verbal. who accepted it in the same way by selling the said property. Orense was called as a witness and was asked whether he and consented to Duran's selling the said property under right of redemption to the firm of Gutierrez Hermanos. Defendant sentenced to make immediate delivery of the property in question and to transfer the rights to plaintiff. thus Duran was acquitted. Jose Duran.
and notorious possession of the property for the period required by law. dismissed case. remitted money to petitioner for items they have purchased. as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership. . 1456 of the Civil Code states that “ If property is acquired through mistake or fraud. ART. subject to his right to collect reimbursement from the remaining co-owners. vs.” * Prescription. NO. MANUFACTURERS HANOVER & TRUST CORPORATION and COURT OF APPEALS. and (4) he has been in possession through open. shouldering the expenses therefore. (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners. using the name "Irene's Wearing Apparel. However. respondents FACTS Petitioner. exclusive. It does not give to the redeeming co-owner the right to the entire property. by force of law. Failure on the part of all the co-owners to redeem it entitles the vendee a retro to retain the property and consolidate title thereto in his name. Felisa Alzul married twice and had children. continuous. After her death. that did not make him the owner of all of it. the person obtaining it is. ISSUE WOM a co-owner acquire exclusive ownership over the property held in common? HELD. The act of repudiation. From her first marriage came defendant and from the second marriage came the plaintiffs. He was able to secure the title in his name alone. Felisa Alzul sold the lot to a third party in pacto de retro. ANDRES. the period of repurchase being 3 years. While the records show that the petitioner redeemed the property in its entirety. she died in without being able to redeem the lot. (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive. DOMETILA M. ADILLE VS CA FACTS The land in question belonged to the mother of the parties. and therefore. must have been preceded by repudiation (of the coownership).6. but during the period of redemption." was engaged in the manufacture of apparel and linens for local and foreign buyers. by way of certiorari. he was not a trustee. Necessary expenses may be incurred by one co-owner. Petition denied. The petitioner must then be said to be a trustee of the property on behalf of the private respondents. The redemption by one co-heir/co-owner of the property in its totality does not vest in him ownership over it. The trial Judge sustained defendant in his position that he was and became absolute owner. Court of appeals reversed the trial Court’s decision to which the petitioner now appeals. considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. It does not provide for a mode of terminating a co-ownership. RATIO The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with aspect to his share alone. in turn is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership. defendant repurchased the lot by himself alone and executed a deed of extra-judicial partition representing himself to be the only heir and child of his mother. 7. Among its foreign buyers was FACETS of US who from time to time." petitioner. His half-brothers and sisters then filed case for partition with accounting on the position that he was only a trustee on an implied trust when he redeemed the lot. doing business under the name "IRENE'S WEARING APPAREL.
00 through PNB. FACETS informed private respondent about the delay and at the same time amended its instruction by asking it to effect the payment through PCIB (the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank) instead of PNB. . there being no contractual relation between them. Private respondent was also unaware that petitioner had already received the remittance from PNB instructed the PCIB to pay $10. That there was a mistake in the second remittance is borne out by the fact that both remittances have the same reference invoice number.S. the payment was not effected immediately because of technicalities thus private respondent sent another telex. Hence. Petitioner then received the remittance. of Ordinance No. CITY OF MANILA AND MARCELO SARMIENTO. Acting pursuant to the provisions of Sec. Private respondent asked petitioner for the return of the second remittance but petitioner refused. as City Treasurer of Manila. 3364. and. Unaware that petitioner had already received the remittance. CA reversed the RTC decision. the obligation to return it arises.000.” This is one of the concrete manifestations of the ancient principle that no one shall enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another. (2) that payment was made by reason of an essential mistake of fact".00 to petitioner. Also. plaintiff-appelle. The contract of petitioner. and it was unduly delivered through mistake. group II. defendants-appellants FACTS Plaintiff is engaged in manufacturing and selling all kinds of furniture while defendant was then the City Treasurer of Manila. all of which assessments plaintiff paid without protest in the erroneous belief that it was liable therefore. vs. hence the appeal.. 1. 4-5). RATIO According to Art. petitioner received a second remittance. A complaint was filed with the RTC. as regards the sale of garments and other textile products. GONZALO PUYAT & SONS. Private respondent was able to send a telex to PNB to pay petitioner $10. 2154 of the Civil Code “If something received when there is no right to demand it. where petitioner had an account. INC. the ordinance which ordered plaintiff to pay dealer’s tax was apparently exempts the plaintiff from payment of taxes. Since private respondent was not a party to the contract of sale between petitioner and FACETS. defendant assessed from plaintiff retail dealer's tax corresponding to the quarters corresponding to the first Quarter of 1950 up to the third Quarter of 1956 on the sales of furniture manufactured and sold by it at its factory site. plaintiff-appellant made the second remittance on the wrong assumption that defendant-appellee did not receive the first remittance 8. who decided in favor of the petitione. U. pp. However. FNSB then instructed private respondent MANTRUST (Manufacturers Hanover and Trust Corporation) to effect the transfer through its facilities and to charge the amount to the account of FNSB with private respondent. CA decision affirmed. New Jersey.FACETS instructed the FNSB (First National State Bank of New Jersey.A) to transfer $10.00 to petitioner via PNB. Newark. petitioner has no right to apply the second remittance delivered by mistake by private respondent to the outstanding account of FACETS. was with FACETS. HELD YES. For this article to apply the following requisites must concur: "(1) that he who paid was not under obligation to do so.000. ISSUE WON the private respondent has the right to recover the second remittance it had delivered to petitioner. Petition denied.000. It was the latter and not private respondent which was indebted to petitioner.
control. RATIO From the reply of appellant City Treasurer. The land in question belongs to the plaintiff. Lastly. ISSUE WON plaintiff-appellee is entitled to the refund of the retail taxes in question? HELD YES. "If the payer was in doubt whether the debt was due. and thus spent on its repairs. only payments made on or after October 30. The Philippine Government made representations with the Office Alien Property Custodian for the use of property by the Government. acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal grounds. Under this circumstance. the land was acquired by a Japanese corporation by the name of Taiwan Tekkosho. that knowing it has no right at all to collect or to receive money for alleged taxes paid by mistake. in whose name the title was registered before the war.When plaintiff filed with defendant City Treasurer of Manila. that they were due. 2156. at the very start. On January 4. shall return the same to him"(Art. during the Japanese military occupation. or any other means. defendant refused to give back the amount. the Alien Property Custodian of the United States of America took possession. but on the erronoues belief. NCC). to December 14. it would seem clear that the taxes collected from appellee were paid. 2125. the amount paid. According to Art. therefore. With this admission. apply to the admitted facts of the case.. "Every person who through an act or performance by another. However. Appellee had duly proved that taxes were not lawfully due. 2154. No one should enrich itself unjustly at the expense of another (Art. During the year 1946 the property was occupied by the Copra Export Management Company under a custodianship agreement with United States Alien Property Custodianand when it vacated the property it was occupied by the defendant herein. protest is not required as a condition sine qua non for its application. the obligationto retun it arises" Also. he may recover if he proves that it was not due" (Art. being a case of solutio indebiti. Civil Code). the payment was not voluntarily made. After liberation. 1950 can be refunded. defendant appeals from the judgement holding him liable for rentals or compensation for the use and occupation of the property from the middle of August. and it was unduly delivered through mistake. In 1948. thru an error or mistake. 1948."If something is received when there is no right to demand it. notwithstanding the Ordinance imposing the Retailer's Tax. since the action has already prescribed. There is. . NCC. even without protest is recoverable. Civil Code). It would seems unedifying for the government. The title was then issued in its name. The appellant City of Manila. had no right to demand payment thereof. and custody of the land through section 12 of the Trading with the Enemy Act. a formal request for refund of the retail dealer's taxes unduly paid. sales of manufactured products at the factory site are not taxable either under the Wholesalers Ordinance or under the Retailers' Ordinance. the new Civil Code. 9. which places said act of payment within the pale of the new Civil Code provision on solutio indebiti. no doubt that the provisions of solutio indebtiti. 1943. The defendant was authorized to repair the warehouse on the land. SAGRADA ORDEN VS NACOCO In the case at bar. 22. 1946. (here the City of Manila). it would be reluctant to return the same. defendant leased one-third of the warehouse.
1946. 1949. The present action is to recover the reasonable rentals from August. While driving the car around. such that the Alien Property Custodian or its permittee (defendant-appellant) may be held responsible for the supposed illegality of the occupation of the property by the said Taiwan Tekkosho. Spanish Civil Code. There was also no privity (of contract or obligation) between the Alien Property Custodian and the Taiwan Tekkosho. 1946. with power to dispose of it by sale or otherwise. is hereby reversed. who was a duly licensed security service agency. 10. a security guard on duty under the said security service agency brought out and drove a car belonging to one of the customers of the plaintiff. on April 5. The Allien Property Administration had the control and administration of the property not as successor to the interests of the enemy holder of the title. to the late of judgment on February 28. to the date it vacated it. to February 28. but a trustee of then Government of the United States. or negligence. must arise from any of the four sources of obligations. 1946. Plaintiff employed the services of the defendant-appelle. crime. It interposes the defense that it occupied the property in good faith. Plaintiff filed a complaint of qualified . the date when the defendant began to occupy the premises. law. defendant-appellee was to protect the business premises of plaintiff from theft. Defendant resists the claim prior to the judgement. hence the appeal. Pursuant to the agreement the court rendered judgment releasing the defendant and the intervenor from liability. but by express provision of law which was Trading with the Enemy Act of the United States. However. but reversing to the plaintiff the right to recover from the National Coconut Corporation reasonable rentals for the use and occupation of the premises. He then brought an action in the CFI Manila to annul the sale of property of Taiwan Tekkosho. the security guard lost control of the car causing it to fall into a ditch. Lastly. (Article 1089. From August. the plaintiff-appellee herein.) Here. WON THE DEFENDANT IS LIABLE TO PAY RENTALS TO THE PLAINTIFF? NO If defendant-appellant is liable at all. Neither is it a trustee of the former owner. pilferage. which sentences defendant-appellant to pay rentals from August. vandalism and all other unlawful acts of any person. Judgement was rendered in favor of the plantiff. contract or quasi-contract. 1948. 1970.Plaintiff made claim to the property before the Alien Property Custodian of the United States but was denied. namley. the Taiwan Tekkosho. Defendant was ordered to pay the rentals. Allien Property Administration had the absolute control of the property as trustee of the Government of the United States. HELD: the part of the judgment appealed from. The existence of an implied agreement to that effect is contrary to the circumstances. Nor has the previous occupants paid rentals for the land’s occupancy. when defendant-appellant took possession. as though it were the absolute owner. without the consent of herein plaintiff. The case did not come for trial because the parties presented a joint petition. PEOPLE’S CAR VS COMMANDO SECURITY appeal from the adverse judgment of the Davao court of first instance limiting amount of plaintiff-appellant's recovery under its complaint. under no obligation whatsoever to pay rentals for the use and occupation of the warehouse. its obligations. robbery. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed. defendantappellant is not guilty of any offense or of any negligence. and to recover its possession. There was no agreement between the Alien Property Custodian and the defendant-appellant for the latter to pay rentals on the property.
theft against the security guard. As plaintiff had duly discharged its liability to the third party.00) pesos per guard post" under paragraph 4 of their contract. His body at once rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving car.000. which limits defendant's liability for the amount of loss or damage to any property of plaintiff to "P1.10 for the damages on the car and for the rental of a new car for temporary use of the owner of the car. and as the railroad station was lighted dimly by a single light located some distance away. as the train slowed down but still proceeded further. the plaintiff was descending the train when one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform. Hence. Judgment was rendered in favor of defendant. that its liability "shall not exceed one thousand (P1. Plaintiff claimed that defendant was liable for the entire amount under paragraph 5 of their contract whereunder defendant assumed "sole responsibility for the acts done during their watch hours" by its guards.489. It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly six meters before it came to a full stop. which involve neither property of plaintiff that has been lost or damaged at its premises nor mere negligence of defendant's security guard on duty. Hence." 11 CANGCO VS MRR Plaintiff was then employed in the Manila Railroad Company as a clerk. With a pass supplied by the company. where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. the appeal. Civil Code. defendant contended. Joseph Luy.00 per guard post. defendant in turn was clearly liable under the terms of paragraph 5 of their contract to indemnify plaintiff in the same amount. "obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith. In the CFI Manila. he was entitled to ride upon the company's trains free of charge. HELD judgment appealed from is hereby reversed WON THE DEFENDANT IS LIABLE TO indemnify plaintiff for the entire damages thus incurred? YES Paragraph 4 of the contract. The plaintiff was brought to a hospital an examination was made and his arm was amputated.000." is by its own terms applicable only for loss or damage 'through the negligence of its guards. nevertheless. defendant's own guard on duty unlawfully and wrongfully drove out of plaintiffs premises a customer's car. Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the defendant company because although negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and from the cars. . without questioning the amount of the actual damages incurred by plaintiff. finding him liable to the plaintiff in the amount of 1k.10. the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded form recovering. for the undisputed damages of P8. its customer. thereby directly causing plaintiff to incur actual damages in the total amount of P8. objects on the platform where the accident occurred were difficult to discern especially to a person emerging from a lighted car. due to the wanton and unlawful act of defendant's guard. Plaintiff had to pay A TOTAL OF P8. HELD: THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT IS REVERSED. Defendant is therefore undoubtedly liable to indemnify plaintiff for the entire damages thus incurred.489. lost control of it on the highway causing it to fall into a ditch. On the day in question. The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark night. Said paragraph is manifestly inapplicable to the stipulated facts of record. plaintiff instituted an action for damages against MRR founding his action upon the negligence of the servants and employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons where they could be a menace to the security of the passengers. Here.489. plaintiff appealed. As ordained in Article 1159.10 caused said customer.
being contractual. which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and supervision. therefore. a suing creditor should assume the burden of proof of its existence. But. and its non-performance could not be excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable to defendant's servants. It is. or both. but only to extracontractual obligations — or to use the technical form of expression. There is always an act or omission productive of damage due to carelessness or inattention on the part of the defendant. But where relations already formed give rise to duties. while on the contrary. . which imposes upon all persons who by their fault or negligence. and consequently. and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises. from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. whether negligence occurs an incident in the course of the performance of a contractual undertaking or its itself the source of an extra-contractual undertaking obligation. as the only fact upon which his action is based. that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual. important to ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of negligence. . or in supervision over him after the selection. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family. the obligation of making good the damage caused. he is not liable for the acts of the latter. do injury to another. if at all. the duty to carry him in safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (civil code. whatever done within the scope of his employment or not. That duty. whether springing from contract or quasi-contract. . As a general rule . in a case of negligence which presupposes the existence of a contractual obligation. The liability of the master is personal and direct. may be rebutted. it is not necessary for him to prove negligence. and (2) that that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure. in article 1902 of the Civil Code. The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it. its essential characteristics are identical. while acting within the scope of his employment causes the injury.WON the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage. if the damage done by the servant does not amount to a breach of the contract between the master and the person injured. the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code. if the master has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in the selection and direction of the servant. if the creditor shows that it exists and that it has been broken. was the cause of it. Under the doctrine of comparative negligence announced in the Rakes case ( supra). the damages should be apportioned. that the liability created by article 1903 is imposed by reason of the breach of the duties inherent in the special relations of authority or superiority existing between the person called upon to repair the damage and the one who. by implication. The acts to which these articles [1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code] are applicable are understood to be those not growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability. said: From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in selection of the servant or employee. The obligation to make good the damage arises at the very instant that the unskillful servant. article 1903 of the Civil Code. was direct and immediate. if the accident was caused by plaintiff's own negligence. it is logical that in case of extra-contractual culpa. In the Rakes case (supra) the decision of this court was made to rest squarely upon the proposition that article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to acts of negligence which constitute the breach of a contract. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu. no liability is imposed upon defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to his injury. article 1258). by his act or omission.
1awph!l. whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly — the age. At the time of the collision. or dimly lighted. we may say that the test is this. There is no reason to believe that plaintiff would have suffered any injury whatever in alighting as he did had it not been for defendant's negligent failure to perform its duty to provide a safe alighting place. defendants-appellants a passenger truck and an automobile of private ownership collided while attempting to pass each other along a bridge. Thousands of person alight from trains under these conditions every day of the year. Our conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.net As the case now before us presents itself. as we find. 12 NARCISO GUTIERREZ. a passenger of the truck." (Thompson. and should be considered. The place. MANUEL GUTIERREZ. and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger. not the care which may or should be used by the prudent man generally. MARIA V. This care has been defined to be.) the mode of exposition used by this court in Picart vs. is that of ordinary or reasonable care. of the age. in the absence of some circumstance to warn him to the contrary. was dark. The private automobile was then driven by Bonifacio Guttierez. but the care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances. In this particular instance. sec. as we have already stated. 3. that the train was barely moving when plaintiff alighted is shown conclusively by the fact that it came to stop within six meters from the place where he stepped from it. the plaintiff had a right to assume. Was there anything in the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff at the time he alighted from the train which would have admonished a person of average prudence that to get off the train under the conditions then existing was dangerous? If so. and SATURNINO CORTEZ. ABELARDO VELASCO. In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act — that is to say. We are of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is that expressed in Thompson's work on Negligence (vol. Bonifacios’s father was not in the car but his mother and six other relatives were with him in it. and as the defendant was bound by reason of its duty as a public carrier to afford to its passengers facilities for safe egress from its trains. that the platform was clear. It is to be considered whether an ordinarily prudent person.. In considering the situation thus presented. sex and condition of the passenger. an 18 year old boy but was owned by his parents. and sustain no injury where the company has kept its platform free from dangerous obstructions. to avoid injury. it should not be overlooked that the plaintiff was. The truck was owned by Saturnino Cortez and was then being driven by a chauffeur named Abelardo Velasco. The collision between the 2 vehicles injured plaintiff Narcisso Gutierrez. vs. . 3010. and his failure so to desist was contributory negligence. would have acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence. for if it were by any possibility concede that it had right to pile these sacks in the path of alighting passengers. BONIFACIO GUTIERREZ. 3010) as follows: The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in attempting to alight from a moving railway train. the only fact from which a conclusion can be drawn to the effect that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence is that he stepped off the car without being able to discern clearly the condition of the platform and while the train was yet slowly moving. sec. vol. plaintiff-appellee. 809). the plaintiff should have desisted from alighting. and this also is proof of a failure upon the part of the defendant in the performance of a duty owing by it to the plaintiff. Commentaries on Negligence. the placing of them adequately so that their presence would be revealed. sex. Smith (37 Phil. rep. 3. ignorant of the fact that the obstruction which was caused by the sacks of melons piled on the platform existed. DE GUTIERREZ.
and Saturnino Cortez. de Palanca refused to be appointed as administratrix and apparently. 1952. [George Pay] at his office at the China Banking Corporation the sum of [Twenty Six Thousand Nine Hundred Pesos] (P26. 91 Atl. whom he designates or permits to run it. more than fifteen years after the execution of the promissory note on January 30. it is uniformly held that the head of a house. defendants Manuel Gutierrez. the father alone and not the minor or the mother.900. that of contract. the late Justo Palanca and Rosa Gonzales Vda. jointly and severally are for the damages to the plaintiff. be appointed as administratrix of a certain piece of residential property. the petition was filed. de Carlos Palanca executed a promissory note which read : “we [jointly and severally promise to] pay to Mr. would be liable for the damages caused by the minor. and of his chauffeur Abelardo Velasco rests on a different basis. The judgement was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. Abelardo Velasco. Based on these facts.. Missell vs. HELD: LOWER COURT DECISION AFFIRMED WON BECAUSE OF THE WORDS ‘UPON DEMAND’ ON THE PROMISSORY. where the car is occupied and being used at the time of the injury for the pleasure of other members of the owner's family than the child driving it. Pay. Petitioner informed that he does not insist on this provision but that he is only claiming on his right under the promissory note. What is undeniable is that on August 26. The theory of the law is that the running of the machine by a child to carry other members of the family is within the scope of the owner's business. the owner of the truck. However. 660. THE DEBT IS STILL DEMANDABLE EVEN AFTER 15 YEARS? NO There is nothing in the record that would indicate whether or not the first alternative in the promissorynoter was fulfilled. the late Justo Palanca. hence the appeal. the owner of an automobile. 13 PAY VS PALANCA Petitioner George Pay is a creditor of the Late Justo Palanca. . the surviving spouse of the late Justo Palanca. Segundina Chua Vda.00). HELD: judgment modified. Hayes . who maintains it for the general use of his family is liable for its negligent operation by one of his children.The plaintiff then brought an action against the defendants to recover damages in the amount of P10. with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum upon receipt by either of the undersigned of cash payment from the Estate of the late Don Carlos Palanca or upon demand'. The Court has inquired whether any cash payment has been received by either of the signers of this promissory note from the Estate of the late Carlos Palanca. 6th ed.) The liability of Saturnino Cortez. can then file his claim against the administratrix.000. 1952. His reasoning is that once the said property is brought under administration. pursuant to the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code. for physical injuries suffered as a result of an automobile accident. namely. the appeal. The guaranty given by the father at the time the son was granted a license to operate motor vehicles made the father responsible for the acts of his son. so that he is liable for the negligence of the child because of the relationship of master and servant.. WON THE FATHER ALONE WOULD BE LIABLE FOR THE DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE MINOR? YES. Hence. George Pay goes to the court and asks that Segundina Chua vda. de Palanca. the property sought to be administered no longer belonged to the debtor. sec. 322. Fifteen years later. as creditor. On January 30. 1967. In the United States. (Huddy On Automobiles. The claim was dismissed because the action of the creditor has already prescribed.
The contract stipulated that the steel tanks were to be delivered within 3-4 months. — This is not guaranteed. and the defendant denied the allegations and the good condition of the goods. is demandable at once. who was the manager of herein defendant.) And as the export of the machinery in question was contingent upon the sellers obtaining certificate of priority and permission of the United States Government. plainitiff and defendant entered into a contract wherein plaintiff would sell 2 steel tanks. the motors.. strikes or other causes known as "Force Majeure" entirely beyond the control of the sellers or their representatives. WON under the contracts entered into and the circumstances established in the record. (referring to pure and conditional obligations). which fact was known to the parties.. as a matter of fact. which is based on Section 43 of Act No. For again. subject to the United States Government requirements and also subject to confirmation of manufactures. The intervenor. Article 1179 of the Civil Code provides: "Every obligation whose performance does not depend upon a future or uncertain event. defendant-appellant In August 1918. Civ. we cannot but conclude that the term which the parties attempted to fix is so uncertain that one cannot tell just whether. what was stipulated was "Approximate delivery within ninety days. it would appear that the filing of the suit after fifteen years was much too late. The plaintiff notified the defendant of the arrival of the goods and their good condition. but the defendant refused to receive and pay for it. its obligation to bring the goods in question to Manila? YES OR WON the condition of the contract ws dependent upon chance or upon will of third persons? YES From the record it appears that these contracts were executed at the time of the world war when there existed rigid restrictions on the export from the United States of articles like the machinery in question. also claimed that his business of manufacturing coconut oil sustained damages because of the delay of the goods. or upon a past event unknown to the parties. The lower court absolved the defendants regarding the sale of the tanks and the motors but ordered them to receive and pay for the expellers. and 2 electric motors to the defendant. 1125. within September or as soon as possible. Defendant ordered to accept and pay for the goods delivered. the prescriptive period for a written contract is that of ten years. vs. Considering these contracts in the light of the civil law. — This sale is subject to our being able to obtain Priority Certificate. At the time of the execution of the contracts. with additional interest. the obligations must be regarded as conditional. " In all these contracts. BELL & CO. there is a final clause that says: The sellers are not responsible for delays caused by fires. LTD. according to the Civil Code. nor of the fact that the other foreseen circumstances therein stated might prevent it. Code. as well as railroad. 14 SMITH. and maritime. in April 1919. Plaintiff brought a suit against the defendant. hence clauses were inserted in the contracts. transportation was difficult. If that is the case. in October 1918." The obligation being due and demandable. The goods arrived in the following order: the expellers. 190. VICENTE SOTELO MATTI. in due time. riots on land or on the sea. plaintiff-appellant. as we think it is. HELD: Judgement modified. (Art. the parties were not unmindful of the contingency of the United States Government not allowing the export of the goods. as well as to railroad . in Febuary 1919 the tanks. and as for the motors. the expellers. 2 expellers. the plaintiff has fulfilled. subject to the rules and regulations. Both parties appealed from the judgment. motors. those articles could be brought to Manila or not. the obligation is conditional and shall be governed by the rules of the next preceding section. If the uncertainty should consist in the arrival or non-arrival of the day.
upon a month-to-month basis for the monthly rental of P35. The plaintiff sent the defendant a formal letter asking that the missing parts be returned. vs MFRUCTUOSO GONZALES. plaintiff-appellee. a portable typewriter for routine cleaning and servicing. the plaintiff asked for the return of the typewriter. 15 ROSENDO O. defendants-appellants. but impliedly covered. plaintiff notified the defendants to vacate the said house because he needed to use it as his office. a typewriter repair man.95 WON IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE PLAINTIFF TO HAVE FIRST FILED A petition for the court to fix the period? NO Where the defendant virtually admitted non-performance by returning the typewriter he was obliged to repair in a nonworking condition. with essential parts. HELD: JUDGMENT AFFIRMED . to which plaintiff agreed. defendants still continued inhabiting the house which thus led to the plaintiff filing a case against them. THE repair cost 89. the appeal. he cannot invoke Article 1137 of the Civil Code. 1945. HELD: JUDGEMENT MODIFIED. Judgement was ordered in favor or plaintiff but he appealed because he was unsatisfied with the amount of the damages awarded to him. The fixing of a period would thus be a mere formality and would serve no purpose than to delay. by the Civil Code. In cases like this. missing. defendant-appellee the plaintiff delivered to the defendant. JACINTA BALDOMAR. and there being a breach of contract by non-performance. 16 VICENTE SINGSON ENCARNACION. At the time of the case. plaintiff leased a house to defendant Jacinta Baldomar and her son. plaintiff filed an action in court demanding certain amounts for damages from the defendant. the plaintiff had the typewriter repaired by a different repair man. even if the condition has not been fulfilled in reality. defendant still was not able to finish the job. the defendants were in arrears for the payment of the house. the obligor will be deemed to have sufficiently performed his part of the obligation. ET AL. Defendant asked for 6P from the plaintiff and said that it was to be used for purchase of spare parts. Despite repeated demands from the plaintiff. The defendants claim that the contract which they had celebrated with plaintiff since the beginning authorized them to continue occupying the house indefinetly and while they should faithfully fulfill their obligations as respects the payment of the rentals. After a year.85 Then after another year. embargoes. DEFENDANT ORDERED TO PAY 89. The defendant returned some of the missing parts along with the P6. until defendants completely vacate the premises. Six years ago. plaintiff found the typewrite in shambles and that some parts were missing. but upon the will of third persons who could in no way be compelled to fulfill the condition. Hence. After Manila was liberated in the last war. plaintiff-appellant. then the delivery was subject to a condition the fulfillment of which depended not only upon the effort of the herein plaintiff. vs. Exasperated with the delay of the job. it was academic for the plaintiff to have first petitioned the court to fix a period for the performance of the contract before filing his complaint in this case. which are not expressly provided for. Upon reaching his house. court entered judgment for restitution and payment of rentals at the rate of P35 a month from May 1. if he has done all that was in his power. CHAVES. The time for compliance having evidently expired. Despite plaintiff’s repeated reminders..
plaintiffs-appellees. so long as defendants elected to continue the lease by continuing the payment of the rentals. deceased. agreed upon in the contract in question? NO Clause 3 begins as follows: "Mr. the lessees could effectively thwart his purpose if they should prefer to terminate the contract by the simple expedient of stopping payment of the rentals. pp. although the owner should desire the lease to continue." and provides that in this case the term shall be fixed by the courts." WON THERE WAS a conventional term. within the meaning of article 1256 of the Civil Code. completely depriving the owner of all say in the matter. 3d ed.) 17 DARIO AND GAUDENCIO ELEIZEGUI. representing the estate of JUSTINA SANTOS Y CANON FAUSTINO. 2. defendant-appellant JUSTINA SANTOS Y CANON FAUSTINO and her sister." The second clause of the contract provides as follows: "The rent of the said land is fixed at 25 pesos per month. it is understood to be for years when an annual rental has been fixed. the owner would never be able to discontinue it. The owners of the land undertake to maintain the club as tenant as long as the latter shall see fit. Williamson. for months when the rent is monthly. may terminate this lease whenever desired without other formality than that of giving a month's notice. 100. were owners of a parcel of land. Cuyugan vs. (Art. a Chinese had been a long-time lessee of a portion of the property and was paying a monthly rental. (8 Manresa. since the continuance and fulfillment of the contract would then depend solely and exclusively upon their free and uncontrolled choice between continuing paying the rentals or not. vs. conversely." In speaking in general of obligations with a term it has supplied the deficiency of the former law with respect to the "duration of the term when it has been left to the will of the debtor. of course. THE MANILA LAWN TENNIS CLUB. and is the debtor with respect to the obligations imposed by articles 1555 and 1561. or whoever may succeed him as secretary of said club.) In every contract. is prohibited by the aforesaid article of the Civil Code. and making such other improvement that might be considered desirable for the comfort and amusement of its members. as laid down by the authorities. vs. This. 1128. Defendant. This term it is which must be fixed by the courts. 627.WON THE DEFENDANTS’ CLAIM WAS TENABLE? NO the defense thus set up by defendant Lefrado Fernando would leave to the sole and exclusive will of one of the contracting parties (defendants in this case) the validity and fulfillment of the contract of lease. by erecting buildings of both permanent and temporary character. Wong Heng. deceased. . defendantappellant. 626. In the contract. in this contract of lease. 34 Phil. the lessee allowed to make improvements upon the land.. . and a debtor upon whom rests the obligation to perform the undertaking.. . a duration. plaintiff-appellant. Thus. sec. In bilateral contracts the contracting parties are mutually creditors and debtors. The case was about the lease of a piece of land for a fixed consideration and to endure at the will of the lessee. there is always a creditor who is entitled to demand the performance. 18 PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION. . Santos. If this defense were to be allowed. The term within which performance of the latter obligation is due is what has been left to the will of the debtor. LUI SHE in her own behalf and as administratrix of the intestate estate of Wong Heng. The theory which has prevailed regarding the term of the lease was that "When the term has not been fixed for the lease. Justina Santos later became the owner of the entire land as her sister died without an heir. the lessee is the creditor with respect to the rights enumerated in article 1554.
one extending the term of the lease to 99 years. she later executed two other contracts. During the appeal. HELD ACCORDINGLY. a businesswoman. The contract was later amended so as to make it cover the entire property. even if no term had been fixed in the agreement. had no other relatives and thus Wong Cheng became her trusted man to whom she delivered various amounts for safekeeping. 1308] of the Civil Code in our opinion creates no impediment to the insertion in a contract for personal service of a resolutory condition permitting the cancellation of the contract by one of the parties. Justina Santos was substituted by the PHILBANK and Wong Cheng was substituted by his wife. went to the house of Maria Ayroso and proposed to sell Ayroso. Indeed." Article 1256 [now art. the exercise of the option is as much in the fulfillment of the contract as any other act which may have been the subject of agreement. the land subject-matter of the contracts is ordered returned to the estate of Justina Santos as represented by the Philippine Banking Corporation. Claiming that the various contracts were made by her because of machinations and inducements practiced by him. This agreement was made in the presence of plaintiff's sister. the contracts in question are annulled and set aside. Justina Santos bade her legatees to respect the contracts she had entered into with Wong. Judgment was decided in favor of the plaintiff with the exception of one contract of lease. does not make either the validity or the fulfillment of the contract dependent upon the will of the party to whom is conceded the privilege of cancellation. . It appears. although the lessee was given the right to withdraw at any time from the agreement. Here. Bantug. for where the contracting parties have agreed that such option shall exist. a petition for which was then pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. however. Both parties appealed. but later appeared to have a change of heart.s tobacco. In grateful acknowledgment of the personal services of the lessee to her. hence the present action. as can be readily seen. this case would at most justify the fixing of a period5 but not the annulment of the contract. then already 90 years old. she now directed her executor to secure the annulment of the contracts. WON THE STIPULATION THAT THE LESSEE MAY WITHDRAW FROM THE LEASE ANYTIME.JUSTINA SANTOS. Ayroso agreed to the proposition.000 a month for the food of her dogs and the salaries of her maids. At any rate. the right of the lessee to continue the lease or to terminate it is so circumscribed by the term of the contract that it cannot be said that the continuance of the lease depends upon his will. Such a stipulation. Another contract was executed giving Wong the option to buy the leased premises payable within ten years at a monthly installment and conditioned on his obtaining Philippine citizenship. The court was asked to direct the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel the registration of the contracts. covering the portion then already leased to him and another portion of the land. IS A VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1308 OF THE CC? NO article 1308 of the Civil Code which provides that "the contract must bind both contracting parties. that this application for naturalization was withdrawn when it was discovered that he was not a resident of Rizal. The appellant was to receive the overprice for which she would sell the tobacco. the cancellation of a contract in accordance with conditions agreed upon beforehand is fulfillment." Justina Santos executed on a contract of lease in favor of Wong. its validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them. Salud G. an amount not exceeding P1. out of the rental due from him. 19 LIM VS PEOPLE Appellant. the collection of various amounts allegedly delivered on different occasions was sought. For his part Wong undertook to pay. and fixing the term of the option of 50 years. both parties died. The lease was for 50 years.
As no further amount was paid. Hence. and this was paid on three different times. Philippine Sugar Estates Development Co. Hence. The parties stipulated in the contract that the buyer will build on the said parcel of land thye Sto Domingo Church and Covenant while the seller for his parts will construct streets on the sides of the land so that it will be a block surrounded by streets on all 4 sides. Inc. Lower court later amended its decision giving Gregorio Araneta 2 years within which to comply with the obligation. hence the appeal. M. and particularly by her sister. the owner a land. answered the complaint saying that the action was premature since its obligation to construct the streets in question was without a definite period which needs to be fixed first by the court in a proper suit. Although the appellant denied that demands for payment were made upon her. Inc. Exhibit "A". she later wrote a letter to Bantug saying that she was still unable to pay the amounts demanded from her because she still had insufficient funds. Petitioner avers that the obligation does not fix a period. is hereby fixed at the date that all the squatters on affected areas are finally evicted therefrom. The tobacco was then loaded to the appellants jeep. Lower court denied motion for reconsideration and appellate court affirmed the judgment.00. that the obligation was immediately demandable as soon as the tobacco was disposed of.. Lower court decided in favor of defendants. that the proceeds of the sale of the tobacco should be turned over to the complainant as soon as the same was sold.. Tuason and Co. through Gregorio Araneta Inc. M. Appellant was found guilty of estafa.Salvador Bantug then drew a document wherein it was stipulated that the appellant has received the tobacco and was to give the proceeds of the tobacco as it was sold. WON THE OBLIGATION WAS IMMEDIATELY DEMANDABLE? It is clear in the agreement. defendants J. filed its complaint against J. and Gregorio Araneta. Pursuant to the letter.. The buyer was able to comply with his part of the deal but the seller was unable to finish constructing the streets because a third party refused to vacate the premises. seeking to compel the latter to comply with their obligation. Article 1197 of the New Civil Code. or. the petition for certiorari. Demands for the payment of the balance of the value of the tobacco were made upon the appellant by Ayroso. Of the total value of P799. Salud Bantug further testified that she had gone to the house of the appellant several times. the complainant filed a complaint against the appellant for estafa. . The law expressly prescribes that — the Court shall determine such period as may under the circumstances been probably contemplated by the parties. which provides that the courts may fix the duration of the obligation if it does not fix a period. and the time for the performance of the obligations of petitioner Gregorio Araneta.50. but the appellant often eluded her. Lt. 20 ARANETA VS PHIL SUGAR ESTATES JM Tuason and Co Inc. appellant paid the the amount of P240. but from its nature and the circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended in which case the only action that can be maintained is a petition to ask the court to fix the duration thereof HELD: PETITION DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT. Salud Bantug. does not apply. the appellant had paid to Ayroso only P240. WON THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN IMPOSING THE 2 YEARS COMPLIANCE PERIOD? NO paragraph of Article 1197 is clear that the period can not be set arbitrarily. sold a portion of the land to the Phil Sugar Estates Devt Co Ltd. HELD: decision appealed from is reversed. Inc. Tuason & Co.
the Court must then proceed to the second step. but must resort to legal processes in evicting the squatters. vs. in view of Mrs. but from its nature and the circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended. respondents. this is not warranted by the Civil Code As the parties must have known that they could not take the law into their own hands. ANTONIO CO and ELSA CO. married to Antonio Co. the trial Court appears to have pulled the two-year period set in its decision out of thin air. It must be recalled that Article 1197 of the Civil Code involves a two-step process. the lessor allegedly stated that the amount of monthly rentals could be resolved at a later time since "the matter is simple among us". So that. the lessor-petitioner agreed to rent out to the lessee a commercial establishment sometime during the last week of May 1980. 124) says in this respect is that "the proven facts precisely warrant the fixing of such a period. HELD: PETITION GRANTED. 4Another letter of demand was received from petitioner which thus prompted the spouses to file a complaint seeking to compel petitioner to renew the contract of lease. pars. but must set the time that the parties are shown to have intended. HAROLD M. as lessee. 21 PACIFICA MILLARE. PREVIOUS JUDGMENT ANNULED AND SET ASIDE WON ARTICLE 1197 OF THE CIVIL CODE IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR? NO Article 1197 of the Civil Code provides as follows: -If the obligation does not fix a period. prompting them to continue occupying the subject premises. Court of Instance of Abra. petitioner. This preliminary point settled." but from the nature and the circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended" (Art." a statement manifestly insufficient to explain how the two period given to petitioner herein was arrived at. Branch I. as contended by the petitioner Gregorio Araneta. they must have realized that the duration of the suits to be brought would not be under their control nor could the same be determined in advance. All that the trial court's amended decision (Rec. HERNANDO. ultimately. since no circumstances are mentioned to support it. In his capacity as Presiding Judge. 1 and 2). Second Judicial District. 3). which was taken by the spouses Co to mean that the Contract of Lease had been renewed. the courts may fix the duration thereof. p. The Court must first determine that "the obligation does not fix a period" (or that the period is made to depend upon the will of the debtor). on Appeal. par. Petitioners motion to dismiss was denied and she was ordered to renew the contract of lease.. Prohibition and Mandamus. which was scheduled to expire on 31 May 1980. HON. They also signified their intention to deposit the amount of rentals in court. Petitioner then filed an ejectment case against the spouses. seeking injunctive relief from the abovementioned orders. Inc. Millare's refusal to accept their counter-offer. 1197. the lessor informed them that they could continue leasing the People's Restaurant so long as they agreed to pay increased rentals to which a counteroffer was made by the spouses. Motion for recon was also denied hence the Petition for Certiorari. Plainly. As the record stands. and decide what period was "probably contemplated by the parties" (Do. the Court can not fix a period merely because in its opinion it is or should be reasonable. Petitioner later wrote a letter to the spouses asking them to vacate the premises saying she had no intention of renewing the contract. Under the written agreement. a five-year Contract of Lease 1was executed between petitioner Pacifica Millare as lessor and private respondent Elsa Co. . The conclusion is thus forced that the parties must have intended to defer the performance of the obligations under the contract until the squatters were duly evicted.
there was in fact no contract at all the period of which could have been fixed [P]arties cannot be coerced to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them as to the principal terms and conditions of the contract. a contract may be annulled if tainted by violence. under the circumstances. which had expired. . Freedom to stipulate such terms and conditions is of the essence of our contractual system. 1336. Here. Article 1197 applies only where a contract of lease clearly exists. since the Contract of Lease did in fact fix an original period of five years. Civil Code of the Philippines). the period cannot be changed by them. (Emphasis supplied. -In every case.-The courts shall also fix the duration of the period when it depends upon the will of the debtor. and by express provision of the statute. Most importantly.) The first paragraph of Article 1197 is clearly inapplicable. intimidation or undue influence (Article 1306. 1337. Once fixed by the courts. have been probably contemplated by the parties. the courts shall determine such period as may. The second paragraph of Article 1197 is equally clearly inapplicable since the duration of the renewal period was not left to the wiu of the lessee alone. the contract was not renewed at all. but rather to the will of both the lessor and the lessee. It is also clear from paragraph 13 of the Contract of Lease that the parties reserved to themselves the faculty of agreeing upon the period of the renewal contract.
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